GWT Coalition-High-Command-And
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003
THE REGIME CHANGE CONSENSUS: IRAQ IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 1990-2003 Joseph Stieb A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the College of Arts and Sciences. Chapel Hill 2019 Approved by: Wayne Lee Michael Morgan Benjamin Waterhouse Daniel Bolger Hal Brands ©2019 Joseph David Stieb ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT Joseph David Stieb: The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003 (Under the direction of Wayne Lee) This study examines the containment policy that the United States and its allies imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War and argues for a new understanding of why the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. At the core of this story is a political puzzle: Why did a largely successful policy that mostly stripped Iraq of its unconventional weapons lose support in American politics to the point that the policy itself became less effective? I argue that, within intellectual and policymaking circles, a claim steadily emerged that the only solution to the Iraqi threat was regime change and democratization. While this “regime change consensus” was not part of the original containment policy, a cohort of intellectuals and policymakers assembled political support for the idea that Saddam’s personality and the totalitarian nature of the Baathist regime made Iraq uniquely immune to “management” strategies like containment. The entrenchment of this consensus before 9/11 helps explain why so many politicians, policymakers, and intellectuals rejected containment after 9/11 and embraced regime change and invasion. -
Bremer's Gordian Knot: Transitional Justice and the US Occupation of Iraq Eric Stover Berkeley Law
Berkeley Law Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository Faculty Scholarship 1-1-2005 Bremer's Gordian Knot: Transitional Justice and the US Occupation of Iraq Eric Stover Berkeley Law Hanny Megally Hania Mufti Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Bremer's Gordian Knot: Transitional Justice and the US Occupation of Iraq, 27 Hum. Rts. Q. 830 (2005) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Bremer's "Gordian Knot": Transitional Justice and the US Occupation of Iraq Eric Stover,* Hanny Megally, ** & Hania Mufti*** ABSTRACT Shortly after the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, L. Paul Bremer III, in his capacity as the chief administrator of the Coalition Provisional Author- ity (CPA), introduced several transitional justice mechanisms that set the *Eric Stover is Director of the Human Rights Center at the University of California, Berkeley, and Adjunct Professor in the School of Public Health. In 1991, Stover led a team of forensic scientists to northern Iraq to investigate war crimes committed by Iraqi troops during the Anfal campaign against the Kurds in the late 1980s. In March and April 2003, he returned to northern Iraq where he and Hania Mufti monitored the compliance with the 1949 Geneva Conventions by all sides to the conflict. He returned to Iraq in February 2004 to assist Mufti in investigating the status of documentary and physical evidence to be used in trials against Saddam Hussein and other members of the Ba'athist Party. -
2003 Iraq War: Intelligence Or Political Failure?
2003 IRAQ WAR: INTELLIGENCE OR POLITICAL FAILURE? A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of The School of Continuing Studies and of The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Liberal Studies By Dione Brunson, B.A. Georgetown University Washington, D.C. April, 2011 DISCLAIMER THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS ACADEMIC RESEARCH PAPER ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND DO NOT REFLECT THE OFFICIAL POLICIES OR POSITIONS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OR THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. ALL INFORMATION AND SOURCES FOR THIS PAPER WERE DRAWN FROM OPEN SOURCE MATERIALS. ii 2003 IRAQ WAR: INTELLIGENCE OR POLITICAL FAILURE? Dione Brunson, B.A. MALS Mentor: Ralph Nurnberger, Ph.D. ABSTRACT The bold U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was anchored in intelligence justifications that would later challenge U.S. credibility. Policymakers exhibited unusual bureaucratic and public dependencies on intelligence analysis, so much so that efforts were made to create supporting information. To better understand the amplification of intelligence, the use of data to justify invading Iraq will be explored alongside events leading up to the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. This paper will examine the use of intelligence to invade Iraq as well as broader implications for politicization. It will not examine the justness or ethics of going to war with Iraq but, conclude with the implications of abusing intelligence. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thank you God for continued wisdom. Thank you Dr. Nurnberger for your patience. iv DEDICATION This work is dedicated to Mom and Dad for their continued support. -
