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GWT Coalition-High-Command-And Welcome Letter Dear Delegates, On behalf of the Secretariat and all of NAMUN, I am pleased to welcome you to the 2017 North American Model United Nations Conference and am honoured to serve as your chair for the Coalition High Command and Provisional Authority (Iraq). I’m looking forward to meeting you all in person in February, and am anticipating a fantastic conference. With the recent spate of terrorist attacks across America and Europe, and the battles raging across Syria and Iraq, international terrorism and counterinsurgency remain very important topics, and will probably for the immediate future. As such I’m anticipating some fascinating debate and strategies as you tackle this issue staring in 2003. I hope that our committee will be exciting and a rewarding experience for all of you, and I hope that your enthusiasm and knowledge of international terrorism help make this an excellent Integrated Crisis Simulation. Warmest Regards, Shanzae Khan Table of Contents Introduction – 3 Historical Background – 4 Issues – 11 State of Affairs – 14 Suggested Sources – 15 Bibliography – 15 Introduction After the 1991 Gulf War, the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 687 commanded that Iraqi synthetic, organic, atomic, and long range rocket projects be stopped and every such weapon destroyed under UN supervision.1 The UN weapons inspectors inside Iraq verified the dismantlement of many Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and materials, but there significant compliance issues remained and the inspectors were unable to check every site and verify that Iraq had destroyed all its WMD materiel by their withdrawal in 1998.2 Iraqi-American relations remained quite hostile throughout this period, with no-fly zones imposed over the Northern and Southern parts of Iraq. Ousting Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq also remained a priority for America; to which end they funded the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and its leader Ahmed Chalabi.3 After the September 11 Attacks in 2001, plans were quickly laid to topple Saddam’s Ba’ath government and support the transition of Iraq to a democracy. By early 2003, America had transferred enormous forces to bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Persian Gulf and had been justifying their planned invasion by claiming to the world Saddam’s government possessed WMDs.4 Failing to achieve UN authorization, on March 20th, 2003, US forces invaded Iraq in a highly successful operation, which was followed by problem riddled efforts at state-building and a tenacious insurgency which has contributed to Iraq’s current strife. This crisis will deal largely deal with these events. Delegates, you will have an opportunity to plan and execute the 2003 invasion, and then attempt to rebuild and govern Iraq in the face of a multitude of dangers. 1 United Nations Security Council. “Resolution 687, (1991),” April 3, 1991. Accessed December 12, 2016. http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/687.pdf 2 Charles Duelfer, “WMD elimination in Iraq: 2003,” The Nonproliferation Review 23, (2016): 166-172. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2016.1179431 3 Martin Chulov, “Ahmed Chalabi: Iraqi exile whose reputation waned after return,” November 3, 2015. Accessed December 16, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/03/ahmed-chalabi-exile-reputation-waned-iraq 4 Council on Foreign Relations, “Timeline: The Iraq War,” 2016. Accessed December 17, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/iraq/timeline-iraq-war/p18876 Historical Background Saddam’s Rise and the Iraq-Iran War In July 1979, Iraqi Vice-President Saddam Hussein forced President Ahmed Al- Bakr to resign and himself assumed the presidency.5 One of Saddam’s top concerns was the Islamist Revolution in Iran earlier that year in February which toppled the Shah from power, and resulted in Ayatollah Khomeini’s accession to power.6 Saddam was worried that the new Shia regime in Iran would attempt to destabilize Iraq by fomenting unrest amongst the large Shia minority in the south of the Iraq.7 Saddam also though saw the Revolution as an opportunity; Iraq’s long-time rival Iran had been weakened by the unrest. Its government was in the middle of a dramatic transformation, its secret services and police were busy hunting old allies and supporters of the Shah, and its military commanders were occupied with internal matters.8 Therefore throughout 1979 and early 1980 Iraqi troops frequently skirmished with Iranian border guards and raided Iranian territory, and in September 1980 Iraqi troops launched a full scale invasion of the country.9 The initial Iraqi invasion was largely successful, seizing significant Iranian territory. However later that year the advance began to stall as Iranian resistance stiffened and support for the Iranian government solidified.10 Saddam had hoped his invasion would weaken support for the Ayatollah, but instead it achieved the opposite. Volunteers poured in and the Iranian army began to reorganize itself to deal with the invasion.11 Through 1981 the war was a stalemate; both sides were dug in to trenches along the front line in scenes reminiscent of World War One, and there were few successful assaults by either side.12 However by 1982, the Iranian army had sufficiently reorganized itself and began 5 Hal Brands and David Palkki, “Conspiring Bastards: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic View of the United States,” Diplomatic History 36 (2012): 625-627. 