THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS OF FAILURE IN : A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RECONSTRUCTION By Kenneth M. Pollack

*This article will appear in Barry Rubin (ed.), Iraq After Saddam (Sharpe, 2007). To order, please contact [email protected].

This article examines the course of the disastrous U.S. reconstruction of Iraq from the invasion through the fall of 2006. It locates the source of America’s many failings not only in the ignorance that governed the Bush Administration’s assumptions about the ease of postwar reconstruction and the absence of appropriate or realistic planning that resulted, but also in a series of equally mistaken decisions by the Bush Administration, the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the U.S. military in the years that followed. It argues that the political deadlock, security vacuum, and absence of a functional Iraqi economy today are all the result of these problems and that only dramatic changes in U.S. policy—not the tactical tinkering that the Bush Administration has engaged in over the past 18 months and that many of its critics continue to recommend today—have any chance of undoing the damage of this long chain of needless mistakes.

It never had to be this bad. The consistently failed to provide them with the reconstruction of Iraq was never going to be opportunities and the framework to quick or easy, but it was not doomed to succeed.2 Indeed, perhaps the most tragic failure.1 Its disastrous course to date has evidence of this unrealized potential is that been almost entirely the result of a even three-and-a-half years after Saddam’s sequence of foolish and unnecessary fall, with Iraq mired in a deepening civil mistakes on the part of the United States. war and no sign of real progress on the Perhaps at some point in the future, horizon, over 40 percent of still clung revisionist historians will try to claim that to the belief that Iraq was headed in the the effort was doomed from the start, that it right direction—with only 35 percent never was possible to build a stable, let saying it was headed in the wrong alone pluralistic, new Iraq in the rubble of direction.3 ’s fall. However, that is If Iraq does slide into all-out , decidedly not the view of the experts, the the Bush Administration will have only journalists covering the story, or the itself to blame. It disregarded the advice of practitioners who went to Iraq to put the experts on Iraq, on nation-building, and on country back together after the 2003 military operations. It staged both the invasion. Americans returning from Iraq— invasion and the reconstruction on the military and civilian alike—have proven cheap. It never learned from its mistakes unanimous in their view that the Iraqis and never committed adequate resources to desperately want reconstruction to succeed accomplish either its original lofty and that they have the basic tools to make it aspirations or even its later, more modest work, but that the United States has goals. It refused to believe intelligence that

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 1 Kenneth M. Pollack contradicted its own views and doggedly reconstruction. Some in the Bush insisted that reality conform to its wishes. Administration had convinced themselves In its breathtaking hubris, the that Saddam was the source of all of the ills Administration engineered a Greek tragedy of the Middle East and that, therefore, any in Iraq, the outcome of which may plague progress on any issue in the region first us for decades. required Saddam’s removal. This was a key piece of the neoconservative support for IGNORANCE AND ARROGANCE Laurie Mylroie’s bizarre claims that Saddam was responsible for the 1993 The invasion of Iraq was born of a great World Trade Center bombing, as well as a many different ideas. As former Deputy number of other attacks.8 Likewise, during Secretary of Defense noted the 1990s, this author personally heard in an interview with Vanity Fair, the threat individuals who would later become senior of Saddam with weapons of mass Bush Administration officials insist that destruction (WMDs) was simply the one Saddam’s opposition had doomed threat upon which all of the senior members American efforts to make peace between of the Bush Administration agreed—and the Arabs and the Israelis in the 1980s. In believed that it could be used to justify the so doing, they simply dismissed all of the war to the public.4 Not all of these ideas evidence that no Arab leader except Hosni were foolish. Some of their rationales for Mubarak had been more supportive of the war were quite reasonable: the international peace process than Saddam during that consensus that Saddam had reconstituted period. This was the basis of the neo- his WMD programs—which turned out to conservative refrain that “the road to be entirely mistaken but was considered Jerusalem runs through .” “incontrovertible”5 at the time;6 the fact that Likewise, this mistaken conviction was part Saddam was one of the most brutal tyrants of the reason that Washington quickly of the previous sixty years; the fact that his shifted its attention from Afghanistan to ambitions ran directly counter to those of Iraq, in the belief that Saddam somehow the United States—and his efforts to stood behind both the Taliban and al- achieve them had destabilized the Persian Qa’ida. It is certainly the case that Gulf for twenty-five years; and the problem Administration figures regularly played fast that the world was losing interest in keeping and loose with the paltry evidence him bound by sanctions, as evinced by the suggesting any kind of relationship between postwar revelations of the Volcker Saddam and bin Ladin, but it is also the commission concerning the corruption and case that they did so because they were manipulation of the Oil-for-Food program certain that it existed, even if there was no by the Iraqi government to secure the evidence to support it and most of the political support of France, Russia, and evidence available suggested the opposite.9 China, among other countries.7 As bad as some of these rationales for However, there were also a great deal of war may have been, far more damaging was unreasonable ideas, and unfortunately these the way in which these rationalizations unreasonable ideas were not only part of the influenced the Administration’s senior justification for the war, but also became leadership regarding the necessity and critical elements of the Administration’s demands of postwar reconstruction. At prewar thinking about postwar bottom, many in the Administration—and

2 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) The Seven Deadly Sins of Failure in Iraq virtually all of those leading the march to determined to exclude those agencies that war—simply did not believe that a major were both more willing and more able. effort at reconstruction was necessary. While State’s capacity to handle postwar United States Central Command reconstruction and nation-building probably (CENTCOM), the military command would also have proven inadequate without responsible for the war, was told to prepare massive international cooperation, it was for humanitarian contingencies such as still orders of magnitude beyond what DoD refugees, but little else. Both the possessed. Instead, the Defense Department CENTCOM commander, General Tommy put together a small team (about 200 people Franks, and the office of the Secretary of at the time of the invasion) led by retired Defense made clear that they wanted to Lieutenant General Jay Garner to handle reduce the American military presence in postwar reconstruction—at least Iraq as quickly as possible, and if there temporarily—until a presidential envoy were any serious efforts at nation-building could be appointed.13 Garner was not even to be made, they were determined that asked to head this postwar transition team someone else do it.10 Rumsfeld and other until January 9, 2003, a little more than two members of the Administration, including months before the start of the war. He was even the President, had made it clear that prevented from cooperating with Central they did not believe that nation-building Command planners, and many of his was the sort of operation in which the U.S. requests for key personnel were denied. military should be involved.11 Other Garner and his team wanted desperately to members of the Administration, particularly do the right thing, and some were quite those close to able, but they started with everything (INC) leader Ahmed Chalabi, saw no need stacked against them. Once again, this was for a major American reconstruction effort, particularly true with regard to the because they hoped to turn the country over intellectual foundations of the to Chalabi and have him run it for the Administration’s approach to war, which United States.12 underlay all of the planning. Most of the To make matters worse, officials at the Administration’s chief Iraq hawks shared a Department of Defense (DoD), the Office deeply naïve view that the fall of Saddam of the Vice President (OVP), and some at and his top henchmen would have relatively the National Security Council (NSC) little impact on the overall Iraqi decided that the State Department was governmental structure. They assumed that “against” the war and would sabotage their Iraq’s bureaucracy would remain intact and plans to run Iraq the way they saw fit and to would therefore be capable of running the install Chalabi in power. They worked country and providing Iraqis with basic assiduously to retain complete control over services. They likewise assumed that the the meager work on postwar reconstruction Iraqi armed forces would largely remain that was being done and to exclude State cohesive and would surrender whole to U.S. Department personnel, offices, and input. forces. While the Administration does not Thus one of the many Catch-22s of U.S. seem to have intended to use the Iraqi army prewar planning for postwar Iraq is that to secure the population, they believed that while neither the military nor the civilian because it would remain cohesive, there leadership of the Pentagon was interested in would be little threat from disgruntled nation-building, they were absolutely