Statement of Mr Sarkout Mahmoud Kurdish Organizations Network Coalition for the International Criminal Court (KONCICC)
Statement of Mr Sarkout Mahmoud Kurdish Organizations Network Coalition for the International Criminal Court (KONCICC) www.koncicc.org 25th Session of the Conference of the States Parties The Hague, The Netherlands Mr. Chairman, Director-General, Representatives of Government, States Parties, NGOs, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen: It is a great privilege to contribute to this conference on behalf of Kurdish Organizations Network Coalition for the International Criminal Court. The Anfal genocide was committed during the Al-Anfal campaign led by Ali Hassan al-Majid, on the orders of President Saddam Hussein, against Iraqi Kurdistan in northern Iraq in the final stages of the Iran–Iraq War. The term, “Anfal,” means "the spoils," and was taken from the title of Sura 8 (al-Anfal) in the Qur'an. As a planned process, it was one of the main strategic methods to exterminate Kurds and eliminate the roots of Kurds. It was to destroy and ruin the demographical Kurdistan and Kurdish culture. The campaigns were characterized by mass summary executions and the mass disappearance of many tens of thousands of noncombatants, the vast majority civilians; the widespread use of chemical weapons; the wholesale destruction of some 2,000 villages, including homes, schools, mosques, churches and wells; the arbitrary arrest and jailing in conditions of extreme deprivation of thousands of women, children and elderly people; the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of villagers; and the destruction of the environment and the rural Kurdish economy and infrastructure. Only 13 victims survived from Anfal, and 9 out of 13 are alive today. Anfal was committed from February 23 to September 6, 1988 in eight stages and damaged more than 31 Assyrian and Christian villages. -
Information Note Mm3.7.2
MM3.7.2 INFORMATION NOTE Date: February 25, 2019 Request to Raise the Flag of Kurdistan on the Courtesy Flag Pole at Toronto City Hall Summary of the Request Councillor Jim Karygiannis received a request from Sartip Kakaee, Chairman of Kurdish House Toronto, to raise the Kurdish flag at City Hall to mark the 31st anniversary of the Halabja chemical attack. Councillor Karygiannis sent the request on to the Strategic Protocol and External Relations office for follow up. Response ● The request does not meet the stated City of Toronto criteria for a flag raising on the courtesy flag pole. ● The flag identified is an official symbol of the sub-national Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and is therefore not a flag of a nation recognized by Global Affairs Canada. ● Council may choose to bring awareness to violent world events through a member announcement or a proclamation. ● The City has other programs and services that enable groups to commemorate and raise awareness for events of importance. Global Affairs Canada perspective The Government of Canada is committed to the unity and diversity of the Republic of Iraq and it supports Iraq’s territorial integrity. This position is well known to the Government's Iraqi interlocutors, including in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. Canada has a constructive partnership with the federal government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government. The Government of Canada favours a peaceful dialogue in good faith, so as to resolve their differences through continued negotiations. The Government of Canada respects that the Kurdistan Regional Government already enjoys certain decision making powers for itself within the Iraqi federal system. -
Iraq: Buttressing Peace with the Iraqi Inter-Religious Congress
Religion and Conflict Case Study Series Iraq: Buttressing Peace with the Iraqi Inter-Religious Congress August 2013 © Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/resources/classroom 4 Abstract 5 This case study shines a light on the sectarian violence that overtook Iraq after the 2003 US-led invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein, and how religious 9 leaders gradually gained recognition as resources for the promotion of peace. This overview of the conflict addresses five main questions: What religious 11 factors contributed to insecurity in post-2003 Iraq? How did Coalition forces approach religious actors prior to 2006? How did governments interface with faith-based NGOs in pursuit of peace? What role did socioeconomic factors 14 play in exacerbating conflict? How did religious engagement intersect with the Sunni Awakening and the surge of Coalition troops in 2007? The case study includes a core text, a timeline of key events, a guide to relevant religious orga- nizations, and a list of further readings. 15 About this Case Study 17 This case study was crafted under the editorial direction of Eric Patterson, visiting assistant professor in the Department of Government and associate di- rector of the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at George- town University. This case study was made possible through the support of the Henry Luce Foundation and the Luce/SFS Program on Religion and International Affairs. 2 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — IRAQ Contents Introduction 4 Historical Background 5 Domestic Factors 9 International Factors 11 Religion and Socioeconomic Factors 12 Conclusion 14 Resources Key Events 15 Religious Organizations 17 Further Reading 19 Discussion Questions 21 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — IRAQ 3 Introduction While the US invasion of Iraq—and the insurgency that a shaky relationship with the United States. -
ECHOES of GENOCIDE FINDING JUSTICE | from ANFAL to ISIS | SURVIVOR STORIES ECHOES of GENOCIDE CONFERENCE on the 30 Th ANNIVERSARY of the HALABJA GENOCIDE
ECHOES OF GENOCIDE FINDING JUSTICE | FROM ANFAL TO ISIS | SURVIVOR STORIES ECHOES OF GENOCIDE CONFERENCE ON THE 30 th ANNIVERSARY OF THE HALABJA GENOCIDE HOSTED BY THE KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES THE NEWSEUM - WASHINGTON, D.C. MARCH 13, 2018 CONTENTS STATEMENTS ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF HALABJA 2 WHAT IS GENOCIDE 16 TEN STAGES OF GENOCIDE 18 BROTHERHOOD OF THE SHAKEN 20 THE POLITICS OF GENOCIDE 22 PESHMERGA UNDER ATTACK 28 THE LAST ‘FIRMAN’ 32 YEZIDI WOMEN’S EXPERIENCES WITH THE PRESS 36 REMNANTS OF IRAQ’S CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY 40 STORIES OF SURVIVAL 46 FOLLOW THE MONEY 54 PURSUING SADDAM’S CHEMICAL FIXER 58 A LEGAL MAZE 61 SPONSORS 64 Cover photograph courtesy of REZA, rezaphoto.org; Illustration (left) by Lukman Ahmad STATEMENTS ON THE 30th ANNIVERSARY OF THE HALABJA GENOCIDE were aimed at eliminating the Kurdish SOMETHING WE CAN national identity. We can never forget NEVER ESCAPE that, for decades, a systematic attempt NECHIRVAN BARZANI was made to eradicate the Kurdish Prime Minister people from the state of Iraq. It is Kurdistan Regional Government something that we can never escape; it lives on in our memories, our literature, our culture, and our politics. It is a part I warmly welcome you all, especially of all that we think and do. Every day in those who have come from far away our region, families sit at dinner with and abroad to participate in this empty seats at the table, once filled by important conference. You are here loved ones who were slaughtered by the for a valuable and noble purpose. -
Timeline: Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the Middle East Compiled by Amanda Tapp
Timeline: Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the Middle East Compiled by Amanda Tapp 1949: The Israel Defense Forces find 1960s: Steps to establish a nuclear sources of uranium in the Negev desert. weapons-free zone in the Middle East begin. The Committee for the 1950s: Iran’s nuclear program begins Denuclearization of the Middle East (a with U.S. assistance as part of the “Atoms group of Israeli intellectuals) proposes for Peace” program, which began under the idea first in 1962, publicly stating U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s that the development of nuclear weapons administration. This collaboration “constitute[s] a danger to Israel and to would come to a halt with the toppling peace in the Middle East,” urging the of the Shah of Iran in the 1979 Iranian United Nations to intervene “to prevent Revolution. military nuclear production”. 1953: Iran launches a civilian nuclear May 1961: The U.S. Atomic Energy program initiative with the aim of Commission (AEC) sends inspectors reaching nuclear cooperation agreements to Dimona. The results affirm that with other nuclear-capable states. Dimona only had a research reactor and was not capable of producing weapons- 1955: The United States agrees to sell grade plutonium. This is reaffirmed by a Israel a small nuclear research reactor. second inspection in September 1962. 1957: Israel begins work on the Negev 1963: Israel agrees to buy 100 tons of Nuclear Research Facility, a large reactor uranium ore from Argentina in a secret in the desert near Dimona, which would agreement in response to rising tensions become the foundation for Israel’s between the United States and Israel. -
Iraq: Can Saddam Be Overthrown?
