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Iraq's Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil

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Iraq's Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775-3270 • Fax: 1 (202) 457-8746 Web: http://www.csis.org/burke Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] With the Assistance of Eric M. Brewer & Sara Bjerg Moller Rough Working Draft for Outside Comment Revised: June 22, 2006 Copyright CSIS, all rights reserved. All further dissemination and reproduction must be done with the written permission of the CSIS Cordesman: Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency 6/22/06 Page ii Executive Summary Later Coalition reporting has shown that the insurgency managed to increase the average number of weekly attacks during the period from around 470 in mid-2005 to 620 in May 2006, and succeeded in triggering a steady increase in civil violence and sectarian and ethnic conflict. While Coalition casualties averaged under 20 per day from the spring of 2005 to the spring of 2006, even a partial count of Iraqi casualties rose from less than 60 per day during February 2005 to February 2006 to 78 per day during February though May 2006.1 The quarterly reports that the Department of Defense issued to Congress do not seem to count many low-level incidents and types of civil violence.2 They omit coverage of major problem areas like Arab-Kurdish ethnic violence in the Kirkuk area, and Shi'ite violence in the Basra area. They still, however, report serious increases in civil conflict and the fact that most Iraqis came to see Shi'ite and Kurdish militias as a growing threat to security by the spring of 2006.3 Even the Coalition's partial count of Iraqi civilian casualties showed an increase from 10% of its national total in January 2006 to 13% in March 2006, and from 10% to 18% in Baghdad. 4 At the same time, sectarian and ethnic violence has come to rival the insurgency in terms of casualties and the threat it poses to political, social, and economic progress in Iraq. Shi'ite militias and death squads reply to the insurgency in kind, often killing, wounding, or kidnapping innocent Sunnis. Neighborhood forces both protect and threat. Ethnic cleansing is forcing many Iraqis to relocate into areas where they are in the sectarian or ethnic majority or flee the country. Shi'ite and Kurdish elements in the security forces and police have joined in the pattern of revenge and violence. The end result is that there is less and less difference between insurgency and civil war, and all sides are to some extent guilty of terrorism. The fighting in Iraq has evolved over time in ways that increase the risk of intense or full-scale civil war. Its now driven by sectarian and ethnic struggles, rather than national movements and causes, and in some cases by internal struggles for power within the same sect, which is the case of the Shi'ites in Basra. In other cases, like Kirkuk, the struggle is between Kurds, Arabs, and other minorities, with little role by the Sunni insurgents. This report provides an overview of both how the Iraqi insurgency has moved towards civil conflict from its inception in the spring of 2003 through the first half of 2006, of the ways in which insurgent tactics and methods have changed over time, and the current level of civil conflict and risk of overall civil war. It is divided into five general sections. • The first section examines Iraq under the rule of Saddam, the immediate post-war aftermath and the development of a violent insurgency in the spring and summer of 2003. It chronicles the insurgency’s inception and how it has evolved from 2003 until 2006 and examines Coalition operations to counter it. • The second evaluates insurgent patterns of attacks, and Coalition and Iraqi casualties. It also examines insurgent tactics, methods of attack, and the political, psychological and informational warfare lessons from 2003-2006. • The third section assesses the composition of the insurgency including Iraqi Sunni Arabs (both “Islamists and “Nationalists”), foreign jihadists, and the uncertain status of the Shi’ites. It also addresses the degree to which these factions cooperate or conflict and the role of Iraqi’s neighbors in the insurgency. • The fourth considers Iraqi views of the threat. • The fifth and final section offers an assessment of probable outcomes of the conflict and lessons of the war. Copyright CSIS, all rights reserved. All further dissemination and reproduction must be done with the written permission of CSIS Cordesman: Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency 6/22/06 Page iii Trends in the Fighting and the Risk of More Intense Civil War The insurgency remains highly sectarian and highly regional. It not only is driven by a relatively small number of Sunni insurgents, it is concentrated in a limited portion of Iraq. Some 80% of the attacks from August 29, 2005 through May 2006 occurred in only four of Iraq’s 18 provinces, although these provinces do include Baghdad and Mosul and have some 37-43% of the population. Twelve provinces, with over 50% of Iraq’s population, have been the scene of only about 6% to 7% of all the insurgent attacks counted by the US.5 At the same time, the insurgents have shown a consistent capability to attack at two major levels of operations. First, through a wide range of constant low-level methods that have a serious cumulative effect. Second, through large attacks designed to capture media attention, intimidate and kill the government’s supporters, and prevent any form of normalization by provoking Shi’ite and Kurdish response and a more intense civil war. The attacks on Shi'ite targets have increasingly led to Shi'ite reprisals and broader Sunni anger and fear in response. If one looks at the cycles in the evolving struggle, there are no clear signs that the struggle is being lost or won. For example, the number of attacks peaked to some 700 per week in October 2005, before the October 15th referendum on the constitution compared to 430 per week in mid- January. This was more a function of insurgent efforts to peak operations in sensitive periods than any outcome of the fighting. Similarly, the number of US killed has averaged some 65 per month since March 2003. The total of US killed was 96 in October 2005, 84 in November, 68 in December, and 63 in January 2006.6 This reflected shifts in the cycles of attacks and in their targets. US experts estimated that some 500 Iraqis were killed between the December 15, 2005 elections and mid-January 2006, an “average” period in US casualties.7 Later Coalition reporting has shown that the insurgency managed to increase the average number of weekly attacks during the period from around 470 in mid-2005 to 620 in May 2006, and succeeded in triggering a steady increase in civil violence and sectarian and ethnic conflict. While Coalition casualties average under 20 per day from the spring of 2005 to the spring of 2006, even a partial count of Iraqi casualties rose from less than 60 per day during February 2005 to February 2006 to 78 per day during February though May 2006.8 The quarterly reports that the Department of Defense issued to Congress do not seem to count many low-level incidents and types of civil violence.9 They omit coverage of major problem areas like Arab-Kurdish ethnic violence in the Kirkuk area, and Shi'ite violence in the Basra area. They still, however, report serious increases in civil conflict and the fact that most Iraqis came to see Shi'ite and Kurdish militias as a growing threat to security by the spring of 2006.10 Even the Coalition's partial count of Iraqi civilian casualties showed an increase from 10% of its national total in January 2006 to 13% in March 2006, and from 10% to 18% in Baghdad. 11 The key issue is not so much the intensity of the fighting, but whether the more extreme Sunni Islamists can paralyze or defeat the political process and intensify the level of civil conflict on all sides. Trends in Late 2005 US and MNF-I officials provided the following summary of trends at the time of the December 2005 elections. • Despite predictions of major violence, there were relatively few attacks by insurgents on the actual day of the October 15, constitutional referendum. Across the country, more than nine million Iraqis voted in 6,000 polling stations. Early estimates put voter turnout at 61% and only five of the capital’s 1,200 polling Copyright CSIS, all rights reserved. All further dissemination and reproduction must be done with the written permission of CSIS Cordesman: Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency 6/22/06 Page iv stations were attacked. However, incidents still occurred in spite of a halt to nearly all movement by non- military and non-governmental vehicles, and placing peak levels of Coalition and Iraqi security forces on duty. Violence returned in late October, and shows no sign of leveling off before the December elections. • Sunni participation in the December 15, 2005 was higher than during the constitutional referendum and Sunni turnout in the October referendum was higher than anticipated. Most political parties did, however, divide along sectarian and ethnic lines. The new Council of Representatives had 275 seats and the final results for the election awarded the following numbers to the main parties: United Iraq Alliance (Shi’ites) 128 seats, Kurdish coalition 53, The Iraqi List (Secular “Allawi list”) 25, Iraqi Accordance Front (Sunnis) 44; Iraqi front for National Dialogue (Sunni) 11.
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