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 3 Kenneth M. Pollack soldiers joining organized crime or headaches for commanders throughout the insurgent groups, as actually happened.14 chain of command. There were too few As has been documented by many other Coalition troops, which meant that long authors, the result of all this was a supply lines were vulnerable to attack by fundamental lack of attention to realistic Iraqi irregulars, and the need to mask entire planning for the postwar environment. As it cities at times took so much combat power was assumed that the Iraqis would be that it brought the entire offensive to a halt. delighted to be liberated—with no American technology at times fell victim to allowance either for those who opposed the simple Iraqi countermeasures—such as invasion, those glad but wary of U.S. barrages of small arms fire that effectively intentions, or those simply looking to take neutralized the fearsome Apache attack advantage of the dictator’s fall to grab as helicopters that the United States had hoped much loot as they could—little thought was would pulverize Iraqi mechanized given to security requirements after formations. Nevertheless, the invasion itself Saddam’s fall. This was carried over into a was, overall, a remarkably successful larger dearth of planning for the provision operation, resulting in the capture of of security and basic services in the Baghdad and the fall of the regime in a little mistaken belief that Iraqi political less than four weeks.16 institutions would remain largely intact and Yet the invasion was not the war. It was therefore able to handle those merely the beginning of the war. responsibilities—especially after America’s Unfortunately, the prewar planning Iraqi friends (particularly Chalabi) were guidance handed down from the civilian installed in Baghdad in Saddam’s place. chiefs in the Department of Defense now Although senior military commanders dictated what the military forces on the decided that the State Department would be ground did and did not do, and that meant responsible for reconstruction, thereby that they did far too little. alleviating themselves of any responsibility Almost immediately, the mistaken for it, the Department of Defense prohibited assumptions and inadequate planning for Garner’s team from interacting with postwar Iraq began to plague U.S. actions. Franks’s staff, while also working to Combat units found themselves in charge of minimize its cooperation with the State large urban areas with no sense of what to Department. Across the board, planning do, whom to contact, or how else to get was disjointed, inadequate, and help. As no orders were issued to the troops unrealistic.15 to prevent looting and other criminal activity—since it was mistakenly assumed NEGLECT AND STUBBORNNESS that there would not be such problems—no one did so. The result was an outbreak of All of these bad ideas—the products of lawlessness throughout the country that arrogance and ignorance—began to bear resulted in massive physical destruction tragic fruit during and immediately after the coupled with a stunning psychological blow invasion of Iraq. There were certainly to Iraqi confidence in the United States, problems with the operation itself. The from neither of which has the country assumption that virtually no Iraqis would recovered. fight proved inaccurate. Most did not, but It was at that moment, in April 2003, enough did to create some serious that the United States created the most

4 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) The Seven Deadly Sins of Failure in Iraq fundamental problems in Iraq. At that point, It is not true, as many seem to believe, having torn down Saddam Hussein’s that the Administration simply barred the tyranny, there was nothing to take its place; and other states from nothing to fill the military, political, and participating in the reconstruction. economic void left by the regime’s fall. However, Washington did impose The result was that the United States conditions on that involvement that made it created a failed state and a power vacuum, unattractive for the UN, international which even as of this writing has not been NGOs, and a long list of foreign properly filled. That power vacuum and that governments to participate. Even countries failed state allowed an insurgency to that disagreed with the United States on the develop in the Sunni tribal community of decision to invade Iraq were eager to assist Western Iraq, left the Shi’a communities to with the reconstruction—indeed some, like be slowly taken over by vicious sectarian , hoped that their fulsome militias, spawned organized crime rings participation in reconstruction would help across the country, and prevented the assuage the anger that their opposition to development of governmental institutions the war itself had created in the United capable of providing Iraqis with the most States. Unfortunately, another pathology of basic services such as clean water, the senior leadership of the Bush sanitation, electricity, and a minimally Administration was that most of them functioning economy capable of generating shared an abiding antipathy to the UN and basic employment. The persistence of these other international organizations. This, problems over time led to the emergence of coupled with their ignorant but adamant low-level civil war in Iraq, and it now belief that a major reconstruction effort threatens to plunge the country into a would be unnecessary in Iraq, hardened Bosnia- or Lebanon-like maelstrom. them in their stand-offish approach to the Compounding the problem, the UN and other members of the international Administration concurrently took a number community. Washington insisted that the of steps that discouraged those who might reconstruction be headed by an American have helped them to address these failings and that all UN and international personnel by helping to build new political, economic, be integrated into the American effort. and security institutions in Iraq capable of However, neither the UN, the replacing Saddam’s fallen regime. Such international NGOs, nor many other capabilities were resident in segments of the governments were interested in working UN bureaucracy and, to an even greater under these conditions. Most UN extent, in scores of non-governmental bureaucrats disliked the Bush organizations (NGOs) that have assisted in Administration (if not the United States nation-building around the world in the altogether) and the invasion of Iraq to begin past. However, the Bush Administration’s with. Moreover, they and members of the stubborn insistence that the United Nations Security Council were loathe to make the be denied overall authority for the UN subordinate to the United States given reconstruction, and that the international both the greater resources and success of community conform to American dictates the UN in nation-building operations in the in Iraq effectively denied the United States past.17 The United Nations provided only a their assistance. small staff of several hundred people and most of the NGOs either stayed away or

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 5 Kenneth M. Pollack sent only small numbers of personnel in Iraq would be done their way and no themselves. To its credit, the United other. The ability to tap into a much larger Nations did send one priceless commodity: network of people with desperately needed Sergio Vieira de Mello, an outstanding skills, by itself, was a crucial virtue of the international administrator who had headed UN that was lost to the United States out of the successful effort to stabilize East Timor sheer hubris.18 in the years before the invasion of Iraq. To the extent that the United Nations and the PANIC AND HASTE rest of the international community participated meaningfully in the It did not take long after the fall of reconstruction of Iraq in the days after the Saddam’s regime for reality to intrude upon fall of Baghdad, it was largely because the pipe dreams of the Administration. It Sergio de Mello was determined to make it quickly became clear that Iraq’s work. When de Mello was killed in August governmental apparatus had largely 2003 by a truck-bomb attack on the UN collapsed. The people had all gone home headquarters in Baghdad, the Secretariat and most were not reporting to work. The immediately reduced its presence in Iraq to buildings had been ransacked by looters. little more than a skeleton crew on the The equipment had largely been stolen or grounds that the United States, which had destroyed. Many of the files had been insisted on retaining complete control of the destroyed, stolen, or acquired for other effort, was failing in its most basic task: nefarious purposes. A comprehensive providing the security that was the sine qua survey undertaken by the new Iraqi minister non of any reconstruction efforts. of water resources after he took office in In retrospect, the meager participation of late 2003, found that the ministry had lost the international community was an 60 percent of its equipment—from pencils important factor in the many failures of to massive dredgers—in the looting.19 The reconstruction. The United Nations, through Administration did look briefly to Ahmed its various agencies, can call upon a vast Chalabi and his INC to fill the void, flying network of personnel and resources vital to Chalabi and 400 of his personnel into al- various aspects of nation-building. One of Nasiriyah early in the war. However, the the greatest problems the United States paltry numbers of followers that Chalabi faced was that it simply did not have could scrape together compared to what he enough people who knew how to do all of claimed, and the increasing evidence that the things necessary to rebuild the political those on the inside did not know or care for and economic systems of a shattered nation. him, made it impossible to simply hand the The UN, in contrast, had worked with reins of power to Chalabi and expect that he thousands of people with such skills in could manage the state. What’s more, it was Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, equally clear that the United States lacked Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Had the UN the personnel with the expertise to step in asked those people to help in Iraq, they and fill these roles—and the international probably would have come. In contrast, community, which did have such personnel, they proved mostly unwilling to answer the was not willing to provide them unless the same call from the Bush Administration, Administration agreed to major changes in especially when Washington rudely and its handling of the postwar reconstruction. repeatedly emphasized that reconstruction

6 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) The Seven Deadly Sins of Failure in Iraq

The result was a sort of panic in both growing, staff in Baghdad to produce Washington and Baghdad, as it became results, and fast. The result was a series of apparent that postwar realities were mistaken decisions in the summer and fall radically different from the of 2003 that further crippled the Administration’s prewar expectations. reconstruction effort.21 Initially, the panic took the form of The best known of these decisions was criticism of Jay Garner. In essence, the first the disbanding of the Iraqi military and response of those in Washington who had security services. This decision actually devised the vision for the threadbare requires a bit of explanation in order to postwar reconstruction was to blame Garner understand the problematic facets of it. As for not being up to the task. They whispered Bremer and his senior staff have repeatedly to the press that it was his execution and not argued, and not incorrectly, “the Iraqi Army their unrealistic expectations and disbanded itself.” As noted above, and as inadequate preparations that were to blame. should have been expected, during and after Not surprisingly, Garner was soon on his the war, most Iraqi soldiers simply went way out. He was relieved of his charge in home. Thus, to some extent, the decision June 2003, and replaced by the more senior merely reflected the reality of the situation. and more politically savvy L. . Moreover, the Administration’s critics are Yet Bremer knew even less about Iraq probably wrong in their contention that the when he took charge than Garner had, Army could have been used to maintain having never handled operations there order, and so take the place of the missing before and not even having had the benefit Coalition soldiers who should have been of Garner’s few months of pre-planning to there to do so. The Iraqi Army was get a sense of the country. Bremer’s early Saddam’s Army—and his security services remarks upon arrival in Baghdad were even more so—and it is very unclear how largely focused on the need to privatize the population would have reacted to an Iraqi industry. It was as if he had inherited American decision to use them to clamp leadership of an Eastern Europe nation that down on civilians after the regime’s fall. In had just shed Soviet-style Communism— this author’s conversations with Iraqis both and not an Arab country suddenly freed inside and outside Iraq since the end of the from war, comprehensive sanctions, and a war, there certainly have been those who near-genocidal dictatorship.20 However, suggested that since most of the conscripts Bremer had another problem to deal with: were Shi’a and merely following orders, the Washington’s demands. people would have accepted them as The manifest problems in Iraq—from enforcers of law and order after Saddam’s the looting and anarchy, to the persistent fall. However, far more have suggested the insurgent attacks, to the lack of any opposite. Bremer’s team heard the same progress in restoring basic services— thing, and an important element in their coupled with the lack of progress in finding decision to disband it was to try to send a WMDs, were putting a serious damper on signal to the people that the old regime was the Administration’s ability to claim that it gone, and the Coalition would be starting had truly “liberated” Iraq and would again from a clean slate to create new quickly be able to leave it a stable, institutions without the taint of Saddam. prosperous state. Washington began to put While this rationale was understandable, intense pressure on its small, but constantly it did not mean that the decision was

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 7 Kenneth M. Pollack faultless. In fact, there was a major burgeoning Sunni insurgency. Equally problem, albeit one principally derived unsurprisingly, many of the rank and file from the poor prewar planning rather than were quickly recruited by the insurgency, from mistakes made by Bremer’s team in by militia leaders, or by organized crime. Baghdad. This was the failure to entice, The result was a massive boost to the forces cajole, or even coerce Iraqi soldiers back to of instability in the country.22 their own barracks or to other facilities Although the decision to disband the where they could be fed, clothed, watched, Army without a DDR program is the best retrained, and prevented from joining the known of the rushed decisions made during insurgency, organized crime, or the militias. the summer and fall of 2003, it was hardly During its various forays into nation- the only one, and two other important ones building in the 1980s and 90s, the United bear mentioning. The first of these was the States learned the importance of a Disarm, decision to accelerate massively the training Demobilize, and Retrain (DDR) program of the new Iraqi Army. When Major for any reconstruction effort. The purpose General Paul Eaton was given of such a program is to take the soldiers and responsibility for setting up a training officers of the old army and put them into a program in Iraq for the New Iraqi Army, he long-term program of transition so that they was told that his goal was to have nine can eventually be reintegrated into the trained battalions (about 10,000 to 12,000 society with the skills needed to find men) at the end of twelve months. This was themselves jobs as civilians. a realistic goal, and Eaton’s plan was fully In Iraq, there was no DDR program, nor capable of achieving it. However, soon after could one have been pulled together the program had started running, Eaton was overnight. Doing so would have required suddenly ordered to accelerate his training places to put those Iraqis (their barracks had program so that he could produce twenty- been bombed in some cases; looted in every seven battalions in only nine months.23 The case), money to pay, feed, and otherwise reason for this was that the Administration care for them; personnel and supplies to had realized that they were desperately train them; and additional troops to guard short of troops to fill the security vacuum them (in both senses of the word). As a the United States had created when it result, the Coalition had nothing to offer toppled Saddam’s regime. However, rather former Iraqi soldiers and (particularly) than mobilize and deploy additional officers, who had once enjoyed privileged American soldiers—or do what would be positions in their society. By abruptly necessary to secure greater participation in disbanding the military and security the Coalition by other nations— services without a DDR program, the Washington’s response was to have Eaton United States turned as many as one million start pumping out as many Iraqi troops as Iraqi men loose on the streets with no he could, heedless of the fact that the money, no way of supporting their families, accelerated programs would inevitably and no skills other than how to use a shovel produce Iraqi soldiers who were neither and a gun. Not surprisingly, many of the properly trained nor fully committed to the Sunni officers were humiliated by how they mission. were treated and went home to their tribes This problem became even more severe in al-Anbar province and joined—along with the creation of the Iraqi Civil Defense with their sons, cousins, and nephews—the Corps (ICDC) in the fall of 2003. The

