Order Code RL31339 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance Updated November 21, 2005 Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance Summary Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains violent and unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency. The Bush Administration says that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is a stable democracy that will not host radical Islamist forces. The Administration has held out Iraq as a potential model for reform throughout the Middle East. However, mounting casualties and costs have intensified a debate within the United States over the wisdom of the invasion and whether or not to wind down U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing those goals. The Bush Administration asserts that U.S. policy in Iraq is showing important successes, demonstrated by elections that chose a National Assembly (January 30, 2005), a referendum that adopted a permanent constitution (October 15, 2005), progress in building Iraq’s security forces, and economic growth. The next major milestone will be the holding of elections for a permanent government by December 15, 2005. While continuing to build, equip, and train Iraqi security units, the Administration has been working with the new Iraqi government to include more Sunni Arabs in the power structure; Sunnis, many of whom are mobilizing to vote against the draft constitution, were dominant during the regime of Saddam Hussein and now feel marginalized by the newly dominant Shiite Arabs and Kurds. The Administration believes that it has largely healed a rift with some European countries over the decision to invade Iraq, and it points to NATO and other nations’ contributions of training for Iraqi security forces and government personnel. Administration critics, including some in Congress, believe the U.S. mission in Iraq is failing and that major new policy initiatives are required. Some believe that U.S. counter-insurgent operations are hampered by an insufficient U.S. troop commitment. Others believe that a U.S. move toward withdrawal might undercut popular support for the insurgency and force compromise among Iraq’s factions. Others maintain that the U.S. approach should focus not on counter-insurgent combat but on reconstruction and policing of towns and cities cleared of insurgents, a plan the Administration says it is now moving toward under an approach termed “clear, hold, and build.” This report will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman and Alfred Prados; CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Jeremy Sharp and Christopher Blanchard; and CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff. Contents U.S. Relations With Anti-Saddam Groups ..............................2 Iraqi National Congress (INC)/Ahmad Chalabi..................2 Iraq National Accord (INA)/Iyad al-Allawi......................4 Major Kurdish Organizations/KDP and PUK....................5 Shiite Islamist Leaders and Organizations: Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI, Da’wa Party, Moqtada al-Sadr, and Others..................5 Mahdi Army Militia ........................................9 Clinton Administration “Regime Change” Strategy/Iraq Liberation Act ....................................................9 Bush Administration Policy ....................................11 Post-September 11: Regime Change Through Military Action .....11 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): Major Combat ................12 Post-Saddam Hussein Governance and Transition .......................14 Occupation Period/Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ........14 The Handover of Sovereignty and Run-up to Elections ...............16 Interim Constitution/Transition Roadmap ......................16 Interim (Allawi) Government/Sovereignty Handover .............16 U.N. Backing of New Government/Coalition Military Mandate .....17 Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq .........................18 January 30, 2005 Elections/New Government ...................19 Drafting the Permanent Constitution and Next Election ...........21 Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance......................23 The Oil Industry ..........................................24 International Donations....................................25 The U.S. Military and Reconstruction .........................25 Sector Allocations for Reconstruction.........................25 Lifting U.S. Sanctions .....................................26 Debt Relief/WTO Membership..............................27 Political and Security Challenges, Responses, and Options ................27 The Insurgent Challenge .......................................27 Foreign Insurgents/Zarqawi.....................................28 U.S. Responses to the Insurgency ................................30 U.S. Counter-Insurgent Operations ...........................31 Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) ..............................32 ISF Funding .............................................33 ISF Components ..........................................33 Coalition-Building and Maintenance ..............................37 Options and Debate on an “Exit Strategy”..........................39 Troop Increase ...........................................40 Troop Drawdown or Withdrawal .............................40 Power-Sharing Formulas...................................41 Accelerating Economic Reconstruction ........................42 Focus on Local Security....................................42 List of Figures Figure 1. Map of Iraq ............................................44 List of Tables Table 1. Some Key Indicators.......................................24 Table 2. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Opposition ...........................43 Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance The United States did not remove Iraq’s Saddam Hussein from power in the course of the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and his regime survived post-war uprisings by Iraq’s Shiites and Kurds. For twelve years after that, the United States provided some support to dissidents inside Iraq, although changing Iraq’s regime did not become U.S. declared policy until November 1998, after repeated crises over access to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) facilities. Iraq has previously had experience with a democratic form of government, although parliamentary elections were held during the period of British rule under a League of Nations mandate (from 1920 until Iraq’s independence in 1932), and the monarchy of the (Sunni Muslim) Hashemite dynasty (1921-1958).1 Previously, Iraq had been a province of the Ottoman empire until British forces defeated the Ottomans and took control of what is now Iraq in 1918. Iraq’s first Hashemite king was Faysal bin Hussein, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca who, advised by British officer T.E Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”), led the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal I and was succeeded by his son, Ghazi (1933-1939). Ghazi was succeeded by his son, Faysal II, who ruled until the military coup of Abd al-Karim al-Qasim on July 14, 1958. Qasim was ousted in February 1963 by a Baath Party-military alliance. Since that same year, the Baath Party has ruled in Syria, although there was rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Baath regimes during Saddam’s rule. One of the Baath Party’s allies in the February 1963 coup was Abd al-Salam al- Arif. In November 1963, Arif purged the Baath, including Baathist Prime Minister (and military officer) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and instituted direct military rule. Arif was killed in a helicopter crash in 1966 and was replaced by his elder brother, Abd al-Rahim al-Arif, who ruled until the Baath Party coup of July 1968. Following the Baath seizure, Bakr returned to government as President of Iraq and Saddam Hussein, a civilian, became the second most powerful leader as Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. In that position, Saddam developed overlapping security services to monitor loyalty among the population and within Iraq’s institutions, including the military. On July 17, 1979, the aging al-Bakr resigned at Saddam’s urging, and Saddam became President of Iraq. Saddam’s regime became particularly repressive of Iraq’s Shiites after the 1979 Islamic revolution in neighboring Iran, which activated and emboldened Iraqi Shiite Islamist movements that wanted to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic of Iraq. 1 See Eisenstadt, Michael, and Eric Mathewson, eds, U.S. Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq: Lessons from the British Experience. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003. Members of the Hashemite family rule neighboring Jordan. CRS-2 U.S. Relations With Anti-Saddam Groups The major factions that now dominate post-Saddam Iraq had been active against Saddam Hussein for decades, receiving some U.S. support after the 1991 Gulf war. Prior to the launching on January 16, 1991, of Operation Desert Storm, which reversed Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush called on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam.