Chapter 96. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (Refs & Annos) § 1964

18 U.S.C.A. § 1964 Page 1

Effective:[See Text Amendments]

United States Code Annotated Currentness Title 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Refs & Annos) Part I. Crimes (Refs & Annos) Chapter 96. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (Refs & Annos) § 1964. Civil remedies

(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.

(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.

(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, except that no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962. The exception contained in the preceding sentence does not apply to an action against any person that is criminally convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case the statute of limitations shall start to run on the date on which the conviction becomes final.

(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States.

CREDIT(S)

(Added Pub.L. 91-452, Title IX, § 901(a), Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 943; amended Pub.L. 98-620, Title IV, § 402 (24)(A), Nov. 8, 1984, 98 Stat. 3359; Pub.L. 104-67, Title I, § 107, Dec. 22, 1995, 109 Stat. 758.)

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

Revision Notes and Legislative Reports

1970 Acts. House Report No. 91-1549, see 1970 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 4007.

1984 Acts. House Report No. 98-1062, see 1984 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 5708.

1995 Acts. Senate Report No. 104-98 and House Conference Report No. 104-369, see 1995 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 679.

Amendments

1995 Amendments. Subsec. (c). Pub.L. 104-67, § 107, inserted exception providing that no person may rely upon fraudulent conduct which would have been criminally actionable under section 1962 of this title as the basis for a civil suit under this section, unless the person who committed such fraudulent conduct has been criminally convicted, in which case the statute of limitations runs from the date the conviction becomes final.

1984 Amendments. Subsec. (b). Pub.L. 98-620 struck out provision that in any action brought by the United States under this section, the court had to proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination thereof.

Effective and Applicability Provisions

1995 Acts. Amendment of this section by section 107 of Pub.L. 104-67 shall not affect or apply to any private action, arising under subchapter I (section 77a et seq.) of chapter 2A of Title 15, Commerce and Trade, or chapter 2B (section 78a et seq.) of Title 15, commenced before and pending on Dec. 22, 1995, see section 108 of Pub.L. 104-67, set out as a note under section 77l of Title 15.

1984 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 98-620 not to apply to cases pending on Nov. 8, 1984, see section 403 of Pub.L. 98-620, set out as a note under section 1657 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.

Rule of Construction

Nothing in Pub.L. 104-67 or the amendment to this section by section 107 of Pub.L. 104-67 shall be deemed to create or ratify any implied private right of action, or to prevent the Commission, by rule or regulation, from restricting or otherwise regulating private actions under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, see section 203 of Pub.L. 104-67, set out as a note under section 78j-1 of this Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

CROSS REFERENCES

Service of process, see 18 USCA § 1965.

LAW REVIEW COMMENTARIES

Adrift at sea: The muddled relationship between civil RICO and the maritime law. Robert M. Jarvis, 12 Tul.Mar.L.J. 111 (1987).

Arbitration of customer-securities broker disputes. James J. Moyland and Laren Ukman, 75 Ill.B.J. 374 (1987).

Assessment of derivative RICO actions by stockholders, limited partners and trust beneficiaries. Thomas J. Bamonte, 21 Loy.U.Chi.L.J. 153 (1989).

RICO at the border: Interpreting Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. and its effect on immigration enforcement. Note, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1243 (Summer 2007).

A trial lawyer's guide: Everything you always wanted to know about RICO before your case was dismissed. Mark E. DuVal, 1986, 12 Wm.Mitchell L.Rev. 291.

Broadening the scope of Civil RICO. Note, 20 U.S.F.L.Rev. 339 (1986).

Causation and civil RICO standing: When is a plaintiff injured “by reason of” a RICO violation? Laura Ginger, 64 St.John's L.Rev. 849 (1990).

Civil RICO, protesters, and the First Amendment: A constitutional combination. 60 Mo.L.Rev. 239 (1995).

Civil RICO and intellectual property after Sedima. Emmette F. Hale, III, 56 Miss.L.J. 567 (1986).

Civil RICO and the prior criminal conviction requirement: Has the second circuit drawn the net too tightly? Diana K. Carey, 60 Wash.L.Rev. 461 (1985).

Civil RICO comes to Texas: A review of civil RICO jurisprudence in the Fifth Circuit and in the Federal District Courts of Texas. David A. Furlow, 37 Baylor L.Rev. 841 (1985).

Civil RICO is a misnomer: The need for criminal procedural protections in actions under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964. Note, 100 Harv.L.Rev. 1288 (1987).

Civil RICO--Limitations in limbo. Robert E. Wood, 21 Willamette L.Rev. 683 (1985).

Civil RICO's cause of action: The landscape after Sedima. Douglas E. Abrams, 12 Tul.Mar.L.J. 19 (1987).

Civil RICO: Should private plaintiffs be granted equitable relief? Kristi Rae Culver, 18 Pac.L.J. 1199 (1987).

Civil RICO: The insurers fight back. Arnold D. Fielkow and Stephen P. Eisenberg, 21 Tort & Ins.L.J. 1 (1985).

Civil RICO--the scope of coverage after Sedima, John E. Grenier and Sally S. Reilly, 47 Ala.Law. 260

(1986).

Civil RICO--the Supreme Court opens the door to commercial litigation. William H. Rivoir, III, 90 Com.L.J. 621 (1985).

Clarifying a “pattern” of confusion: A multi-factor approach to civil RICO's pattern requirement. Note, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1745 (1988).

Clarifying civil RICO: Sedima v. Imrex, Co., Inc. Comment (1986) 7 U.Bridgeport L.Rev. 189.

Closing the RICO floodgates in the aftermath of Sedima. Frederick C. Boucher, 31 N.Y.L.Sch.L.Rev. 133 (1986).

Comment, Civil RICO after Sedima: An exercise in restraint. Jeffery Nelson Luthi, 22 Land & Water L.Rev. 153 (1987).

Concurrent jurisdiction over federal civil RICO claims: Is it workable? An analysis of Tafflin v. Levitt. Yolanda Eleni Stefanou, 64 St.John's L.Rev. 849 (1990).

Concurrent state court jurisdiction in private civil RICO actions after Sedima v. Imrex. Jonathan D. Mor- genstern, 15 Barrister 51 (Fall 1988).

Congress responds to Sedima: Is there a contract out on civil RICO? Comment, 19 Loy.L.A.L.Rev. 851 (1986).

Crimes by health care providers. Pamela H. Bucy, 1996 U.Ill.L.Rev. 589.

Den of inequity: The case for equitable doctrines in Rule 10b-5 cases. Comment, 81 Cal.L.Rev. 1587 (1993).

Effect of RICO on maritime arbitration. William P. Byrne, 12 Tul.Mar.L.J. 77 (1987).

Employers' RICO liability for the wrongful discharge of their employees. Laura Ginger, 68 Neb.L.Rev. 673 (1989).

Enterprise requirement: Getting to the heart of civil RICO. Comment, 1988 Wis.L.Rev. 663 (1988).

Equitable relief under civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will civil RICO be effective only against white-collar crime? G. Robert Blakey and Scott D. Cessar, 62 Notre Dame L.Rev. 526 (1987).

Exclusion of criminals from union post. John E. Sanchez. (1985) 12 W.St.U.L.Rev. 689.

Frontier of RICO standing: Interpreting RICO's conspiracy provision to realize congress' goal of creating a powerful crime-fighting weapon. 21 J.Legis. 147 (1995).

Hobbs Act and RICO: A remedy for greenmail? Note, 66 Tex.L.Rev. 647 (1988).

Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.: Standing to sue under Section 1464(c) of RICO for the se-

curities fraud plaintiff. Antonella M. Madonia, 18 Del.J.Corp.L. 923 (1993).

Illegal traffic in women: A civil RICO proposal. Lan Cao, 96 Yale L.J. 1297 (1987).

Improper civil RICO claim: If such a thing exists, can it be battled with sanctions. Elwyn Berton Spence, 51 Ala.Law. 290 (1990).

Judicial efforts to redirect an errant statute: Civil RICO and the misapplication of vicarious corporate liability. Senah Elizabeth Green, 65 B.U.L.Rev. 561 (1985).

Laying hands on religious racketeers: Applying civil RICO to fraudulent religious solicitation. Jonathan Turley, 29 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 476 (1988).

Legal prevention of equine insurance fraud--How we can stop the killing game. 22 Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 845 (1996).

Legal shakedown of legitimate business people: The runaway provisions of private civil RICO. Phillip A. Lacovara and Geoffrey F. Aronow, 21 New Eng.L.Rev. 1 (1984-1985).

Making civil RICO “suave”: Congress must act to ensure consistent judicial interpretations of the Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Comment, 47 Santa Clara L. Rev. 123 (2007).

Making civil RICO work. Frederick D. Huebner & Richard E. Spoonemore, 46 Wash.St.B.News 11 (June 1992).

Maritime RICO--A corporate counsel's concerns. Manuel R. Llorca, 12 Tul.Mar.L.J. 95 (1987).

Maritime RICO as seen by an arbitrator. Jack Berg, 12 Tul.Mar.L.J. 85 (1987).

McMahon mandate: Compulsory arbitration of securities and RICO claims. Stephen P. Bedell, Lolla M. Harrison and Stuart C. Harvey, Jr., 19 Loy.U.Chi.L.J. 1 (1987).

“Mother of mercy, is this the beginning of RICO.”: The proper point of accrual of a private civil RICO action. Note, 65 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 172 (1990).

New proposal for limiting private civil RICO. Norman Abrams, 35 UCLA L.Rev. 1 (1989).

No place to hide: Why state and federal enforcement of stalking laws may be the best way to protect abortion providers. 73 Wash.U.L.Q. 635 (1995).

Partaker or prey? Futures commission merchants under civil RICO and the Commodity Exchange Act. Note, 16 Fordham Urb.L.J. 69 (1988).

Place of procedural control in determining who may sue or be sued: Lessons in statutory interpretation from civil RICO and Sedima. Douglas E. Abrams, 38 Vand.L.Rev. 1477 (1985).

Pleading a RICO claim. David G. Duggan, 78 Ill.B.J. 454 (1990).

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Retroactive application of the RICO Amendment. Mi-

chael S. Rafford, 23 Journal of Legislation 283 (1997).

Proper application of civil RICO to patent fraud. Steven Fasman, 96 Yale L.J. 1323 (1987).

Prospective application of judicial legislation. Michael B. Dashjian, 24 Pac.L.J. 317 (1993).

Proximate cause in civil racketeering cases: the misplaced role of victim reliance. Michael Goldsmith and Evan S. Tilton, 59 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 83 (2002).

Quiet revolution: Securities arbitration confronts the hard questions. Joel Seligman, 33 Hous.L.Rev. 327 (1996).

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations. Tracy Doherty, David Druffner, Rajinder Singh, and Anna Warde, 31 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 769 (1994).

Reaching a deep pocket under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Mark S. Poker, 72 Marq.L.Rev. 511 (1989).

Requirements for pleading RICO injury. Michael C. Silberberg, 209 N.Y.L.J. 3 (June 3, 1993).

RICO: A new weapon in intellectual property law? Ronald B. Coolley, 65 Chi.B.Rec. 370 (1984).

RICO's new community of racketeers: The need for a prior criminal conviction requirement. Note, 64 Wash.U.L.Q. 229 (1986).

Seventh Circuit bestows immunity from RICO prosecutions upon anti-abortion protestors. Frans J. von Kaenel, 71 Wash.U.L.Q. 175 (1993).

Shifting the burden of losses in the securities markets: The role of civil RICO in securities litigation. Ar- thur F. Mathews, 65 Notre Dame L.Rev. 896 (1990).

Standing to sue under RICO. Edward Brodsky, 212 N.Y.L.J. 3 (Nov. 9, 1994).

Taking RICO to sea: A primer on the use of RICO for the maritime bar. Sanford E. Balick, 12 Tul.Mar.L.J. 53 (1987).

Treble damages under RICO: Characterization and computation. Note, 61 Notre Dame L.Rev. 526 (1986).

When the database is wrong ... Do consumers have any effective remedies against credit reporting agencies or information providers? David Rameden, 100 Com.L.J. 390 (1995).

Why we picketed the corporate law firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, chanting “Hands Off RICO.” Russell Mokhiber, 31 N.Y.L.Sch.L.Rev. 147 (1986).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

American Digest System

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 55-85.

Key Number System Topic No. 319H.

Corpus Juris Secundum

CJS Bankruptcy § 1045, Abuse of Bankruptcy Code Provisions; Liability for Certain Debts. CJS Federal Courts § 595, Dismissal; Judgment on the Pleadings. CJS Limitations of Actions § 286, Rico Claims. CJS RICO (Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Orgs.) § 14, Federal Offenses--Securities Fraud. CJS RICO (Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Orgs.) § 28, Standing. CJS RICO (Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Orgs.) § 29, Standing--Necessity that Injury Involve Business or Property. CJS RICO (Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Orgs.) § 31, Injury from Racketeering Activity. CJS RICO (Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Orgs.) § 32, “But-For” and Proximate Causation; Direct Injury. CJS RICO (Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Orgs.) § 38, Equitable Relief. CJS RICO (Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Orgs.) § 39, Damages. CJS RICO (Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Orgs.) § 40, Costs and Attorney's Fees.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR Library

65 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 21, Construction and Application of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) Nationwide Service of Process Provision, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965.

10 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 461, Application of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et Seq., to Terrorists and Acts of Terrorism.

15 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 315, Construction and Application of Whistleblower Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514a(A)(1).

28 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 397, Recovery of Computer-Assisted Research Costs as Part of or in Addition to Attor- ney's Fees Under Federal Fee-Shifting Statutes.

33 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 111, Pendency of Criminal Prosecution as Ground for Continuance or Postponement of Civil Action to Which Government is Party Involving Facts or Transactions Upon Which Prosecution is Predic- ated--Federal...

2005 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 3, Validity, Construction and Application of Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con- sumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).

4 ALR, Fed. 123, Timeliness of Amendments to Pleadings Made by Leave of Court Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).

4 ALR, Fed. 881, Elements of Offense Proscribed by the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1951) Against Racketeering in Interstate or Foreign Commerce.

10 ALR, Fed. 352, Application of Common-Law Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Federal Courts After Enactment of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(A) Authorizing Transfer to Another District.

23 ALR, Fed. 157, Validity, Construction, and Application of Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78aaa et seq.).

27 ALR, Fed. 407, Construction and Application of Provision of Rule 9(B), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that Circumstances Constituting Fraud or Mistake be Stated With Particularity.

29 ALR, Fed. 826, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962, Making Unlawful Certain Acts Involving “Pattern of Racketeering Activity” or “Collection of an Unlawful Debt”.

31 ALR, Fed. 833, Award of Counsel Fees to Prevailing Party Based on Adversary's Bad Faith, Obduracy, or Other Misconduct.

52 ALR, Fed. 818, What is an “Enterprise,” as Defined at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4), for Purposes of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Statute (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et seq.).

76 ALR, Fed. 199, When Will Premature Notice of Appeal be Retroactively Validated in Federal Civil Case.

82 ALR, Fed. 829, Proper Test to Determine Identity of Claims for Purposes of Claim Preclusion by Res Ju- dicata Under Federal Law.

96 ALR, Fed. 881, Recovery of Damages for Personal Injuries in Civil Action for Damages Under Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(C)).

116 ALR, Fed. 163, Exemption or Immunity from Federal Antitrust Liability Under Mccarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1011-1013) and State Action and Noerr-Pennington Doctrines for Business of Insurance and Per- sons Engaged In...

138 ALR, Fed. 393, What Matters Not Contained in Pleadings May be Considered in Ruling on a Motion to Dis- miss Under Rule 12(B)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Un- der Rule 12(C) Without...

139 ALR, Fed. 331, When Does Period for Filing Petition for Removal of Civil Action from State Court to Fed- eral District Court Begin to Run Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(B).

156 ALR, Fed. 361, Statute of Limitations in Civil Actions for Damages Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968.

172 ALR, Fed. 109, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346, Providing That, for Pur- poses of Some Federal Criminal Statutes, Term “Scheme or Artifice to Defraud” Includes Scheme or Artifice to Deprive Another Of...

188 ALR, Fed. 419, Civil Liability of Antiabortion Protesters Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO) in Light of Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1057, R.I.C.O. Bus. Disp. Guide...

2003 ALR, Fed. 1, Construction and Application of Garmon Preemption Doctrine by Federal Courts.

171 ALR, Fed. 1, Validity, Construction, and Application of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et Seq.--Supreme Court Cases.

134 ALR, Fed. 289, What is “Investment Contract” Within Meaning of § 2(1) of Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(1)) and § 3(A) (10) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(A) (10), Both Defin- ing Term...

98 ALR, Fed. 481, Validity, Construction, and Application of § 504 of Labor-Management Reporting and Dis- closure Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 504), Precluding Certain Convicted Persons from Serving in Union Office for Spe- cified...

99 ALR, Fed. 700, Immunity of Federal Tax Agent from Suit Based Upon Agent's Effort to Enforce or Collect Tax.

100 ALR, Fed. 667, Liability, Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968) for Retaliation Against Employee for Disclosing or Refusing to Commit Wrongful Act.

70 ALR, Fed. 538, Civil Action for Damages Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(C) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (Rico, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et seq.) for Injuries Sustained by Reason of Racketeer- ing...

55 ALR, Fed. 778, Requirement of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1955, Prohibiting Illegal Gambling Businesses, that Such Businesses Involve Five or More Persons.

20 ALR, Fed. 803, Construction and Application of Provision of Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (18 U.S.C.A. § 1965(A)) that Civil Action or Proceeding Under Act Against Any Person May be Instituted in Feder-

al District Court For...

3 ALR, Fed. 819, Fraud or Deceit as “In Connection With” Purchase or Sale of Securities Within Meaning of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(B) (15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(B)) and Sec Rule 10b-5.

7 ALR 6th 319, Propriety of Class Action to Recover Damages Caused by Smoking.

21 ALR 6th 515, Construction and Application of “Tail” Insurance Policies.

23 ALR 6th 223, Products Liability: Pacemakers.

25 ALR 6th 435, Validity, Construction, Application, and Effect of Master Settlement Agreement (Msa) Between Tobacco Companies and Various States, and State Statutes Implementing Agreement; Use and Distri- bution of Msa...

62 ALR 4th 654, Civil Action for Damages Under State Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Acts (RICO) for Losses from Racketeering Activity.

75 ALR 4th 13, Liability for Retaliation Against At-Will Employee for Public Complaints or Efforts Relating to Health or Safety.

55 ALR 4th 394, Commodities Broker's State-Law Duties to Customers.

36 ALR 4th 144, Validity and Effect of “Wraparound” Mortgages Whereby Purchaser Incorporates Into Agreed Payments to Grantor Latter's Obligation on Initial Mortgage.

12 ALR 2nd 695, May Federal Court, Acquiring Jurisdiction Because of Federal Question But Deciding Such Question Adversely to Party Invoking Jurisdiction, Decide Non-Federal Questions.

18 ALR 2nd 1287, Conviction or Acquittal as Evidence of the Facts on Which it was Based in Civil Action.

22 ALR 2nd 621, Failure to Assert Matter as Counterclaim as Precluding Assertion Thereof in Subsequent Ac- tion, Under Federal Rules or Similar State Rules or Statutes.

62 ALR 2nd 1369, When Does Statute of Limitations Begin to Run Against Civil Action or Criminal Prosecu- tion for Conspiracy.

79 ALR 2nd 301, Liability of Manufacturer or Seller for Injury Caused by Drug or Medicine Sold.

90 ALR 2nd 265, Federal Court's Adoption of State Period of Limitation, in Action to Enforce Federally Created Right, as Including Related or Subsidiary State Laws or Rules as to Limitations.

15 ALR 2nd 500, Effect of Fraud to Toll the Period for Bringing Action Prescribed in Statute Creating the Right of Action.

74 ALR 1280, Amendment of Pleading After Limitation Period by Substituting New Defendant, or Changing Allegations as to Capacity in Which Defendant is Sued or the Theory Upon Which Defendant is Sought to be Held Responsible For...

132 ALR 749, Comment Note.--Identity or Community of Interests Essential to Class or Representative Suit.

139 ALR 1017, Who May be Regarded as Injured in His Business or Property Within Provisions of Anti-Trust Acts as to Person Who May Recover Damages Resulting from Violation of the Acts.

140 ALR 717, Duty of Federal Courts, Since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, in Determining Ultimate Federal Ques- tion, to Follow State Laws or State Court Decisions of Substantive Character, Upon Questions Which Are Pre- liminary, Incidental...

150 ALR 778, When Statute of Limitations Commences to Run Against Action Based on Fraud in Construction, Repair, or Equipment of Building.

162 ALR 1373, Validity and Construction of Statutes Making Conspiracy to Deprive or Deprivation of Constitu- tional Right a Federal Offense.

163 ALR 1050, What Constitutes Stock, Securities, or Investment Contracts Within Contemplation of State and Federal Statutes Regulating Sale of Securities.

173 ALR 576, Comment Note.--What Constitutes Concealment Which Will Prevent Running of Statute of Lim- itations.

172 ALR 265, Pleading Avoidance of Delay in Discovery of Fraud in Order to Toll Statute of Limitations.

158 ALR 705, Power of Court to Prescribe Rules of Pleading, Practice, or Procedure.

27 ALR 549, Civil Liability of Member of a Mob.

21 ALR 961, Receivership Proceedings as Suspending Statute of Limitations.

Encyclopedias

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Monopoly, Restr. of Trade, Unf. Trade § 116.50, Complaint in Federal Court--Fraudulent Ma- nipulation of Price Indexes by Gas Trader--Excessive Natural Gas Prices Charged to Oil Company--Sherman Act and Rico Violations--Breach of.

6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1, Misrepresentation of Expertise by Tax Return Preparation Service.

35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 255, False Representation as to Quality or Character of Product.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 289, “Pattern of Racketeering Activity” Under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO).

22 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 411, Liability of Private Trade School to Student.

22 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 485, Proof of a “Security” Under Federal and State Statutes.

24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 609, Admissibility and Reliability of Laboratory Analysis of Soil, Water, and Air Samples in Environmental Litigation.

30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 249, Piercing the Limited Partner Veil.

32 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 129, Proving Fraudulent Concealment to Toll Statutory Limitations Periods.

32 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 299, Proof that an International Union Ratified Wrongdoing by One of Its Local Affiliates.

33 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 359, Sports Memorabilia Dealer's Liability to Collector.

35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 161, Proving Damages Caused by Securities Brokers' Excessive, Unsuitable, or Unauthorized Trading.

37 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 259, Liability for Airing False or Misleading Television Infomercials.

39 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 181, Cigarette Manufacturer's Liability for Mesothelioma Caused by Asbestos Fibers in Cigarette Filters.

47 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 317, Proving Insurance Coverage for Legal Malpractice Under Errors and Omis-

sions Liability Policy.

51 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 361, Liability of Real Estate Professional for Interstate Real Estate Fraud.

61 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 245, Liability of a Physician for Improper Referral of Patients to a Medical Care- Facility in Which the Physician Has a Financial Interest.

62 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 107, Proof of Internal Union Election Practices.

66 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1, Liability of Health Maintenance Organizations.

71 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 193, Enforcement of Casino Gambling Debts.

4 Am. Jur. Trials 441, Solving Statutes of Limitation Problems.

20 Am. Jur. Trials 351, Handling the Defense in a Conspiracy Prosecution.

36 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Broker-Dealer Fraud: Churning.

42 Am. Jur. Trials 1, The Appeal of a Federal Mail Fraud Conviction.

44 Am. Jur. Trials 613, Defense of Lender Liability Litigation.

45 Am. Jur. Trials 113, Third-Party Accountant Liability--Prospective Financial Statements Used in Securities Offerings.

50 Am. Jur. Trials 471, Use and Examination of Experts in Environmental Litigation.

56 Am. Jur. Trials 293, A Guide to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

78 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Chiropractic Malpractice Litigation.

86 Am. Jur. Trials 111, Arbitration Highways to the Courthouse--A Litigator's Roadmap.

91 Am. Jur. Trials 151, When Clergy Fail Their Flock: Litigating the Clergy Sexual Abuse Case.

Am. Jur. 2d Abortion and Birth Control § 112, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).

Am. Jur. 2d Costs § 10, Presumption that Prevailing Party is Entitled to Costs.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 119, Predicate Acts, Generally.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 178, Generally; Purpose.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 181, Construction.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 184, Injury to Business or Property.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 185, Prior Criminal Conviction.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 187, Participation by Plaintiff in Racketeering Activity.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 193, Pleading.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 196, Right to Jury Trial.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 198, Treble Damages.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 199, Punitive Damages.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 200, Costs and Attorney's Fees.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 202, Survival of Claim Upon Death of Defendant.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 205, Availability to Private Parties.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 206, Constitutionality.

Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts § 887, Exhaustion of Other Remedies as Necessary--Effect of State Judgment.

Am. Jur. 2d Governor § 10, Judicial Control and Review--Immunity of Governor from Suit.

Forms

Federal Procedural Forms § 61:4, Choice of Law Where Statute of Limitation Implied--Federal Law.

Federal Procedural Forms § 42:48, Restrictions on Future Activities and Investments.

Federal Procedural Forms § 61:31, Clayton Act Action--Four-Year Limitation Period Expired [15 U.S.C.A. § 15b; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(C)].

Federal Procedural Forms § 8:262, Complaint--Under Rico--For Damages--Conspiracy to Defraud Plaintiff of Proceeds Due Under Contracts [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961, 1962, 1964(C); 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1332, 1337].

Federal Procedural Forms § 9:854, Generally--Where Trustee or Debtor is Unable to Obtain Unsecured Credit.

Federal Procedural Forms § 40:882, Complaint--Rico Conspiracy and Violations of Fair Labor Standards Act- -Harboring, Transporting and Encouraging Unauthorized Aliens [8 U.S.C.A. § 1324; 18 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 1584, 1956, 1961...

Federal Procedural Forms § 12:152, Allegation in Complaint--Treble Damages for Churning of Commodities Accounts--Proceeding Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961, 1962...

Securities Litigation: Forms and Analysis § 3:3, Pleading Jurisdiction and Venue.

Securities Litigation: Forms and Analysis App 5, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

Securities Litigation: Forms and Analysis § 3:36, Fraud in Sale of Securities.

3 West's Federal Forms § 3056.40, Complaint in Class Action--Rico.

2B West's Federal Forms § 1774, Introduction.

2B West's Federal Forms § 1775, Scheme to Defraud and to Steal Jewels.

2B West's Federal Forms § 1776, Extortion, Assault, and Other Illegal Activities.

2B West's Federal Forms § 1777, Scheme to Defraud and Procure Secret Profits.

2C West's Federal Forms § 2234, Complaint for Fraud--Rico Allegations.

6B West's Federal Forms § 10506.10, Motion for Entry of Discharge--11 U.S.C.A. § 1228.

6B West's Federal Forms § 10637.10, Motion for Entry of Discharge--11 U.S.C.A. § 1328.

9A West's Legal Forms § 19:30, Affidavit in Support of Motion for Entry of Discharge.

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Abortion § 8, Complaint, Petition, or Declaration--To Enjoin Illegal Blockade of Abor- tion Clinics--Class Action.

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Gambling § 23.50, Complaint in Federal Court--Against On-Line Poker Provider- -Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Negligence, Fraud, and Other Claims--By On-Line Poker Players.

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Gambling § 23.70, Complaint in Federal Court--Class Action--To Recover Electronic Gaming Machine Losses--Illegal Gaming Operations at Dog Racing Establishment.

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Hospitals § 153, Complaint in Federal Court--Failure to Provide Medical Care- -Suspect Marketing, Billing, Accounting and Tax Practices--Rico--Pendent State Claims of Statutory Consumer Fraud, Common...

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Physicians Surgeons & Healers § 201, Complaint in Federal Court--Diversity of Cit- izenship--Negligent Spinal Surgeries and Post-Operation Physical Therapy--Conspiracy to Defraud- -Unnecessary Surgery and Care--Treble...

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Products Liability § 314, Complaint in Federal Court--Diversity of Citizenship--By Counties--Against Manufacturers of Cigarettes and Trade Associations--Fraud and Misrepresentation--Breach of Express...

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Securities Regulation § 60, Complaint in Federal District Court--Action by Investor Against Broker-Dealer Firm and Employee of Firm for Churning Customer's Account--Allegations--Violations of Racketeer...

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Securities Regulation § 86, Complaint in Federal Court--Action by Shareholders Against Directors--For Violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act...

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Stock & Commodity Exchanges § 62, Complaint in Federal Court--Allegation--Treble Damages for Churning of Commodities Accounts--Proceeding Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act...

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Subscriptions § 8.70, Complaint in Federal Court--Subscription Fraud.

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Telecommunications § 71, Complaint in Federal Court--By Television Cable Com- pany--Against Private Individual--For Injunctive Relief and Damages--For “Stealing” Cable Television Signals.

Treatises and Practice Aids

Bankruptcy Law Fundamentals § 7:6, Real Property Exemption as Homestead or Property Held by Tenants by the Entireties.

Bankruptcy Law Manual § 5:42, Limitations on Exemptions--Waiver Unenforceable, Loss and Surcharge of Ex- emptions for Misconduct.

Bankruptcy Service Lawyers Edition § 39:3, Overview of Code Section--Generally; Grounds for Denial of Dis- charge (§ 727(a)).

Bankruptcy Service Lawyers Edition § 57:53, Other Particular Circumstances or Specific Forms of Relief.

Bankruptcy Service Lawyers Edition § 26:117, Legislative History.

Bankruptcy Service Lawyers Edition § 26:122, Overview of Code Section--Other Matters.

Bankruptcy Service Lawyers Edition § 57:411, Real Party in Interest.

Bankruptcy Service Lawyers Edition § 57:433, Miscellaneous Entities as Needed Party.

Bankruptcy Service Lawyers Edition § 59:701, Matters Which Could Have Previously Been Raised; Re- Argument or Relitigation--Illustrative Particular Applications.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:37, Concurrent Jurisdiction--Between Federal and State Courts to En- force Federal Penal Laws.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 8:554, Exclusive State-Court Jurisdiction Where Federal Deposit Insur- ance Corporation Acts as Receiver of State Bank.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 9:854, Ability of Debtor to Choose Between Federal and State-Law Ex- emptions.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:132, Overview.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:134, Limitation of Actions.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:150, Rico Standing Requires Plaintiff to Show Injury and Causation.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:151, Non-Rico Standing Requirements--Securities-Fraud Cases.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:157, Where Injury is to Nonbusiness Property.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:159, Personal Injuries Do Not Confer Standing.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:162, was Plaintiff's Injury Proximately Caused by Defendant's Viola- tion?

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:164, was Plaintiff's Injury Proximately Caused by Defendant's Viola- tion?--In Other Particular Circumstances.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:173, Creditors.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:177, Shareholders and Limited Partners.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:179, Employees.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:180, Employees--Terminated for Reporting Violations.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:188, Assignees and Other Successors.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:214, Plaintiff is Not Required to Allege Organized-Crime Involve- ment.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:226, Securities Fraud.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:244, Standard of Proof.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:250, Conspiracy.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:258, Injunction.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:261, Costs and Attorney's Fees.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 47:143, Civil Remedies.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 47:144, Civil Remedies--Comparison to Relief Under Antitrust Laws.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 47:145, Institution of Action by United States.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 47:146, Institution of Action by United States--Expedition of Actions.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 47:147, Institution of Action by United States--Timeliness of Actions.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 47:151, Standard of Proof.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 62:136, Applicability of Requirement--Particular Actions or Allegations.

Mertens: Law of Federal Income Taxation § 7:92, Settlements for Lost Wages--Prior Law.

Patent Law Fundamentals § 4:14, Unfair (Improper) Means--Tort.

Securities and Federal Corporate Law § 14:7, Central Bank and Liability of Aiders and Abetters for Violations of Rule 10b-5--Implications of Central Bank Regarding Liability of Co-Conspirators for Violations of Rule 10b-5.

Securities and Federal Corporate Law § 16:1, Road to and After the PSLRA.

Securities and Federal Corporate Law App. A1, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

Securities and Federal Corporate Law App. A2, H.R. 1058 as Amended by Senate.

Securities and Federal Corporate Law App. A3, S. 240 as Reported Out of Banking Committee.

Securities and Federal Corporate Law App. A4, H.R. 1058 as Passed by House.

Securities and Federal Corporate Law App. B1, Statement of Managers' Conference Report.

Securities and Federal Corporate Law App. B3, Debate in Senate on S. 240.

Securities and Federal Corporate Law App. B8, Debate in House on H.R. 1058.

Securities and Federal Corporate Law § 13:53, Rico Non-Alternative.

Securities and Federal Corporate Law § 13:54, Rico Non-Alternative--Rico and PSLRA.

Securities and Federal Corporate Law § 13:56, Rico Non-Alternative--Rico and the Applicable Statute of Limit- ations.

Securities and Federal Corporate Law § 16:185, Rico and Other PSLRA Litigation-Related Provisions.

Securities Crimes § 5:2, Applicability and Operation.

Securities Litigation: Damages § 9:9, Implication of Private Right of Action Under Rule 10b-5--Constitutionality of § 10(B) Implied Rights of Action--Coping With the Absence of the Judicially Cre- ated § 10(B) Private Remedy.

Securities Litigation: Damages App 3, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO): Relevant Sections.

Securities Litigation: Damages § 22:1, Rico Securities Fraud.

Securities Litigation: Damages § 22:4, Rico Causation and Damages.

Securities Litigation: Damages § 22:8, Trebling Damages.

Securities Litigation: Damages § 22:9, Equitable Relief, Fees and Costs.

Securities Prac.: Fed. & State Enforcement, 2nd Ed § 7:36, Civil Rico--Overview.

Securities Prac.: Fed. & State Enforcement, 2nd Ed App 2G, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference.

Securities: Public and Private Offerings § 12:19, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

Trade Secrets Law App M, U.S. Department of Justice Licensing Guidelines: 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property; 1988 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations.

US Sec. L. Int'L Fin. Trans. & Cap. Markets 2d Ed § 13:159, Introduction.

West's Federal Administrative Practice § 808, Subject Matters Beyond the Court's Jurisdiction.

Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. § 1298, Pleading Fraud With Particularity--Extent of Requirement.

Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. § 2004, Application of the Discovery Rules.

Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. § 3806, Subsections 1391(A)(2) and (B)(2)--History of Transactional Venue.

Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. § 3929, Permissive Interlocutory Appeals--§ 1292(B).

Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. § 4403, Policies and Sources of Res Judicata.

Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. § 4515, Areas of Competence for the Formulation of Federal Common Law--Conflict Between State Law and Federal Interests.

Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. § 1251.1, Statement of Particular Matters--Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).

Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. § 2675.2, Particular Items of Cost--Attorney's Fees: Statutory Authority.

NOTES OF DECISIONS

I. GENERALLY 1-70 II. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE GENERALLY 71-210 III. COMPLAINT 211-300

I. GENERALLY

Aiders and abettors 42

Business or property 12 Causation 13, 14 Causation - Generally 13 Causation - Proximate causation 14 Conspiracy 41 Constitutionality 1 Construction 2 Construction with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 Construction with other laws 3 Corporations, persons liable 35 Criminal indictment or conviction 15, 16 Criminal indictment or conviction - Generally 15 Criminal indictment or conviction - Fraud 16 Elements of action 11 Enterprise 17 Enterprises, persons liable 36 Exceptions, preemption 8 Fraud, criminal indictment or conviction 16 Governmental entities, persons liable 37 Indirect injury 19 Injury 18-26 Injury - Generally 18 Injury - Indirect injury 19 Injury - Lost opportunity 20 Injury - Obstruction of justice 21 Injury - Personal injury 22 Injury - Predicate act injury 23 Injury - Racketeering activity injury 24 Injury - Racketeering enterprise injury 25 Injury - Racketeering proceeds injury 26 Investment of income 27 Investment of racketeering proceeds, injury 26 Law governing 6 Lost opportunity, injury 20 Mens rea 28 Obstruction of justice, injury 21 Organized criminal activity 29 Pattern of racketeering activity 31 Personal injury 22 Persons liable 34-37 Persons liable - Generally 34 Persons liable - Corporations 35 Persons liable - Enterprises 36 Persons liable - Governmental entities 37 Predicate act injury 23

Preemption 7, 8 Preemption - Generally 7 Preemption - Exceptions 8 Principals and agents 38 Proximate causation 14 Purpose 5 Racketeering activity 30 Racketeering activity injury 24 Racketeering enterprise injury 25 Racketeering proceeds injury 26 Reliance 32 Remedial nature of section 9 Respondeat superior 39 Retroactivity 10 Separation of powers 8a Use of racketeering proceeds, injury 26 Vicarious liability 40 Wrongful discharge 33

1. Constitutionality

Punitive damages award of $1 million violated Due Process Clause in civil action brought under Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act and state racketeering statute, which arose from long-distance telephone service provider's including in its long-distance bills fees charged by company that conducted telephone gambling game, which provider had agreed to bill and collect for company; while provider's actions were reprehensible, plaintiff's actual damages were only $115, warranting reduction of award to $250,000, still sufficient to promote state's interest in deterring fraud and illegal gambling. Kemp v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., C.A.11 (Ga.) 2004, 393 F.3d 1354. Constitutional Law 4427; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 85; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 118

Investors met their burden for constitutional standing, that their injuries were fairly traceable to banks' conduct, in lawsuit against banks alleging state law claims as well as federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions (RICO) claims arising from Ponzi scheme orchestrated by lawyer, by alleging that attorney would have been disbarred promptly, and investors would have ceased investing in attorney's scheme, if banks would have met their escrow account reporting requirements. Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 318 F.3d 113, as amended , certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 532, 540 U.S. 1012, 157 L.Ed.2d 424, on remand 2005 WL 2064088. Deposits And Escrows 13; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

This section is not unconstitutionally vague inasmuch as kinds of activity to which an injunction may be addressed are described with sufficient particularity in substantive provisions. U. S. v. Cappetto, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1974, 502 F.2d 1351, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 1121, 420 U.S. 925, 43 L.Ed.2d 395. Constitutional Law 1133; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Pattern of racketeering activity element, as incorporated by reference to provision in Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), was not unconstitutionally vague, since element was not too broad to give reasonable person notice of prohibited conduct, RICO's substantive provisions described prohibited activity with sufficient particularity, and any ambiguity was cured by RICO provision defining pattern of racketeering activity with reference to definite number of acts of racketeering activity within specified time periods. Buchanan County, Virginia v. Blankenship, W.D.Va.2008, 545 F.Supp.2d 553. Constitutional Law 1133; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Plaintiffs' use of statistical evidence to establish liability and damages did not violate cigarette manufacturers' right to due process in class action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleging that manufacturers induced smokers to buy “light” cigarettes by falsely representing that they would experience reduced health risks, where class included tens of millions of individuals, probabilistic evidence was likely to be as accurate as particularistic evidence, and plaintiffs' claims could not be economically tried individually. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., E.D.N.Y.2006, 449 F.Supp.2d 992, reversed 522 F.3d 215. Constitutional Law 4002; Evidence 150

Government's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against cigarette manufacturers and tobacco-related entities alleging conspiracy to deceive public regarding harmfulness of tobacco products, addictiveness of nicotine, and possibility of manufacturing safer products did not impermissibly request court to commission federal personnel to enforce local and state ordinances in violation of the Tenth Amendment; Government denied it sought any such relief, and there was no evidence to the contrary. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, D.D.C.2004, 316 F.Supp.2d 19. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69; States 4.16(1)

Government's fraud-based claims against cigarette manufacturers under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO), alleging unlawful conspiracy to deceive American public, were not precluded under separation of powers doctrine on theory that Congress had via tobacco-specific legislation created regulatory scheme reserving for itself alone authority to regulate tobacco; RICO action was brought to enforce RICO, not to regulate tobacco industry, and application of RICO to tobacco-related entities did not logically imply ban on tobacco or otherwise irreconcilably conflict with Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) or other legislation. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc, D.D.C.2004, 310 F.Supp.2d 68. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO's) pattern requirement was unconstitutionally vague as applied to attorneys and family members who allegedly participated in enterprise to deplete grandmother's estate of assets that would have passed under residuary clause of grandmother's will to inter vivos trust of which grandchildren were beneficiaries; dispute involved family members and property that should or should not have remained in grandmother's estate, which was far removed from RICO's intended scope of coverage. Firestone v. Galbreath, S.D.Ohio 1990, 747 F.Supp. 1556, affirmed in part on other grounds 976 F.2d 279, rehearing denied , certified question answered 616 N.E.2d 202, 67 Ohio St.3d 87, answer to certified question conformed to 25 F.3d 323, on remand 895 F.Supp. 917. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to

broker accused of wrongful activities in connection with sale of limited partnership interests, despite claim that use of term “pattern of racketeering” did not provide adequate notice that broker's sale could be combined with others, made by different brokers a year later after broker had left office, for purposes of establishing liability. Beck v. Edward D. Jones & Co., C.D.Ill.1990, 735 F.Supp. 903. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 2

Twenty-first Amendment did not bar Government's civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act where Government sought no more, and no less, than prevention and restraint of future implementation of scheme which had incidental effect on alcoholic beverage trade within state. U.S. v. Ianniello, S.D.N.Y.1986, 646 F.Supp. 1289, affirmed 824 F.2d 203. Intoxicating Liquors 2.1

2. Construction

The phrase “by reason of,” as used in the provision for treble damages and attorney fees under the Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which states that [a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of [enterprise activity provision] of this chapter may sue therefor,” means causation under the traditional tort requirements of proximate or legal causation, as opposed to mere factual or “but for” causation. Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., LLC, C.A.8 (Mo.) 2004, 387 F.3d 721. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 62

Though this chapter was intended to be broadly construed, the provision of subsec. (c) of this section for a private right of action for treble damages to anyone injured “by reason of” a violation of section 1962 of this title must be interpreted by careful attention to the purposes of subsec. (c) of this section and there must be avoidance of a slavish literalism allowing civil actions, which have traditionally been brought in state courts, to be brought into federal court. Noland v. Gurley, D.C.Colo.1983, 566 F.Supp. 210. Commerce 80

3. Construction with other laws

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provides a private right of action for treble damages to any person injured in his business or property by reason of the conduct of a qualifying enterprise's affairs through a pattern of acts indictable as mail fraud. Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., U.S.2008, 128 S.Ct. 2131, 553 U.S. 639, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59; Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Suit under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), claiming that group insurer secured discounts for hospital services that it neither disclosed nor passed on to policy beneficiaries, would not “impair” Nevada law and therefore was not precluded by McCarran-Ferguson Act, despite differences in federal and state remedial regimes; RICO advanced state's interest in combating insurance fraud, did not frustrate any articulated Nevada policy or proscribe conduct that state insurance laws permitted, and its private right of action and treble damages provision appeared to complement Nevada's statutory and common-law claims for relief. Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, U.S.Nev.1999, 119 S.Ct. 710, 525 U.S. 299, 142 L.Ed.2d 753. Insurance 1103; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 10; States 18.41

Cigarette manufacturers could be held to higher standard of proof reserved for claims of mootness based on voluntary compliance, despite passage of Tobacco Control Act that subjected manufacturers to comprehensive regulatory oversight of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) after court issued injunctions under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) that applied to similar conduct, since manufacturers had history of non-compliance with various legal requirements. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., C.A.D.C.2012, 686 F.3d 832, 402 U.S.App.D.C. 34. Antitrust and Trade Regulation 282

Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) precluding use of securities fraud as predicate violation under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) barred minority shareholders' civil RICO claim against company's directors and lawyers related to sale of company's assets to another company and the subsequent diminution of the value of their shares; allegations that company's directors defrauded minority shareholders from receiving purchasing company's stock as provided in the transaction due to subsequent sale of purchasing company described a purchase and sale of securities. Bixler v. Foster, C.A.10 (N.M.) 2010, 596 F.3d 751. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), that insurer discontinued payment of long-term disability (LTD) benefits as part of racketeering scheme involving intentional and illegal policy of rejecting expensive payouts to disabled insureds, would not impair New Jersey's state insurance scheme, and thus McCarran-Ferguson Act reverse-preemption did not apply, since state's scheme was not intended to be exclusive in light of available state common law and statutory remedies, RICO would not disturb or interfere with state insurance regime, and RICO's provisions supplemented available state statutory and common-law claims for relief. Weiss v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., C.A.3 (N.J.) 2007, 482 F.3d 254, on remand 2008 WL 755958. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55; States 18.41

Civil proceedings authorized by this section are not designed as alternatives to criminal prosecutions to serve when requisite proofs are lacking. U. S. v. Cappetto, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1974, 502 F.2d 1351, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 1121, 420 U.S. 925, 43 L.Ed.2d 395. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55; Torts 436

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) barred Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim alleging that members of panel assembled by banking trade association were part of association in fact, whose purpose was to cause association to set London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) interest rate benchmark artificially low by each defendant's misrepresentation of its expected borrowing costs, and thereby to allow defendants to increase their net interest revenues by making artificially low payments to investors; at least with regard to LIBOR-based financial instruments they purchased from defendants that were securities, conduct alleged by plaintiffs could have been subject of suit for securities fraud brought by Securities and Exchange Com- mission (SEC), and though certain of the alleged predicate acts might not have been actionable as securities fraud, plaintiffs unambiguously alleged that defendants' conduct constituted a single fraudulent scheme. In re LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation, S.D.N.Y.2013, 2013 WL 1285338, reconsideration denied 2013 WL 4504769. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 11

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's (PSLRA) Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) amendment barred civil RICO claims, based on predicate acts of securities fraud undertaken to keep

Ponzi scheme alive, regardless of whether the securities were foreign or traded on an American stock exchange. Picard v. Kohn, S.D.N.Y.2012, 907 F.Supp.2d 392. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 11; Securities Regulation 67.12

Home purchasers' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against vendor, mortgage lender, and others, alleging that defendants obtained inflated appraisals for homes, in order to complete sales at above-market prices was not barred as actionable securities fraud claim under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), absent allegations that investors in the secondary markets relied on vendor's and lender's deceptive acts. Johnson v. KB Home, D.Ariz.2010, 720 F.Supp.2d 1109. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 11

Investors' claims for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against corporation and others, arising from alleged Ponzi scheme orchestrated around selling of corporation's publicly traded securities, relied on conduct actionable as fraud in purchase or sales of securities, and thus were barred by Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), although investors alleged mail and wire fraud as predicate acts, where all of defendants' alleged conduct occurred in connection with the purchase or sales of corporation's stock. Armstrong v. American Pallet Leasing Inc., N.D.Iowa 2009, 678 F.Supp.2d 827. Securities Regulation 60.15

Variable annuity contracts, whose funds were invested in various sub-fund portfolios of stocks, bonds and mutual funds and whose expected return was to be profits coming solely from the efforts of others, were “investment contracts” under Howey, and thus, were “securities” under federal securities laws; therefore, a fraud in connection with their purchase and sale could not constitute a predicate offense under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO). Luzerne County Retirement Bd. v. Makowski, M.D.Pa.2007, 627 F.Supp.2d 506 . Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11; Securities Regulation 5.30

California provided for robust policy in favor of vindicating rights of private plaintiffs damaged by insurer's unlawful conduct, and thus McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar purchasers' claim that insurance company and its agents violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in scheme to defraud senior citizens into purchasing deferred annuities that were inappropriate for them, even though California did not provide statutory private right of action to enforce its insurance code; plaintiffs were permitted to bring common law fraud and breach of contract claims against insurers for same conduct. In re National Western Life Ins. Deferred Annuities Litigation, S.D.Cal.2006, 467 F.Supp.2d 1071. Annuities 13; Insurance 1105; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55; States 18.41

Defendants whose assets were placed in receivership in Canadian class action failed to show that there was a reasonable possibility that they would prevail in receiver's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action, as required to order receiver to post security for costs under California law; inference regarding merits of defendants' case could not be drawn from receiver's failure to obtain a temporary restraining order on an ex parte basis or evidence that one defendant passed a polygraph test, and receiver's first amended complaint had survived a motion to dismiss. A. Farber and Partners, Inc. v. Garber, C.D.Cal.2006, 417 F.Supp.2d 1143. Costs 105

Physician, physician's assistant and emergency room patient, who were not engaged in the interstate transportation of goods, or in the sale of merchandise flowing through interstate commerce, failed to state Hobbs Act claims against county health defendants as a predicate for civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) liability; none of the factual allegations of proposed complaint identified any property “obtained” or acquired from the plaintiffs by county, health district, or any of the named individual defendants with plaintiffs' consent “induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right” nor did any allegations describe conduct of the kind of “organized crime, gang activity, or wide-ranging criminal activity” on the part of the named defendants that Congress had in mind in enacting the Hobbs Act. Ma- cArthur v. San Juan County, D.Utah 2005, 416 F.Supp.2d 1098, appeal dismissed 495 F.3d 1157. Extortion 33

Application of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to action challenging termination of long-term disability (LTD) insurance benefits would invalidate, impair, or supersede New Jer- sey's Insurance Trade Practices Act (ITPA), and thus, RICO claim was barred by the McCarran-Ferguson Act; ITPA did not permit a private right of action for nonpayment of benefits. Weiss v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., D.N.J.2005, 416 F.Supp.2d 298, reversed and remanded 482 F.3d 254, on remand 2008 WL 755958. Action 3; Insurance 1103; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55; States 18.41

Acts of mail fraud and wire fraud alleged in plaintiffs' complaint under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO), i.e., that investment bank used telephone and mail to make numerous misrepresentations and fraudulent omissions regarding tax shelters marketed and sold to plaintiffs, involved conduct that was actionable as securities fraud for those plaintiffs who allegedly were induced to purchase or sell securities as key part of tax shelter strategy, and thus, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's (PSLRA) amendment of RICO prohibited those plaintiffs from relying upon such conduct as predicate for RICO claims against investment bank. Blythe v. Deutsche Bank AG, S.D.N.Y.2005, 399 F.Supp.2d 274. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 11

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) precluded securities fraud claims from serving as predicate acts under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and thus fraudulent advice provided by law firm to investors in connection with tax shelter strategy could not violate RICO, despite investors' contention that securities transactions they engaged in were wholly separate from allegedly fraudulent tax advice, where strategy required investors to acquire marketable securities, and investors presented strategy as single, unified product. Stechler v. Sidley, Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P., S.D.N.Y.2005, 382 F.Supp.2d 580. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Allegations that bank facilitated securities fraud by providing banking services, including the creation of a master account system and the issuance of debit cards, did not state a claim actionable under the securities laws, and thus claims against bank brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) were not precluded on they were actionable as securities fraud; bank's alleged conduct did not involve misstatements or omissions by bank in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, and was no more than aiding and abetting. OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe Intern., Inc., S.D.N.Y.2005, 354 F.Supp.2d 357, reconsideration denied 2005 WL 309758, opinion adhered to on reconsideration 2005 WL 309755. Securities Regulation 60.18

Internet service providers (ISPs) who were entitled to safe harbor protections of Digital Millennium Copyright Act could not be held liable to copyright owner for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims that were based solely on predicate acts of criminal copyright infringement. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, C.D.Cal.2004, 340 F.Supp.2d 1077, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1568, affirmed in part , reversed in part and remanded 481 F.3d 751, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, amended and superseded on denial of rehearing 488 F.3d 1102, certiorari denied 128 S.Ct. 709, 552 U.S. 1062, 169 L.Ed.2d 553. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 5

Investor's claim that investment firm violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by inducing him to attempt to reduce his tax liability by use of basis shifting tax shelters was barred by Private Se- curities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), despite investor's contention that firm's predicate acts of mail and wire fraud were for purpose of inducing him to pay substantial fees to firm, where predicate acts alleged breaches of duty coincident with securities transactions that were part of tax strategy offered by firm. Jacoboni v. KPMG LLP, M.D.Fla.2004, 314 F.Supp.2d 1172. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

McCarran-Ferguson Act did not preclude action against workers' compensation insurer under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) arising from insurer's alleged scheme to defraud employers by charging premiums in excess of state filed rates, as application of RICO did not directly conflict with any state regulation, but rather complemented states' regulations by enforcement. Sandwich Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reli- ance Nat. Indemnity Ins. Co, S.D.Tex.2000, 111 F.Supp.2d 867. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 10; States 18.41; Workers' Compensation 1072

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, as applied to secured lender's force placed insurance for borrowers, would not invalidate, impair, or supersede any Illinois state law for regulating business of insurance, and, thus, McCarran-Ferguson Act permitted borrower's RICO action against secured lender, even if challenged conduct constituted business of insurance; overlap resulting from violation of federal and state law would not violate McCarran-Ferguson Act, and nothing indicated that Illinois law permitted finance company to charge borrowers for unauthorized insurance or improperly keep rebates. Moore v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., N.D.Ill.1995, 884 F.Supp. 288. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7; States 18.41

Because the language of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) authorizing suit by any person injured in his business or property by reason of violation of Act tracks § 4 of Clayton Act, rules established in antitrust cases for identifying proper plaintiffs should be applied to RICO, too. Attick v. Valeria Asso- ciates, L.P., S.D.N.Y.1992, 835 F.Supp. 103. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

For purposes of determining whether McCarran-Ferguson Act precluded Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) action, application of RICO would invalidate, impair, or supersede insurance regulations of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; there was no private cause of action available for violation of Pennsylvania Unfair Insurance Practices Act (PUIPA) or any Pennsylvania insurance regulations, and while common-law causes of action available prior to enacting the PUIPA continued to be viable options for aggrieved insureds, they did not reward plaintiffs with treble damages, costs, and attorney fees mandated by RICO. Wexco Inc. v. IMC, Inc., M.D.Pa.1993, 820 F.Supp. 194. Insurance 1103

RICO does not create exception to full faith and credit statute. Reeder v. Kermit Johnson, Alphagraphics, Inc., D.Utah 1989, 723 F.Supp. 1428. Judgment 828.4(1)

Former employees' claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, that employer, company that acquired division and division's vice-president/general manager engaged in conspiracy to defraud employees of their employment, pension benefits and seniority rights as division employees in order that acquiring corporation and vice-president could directly and indirectly acquire and maintain control over interest in employer's division was preempted by National Labor Relations Act; underlying fraudulent scheme was wrongful only by virtue of labor laws. Brown v. Keystone Consol. Industries, Inc., N.D.Ill.1988, 680 F.Supp. 1212. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 12; States 18.15

Delaware state law controlled on question of whether amended complaint filed by stockholder in derivative suit sufficiently alleged that board of directors wrongfully rejected stockholder's demand, despite stockholder's allegation of violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, a federal statute, since nothing in RICO or its legislative history indicated that policy underlying RICO was inconsistent with Delaware law of director termination of derivative litigation. Allison on Behalf of General Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., D.C.Del.1985, 604 F.Supp. 1106, affirmed 782 F.2d 1026. Federal Courts 414

Since language of this section providing for private right of action for treble damages to any one injured “by reason of” a violation of this chapter is nearly identical to similar language in Clayton Antitrust Act, section 15 of Title 15, and since Congress retained language long after it had decided that this chapter should be enacted as independent statute, analogy to antitrust law is most logical point of departure in fashioning well-reasoned construction of treble damages action under this section. Harper v. New Japan Securities Intern., Inc., C.D.Cal.1982, 545 F.Supp. 1002. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Fact that Clayton Antitrust Act, sections 12 to 27 of Title 15, makes civil or criminal antitrust judgment rendered in favor of United States prima facie evidence against losing defendant in subsequent actions by any party, together with fact that this section's civil remedies are patterned after antitrust laws, does not indicate that Con- gress wished to deny private plaintiffs benefits of collateral estoppel in civil suits for treble damages arising from racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. Anderson v. Janovich, W.D.Wash.1982, 543 F.Supp. 1124. Judgment 644

Class action was superior to other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of controversy, for purposes of determining maintainability of class action alleging that New York village and several of its present and former officials and employees created scheme whereby, under color of law, they purported to enforce traffic and other laws and collect purported fines for alleged violations of those laws through a distinct enterprise in violation of, inter alia, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and §§ 1983. Coco v. Incor- porated Village of Belle Terre, E.D.N.Y.2005, 233 F.R.D. 109, leave to appeal denied 448 F.3d 490. Federal Civil Procedure 181

Doctrine of in pari delicto barred trustee for litigation trust, which was created pursuant to confirmed Chapter 11 plan and held estate's claims, from asserting against debtors' prepetition counsel claims for violations of Racket-

eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and Idaho's RICO statute, conspiracy to violate federal and Idaho RICO statutes, professional malpractice, and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty owed to debtors, given complaint's allegations that debtors' entire structure was fraudulent, that debtors became nothing more than elaborate Ponzi scheme to defraud investors, purportedly operating as single enterprise, and that debtors played essential role in scheme by distributing misleading information and misappropriating investor funds. Zazzali v. Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., D.Del.2012, 482 B.R. 495. Bankruptcy 2154.1; Bankruptcy 3570

Creditor's claim for damages in its Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against Chapter 13 debtors was “debt,” within meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. In re Huelbig, D.R.I.2004, 313 B.R. 540. Bankruptcy 2021.1

4. Construction with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Highway paving contractor waived on appeal civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) officials and engineering contractors who tested contractor's asphalt for lime content, following dismissal of RICO claim on District Court's partial grant of defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings based on contractor's failure to plead direct reliance on defendants' alleged misrepresentations about the lack of lime in the asphalt, despite subsequent Supreme Court decision in Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., holding that plaintiffs who had not themselves relied on the misrepresentations could bring a civil RICO claim based on mail or wire fraud, where contractor failed to notify District Court of Bridge decision prior to entry of final judgment in the case, which was almost two years after the RICO claim was dismissed and 15 months after the Bridge case. Douglas Asphalt Co. v. QORE, Inc., C.A.11 (Ga.) 2011, 657 F.3d 1146. Federal Courts 615

Borrowers failed to adequately plead Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) cause of action predicated on mail and wire fraud against lender banks, insofar as their conclusory allegations of fraud did not comply with federal civil rule requiring that allegations of fraud be pled with specificity and their specific allegations regarding particular transactions did not amount to fraud; purportedly fraudulent credit agreements did not define term “prime rate” as lowest interest rate available to bank's most creditworthy borrowers. Lum v. Bank of America, C.A.3 (N.J.) 2004, 361 F.3d 217, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 271, 543 U.S. 918, 160 L.Ed.2d 203. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Request for attorney fees in civil RICO action was timely where made within 20-day time limit prescribed by local rules, even though not made within 10 days as would be required if it were a motion to alter or amend judgment. Morley v. Cohen, C.A.4 (Md.) 1989, 888 F.2d 1006. Federal Civil Procedure 2742.5

Predicate acts of fraud, required for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, were not pleaded with degree of particularity required by civil procedure rule governing fraud pleading, when allegedly defrauded investor made general fraud allegations against investment promoters, without providing details as to date, or as to which promoter was responsible for particular statement. Ageloff v. Kiley, S.D.Fla.2004, 318 F.Supp.2d 1157. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Both requirements of Rule mandating particularity in pleading of fraud and liberal notice pleading philosophy of federal Rules apply to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims based upon fraud. Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Kapoor, N.D.Ill.1993, 814 F.Supp. 720. Federal Civil Procedure 636; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Commonality requirement for class action certification was satisfied, in suit by landowners in three states claiming that telecommunications company exceeded easements for passage of cable over their properties by transmitting fiber optic information signals as well as electricity; common to all landowners was claim that company violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Corley v. Entergy Corp., E.D.Tex.2004, 220 F.R.D. 478, subsequent determination 222 F.R.D. 316, affirmed 152 Fed.Appx. 350, 2005 WL 2600177. Federal Civil Procedure 186

Derivative action requirements of Federal Rule 23.1 apply to shareholder suits brought under RICO [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.]. Nordberg v. Lord, Day & Lord, S.D.N.Y.1985, 107 F.R.D. 692. Corporations And Business Organizations 2020

5. Purpose

Congress intended Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act's civil remedies to help eradic- ate organized crime from social fabric by divesting association of fruits of ill-gotten gains. Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., C.A.3 (N.J.) 1991, 937 F.2d 899. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55

Purpose of civil RICO liability does not extend to deterring any illegal act, such as retaliatory firings, for which there are state and common-law remedies. Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1990, 897 F.2d 21, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 655. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55

In a civil RICO action in which a predicate offense already had a well-developed private right of action under federal law, RICO simply expanded the range of remedies by allowing for treble damages and attorneys' fees, but did not summarily overturn settled law. International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, C.A.4 (Va.) 1987, 812 F.2d 149. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55

Purpose of amendment to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) which limited private actions by providing that persons injured in business or property by violation may not rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in purchase or sale of securities to establish violation was to prevent duplicative recovery for injuries arising out of securities fraud. District 65 Retirement Trust for Members of Bureau of Wholesale Sales Representatives v. Prudential Securities, Inc., N.D.Ga.1996, 925 F.Supp. 1551. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Civil provisions of this chapter were not enacted for purpose of imposing federal liability for state business fraud claims but, rather, primary intent of Congress was to combat infiltration of organized crime into legitimate businesses operating in interstate commerce. Seville Indus. Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp., D.C.N.J.1983, 567 F.Supp. 1146, affirmed in part , reversed in part 742 F.2d 786, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct.

1179, 469 U.S. 1211, 84 L.Ed.2d 327. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Treble damages provision within subsec. (c) of this section is designed to protect those whose businesses have been infiltrated and damaged by the offenses proscribed in section 1962 of this title. Noland v. Gurley, D.C.Colo.1983, 566 F.Supp. 210. Commerce 80

Congress, in drafting this section providing cause of action for any person injured in his business or property, did not intend to provide additional remedy for already compensable injury. Johnsen v. Rogers, C.D.Cal.1982, 551 F.Supp. 281. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Congress did not intend this section to afford remedy to every consumer who can trace purchase of product to violation of section 1962 of this title, prohibiting person employed by or associated with interstate enterprise from conducting enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity. Van Schaick v. Church of Sciento- logy of California, Inc., D.C.Mass.1982, 535 F.Supp. 1125. Commerce 82.6; Criminal Law 1220; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

6. Law governing

Any requirement that RICO plaintiff be an innocent party need not turn on any uniform federal common-law rule but, rather, should be based on determination under state law of whether the party seeking to recover is “innocent.” Roma Const. Co. v. aRusso, C.A.1 (R.I.) 1996, 96 F.3d 566, on remand 1998 WL 156708. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

In savings and loan association's action against bank in which association alleged both RICO and common-law fraud claims, bank's right to indemnity under RICO claim was governed by federal law, but state law controlled bank's claim to indemnity with respect to common-law fraud claim. Central Illinois Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dupage County Bank of Glendale Heights, N.D.Ill.1985, 622 F.Supp. 1493. Indemnity 24

Boxing champion who was awarded damages on his claims against promoters and their principal for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was entitled to amend judgment and bifurcate damages to ensure enforceability of majority of judgment in Great Bri- tain, where principal lived and maintained most of his assets, given possibility that Great Britain would not hon- or judgment including treble damages awarded to champion under RICO. Panix Productions, Ltd v. Lewis, S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 21659370, Unreported. Federal Civil Procedure 2651.1

7. Preemption--Generally

School Districts' civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against bank acting as custodian of districts' assets, seeking to recover monies lost as result of alleged Ponzi scheme, relied on conduct actionable as fraud in purchase or sales of securities, and thus was barred by Private Securities Litiga- tion Reform Act (PSLRA), inasmuch as districts alleged that bank's role was essential to scheme and that scheme was a securities fraud, and bank's alleged conduct constituting bank fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud

was integral part of alleged securities fraud scheme. Bald Eagle Area School Dist. v. Keystone Financial, Inc., C.A.3 (Pa.) 1999, 189 F.3d 321. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Rhode Island bribery statute did not preclude finding that developers who paid money to town officials to obtain necessary approval were innocent parties, and they thus could maintain RICO action even if there is an innocent party requirement, in view of evidence that developers made the payments as the result of coercion by town officials. Roma Const. Co. v. aRusso, C.A.1 (R.I.) 1996, 96 F.3d 566, on remand 1998 WL 156708. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Railroad employees' claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against railroad's former parent company, for allegedly inducing them to accept employment with purchaser of railroad and thereby depriving them of seniority rights and severance pay, were preempted by the Railway Labor Act (RLA); RICO claim alleging generic wire and mail fraud depended solely upon interpretation of rights created by collective bargaining agreement. Underwood v. Venango River Corp., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1993, 995 F.2d 677. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Local rule imposing time limitation of petition for attorney fees did not alter petitioner's substantive rights or conflict with federal RICO statute which authorized award of fees. Quick v. Peoples Bank of Cullman County, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1993, 993 F.2d 793. Federal Civil Procedure 25

Alleged conduct of investment managers, accountants, auditors, actuaries, and former retirement board members, who engaged in a pay-to-play scheme in which board members awarded contracts to invest or manage retirement fund assets in variable annuities in exchange for excessive commissions and charges, and political contributions to finance members' reelection campaigns and who concealed the payment of excessive commissions and excessive management fees and expense recovery charges related to the annuity contracts, was actionable as securities fraud, and therefore Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims based on such conduct were barred by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). Luzerne County Retirement Bd. v. Makowski, M.D.Pa.2007, 627 F.Supp.2d 506. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11; Securities Regulation 60.19

Employer's claim that union and union officers engaged in pattern of racketeering activity under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by committing extortionate acts to coerce it to enter a labor agreement was not preempted by the NLRA, under Garmon preemption doctrine, as Garmon preemption does not apply to federal claims. A. Terzi Productions, Inc. v. Theatrical Protective Union, S.D.N.Y.1998, 2 F.Supp.2d 485. Labor And Employment 1677(1)

Employer's allegations that unions and union members intimidated or harassed certain persons at or within vicinity of employer's mine or various other unspecified mines and failed to control actions of individual union members who engaged in intimidation or harassment constituted arguable violations of the NLRA and, as such, were relegated to exclusive jurisdiction of National Labor Relations Board (NLRB); therefore, federal labor law preempted that underlying conduct and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim based on that conduct. Buck Creek Coal, Inc. v. United Workers of America, S.D.Ind.1995, 917 F.Supp. 601. Labor And

Employment 1677(4); Labor And Employment 1967; States 18.53

RICO claims for mail and wire fraud typically are preempted by federal labor law. Mann v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, S.D.Fla.1994, 848 F.Supp. 990. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Claims by employees and labor organization stockholders that organization engaged in fraud in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NRLA), even though mail fraud, wire fraud, and extortion alleged by employees and stockholders were predicate acts under RICO; underlying fraud allegedly committed by labor organization was based on violation of labor law. Brennan v. Chestnut, D.Minn.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1469, affirmed 973 F.2d 644. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 12