8 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) The Seven Deadly Sins of Failure in Iraq purpose of the ICDC was to provide local in the new systems. What this suggested militia forces—like those used successfully was the requirement for a period of three to in many other counterinsurgency and six years of political transition during which stability operations around the world—as sovereignty and ultimate stewardship of the adjuncts to the national military forces. decision-making process resided in an Again, the basic idea was sound. However, external force—ideally a UN-authorized in Washington’s fever to churn out more “high commissioner” or the like, backed by Iraqi soldiers to hold up as proof that no international security forces and NGOs more American or other foreign forces were skilled in political and economic needed, the Administration insisted on a reconstruction. These experiences of breakneck pace that virtually eliminated nation-building had demonstrated that when any ability to vet personnel before they the process of turning control of the were brought into the ICDC. At the same government back to the indigenous time, training time was cut to just two or population was rushed, the old elites and three weeks. Not surprisingly, the ICDC anyone else with guns inevitably took over turned out to be a total debacle: It had the government by buying or bullying the virtually no combat capability, was electorate. thoroughly penetrated by the insurgents, Thus, the experts on reconstruction militias, and organized crime, and collapsed generally urged the inclusion of Iraqi voices whenever it was committed to battle. in the decision-making process, but not the The last key mistake made in that turning over of decision-making summer of panic was the decision to create authority—or the appearance of it—to any an (IGC), which Iraqi group. Instead, the focus was on a laid the foundation for many of Iraq’s longer timeframe of building a new political current political woes. The experience of system from the ground up over a period of nation-building in other states over the past years, during which time an international twenty to thirty years left the experts coalition, blessed by the UN, would retain convinced that the process of political sovereignty and only delegate authority to reconstruction could not be rushed. In most new Iraqi political entities as they became of these situations, the problem was that ready.24 there was no readily available pool of To some extent, that was the intent of leaders who genuinely represented the some Americans in Iraq. Both State people. This was especially true in Department personnel and U.S. military Saddam’s Iraq, where he had effectively officers—particularly those who had served “decapitated” the population by killing or in the Balkans and witnessed UN and NGO co-opting any person with the charisma or personnel in action there—began stature to lead segments of the population establishing local governing councils all and so pose a threat to his rule. In all of across Iraq as part of such a bottom-up these societies, it took years to allow new approach of building local governance leaders to emerge from the people. Such capacity first, before moving on to men and women had to feel safe enough to provincial and then national levels. want to lead, they had to become known to However, the unhappiness of Iraqis, large groups of people (large enough to get Americans, and others with the course of elected to some new position), and then reconstruction after the fall of Saddam, they had to demonstrate their ability to lead coupled with the desire of Ahmed Chalabi

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 9 Kenneth M. Pollack and his allies to see him installed in power, IGC to engineer their own further political led Washington to insist on a change. and military (and financial) Rather than allowing the bottom-up process aggrandizement, so that membership on the the time it needed to succeed, they short- IGC became a ticket to political power for circuited the process and instead opted for a those who might otherwise have had none. top-down approach, in which a new council The seeds of a great many of Iraq’s of Iraqis (what became the IGC) would problems lay in this arrangement. The IGC work with a fully-empowered American set the tone for later Iraqi governments, viceroy—Bremer—to run the country.25 It particularly the transitional governments of was a combination of wanting to put the and Ibrahim Jaafari that Iraqis out in front so that they would take followed. Many of the IGC leaders were the heat for the mistakes and problems of horribly corrupt, and they stole from the reconstruction (some of which were public treasury and encouraged their inevitable), and wanting Chalabi in charge subordinates to do the same. They cut deals even though it had become apparent that he with nefarious figures, many in organized could not get himself elected dog-catcher of crime. They built up their militias and Baghdad if he were forced to actually work insinuated them into the various security his way up in a process of bottom-up services. They used the instruments of political reconstruction.26 government to exclude their political rivals As a result, the United States created the from gaining any economic, military, or twenty-five-member IGC and gave it an political power—particularly Chalabi, who important role in guiding reconstruction. gained control of the de-Ba’thification However, because Washington had not program and used it to exclude large allowed enough time—let alone created the numbers of Sunnis from participating in the circumstances—for genuinely popular new Iraqi government.27 Because they figures to emerge, the Coalition Provisional wrote the first Iraqi constitution, the Authority (CPA) simply appointed twenty- Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), five Iraqi leaders well-known to them. this became a document largely suited to Some, like the Kurdish leaders Jalal their own interests and not necessarily those Talabani and Mas’ud Barzani, truly did of the country; and because the TAL represent their constituency. Others, like became the basis of the subsequent Shi’a leader ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, were constitution, the constitution carried over at least respected in their community, even some of these problems, while leaving if they could not necessarily be trusted to many key issues ambiguous, since delegates speak for it. Most could not even claim that. could not reach a consensus between what Most were entirely unknown—a State the TAL espoused and what was actually Department poll found that only seven of best for Iraq. them were known well enough for 40 This last point raises another problem percent or more of the population to have that resulted from the creation of the IGC: any opinion of them, positive or negative. the marginalization of a number of In some cases, like Chalabi, they were important Iraqi communities, most notably genuinely disliked. In other cases, the the Sunni tribal segment of the population. choices were equally unfortunate, because The IGC itself included only one Sunni they were nothing more than militia leaders. tribal leader, and he was not widely Many of them used their positions on the respected in his own community. As a

10 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) The Seven Deadly Sins of Failure in Iraq result, the Sunnis saw the IGC as an IGC. Unfortunately, its very complexity American instrument for turning the doomed it. Those members of the IGC who country over to the and the Shi’a. knew they could not get elected in a truly The Sunnis became increasingly concerned representative system began lobbying as the members of the IGC and their heavily with their allies in Washington and followers set about using their new in the in Baghdad. Meanwhile, positions to steal, expand their political and the Shi’a militia leaders convinced Grand economic power, and further discredit Ayatollah Ali Sistani—the Marja-e Taqlid Sunnis through de-Ba’thification—all the al-Mutlaq, the most revered figure in Shi’a while filling government jobs with their Islam and the spiritual leader of the Iraqi own cronies. All of these strategies had Shi’a community—to oppose the November been previously employed by the Sunnis 15 Agreement based on the spurious claim themselves under Saddam, thus, the Sunnis that because it did not include direct became convinced that in the new Iraq they elections, it was therefore undemocratic and would be oppressed just as they had once a plot to prevent the Shi’a from realizing oppressed the Shi’a and the Kurds. More their rightful place in Iraqi society. It is far than anything else, this conviction fed the more likely that Sistani just did not Sunni-based insurgency.28 understand the agreement and its complex Not everything that Bremer’s CPA did caucus system and allowed various other was a mistake, however. In November leaders in the Shi’a community to 2003, Bremer and his team appear to have manipulate him into opposing it because it recognized the Frankenstein’s monster that was a threat to their new power and wealth. had been created in the IGC—something Tragically, Sistani’s opposition and that Bremer reportedly opposed from the Washington’s machinations doomed the start. As a result, they fashioned a new November 15 Agreement, America’s best approach to Iraqi participation in the chance to derail the pernicious political reconstruction and the development of the system inaugurated by the creation of the Iraqi political sector, called the November IGC in the summer of 2003. 15 Agreement for the date that it was finally accepted. The November 15 Agreement DENIAL received a lot of undeserved bad press. This accord was a very complex formula to Unfortunately, the mistakes did not end produce a new Iraqi legislative and there. As bad as the Administration’s executive body through a bottom-up prewar assumptions were, as tragic as it was process of caucuses. The reason for the that General Franks and his command did complexity was that it was designed to not see the need to stabilize the country, exclude the unpopular exiles and militia and as badly as the mistakes of the CPA leaders who had been brought into the were in compounding these problems, there power structure through the creation of the were still more to come, and these too IGC and allow for genuinely popular became critical components in the overall leaders to be elected to new regional and problems besetting the reconstruction. national political bodies.29 In 2004-05, the Bush Administration It is unclear just how well it might have largely convinced itself that the problems worked, but it was a clever effort to repair besetting Iraq were not as great as their the damage done by the creation of the critics claimed. While recognizing that

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 11 Kenneth M. Pollack reconstruction had turned out to be more operations,30 the best course of action is to demanding than they had anticipated, they blanket the entire country with a thick layer convinced themselves that the problems of of security personnel to protect the the country were simple and population and make it difficult—if not straightforward, and so could be addressed impossible—for insurgents, militias, and by a limited number of simple steps. Of criminals to harm the civilian population. greatest importance, they convinced That was the strategy that the U.S. military themselves that solving Iraq’s problems did attempted to employ in Iraq immediately not require any difficult political, economic, after the invasion. However, while numbers or military decisions, and no matter how are always soft in warfare, historically it has much the evidence diverged from their required a rough ratio of twenty security theories, they refused to accept reality and personnel per thousand of the population to give up their theories. In particular, create such security in both throughout 2004-05, Administration counterinsurgency and stability officials believed that the problems operations.31 Even if one allows that the besetting Iraq were almost entirely the fault 70,000 Peshmerga are more than adequate of the Iraqi insurgency, which they to secure Kurdistan, the rest of Iraq would maintained was largely driven by al-Qa’ida still require roughly 450,000 troops to and by a small number of former regime achieve such a ratio. It is clear that there figures. They insisted that once Iraq held were never going to be 450,000 troops fair and free elections to constitute a new available to adequately blanket the entire legislature, this would undermine the country,32 at least not until many years into legitimacy of the insurgency, causing it to the future when much larger numbers of whither away, and thus alleviating—if not competent Iraqi troops would be available. eliminating—all of the problems. The United States was never willing to Unfortunately, none of this was true. commit more than about 150,000 troops, Moreover, by insisting that all of the and the Coalition allies never produced problems of the country were caused by the more than 20,000. Even by 2006, the actual insurgency—rather than that all of the number of Iraqi troops capable of problems of the country were helping to contributing meaningfully to this operation fuel the insurgency—and that, especially in was probably around 60-80,000. 2004 and early 2005, the insurgency was This gap, and the fact that the really about al-Qa’ida operatives and Administration had no intention of former regime “dead-enders,” the United providing the numbers of troops they States concentrated its efforts in the wrong required to actually make such a strategy places and on the wrong problems. As a work, became apparent to American result, the United States not only failed to military commanders in late 2003. At that quash the insurgency, but allowed the rest point, they faced a choice: They could of the country to fall effectively under the either concentrate the troops they had control of sectarian militias and organized available on the areas of insurgent activity crime. to try snuff them out, or they could A major manifestation of this fatally concentrate those forces in and around Iraqi misguided approach lay in the realm of population centers to try to protect them military operations. In both against insurgents and criminals. counterinsurgency and stability Unfortunately, but not unexpectedly, the

12 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) The Seven Deadly Sins of Failure in Iraq

American military commanders made the see the United States as a paper tiger, with a wrong decision: They chose the former, variety of detrimental consequences. Last, rather than the latter. because too many Coalition forces were off In conventional warfare, the goal is to go playing “whack-a-mole” with insurgents in on the offensive, take the fight to the the sparsely populated areas of western enemy, focus on killing “bad guys,” and put Iraq, the rest of the country was relatively the enemy on the defensive. In denuded of troops—indeed, there were vast unconventional warfare—including swathes of southern Iraq where one might counterinsurgency and stability not see Coalition or Iraqi Army forces for operations—the only way to win is to do hours if not days—which allowed the the exact opposite: remain mostly on the militias and organized crime rings to defensive, focus on protecting “good guys,” gradually take control over neighborhoods and create safe spaces in which political and villages all across the rest of Iraq. and economic reform/reconstruction can Many of the current problems with the take place—thereby undermining popular virtually unchecked insurgent attacks on the support for the “bad guys.” The U.S. Shi’a, the explosive growth of vicious military, and particularly the U.S. Army, Shi’a—and Sunni, and Kurd, and other— has never liked unconventional warfare. militias, and the spiraling sectarian violence The small number of officers who among them, can all be traced to this understood it were typically relegated to the mistaken approach. special forces and rarely ever rose to To make matters worse, not until 2006 prominent command positions. Those who did the U.S. military even acknowledge that did rise to the top were those steeped in the their strategic concept—and tactics—in Iraq principles of conventional warfare, which were not working. Despite numerous Army ideology insisted was universally criticisms from both inside and outside the applicable, including in unconventional armed forces arguing that a conventional operations, even when centuries of history approach to the unconventional mission of made it abundantly clear that this was not securing Iraq was bound to fail—and was the case. manifestly failing—the military refused to Thus for nearly all of 2004 and 2005, give up its strategy. Only at the start of Coalition forces were inordinately 2006, when Lieutenant General Peter concentrated in western Iraq, romping Chiarelli arrived in Baghdad to take over around the Sunni triangle trying to catch the corps command there, did the U.S. and kill insurgents. The results were military command in Baghdad devise a true disastrous. First, because the insurgents counterinsurgency/stability operations were always willing to flee to fight again approach to dealing with the security another day, these operations had virtually problems of the country. This effort began no impact on the insurgency overall, which with what became known as “the Baghdad actually grew stronger as ham-fisted Security Plan,” which was designed to American raids antagonized ever more concentrate large numbers of Iraqi and Sunni tribesmen, convincing them to join Coalition troops in Baghdad and employed the insurgency.33 Second, because the the proper tactics to secure the capital and insurgency grew stronger and stronger over allow political and economic reconstruction time despite the massive exertions of the efforts to begin to take hold there. U.S. military, Iraqis increasingly began to