6 Ibid, 635-640. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid, 635-638. 9 William Keylor, A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 10 Keylor, A World of Nations. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. a vicious counterattack. They retook most of the Iranian territory the Iraqis had earlier seized, and had begun to drive into Iraq itself.13 Throughout the rest of the war, the Iraqis remained largely on the defensive until a UN negotiated ceasefire in 1988 ended the violence.14 The war had enormous ramifications for the Middle East and the World. Iran and Iraq suffered well over one million casualties, about half of which were civilians.15 Both sides had committed significant war crimes, including the Iraqi usage of poisonous gas against Iranian troops and widespread Iranian usage of child soldiers. The Iranian and Iraqi economies had also been ravaged, with major infrastructure damage on both sides and large Iraqi foreign debts accrued, particularly to Kuwait.16 Many other powers had also been involved in the war; the Soviet Union, America, France and much of the Arab world including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar provided arms, money or intelligence to Iraq.17 This reinforced Khomeini’s view that conservative Western-allied or supported Middle Eastern states, and the West itself, especially America, were opposed to Islamist Iran’s existence and would continue to be hostile to them. This of course contributed to Iran’s recent hostility to America, its status as a rogue nation and its pursuit of WMDs. Figure 1: Iranian Revolutionary Guards In 1986, it was discovered that President Raegan had during the Iran-Iraq War. Image Retrieved from been illegally selling Iran anti-tank missiles and other weapons in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2% 80%93Iraq_War exchange for money to fund an anti-communist insurgency in Nicaragua. Apart from causing an enormous political scandal in the US, the Iran-Contra Affair solidified Saddam’s distrust of the US.18 Always wary of American intentions towards himself and Iraq, after 1986 Saddam became convinced that the US would not allow him and his Ba’ath party to rule Iraq indefinitely and would attempt to topple him 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Encyclopedia Britannica, “Iran-Iraq War,” September 2008. Accessed December 20, 2016. https://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-Iraq-War 16 Brands and Palkki, “Conspiring Bastards,” 652-655. 17 Brands and Palkki, “Conspiring Bastards,” 625-659. 18 Ibid, 640-645. from power.19 This conviction, a desire to strengthen Iraq through weakening an American ally and acquiring their wealth, and the fact that Iraq owed Kuwait enormous debts because of the war all factored into Saddam’s decision in 1990 to invade Kuwait, prompting the First Gulf War.20 1st Gulf War In August 1990, the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait. Iraq’s forces were more experienced, often better equipped and far outnumbered the beleaguered Kuwaiti military, and within two days Iraq more or less controlled the entire country.21 The UN Security Council and the Arab League attempted to diffuse the situation and diplomatically pressure Iraq into withdrawing its forces. While this was happening, the US had Figure 2: Map of Coalition Movements During the First Gulf launched an enormous military build-up called War. Retrieved from operation Desert Shield in Saudi Arabia, at the http://smattinglywarandpeace.weebly.com/first-gulf- Saudi King Fahd’s request, and elsewhere war.html throughout the Persian Gulf.22 This was to prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia, with whom tensions had been rising, and gaining control of more than half the world’s oil reserves. However, by January 1991 diplomatic efforts had reached a standstill, and an American backed coalition initiated operation Desert Strom, the effort to retake Kuwait. The coalition, while primarily American led, contained large contingents of British, Saudi, French and Egyptian troops, and many other states ranging from New Zealand to the Philippines to Pakistan provided troops, equipment or financial aid.23 Operation Desert 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid, 645-646. 21 Council on Foreign Relations, “The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Gulf War,” September 10, 2015. Accessed December 21, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/twenty-fifth-anniversary-gulf- war/p36954 22 Keylor, A world of Nations. 23 CNN, “Gulf War Fast Facts,” August 2, 2016. Accessed November 1, 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/15/world/meast/gulf-war-fast-facts/ Storm was militarily an enormous success.
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