Claims by employees and labor organization stockholders that organization engaged in fraud in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), even though mail fraud, wire fraud, and extortion alleged by employees and stockholders were predicate acts under RICO; underlying fraud allegedly committed by labor organization was based on violation of labor law. Brennan v. Chestnut, D.Minn.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1469, affirmed 973 F.2d 644. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 12

8. ---- Exceptions, preemption

A plaintiff asserting a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim for injury to business or property must allege actual, quantifiable injury. McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2008, 522 F.3d 215. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Only violation of federal labor law that is not preempted by National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and for which plaintiff may bring RICO claim is violation of Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) by restriction on payment and loans from employee representatives or labor organization, which is specifically listed as separate predicate act under RICO statute. Brennan v. Chestnut, D.Minn.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1469, affirmed 973 F.2d 644. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 12

8a. Separation of powers

Government was enforcing law that Congress passed and carrying out its intent, not usurping legislative function of Congress in violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, by bringing civil Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against cigarette manufacturers and tobacco-related entities alleging conspiracy to deceive public regarding harmfulness of tobacco products, addictiveness of nicotine, and possibility of manufacturing safer products, even though Congress had created distinct regulatory scheme for tobacco. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, D.D.C.2004, 316 F.Supp.2d 19. Constitutional Law 2621; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

9. Remedial nature of section

Action brought by United States pursuant to this section was remedial, not punitive, in nature and defendants were not entitled to rights guaranteed by Constitution to criminal defendants. U. S. v. Cappetto, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1974, 502 F.2d 1351, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 1121, 420 U.S. 925, 43 L.Ed.2d 395. Action 18; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55; Torts 436

Under federal common law, private claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) survives demise of plaintiff or defendant; civil RICO is remedial, rather than punitive. Epstein v. Epstein, S.D.N.Y.1997, 966 F.Supp. 260. Abatement And Revival 58(.5); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 20

10. Retroactivity

Section of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) eliminating, as predicate for civil claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), any conduct actionable as fraud in purchase or sale of securities, cannot be applied retroactively to bar civil RICO claims filed after PSLRA's effective date based on conduct occurring prior to its effective date; Congress did not expressly provide for temporal reach of RICO amendment, amendment had retroactive effect of depriving plaintiffs of right to bring RICO claims based on securities fraud and of attaching new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment, and since there was no clear Congressional intent to apply statute retroactively, traditional presumption against retroactivity applied. Scott v. Boos, C.A.9 (Nev.) 2000, 215 F.3d 940. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Section of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act eliminating, as predicate act for private cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), any conduct actionable as fraud in purchase or sale of securities, did not apply retrospectively to securities fraud-based RICO claims pending when Congress enacted the Act; there was no express prescription in statute directing its application prospectively or retrospectively, there was no intent to apply statute prospectively only, and Amendment had retroactive effect but there was no clear congressional intent, in text, policy or legislative history of Act, to apply Amendment retrospectively. Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., C.A.3 (Pa.) 1998, 161 F.3d 156, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 1460, 526 U.S. 1067, 143 L.Ed.2d 546. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Provision in Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) eliminating securities fraud as predicate act for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim applied to RICO suit which was filed after PSLRA's enactment, even if alleged fraudulent conduct occurred prior to passage of PSLRA. Metz v. United Counties Bancorp, D.N.J.1999, 61 F.Supp.2d 364. Fraud 3

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (SRA) amendments to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) did not apply retroactively to bar investors' RICO action based on securities fraud violations filed eight months after effective date of amendments; conduct on which action was based occurred prior to effective date of SRA, and statute of limitations on securities fraud action had run when SRA became effective. Gubitosi v. Zegeye, E.D.Pa.1998, 28 F.Supp.2d 298. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Section of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act amending Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to remove securities fraud claims as RICO predicate acts applies to cases filed after its enactment even when underlying conduct pre-dates the change. ABF Capital Management v. Askin Capital Management, L.P., S.D.N.Y.1997, 957 F.Supp. 1308. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Provision of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, eliminating as violation of Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) any conduct actionable as fraud in purchase or sale of securities, applied retrospectively to conduct occurring before Act was adopted. Rowe v. Marietta Corp., W.D.Tenn.1997, 955 F.Supp. 836. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Section of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act eliminating use of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) in cases alleging conduct that would have been actionable under securities laws did not apply to RICO claims pending when Reform Act was passed; application of Reform Act would not merely change forum in which plaintiffs could bring their RICO claims, but would deprive them of their day in court altogether, and there was no clear Congressional intent to apply section to cases pending when Reform Act was passed. Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., W.D.Pa.1996, 947 F.Supp. 180, on subsequent appeal 161 F.3d 156, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 1460, 526 U.S. 1067, 143 L.Ed.2d 546. Securities Regulation 2.30

Amendments to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) made by Private Securities Litiga- tion Reform Act so as to eliminate securities fraud as predicate act for RICO claim, did not apply retroactively so as to divest oil and gas well investors of their RICO claims, which were pending on date of enactment of amendments, against well operator and related defendants, alleging that defendants engaged in fraudulent schemes in connection with investors' investments; Congress did not express clear intent to endow amendments with retrospective effect, and application of amendments would result in retroactive operation by impairing right that investors possessed when they acted. Baker v. Pfeifer, S.D.Ohio 1996, 940 F.Supp. 1168. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 2

11. Elements of action

In order to state claim for treble damages as result of injury to business or property, plaintiff in Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action must prove RICO violation, injury to business or property, and that the violation caused the injury. Avirgan v. Hull, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1991, 932 F.2d 1572, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 913, 502 U.S. 1048, 116 L.Ed.2d 813. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

To make out a claim for relief, a civil RICO claimant must prove a violation of the substantive RICO statute, and injury to plaintiff's business or property by reason of the violation, and thus in addition to the element of injury, civil RICO plaintiff must prove: existence of enterprise which affects interstate or foreign commerce; that defendant was “employed by” or “associated with” the enterprise; that defendant participated in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs; and that the participation was through a pattern of racketeering activity. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, C.A.D.C.1990, 913 F.2d 948, 286 U.S.App.D.C. 182, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2839, 501 U.S. 1222, 115 L.Ed.2d 1007. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or-

ganizations 25; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 34

In order to have standing to sue under RICO civil liability provisions, plaintiff must show a violation of RICO, injury to business or property, and causation of the injury by the violation. Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1990, 897 F.2d 21, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 655. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Essential elements of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim are: (1) existence of RICO enterprise; (2) existence of pattern of racketeering activity; (3) nexus between defendant, pattern of racketeering activity or RICO enterprise; and (4) resulting injury to plaintiff, in his business or property. Stand- ard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, D.Del.1992, 821 F.Supp. 232. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 3

Plaintiff asserting civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim must, inter alia, demonstrate that he sustained injury as proximate result of one or more predicate acts constituting pattern. Jordan v. Berman, E.D.Pa.1992, 792 F.Supp. 380, affirmed in part , vacated in part 20 F.3d 1250, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Claim under civil rights conspiracy statute requires conspiracy for purpose of depriving person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the law, overt act in furtherance of conspiracy, and injury to plaintiff's person or property or deprivation of right or privilege of citizen of United States. Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, D.Conn.1992, 792 F.Supp. 161, vacated in part 991 F.2d 1039, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 185, 510 U.S. 865, 126 L.Ed.2d 144. Conspiracy 7.5(1)

Elements of a RICO claim are the conducting of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity and injury to plaintiff's business or property. Korman v. Trusthouse Forte PLC, E.D.Pa.1992, 786 F.Supp. 458. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 3

Availability of RICO's treble damages is restricted to those who can show that RICO violation was proximate cause of their injury to business or property. Sperber v. Boesky, S.D.N.Y.1987, 672 F.Supp. 754, affirmed 849 F.2d 60. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Essential elements of any civil RICO action are: existence of a RICO “enterprise”; existence of a “pattern of racketeering activity”; nexus between defendant, pattern of racketeering activity or the RICO “enterprise”; a resulting injury to plaintiff, in his “business or property.” Klapper v. Commonwealth Realty Trust, D.Del.1987, 657 F.Supp. 948, stay granted , motion to certify appeal granted 662 F.Supp. 235. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 3

To recover under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, plaintiff must have been injured by con-

duct constituting RICO violation. Robinson v. City Colleges of Chicago, N.D.Ill.1987, 656 F.Supp. 555. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Plaintiff in a civil RICO action must prove a violation of the substantive RICO provisions of section 1962 of this title and an injury to his business or property by reason of that violation; plaintiff must prove the existence of an enterprise which affects interstate or foreign commerce, that the defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise, that the defendant participated in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs, and that the participation was through a pattern of racketeering activity. Maxwell v. Southwest Nat. Bank, Wichita, Kan., D.C.Kan.1984, 593 F.Supp. 250. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 3

To make out RICO claim, plaintiff must allege that defendant, through commission of two or more acts, constituting pattern of racketeering activity, directly or indirectly invested in, or maintained an interest in, or participated in an enterprise affecting interstate commerce. Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v. Integrated Resources, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1987, 114 F.R.D. 684. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 3

There are three essential elements in a private action under this chapter: a violation of this chapter; direct injury to plaintiffs from such a violation; and damages sustained by plaintiffs. Wilcox Development Co. v. First Inter- state Bank of Oregon, N.A., D.C.Or.1983, 97 F.R.D. 440. Antitrust And Trade Regulation 958; Antitrust And Trade Regulation 963(1); Commerce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

12. Business or property

Employees alleged a business interest injured by employer's alleged practice of employing illegal workers, as would support recovery of treble damages for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), by averring that employer's practice depressed wages paid legal hourly workers. Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., C.A.11 (Ga.) 2006, 465 F.3d 1277, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1381, 549 U.S. 1260, 167 L.Ed.2d 174. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Value of client's sexual activity, allegedly performed for attorney to pay legal fees incurred in divorce proceeding, was not a property interest under Illinois law, and was not “business or property” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Doe v. Roe, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 958 F.2d 763, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Student's claim that he suffered physical and emotional injuries as result of private school officials' actions did not involve student's “business or property,” and thus was not cognizable under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO). Giannone v. Ayne Institute, E.D.Pa.2003, 290 F.Supp.2d 553. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Family members and representatives of victims of September 11 terrorist attacks failed to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), for failure to allege that they suffered “business or

property” injury, although they alleged inability to derive income from their decedents' businesses or professions. Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. and Development Corp., D.D.C.2003, 274 F.Supp.2d 86. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Injury to assets of labor union health and welfare trust funds as result of alleged conspiracy by tobacco companies and public relations firms to deceive general public about dangers of smoking was injury to “business or property” for which funds could seek recovery under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); alleged injuries included loss of financial health and stability, and inability of funds to provide their participants with effective smoking-cessation and other general health programs. Service Employees Intern. Uni- on Health and Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., D.D.C.1999, 83 F.Supp.2d 70, affirmed in part , reversed in part 249 F.3d 1068, 346 U.S.App.D.C. 74, certiorari denied 122 S.Ct. 463, 534 U.S. 994, 151 L.Ed.2d 380. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Judgment sought by plaintiff in prior action was not plaintiff's “property” within meaning of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) section requiring private plaintiff to prove that he suffered injury to his business or property. Nix v. Hoke, D.D.C.1999, 62 F.Supp.2d 110. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 59

Damages alleged by former state university football player in form of knee injury, and resulting pecuniary losses in form of voided professional football contract and medical expenses, were not compensable as damage to “business or property” for purposes of player's claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against coaching officials based on their participation in exploitative football program. Gaines v. Texas Tech University, N.D.Tex.1997, 965 F.Supp. 886. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Monetary expenses that plaintiffs allegedly incurred as direct result of their addiction to defendants' tobacco products, which expenses included lost wages, medical expenses, cost of tobacco, and costs incurred in attempting to quit smoking, did not constitute injury to “business or property” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), thus requiring dismissal of that claim; plaintiffs' core injuries were medical in nature (i.e., nicotine addiction, carcinoma, lung tumors, and lung cancer), not proprietary. Ehrich v. B.A.T. Industries P.L.C., D.N.J.1997, 964 F.Supp. 164. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Although any emotion or distress caused by termination of plaintiff's parental rights or by any other conduct of defendants was not compensable injury pursuant to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), loss of nonbusiness property, such as marital home, was sufficient to state injury as required to maintain cause of action pursuant to RICO. Reynolds v. Condon, N.D.Iowa 1995, 908 F.Supp. 1494, modified on denial of reargument, reconsideration denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Although determination of whether particular interest is considered property is usually question of state law, District Court will not adopt state interpretation of “property” that will contravene Congress' intent in enacting Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Allman v. Philip Morris, Inc., S.D.Cal.1994, 865

F.Supp. 665. Federal Courts 430

Not-for-profit corporation that claimed to represent residential real estate owners in city failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that it suffered injury to its “business or property” with regard to utility's alleged involvement in scheme to submit false information to Arizona corporation commission in order to secure approval of higher-than-proper utility rates, and, thus, corporation failed to invoke civil remedies under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in action against utility; not-for-profit corporation had not alleged that it either paid alleged excessive rates or that it had suffered injury to its business or property as result of alleged excessive rates. Sun City Taxpayers' Ass'n v. Citizens Utilities Co., D.Conn.1994, 847 F.Supp. 281, affirmed 45 F.3d 58, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 1693, 514 U.S. 1064, 131 L.Ed.2d 557. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Charitable organization was not injured in its “business or property” by reason of unpaid directors' alleged wrongful denial of economic information and honest administration, and organization lacked standing to bring action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against directors; possible economic injury resulting from withholding of “economic information” was too speculative, and there was no allegation as to discernible economic injury caused by directors' conduct, but only allegation that organization had been injured in its ability to carry out its function, which did not fall within scope of definition of business or property. Turkish v. Kasenetz, E.D.N.Y.1993, 832 F.Supp. 565, reversed 27 F.3d 23, on remand 964 F.Supp. 689. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Prisoner did not have property right to default judgment in prior civil action against state officials, as required to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against state Attorney General based on Attorney General's appointment of counsel to represent officials in prior action; even if counsel had not been appointed, officials could have petitioned court for appointed private attorney or could have litigated claims pro se. Manchester v. Rzewnicki, D.Del.1991, 777 F.Supp. 319, affirmed 958 F.2d 364. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 59

Losses alleged by investor, monetary loss as result of decrease in value of her shares of common stock due to alleged activities of brokerage firm and its registered representative were injury to “business or property” within meaning of subsec. (c) of this section. Wilkinson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., D.C.Ga.1983, 585 F.Supp. 23. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

In construing word “property” in this section, courts should be sensitive to the commercial orientation of these provisions and to Congress' obvious intention to restrict plaintiff class. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of California, Inc., D.C.Mass.1982, 535 F.Supp. 1125. Commerce 82.6; Criminal Law 1220; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55

13. Causation--Generally

Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) did not show right to sue broker-dealer existed under treble damage provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) after SIPC had received judi-

cial authorization to protect customers of broker-dealer, as link between stock manipulation, alleged as direct injury to broker-dealers, and losses to nonpurchasing customers was too remote to satisfy treble damage provision's proximate cause requirement. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., U.S.Cal.1992, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 503 U.S. 258, 117 L.Ed.2d 532, on remand 964 F.2d 924. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 62

Right to sue under treble damage provision of RICO requires showing that plaintiff was injured and that defendant's violation was proximate cause of injury suffered by plaintiff; although treble damage section could be read to require only “but for” causation, unlikelihood that Congress meant to allow all injured plaintiffs to recover weighed against giving RICO expansive reading. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., U.S.Cal.1992, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 503 U.S. 258, 117 L.Ed.2d 532, on remand 964 F.2d 924. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Convicted felon lacked standing to assert declaratory and equitable claims under the civil remedies provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the statute prohibiting conspiracy to interfere with civil rights based on an alleged conspiracy of Department of Justice employees, federal judges, and four presidents to deprive criminal defendants of their constitutional rights, since he did not allege any particularized injury that was fairly traceable to conduct by any of the named defendants, and he did not request any relief likely to redress the injury asserted. Zaleski v. Burns, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2010, 606 F.3d 51, certiorari denied 131 S.Ct. 805, 178 L.Ed.2d 546. Declaratory Judgment 300

Evidence established causation and damages, for purposes of parent corporation's Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against individual connected with enterprise existing among liability insurance purchase group and its affiliated service companies operating as continuing business unit, in connection with failure to properly forward premiums that had been paid to insure health maintenance organizations (HMOs) owned or managed by parent's subsidiary. United HealthCare Corp. v. American Trade Ins. Co., Ltd., C.A.8 (Minn.) 1996, 88 F.3d 563. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Corporate computer lessor could not maintain Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against certain officers and directors, based on claim that they had committed predicate acts by misrepresenting to lessees terms under which computers could be leased; proximate cause requirement of RICO was not satisfied, as representations in themselves would not cause harm to corporation, but required intermediary computer manufacturer to bring lawsuit for breach of its leasing agreement before harm would occur. Mendelovitz v. Vosicky, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1994, 40 F.3d 182. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Borrowers' alleged misrepresentations concerning value of secured property could not be proximate cause of lender's damages from unforeclosed loans, as needed to state civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), given that estimates of losses were based on flawed and unreasonable methodolo- gies, and five-year interval between lender's losses and alleged misrepresentation indicated that real estate market collapse was cause of losses. First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 27 F.3d 763, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 728, 513 U.S. 1079, 130 L.Ed.2d 632. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 62

Reseller of long-distance telephone services could maintain RICO action for damages incurred “by reason of” racketeering activity, based upon claim that competitor had used computer program to randomly inflate number of minutes customers' calls lasted, so as to be able to offer apparently lower base rates to reseller's customers, even though competitor claimed that any damages were sustained by reseller's customers and not by reseller. Mid Atlantic Telecom, Inc. v. Long Distance Services, Inc., C.A.4 (Md.) 1994, 18 F.3d 260, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 323, 513 U.S. 931, 130 L.Ed.2d 283. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 60

Loss of employment in rare coin business allegedly sustained by majority stockholder was too attenuated from alleged predicate acts to have been proximately caused by alleged RICO violations in connection with alleged “kickback” scheme involving conspiracy among employees and others to sell corporation over-graded coins at excessive prices where stockholder lost employment as consequence of FTC enforcement action, ensuing Chapter 11 proceeding, and independent decision of special counsel to terminate his employment; thus stockholder lacked individual standing to assert RICO claims. Willis v. Lipton, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1991, 947 F.2d 998. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Journalists allegedly injured in a bombing of a Costa Rican press conference could not recover on a claim against CIA operatives and other defendants under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), absent any evidence as to who was responsible for the bombing. Avirgan v. Hull, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1991, 932 F.2d 1572, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 913, 502 U.S. 1048, 116 L.Ed.2d 813. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 79

Private litigant can recover for racketeering injuries but injury must flow from commission of predicate acts which means that private plaintiff who wants to recover under civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) must show some injury flowing from one or more predicate acts; plaintiff cannot allege merely that act of racketeering occurred and that he lost money. Pelletier v. Zweifel, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1991, 921 F.2d 1465, rehearing denied 931 F.2d 901, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 167, 502 U.S. 855, 116 L.Ed.2d 131. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Neither predicate acts alleged by holders of option to purchase ranch nor alleged violations of the Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) itself by loan broker or others contributed to holders' inability to purchase ranch, which was caused by their inability to provide appraisal required by bank as condition for loan, and thus, holders failed to establish standing to allege RICO violation; loan-point arrangements, financing for eventual purchase of ranch after option expired, or other transactions not involving holders could not have been cause of holders' lost opportunity to purchase ranch. Marriott Bros. v. Gage, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1990, 911 F.2d 1105, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Evidence failed to establish that alleged mail fraud, wire fraud, and commercial bribery by construction lender's president and closing agent or conspiracy by owner and president proximately injured purchaser whose condominium developments failed and that president and owner engaged in actionable pattern of racketeering activity and racketeering conspiracy; president and agent allegedly committed fraud in the solicitation of deposits and allegedly caused lender to make favorable loans to those who gave personal favors; neither predicate acts nor conspiracy caused artificial increase in land values; and neither predicate acts nor conspiracy were committed

with purpose of overbuilding of condominiums in area. Zervas v. Faulkner, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1988, 861 F.2d 823. Conspiracy 19

Price increase in six stocks that were not subject of illegal insider trading, allegedly caused solely by increased attraction to takeover stocks in general as result of insider trader's success, was too remote from trader's illegal activities to hold him liable under RICO to investors in six stocks. Sperber v. Boesky, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1988, 849 F.2d 60. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Title insurance company executive vice president's initial inaction followed by alleged actions attempting to cover up alleged frauds that had already occurred and been orchestrated by agents of company did not cause the frauds in which plaintiffs lost their money, and therefore, even if vice president's actions could be imputed to majority stockholder, did not permit private right of action against stockholder under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), absent evidence that vice president was an active participant in the underlying frauds. Albright v. Attorney's Title Ins. Fund, D.Utah 2007, 504 F.Supp.2d 1187. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Alleged costs incurred by carnival midway operator in preparing bids and proposals for state fair midway contract and elevated cable lift leases did not meet cause-in-fact requirement for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) injury, as required to support operator's RICO claim against state officials; even assuming that officials alleged unlawful conduct had not taken place and that bids had been received on an even playing field, operator would have incurred same expenses. Strates Shows, Inc. v. Amusements of America, Inc., E.D.N.C.2005, 379 F.Supp.2d 817. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Fixed-base operator at municipal airport, who claimed that airport commission and municipal officials violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by fraudulently inducing it to enter a fixed-base operations contract by misrepresenting the number of annual aircraft landings and takeoffs in submissions to governmental agencies, could not establish causation element of civil RICO claim based on its reliance on documents which defendants had not yet transmitted to the relevant governmental agencies; furthermore, causation element could not be satisfied by reliance on a alleged predicate act of mail or wire fraud which was not part of a pattern of racketeering at the time it caused operator's injury. Barry Aviation, Inc. v. Land O'Lakes Municipal Airport Com'n, W.D.Wis.2005, 366 F.Supp.2d 792. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Increased health care costs incurred by counties as result of providing health care to smokers were not proximately caused by alleged unlawful conduct of cigarette manufacturers in making misrepresentations concerning health consequences of smoking and breaching duty they had assumed to cooperate in protecting public health, and thus, counties could not recover medical costs in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) action against manufacturers; any violations were not directly linked to increased health care costs given intervening link of individual smokers, whose actions were independent intervening causes of injuries to counties, and public policy requires limiting recovery under RICO to direct victims. City and County of San Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc., N.D.Cal.1997, 957 F.Supp. 1130. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 62

Reasonable fees and expenses companies incurred over course of litigation brought by multiemployer pension fund and its trustees to collect withdrawal liability under ERISA in forcing trustees to reduce their demand from inflated figure was not proximately caused by trustees' alleged racketeering activity, and therefore companies proposed counterclaim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity was legally insufficient. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union (Independent) Pension Fund v. Brotherhood Labor Leasing, E.D.Mo.1996, 950 F.Supp. 1454, amended on denial of reconsideration 974 F.Supp. 751, affirmed 141 F.3d 1167. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Requirement of injury in one's “business or property” limits availability of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO) civil remedies to those who have suffered injury in fact; there must be direct relationship between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged and only where proximate cause exists does plaintiff have standing to raise RICO claim. Baglio v. Baska, W.D.Pa.1996, 940 F.Supp. 819, affirmed 116 F.3d 467. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Alleged scheme by contractor to secure and retain contracts through bribery and extortion of foreign officials may have constituted “racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), but loss of business suffered by contractor's service sales representative in Peru when contractor refused to renew parties' contract due to representative's alleged refusal to cooperate in alleged scheme was not a proximate result of the alleged racketeering activity; rather, those proximately injured by alleged scheme would have been contractor's competitors, through lost business, or purchasers of contractor's products, through inflated prices to pay for bribes. J.S. Service Center Corp. v. General Elec. Technical Services Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1996, 937 F.Supp. 216. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Former governor's alleged racketeering activity allegedly resulting in state of West Virginia's refund to coal company of premiums paid to its black lung fund was not proximate cause of damages to state, as required to support civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; coal companies would have qualified for refund before money in fund would have been available to state for other purposes, and federal De- partment of Labor (DOL) officials, not former governor or other state employees, made all important decisions with regard to refund. State of W.Va. v. Moore, S.D.W.Va.1995, 895 F.Supp. 864. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Prospective subcontractor of unsuccessful bidder on government contract failed to establish proximate cause necessary for action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and Clayton Act against successful bidder arising from alleged fraud in obtaining contract; subcontractor's claims were merely derivative of unsuccessful bidder's rights in that successful bidder's fraud allegedly injured subcontractor only insofar as it first injured unsuccessful bidder, leaving unsuccessful bidder without contract for which to hire any subcontract- or. Anaren Microwave, Inc. v. Loral Corp., S.D.N.Y.1994, 855 F.Supp. 634, affirmed 49 F.3d 62. Antitrust And Trade Regulation 963(3); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Shareholders' RICO claim against corporation's Board of Directors and some of its present/former officers, for participation in conduct of RICO enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity was barred on prox-

imate causation/statutory standing grounds, even if harm to corporation was foreseeable; corporation was intended beneficiary and unintended victim of alleged RICO violations, independent factors in chain of causation were responsible for translation of actions into injury suffered by corporation, shareholders were not within “zone of interests” intended to be protected by RICO statute, and RICO was not intended to federalize internal corporate relations. In re Teledyne Defense Contracting Derivative Litigation, C.D.Cal.1993, 849 F.Supp. 1369. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Alleged mail and wire fraud by generic drug manufacturer's competitor in submitting abbreviated new drug applications (ANDA) in order to market generic drugs did not proximately cause manufacturer's loss and, therefore, was not actionable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even if there was no direct victim who could commence RICO action; manufacturer's alleged injury was at best speculative and dependent on intervening actions of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and competitor's customers. Barr Laboratories, Inc. v. Quantum Pharmics, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1993, 827 F.Supp. 111, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1371, reconsideration denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Alleged predicate acts by competitors in trucking industry consisting of mail and wire fraud or bribery were not “proximate cause” of plaintiff's injuries for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); although plaintiff went out of business, the alleged predicate acts were all directed at third parties, i.e., rate bureaus, Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), and customers, and any harm from alleged conspiracy would be purely contingent on how rate bureaus and ICC acted based on alleged predicate acts and then customers taking action based on ICC action. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, D.S.C.1992, 805 F.Supp. 1277, affirmed 998 F.2d 1009, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 553, 510 U.S. 993, 126 L.Ed.2d 454. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

“By reason of” language in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) statute requires plaintiff who brings civil RICO action to show how RICO violation caused his injury, and in conjunction with RICO prohibitions stated in § 1962, which centers on actions conducted through pattern of racketeering activity, “by reason of” requirement effectively forces civil RICO plaintiff to demonstrate that predicate act alleged for purposes of making out violation of § 1962 resulted in direct harm to him or her. Grafman v. Century Broadcast- ing Corp., N.D.Ill.1990, 743 F.Supp. 544. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Causal connection between injury and alleged acts of racketeering activity is requirement of standing under Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Wooten v. Loshbough, N.D.Ind.1990, 738 F.Supp. 314 , affirmed 951 F.2d 768. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Alleged damages sustained by corporation as result of mail, wire, and securities fraud committed by corporate principals, which included a dramatic drop in price of its stock, damage to its credit rating, going-concern value, and business reputation, and corporation's potential liability to its shareholders, were not “proximately caused” by alleged fraud committed by corporate principals, and thus corporation did not sustain “injury” necessary to enable corporation to recover treble damages under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act from its principals; fraud was not directed at corporation but at shareholders and investing public, and corporation's damages did not result from scheme to disseminate false information about corporation's financial health, but

rather from public revelation of fraud. In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, E.D.N.Y.1989, 714 F.Supp. 1285. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Insurer for Dalkon Shield manufacturer could not be held liable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.] for injuries caused by allegedly defective Dalkon Shield absent allegation of casual connection between racketeering offenses attributable to insurer and injuries suffered or allegation of injury to “business or property.” Campbell v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., W.D.Wis.1985, 615 F.Supp. 496. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Uncontroverted facts showed absence of requisite causal connection between violation of section 1962(c) of this title and injury allegedly caused plaintiff employees by delay in their hiring occasioned by allegedly collusive agreement between employer and rival union under which employer, in hiring workers for its brewery, favored applicants who supported rival union over others. Seawell v. Miller Brewing Co., M.D.N.C.1983, 576 F.Supp. 424. Commerce 80

Corporations which purchased waste-oil re-refining plants from defendants, but allegedly could not obtain government permits required to operate the plants due to individual defendant's criminal violations arising from his business activities, could not recover under this section, since corporations' injury was “by reason of” defendant's failure to advise them about true nature of his activities, a fraud, and fact that business that was sold may have been operated as a “racketeering enterprise” did not establish that such conduct was proximate cause of corporations' injuries. Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, S.D.N.Y.1983, 566 F.Supp. 1466. Commerce 80

14. ---- Proximate causation

Assuming that alleged violation of Jenkins Act by out-of-state online seller of cigarettes, in failing to file a report with the State listing the name, address, and quantity of cigarettes purchased from online seller by state residents, could constitute a predicate offense under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), such violation was not proximate cause of city's alleged injury from loss of tax revenues based on failure of city residents to pay city's use tax for their cigarette purchases from online seller, as required for a RICO civil claim based on the plaintiff being injured in his business or property by reason of a RICO predicate offense, because the conduct directly causing the harm to city, i.e., cigarette purchasers' failure to pay use taxes to city, was distinct from the conduct giving rise to the alleged predicate acts of fraud, i.e., the online seller's failure to file Jenkins Act reports with the State. (Per Chief Justice Roberts, with three Justices concurring and one Justice concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.) Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, N.Y., U.S.2010, 130 S.Ct. 983, 559 U.S. 1, 175 L.Ed.2d 943. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Misrepresentations of operators of a complex investment program, which purportedly allowed investors to lease thoroughbred mares, breed those mares for a season and then keep the resulting foal, and also later provided alternative mineral investment opportunities, were a substantial and foreseeable cause of the disallowance of investors' tax deductions, despite contention that investors were aware that the program had substituted less valuable quarter-horses, where investors were not aware that the entire lease program had been underfunded, that the relationship between financing entity and leasing entity precluded favorable tax treatment, and that the law firms

which prepared a supporting opening letter had concealed their financial interest in the program. In re Classic- Star Mare Lease Litigation, C.A.6 (Ky.) 2013, 2013 WL 3746220. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions 62

Proximate cause requirement for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) cause of action was satisfied, in action by regular bidders at county's auctions of tax liens against competitor alleging that competitor had engaged in pattern of mail fraud by lying to county about its violating county's single-bid-per-parcel rule; bidders were only victims and thus proper plaintiffs, since county lost no money as long as winning bidder paid back taxes and interest, and property owners were indifferent to identity of winning bidder. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. v. Bridge, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2007, 477 F.3d 928, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , certiorari granted 128 S.Ct. 829, 552 U.S. 1087, 169 L.Ed.2d 625, affirmed 128 S.Ct. 2131, 553 U.S. 639, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint sufficiently alleged that employer's hiring of illegal workers was proximate cause of employees' alleged business injury, by averring that employer's practice depressed wages paid legal hourly workers. Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., C.A.11 (Ga.) 2006, 465 F.3d 1277, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1381, 549 U.S. 1260, 167 L.Ed.2d 174. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

The issue of proximate causation in the standing context under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) is sufficiently intertwined with the merits of the RICO claim that any potential distinction between statutory standing as a jurisdictional issue and the merits issue is untenable; it would change the merits issues into limitations on jurisdiction. Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 318 F.3d 113, as amended , certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 532, 540 U.S. 1012, 157 L.Ed.2d 424, on remand 2005 WL 2064088. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Alleged injuries of multi-employer labor union health and welfare trust funds, and nation of Guatemala, which paid health care costs for treating its members' or citizens' smoking-related illnesses, were too remote to have been proximately caused by alleged conduct of tobacco companies and other defendants, and therefore, those injuries were not actionable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) or a fraud theory. Service Employees Intern. Union Health and Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., C.A.D.C.2001, 249 F.3d 1068, 346 U.S.App.D.C. 74, certiorari denied 122 S.Ct. 463, 534 U.S. 994, 151 L.Ed.2d 380. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Factual causation (i.e., “cause-in-fact” or “but-for” causation) is insufficient to confer standing under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) subsection that provides for treble damages for injuries to business or property; rather, court must use common law of proximate causation in making such standing determinations. Khurana v. Innovative Health Care Systems, Inc., C.A.5 (La.) 1997, 130 F.3d 143, vacated 119 S.Ct. 442, 525 U.S. 979, 142 L.Ed.2d 397, on remand 164 F.3d 900. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 62

RICO plaintiff must prove proximate causation in order to recover, but proximate cause is not the same thing as

sole cause; factor is “proximate cause” if it is substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causations. Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1994, 17 F.3d 1386, modified on rehearing 30 F.3d 1347, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 900, 513 U.S. 1110, 130 L.Ed.2d 784. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 62

Injury complained of by civil RICO plaintiff must be caused by a pattern of racketeering activity or by individual RICO predicate acts; the RICO pattern or acts must proximately cause the plaintiff's injury. Hecht v. Com- merce Clearing House, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1990, 897 F.2d 21, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 655. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Former employees, who claimed that defendants unlawfully transferred former employer's monies to its parent company and thus rendered former employer unable to pay promised deferred compensation, did not have standing to assert bank fraud as a predicate act of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) liability; employees' allegations did not plead a direct chain of causation between the allegedly illegal conduct and employees' alleged injury. Hill v. Opus Corp., C.D.Cal.2011, 841 F.Supp.2d 1070. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 62

Construction corporation's injury in harm to value of joint venture's contracts with city involving water pollution upgrades was not proximately caused by former associates' alleged predicate acts, including defrauding city concerning master electrician requirements, as required for civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; injuries were at best harm in the fourth step, and act of defrauding city was not directly responsible for injury. DDR Const. Services, Inc. v. Siemens Industry, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2011, 770 F.Supp.2d 627, reconsideration denied 2012 WL 4711677. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Ex-wife did not suffer any damage to her property as a proximate cause of her ex-husband's violation of Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in defrauding his employer, thereby precluding ex-wife's civil RICO claim. Murray v. Mulgrew, D.D.C.2010, 704 F.Supp.2d 45. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 62

Injury allegedly suffered by carnival midway operator when it was not awarded state fair midway contract or elevated cable lift leases was not proximately caused by state officials' alleged racketeering activity, as required to support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; intervening factors existed, such as the presence of other bidders, lack of a set selection procedure or criteria, and administrative discretion, and how selection process would have been conducted but for alleged illegal conduct was matter of speculation. Strates Shows, Inc. v. Amusements of America, Inc., E.D.N.C.2005, 379 F.Supp.2d 817. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Traditional principles of proximate causation apply to RICO cases. In re American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Deal- erships Relations Litigation, D.Md.1996, 941 F.Supp. 528. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

In order to establish standing to sue under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), plaintiff must show that its harm was proximately caused by RICO predicate acts alleged, i.e., that there was direct relationship between plaintiff's injury and plaintiff's conduct; this requires showing not only that defendant's alleged RICO violation was the but for, or cause-in-fact of his injury, but also that the violation was the legal or proximate cause. Red Ball Interior Demolition Corp. v. Palmadessa, S.D.N.Y.1995, 908 F.Supp. 1226. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), facts alleged in complaint must demonstrate that unlawful activity in question was proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries as well as actual cause; test is whether injury is reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as natural consequence. Protter v. Nathan's Famous Sys- tems, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1995, 904 F.Supp. 101. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62; Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Shareholder derivative suit could not be based on RICO claim that officers and directors had participated in racketeering activity, involving making of defamatory statements regarding former officer and director; necessary proximate cause connection between racketeering acts and harm sustained by shareholders was not present. In re American Exp. Co. Shareholder Litigation, S.D.N.Y.1993, 840 F.Supp. 260, affirmed 39 F.3d 395. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Plaintiff asserting civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) must not only demonstrate causation-in-fact, but also demonstrate proximate, or legal causation. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer- ica v. U.S. Gypsum Co., D.N.J.1993, 828 F.Supp. 287. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Convergence of deceived and injured is not required to demonstrate proximate causation for Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Trautz v. Weisman, S.D.N.Y.1993, 819 F.Supp. 282. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) pattern or predicate acts must be proximate cause of RICO plaintiffs' injuries. In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, E.D.N.Y.1993, 812 F.Supp. 338. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

To make out claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), RICO predicate acts or pattern of racketeering activity must be proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Shaw v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1990, 745 F.Supp. 982, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1523. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

To maintain private action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, pattern of racketeering activity or predicate acts must proximately cause plaintiff's injury. Miller v. Helmsley, S.D.N.Y.1990, 745 F.Supp. 932. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Cause of lost profits that minority-owned subcontractor would have earned from airport subcontract and money spent in reliance on receiving baggage-maintenance subcontract was not directly related to conduct of joint venture that was awarded airport services contract, requiring use of disadvantaged business entities (DBEs) to perform subcontracts, in making misrepresentations to government entities that it was using DBEs as subcontractors when, in fact, it was using its own affiliated companies to keep contract payments for itself, as was required to establish proximate causation in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action; direct victim of joint venture's fraudulent conduct was the federal, state, and local government entities that awarded and funded contract, not subcontractor. V-Tech Services, Inc. v. Street, C.A.3 (Pa.) 2007, 215 Fed.Appx. 93, 2007 WL 397405, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

15. Criminal indictment or conviction--Generally

There is no requirement that a private treble damages action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act can proceed only against a defendant who has already been convicted of a predicate act or of a RICO violation; hence, fact that defendant corporation, which had entered into joint venture with plaintiff and which allegedly was cheating plaintiff by overbilling, and two of its officers had not been convicted under RICO or for the charged federal mail and wire fraud statutes did not bar private RICO action; disavowing Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 and result reached in Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., U.S.N.Y.1985, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 473 U.S. 479, 87 L.Ed.2d 346, dissenting opinion 105 S.Ct. 3292, 473 U.S. 479, 87 L.Ed.2d 346. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 19

Real estate broker who brought action against title company under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.] following allegedly fraudulent real estate transaction was not required to prove that title company was criminally convicted for predicate acts to recover. Bowling v. Founders Title Co., C.A.11 (Ala.) 1985, 773 F.2d 1175, on remand 111 F.R.D. 322, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1516, 475 U.S. 1109, 89 L.Ed.2d 915. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

This section creates private right of action for parties injured by conduct involving pattern of racketeering activity, without any requirement of prior criminal conviction for such conduct. Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Busi- ness Forms, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1983, 713 F.2d 1272.

Civil racketeering cause of action did not require prior criminal conviction, relationship to organized crime, or proof of injuries outside those caused by the predicate acts. Hurst v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., W.D.Pa.1985, 613 F.Supp. 1210. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Conviction of predicate criminal offenses is not a requirement for imposing civil liability under Racketeer Influ- ence in Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c)]. Ahern v. Gaussoin, D.C.Or.1985, 611 F.Supp. 1465. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 19

In federal securities fraud action, claim brought under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968] was subject to dismissal for plaintiff's failure to allege existence of criminal convictions for predicate acts. Alkoff v. Gold, S.D.N.Y.1985, 611 F.Supp. 63. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or-

ganizations 11

Before a private civil action may be maintained under RICO, there must be a violation, i.e., criminal convictions on the underlying predicate offenses which form the pattern of racketeering activities that the RICO statute is intended to address. Spinelli, Kehiayan-Berkman, S.A. v. Imas Gruner, A.I.A., & Associates, D.C.Md.1985, 602 F.Supp. 372. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 19

Claim under this chapter was not precluded on the ground that defendants had not been convicted of improprieties. Poling v. Morgan, D.C.Ariz.1984, 598 F.Supp. 686. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 19

Civil remedy exists independently of criminal penalties under this chapter, and criminal prosecution or conviction is not prerequisite to initiation of private lawsuit. Lode v. Leonardo, N.D.Ill.1982, 557 F.Supp. 675. Com- merce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55

Indictment under this chapter for engaging in prohibited activities is no prerequisite to a private civil action under this section. Kaushal v. State Bank of India, N.D.Ill.1983, 556 F.Supp. 576. Commerce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55

Provision of this section authorizing civil relief for violations of section 1962 of this title does not limit scope of civil remedy to persons convicted or indicted. Glusband v. Benjamin, S.D.N.Y.1981, 530 F.Supp. 240. Com- merce 82.6; Criminal Law 1220; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 19

Count in complaint alleging that defendant used United States Postal Service mail system two or more times in furtherance of alleged fraudulent scheme involving commodities trading stated civil cause of action under this chapter, even though no criminal conviction had been obtained. Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., N.D.Ill.1980, 487 F.Supp. 645. Fraud 69(2)

This section providing for private cause of action arising out of this chapter does not condition cause of action in any way upon a previous conviction under section 1963 of this title and only requires that plaintiff prove elements of this chapter by a preponderance of evidence. Farmers Bank of State of Del. v. Bell Mortg. Corp., D.C.Del.1978, 452 F.Supp. 1278. Criminal Law 1220

16. ---- Fraud, criminal indictment or conviction

“Conviction exception” to section of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act generally eliminating securities fraud as predicate act for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, providing that section does not apply to action against any person criminally convicted in connection with the fraud is only available to those plaintiffs against whom a defendant has specifically been convicted of criminal fraud. Krear v. Malek, E.D.Mich.1997, 961 F.Supp. 1065. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Distributees of a decedent's estate failed to prove that the preliminary executor of the estate and a restaurant's general manager engaged in a scheme to defraud when they transferred decedent's stock in closely held corporations to the decedent and the preliminary executor as joint tenants, thus defeating distributees' conversion and civil RICO claims; all of the evidence indicated that the decedent wanted the preliminary executor to take all of the corporate stock upon his death, and repeatedly communicated this wish to the preliminary executor. Estate of Wooters ex rel. Klein v. Goujjane, S.D.N.Y.2003, 305 F.Supp.2d 280. Executors And Administrators 450

17. Enterprise

See, also, Notes of Decisions under section 1961 of this title.

For failure to show that alleged bank fraud was related to alleged enterprise, lender failed to show that injury to its tangible property interest was “by reason of” violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and, consequently, lender lacked standing to make claim under RICO; lender's security interest was of no value from inception of loan, so nothing that occurred subsequent to funding of loan proximately caused any harm to lender, and lender's allegation of fraud in loan application process was not related to alleged RICO enterprise. Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., LLC, C.A.8 (Mo.) 2004, 387 F.3d 721. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 62

In the context of proximate cause, the reasonably foreseeable victims of a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) are the targets, competitors, and intended victims of the racketeering enterprise. Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 318 F.3d 113, as amended , certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 532, 540 U.S. 1012, 157 L.Ed.2d 424, on remand 2005 WL 2064088. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 62

Public hospital districts and their association lacked antitrust and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) standing to recover from tobacco firms their unreimbursed costs for treating patients suffering from tobacco-related illnesses, as the districts were attempting to recover damages that were derivative of the injuries suffered by smokers, smokers were the more direct victims who could vindicate the public interest in deterring the alleged wrongful conduct, calculation of the districts' damages would entail considerable speculation, and potential for duplicative recovery was present. Association of Washington Public Hosp. Districts v. Philip Morris Inc., C.A.9 (Wash.) 2001, 241 F.3d 696, certiorari denied 122 S.Ct. 207, 534 U.S. 891, 151 L.Ed.2d 147. Antitrust And Trade Regulation 963(3); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Patients and health care plans sufficiently alleged that cancer drug manufacturer and pharmaceutical company took some part in directing affairs of drug distributor, a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise, to state claim under RICO; complaint alleged that high-ranking officials of manufacturer were installed in distributor's headquarters to oversea its activities, that company and manufacturer collectively determined price that distributor charged for drug, and that company and manufacturer supervised and directed distributor's allegedly fraudulent marketing scheme. In re Lupron Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, D.Mass.2003, 295 F.Supp.2d 148. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

To prove that “enterprise” existed within meaning of RICO, plaintiffs must present evidence of ongoing organization, formal or informal, and evidence that various associates functioned as continuing unit. Compagnie de Re- assurance D'Ile de France v. New England Reinsurance Corp., D.Mass.1993, 825 F.Supp. 370, affirmed in part , vacated in part and reversed in part 57 F.3d 56, amended on denial of rehearing , certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 564, 516 U.S. 1009, 133 L.Ed.2d 490, on remand 944 F.Supp. 986. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

RICO plaintiff must establish that defendant has received money from pattern of racketeering activity and has invested that money in enterprise, and that enterprise affected interstate commerce. Grand Cent. Sanitation, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Palmerton, M.D.Pa.1992, 816 F.Supp. 299. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 3

Plaintiff cannot state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act claim until there is conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity. Randolph County Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Sutliffe, S.D.Ohio 1991, 775 F.Supp. 1113. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 34

Person cannot simultaneously be Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act enterprise and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act person who conducts affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering. Davis v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., W.D.La.1988, 687 F.Supp. 266. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

To prevail on civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, plaintiff is required to prove existence of enterprise affecting interstate commerce with which defendants were associated and in affairs of which defendants participated through pattern of racketeering activity. Peckarsky v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., D.C.D.C.1984, 603 F.Supp. 688. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 3

Plaintiff who alleged an ongoing enterprise consisting of a bank, bank officers, lawyers, and named and unnamed others engaged in a pattern of racketeering activities, including acts indictable under the mail and wire fraud statutes, in an unlawful scheme whereby the defendants would identify and target elderly rich people for the purpose of defrauding them, their heirs, and their legatees out of their estates sufficiently alleged a claim under this chapter. Maxwell v. Southwest Nat. Bank, Wichita, Kan., D.C.Kan.1984, 593 F.Supp. 250. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Claims for civil damages under this section must involve defendants' participation in affairs of an enterprise. Salisbury v. Chapman, N.D.Ill.1981, 527 F.Supp. 577.

18. Injury--Generally

Minority shareholders' allegations that majority shareholders received personal compensation for arranging transaction in which company's assets were sold, while minority shareholders did not receive compensation, failed to allege an injury to themselves, rather than the company, as required to have standing under the share-

holder standing rule to bring a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against the company's directors and lawyers based on the diminution of the value of their shares; nothing indicated that minority shareholders' corporate ownership was diluted or that value of majority shareholders' shares increased more than shares held by minority shareholders. Bixler v. Foster, C.A.10 (N.M.) 2010, 596 F.3d 751. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Losses alleged by insured as result of having to sell his home and personal property below property's fair market value, as well as having incurred fees and penalties from Internal Revenue Service (IRS), were out-of-pocket expenses fairly traceable to alleged conduct of insurer in discontinuing payment of long-term disability (LTD) benefits as part of racketeering scheme involving intentional and illegal policy of rejecting expensive payouts to disabled insureds, and thus qualified as injury to property for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO). Weiss v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., C.A.3 (N.J.) 2007, 482 F.3d 254, on remand 2008 WL 755958. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Husband's alleged efforts to conceal real property or cash that as yet, while divorce proceeding remained pending in New Hampshire, still belonged to him could not result in any injury to wife's business or property, as precondition to her civil damages action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). DeMauro v. DeMauro, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1997, 115 F.3d 94. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Showing that patients' insurance companies had to pay out more than they otherwise would have without alleged overbilling by hospital psychiatric unit did not constitute “financial loss” sufficient to confer standing on patients under Nevada or federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) statutes; patients suffered no out-of-pocket loss, and failed to demonstrate that alleged overbilling proximately caused patients to pay claims out of their own funds due to depletion of insurance benefits. Steele v. Hospital Corp. of America, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1994, 36 F.3d 69. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Promisee had standing to bring claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against persons and entities which allegedly looted assets of corporate maker of $500,000 promissory note given in exchange for settlement of prior unrelated litigation and intentionally caused note to become worthless shortly after it was issued; note's timing and magnitude fairly posited directness of injury required for standing under RICO. GICC Capital Corp. v. Technology Finance Group, Inc., C.A.2 (Conn.) 1994, 30 F.3d 289, on remand 891 F.Supp. 64. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Lender's undersecured status, which resulted from borrowers' alleged fraudulent misrepresentation of value of

secured properties was not fraud damages needed to support civil claim by lender under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); actual damages suffered by lender could not be determined with respect to unforeclosed loans. First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 27 F.3d 763, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 728, 513 U.S. 1079, 130 L.Ed.2d 632. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Although Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is to be “liberally construed,” not all injuries are compensable thereunder; showing of “injury” requires proof of concrete financial loss. Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pacific Co., C.A.9 (Wash.) 1992, 976 F.2d 1303, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 1644, 507 U.S. 1004, 123 L.Ed.2d 266. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Tenant in apartment building located near student cooperative apartment building who alleged only a decrease in the value of her property due to alleged drug racketeering activity engaged in by tenants in the student cooperative building did not allege any financial loss which would be compensable under RICO. Oscar v. University Stu- dents Co-op. Ass'n, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1992, 965 F.2d 783, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 655, 506 U.S. 1020, 121 L.Ed.2d 581, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 656, 506 U.S. 1020, 121 L.Ed.2d 581. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 75

Former directors whose liability policies were cancelled, allegedly when the insurers learned of directors' potential liability for an excess of $10 billion on shareholder derivatives, did not suffer any financial loss or damages compensable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and thus could not maintain RICO action against insurers for allegedly wrongful cancellation of policies; derivative suits were dismissed and only other claimed loss was emotional distress, which is not compensable under RICO. Berg v. First State Ins. Co., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1990, 915 F.2d 460. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act provides no cause of action to individuals injured by acts other than by criminal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act violations. Nodine v. Textron, Inc., C.A.1 (R.I.) 1987, 819 F.2d 347. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Wife's civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), alleging husband and others schemed to frustrate her right to recover marital property in underlying divorce action, was not ripe until parties' divorce action was resolved and wife's actual loss, if any, became definite, and thus wife lacked standing to assert RICO claims. Rosner v. Rosner, E.D.N.Y.2011, 766 F.Supp.2d 422. Federal Courts 13; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Purchasers' allegation that they bought undeveloped subdivision lots expecting them to be worth the recorded price, but that lots appraised for significantly less, did not state a concrete, non-speculative injury to property, and purchasers thus lacked standing to bring civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against vendors and bank which allegedly engaged in fraudulent scheme to misrepresent lots' value; although lots' appraised value was not as high as represented, lots were worth at least what purchasers paid, so purchasers did not lose money on property but rather the opportunity to realize a profit, which was not the type of loss necessary to support RICO injury, particularly given that purchasers never in fact tried to re-sell their

lots. Ivar v. Elk River Partners, LLC, D.Colo.2010, 705 F.Supp.2d 1220. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 59

Alleged improper assignment of accounts to union agents by employers constituted cognizable injury to sales representatives, as required for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against employers and union agents; improper assignment of accounts hampered sales representatives' legal entitlement to business relations. Marceau v. International Broth. of Elec. Workers, D.Ariz.2009, 618 F.Supp.2d 1127. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Publisher's general allegations of lost sales did not allege injury to his business or property sufficient to confer Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) standing; publisher alleged defendants used fear and coercion in attempt to obtain property in form of revenue and market share, but did not identify the lost revenue or the market share percentage. Parker v. Learn Skills Corp., D.Del.2008, 530 F.Supp.2d 661. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

New Jersey contractor was not injured by bribe allegedly extorted from him by county executive, for purpose of injury to business or property cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where contractor benefited from payment of initial bribe by award of government contract and renewal of that contract for years. County of Hudson v. Janiszewski, D.N.J.2007, 520 F.Supp.2d 631, as amended , reconsideration denied 2007 WL 4554227, affirmed 351 Fed.Appx. 662, 2009 WL 3387960. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Health spa manager failed to allege any facts that demonstrated that she suffered an injury to her business or property and that the injury was caused by employee, who had brought action against spa and manager under Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as required for manager to establish standing to assert violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against employee; manager alleged only that telephone calls made by employee to other employees to solicit participation in her FLSA action and settlement solicitation letter sent by employee's attorney constituted extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, and that these were the predicate acts that supported her RICO claim. Flores v. Osaka Health Spa, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2007, 474 F.Supp.2d 523. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Alleged deprivation of First Amendment rights alone does not constitute the kind of injury required to invoke Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO) civil remedies. McCormick v. City of Lawrence, D.Kan.2004, 325 F.Supp.2d 1191, affirmed 130 Fed.Appx. 987, 2005 WL 1221632. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Former campaign treasurer who brought action against law firm and attorneys, stemming from their purported failure to disclose source of campaign funds, adequately alleged injury to business and property, as required to establish standing to bring claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where complaint made specific reference to harm to professional reputation and to out-of-pocket costs, including professional fees, incurred as result of alleged actions. Clark v. Stipe Law Firm, L.L.P., W.D.Okla.2004, 320 F.Supp.2d 1207. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provides recovery for injury to business and property; it does not provide recovery for physical and emotional injuries. Williams v. Dow Chemical Co., S.D.N.Y.2003, 255 F.Supp.2d 219. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Allegations of sport utility vehicle and tire manufacturers' customers that manufacturers had withheld information regarding safety risks which would have caused customers to pay less or not purchase tires and vehicles did not satisfy the injury to business or property requirement of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where customers had not actually realized pecuniary loss, but had alleged possibility or probability of future loss. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Products Liability Litigation, S.D.Ind.2001, 155 F.Supp.2d 1069, on reconsideration in part 2001 WL 34691976, on reconsideration in part 205 F.R.D. 503, reversed in part 288 F.3d 1012, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , certiorari denied 123 S.Ct. 870, 537 U.S. 1105, 154 L.Ed.2d 774, on subsequent appeal 333 F.3d 763, on remand 271 F.Supp.2d 1080. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Where plaintiff alleged that defendants' RICO violations, including misrepresenting the fire safety of manufactured homes, induced plaintiff to purchase a manufactured home for use as personal residence, plaintiff had not suffered any injury to business or property, as required for standing under RICO, because he paid no more than fair market value for a manufactured home without a sprinkler system. Line v. Astro Mfg. Co., Inc., E.D.Ky.1998, 993 F.Supp. 1033. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Policyholder suffered no injury within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) as result of illegal sale of policy that resulted in lack of guaranty fund protection since guaranty fund would become relevant only upon insurer's insolvency, which was future event whose occurrence was speculative. Dorn- berger v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., S.D.N.Y.1997, 961 F.Supp. 506. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 58

Purported illegality of fee arrangement under insurance procurement contract between purchasing group and brokerage group did not preclude purchasing group from proving the damages required to support their Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and breach of contract claims against brokerage group, and thus did not require dismissal for failure to state claim, where it was possible that purchasing group could prove out-of-pocket losses distinct from the allegedly illegal fees that they were to receive under contract. American Buying Ins. Services, Inc. v. S. Kornreich & Sons, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1996, 944 F.Supp. 240. Insurance 1673; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Injury needed to state cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was adequately alleged by complaint asserting scheme to defraud plaintiff promoter by fixing boxing matches, where plaintiff alleged that scheme caused him to drop earlier lawsuit and deprived him of hundreds of thousands of dollars, and especially considering that plaintiff expressly alleged that he suffered injury to his business and property as “proximate result” of each RICO violation. Venzor v. Gonzalez, N.D.Ill.1996, 936 F.Supp. 445. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Private litigants have standing under federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) only

to extent that they have been injured in their business or property by conduct constituting RICO violation; RICO “injury” must consist of concrete financial loss, and not mere injury to valuable, but intangible, property interest. Pedrina v. Chun, D.Hawai'i 1995, 906 F.Supp. 1377, affirmed 97 F.3d 1296, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 2441, 520 U.S. 1268, 138 L.Ed.2d 201. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Alleged loss of profits and dividends from corporations and loss due to sale of assets at distress price was not “injury to business or property” needed for shareholder to have standing to maintain suit under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act against organized crime leaders who arranged for murder of competing corporations' executives to maintain control of garbage carting industry. Jerry Kubecka, Inc. v. Avellino, E.D.N.Y.1995, 898 F.Supp. 963. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Although fraud and embezzlement by insurance company's employees did not result in insolvency of company, company had suffered injury sufficient to support civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit against employees; RICO recognizes injuries other than extreme injury of insolvency, such as loss of monies by company whose officers embezzled funds. Corporacion Insular de Seguros v. Munoz, D.Puerto Rico 1995, 896 F.Supp. 238. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Expenses incurred by employer in defending allegedly fraudulent workers' compensation hearing loss claims were expenses which could foreseeably and directly result from alleged conduct in violation of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and constitute injury by reason of RICO violation. Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, S.D.N.Y.1994, 869 F.Supp. 1076, affirmed 66 F.3d 12. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 62

City suffered injury for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against administrator of municipal employee deferred compensation plan; under Pennsylvania law, all deferred funds in plan remained asset of political subdivision until such time as funds are distributed to participant or his beneficiary and, consequently, any diminution of funds constituted direct reduction of city's assets and therefore was very real and immediate injury to city. City of Philadelphia v. Public Employees Ben. Services Corp., E.D.Pa.1994, 842 F.Supp. 827. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Economic consequences suffered by abortion clinic as result of antiabortion protest were not type of financial loss required by RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act). Town of West Hartford v. Opera- tion Rescue, D.Conn.1992, 792 F.Supp. 161, vacated in part 991 F.2d 1039, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 185, 510 U.S. 865, 126 L.Ed.2d 144. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 34

Except possibly where there is actual employment relationship, lack of compensation for services will not be considered injury to business or property under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) section providing for civil suit for damages for any person injured in his business or property by reason of RICO violation. Doe v. Roe, N.D.Ill.1991, 756 F.Supp. 353, affirmed 958 F.2d 763, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Phrase “injury to business or property” from violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act can include lost profits, subject to proof of such proximately caused damages. Advanced Business Systems, Inc. v. Philips Information Systems Co., E.D.La.1990, 750 F.Supp. 774. Commerce 59

Injury to business or property is necessary to confer standing upon a private plaintiff under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Wiley v. Hughes Capital Corp., D.N.J.1990, 746 F.Supp. 1264. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Principal under payment and performance bond failed to show RICO violation by broker absent evidence that it was injured due to alleged scheme to defraud principal and other insureds through broker's charge of undis- closed unlawful and excessive fees to procure insurance and that it would not have paid combined service fee if it had known exactly how that amount was divided between the broker and the insurer. Aeropulse, Inc. v. Arm- strong & Brooks, Ltd., E.D.N.Y.1990, 740 F.Supp. 938. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Former employee of convenience store, who alleged that he quit but was asked to return to store for interview, during which he was asked to confess to theft, could seek recovery pursuant to his state and federal racketeering claims for costs incurred in traveling to store and for his time; such losses could be injury to his business or property. Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., D.N.J.1989, 728 F.Supp. 1123. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59; Torts 436

Employer failed to establish how any violation of federal employee benefit plan embezzlement statute by union and its local affiliates caused employer any injury, as was required for employer to use violation of embezzlement statute as predicate act for employer's claim against union and its local affiliates under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Domestic Linen Supply & Laundry Co. v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, E.D.Mich.1989, 722 F.Supp. 1472. Embezzlement 4

Time, effort and money spent by corporation's president and majority shareholder in investigating alleged harassment by opponents in state court litigation were not injuries compensable in civil action under Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Rylewicz v. Beaton Services, Ltd., N.D.Ill.1988, 698 F.Supp. 1391, affirmed 888 F.2d 1175, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Complaint by borrowers against mortgage broker satisfied “injury” requirement to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim; borrowers alleged that they lost their $250 application fee and opportunity to obtain mortgage on better terms because of broker's alleged RICO violation. Ferleger v. First American Mortg. Co., N.D.Ill.1987, 662 F.Supp. 584. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Low bidder for several government contracts could demonstrate injury in form of damages, for profit lost when it failed to receive contract to which it was potentially entitled under Kansas law, for purpose of stating claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Andersen-Myers Co., Inc. v. Roach, D.Kan.1987, 660 F.Supp. 106. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Claim that seller induced buyer to purchase a diamond ring by misrepresenting value of diamond was insufficient to allege injury necessary to state a cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act in absence of a showing that seller's alleged wrongful conduct caused buyer to pay more than fair market value for ring. Heinold v. Perlstein, E.D.Pa.1987, 651 F.Supp. 1410. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 58

Cable television corporation did not show RICO injury to business or property from acts of competitors who received cable franchise; corporation would not necessarily have received that franchise but for those acts, and franchise award was not exclusive and did not preclude use of corporation's services. District Telecommunica- tions Development Corp. v. District Cablevision, Inc., D.D.C.1985, 638 F.Supp. 418. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 60

Contract for deed purchaser did not sustain any RICO or other injury, even assuming that bank fraudulently procured second mortgage on land, where bank previously held valid security interest in subject property. Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, C.D.Ill.1986, 630 F.Supp. 844, affirmed in part , reversed in part 808 F.2d 1228.

There was no real or threatened injury to city controller's property, although he contended he was liable to city for $150,000 for approving illegal contracts, and thus, controller failed to present case or controversy over which district court had jurisdiction in action brought under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(a, c)] where complaint did not allege that city had demanded that controller pay contract price nor did complaint allege that any demand had been threatened, and city solicitor had stated under oath that city had no intention of seeking any damage against controller or his office resulting from his signing of contract. Flaherty v. Torquato, W.D.Pa.1985, 623 F.Supp. 55, affirmed 800 F.2d 1133. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2

Buyer of automobile failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act cause of action against credit company which had taken dealer's assignment of retail installment contract where buyer failed to allege injury needed to bring RICO civil action. Doxie v. Ford Motor Credit Co., S.D.Ga.1984, 603 F.Supp. 624. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

No particular RICO injury need be proven to maintain a civil RICO action. Miller v. Affiliated Financial Corp., N.D.Ill.1984, 600 F.Supp. 987. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

The “injury in his business or property * * *” forming basis of cause of action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act must cause proprietary type of damage to individual's property or business, and where the only injuries allegedly suffered by labor union were attorney fees and costs incurred by decertification efforts, such injuries were at most incidental damages and did not rise to type of proprietary damage for which RICO provides compensation. Local 355 Hotel, Motel, Restaurant & Hi-Rise Employees and Bartenders Union, AFL-CIO v. Pier 66 Co., S.D.Fla.1984, 599 F.Supp. 761. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

A showing of competitive injury is not required before a civil claim under this section can be stated. Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., E.D.Pa.1983, 581 F.Supp. 88. Commerce 80

Competitive or commercial loss is not required for recovery of damages under this section. Gitterman v. Vit- oulis, S.D.N.Y.1982, 564 F.Supp. 46. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59; Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 60

Plaintiff must show how it was injured competitively by the violation of this chapter in order to state cause of action. North Barrington Development, Inc. v. Fanslow, N.D.Ill.1980, 547 F.Supp. 207. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 60

Violation of this chapter does not depend upon existence of competitive injury. Van Schaick v. Church of Sci- entology of California, Inc., D.C.Mass.1982, 535 F.Supp. 1125. Commerce 82.6; Criminal Law 1220; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 60

Even though shipping company may have benefited from alleged scheme of kickbacks, padded bills and bribes by insuring union peace and reliable service from defendant, they were clearly injured within meaning of this section. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, S.D.N.Y.1981, 523 F.Supp. 244. Criminal Law 1220

Bankruptcy debtor was entitled to judgment on judgment creditors' claim alleging violation of RICO through use of trust to conceal assets from creditors, where creditors had not attained status of judicial lienholders under Illinois law, and were thus only general unsecured creditors, and creditors had not alleged or proven value of debtor's assets declined during the relevant time frame and had not claimed they had irrevocably lost their right to satisfy their judgments, as debtor's property was located in bankruptcy court and bankruptcy trustee's recovery of assets from another trust made it possible creditors would be able to fully satisfy their judgments in that forum. Barnett v. Stern, N.D.Ill.1988, 93 B.R. 962, reversed 909 F.2d 973. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 55

19. ---- Indirect injury

In civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action, plaintiffs must prove that criminal conduct in violation of RICO directly or indirectly injured plaintiff's business or property. Avirgan v. Hull, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1991, 932 F.2d 1572, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 913, 502 U.S. 1048, 116 L.Ed.2d 813. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Legal fees and costs incurred by carnival midway operator in pursuing bid protest after it was not awarded state fair midway contract and elevated cable lift leases were not proximately caused by state officials' alleged racketeering activity and thus did not satisfy standing requirement of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); such legal fees and costs were not direct injury flowing from defendants' illegal conduct, but rather, at best, “indirect” injury which operator did not automatically incur, but chose to incur, in mitigating the effect of that conduct. Strates Shows, Inc. v. Amusements of America, Inc., E.D.N.C.2005, 379 F.Supp.2d 817. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

“Direct-purchaser rule” prohibits recovery under federal antitrust law or Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) by those who are not directly injured by violator of those federal laws. Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. Thorpe, W.D.Ky.1996, 921 F.Supp. 460. Antitrust And Trade Regulation 967; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Successor corporation had standing to bring cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) against accountant who committed mail fraud against predecessor corporations, even though successor corporation suffered injury only indirectly; recovery under RICO was not limited to direct victims. Zee-Bar, Inc. N.H. v. Kaplan, D.N.H.1992, 792 F.Supp. 895. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Entities which allegedly sustained indirect injury from monopolization of sludge hauling industry had standing to sue for civil violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. County of Oakland by Kuhn v. City of Detroit, E.D.Mich.1992, 784 F.Supp. 1275. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Liability under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act may be imposed for direct as well as indirect injury. Miller v. Helmsley, S.D.N.Y.1990, 745 F.Supp. 932. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 62

Injuries alleged by city and nonprofit neighborhood organizations were too indirect and remote from defendants' alleged scheme to defraud Department of Housing and Urban Development into approving home mortgage insurance on loans for purchase of dilapidated houses to permit recovery under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act; city and organizations claimed that as a result of scheme, city's policy of neighborhood preservation had been damaged, real estate and loan investment values had been lowered, criminal activity had developed, and funds from other city projects had to be diverted to repair destruction left by scheme. City of Milwaukee v. Universal Mortg. Corp., E.D.Wis.1988, 692 F.Supp. 992. Extortion 33; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58; Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 111

Requirement of direct injury is gravamen of RICO standing, and a shareholder of a corporation does not suffer direct injury merely when corporation itself is harmed. Klapper v. Commonwealth Realty Trust, D.Del.1987, 657 F.Supp. 948, stay granted , motion to certify appeal granted 662 F.Supp. 235. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Standing to sue for RICO violation requires direct injury, and suit seeking damages for harm suffered derivatively will be dismissed for lack of standing. Lawaetz v. Bank of Nova Scotia, D.Virgin Islands 1987, 653 F.Supp. 1278. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

There is no requirement of “direct commercial injury” to state cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Micro-Medical Industries, Inc. v. Hatton, D.C.Puerto Rico 1985, 607 F.Supp. 931. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

20. ---- Lost opportunity, injury

Profit opportunity which bank's shareholders allegedly lost, when bank's officers, directors and controlling shareholders failed to disclose bank's true financial condition and deprived shareholders of the chance to sell stock at inflated prices, was too speculative to qualify as injury to shareholders individually, such as might confer on shareholders standing to bring nonderivative RICO claims against directors. Crocker v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., C.A.5 (Miss.) 1987, 826 F.2d 347, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 1075, 485 U.S. 905, 99 L.Ed.2d 235. Corporations And Business Organizations 2079; Corporations And Business Organizations 2179

Toy company suffered no concrete financial loss, either in the form of lost opportunity or lost profits, as required to support civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against competitor that allegedly deprived company of its property interest in exclusive use of company's trade secret materials; misappropriations did not affect company's contracts, relationships, or sales, but, to the contrary, company re- leased allegedly misappropriated toy concepts, and successfully applied business strategies even after materials were allegedly misappropriated. Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., C.D.Cal.2011, 782 F.Supp.2d 911. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 60

New Jersey contractor was not injured by county's discretionary decision to not renew public contract with contractor after learning of contractor's participation in bribery scheme with county executive and other government contractors, and thus contractor did not have standing to pursue injury to business or property cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). County of Hudson v. Janiszewski, D.N.J.2007, 520 F.Supp.2d 631, as amended , reconsideration denied 2007 WL 4554227, affirmed 351 Fed.Appx. 662, 2009 WL 3387960. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Injury allegedly suffered by carnival midway operator when it was not awarded state fair midway contract or elevated cable lift leases as alleged result of state officials' racketeering activity was injury to expectancy interest that could not support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) standing; operator had no pre-existing leases or contracts with the state that were terminated due to defendant's activities, but instead merely lost fair opportunity to submit bids or proposals. Strates Shows, Inc. v. Amusements of America, Inc., E.D.N.C.2005, 379 F.Supp.2d 817. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Alleged actions of competitors and their owners and operators, which included paying bribes and kickbacks to city officials to obtain municipal asbestos-abatement contracts, directing lucrative contracts to associated companies that in turn paid kickbacks to competitors, and submitting fraudulent invoices that were paid by city officials, directly caused alleged injury of asbestos-abatement contractor, which thus had standing to sue under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), notwithstanding contention that city official's false statement that city asbestos work was unavailable served as intervening, non-predicate act which broke causal link; allegations charged defendants with subverting municipal bidding process and denying contractor, the sole local contractor with bid preferences, the opportunity to bid and perform city work. Astech-Marmon, Inc. v. Lenoci, D.Conn.2004, 349 F.Supp.2d 265. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Developer's claim of “lost opportunity” to develop shopping center following city council's approval of competing development was not the actual, concrete injury necessary to establish cognizable injury under RICO; de-

veloper's failure to apply for rezoning after approval of competing development rendered injury speculative. Bi- eter Co. v. Beatta Blomquist, D.Minn.1992, 784 F.Supp. 1405, reversed 987 F.2d 1319, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 81, 510 U.S. 823, 126 L.Ed.2d 50, on remand 848 F.Supp. 1446, on remand 156 F.R.D. 173. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

21. ---- Obstruction of justice

RICO claims predicated on alleged obstructions of justice in insurance agent's first action against insurance company for requiring it to have exclusive representation contract constituted an injury to business or property within the meaning of Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., C.A.3 (Pa.) 1986, 792 F.2d 341, certiorari granted in part 107 S.Ct. 569, 479 U.S. 983, 93 L.Ed.2d 573, affirmed 107 S.Ct. 2759, 483 U.S. 143, 97 L.Ed.2d 121. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 59

22. ---- Personal injury

Plaintiff who alleged only that he suffered extreme mental anguish when he learned of recordings of telephone conversations did not have standing to assert a claim for civil damages under RICO. Bast v. Cohen, Dunn & Sin- clair, PC, C.A.4 (Va.) 1995, 59 F.3d 492. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Under provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) requiring plaintiff to allege injury to “business or property” by reason of racketeering violation, terms “business or property” are words of limitation which preclude recovery for personal injuries and pecuniary losses incurred therefrom. Doe v. Roe, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 958 F.2d 763, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act provision for recovery for “injury to business or property” does not allow recovery for physical and emotional injuries due to harmful exposure to toxic waste. Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., C.A.3 (N.J.) 1991, 937 F.2d 899. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 59

No recovery was permitted under RICO Act for “personal injuries” allegedly suffered by officer and substantial shareholder of corporation against which predicate acts of extortion and intimidation were directed; any injuries suffered by officer and shareholder were not “injuries to business or property,” within meaning of RICO Act. Rylewicz v. Beaton Services, Ltd., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1989, 888 F.2d 1175, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Recovery for physical injury or mental suffering is not allowed for civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act violation, as physical injury or mental suffering is not injury to business or property. Fleisch- hauer v. Feltner, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1989, 879 F.2d 1290, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 1122, 493 U.S. 1074, 107 L.Ed.2d 1029, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 1473, 494 U.S. 1027, 108 L.Ed.2d 611. Damages 57.1; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 82

Personal injury suffered by employees from their exposure at work to vinyl chloride was not within ambit of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Drake v. B.F. Goodrich Co., C.A.6 (Ky.) 1986, 782 F.2d 638. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Employer's alleged fraudulent concealment of existence of viable personal injury causes of action from workers after workplace explosion did not constitute injury cognizable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO), and thus workers lacked standing to assert RICO claim, since such conduct did not constitute injury to workers' “business or property” as required under RICO statute. Bradley v. Phillips Petroleum Co., S.D.Tex.2007, 527 F.Supp.2d 625, affirmed 337 Fed.Appx. 397, 2009 WL 1870936. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Personal injuries and mental distress suffered by alleged victim from continuous sexual abuse by his former financial benefactor during period of alleged victim's minority, which allegedly reduced alleged victim's income and earning potential, were not injuries in his “business or property,” as required to have standing to sue benefactor for violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Doe v. Schneider, E.D.Pa.2009, 667 F.Supp.2d 524. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Allegedly diminished settlements entered into by commercial nurserymen in products liability actions due to fungicide manufacturer's purportedly fraudulent concealment of adverse testing data was not “injury” to business or property cognizable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), but rather was type of personal injury or injury to intangible interest not remediable by RICO's civil provisions. Matsuura v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., D.Hawai'i 2004, 330 F.Supp.2d 1101, reversed and remanded 431 F.3d 353, certiorari denied 126 S.Ct. 2861, 547 U.S. 1192, 165 L.Ed.2d 895, on remand 2006 WL 2734291. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Manufacturer's alleged mail and wire fraud directed at consumers of non-agricultural pesticide did not constitute injury under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where consumers alleged that they suffered personal injuries as result of fraud, not injuries to their business or property. Williams v. Dow Chemical Co., S.D.N.Y.2003, 255 F.Supp.2d 219. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim for hazard pay asserted by workers allegedly exposed to asbestos was at base claim for emotional distress and, thus, was one for “personal injury,” not injury to “business or property” as required to confer RICO standing; hazard pay was apparently payment made as compensation for fear of catching disease, and fear was type of emotional distress, and was therefore not covered by RICO. Fried v. Sungard Recovery Services, Inc., E.D.Pa.1995, 900 F.Supp. 758. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Damages for emotional distress are not recoverable as damages to business or property under RICO. Chanoff v. U.S. Surgical Corp., D.Conn.1994, 857 F.Supp. 1011, affirmed 31 F.3d 66, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 667, 513 U.S. 1058, 130 L.Ed.2d 601, affirmed 33 F.3d 50. Damages 57.37

Damages for injured reputations were not recoverable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by Puerto Rico judge and prosecutor who charged they were victims of campaigns of harassment by political adversaries; damages relating to injury to reputation were personal injuries not recoverable under RICO. Padilla Rodriguez v. Llorens Quinones, D.Puerto Rico 1993, 813 F.Supp. 924. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

RICO damages are limited to injury to business and property; personal injury damages are excluded. MHC, Inc. v. International Union, United Mine Workers of America, E.D.Ky.1988, 685 F.Supp. 1370. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Personal injuries arising out of domestic relations dispute are not type of injuries Congress intended to be actionable when it provided that person injured in his business or property by RICO violation could bring civil suit. McMurtry v. Brasfield, E.D.Va.1987, 654 F.Supp. 1222. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Civil RICO statute [18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c)] did not permit action for personal injury by patient who ingested an arthritis medication alleged to have been defective absent clear statement by Congress that it intended to include personal injury as well as property injury within ambit of statute. Moore v. Eli Lilly and Co., D.Mass.1986, 626 F.Supp. 365. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Allegation that patients suffered illness and injuries secondary to their contraceptive use of intrauterine device failed to state cause of action under Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act section [18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c)] which provides private right of action for treble damages to person injured in his business or property by reason of violation of statute. Bast v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., E.D.Wis.1985, 616 F.Supp. 333. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Personal injuries are not injuries to either business or property so as to be recoverable under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.]. Campbell v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., W.D.Wis.1985, 615 F.Supp. 496. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Only business or property damages were compensable in an action under this section; successful showing of a RICO injury to business or property did not entitle plaintiffs to compensation for other types of injury, such as mental suffering or physical injury. Cuzzupe v. Paparone Realty Co., D.C.N.J.1984, 596 F.Supp. 988. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

23. ---- Predicate act injury

Civil claim for treble damages under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act does not require that plaintiff have suffered damages by reason of defendant's violation through prescribed predicate offenses, rather, injury from those offenses alone is sufficient. American Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago v. Haroco, Inc., U.S.Ill.1985, 105 S.Ct. 3291, 473 U.S. 606, 87 L.Ed.2d 437, dissenting opinion 105 S.Ct. 3292, 473 U.S. 479,

87 L.Ed.2d 346, on remand 662 F.Supp. 590. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Minority shareholders' claim that majority shareholders filed frivolous lawsuits against them in order to force them to abandon their interests in company did not state a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate act. Bixler v. Foster, C.A.10 (N.M.) 2010, 596 F.3d 751. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 6

Debtor's wife's alleged misrepresentations to bank in loan applications as to debtor's role in her business did not constitute actionable bank fraud, and thus could not serve as predicate acts in creditor's action against debtor and wife under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act(RICO), even if wife's actions were part of scheme to hide assets from creditor, where bank suffered no damages as result of alleged misrepresentations. Bressner v. Ambroziak, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2004, 379 F.3d 478. Banks And Banking 509.20

Provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) proscribing use as predicate act any conduct that would have been actionable as securities fraud precluded subscribers from relying on allegations that interactive computer services provider misrepresented revenues, profits, and numbers of subscribers, used improper accounting practices, and illegally sold stock at profit as predicate acts supporting their RICO claim, even though subscribers lacked standing to bring securities fraud claims against provider, given that allegations would have been actionable as such by one with proper standing. Howard v. America Online Inc., C.A.9 (Cal.) 2000, 208 F.3d 741, certiorari denied 121 S.Ct. 77, 531 U.S. 828, 148 L.Ed.2d 40. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) allows suits when predicate offenses influence customers, and, derivatively, injure business rivals. Israel Travel Advisory Service, Inc. v. Israel Identity Tours, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1995, 61 F.3d 1250, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1847, 517 U.S. 1220, 134 L.Ed.2d 948. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 60

Plaintiff has standing to sue under RICO if complaint alleges injury to her business or property proximately caused by overt act in furtherance of conspiracy to violate RICO, even though the overt act is not a predicate act required in a RICO pattern. Schiffels v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 978 F.2d 344, on remand. Conspiracy 17

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's private civil action provision does not permit recovery for economic aspects of personal injuries inflicted by predicate acts involving murder. Grogan v. Platt, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1988, 835 F.2d 844, rehearing denied 851 F.2d 1423, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 531, 488 U.S. 981, 102 L.Ed.2d 562. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Prescription assistance company that sued promotion firm and officers, stemming from alleged misrepresentation of company's services, failed to allege that firm's predicate acts of racketeering were proximate cause of its injury, as required for standing to maintain claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); complaint averred no basis for $500,000 figure alleged to have paid out by company in refunds, and in-

jury to company for having to defend itself in legal actions was caused only because firm's alleged scheme was exposed. MyFreeMedicine.com, LLC v. Alpine Investors, D.Me.2010, 739 F.Supp.2d 8. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Fixed annuity purchased by retirement fund was properly considered a type of insurance and thus exempt from both the registration and anti-fraud provisions of federal securities laws; however, to extent that fund assets were placed in variable pooled sub-funds, annuity contracts were variable annuities not entitled to insurance exemption, and therefore a fraud in connection with their purchase and sale could not constitute a predicate offense under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Luzerne County Retirement Bd. v. Makowski, M.D.Pa.2007, 627 F.Supp.2d 506. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11; Securities Regula- tion 14.18

Buyer of signal theft device could not identify two or more predicate acts that demonstrated pattern of racketeering activity, and thus failed to show that distributor of encrypted satellite television programming violated Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by sending demand letters to persons suspected of signal piracy, inasmuch as buyer's claims against distributor for extortion, fraud, defamation, and alleged violations of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) lacked merit and could not serve as RICO predicate acts, and buyer presented no authority that distributor's alleged violation of Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) could serve as predicate act. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Cavanaugh, E.D.Mich.2003, 321 F.Supp.2d 825. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Where plaintiff's alleged injury results only from predicate racketeering acts themselves, and not from defendant's acquisition or control of interest in enterprise through pattern of racketeering, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim for injury resulting from acquisition or maintenance of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity cannot be sustained. Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, D.Del.1992, 821 F.Supp. 232. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Monetary loss suffered by subrogated surety flowed directly from various predicate acts committed by defendants and, thus, constituted “injury” to surety's business sufficient to satisfy requirements for standing under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Federal Ins. Co. v. Ayers, E.D.Pa.1990, 760 F.Supp. 1118. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

For minority shareholder in corporation to recover under section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) prohibiting investment of racketeering income in enterprise, shareholder was required to show

that her injuries were caused by use or investment of proceeds of racketeering activity into enterprise, not that her injury stemmed from predicate acts underlying her claim. Helman v. Murry's Steaks, Inc., D.Del.1990, 742 F.Supp. 860, reargument denied 743 F.Supp. 289. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Plaintiff in racketeering action need only establish that predicate acts were proximate cause of injury. Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, S.D.N.Y.1989, 718 F.Supp. 168, reconsideration denied 724 F.Supp. 259. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Person injured only by predicate acts may recover under RICO provision prohibiting use or investment of racketeering funds to acquire interest in or establish enterprise and under provision prohibiting racketeering activity directed toward acquiring interest in or controlling an enterprise. Bumgarner v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., D.Kan.1988, 716 F.Supp. 493. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 16

Under RICO § 1962(a), in which violation involves not only commission of predicate acts but investment of or use of the money obtained in operation of an enterprise engaging in or affecting interstate commerce, plaintiff who has been injured only by the predicate acts, as opposed to use of the alleged racketeering proceeds, may recover. Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., D.Kan.1987, 678 F.Supp. 823, reconsideration denied 124 F.R.D. 665. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

A private litigant suing under RICO must sustain an injury separate from the injury received from the predicate act themselves. Rother v. La Renovista Estates, Inc., W.D.Okla.1984, 603 F.Supp. 533. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Injuries sustained by plaintiff seeking civil remedy under subsec. (c) of this section must be proximately caused by pattern of racketeering activity which violates this chapter rather than directly from the underlying acts which combine to constitute that pattern. Teltronics Services, Inc. v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1984, 587 F.Supp. 724, affirmed 762 F.2d 185. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

The victim of a “predicate act” under this chapter has standing to seek treble damages under this section for injury caused by violation of section 1962(c) of this title but only where the predicate act is committed in pursu- ance of the affairs of a criminal enterprise; because record before district court did not establish whether plaintiff borrower was alleging that the claimed enterprise consisting of defendant lender and its holding company was a criminal enterprise, ruling on lender's motion to dismiss for lack of standing would be deferred pending a hearing. Morosani v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, N.D.Ga.1984, 581 F.Supp. 945.

Something more than or different from injury from predicate acts is required for plaintiff to have standing to recover treble damages under this section. Landmark Sav. & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., E.D.Mich.1981, 527 F.Supp. 206. Criminal Law 1220

24. ---- Racketeering activity injury

No distinct “racketeering injury” requirement is necessary to maintain a private treble damages action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; if defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by section 1962 and the racketeering activities injured the plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a private claim for treble damages; disavowing Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany In- dustries, Inc., 742 F.2d 408; Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 and result reached in Furman v. Cir- rito, 741 F.2d 524. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., U.S.N.Y.1985, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 473 U.S. 479, 87 L.Ed.2d 346, dissenting opinion 105 S.Ct. 3292, 473 U.S. 479, 87 L.Ed.2d 346. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 63

District court had original jurisdiction to support the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over investors' state law claims against banks, even though investors' claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) were dismissed for failure to plead proximate causation between alleged RICO violation and investors' injuries. Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 318 F.3d 113, as amended , certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 532, 540 U.S. 1012, 157 L.Ed.2d 424, on remand 2005 WL 2064088. Federal Courts 18

Accounting firm had standing to maintain civil RICO action against its client without allegation of “racketeering injury.” Alexander Grant and Co. v. Tiffany Industries, Inc., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1985, 770 F.2d 717, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 799, 474 U.S. 1058, 88 L.Ed.2d 776. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

French citizen who allegedly was victim of purported conspiracy to affect judicial processes of Peruvian government in connection with exploitation of mineral resources in Peru failed to allege, in support of his claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), that he suffered requisite injury “in his business or property by reason of” defendants' purported wrongful conduct, given that French citizen did not allege facts showing that his ability to carry on business activity was affected by defendants' purported efforts to defame him or show that he held any ownership right respecting underlying mineral interests, but rather alleged at most expectancy to obtain some form of property for his clients in which he was to share, and given absence of allegations indicating that defendants' purported conduct could be considered proximate cause of claimed injuries. Maugein v. Newmont Mining Corp., D.Colo.2004, 298 F.Supp.2d 1124. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 75

Plaintiff seeking recovery under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961- 1968] need not plead or establish racketeering injury distinct from damages occurring as a result of alleged racketeering activities of defendants. Van Dorn Co., Cent. States Can Co. Div. v. Howington, N.D.Ohio 1985, 623 F.Supp. 1548. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Plaintiffs in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961] action are not required to establish a “racketeering injury” in order to state cause of action. Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Martin, S.D.Tex.1985, 616 F.Supp. 924. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

The extraordinary private remedy set forth in this section is limited to the class of plaintiffs who have suffered a competitive injury by reason of the defendant's racketeering activities. Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, S.D.N.Y.1983, 566 F.Supp. 1235, affirmed 741 F.2d 511, vacated 105 S.Ct. 3550, 473 U.S. 922, 87 L.Ed.2d 673

, on remand 779 F.2d 36. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

25. ---- Racketeering enterprise injury

To establish that defendant acquired interest in enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity under § 1962(b) of RICO, plaintiff must show that it was harmed by defendant's acquisition of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity. NL Industries, Inc. v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., D.Kan.1986, 650 F.Supp. 1115. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Under section 1962(c) of this title prohibiting persons employed or associated with interstate enterprise from participating in conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, no special racketeering enterprise injury must be shown by civil litigants to obtain recovery. Econo-Car Intern., Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., D.C.Mass.1984, 589 F.Supp. 1368. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Plaintiffs alleging violation of this chapter by virtue of defendants' fraud in soliciting investment from them were not required to allege “nexus” or “link” between defendants and organized crime, nor were they obliged to prove “racketeering enterprise injury” separate from injury resulting from predicate offenses themselves. Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, N.D.Cal.1984, 586 F.Supp. 561. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Civil claim under this chapter does not require a “racketeer enterprise injury.” In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton and Co., Inc. Securities Litigation, E.D.Pa.1984, 583 F.Supp. 1388. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 63

It is not required that plaintiff seeking civil recovery under this chapter assert competitive or commercial injuries; there is no enterprise injury requirement under this chapter. In re Longhorn Securities Litigation, W.D.Okla.1983, 573 F.Supp. 255. Commerce 80

26. ---- Racketeering proceeds injury

Entrepreneur had standing to assert illegal investment claim against competitor under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where complaint alleged that part of proceeds of competitor's alleged “cash, no tax” scheme properly could have been viewed as racketeering income, indirectly derived from its pattern of mail and wire frauds, given that those frauds enabled competitor to avoid paying percentage of those proceeds to state as taxes, and complaint alleged that competitor used profits gained from operation of its “cash, no tax” scheme at another location to fund opening of its retail outlet near entrepreneur's outlet in that borough. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2004, 373 F.3d 251, on remand 2005 WL 911470, certiorari granted

126 S.Ct. 713, 546 U.S. 1029, 163 L.Ed.2d 567, reversed in part , vacated in part 126 S.Ct. 1991, 547 U.S. 451, 164 L.Ed.2d 720, on remand 2009 WL 1883272. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 60

Consumers who entered into usurious rent-to-own agreements with rental company lacked standing to sue company under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision barring use or investment of income derived from pattern of racketeering activity or though collection of unlawful debt, since consumers were injured only by company's unlawful debt collection, not by any use or investment of the unlawfully obtained income, despite consumers' contention that company reinvested income it obtained from unlawful debt collection in operation and maintenance of the rent-to-own business. Fogie v. THORN Americas, Inc., C.A.8 (Minn.) 1999, 190 F.3d 889. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Working interest holder in group of oil and gas wells, who asserted in RICO action that well operators engaged in two interrelated schemes to defraud in connection with operation of wells, did not have standing to assert claim for damages based on violation of provision prohibiting use or investment of income from racketeering activity, where holder failed to allege any facts showing injury from use or investment of racketeering income. Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., C.A.10 (Okla.) 1989, 868 F.2d 1147, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 76, 493 U.S. 820, 107 L.Ed.2d 43. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

There was no requirement, for standing to bring a § 1962(a) RICO claim, that there be showing of injury from the use or investment of racketeering income. In re ContiCommodity Services, Inc., Securities Litigation, N.D.Ill.1990, 733 F.Supp. 1555, reversed in part 976 F.2d 1104, affirmed in part 63 F.3d 438, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1318, 517 U.S. 1104, 134 L.Ed.2d 471. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 58

To recover damages under section of RICO prohibiting use or investment of racketeering proceeds in enterprise, plaintiffs must allege facts showing that use of racketeering proceeds has caused them harm. In re Rexplore, Inc. Securities Litigation, N.D.Cal.1987, 671 F.Supp. 679. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 16

27. Investment of income

Bank's use of income derived from alleged fraudulent scheme, consisting of use of funds held in account from individual allegedly defrauded and proceeds from equipment sold to the individual, would be sufficient use or investment of ill-gotten gains to support civil RICO action under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(a) in situation in which bank was both “person” deriving income and “enterprise.”. Dunham v. Independence Bank of Chicago, N.D.Ill.1986, 629 F.Supp. 983. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 16

28. Mens rea

Existence of specific intent to harm does not answer question of whether injury is specifically direct as required for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action. Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Lerner, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1994, 31 F.3d 924. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

City was incapable of forming malicious intent necessary to support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO) action against it. Banks v. Department of Motor Vehicles for Cal., C.D.Cal.2006, 419 F.Supp.2d 1186. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Civil RICO requires that defendant's state of mind is the same as that required in a criminal prosecution. Babst v. Morgan Keegan & Co., E.D.La.1988, 687 F.Supp. 255. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 6

29. Organized criminal activity

See, also, Notes of Decisions under section 1961 of this title.

Plaintiffs in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act action were not required to allege nexus between defendants and organized crime. Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., C.A.3 (Pa.) 1985, 769 F.2d 940, on remand 643 F.Supp. 107. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

A link to organized crime is not a requirement of a civil cause of action under this chapter. Kimmel v. Peterson, E.D.Pa.1983, 565 F.Supp. 476. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 1

This chapter applies only to actions involving organized crime activities, and not to everyday civil actions involving private litigants with no relation to organized crime and civil remedies provisions of this section are not designed to convert every fraud or misrepresentation action involving corporations who use mails or telephones to conduct their businesses in interstate commerce into treble damages actions under this section. Waterman S. S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., E.D.La.1981, 527 F.Supp. 256. Criminal Law 1220

30. Racketeering activity

See, also, Notes of Decisions under section 1961 of this title.

Allegations of county employees concerning various acts of bribery, extortion and “macing” by county and political party officials in violation of Pennsylvania law sufficiently alleged racketeering activity to support civil RICO claim; employees alleged that criminal proceedings were instituted against them through defendant officials' offers to benefit prosecutors' political careers as well as through threats to those careers. Rose v. Bartle, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1989, 871 F.2d 331, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Manufacturer's alleged fraud in obtaining approval from Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for use and sale of non-agricultural pesticide did not constitute “racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO), since alleged scheme was designed to obtain EPA regulatory approval of pesticide, not to deprive EPA of money or property. Williams v. Dow Chemical Co., S.D.N.Y.2003, 255 F.Supp.2d 219. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

To prove pattern of “racketeering activity” within meaning of RICO, plaintiffs must establish the occurrence of at least two predicate acts, show that predicates were related, and show that they pose a threat of continued criminal activity; certain state and federal crimes listed in RICO are “predicate acts” which must be established. Compagnie de Reassurance D'Ile de France v. New England Reinsurance Corp., D.Mass.1993, 825 F.Supp. 370, affirmed in part , vacated in part and reversed in part 57 F.3d 56, amended on denial of rehearing , certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 564, 516 U.S. 1009, 133 L.Ed.2d 490, on remand 944 F.Supp. 986. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

To satisfy Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO) standing requirement, plaintiff must allege and later prove that it has been directly injured in its business or property by reason of RICO violation; valid RICO injury stems from at least one of predicate acts that underpin violation and not necessarily from pattern of such acts. American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Intern. Importing Enterprises, Ltd., E.D.Pa.1990, 755 F.Supp. 1292. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Conspiracy to commit extortion or attempted extortion could be proper predicate offenses, in abortion clinic's civil RICO action against protestors, where there was evidence that center's property and business were harmed due to actions of protestors. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, E.D.Pa.1988, 689 F.Supp. 465, affirmed 868 F.2d 1342, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 261, 493 U.S. 901, 107 L.Ed.2d 210, rehearing denied 110 S.Ct. 1515, 494 U.S. 1050, 108 L.Ed.2d 651, on remand 745 F.Supp. 1082. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 15

Cardinal question at threshold of determination of civil violation of this chapter is whether there has been commission of one of enumerated prohibited activities, i.e., one of racketeering crimes in course of organized crime defined by section 1961 of this title, which has caused injury to plaintiff. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., S.D.N.Y.1983, 553 F.Supp. 1347, affirmed 719 F.2d 5, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1280, 465 U.S. 1025, 79 L.Ed.2d 684. Commerce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Although bank customer's allegation that bank engaged in mail fraud when it mailed allegedly fraudulent interest statements to customer and others, that such mail fraud constituted racketeering activity under this chapter, and that excess interest paid by customer and others to bank pursuant to such fraudulent interest state-

ments constituted damages collectable under this section literally fit within parameters of this section, customer was not entitled to assert causes of action based thereon against bank under this section where practice of which customer complained was not recognized form of criminal activity. Kleiner v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, N.D.Ga.1981, 526 F.Supp. 1019. Criminal Law 1220

31. Pattern of racketeering activity

See Notes of Decisions under section 1961 of this title.

Injury alleged by lender as result of contractors' default on loans, as caused by alleged pattern of racketeering activity in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), whereby loans were sought under false pretenses, fell within class of risks of harm sought to be prevented by RICO, as required to establish lender's standing to pursue RICO claims. Baisch v. Gallina, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 346 F.3d 366. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Allegations, that former employer misappropriated plaintiff's research, fabricated portion of research data and published research with plaintiff's name listed as additional author without her knowledge or permission, failed to state racketeering claim, absent evidence of continuity, as required to establish pattern of racketeering activity. Polsby v. Chase, C.A.4 (Md.) 1992, 970 F.2d 1360, as amended , vacated 113 S.Ct. 1940, 507 U.S. 1048, 123 L.Ed.2d 646, on remand 925 F.Supp. 379. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Alleged wrongdoing associated with litigation of prior lawsuit which concluded shortly after workplace explosion did not constitute pattern of racketeering activity, for purpose of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO) claim that resulted from that explosion, since such conduct did not constitute or threaten long-term criminal activity. Bradley v. Phillips Petroleum Co., S.D.Tex.2007, 527 F.Supp.2d 625, affirmed 337 Fed.Appx. 397, 2009 WL 1870936. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Absence of showing of pattern of activities precluded determination that police sergeant violated Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in performing police work leading to arrest of juvenile on charges of attempted sexual assault in second degree; entire matter was resolved in two-month period. Frey v. Maloney, D.Conn.2007, 476 F.Supp.2d 141. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Police officers' alleged acts of kidnapping and robbing protesters on two occasions and committing “extortion” by threatening to arrest them unless they ceased their First Amendment activities on several occasions did not meet the “pattern” requirement of Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); officers' alleged acts were against a single victim or set of victims, the acts were similar, if not identical, and were only taken over the course of less than a year. McCormick v. City of Lawrence, D.Kan.2004, 325 F.Supp.2d 1191, affirmed 130 Fed.Appx. 987, 2005 WL 1221632. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Financial professionals involved in mortgage loan did not engage in pattern of racketeering activity necessary to support mortgagor's claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where mortgagor

alleged closed-ended series of predicate acts constituting single scheme in which her signature was forged to accomplish discrete goal of closing on loans by end of month, directed at finite group of individuals involved with loan, with no potential to extend to other persons or entities. Welch v. Centex Home Equity Co., L.L.C., D.Kan.2004, 323 F.Supp.2d 1087, reconsideration denied 224 F.R.D. 490. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Racketeering predicates which take place pursuant to specific business transaction lasting only a few months are not evidence of a specific threat of “continuity,” as required for racketeering claim under RICO or Colorado law. Alter v. DBLKM, Inc., D.Colo.1993, 840 F.Supp. 799. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 104

Sale of two different fee agreements by investment advisor to pension trust did not qualify as distinct scheme to establish pattern of racketeering activity, though they involved different portfolios, where sales pitch discussed both fee agreements together and advisor's purpose was to induce trust to purchase its interests in agreements. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Salomon Bros., Inc., N.D.Ill.1993, 832 F.Supp. 1169. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Continuity needed for video store franchisees to establish pattern of racketeering in suit against franchisors and individual employees was not shown where alleged instances of fraud involved mostly mail and wire fraud, allegations referred to single scheme of fraudulently inducing video store franchise, and no distinct injuries were alleged. Dudley Enterprises, Inc. v. Palmer Corp., N.D.Ill.1993, 822 F.Supp. 496. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Discharged anesthesiologist who alleged that during period of time he was on staff, hospital and anesthesiology staff engaged in price fixing and concerted refusal to deal, but did not allege that this conduct continued beyond that period, or that it threatened to do so, did not establish pattern of racketeering activity so as to support Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against hospital and anesthesiology staff. Pur- gess v. Sharrock, S.D.N.Y.1992, 806 F.Supp. 1102, supplemented. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 28

Committee established by alleged theocratic enterprise failed to allege sufficient “pattern” of racketeering activity to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against persons and organizations alleged to be affiliated with enterprise, where majority of enterprise's alleged racketeering acts caused no harm to Committee's business or property, and remaining acts, including allegation that enterprise disbursed $179,783 from Committee's account to pay press for brochure advocating pardon of enterprise leader, posed no threat of continuing racketeering activity. Committee to Defend U.S. Constitution v. Moon, D.D.C.1991, 776 F.Supp. 568. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 28

Town could not establish pattern of racketeering acts of extortion by antiabortion protesters at abortion clinics or injury in business or property by reason of violation of racketeering statute. Town of Brookline v. Operation Rescue, D.Mass.1991, 762 F.Supp. 1521. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25; Racketeer

Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

In determining whether a RICO defendant acted through a pattern of racketeering activity, courts must make a case-by-case analysis and examine such factors as the number of unlawful acts, length of time over which the acts were committed, similarity of acts, number of perpetrators and the character of the unlawful activity. Key- stone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, E.D.Pa.1988, 692 F.Supp. 466, reversed on other grounds 863 F.2d 1125. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Gas supplier committed “pattern of racketeering activity” sufficient to trigger Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act liability, where each of two invoices it submitted to buyer after court decision declaring similar charges against different buyer improperly contained at least two fraudulent representations, each invoice did independent damage to buyer by causing it to pay higher price than it negotiated, and supplier would have continued to send buyer such invoices if buyer had not refused to take any more gas. Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., E.D.La.1986, 642 F.Supp. 781. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 26

In the absence of pattern of racketeering activity by mail fraud or wire fraud, plaintiff could not recover under RICO, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c). Akers v. Bonifasi, M.D.Tenn.1984, 629 F.Supp. 1212. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Complaint filed by purchaser of all stock in two companies against seller, certain banks, their directors, and others, alleging violation of racketeering statute [18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)] arising from sale of stock, failed to state valid cause of action in view of fact that complaint ignored element of continuity of enterprise. Lipin Enter- prises, Inc. v. Lee, N.D.Ill.1985, 625 F.Supp. 1098, affirmed 803 F.2d 322. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

32. Reliance

When Congress established in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) a civil cause of action predicated on a violation of the mail fraud statute, it did not incorporate reliance element of common-law fraud, since mail fraud was a statutory offense unknown to the common law. Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., U.S.2008, 128 S.Ct. 2131, 553 U.S. 639, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 10

Bank could not reasonably rely on borrowers' allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations, and thus could not establish bank fraud as predicate offense in civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, if its officers were aware of, and participated in, borrowers' activities, even if officers were acting adversely to bank, unless officers' actions exhibited total abandonment of bank's interests. Bank of China, New York Branch v. NBM LLC, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2004, 359 F.3d 171, for additional opinion, see 89 Fed.Appx. 751, 2004 WL 322484, certiorari granted in part 125 S.Ct. 2956, 545 U.S. 1138, 162 L.Ed.2d 886, certiorari dismissed 126 S.Ct. 675, 546 U.S. 1026, 163 L.Ed.2d 545, on remand 2004 WL 1907308. Banks And Banking 509.10

Building owner could not use fraud-on-the-market theory to show that it was injured “by reason of” asbestos manufacturer's alleged misrepresentations, as required to demonstrate standing to pursue RICO claim against manufacturer; rather, building owner was required to produce evidence to show that it detrimentally relied on misrepresentation when it purchased the building. Appletree Square I, Ltd. Partnership v. W.R. Grace & Co., C.A.8 (Minn.) 1994, 29 F.3d 1283, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Plaintiff justifiably relied on defendants' representations concerning defendants' financial condition so as to establish causal connection between RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) predicate act of mail fraud and plaintiff's injury where defendant's misrepresentations and nondisclosures denied plaintiff's advisors access to accurate information and plaintiffs did not know true state of financial affairs of corporation in which they had purchased stock from defendants, even though plaintiff had team of attorneys and financial experts studying the corporation's condition. Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1992, 983 F.2d 350, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 2445, 508 U.S. 952, 124 L.Ed.2d 662. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

In suit by county as rate payer against electric utility under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), evidence was insufficient to support a verdict in favor of county on theory that electric company made misrepresentations before State Public Service Commission (PSC) in rate proceedings, in that evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that misrepresentations were relied on by the PSC, which knew the true facts with respect to certain misrepresentations and granted particular rate increase because of concerns as to the financial stability of the utility. County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1990, 907 F.2d 1295. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Even if fire extinguisher distributor had established lost profits as a result of fire extinguisher manufacturer's breach of distributorship agreement, distributor did not rely on any misrepresentation or omissions of material fact in manufacturer's correspondence, so that any injury which distributor allegedly suffered could not have resulted from misrepresentation or omissions of material fact in correspondence, and thus distributor failed to establish causation necessary for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act claim predicated on alleged acts of mail and wire fraud. Grantham and Mann, Inc. v. American Safety Products, Inc., C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1987, 831 F.2d 596. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Fact that automobile buyers who executed retail installment contracts and purchased accompanying credit life insurance did not rely on alleged predicate acts of mail fraud committed by automobile financing companies in deciding to purchase such insurance, i.e. mailing of documents between companies and dealers incidental to sale of insurance, precluded buyers' action against companies under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) based on alleged fraud. Dixon v. Ford Motor Credit Co., E.D.La.2000, 137 F.Supp.2d 702. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

ket theory in alleging that defendants, by means of the wires and mails, had coordinated their efforts in attempt to artificially manipulate price of copper. In re Sumitomo Copper Litigation, S.D.N.Y.1998, 995 F.Supp. 451. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 77

Reliance could be presumed, of kind required to establish the requisite causal connection between defendants' alleged predicate acts of mail and wire fraud and injury which formed basis of plaintiffs' civil complaint under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where plaintiffs relied on a fraud on the market theory in alleging that defendants, by means of the wires and mails, had coordinated their efforts in attempt to artificially manipulate price of copper. In re Sumitomo Copper Litigation, S.D.N.Y.1998, 995 F.Supp. 451. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 77

Factor weighing heavily in finding at least a question of fact concerning proximate causation in RICO action brought by buyer of feed storage system against seller was the foreseeability of harm, as seller admitted that it knowingly misrepresented oxygen-limiting capabilities of the system and it was foreseeable that farmers would purchase, lease, and use the systems in reliance upon the misrepresentations, with naturally occurring injurious results to livestock health. Martin v. A.O. Smith Corp., W.D.Mich.1996, 931 F.Supp. 543. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Complaint asserting that broker committed two acts of mail fraud or wire fraud in communicating misrepresentations to customer, that customer lost property, namely, money, and that customer's actions in reliance on alleged misrepresentations caused the loss of money and thus injury pleaded cause of action under Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Florida Dept. Ins. v. Debenture Guar., M.D.Fla.1996, 921 F.Supp. 750. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 75

Fast food restaurant franchisee's allegations that misrepresentations by franchisor and franchisor's officers regarding success of other franchises and franchisor's future plans induced him to purchase three franchises sufficiently alleged proximate cause required to support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Protter v. Nathan's Famous Systems, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1995, 904 F.Supp. 101. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Used car purchasers' civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against financial corporation, car wholesaler, and collection company, for car “churning,” whereby used cars were sold to high risk customers, repossessed after default, and resold, premised upon predicate act of mail fraud, had to be dismissed for purchasers' failure to adequately plead that defendants' actions were proximate cause of purchasers' injuries, where purchasers failed to allege detrimental reliance on allegedly fraudulent mailings. Chisolm v. Charlie Falk Auto Wholesalers, Inc., E.D.Va.1994, 851 F.Supp. 739, vacated 95 F.3d 331. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

In Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) cases involving mail fraud, plaintiffs must show reliance upon misrepresentations and injury caused by that reliance. Moeller v. Zaccaria, S.D.N.Y.1993, 831 F.Supp. 1046. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Mortgage broker's alleged misrepresentations regarding value of collateral and borrowers' ability to service debt proximately caused injury to mortgagee, for purpose of establishing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) liability, to extent mortgagee loaned more to borrowers than it would have in the absence of misrepresentations. First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding, Corp., S.D.N.Y.1993, 820 F.Supp. 89, affirmed 27 F.3d 763, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 728, 513 U.S. 1079, 130 L.Ed.2d 632. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Investors that could not show that they relied on a company's financial statements in purchasing company's securities could not show injury by reason of mail fraud or wire fraud, for purpose of the investors' Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action. In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, E.D.N.Y.1993, 812 F.Supp. 338. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) liability based on predicate acts of mail fraud or wire fraud requires that plaintiffs suffer injuries resulting from their reliance on alleged fraud. Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 213, affirmed 99 F.3d 401. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Reliance by rate bureaus and customers or prospective customers on representations made by plaintiff's competitors in trucking industry was insufficient to establish detrimental reliance necessary to establish injury to business or property by reason of predicate acts of wire and mail fraud under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganization Act (RICO). Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, D.S.C.1992, 805 F.Supp. 1277, affirmed 998 F.2d 1009, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 553, 510 U.S. 993, 126 L.Ed.2d 454. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Former employee, who asserted Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against physician and medical group, arising from denial of long-term disability insurance, properly pled that physician made false statements and misrepresentation, in context of procedural rule requiring heightened pleading for fraud claims; employee's complaint made clear that she relied on the physician's purported independence to her detriment. Morrison v. Steiman, S.D.Ohio 2002, 2002 WL 31409860, Unreported. Federal Civil Procedure 636

33. Wrongful discharge

Employee who alleged he was discharged for criticizing or refusing to participate in employee's racketeering activity did not have standing to bring civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim based on underlying RICO conspiracy, because he was not harmed by RICO predicate act committed in furtherance of conspiracy. Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1993, 985 F.2d 383, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 2459, 508 U.S. 957, 124 L.Ed.2d 674. Conspiracy 17

Claim for wrongful discharge cannot be successfully pursued under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) when injury itself is not result of predicate act. Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 1991, 948 F.2d 41. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Former employee who alleged that he was wrongfully discharged because he refused to participate in cover-up of illegal bribes to foreign officials intended to secure award of military contracts to employer did not have standing to sue under section of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) prohibiting conduct of an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity; injury which employee suffered was a result of his alleged wrongful termination and was not caused by predicate RICO acts. Reddy v. Litton Indus- tries, Inc., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1990, 912 F.2d 291, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 332, 502 U.S. 921, 116 L.Ed.2d 272. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Employee who was allegedly discharged for reporting employer's alleged scheme to ship defective military hardware did not have standing, as “whistleblower,” to bring civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) claim against his former employer, absent showing that employee's discharge was direct result of employer's alleged RICO violations. Kramer v. Bachan Aerospace Corp., C.A.6 (Mich.) 1990, 912 F.2d 151. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Former vice-president of brokerage firm lacked standing to maintain civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act action to challenge his discharge for complaining of firm's alleged corrupt practices; any injury caused by alleged mail and securities fraud by firm had been inflicted on firm's customers and did not damage vice-president's business or property, and former vice-president's claim that fraud interfered with his ability to serve his customers, keep them happy, and earn a living for himself was too remotely related to predicate acts to support RICO claim. Burdick v. American Exp. Co., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1989, 865 F.2d 527. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Employee who refuses to participate in activity which is violative of RICO and is constructively discharged for such a refusal does not have standing to sue under RICO's civil damage section for his discharge. Cullom v. Hi- bernia Nat. Bank, C.A.5 (La.) 1988, 859 F.2d 1211. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Vice-president, who was discharged for reporting allegedly irregular transaction to Comptroller of Currency, did not suffer injury flowing directly from banking violations and, therefore, was not entitled to relief under statute, which creates private cause of actions for injuries caused by racketeering activity, and was not entitled to relief under Georgia racketeering statutes. Morast v. Lance, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1987, 807 F.2d 926. Torts 424

Plaintiff does not have standing to sue for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) section proscribing conduct of affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity where the injury consists of termination from employment for failure to cooperate with employer's racketeering activity. Baglio v. Baska, W.D.Pa.1996, 940 F.Supp. 819, affirmed 116 F.3d 467. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 62

To have civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for wrongful termination of employment or any other injury, plaintiff must prove that he was injured in his business or property by reason of alleged violation of enumerated prohibited activities. Cardwell v. Sears Roebuck and Co., D.S.C.1993, 821 F.Supp. 406. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Enterprise's alleged use or investment of income did not cause employment discharge in connection with alleged scheme to extort other employees to participate in illegal scheme, and, thus, former employees lacked standing to recover for enterprise's alleged use or investment of income. Hughes v. Technology Licensing Consultants, Inc., W.D.Pa.1992, 815 F.Supp. 847. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Employee who was allegedly discharged for complaining about employer's practice of double billing merchandise suppliers for advertising had standing to sue under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., W.D.Mo.1991, 773 F.Supp. 174, reversed 985 F.2d 383, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 2459, 508 U.S. 957, 124 L.Ed.2d 674. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Unjust discharge claim does not become federal claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act merely by recasting it in terms of refusal to participate in fraud under Act or retaliation for reporting fraud under Act. Miller v. Helmsley, S.D.N.Y.1990, 745 F.Supp. 932. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 62

An employee terminated for threatening to expose, or refusing to participate in, his employer's allegedly unlawful racketeering practices lacked standing to sue his employer under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) to recover for the termination since employee's termination was not an “injury” that occurred “by reason of” the allegedly racketeering acts. Flinders v. Datasec Corp., E.D.Va.1990, 742 F.Supp. 929. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Termination of employee for threatening to expose, or refusing to participate in, his employer's allegedly unlawful racketeering practices was not a wrongful act under Virginia law and therefore employee lacked standing to bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy claim against his employer. Flinders v. Datasec Corp., E.D.Va.1990, 742 F.Supp. 929. Conspiracy 17; Labor And Employment 777; Labor And Employment 783

Bank president allegedly terminated because he refused to participate in alleged acts of mail and securities fraud was damaged by discharge rather than by RICO violation, and thus did not have standing to maintain RICO suit. Cullom v. Hibernia Nat. Bank of New Orleans, La., E.D.La.1987, 666 F.Supp. 88, affirmed 859 F.2d 1211. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Vice-president of national bank who alleged that he was discharged in retaliation for reporting allegedly improper transaction to Comptroller of the Currency did not allege damages sustained, “by reason of a violation of” substantive provisions of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968] within meaning of statute establishing private civil action to recover treble damages for such injuries [18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c)] and thus could not maintain such action against bank and its officials to recover for loss of job. Morast v. Lance, N.D.Ga.1986, 631 F.Supp. 474, affirmed 807 F.2d 926. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

34. Persons liable--Generally

Central to the notion of proximate cause with regard to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is the idea that a person is not liable to all those who may have been injured by his conduct, but only to those with respect to whom his acts were a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation, and whose injury was reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence. Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 318 F.3d 113, as amended , certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 532, 540 U.S. 1012, 157 L.Ed.2d 424 , on remand 2005 WL 2064088. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Abortion protestor was not be liable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), for conducting affairs of anti-abortion organization, absent evidence that protestor engaged in or conspired to engage in any illegal acts; appearance of protestor's name and telephone number on single document related to another anti-abortion organization was insufficient to establish connection with alleged enterprise. Palmetto State Medical Center, Inc. v. Operation Lifeline, C.A.4 (S.C.) 1997, 117 F.3d 142. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Alleged organized crime family was not a “person” subject to suit under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act. U.S. v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1989, 879 F.2d 20. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Private school itself did not constitute “RICO person,” precluding former students' and former summer camp attendees' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) civil claims against school in relation to school's alleged role in concealing sexual abuse by school's football coach, where plaintiffs' complaint merely alleged that, as part of school's regular affairs, its employees and agents carried out scheme to defraud. Zimmer- man v. Poly Prep Country Day School, E.D.N.Y.2012, 888 F.Supp.2d 317. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 40

Surety, as obligor, could not be held liable to county on fidelity bonds for time period that county executive, as principal, cooperated with government officials in their investigation of bribery scheme involving government contractors, with regard to county's claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), since asserted underlying predicate crimes required actor to have acted purposefully, knowingly, or willfully, executive did not act on his own volition once he cooperated in investigation, executive would have been able to raise valid defense against county as to alleged damages suffered after cooperation began, and surety benefited from executive's defense. County of Hudson v. Janiszewski, D.N.J.2007, 520 F.Supp.2d 631, as amended , reconsideration denied 2007 WL 4554227, affirmed 351 Fed.Appx. 662, 2009 WL 3387960. Counties 99

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision defining civil remedies that limited liability to disgorgement of ill-gotten gains did not preclude imposing joint and several liability in Government's civil RICO action against cigarette manufacturers and tobacco-related entities alleging conspiracy to deceive public regarding harmfulness of tobacco products, addictiveness of nicotine, and possibility of manufacturing safer products; over-all wrongdoing alleged was collective, and so any disgorgement ordered could consist of unitary amount, rather than amount apportioned based on gains of each individual defendant. U.S. v. Philip Mor- ris USA, D.D.C.2004, 316 F.Supp.2d 19. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64; Racketeer

Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 83

Banks with which currency trader did business and head of foreign exchange desk of one of those banks could not be liable for investors' losses under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where those defendants played no role in directing affairs of currency trading operation. Sundial Intern. Fund Ltd. v. Delta Consultants, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1996, 923 F.Supp. 38, reconsideration denied 1998 WL 196212. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Liability under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for using pattern of racketeering activity in conduct of affairs of enterprise is not limited to those with primary responsibility for, or in formal position in the enterprise, but defendants must have some part in directing the affairs of the enterprise. Brooks v. Bank of Boulder, D.Colo.1996, 911 F.Supp. 470. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Coconspirators in civil conspiracy under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act to fraudulently secure health coverage for nonexistent employee groups were jointly and severally liable to health insurer for treble amount of insurer's damages of $27,425,080. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, E.D.N.Y.1995, 887 F.Supp. 473, remanded 101 F.3d 684, opinion after remand 111 F.3d 278. Conspiracy 20

For purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, requirement that defendant have had some part in directing affairs of alleged enterprise does not exclude from liability low-level participants who are under direction of upper management. Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, S.D.N.Y.1994, 869 F.Supp. 1076, affirmed 66 F.3d 12. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Each defendant charged with conduct of enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity is liable in civil RICO action both for predicate acts that he personally committed and for those he aided and abetted. Mor- row v. Black, E.D.N.Y.1990, 742 F.Supp. 1199. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Individuals who were alleged to have controlled broker/dealers and investment advisory service for purpose of engaging in pattern of racketeering activity could be held liable for civil RICO violations notwithstanding fact that those enterprises, which were not alleged to be separate defendants in civil RICO violations, were alleged to have committed securities frauds. Lazzaro v. Manber, E.D.N.Y.1988, 701 F.Supp. 353. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 16

Broker acting within scope of employment was incapable of civil conspiracy with brokerage firm under Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Gaudette v. Panos, D.Mass.1987, 650 F.Supp. 912, reversed on other grounds 852 F.2d 30. Conspiracy 2

Corporate president who allegedly intentionally interfered with corporation's contract was not immune from liability in tort on basis of his status as corporate officer in light of allegation that president did not act in best interest of corporation. Electronic Relays (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Pascente, N.D.Ill.1985, 610 F.Supp. 648, on recon-

sideration. Torts 242

Only “person” who conducts affairs of an “enterprise” is subject to civil liability under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Shared Diagnostic Services, Inc. v. Henningsen, E.D.Pa.1984, 602 F.Supp. 428. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Where one group of partners who were not satisfied with progress of project entered into agreement with other partners requiring the other partners to repay their capital contribution with interest, and where the property had been sold but no payment had been made to the plaintiff partners, plaintiff partners were entitled to judgment against the defendant partners for their capital contribution plus interest. Spinelli, Kehiayan-Berkman, S.A. v. Imas Gruner, A.I.A., & Associates, D.C.Md.1985, 602 F.Supp. 372. Partnership 108

Plaintiffs who had commodities trading account were not entitled to recover under this section from defendant, a commodities brokerage firm, on basis that two of defendant's brokers had defrauded plaintiffs and, in furtherance of scheme to defraud them, had caused mail to be delivered by United States Postal Service two or more times, since any suit for violation of this chapter should have been asserted against the violators, the persons who engaged in the unlawful conduct, and not the defendant firm that had itself been infiltrated by the unlawful conduct. Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., N.D.Ill.1982, 548 F.Supp. 20. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

This section was not intended to create private right of action for alleged mail fraud by a telephone answering service, where defendant was not a member of a society of criminals operating outside of the law. Barr v. WUI/ TAS, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1975, 66 F.R.D. 109. Fraud 33

35. ---- Corporations, persons liable

Corporation may conspire, even with its own officers, to conduct another enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity and may, on that basis, be liable under RICO. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1989, 875 F.2d 1271. Conspiracy 2

Corporation could not be held liable in civil action under this section for conducting its own affairs through pattern of racketeering activity, but could be held liable for conducting affairs of its parent corporation through pattern of racketeering activity. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1984, 747 F.2d 384, certiorari granted 105 S.Ct. 902, 469 U.S. 1157, 83 L.Ed.2d 917, affirmed 105 S.Ct. 3291, 473 U.S. 606, 87 L.Ed.2d 437, dissenting opinion 105 S.Ct. 3292, 473 U.S. 479, 87 L.Ed.2d 346, on remand 662 F.Supp. 590. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Bank's actions in permitting operators of Ponzi scheme to commingle their assets within several bank accounts were insufficient to satisfy Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO) participation requirement, despite investors' contention that bank gave operators aura of legitimacy that they needed to continue to fool investors. Gonzales v. Lloyds TSB Bank, PLC, C.D.Cal.2006, 532 F.Supp.2d 1200. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Manufacturers of cigarettes and other tobacco-related entities were each distinct from alleged enterprise itself, and thus subject to liability under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where each was a separate legal entity. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., D.D.C.2004, 327 F.Supp.2d 13. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Neither corporation nor its subsidiary could be held directly liable for alleged civil rights abuses allegedly perpetrated in Nigeria by a company owned by the subsidiary; there was no evidence that the corporation or the subsidiary directly commissioned the acts that were the subject of the complaint, nor any sufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury could base a finding of direct liability. Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., N.D.Cal.2004, 312 F.Supp.2d 1229. Corporations And Business Organizations 1645

Chemical corporation's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint failed to state claim against corporate competitor under section prohibiting certain investments of income derived from pattern of racketeering activity, as it failed to establish that competitor's management either participated in or counten- anced alleged misappropriation of corporation's trade secret. R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v. Nalco Chemical Co., N.D.Ill.1990, 757 F.Supp. 1499. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

The fact that civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint did not allege that a corporation was a “person” did not preclude the corporation from being sanctioned under RICO for unlawful conduct if the corporation used the proceeds of a pattern of racketeering activity in its activities. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Mutual Trading Corp., N.D.Ill.1990, 749 F.Supp. 869. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Corporation could be civilly liable under this section for an agreement of its officers to conduct affairs of corporation in a manner which violates section 1962(c) of this title. Bernstein v. IDT Corp., D.C.Del.1984, 582 F.Supp. 1079. Commerce 82.6

Bank was not liable, on civil RICO theory, to corporation that had agreed to act as successor lender following bank's decision to liquidate certain loans, for permitting corporation's principal to use precious metals that secured loans to speculate on futures market, and for not disclosing such suspected improprieties to corporation; even ignoring corporation's failure to establish predicate acts of fraud, corporation failed to establish any participation by bank in acts of corporate principal. Hashimoto v. Clark, D.Ariz.2001, 264 B.R. 585. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 50

36. ---- Enterprises, persons liable

Fact that bank provided general professional services to American financial services company and its Chinese affiliate in connection with their scheme to defraud investors through improper foreign currency futures contracts did not provide basis for inferring that bank, company, and affiliate shared common unlawful purpose to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as required to establish that bank participated in RICO enterprise, where bank provided same services to public at large, and there was no evidence regarding hierarchy of alleged enterprise. Rosner v. Bank of China, S.D.N.Y.2007, 528 F.Supp.2d 419. Racketeer

Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), only RICO defendant and not enterprise can be found liable for RICO violations. Ocaso, S.A., Compania De Seguros Y Reaseguros v. Puerto Rico Mari- time Shipping Authority, D.Puerto Rico 1996, 915 F.Supp. 1244. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 38

Debtor and his bankruptcy estate were distinct entities in debtor's bankruptcy proceeding, and thus debtor and estate were distinct “person” and “enterprise” required to support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) claim. Ad-X Intern., Inc. v. Kolbjornsen, C.A.10 (Colo.) 2004, 97 Fed.Appx. 263, 2004 WL 887354, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

37. ---- Governmental entities, persons liable

Congress did not intend to subject municipal corporations to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act liability; RICO's mandatory provision for treble damages serve a predominantly punitive purpose, and assessing treble damages against municipality would impose punitive damages upon innocent taxpayers. Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., C.A.3 (N.J.) 1991, 937 F.2d 899. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 64

Various village officials could not be sued, in their official capacities, in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) suit alleging illegal scheme to ticket and fine motorists; official capacity suit was equivalent to suit against village, which could not be maintained. Wood v. Incorporated Village of Patchogue of New York, E.D.N.Y.2004, 311 F.Supp.2d 344. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Absent express waiver of sovereign immunity, RICO action cannot be maintained against United States. An- drade v. Chojnacki, S.D.Tex.1996, 934 F.Supp. 817. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Florida Bar and other officials and agents of Florida court system were not liable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act to individuals based on their criminal prosecution of individuals for engaging in unauthorized practice of law, as such acts were not unlawful acts sufficient to constitute “predicate acts” for civil RICO claim. Ippolito v. State of Fla., M.D.Fla.1993, 824 F.Supp. 1562. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Municipal corporation cannot form requisite criminal intent to establish underlying predicate offenses and therefore, cannot be liable under civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations laws. County of Oakland by Kuhn v. City of Detroit, E.D.Mich.1992, 784 F.Supp. 1275. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Township could not form requisite mental state to commit act of racketeering activity and could not be civilly liable under RICO. Genty v. Township of Gloucester, D.N.J.1990, 736 F.Supp. 1322, affirmed 937 F.2d 899.

Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Where state did not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity and Congress had not subjected state to suit pursuant to Fourteenth Amendment, agency of state could not be sued in federal action alleging antitrust violations and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Fiore v. Kelly Run Sanitation, Inc., W.D.Pa.1985, 609 F.Supp. 909. Federal Courts 269

38. Principals and agents

Principal can only be subject to civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act for acts of his agent if principal would be subject to criminal liability for his acts. Reinfeld v. Riklis, S.D.N.Y.1989, 722 F.Supp. 1077. Principal And Agent 159(1)

39. Respondeat superior

Union could be held liable on basis of respondeat superior for RICO violations of union negotiators who arranged for themselves to secretly receive pension benefits to which they were not entitled when they agreed to collective bargaining agreement concessions on the basis of evidence that negotiators' demand for personal pension benefits was made pursuant to their duties as union representatives for the negotiations and was in furtherance of the business of the union and on basis of evidence that union failed to investigate allegations against them or discipline them until after they were convicted; it could be found that union acquiesced in the misdeeds. Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1994, 17 F.3d 1386, modified on rehearing 30 F.3d 1347, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 900, 513 U.S. 1110, 130 L.Ed.2d 784. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 64

Bank was liable based on respondeat superior doctrine for loan officer's violation of federal Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act, even if bank was initially unaware of violations, where violations were incident to loan officer's assigned duties and took place during bank business hours, officer had been assigned function of making loans and wrongful activities, bank acquiesced in violations by requesting that debtors sign consolidation note including amounts fraudulently taken by loan officer, and accepted benefit of wrongful activities by keeping interest on additional debt incurred by debtors. Quick v. Peoples Bank of Cullman County, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1993, 993 F.2d 793. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Respondeat superior and agency liability is inappropriate under provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) prohibiting conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, where the person is the RICO enterprise. Brady v. Dairy Fresh Products Co., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1992, 974 F.2d 1149. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) proscribing conduct of affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity does not recognize corporate liability on part of enterprise under theory of respondeat superior, even though individual officers or employees of enterprise, acting within scope and course of their employment, may themselves be culpable. Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, C.A.1 (Puerto

Rico) 1991, 948 F.2d 41. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Insurance companies could not be held liable under respondeat superior for insurance agents' Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, as required for RICO claims against insurance companies alleged by private school that purchased policies from unauthorized agent; when insurance agents sent fake invoices to private school and stole money that school remitted, they were not acting to further insurance companies' goals but, rather, to further their own goals, which were at odds with insurance companies' goals. Herit- age Christian Schools, Inc. v. ING North America Ins. Corp., E.D.Wis.2012, 851 F.Supp.2d 1154. Insurance 1654; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 64

Brokerage firm and its vice president could not be held vicariously liable under doctrine of respondeat superior for acts of employee which allegedly violated section of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Arioli v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., E.D.Mich.1993, 811 F.Supp. 303. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Allegations that bank benefitted from and actively participated in its employees' alleged wrongdoing were sufficient to state claim for respondeat superior liability under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 213, affirmed 99 F.3d 401. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Liability could be imposed on corporate defendants in civil RICO action, based on theory of respondeat superi- or. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Even assuming that liability for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations can be imposed under theory of respondeat superior, automobile manufacturer could not be held vicariously liable for alleged RICO violations by franchisee absent any allegations that manufacturer authorized, ratified or benefitted from alleged wrongful acts of franchisee's employees; single allegation that manufacturer knew or reasonably should have known of activities of franchisee was conclusory and insufficiently specific to trigger vicarious liability. Thrailkill v. Champion Ford, Inc., D.N.M.1991, 776 F.Supp. 1486. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Bank could not be held liable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for independent acts of one of its employees in allegedly conspiring to defraud customer, either on theory of respondeat superior or under agency doctrine of apparent authority. Metro Furniture Rental, Inc. v. Alessi, S.D.N.Y.1991, 770 F.Supp. 198. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Investment banking firms could not incur Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act liability, under doctrine of respondeat superior, for acts of their investment bankers. FMC Corp. v. Boesky, N.D.Ill.1989, 727 F.Supp. 1182, affirmed 36 F.3d 255. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Respondeat superior can never be the basis of liability in a civil RICO suit. First Nat. Bank of Louisville v. Lust- ig, E.D.La.1989, 727 F.Supp. 276. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Brokerage firm could be held liable under respondeat superior for RICO violations of broker. Capalbo v. PaineWebber, Inc., N.D.Ill.1988, 694 F.Supp. 1315.

Where plaintiff alleged that employee took money from investors, represented that he would make certain investments and either failed to make the investments or later liquidated the investments and converted the funds, employer could be equally liable in a civil RICO action, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, if employer benefited from employee's acts, or had reason to question manner in which employee dealt with customers or their accounts. Woods v. Piedmonte, E.D.Mich.1987, 676 F.Supp. 143. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 64

Investors in partnership interests sold by individual defendant failed to establish liability of corporate defendant under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; even assuming that respondeat superior was available as basis for corporate defendant's liability, individual defendant was an independent contractor of corporate defendant with respect to transactions at issue, and even if individual defendant could be construed to have been an employee, he acted beyond scope of his employment authority by failing to seek approval of proposed investments from corporation. McLemore v. Landry, M.D.La.1987, 668 F.Supp. 531. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 64

Brokerage firm could not be liable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act for activities of its branch offices on theory of respondeat superior, as liability would effectively read enterprise requirement out of statute entirely whenever corporate defendant was involved. Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., E.D.Pa.1986, 643 F.Supp. 107, reconsideration denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

40. Vicarious liability

Under section of Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act proscribing conduct of affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, enterprise cannot be held vicariously liable for violations committed by its employees if employees are persons named in complaint as having conducted affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity. Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North America, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1987, 824 F.2d 1349. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

General partners of limited partnerships involved in fraudulent tax shelter scheme were vicariously liable for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations of their partnership and copartners. 131 Main Street Associates v. Manko, S.D.N.Y.1995, 897 F.Supp. 1507. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 64

Commodity futures brokerage firm did not have RICO liability to investors who maintained separate accounts with broker, arising from broker's embezzlement of funds from those accounts to pay for losses in broker's com-

modities trading activities, on grounds that firm had engaged in pattern of racketeering; there was no vicarious liability under provision and there was no evidence that firm had any knowledge of or involvement with embezzlement activities. Tatum v. Smith, N.D.Miss.1995, 887 F.Supp. 918, affirmed 83 F.3d 121. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 50; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Independent acts of bank employee in accepting checks fraudulently endorsed by securities broker and deposited in his personal account, not acting in bank's interest, were not of sufficient basis to hold bank liable in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action. Kahn v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., S.D.N.Y.1991, 760 F.Supp. 369. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Corporate defendants could not be held vicariously liable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for individual wrongdoings of employees on theory of respondeat superior if no facts are alleged which portray company as active perpetrator of fraud or central figure in criminal scheme. Philan Ins. Ltd. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1990, 748 F.Supp. 190, reargument denied 755 F.Supp. 94. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Vicarious liability is not a proper basis for finding of liability under RICO. Bingham v. Zolt, S.D.N.Y.1988, 683 F.Supp. 965. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Brokerage firm could not be vicariously liable, under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c), for the predicate acts of its registered representative. Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1985, 628 F.Supp. 1188. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Bank could not be held vicariously liable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act for alleged acts of its employees in allegedly assisting promoters of oil and gas limited partnerships in creating false track record of success in drilling projects, thereby luring investors into investing in partnerships, where activities of bank's employees did not further corporate policy goals of bank. K & S Partnership v. Continental Bank, N.A., D.Neb.1989, 127 F.R.D. 664, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds 952 F.2d 971, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 2993, 505 U.S. 1205, 120 L.Ed.2d 870. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 64

41. Conspiracy

A civil claim for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy requires allegations of the same elements of a RICO claim, plus allegations that each RICO co-conspirator knowingly joined the conspiracy and involved himself or herself, directly or indirectly, in the commission of at least two predicate offenses. Dickey v. Kennedy, D.Mass.2008, 583 F.Supp.2d 183. Conspiracy 18

Cigarette manufacturers and other tobacco-related entities did not establish Government's unmistakable intent to waive its right to bring civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against them for unlawful conspiracy to deceive public, despite Government's alleged failure to speak out to the extent Gov- ernment considered defendants' conduct unlawful when it had longstanding knowledge of adverse health con-

sequences of tobacco use and extensively regulated cigarettes, Government's work with defendants to develop “safer” cigarette, and Government's alleged encouraging of smokers to switch to low-tar cigarettes on ground they were safer. U.S. v. Philip Morris Inc., D.D.C.2004, 300 F.Supp.2d 61. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Damages resulting from a civil conspiracy under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act are recoverable in a cause of action separate and distinct from a cause of action based upon independent underlying tort. State of Okl. ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v. Children's Shelter, Inc., W.D.Okla.1985, 604 F.Supp. 867. Con- spiracy 8

42. Aiders and abettors

Property owner's claim that law firm, of which partner in joint farming venture with owner was member, drew up documents for sale of owner's property to partner and subsequent eviction of owner, despite transfer of property merely to shield owner's assets from separate lawsuit, sufficiently alleged that law firm aided and abetted partner in scheme to defraud owner, in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Crowe v. Henry, C.A.5 (La.) 1995, 43 F.3d 198, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

One who aids and abets two predicate acts can be civilly liable under RICO; to establish civil liability for aiding and abetting, plaintiff must show that defendant was generally aware of its role as part of an overall improper activity at the time that it provided that assistance and that the defendant knowingly and substantially assisted the principal violation. Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1994, 17 F.3d 1386, modified on rehearing 30 F.3d 1347, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 900, 513 U.S. 1110, 130 L.Ed.2d 784. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Brokerage firms which employed stock broker, who allegedly sold stock by misrepresenting that corporation would increase in value, were not liable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for aider and abettor liability; investors failed to establish that firms were associated with misrepresentations by broker, that they participated in making alleged false statements, that there were any actions on their part which helped broker to succeed, or that there was a pattern of racketeering activity by the firms. Downing v. Hallibur- ton & Associates, Inc., M.D.Ala.1993, 812 F.Supp. 1175, affirmed 13 F.3d 410. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 64

Aiding and abetting liability for “fraud in the sale of securities” Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim requires securities law violation by primary wrongdoer, knowledge of wrongdoing, and substantial assistance in primary wrongdoing. In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, E.D.N.Y.1993, 812 F.Supp. 338. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

One may be civilly liable for a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation if he aids and abets commission of two predicate acts, and all other requirements have been met; to establish liability as aider and abettor, plaintiff must show for each predicate act that defendant was associated with wrongful con-

duct, participated in it with intent to bring it about, and sought by his actions to make it succeed, and mere negative acquiescence in act is not enough; there must be evidence of overt act designed to aid in success of venture. In re Sahlen & Associates, Inc. Securities Litigation, S.D.Fla.1991, 773 F.Supp. 342. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Third-party professionals were not liable for aiding and abetting the conducting of enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity based on their involvement in allegedly fraudulent transfer of Chapter 11 debtor's assets to affiliates for purpose of putting assets out of reach of creditors; allegations that professionals knowingly, intentionally or recklessly assisted in effecting transactions were insufficient to establish that professionals directed affairs of enterprise. Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., S.D.N.Y.1998, 218 B.R. 294. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

II. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE GENERALLY

Abortion providers, persons entitled to maintain action 75 Abstention 107 Abuse of process 101 Accounting, equitable remedies 164 Accrual of cause of action, limitations 118 Admissibility of evidence 140 Admissibility of evidence, disciplinary proceedings 178 Alternate remedies 98 Arbitration 146 Assignment 94 Attachment 147 Attorney fees 149 Attorney representation 150 Bankrupt estates, persons entitled to maintain action 76 Burden of proof 139 Causation, summary judgment 130 Class actions 73 Collateral estoppel, defenses 111 Concurrent jurisdiction 104 Consent decrees 185 Constructive trust, equitable remedies 165 Contempt 152 Continuing acts, limitations 119 Contribution 161 Corporate officers, persons entitled to maintain action 77 Corporations, persons entitled to maintain action 78 Costs 172 Credibility of witnesses, disciplinary proceedings 179

Creditors, persons entitled to maintain action 79 Damages 120, 153-160 Damages - Generally 153 Damages - Indirect injury 154 Damages - Interest 155 Damages - Limitations 120 Damages - Predicate acts 156 Damages - Punitive damages 157 Damages - Settlement 158 Damages - Taxes 159 Damages - Treble damages 160 Death of party 96 Defendant 95 Defenses 109-175 Defenses - Generally 109 Defenses - Disciplinary proceedings 175 Defenses - Double jeopardy 110 Defenses - Estoppel 111 Defenses - Filed rate doctrine 112 Defenses - First amendment 113 Defenses - Immunity 114 Defenses - Res judicata 116 Defenses - Unclean hands 115 Depositors, persons entitled to maintain action 80 Disciplinary proceedings 173-182 Disciplinary proceedings - --Generally 173 Disciplinary proceedings - Admissibility of evidence 178 Disciplinary proceedings - Credibility of witnesses 179 Disciplinary proceedings - Defenses 175 Disciplinary proceedings - Estoppel 176 Disciplinary proceedings - Findings of administrator 180 Disciplinary proceedings - Limitations 177 Disciplinary proceedings - Persons bound 174 Disciplinary proceedings - Sanctions barring office holding 182 Disciplinary proceedings - Sanctions 181 Discovery and inspection 128 Divestiture 162 Double jeopardy, defenses 110 Employees, persons entitled to maintain action 81 Enterprise, summary judgment 131 Equitable remedies 163-169a Equitable remedies - Generally 163 Equitable remedies - Accounting 164 Equitable remedies - Constructive trust 165 Equitable remedies - Grievance procedure 167

Equitable remedies - Indemnity 166 Equitable remedies - Injunction 168 Equitable remedies - Limitations 169 Equitable remedies - Particular cases 169a Estoppel, defenses 111 Estoppel, disciplinary proceedings 176 Exhaustion of remedies 100 Filed rate doctrine, defenses 112 Findings of administrator, disciplinary proceedings 180 First amendment, defenses 113 Forum selection 148 Franchisees, persons entitled to maintain action 82 Fraud, summary judgment 132 Governmental entities, persons entitled to maintain action 83 Grievance procedure, equitable remedies 167 Guarantors, persons entitled to maintain action 84 Harmless or prejudicial error 184 Heirs, persons entitled to maintain action 85 Immunity, defenses 114 Indemnity, equitable remedies 166 Indirect injury, damages 154 Injunction, equitable remedies 168 Injury, summary judgment 133 Instructions 143 Insurance administrators, persons entitled to maintain action 86 Intended victim, persons entitled to maintain action 88 Interest, damages 155 Investors, persons entitled to maintain action 87 Joinder of claims 97 Judicial remedies or relief 151 Jurisdiction 102-105 Jurisdiction - Generally 102 Jurisdiction - Concurrent jurisdiction 104 Jurisdiction - State court 103 Jurisdiction - State law claims 105 Jury trial 138 Justiciability 108 Knowledge, limitations 121 Last predicate act, limitations 122 LimitationsLimitations - Generally 117 Limitations - Accrual of cause of action 118 Limitations - Continuing acts 119 Limitations - Damages 120 Limitations - Disciplinary proceedings 177 Limitations - Equitable remedies 169

Limitations - Knowledge 121 Limitations - Last predicate act 122 Limitations - Other claims 123 Limitations - Retroactivity 124 Limitations - State law 125 Limitations - Summary judgment 134 Limitations - Tolling 126 Limitations - Waiver 127 New trial 145 Other claims, limitations 123 Particular cases, equitable remedies 169a Parties 72 Partners, persons entitled to maintain action 89 Pattern of racketeering activity, summary judgment 135 Pendent-party jurisdiction 106 Persons bound, disciplinary proceedings 174 Persons entitled to maintain action 74-93 Persons entitled to maintain action - Generally 74 Persons entitled to maintain action - Abortion providers 75 Persons entitled to maintain action - Bankrupt estates 76 Persons entitled to maintain action - Corporate officers 77 Persons entitled to maintain action - Corporations 78 Persons entitled to maintain action - Creditors 79 Persons entitled to maintain action - Depositors 80 Persons entitled to maintain action - Employees 81 Persons entitled to maintain action - Franchisees 82 Persons entitled to maintain action - Governmental entities 83 Persons entitled to maintain action - Guarantors 84 Persons entitled to maintain action - Heirs 85 Persons entitled to maintain action - Insurance administrators 86 Persons entitled to maintain action - Intended victim 88 Persons entitled to maintain action - Investors 87 Persons entitled to maintain action - Partners 89 Persons entitled to maintain action - Prisoners 90 Persons entitled to maintain action - Shareholders 91 Persons entitled to maintain action - Students 92 Persons entitled to maintain action - Taxpayers 93 Predicate acts, damages 156 Predicate acts, summary judgment 136 Prerequisites to suit 100a Prisoners, persons entitled to maintain action 90 Punitive damages 157 Questions for court 142 Questions for jury 141 Racketeering activity, summary judgment 137

Res judicata, defenses 116 Rescission 99 Retroactivity, limitations 124 Sanctions, disciplinary proceedings 181 Sanctions barring office holding, disciplinary proceedings 182 Self-incrimination 171 Settlement, damages 158 Shareholders, persons entitled to maintain action 91 Standing 71 State court, jurisdiction 103 State law, limitations 125 State law claims, jurisdiction 105 Stay of actions 170 Students, persons entitled to maintain action 92 Summary judgment 129-137 Summary judgment - Generally 129 Summary judgment - Causation 130 Summary judgment - Enterprise 131 Summary judgment - Fraud 132 Summary judgment - Injury 133 Summary judgment - Limitations 134 Summary judgment - Pattern of racketeering activity 135 Summary judgment - Predicate acts 136 Summary judgment - Racketeering activity 137 Taxes, damages 159 Taxpayers, persons entitled to maintain action 93 Tolling, limitations 126 Treble damages 160 Trusteeship 183 Unclean hands, defenses 115 Waiver, limitations 127 Weight and sufficiency of evidence 144

71. Standing, practice and procedure generally

Employees' complaint against employer for hiring illegal workers alleged sufficiently direct injuries for standing under federal and Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); complaint alleged that employer engaged in widespread and knowing hiring and harboring of illegal aliens with express purpose and direct result of lowering wages of legal workers. Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., C.A.11 (Ga.) 2006, 465 F.3d 1277, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1381, 549 U.S. 1260, 167 L.Ed.2d 174. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Subsidiary of tobacco company, which was denied expanded intervention to allow it to protect its claimed privileges in deposition and trial testimony in federal government's action against company and others for alleged violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), lacked standing to appeal order in

which district court overruled most of company's objections to witness's allegedly privileged trial testimony. U.S. v. British American Tobacco Australia Services, Ltd., C.A.D.C.2006, 437 F.3d 1235, 369 U.S.App.D.C. 383. Federal Courts 544

Arrestee's alleged loss of the ability to pursue gainful employment and lost potential income from that employment due to police officer's alleged malicious prosecution and false imprisonment did not constitute a cognizable injury to business or property, as required to confer standing under the civil remedies provision of Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Evans v. City of Chicago, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2006, 434 F.3d 916. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Termination of two union members, allegedly as result of their opposition to imposition of emergency trusteeship over union local, was insufficient to establish nexus under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) which required that RICO violation be the proximate cause of their terminations, as required to have standing to maintain civil action against international union and local union activists whom they alleged had conducted or conspired to conduct union affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity to place union local under emergency trusteeship to effectuate ouster of its principal officer. Anderson v. Ayling, C.A.3 (Pa.) 2005, 396 F.3d 265. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Legally documented agricultural laborers were direct victims of fruit growers' alleged scheme to leverage hiring of undocumented immigrants in order to depress wages, for purposes of determining whether laborers had statutory standing to sue under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., C.A.9 (Wash.) 2002, 301 F.3d 1163. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Online gambling company's alleged racketeering activities of misrepresenting the safety and security of participants' funds in their individual player accounts and omitting gambling codes from transactions so banks would continue to process gambling transactions were not the proximate cause of participants' injuries of being unable to access their player funds after company was shut down by federal agents, as required for participants to have standing to assert Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim company and its founders; government shutdown of company's website and company's subsequent decision to freeze player accounts were intervening causes between the racketeering activities and the asserted injuries. Lawson v. Full Tilt Poker Ltd., S.D.N.Y.2013, 2013 WL 950871. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 62

Former employees, who claimed a vested interest in unfunded deferred compensation plans, did not suffer an injury to their “business or property” sufficient to confer Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) standing against defendants who allegedly transferred former employer's monies to its parent company; by agreeing to receive deferred compensation through former employer's top hat plans, employees made their right to receive the compensation dependent on the employer's ongoing success, and therefore employees were unsecured creditors of employer to the extent of the deferred compensation benefits they claimed. Hill v. Opus Corp., C.D.Cal.2011, 841 F.Supp.2d 1070. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 59

Landowners whose lots secured loans issued to manufactured home buyers lacked standing to maintain Racket-

eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against sellers, parent corporation and corporate officer, due to alleged illegal property liens, since landowners did not allege that they suffered out-of-pocket expenses due to purported RICO violations; landowners had conveyed property at issue, notwithstanding liens, and had not incurred financial losses. Vanderbilt Mortg. and Finance, Inc. v. Flores, S.D.Tex.2010, 747 F.Supp.2d 794. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Purchasers of custom homes lacked standing to bring civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against vendor, mortgage lender, and others, based on allegations that vendor and lender obtained inflated appraisals for the homes, in order to complete sales at above-market prices, where purchasers asserted that they paid less for their home than it was worth, and thus, could not establish that they suffered any injury. Johnson v. KB Home, D.Ariz.2010, 720 F.Supp.2d 1109. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Former coowner of business had standing to bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, as he alleged direct harm to his business and property interest; although he alleged harm to corporation in lost business, he also alleged that his interest in it was sold out from under him, and he was not merely alleging injury to corporation based on inadequate compensation in transfer, but rather that he was individually singled out and swindled. LaFlamboy v. Landek, N.D.Ill.2008, 587 F.Supp.2d 914. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Out-of-pocket expenses in the form of travel, lodging, telephone calls, food, attorney fees incurred by father, whose children were unlawfully removed by mother from county's custody during visitation, as a direct result of alleged racketeering activity by county and rape crisis center constituted injury to his business or property for purposes of establishing standing for claims under federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and North Dakota RICO statute. Geraci v. Women's Alliance, Inc., D.N.D.2006, 436 F.Supp.2d 1022. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 111

Immigrant workers claiming that payroll checks did not include overtime pay adequately alleged facts to satisfy the standing requirement necessary to state a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); workers allegedly were lulled into accepting paychecks mailed to them without any overtime compensation, allegedly relied to detriment on alleged mail and wire fraud, and allegedly sustained injury to business or property by reason of the RICO violation. Choimbol v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., E.D.Va.2006, 428 F.Supp.2d 437. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Hospital plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a direct injury to meet the requirements of Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) standing; plaintiffs set forth extensive allegations describing how defendant hospital owner's practice of artificially inflating its billings to increase its reimbursements from Medicare outlier trust fund for inpatient hospital services injured plaintiffs' business or property by driving up the outlier threshold and reducing the reimbursements that they were entitled to receive from the outlier pool. State of Fla., Office of Atty. Gen., Dept. of Legal Affairs v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., S.D.Fla.2005, 420 F.Supp.2d 1288. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Employees and insurance agents who sued insurance company, alleging that company caused sponsored benefit plans to improperly invest their assets, lacked standing to bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims derivatively, since such cause of action was not specifically enumerated remedy under Em- ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Mehling v. New York Life Ins. Co., E.D.Pa.2005, 413 F.Supp.2d 476. Labor And Employment 630; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Former property owner lacked prudential and constitutional standing under Article III to bring action against presently or formerly practicing Pennsylvania attorneys and business entities through which they practiced law, alleging a claim under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) and state law claims for fraud and conspiracy, based upon defendants' alleged inaccurate descriptions of property belonging to individuals and entities to whom former owner transferred the property, and defendants' filing of enforcement proceedings to collect back taxes from those individuals and entities, where former owner no longer owned properties at issue, and he did not suffer an “injury in fact” from defendants' alleged conduct. Gagliardi v. Kratzenberg, W.D.Pa.2005, 404 F.Supp.2d 858, affirmed on other grounds 188 Fed.Appx. 86, 2006 WL 1525380. Conspiracy 17; Fraud 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Felon convicted of criminal conspiracy lacked standing to assert claims under civil provision of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against his co-conspirators to recover economic losses incurred because of forfeitures arising from plaintiff's conviction, where plaintiff had forfeited to United States all right, title, and interest in property allegedly held by co-conspirators, plaintiff had no cognizable interest in stolen funds, and any injury arising from conspiracy was not attributable to co-conspirators, but to plaintiff's own criminal activity and subsequent application of forfeiture statutes pursuant to criminal law. Descent v. Kolitsidas, M.D.Fla.2005, 396 F.Supp.2d 1315. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Copyright owner, whose own infringement claims against Internet service providers (ISPs) were barred by safe harbor provisions of Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), lacked standing to assert Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against ISPs based on predicate acts of infringements of third- party copyrights; third parties were more direct victims, owner's injury was speculative, and any damage award would have to be apportioned. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, C.D.Cal.2004, 340 F.Supp.2d 1077, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1568, affirmed in part , reversed in part and remanded 481 F.3d 751, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, amended and superseded on denial of rehearing 488 F.3d 1102, certiorari denied 128 S.Ct. 709, 552 U.S. 1062, 169 L.Ed.2d 553. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Insureds lacked standing to assert civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against insurance broker based on broker's participation in kickback scheme involving insurance funds covering properties owned or controlled by insureds because they did not establish that they were injured by the alleged RICO violation; insureds, which were not foreseeable victims of the scheme to defraud because they were not the targets, competitors, or intended victims of the alleged racketeering enterprise, did not demonstrate that the kickback scheme resulted in insufficient funds for them to rebuild or repair their properties following Hurricane Andrew. Meadowbrook-Richman, Inc. v. Associated Financial Corp., S.D.N.Y.2004, 325 F.Supp.2d 341. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Current and former hourly employees' complaint against employer, stating that employer hired illegal workers, and thereby depressed employees' wages, sufficiently alleged injury to employee's “business or property,” for purposes of determining whether employees had standing to sue employer under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., N.D.Ga.2004, 314 F.Supp.2d 1333, affirmed in part , reversed in part and remanded 411 F.3d 1252, certiorari granted in part 126 S.Ct. 830, 546 U.S. 1075, 163 L.Ed.2d 705, certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted 126 S.Ct. 2016, 547 U.S. 516, 164 L.Ed.2d 776, on remand 465 F.3d 1277. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Loss of jobs of two union members, allegedly as result of opposing imposition of emergency trusteeship over union local, was insufficient to establish nexus under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) which required that RICO violation be the proximate cause of their terminations, as required to have standing to maintain civil action against international union and local union activists whom they alleged had conducted or conspired to conduct union affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity to place union local under emergency trusteeship to effectuate ouster of its principal officer. Anderson v. Ayling, E.D.Pa.2003, 297 F.Supp.2d 805, affirmed 396 F.3d 265. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Asbestos manufacturer's allegations that manufacturer was intended target of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations by law firm and its principals, including acts of mail and wire fraud, and that manufacturer thereby suffered injury resulting from payment of higher settlements to claimants, which entitled firm to more generous legal fees, were sufficient to allege proximate cause required to establish standing in manufacturer's RICO action alleging unlawful pattern of racketeering activity. G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Baron & Budd, S.D.N.Y.2002, 238 F.Supp.2d 521. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Former university employee who was allegedly forced to resign due to his opposition to athletic apparel manufacturer's labor practices lacked standing to bring RICO claim against university and manufacturer, absent evidence that employee's constructive discharge was caused by act that was independently wrongful under RICO. Keady v. Nike, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2000, 116 F.Supp.2d 428, affirmed in part , vacated in part 23 Fed.Appx. 29, 2001 WL 1168334. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Increased law enforcement costs incurred by Canada in combatting cigarette manufacturers' alleged scheme to smuggle cigarettes into Canada did not constitute cognizable injury to Canada as party to commercial transaction, but, rather, constituted injury to Canada's general economy and its ability to carry out its functions, and thus Canada did not have standing to maintain action against manufacturers under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to recover costs. Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., N.D.N.Y.2000, 103 F.Supp.2d 134, affirmed 268 F.3d 103, certiorari denied 123 S.Ct. 513, 537 U.S. 1000, 154 L.Ed.2d 394. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

In order to have standing under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), plaintiff must demonstrate that harm he suffered is direct result of predicate act or alleged pattern of racketeering activity. J.S. Service Center Corp. v. General Elec. Technical Services Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1996, 937 F.Supp. 216. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Standing is conferred on a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) plaintiff whose business or property has been injured by reason of conduct constituting a RICO violation. Buck Creek Coal, Inc. v. United Workers of America, S.D.Ind.1995, 917 F.Supp. 601. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act limits standing to plaintiffs whose injuries were both factually and proximately caused by alleged RICO violation. Three Crown Ltd. Partnership v. Salomon Bros., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1995, 906 F.Supp. 876. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Plaintiff had standing generally to bring civil RICO action since injury it suffered was proximately caused by RICO violations, where plaintiff alleged that defendants created enterprise and perpetrated scheme the purpose of which was advanced by alleged acts of mail and wire fraud, that plaintiff was injured by these fraudulent acts as they induced plaintiff to be duped by defendants' scheme, that fraud was directed at plaintiff and that injury suffered by plaintiff was proximately caused thereby. Update Traffic Systems, Inc. v. Gould, E.D.N.Y.1994, 857 F.Supp. 274. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

To have standing to raise claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), plaintiffs must show that their injuries were proximately caused by predicate acts committed by defendants. Trautz v. Weisman, S.D.N.Y.1993, 819 F.Supp. 282. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

In order to have standing to sue under RICO, alleged injury must be caused by pattern of racketeering activity in violation of the statute or by individual RICO predicate acts, and RICO pattern or acts must proximately cause alleged injury. Haviland v. J. Aron & Co., S.D.N.Y.1992, 796 F.Supp. 95, affirmed 986 F.2d 499, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 1945, 507 U.S. 1051, 123 L.Ed.2d 650. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 5; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Plaintiff does not have standing to sue until he has been injured by conduct constituting Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act violation. Randolph County Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Sutliffe, S.D.Ohio 1991, 775 F.Supp. 1113. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Standing for civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) relief requires that plaintiff demonstrate defendant has committed predicate offense. O & K Trojan, Inc. v. Municipal & Contractors Equip- ment Corp., S.D.N.Y.1990, 751 F.Supp. 431. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 5

There exists requirement of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.], as under antitrust acts, that plaintiff must suffer injury by defendants' actions before it has standing to sue. Oak- land County by Kuhn v. City of Detroit, E.D.Mich.1986, 628 F.Supp. 610. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Antitrust standing principles are not applicable to a civil claim under this section. In re Catanella and E.F. Hut-

ton and Co., Inc. Securities Litigation, E.D.Pa.1984, 583 F.Supp. 1388. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 57

With regard to a civil claim under this section plaintiff, to have standing, need only establish that he was injured by at least two acts of racketeering activity, i.e., a pattern of such activity, charged to the defendant. Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., E.D.Pa.1983, 581 F.Supp. 88. Commerce 80

No basis exists for imposing judicially-created standing requirement limiting recovery under subsec. (c) of this section to businessmen, or those suffering from an undefined “racketeering enterprise” injury, since nothing under this chapter nor legislative history authorizes such limitation. Ralston v. Capper, E.D.Mich.1983, 569 F.Supp. 1575. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

A plaintiff under this section must allege some injury “by reason of” violation of this chapter in order to have standing to bring action for treble damages under this chapter and thus plaintiff must allege not only injury from predicate offenses but injury of type this chapter was intended to prevent. Harper v. New Japan Securities In- tern., Inc., C.D.Cal.1982, 545 F.Supp. 1002. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Former local union president lacked standing to assert civil RICO claim against international union, absent allegation he suffered direct injury to his own business or property; removal as president and subsequent expul- sion from membership in union were insufficient as removal was not caused by act that was independently wrongful under RICO, i.e., act of racketeering. Commer v. American Federation of State, County and Mun. Em- ployees, S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 21697873, Unreported, reconsideration denied 2003 WL 22671546. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Former prisoner's claim for employment loss alleged an injury to business, and thus, he had standing under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to sue police chief and various police officers for lost employment, loss of employment opportunities, and wages and other compensation associated with loss of employment and other opportunities which resulted from his wrongful conviction of state offenses based upon false evidence. Slade v. Gates, C.D.Cal.2003, 2003 WL 21149840, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 59

Plaintiff's claim for employment loss could constitute an injury to business, and thus, plaintiff had standing under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to sue prosecutor for lost employment, loss of employment opportunities, and wages and other compensation associated with loss of employment and other opportunities. Slade v. Gates, C.D.Cal.2003, 2003 WL 21149789, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 59

Individual participants and beneficiaries of union employee benefit plans lacked standing to bring a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against trustee and nontrustee defendants who allegedly breached their fiduciary duties because they did not adequately allege that they were injured “by reason of” the RICO predicate acts alleged in the complaint; participants' injuries were derivative of direct injuries to

the funds and the union. Bona v. Barasch, S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 1395932, Unreported, on reconsideration 2004 WL 1555191. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

72. Parties, practice and procedure generally

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's complaint alleging violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act and Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act did not fail to name indispensable parties; defendants failed to establish an interest on behalf of alleged indispensable parties and failed to clearly identify which parties were purportedly indispensable. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Beall, M.D.Pa.1987, 677 F.Supp. 279. Federal Civil Procedure 211

73. Class actions, practice and procedure generally

Payment by plaintiff unions and insurers, as third-party payors (TPPs), for excess prescriptions due to manufacturer's alleged misrepresentations as to efficacy and side effects of drug was not demonstrable with generalized proof, as required to certify class under quantity effect theory in action asserting civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation and conspiracy to violate RICO, since individual physicians pre- scribing drug may have relied on manufacturer's alleged misrepresentations to different degrees, or not at all, some excess prescriptions may not have actually caused loss, given likelihood of substitute prescriptions for other drugs, and different TPPs may have paid for different “excess” quantities of prescriptions. UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly and Co., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2010, 620 F.3d 121. Federal Civil Procedure 186.5

Common questions did not predominate as to reliance, for purposes of determining whether to certify class in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action alleging that manufacturers deceived smokers into believing that “light” cigarettes were more healthful than “full-flavored” cigarettes, even though manufacturers conducted national marketing campaign for “light” cigarettes, inasmuch as individualized proof was needed to overcome possibility that a member of purported class purchased “light” cigarettes for reason other than health. McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2008, 522 F.3d 215. Federal Civil Proced- ure 182.5

Even though some members of class certified in action brought by taxpayers against bank, attorneys and law firm, and accounting firm that purportedly devised or marketed illegal tax strategies lacked standing to sue under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), district court could have properly retained jurisdiction over those class members' state-law claims, given that same factual and legal issues had to be adjudicated for both RICO and non-RICO class members, and therefore class certification was not improper on standing grounds. Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2006, 443 F.3d 253. Federal Civil Procedure 182.5; Federal Courts 15

Federal district court's refusal to certify nationwide class in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit alleging mail and wire fraud on part of tax preparers and lenders in connection with refund anticipation loans (RALs) was not preclusive in subsequent RICO action involving same allegations and same defendants, given defendants' change of position; defendants, who argued preclusion in opposing class certification in second action, had, at time of proposed settlement of that action which was later disapproved, insisted that class

treatment of RICO claim in second action was entirely appropriate. Carnegie v. Household Intern., Inc., C.A.7 2004, 376 F.3d 656, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 877, 543 U.S. 1051, 160 L.Ed.2d 772. Judgment 746

Proposed class action would not be manageable as required for class certification respecting customers' action against long-distance telephone companies, which provided “900” telephone number service to sponsors of pro- motions, alleging violation of federal and Georgia racketeering statutes, arising from credit card offers; individual issues abounded and were magnified by necessity of applying diverse state laws to programs that in many cases had little in common beyond their use of “900” numbers. Andrews v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., C.A.11 (Ga.) 1996, 95 F.3d 1014, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied 104 F.3d 373, on remand 54 F.Supp.2d 1371. Federal Civil Procedure 182.5

Farmers and ranchers, who were members of putative class, did not have standing to bring action under Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleging that state agency, indenture trustee, and other entities issued taxable municipal bonds, which were intended to fund agricultural loans, as part of fraudulent scheme as they had not been “injured” as result of alleged RICO violation, notwithstanding contention that farmer and ranchers suffered damages in amount of difference between low interest rates of bond loans and higher interest rates they currently paid on other credit; their ability to obtain other loans rendered them ineligible for bond loans, there was no showing of actual financial loss, and lost “opportunity” to obtain bond loans, by itself, was too speculative to constitute injury. In re Taxable Mun. Bond Securities Litigation, C.A.5 (La.) 1995, 51 F.3d 518. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Common issues predominated in drug pricing class action brought by local and municipal government entities that had reimbursed retail pharmacies for brand-name drugs through self-insured health insurance programs that provided prescription drug benefits to current and former employees, up to point at which some plaintiffs began to mitigate damages caused by inflated pricing, and thus it was proper to limit duration of action to period between 2001 and 2006; some plaintiffs had negotiated discounts with retail pharmacies or taken other cost- cutting measures while other plaintiffs were unaware of mitigation methods, and 2006 was point at which individual issues of mitigation predominated over issues common to the class. In re McKesson Governmental Entit- ies Average Wholesale Price Litigation, D.Mass.2011, 767 F.Supp.2d 263. Federal Civil Procedure 181

Numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements were all satisfied with respect to class action brought on behalf of approximately two million users of internet auction site who paid for their transactions by using online payments company against operator of internet auction site and online payments company for violations of Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and New York's deceptive trade practices and false advertising statutes, and engaging in acts constituting fraudulent inducement, breach of contract and negligence; claims of each settlement class member turned on whether the terms of payment policies were breached by online payments company, the class representatives were each U.S. residents who made one or more purchases through defendant company and funded their transaction by bank transfer, and there was no indication that any of the representative plaintiffs maintained interests that are inconsistent with the claims of the proposed class. Farinella v. Paypal, Inc., E.D.N.Y.2009, 611 F.Supp.2d 250. Federal Civil Procedure 182.5

Class action was likely only method for fair and efficient adjudication of “light” cigarette purchasers' claim that

cigarette manufacturers violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by inducing them to buy “light” cigarettes based on false representations that they would experience reduced health risks, and thus certification of class was warranted, despite manufacturers' contention that individualized proof of reliance, damages, and statute of limitations would be necessary, where action involved alleged conspiracy perpetrated by multiple corporate defendants over period of several decades, extensive discovery and litigation would be necessary, costs to individual plaintiffs would dwarf any potential recovery, purchasers were only victims of alleged scheme, manufacturers could not otherwise be held financially responsible for fraud, questions relating to manufacturers' commission of mail and wire fraud through alleged conspiracy and scheme generated significant number of common questions of law and of fact, reliable statistical evidence was available to help jury decide, within reasonably precise range, how many purchasers fell into defrauded category, and there was substantial evidence of manufacturers' alleged conspiracy to hide truth about “light” cigarettes from public. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., E.D.N.Y.2006, 449 F.Supp.2d 992, reversed 522 F.3d 215. Federal Civil Procedure 182.5

Employees and insurance agents who sued insurance company, alleging that company caused sponsored benefit plans to improperly invest their assets, failed to establish that their injuries were proximately caused by alleged racketeering conduct, and thus lacked standing to bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims directly as class; alleged injury was derivative of harm suffered by third party, and alternative remedies were available under Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Mehling v. New York Life Ins. Co., E.D.Pa.2005, 413 F.Supp.2d 476. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

In action brought by putative class of participants and beneficiaries of employer-sponsored health benefit plans against the plans' insurer/administrator asserting a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim based on defendant's alleged scheme to underpay plan members the benefits to which they were entitled under their respective plans, plaintiffs failed to establish that the third and fourth elements of their claim, that the alleged enterprise engaged in mail and wire fraud misrepresenting that the out-of-network (ONET) benefit was based on accurate usual, customary, and reasonable (UCR) data, could be established at trial based on evidence common to the class, as required to satisfy the predominance requirement for class certification, absent proof of uniformity or at least substantial similarity in the UCR provision of the governing plans. Franco v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., D.N.J.2013, 289 F.R.D. 121. Federal Civil Procedure 184.5

In the interest of case management, district court, after denying class certification, would sever misjoined parties and claims, in action by prospective purchasers of properties in Costa Rica against defunct corporations, corporations' principals, escrow agents, and others, asserting claims for breach of contract, civil liability under Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), breach of fiduciary duty, violations of Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSA or ILSFDA), and fraudulent transfer; action involved over 250 individually- named plaintiffs, plaintiffs had purchased separate plots of land pursuant to different contracts that were modified on inconsistent basis over four-year period, the only nondefaulted defendants actively engaged in defense of the action were escrow agents against whom state-law fiduciary duty claims were asserted, defendants against whom state-law fraudulent transfer claims were asserted, and two pro se defendants against whom claims under federal and state law were asserted, defendants who had engaged in discovery throughout the last two years had faced substantial resistance from named plaintiffs, and it was unclear how many named plaintiffs wanted to continue the litigation. Oginsky v. Paragon Properties of Costa Rica, LLC, S.D.Fla.2012, 282 F.R.D. 681. Federal

Civil Procedure 87; Federal Civil Procedure 388

Proposed class, consisting of all individuals who signed a purchase agreement for properties in Costa Rica from defendant vendors or independent sales organizations working on their behalf, who made payment towards purchase, and who failed to receive a full refund, was too vague, indefinite, and overbroad for class certification, in action for breach of contract, civil liability under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSA or ILSFDA), naming as defendants defunct corporations, corporations' principals, and escrow agents; class definition referred to indefinite number of plaintiffs, over unspecified time period, without any reference to varying statutes of limitations for separate causes of action, and class definition did not incorporate factual limitations to ensure that proposed class was made up only of those purchasers who shared commonality. Oginski v. Paragon Properties of Costa Rica, LLC, S.D.Fla.2012, 282 F.R.D. 672. Federal Civil Procedure 182.5

Common questions of law or fact predominated over questions affecting individual members, as required for certification of class of home purchasers who were allegedly charged fees through sham entity as part of illegal kickback scheme in which mortgage lender and affiliated business arrangements (ABA) participated, as to borrowers' claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even though individual damages determinations were necessary, where each class member could show reliance through common evidence. Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., D.Md.2011, 274 F.R.D. 525. Federal Civil Procedure 182.5

Common questions of law or fact predominated over questions affecting individual members, as required for certification of a class of home purchasers who were allegedly charged fees for title work through a sham entity as part of an illegal kickback scheme in which mortgage lender and affiliated business arrangements (ABAs) participated, as to mail fraud claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even though individual damages determinations were necessary, where each class member could show reliance through common evidence, not necessarily reliance on any particular fraudulent mailing or misrepresentation. Robinson v. Fountainhead Title Group Corp., D.Md.2009, 257 F.R.D. 92. Federal Civil Procedure 182.5

Numerosity requirement for class certification was satisfied in suit by consumers and third-party payors (TPPs) alleging that publisher of electronic drug pricing information and pharmaceutical wholesaler engaged in a racketeering enterprise to fraudulently state the average wholesale price (AWP) for prescription drugs in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and California state law, based on plaintiffs' estimate that there were hundreds of thousands of class members in consumer class, and tens of thousands of members of in the TPP class. New England Carpenters Health Benefits Fund v. First Databank, Inc., D.Mass.2007, 244 F.R.D. 79. Federal Civil Procedure 182.5

Proposed class definition in suit by acute care hospital against health care provider network alleging that defendant violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by “turbocharging” to increase its Medicare outlier reimbursements at the expense of other hospitals was arbitrary and unfair in including any acute care hospital that received at least one outlier payment and whose cost-to-charge ratio (CCR) was not below the low national threshold; class definition simply assumed without sufficient explanation or authority that hospitals with CCRs that fell below the low national threshold line engaged in unlawful turbocharging, whereas

those hospitals whose remained above that line did not. Boca Raton Community Hosp., Inc. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., S.D.Fla.2006, 238 F.R.D. 679, affirmed 582 F.3d 1227. Federal Civil Procedure 181

Requirement for class action certification, that common claims predominate over different claims, was not satisfied in connection with claims by landowners that communications company violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in connection with securing easements allowing for passing of fiber optic cables over their properties; RICO required finding that defendant's conduct was proximate cause of injuries, which necessitated individual suits. Corley v. Entergy Corp., E.D.Tex.2004, 220 F.R.D. 478, subsequent determination 222 F.R.D. 316, affirmed 152 Fed.Appx. 350, 2005 WL 2600177. Federal Civil Procedure 186

In action alleging that defendants failed to disclose existence of scheme to defraud customers of commodities firm by soliciting and stimulating excessive trading in commodities options, affirmative defenses of estoppel, waiver, laches and ratification could be tried on classwide basis, except that defendants would be afforded opportunity to present proof of nonreliance regarding counts under CEA and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO). Waters v. International Precious Metals Corp., S.D.Fla.1996, 172 F.R.D. 479. Federal Civil Procedure 187

Because there were individual reliance issues in mail and wire fraud claims at heart of automobile loan borrower's RICO claims, class issues did not predominate over individual issues for purposes of class certification, where borrower claimed that automobile financing company allowed dealerships to charge borrowers higher interest rate than company charged dealers; RICO claims would require case-by-case analysis of actions of company, each individual dealer and each individual class members to determine whether there was reasonable reliance, which made class unmanageable. Mack v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., M.D.Ala.1996, 169 F.R.D. 671. Federal Civil Procedure 182.5

74. Persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally--Generally

Landowners's allegations that the administration of county's zoning ordinances by county officials constituted a pattern of extortion in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) were sufficient to establish a causal connection between the officials's alleged racketeering activities and some injury to landowners business or property, as required to have standing to bring RICO claims against the officials; although many of the acts constituting an alleged pattern of racketeering activity involved non-parties, landowners also alleged in detail several predicate acts directed toward them, which they characterized as attempted theft by extortion which damaged them by reducing the development potential, and thus the value, of their properties. Gillmor v. Thomas, C.A.10 (Utah) 2007, 490 F.3d 791. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Fact that regular bidders at county's auctions of tax liens were not recipients of false statements in mail fraud allegedly committed by competitor, consisting of lying to county about violating county's single-bid-per-parcel rule, did not preclude bidders' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against competitor; bidders, as direct victims of alleged mail fraud-based scheme, did not also have to be direct recipients of fraudulent statements. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. v. Bridge, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2007, 477 F.3d 928, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , certiorari granted 128 S.Ct. 829, 552 U.S. 1087, 169 L.Ed.2d 625, affirmed 128 S.Ct.