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 13 Kenneth M. Pollack

It was a brilliant plan, the first that could warlords and militia leaders instead. As a have actually accomplished what it set out result, he worked tirelessly to force a new to, but when it was finally approved in the national reconciliation agreement that might summer of 2006, Chiarelli was given only accomplish the first two goals and to make about 70,000 mostly Iraqi troops—and then it possible to have a government that could mostly Iraqi police, the worst of their partner with a new American military security services—not the roughly 125,000 approach to achieve the third. that he would have needed (and reportedly However, this has proven to be a requested). Moreover, Chiarelli’s plan Herculean (perhaps even Sisyphean) labor. called for a fully integrated military and The problem derives from the flawed civilian chain of command with adequate decisions to rapidly create the IGC in numbers of civilian personnel to match their 2003—an Iraqi executive body, manned American military and Iraqi civilian mostly by those best known to the United counterparts—two more things sorely States—and in doing so adopt a top-down lacking in Iraq from the very beginning— approach to political reconstitution rather but none of this was forthcoming. As of this than the bottom-up approach that past writing, the Baghdad security plan appeared experiences in nation-building to be enjoying some real success in those demonstrated to be essential. Having pockets of Baghdad where mixed brought exiles and militia leaders into the formations of Iraqi and American units government and given them positions of were present, but accomplishing little power, it became virtually impossible to get everywhere else. It too seems likely to fail them out, and even more difficult to as a result of the too little, too late approach convince them to make compromises. The Washington has taken toward the militia leaders used their positions to reconstruction of Iraq from start to finish. maintain and expand their power, at the At the political level, the United States expense both of their rivals who were not in actually began to do a bit better starting in the government and of the central 2005. The appointment of Zalmay government itself. Khalilzad as ambassador to Baghdad to The problem is most easily understood succeed Bremer as the head of the civilian in this way. What was most needed in Iraq side of the U.S. reconstruction effort proved by early 2004 and on through 2005 and to be an inspired choice. Khalilzad did not 2006, were basic security and basic services have every skill that one would have for the Iraqi people (electricity, water, wanted for that post—perhaps no mortal sanitation, gasoline, as well as jobs, medical could—but he was a superb negotiator, and care, and in some cases food). The militia he understood some critically important leaders exerted their power by laying claim basic truths. He knew that the Sunnis had to to areas of the country that the be brought back into the government to end government’s security forces—and the the insurgency. He knew that real power- Americans—could not occupy or patrol. sharing arrangements had to be crafted so They then built public support by providing that the major figures in Iraq would commit the security and basic services that the to supporting the governmental structure. government could not, explicitly following He also knew that the Iraqi people needed the model employed so successfully by to be provided with basic security and basic Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas in the services or they would begin to turn to Palestinian territories. The best way for the

14 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) The Seven Deadly Sins of Failure in Iraq federal government to rid the country of the United States has no one to blame but itself. problem of the militias was to acquire the There was so much potential in Iraq. It took capacity to provide both the security and so many needless blunders to drive the the services for the Iraqi people so that they country to its current state. As of this would not have to rely on the militias. writing, in late 2006, Iraq is caught in the However, with the militia leaders running swift current of a river of American the central government, they had absolutely mistakes. They are headed quickly toward no interest in having it acquire such the falls, and the leaders the United States capacity, because doing so would mean the put in power in Baghdad lack not just the loss of their own power bases. Thus they ability, but even the desire to prevent them had every incentive to continue to use their from going over. As it was in the beginning, posts in the government to reward their the end of this story is entirely in the hands cronies, steal as much from the public of the United States. This Iraqi leadership coffers as they could, and otherwise block will not save the country. Only a dramatic their adversaries from doing so—without change in approach by Washington can do lifting a finger to actually address the most so. desperate needs of the Iraqi state. Likewise, In nearly every previous instance of state they had no incentive to cut real deals with failure and civil war, observers on the scene their adversaries, particularly the Sunni and experts elsewhere failed to recognize tribal leaders, because doing so would bring that they had passed the point of no them into the government, giving them return—when disaster became inevitable— access to the same power and graft, and until long after they had done so. As of this thereby creating a threat to their growing writing, the situation in Iraq seems bleak, control of the country and its resources. but there are still areas of progress that Khalilzad and his colleagues struggled could lead one to be hopeful that all is not against this conundrum unflaggingly, but lost. In other words, it does not yet look like the challenges were enormous. There were the point of no return has been crossed. too few truly selfless Iraqis devoted to However, it is essential that the United making their nation safe, stable, and strong States recognize that it is perilously close. again, and too many simply looking to line At the very least, we should not assume that their own pockets as best they could while the United States has much longer to turn preventing their rivals from doing the same. things around. Thus, on the political side the United States came to the right idea much sooner than *Kenneth M. Pollack is Director of was the case on the military side, but the Research at the Saban Center for Middle initial mistakes of the wrong ideas created a East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He set of circumstances that has so far made it has served previously as a CIA Persian impossible to actually achieve what they Gulf Military Analyst and Director for knew to be the right goals. Persian Gulf Affairs at the National Security Council. His most recent book is CONCLUSIONS The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between and America, (Random House, 2004). The summary above barely scratches the surface of the many tragic mistakes made in the American reconstruction of Iraq. The