S. HRG. 105±444 IRAQ: CAN SADDAM BE OVERTHROWN? HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION MARCH 2, 1998 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations You may access this document on the Internet at: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate11.html ( U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 47±150 CC WASHINGTON : 1998 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JAMES W. NANCE, Staff Director EDWIN K. HALL, Minority Staff Director SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia ROD GRAMS, Minnesota DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California JESSE HELMS, North Carolina PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland (II) CONTENTS Page Chalabi, Ahmed, President of the Executive Council, Iraqi National Congress, London, England .................................................................................................. 3 Haass, Richard -
The CIA War in Kurdistan: the Untold Story of the Northern Front in the Iraq War
Journal of Strategic Security Volume 13 Number 4 Vol. 13, No. 4 Climate Change Article 13 and Global Security The CIA War in Kurdistan: The Untold Story of the Northern Front in the Iraq War. By Sam Faddis. Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2020. Mark J. Roberts Middle East Area Specialist and Terrorism Analyst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss pp. 164-167 Recommended Citation Roberts, Mark J.. "The CIA War in Kurdistan: The Untold Story of the Northern Front in the Iraq War. By Sam Faddis. Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2020.." Journal of Strategic Security 13, no. 4 (2020) : 164-167. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.4.1898 Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss4/13 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The CIA War in Kurdistan: The Untold Story of the Northern Front in the Iraq War. By Sam Faddis. Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2020. This book review is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/ vol13/iss4/13 Roberts: The CIA War in Kurdistan: The Untold Story of the Northern Front The CIA War in Kurdistan: The Untold Story of the Northern Front in the Iraq War. By Sam Faddis. Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2020. ISBN 978- 1-61200-834-9. Photographs. Pp. -
THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS of FAILURE in IRAQ: a RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS of the RECONSTRUCTION by Kenneth M
THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS OF FAILURE IN IRAQ: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RECONSTRUCTION By Kenneth M. Pollack *This article will appear in Barry Rubin (ed.), Iraq After Saddam (Sharpe, 2007). To order, please contact [email protected]. This article examines the course of the disastrous U.S. reconstruction of Iraq from the invasion through the fall of 2006. It locates the source of America’s many failings not only in the ignorance that governed the Bush Administration’s assumptions about the ease of postwar reconstruction and the absence of appropriate or realistic planning that resulted, but also in a series of equally mistaken decisions by the Bush Administration, the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the U.S. military in the years that followed. It argues that the political deadlock, security vacuum, and absence of a functional Iraqi economy today are all the result of these problems and that only dramatic changes in U.S. policy—not the tactical tinkering that the Bush Administration has engaged in over the past 18 months and that many of its critics continue to recommend today—have any chance of undoing the damage of this long chain of needless mistakes. It never had to be this bad. The consistently failed to provide them with the reconstruction of Iraq was never going to be opportunities and the framework to quick or easy, but it was not doomed to succeed.2 Indeed, perhaps the most tragic failure.1 Its disastrous course to date has evidence of this unrealized potential is that been almost entirely the result of a even three-and-a-half years after Saddam’s sequence of foolish and unnecessary fall, with Iraq mired in a deepening civil mistakes on the part of the United States. -
From De-Ba'athification to Daesh: Analyzing the Consequences Of
From De-Ba’athification to Daesh: Analyzing the Consequences of U.S. Policy in Iraq C. J. Dijkstra S1357298 Supervisor: Dr. T. Nalbantian August 2017 Leiden University Faculty of Humanities MA Middle-Eastern Studies: Modern Middle-Eastern Studies Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts 2 Table of contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 4 State of the field ....................................................................................................................... 6 Pattern of organization ............................................................................................................ 8 Theoretical framework .......................................................................................................... 10 Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 11 Chapter 1 – Ottomans and Ba’athists: Historical context of Iraq ................................................. 12 1.1 A brief history of Iraq .......................................................................................................... 12 The Ottoman Empire ............................................................................................................. 12 The British Mandate era ........................................................................................................ 14 Iraq from 1979-2003 ............................................................................................................