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 15 Kenneth M. Pollack

NOTES and Giroux, 2005); David L. Phillips, 1 For this author’s assessment of both the Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar difficulty and criticality of the Reconstruction Fiasco (Boulder, CO: reconstruction effort, see Kenneth M. Westview, 2005); Thomas E. Ricks, Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case Fiasco: The American Military Adventure for Invading Iraq (New York: Random in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006). House, 2002), pp. 387-410. Notably, this 3 International Republican Institute, chapter begins with the following words: “Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion: June 14, “The rebuilding of Iraq cannot be an June 24, 2006,” July 19, 2006, , afterthought to a policy of regime change. http://www.iri.org/mena/iraq/pdfs/2006-07- Instead, it must be a central element in U.S. 18-Iraq%20poll%20June%20June.ppt, preparations. It is likely to be the most downloaded August 20, 2006, p. 4. important and difficult part of the policy, 4 Wolfowitz’s statement to this effect and we would be living with the results or originally appeared in an article by Sam suffering from the consequences for many Tanenhaus in Vanity Fair in May 2003. decades to come. Saddam’s overthrow However, the “quote” used in the would remove an enormous threat to the Tanenhaus piece was actually a vital interests of the United States. misquotation. What Wolfowitz actually said However, because Iraq is a pivotal state in was, “ is that for reasons that have one of the most important and fragile a lot to do with the U.S. government regions of the world, what will follow bureaucracy we settled on the one issue that Saddam is of equal importance. It would be everyone could agree on which was a tragic mistake if we were to remove the weapons of mass destruction as the core threat of Saddam only to create some new, reason, but . . . there have always been three perhaps equally challenging, threat in Iraq fundamental concerns. One is weapons of following his demise.” mass destruction, the second is support for 2 For concurring assessments that the terrorism, the third is the criminal treatment reconstruction of Iraq could have succeeded of the Iraqi people. Actually I guess you had it not been for a series of unnecessary could say there's a fourth overriding one blunders see, Larry Diamond, Squandered which is the connection between the first Victory: The American Occupation and the two. . . .” See William Kristol, “What Bungled Effort to Bring to Iraq Wolfowitz Really Said,” The Weekly (New York: Times Books, 2005); Noah Standard, Vol. 8, No. 38, (June 9, 2003). Feldman, What We Owe Iraq: War and the 5 The word is, again, Wolfowitz’s. See Ethics of Nation Building (Princeton, NJ: Mark Bowden, “Wolfowitz: The Exit Princeton University Press, 2004); Michael Interviews,” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. Gordon and Bernard Trainor, Cobra II: The 296, No. 1 (July/August 2005), p. 114. Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation 6 Contrary to the claims of many of Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2006); T. Administration critics, the government Christian Miller, Blood Money: Wasted distorted, but did not wholly fabricate, the Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed U.S. intelligence community’s assessments. in Iraq (Boston: Little, Brown, 2006); The U.S. intelligence community—as well George Packer, The Assassin’s Gate: as those of all of the Western European America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Straus states, Israel, Iran, Russia, and China—

16 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) The Seven Deadly Sins of Failure in Iraq

were nearly unanimous in the belief that by Administration. In retrospect, the WMD 2003, Saddam had reconstituted his WMD argument was wrong because Saddam had programs. Only a tiny number of analysts not reconstituted these programs and dissented from this position, and those that probably would have required eight to did so tended to be discredited for one twelve years to acquire a nuclear weapon, reason or another. Of course, the by far the most important WMD threat. I intelligence communities were wrong in believe the other arguments remain sound; this belief, but it is simply not the case that however, at this point, whatever benefits the Bush Administration claimed that Iraq were derived in addressing these problems had reconstituted its WMD programs, will be entirely outweighed should Iraq contrary to the beliefs of the intelligence slide into all-out civil war, thereby professionals. Where the Administration spreading instability throughout the Persian exaggerated the conclusions of the Gulf region. If that is the ultimate outcome intelligence community was in claiming of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, then it will be that Iraq had ties to al-Qa’ida, and that impossible for anyone to argue that it Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was on the benefited the United States, the Iraqis, or brink (usually described as “one year”) of anyone else, no matter how noble (or acquiring a nuclear weapon. Ninety percent ignoble) the intentions upon which it was of the intelligence analysts did believe that based. Iraq would have nuclear weapons within 8 Jim Woolsey wrote the forward to five to seven years (as reported in the 2002 Mylroie’s book, A Study of Revenge, Special National Intelligence Estimate), but (Washington, DC: AEI, 2001), in which she very few believed that Iraq could acquire laid out her argument. Paul Wolfowitz one within a year. On this set of issues, see provided a dust jacket quote claiming that Paul Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the the book, "...argues powerfully that the War in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. mastermind of the 1993 World Trade 2 (March/April 2005); Kenneth M. Pollack, Center bombing was actually an agent of “Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Iraqi intelligence." As a side note, U.S. Wrong?” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 293, intelligence experts reviewed Mylroie’s No. 1 (January/February 2004); United work in detail and found it to be not only States Senate Select Committee on unsubstantiated, but deeply flawed. For an Intelligence, Report on U.S. Intelligence unclassified assessment of Mylroie’s claims Community’s Prewar Intelligence by a highly-regarded terrorism expert, see Assessments on Iraq, (Washington, DC: Peter Bergen, “Armchair Provocateur: The GPO, 2004); United States Senate Select NeoCons’ Favorite Conspiracy Theorist,” Committee on Intelligence, Report on Washington Monthly (December 2003). Postwar Findings about Iraq’s WMD 9 On the evidence available before the Programs and Links to Terrorism and How invasion both for and against a relationship they Compare with Prewar Assessments, between Saddam and al-Qa’ida—and (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006). concluding that no meaningful relationship 7 These were my own reasons for believing existed—see Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, that a war with Saddam eventually would and the War in Iraq”; and Pollack, The be necessary—albeit not at the time nor in Threatening Storm, pp. XXI-XXIII, 153-58. the manner conducted by the

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 17 Kenneth M. Pollack

10 On this, see in particular Gordon and the planning guidance they had been Trainor, Cobra II, especially pp. 457-96; provided by the office of the Secretary of and Ricks, Fiasco, esp. pp. 85-213. Defense. In particular, they had been told 11 For instance, in the second debate of the that one of their greatest challenges would 2000 presidential campaign, Bush replied in be providing for all of the Iraqi formations answer to a question about the U.S. mission that were expected to be surrendering to the in Somalia that, “[It] started off as a United States. I remember telling them, humanitarian mission and it changed into a along with one of my colleagues, that they nation-building mission, and that's where would be quite lucky if they had that the mission went wrong. The mission was problem and that instead, they were much changed. And as a result, our nation paid a more likely to face a situation where the price. And so I don't think our troops ought vast bulk of Iraqi soldiers simply went to be used for what's called nation-building. home once the shooting started. Thus, their I think our troops ought to be used to fight most likely challenge would be to convince and win war. I think our troops ought to be those soldiers to come back to their used to help overthrow the dictator when barracks, where they could be kept out of it's in our best interests. But in this case it trouble and eventually demobilized. was a nation-building exercise, and same 15 In addition to the accounts sited in note 2 with Haiti. I wouldn't have supported above, see also James Fallows, “The Fifty- either.” Commission on Presidential First State?” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. Debates, “Transcript: The Second Gore- 290, No. 4 (November 2002); and James Bush Presidential Debate,” October 11, Fallows, “Blind Into Baghdad,” The 2000, Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 293, No. 1 http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000b.ht (January/February 2004). ml, downloaded, August 22, 2006. 16 On the course of the war itself, see 12 See for instance, Ricks, Fiasco, Anthony H. Cordesman, The : especially pp. 104-05; PBS Frontline, Strategy, Tactics and Military Lessons “Interview: General Jay Garner,” from (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003); Gordon and “Truth, War and Consequences,” Trainor, Cobra II; Williamson Murray and http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sh Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., The ows/truth/interviews/garner.html, Iraq War (Cambridge, MA: Belknap of downloaded on August 23, 2006. Harvard University Press, 2003); Bing West 13 Jane Perlez, “U.S. Team Arrives in Iraq and Major General Ray L. Smith, The to Establish Postwar Base,” The New York March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st Times, April 9, 2003. Marine Division (New York: Bantam, 14 In the spring of 2003, shortly before the 2003). invasion, Jay Garner’s military team met 17 On the comparative record of the United with me and two other experts on the Iraqi States and the UN in nation-building armed forces to get our advice on how to operations, see James Dobbins, John G. tackle their new jobs. While the members of McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Garner’s team were themselves quite Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, competent, they were not experts on Iraq and Anga Timilsina, America’s Role in (as they readily acknowledged), and we Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq were stunned by the ignorance inherent in (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003); and James

18 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) The Seven Deadly Sins of Failure in Iraq

Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Unrest,” October Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard 28, 2003, pg. A4.. Teltschik, and Anga Timilsina, The UN’s 21 For Bremer’s version, see L. Paul Bremer Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo with Malcolm McConnell, My Year in Iraq: to Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005). The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope 18 In the spring of 2003, just weeks before (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006). the invasion of Iraq, I was invited to spend 22 Jay Garner has publicly agreed that an afternoon with the officers and other key disbanding the army was a mistake largely personnel of the 352nd and 354th Civil because there was no DDR program and so Affairs battalions of the U.S. Army. These instead it set too many young Iraqi men were the two civil affairs battalions slated loose on the streets with no means of to go to Iraq and lead the reconstruction support. See for instance, Sydney J. effort, but they claimed that they could not Freedberg, Jr., “Federalism Can Avert Civil get any support from DoD in terms of War in Iraq: An Interview with Jay expertise on Iraq and what they might Garner,” National Journal, Vol. 36, No. 7 expect when they got there. They called me (February 14, 2004). as a private citizen in the hope that I would 23 Pollack, “After Saddam,” p. 12. be willing to provide what their own chain 24 On this see, James Dobbins, John G. of command would not. One of the many McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie things that struck me about that afternoon Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, was how many of the officers I met asked Anga Timilsina, America’s Role in Nation- me whether we would have UN and NGO Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa participation in the reconstruction, which Monica: RAND, 2003), pp. 184-210; John they considered absolutely vital. This was Hamre, Frederick Barton, Bathsheba especially true of those personnel who had Crocker, Johanna Mendelson-Forman, and served in the Balkans. What I heard from Robert Orr, “Iraq’s Post-Conflict them over and over again was that, “We are Reconstruction: A Field Review and going to have the UN with us, right? Recommendations,” Center for Strategic ‘Cause in the Balkans, all we did was act as and International Studies, July 17, 2003, pp. liaison between the UN and the NGOs and 4-7; Pollack, The Threatening Storm, pp. NATO forces. We don’t know how to 406-09; Pollack, “After Saddam,” pp. 16- rebuild a country, but they [the UN and the 23. NGOs] do.” 25 Pollack, “After Saddam,” p. 23. 19 Kenneth M. Pollack, “After Saddam: 26 On Chalabi’s unpopularity, see the Assessing the Reconstruction of Iraq,” polling data on the popularity of various Analysis Paper No. 1, The Saban Center for Iraqi figures in Dina Smeltz and Jodi Middle East Policy at the Brookings Nachtwey, “Iraqi Public Opinion Analysis,” Institution, January 2004, p. 27. U.S. Department of State, October 21, 20 Edmund L. Andrews, “Overseer in Iraq 2003, http://www.cpa- Vows to Sell Off Government-Owned iraq.org/government/political_poll.pdf, p. 8. Companies,” , June 23, In addition, during the parliamentary 2003, pg. A.13; Neil King Jr., “Selling elections of December 2005, Chalabi’s Iraqis on Selling Iraq: U.S. Pushes to Put political party failed to win a single seat. State Firms on the Block, Skeptics Warn of 27 Pollack, “After Saddam,” pp. 14-15.

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 19 Kenneth M. Pollack

28 Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and demonstrated that stabilizing a country Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Ithaca, NY: requires roughly twenty security personnel Cornell University Press, 2006); Packer, (troops and police) per thousand inhabitants The Assassin’s Gate, pp. 308-12, 415-17; just as COIN operations do. Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s 32 On the problems besetting the Iraqi People in the Shadow of America’s War, armed forces in 2006, see Anthony H. especially 219-44, 279-315. Cordesman, “Iraqi Force Development: 29 See Pollack, “After Saddam,” pp. 20-24. Summer 2006 Update,” Center for Strategic 30 Stability operations are those military and International Studies, August 23, 2006; operations employed to deal with a failed and Pollack, A Switch in Time, pp. 41-47. state, a state that has just undergone a 33 In many ways, poor tactics were just as massive military conflict or natural disaster, detrimental to the U.S. counterinsurgent or other similar circumstances. As a result and stability operations as were the of the problems of postwar Iraq, which inappropriate strategic concept. For longer included a failed state, a nation traumatized discussions of these issues, see Pollack, by war, and an insurgency, both types of “After Saddam,” pp. 13-16, Pollack, A operations were critical to success in Iraq. Switch in Time, pp. 28-41. Many commentators mistakenly tried to argue that only one or the other was relevant. In fact, what made Iraq so challenging was that we had created a situation where both afflictions were present. For a longer discussion of this issue, see Kenneth M. Pollack and the Iraq Policy Working Group of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, A Switch in Time: A New Strategy for America in Iraq, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, February 2006, pp. 1- 3, 9-21. 31 Bruce Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” Washington, DC, RAND Corp., June 2004; Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (May- June 2005), p. 9; James T. Quinlivan, “The Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations,” RAND Review, (Summer 2003). Available at: http://www.rand.org/publications/randrevie w/issues/summer2003/burden.html. Also, James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters (Winter) 1995, pp. 56–69. Quinlivan has

20 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006)