2131, 553 U.S. 639, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012. Postal Service 35(9); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 62

Entrepreneur, who was directly targeted by competitor for competitive injury, had standing to assert civil Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against competitor for injury to his business or property based upon alleged predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, although fraud was perpetrated on another person and entrepreneur did not rely upon competitor's alleged mail and wire frauds. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2004, 373 F.3d 251, on remand 2005 WL 911470, certiorari granted 126 S.Ct. 713, 546 U.S. 1029, 163 L.Ed.2d 567, reversed in part , vacated in part 126 S.Ct. 1991, 547 U.S. 451, 164 L.Ed.2d 720, on remand 2009 WL 1883272. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 60

“RICO standing” is not jurisdictional in nature, but is rather an element of the merits addressed under a motion for failure to state a claim; RICO standing is sufficiently intertwined with the merits of the action, such that its determination requires an evaluation of the merits of the action and makes any potential distinction between the merits and RICO standing exceedingly artificial. Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 318 F.3d 113, as amended , certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 532, 540 U.S. 1012, 157 L.Ed.2d 424, on remand 2005 WL 2064088. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Union trust funds, which provided comprehensive health care benefits to employees, retirees and their depend- ents through welfare benefit plans, could not recover from tobacco companies the costs incurred treating tobacco-related afflictions; loss was too remote from the manufacture and sale of cigarettes to justify direct recovery by the trust funds for any alleged antitrust or Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations. Texas Carpenters Health Ben. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 2000, 199 F.3d 788. Antitrust And Trade Regulation 963(3); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Welfare benefit funds and insurers could not recover directly from cigarette manufacturers, under Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), costs of providing health care benefits to smokers, on grounds that manufacturers made misstatements about relation between smoking and health; injury for which recovery was sought was remote, smokers' ability to file own RICO actions made risk of double recovery palpable, and damages were extremely difficult to calculate. International Broth. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1999, 196 F.3d 818. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 62

Foreign tourism official was not target of alleged racketeering enterprise, which involved use of bribery, kickbacks, extortion, and fraud in attempt to acquire tourist board's advertising account, and therefore he did not have cause of action under Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against advertising firm and various employees and other individuals allegedly involved in enterprise; targets of enterprise were firm's competitors, tourist board, and foreign government. Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam Inc., C.A.2 (Conn.) 1996, 79 F.3d 234, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 66, 519 U.S. 816, 136 L.Ed.2d 27, certified question answered 692 A.2d 709, 240 Conn. 300. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Horse breeders' association and its members had standing to maintain RICO action against purchasers of harness

racing facility, alleging that purchasers never intended to continue track in operation but planned instead to use property for other purposes; causal relationship existed between misrepresentations and injury to plaintiffs; the plaintiffs' lack of contractual right to expect that purchasers would not close track was not of controlling significance. Standardbred Owners Ass'n v. Roosevelt Raceway Associates, L.P., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1993, 985 F.2d 102. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Union showed sufficient concrete injury and sufficient relationship to organizational purpose so as to allow union to assert its members' rights and appeal from permanent injunction under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) prohibiting union member from participating in union affairs; union alleged that injunction infringed its other members' rights of association under First Amendment and Labor-Management Re- porting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). U.S. v. Local 560 (I.B.T.), C.A.3 (N.J.) 1992, 974 F.2d 315. Federal Courts 544

Automobile parts distributor had standing to assert claim that automobile manufacturer's continued use of certain design allegedly in defiance of court divestiture order violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO), even though distributor was not party to divestiture order which provided predicate for RICO claim; standing inquiry in civil RICO case depended solely on demonstrating injury to business or property, and not on satisfying any standing requirement attached to predicate act. Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Products, Inc., C.A.3 (N.J.) 1991, 930 F.2d 277, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1417, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 373, 502 U.S. 939, 116 L.Ed.2d 324. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Supplier which sold building materials to construction company that later filed petition in bankruptcy without paying for supplies lacked cognizable injury from alleged RICO conduct loan officer's requiring kickbacks as condition of loans to construction company that allegedly injured supplier by defrauding company of money that would have allowed payment to creditors--and accordingly, supplier lacked standing to bring action against loan officer and primary lender; supplier's injury of nonpayment should be viewed as flowing from legitimate contractual relationship it had as supplier to company, not from remote corrupt acts of virtual stranger to that contract and to that relationship. National Enterprises, Inc. v. Mellon Financial Services Corp. No. 7, C.A.5 (La.) 1988, 847 F.2d 251. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Purchasers of custom homes had standing to bring civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against vendor, mortgage lender, and others, based on allegations that vendor and lender obtained inflated appraisals for the homes, in order to complete sales at above-market prices, and that purchasers would not have completed their purchases at the contract prices if defendants had not arranged for the inflated appraisals. Johnson v. KB Home, D.Ariz.2010, 720 F.Supp.2d 1109. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

There is no private right of action for aiding and abetting a violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO). In re Countrywide Financial Corp. Mortg. Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, S.D.Cal.2009, 601 F.Supp.2d 1201. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Absent competent evidence that their property was overvalued in the appraisal, purchasers of property could not

show they incurred a concrete injury as a result of an allegedly fraudulent appraisal, and thus, purchasers lacked standing to bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against developer, appraiser, and lender defendants based on allegations that they paid more than fair market value for their property and paid more in interest. Wilson v. Parisi, M.D.Pa.2008, 549 F.Supp.2d 637. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Former plan trustee lacked standing to bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, as he did not sufficiently allege injury to business or property; allegations that, as former fiduciary, he was liable for any losses incurred as result of defendants' alleged racketeering activity and that his personal property interest in pension and welfare plans had been injured because every dollar lost was dollar no longer available to pay his benefits, were insufficient. Ello v. Singh, S.D.N.Y.2007, 531 F.Supp.2d 552, as amended. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Billboard advertising company's alleged loss of opportunity to compete in bidding process for contract with city due to competitor's alleged racketeering activity provided company with standing to prove damages under Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Bulletin Displays, LLC v. Regency Outdoor Advert- ising, Inc., C.D.Cal.2007, 518 F.Supp.2d 1182. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 60

Even if third-party administrator (TPA) for health plans engaged in attempted extortion in furtherance of its alleged scheme to fraudulently take plans' assets, such extortion was not proximate cause of economic harm allegedly sustained by subcontractor that performed claims administration for TPA, as would support subcontract- or's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against TPA, where TPA's decision to remove subcontractor from certain cases was not a direct result of subcontractor's refusal to acquiesce to the extortion; rather, subcontractor's removal from certain cases was for reasons unconnected to the asserted pattern of fraud. Corporate Healthcare Financing, Inc. v. BCI Holdings Co., D.Md.2006, 444 F.Supp.2d 423. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Neither extreme mental anguish nor pecuniary loss stemming from personal injury confers standing sufficient to prosecute private claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Byrd v. Hopson, W.D.N.C.2003, 265 F.Supp.2d 594, affirmed 108 Fed.Appx. 749, 2004 WL 1770261. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Plaintiff family members had standing to sue defendant family members for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations that allegedly resulted when defendants fraudulently induced plaintiffs to enter into settlement agreement by representing that, based on advice of defendants' accountants, all loans made by entities in which plaintiffs' trusts had any interest had been fully repaid with interest; alleged injury was cognizable under RICO, defendants proximately caused alleged injury, and injury to trusts was direct. Turkish v. Kasenetz, E.D.N.Y.1997, 964 F.Supp. 689. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Members of cooperative corporation which owned and operated a commercial building lacked standing to bring claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicated by corporation's acts of

mail fraud, where members did not claim that any misrepresentation contained in mailings were relied upon, and members failed to allege damage that was proximately caused by mail fraud. Curatola v. Ruvolo, S.D.N.Y.1997, 949 F.Supp. 223. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Insurance agent had standing to challenge alleged violation of provision making it unlawful to use money derived from pattern of racketeering activity to invest in enterprise and provision making it unlawful to acquire control of activity through pattern of racketeering activity, even though predicate violations were not aimed at him, since RICO conspiracy claim against agent was premised on existence of these violations. Resolution Trust Corp. v. S & K Chevrolet Co., C.D.Ill.1996, 918 F.Supp. 1235, opinion vacated in part on reconsideration 923 F.Supp. 135. Conspiracy 17

Developers who paid bribes to city officials for permits and approval were not innocent nor victims and, thus, could not maintain civil action against city and officials under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); developers had obligation to avoid whatever damage may have resulted from extortionate demands by reporting officials to appropriate law enforcement officials. Roma Const. Co., Inc. v. aRusso, D.R.I.1995, 906 F.Supp. 78, reversed 96 F.3d 566, on remand 1998 WL 156708. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 57

To state a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, private plaintiff must allege that he or she suffered an injury in his business or property by reason of a violation of the Act; requirements of injury and causation are aspects of RICO standing. In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Securities Litigation, W.D.Pa.1994, 900 F.Supp. 777. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 62

Individual lacked standing to assert RICO claim in his own right based on alleged misappropriation of funds from various nonprofit organizations of which is member; injury to business or property from alleged misappropriation was not his injury, but injury sustained by organizations. Pappas v. Passias, E.D.N.Y.1995, 887 F.Supp. 465. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Former manager for department store's automotive center lacked standing to bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against store based on predicate act of extortion arising from alleged scheme of store to sell unneeded automotive parts and services inasmuch as alleged scheme was directed at customers and not at manager. Cardwell v. Sears Roebuck and Co., D.S.C.1993, 821 F.Supp. 406. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 59

A mortgagee lacked standing to assert a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against a mortgage broker, which had allegedly misrepresented value of property and ability of borrowers to service debt, with regard to loans which were not yet in default; although default rate on loans through broker were allegedly higher than default rate on other loans, neither additional risk unknowingly assumed by mortgagee as result of allegedly fraudulent loans nor adverse impact of loans on mortgagee's ability to lend, due to taking of additional loss reserves, stated injury compensable under RICO. First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding, Corp., S.D.N.Y.1993, 820 F.Supp. 89, affirmed 27 F.3d 763, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 728, 513 U.S. 1079, 130

L.Ed.2d 632. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

A private suit may be brought under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of the statute. Koal Industries Corp. v. Asland, S.A., S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 1143. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Defendant lacked standing to assert counterclaim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) based on allegations that pension fund trustees and their attorneys refused to comply with discovery requests and that they communicated refusals through the mail and over the telephone, and that such refusals were intended to conceal earlier acts of fraud and of embezzlement; even assuming that trustees' position in discovery dispute was an attempt to conceal earlier fraud, and even if refusal by counsel to comply with discovery request could ever constitute a RICO predicate act, letters and telephone calls bore no relation to any injury that defendant alleged that he himself suffered. Leogrande v. Leogrande, E.D.N.Y.1992, 799 F.Supp. 1354. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Public housing tenants lacked standing to sue under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); it was Department of Housing and Urban Development, rather than tenants, that appeared to have been target of alleged fraud. Kingston Square Tenants Ass'n v. Tuskegee Gardens, Ltd., S.D.Fla.1992, 792 F.Supp. 1566. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Accountant's alleged forgeries were not proximate cause of injurious tax penalties, and thus, clients of accountant had no standing to rely on accountant's forgeries to support action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act based on mail fraud. Zee-Bar, Inc. N.H. v. Kaplan, D.N.H.1992, 792 F.Supp. 895. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Property developer failed to show that it had suffered injury proximately caused by conduct of city officials and rival developers sufficient to confer RICO standing; based on city councilmembers' denial of rezoning request; there was no evidence that councilmember who accepted fishing trip from developer did so with understanding that it would influence his vote, and the allegedly favorable contracts received by another councilmember were not shown to involve payment in excess of fair market value, and there was no other evidence that his voting was influenced by contracts. Bieter Co. v. Beatta Blomquist, D.Minn.1992, 784 F.Supp. 1405, reversed 987 F.2d 1319, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 81, 510 U.S. 823, 126 L.Ed.2d 50, on remand 848 F.Supp. 1446, on remand 156 F.R.D. 173. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

High bidder at bank foreclosure auction did not have standing to assert Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO) claim against bank and officers for alleged scheme to defraud bidder and others of property, absent showing how alleged injury of fraudulent inducement to bid on property subject to alleged secret agreements was caused by charged “predicate acts” of mail or wire fraud. Cutler v. F.D.I.C., D.Me.1992, 781 F.Supp. 816. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Insurance intermediary could challenge validity of insured's purported assignment of Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim to intermediary where intermediary alleged substantial prejudice from assignment since assignment was not executed until after intermediary had filed its motion to dismiss RICO counterclaims over one year into life of litigation and intermediary had not directed previous discovery efforts at insured because it was not presented with claim by insured or on its behalf and presence of RICO claims in present case would bring into case for first time new theories of liability and damages. Nicolls Pointing Coulson, Ltd. v. Transportation Underwriters of Louisiana, Inc., E.D.La.1991, 777 F.Supp. 493. Assignments 70

Joint venturer did not have standing to assert Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against joint venture's accountant, where complaint did not allege injury to business or property of joint venturer caused by accountant; joint venturer admitted that it refused to honor capital call, so did not allege facts showing losses caused by accountant. Browning Ave. Realty Corp. v. Rosenshein, S.D.N.Y.1991, 774 F.Supp. 129. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Purchaser of telephone system failed to allege standing to sue manufacturer for violation of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); purchaser did not allege injury by virtue of manufacturer's use or investment of racketeering income, but rather injury by virtue of allegedly having been fraudulently induced to purchase phone system. Princeton Economics Group, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., D.N.J.1991, 768 F.Supp. 1101. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Nonminority contractor could not establish causal nexus between its alleged loss of state contracts and competitors' alleged creation of minority business enterprise as “front” to obtain contracts, and, therefore, contractor did not have standing to maintain Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action premised on alleged mail and wire fraud used in obtaining contracts; even if mail fraud may have enabled competitors to obtain contracts for which they would not have been eligible, contractor was not minority business enterprise and was also ineligible. United Fence & Guard Rail Corp. v. Royal Guard Fence Co., Inc., E.D.N.Y.1991, 765 F.Supp. 55. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Organizer of bank did not have standing to bring civil RICO action for defendants' alleged bank fraud in obtaining property of bank, as any injury arising from bank fraud was injury to bank and not to bank's organizer. Ben- nett v. Centerpoint Bank, D.N.H.1991, 761 F.Supp. 908, affirmed 953 F.2d 634. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 58

Minority and woman-owned business enterprises (MWBEs) lacked standing to maintain Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit against contractors based on scheme to subvert mandatory “set-aside” programs for MWBEs by use of “conduit” scheme; MWBEs had no property right in the mere desire to obtain business, and could not establish reliance and harm when the allegations involved fraud directed against the government. Daley's Dump Truck Service, Inc. v. Kiewit Pacific Co., W.D.Wash.1991, 759 F.Supp. 1498, affirmed 976 F.2d 1303, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 1644, 507 U.S. 1004, 123 L.Ed.2d 266. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Plaintiff, who alleged that it had suffered monetary injury to its business or property resulting from defendants' acquisition or maintenance of interest in or control of enterprise affecting interstate commerce due to pattern of

racketeering activity, had standing to assert civil claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Intern. Importing Enterprises, Ltd., E.D.Pa.1990, 755 F.Supp. 1292. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Even assuming that third-party defendants' failure to disclose fraudulent scheme caused injury to accountants who were sued by others, any harm to the accountants stemmed from the alleged nondisclosure rather than from the fraudulent acts, so that accountants did not have standing to assert a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) claim based on the fraudulent act. Department of Economic Development v. Arthur An- dersen & Co. (U.S.A.), S.D.N.Y.1990, 747 F.Supp. 922. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Plaintiff not involved in purchase or sale of securities with respect to which securities fraud consisting of violation of § 10b-5 allegedly occurred lacked standing to assert such a security fraud claim and lacked standing under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to assert such securities fraud claims as predicate acts of racketeering. Viacom Intern. Inc. v. Icahn, S.D.N.Y.1990, 747 F.Supp. 205, affirmed 946 F.2d 998, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 1244, 502 U.S. 1122, 117 L.Ed.2d 477. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 61; Securities Regulation 60.37

Since any relief obtained when beneficiary of union employee benefit fund brought action for unpaid contributions would accrue solely to funds and primary right to seek redress for damages to funds belonged to trustees, beneficiary lacked individual standing to bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim based on failure to pay contributions. Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1990, 737 F.Supp. 792, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds 974 F.2d 270, on remand 870 F.Supp. 489. Fed- eral Civil Procedure 184.5

Lessor of interest in mine, which was not purchaser or seller of securities of lessee, lacked standing to claim that lessee violated Racketeer Influenced and Corruption Organizations Act by engaging in pattern of racketeering through making several allegedly false representations in securities filings, in violation of Rule 10b-5, that lessee planned to conduct mining activities in properties covered by lease. Chief Consol. Min. Co. v. Sunshine Min. Co., D.Utah 1989, 725 F.Supp. 1191. Securities Regulation 60.37

Unsuccessful bidder, which alleged that navy contractor's repeated acts of mail and wire fraud consisting of false representations that it was or would be in compliance with relevant environmental laws, regulations, and contract provisions relating to hazardous waste disposal laws, were part of a scheme to defraud navy and to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other bidders for navy contracts and that contracts awarded to contractor would have been awarded to it but for contractor's wrongful conduct, had a standing to sue and sufficiently stated a claim actionable under RICO. Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., N.D.Cal.1989, 720 F.Supp. 805. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 60

Oil company which was allegedly overcharged by architect, but which also was reimbursed by foreign government, was not real party in interest and thus could not recover from architect for overcharges under federal or Florida racketeering statutes or Florida civil theft statute; oil company was not injured in its business or prop-

erty. Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone, M.D.Fla.1989, 713 F.Supp. 1420. Conversion And Civil Theft 100; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Allegations of telecommunications consulting firm and its president that firm sustained reputational and other damage stemming from competitors' actions in supplying applicants for cellular mobile radio systems with packets which could be used to protest grants of licenses to firm's clients were sufficient to meet standing requirement of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Lewis v. Lhu, D.D.C.1988, 696 F.Supp. 723. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 60

Person injured by either racketeering activity or investment of income from racketeering activity has civil RICO cause of action. Capalbo v. PaineWebber, Inc., N.D.Ill.1988, 694 F.Supp. 1315. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 16

Regardless of whether lending bank caused borrower corporation to go out of business, corporation's shareholders had standing to bring RICO action against bank in connection with letter of credit agreement between bank and corporation, alleging shareholders were fraudulently induced by bank's commission of predicate act to personally guarantee line of credit. Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago, N.D.Ill.1988, 693 F.Supp. 666, affirmed 877 F.2d 1333. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

In absence of evidence that consumer sustained injury to his business or property by reason of alleged conspiracy between magazine and collection agency to defraud public into purchasing subscriptions to magazine, consumer had no standing to pursue Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim. Howe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1988, 686 F.Supp. 461. Conspiracy 8

Importer of watches had standing to sue under civil RICO statute for damages resulting from alleged injury to his property which resulted when customs officials confiscated eight imported watches, allegedly due to conduct of United States and Swiss watch manufacturer, but any claims for damages based on business injury required dismissal; importer did not allege that actions by manufacturer caused demise of his business. Shaw v. Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1987, 673 F.Supp. 674. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Plaintiff bringing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act complaint only has standing if, and can only recover to extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by conduct constituting violation. H.G. Gallimore, Inc. v. Abdula, N.D.Ill.1987, 652 F.Supp. 437. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 59

Insured did not have standing to bring civil RICO action under section making it unlawful for any person to use or invest money obtained from pattern of racketeering or under section making it unlawful to acquire or maintain interest in enterprise through pattern of racketeering, where insured did not allege that it suffered any injury from use or investment of money obtained from pattern of racketeering activities or from acquisition of interest in enterprise through pattern of racketeering. Rich Maid Kitchens, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., E.D.Pa.1986, 641 F.Supp. 297, affirmed 833 F.2d 307. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations

Lending banks had no civil cause of action under Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against accounting firm which prepared financial statements required by banks for loan to corporation and which allegedly committed multiple acts of wire and mail fraud related to sending false financial information, as banks were not claiming injury collateral to corporation's status as a racketeer influenced organization but were alleging direct injury as victims of criminal acts and banks did not allege that they were victims of a corrupt criminal enterprise directed by the accountants. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., N.D.Ga.1985, 603 F.Supp. 351, reversed 782 F.2d 966. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Securities customers who alleged injury only by predicate acts of racketeering by broker without alleging that a criminal enterprise was involved did not have standing under this section limiting plaintiffs to those injured by reason of a pattern of racketeering. Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., N.D.Cal.1984, 591 F.Supp. 581. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Plaintiffs, having alleged a compensable injury to their business or property by reason of the defendant's alleged violation of this chapter, fell within the category of racketeering victims afforded a cause of action under this section. Slattery v. Costello, D.C.D.C.1983, 586 F.Supp. 162. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Standing to sue for treble damages under this section relied solely on allegations by broker and stockholders that corporation committed predicate acts listed in this chapter, and no claim of existence of racketeering enterprise was made; therefore, broker and stockholders did not have standing to maintain civil claim for treble damages under section 1964 of this title. In re Action Industries Tender Offer, E.D.Va.1983, 572 F.Supp. 846. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Provisions of this section do not contain any substantive prohibitions unknown to other sections of federal criminal law; instead, they confer upon victims of certain criminal violations right to proceed in civil suit against of- fenders. Salisbury v. Chapman, N.D.Ill.1981, 527 F.Supp. 577. Criminal Law 1220

Insurance company's alleged mail fraud in connection with decisions to discourage purchase of new policies with cash value or equity of older policies did not directly or indirectly cause discharge of employee, and, thus, employee lacked standing to sue for violation of federal racketeering statute. Giuffre v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., S.D.N.Y.1989, 129 F.R.D. 71. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Law firm did not have standing to sue Chapter 11 debtor under RICO, though its clients did not receive personal injury settlements from debtor as result of debtor's alleged violations of Act, and though firm was thereby prevented from collecting its legal fees, where firm's injuries did not result directly from alleged violations. In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., N.D.Ill.1986, 63 B.R. 415. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

75. ---- Abortion providers, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

Abortion clinics had standing to bring action against coalition of antiabortion groups alleging that groups conspired to use force to induce clinic staff and patients to stop working and obtain medical services elsewhere, in- juring the business and/or property interest of clinics in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO). National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, U.S.Ill.1994, 114 S.Ct. 798, 510 U.S. 249, 127 L.Ed.2d 99, rehearing denied 114 S.Ct. 1340, 510 U.S. 1215, 127 L.Ed.2d 688, on remand 25 F.3d 1053, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

RICO liability could not be imposed against coalition of antiabortion groups by women's abortion clinics that coalition sought to close where neither alleged enterprise nor racketeering acts was economically motivated; noneconomic crimes committed in furtherance of noneconomic motives were not within ambit of RICO. Nation- al Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 968 F.2d 612, rehearing denied , certiorari granted in part 113 S.Ct. 2958, 508 U.S. 971, 125 L.Ed.2d 659, reversed 114 S.Ct. 798, 510 U.S. 249, 127 L.Ed.2d 99, rehearing denied 114 S.Ct. 1340, 510 U.S. 1215, 127 L.Ed.2d 688, on remand 25 F.3d 1053, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 22

Abortion clinic had standing to assert injuries from extortion of its employees by abortion protestors, in civil RICO suit, so long as clinic itself was injured as result of protestors' acts. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, E.D.Pa.1988, 689 F.Supp. 465, affirmed 868 F.2d 1342, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 261, 493 U.S. 901, 107 L.Ed.2d 210, rehearing denied 110 S.Ct. 1515, 494 U.S. 1050, 108 L.Ed.2d 651, on remand 745 F.Supp. 1082. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Members of proposed class of all women who were not members of certain women's organization and whose rights to services of abortion clinics in United States had been or would be interfered with by racketeering activities of abortion opponents and anti-abortion groups suffered injury to their business or property and, therefore, had standing to bring suit against the abortion opponents and anti-abortion groups under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as defendants' activities allegedly resulted in the women's inability to avail themselves of commercial relationship with abortion clinics. National Organization For Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, N.D.Ill.1997, 172 F.R.D. 351. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

76. ---- Bankrupt estates, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

Trustee of bankruptcy estate of debtor-corporation that devised, promoted and operated massive Ponzi scheme was barred by doctrine of in pari delicto from recovering on his federal racketeering claims against entities which allegedly assisted this scheme by funneling investors to it, given that debtor was far more than mere pass- ive participant in alleged fraud, and that application of in pari delicto doctrine would further policies behind the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) of divesting RICO participants of fruits of ill- gotten gains by barring award of treble damages to admitted violator of RICO provisions. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, C.A.11 (Ga.) 2006, 437 F.3d 1145, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 45, 549 U.S. 811, 166 L.Ed.2d 19. Action 4; Bankruptcy 2154.1; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 57

Only trustee in bankruptcy for insurer, not insured, had standing to bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act claim against insurance agent, its parent company, and claims handler for money owed to insurer's bankruptcy estate; insured contended that agent's insurance sales violated rate structure imposed by Louisiana law and as a result insurer was defrauded of insurance premiums and income partially causing insurer's demise. Ocean Energy II, Inc. v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., C.A.5 (La.) 1989, 868 F.2d 740. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Liquidator of company did not lack standing to bring action alleging violation of the Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968] on ground that defendants were alleged to have controlled the company and one could not deceive oneself. Kempe v. Monitor Intermediaries, Inc., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1986, 785 F.2d 1443. Federal Civil Procedure 103.2

Liquidator of insolvent insurers who were allegedly brought to financial ruin by actions of defendant had no standing to bring civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action on behalf of the policyholders and other creditors of insolvent insurers, inasmuch as creditors and policyholders had no standing themselves because their losses were indirect and derivative of those suffered by victim insurers. Kaiser v. Stew- art, E.D.Pa.1997, 965 F.Supp. 684. Insurance 1407; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Under civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), liquidator of insurance company has standing to maintain RICO action against officers and directors of company for fraud, as liquidator is prosecuting lawsuit on behalf of insolvent company. Corporacion Insular de Seguros v. Munoz, D.Puerto Rico 1995, 896 F.Supp. 238. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Corporate debtor's bankruptcy trustee had standing to assert RICO claim against corporate officers and directors on its own behalf for harm done to corporation itself, but not to bring claims on behalf of debtor's shareholders and creditors. Zimmerman v. Duggan, E.D.Pa.1988, 86 B.R. 47. Bankruptcy 2154.1

Chapter 7 trustee lacked standing to bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims against accounting firms which issued unqualified opinion with respect to debtor's financial condition, despite misrepresentation of financial condition in several respects; debtor was merely indirectly injured party whose damages stemmed from diminution in value of its stock in subsidiaries which were more directly injured by accounting firm's alleged racketeering activity. In re American Reserve Corp., N.D.Ill.1987, 70 B.R. 729, reconsideration denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Fact that property conveyed by debtor prior to filing bankruptcy petition was allegedly conveyed in effort to defraud creditors did not give trustee any interest in such property prior to obtaining judgment of fraudulent conveyance, and thus, under section of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c), requiring that plaintiff be injured in his business or property, trustee did not have standing to bring RICO action regarding alleged fraudulent conveyances which occurred prior to filing of debtor's bankruptcy petition. Kremen v. Blank, D.C.Md.1985, 55 B.R. 1018. Bankruptcy 2723

77. ---- Corporate officers, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

Business owner who sued city development authority and developers, challenging urban redevelopment project, lacked standing to maintain antitrust and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims, since owner did not aver that he personally suffered antitrust injury as result of defendants' actions; although business suffered from alleged fraudulent condemnation, owner could not assert personal injury based on condemnation of property he did not own, nor could he claim lost profits and business opportunities from alleged bid-rigging. Tal v. Hogan, C.A.10 (Okla.) 2006, 453 F.3d 1244, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1334, 549 U.S. 1209, 167 L.Ed.2d 81. Antitrust And Trade Regulation 963(3); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Plaintiff, former CEO of target corporation, had standing to allege violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) based on predicate acts of defendant corporation and its officers and directors, as facts alleged supported finding of transaction and loss causation, where plaintiff alleged that defendants were in process of formulating Recapitalization Plan that would issue large amounts of stock to acquiring corporation at below market price, and substantially dilute value of plaintiff's stock in target corporation and options, at time that they negotiated plaintiff's resignation from target corporation. Powers v. British Vita, P.L.C., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1995, 57 F.3d 176. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Officer and substantial shareholder of corporation which was allegedly victimized by defendant's predicate acts of extortion and intimidation did not have RICO standing, notwithstanding derivative injuries they allegedly suffered as indirect result. Rylewicz v. Beaton Services, Ltd., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1989, 888 F.2d 1175, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

President and vice president of company toward which RICO violations were allegedly directed lacked individual standing to maintain action under RICO, absent allegation that they personally suffered as a result of fraudulent scheme to terminate certain insurance plans. Robinson v. Hawkins, E.D.Mo.1996, 942 F.Supp. 1234. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Former vice-president of brokerage firm could not bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act action alleging mail and securities fraud based on alleged mishandling of dividends, interest and commissions; although he claimed that he was fired in retaliation for complaining about alleged illegal activities, predicate acts were frauds directed at customers, not at him, and therefore, he was not injured “by reason of” alleged fraud. Burdick v. American Exp. Co., S.D.N.Y.1988, 677 F.Supp. 228, affirmed 865 F.2d 527. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 62

78. ---- Corporations, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

Corporation does not have standing to sue under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for damages allegedly occurring from actions of its directors or officers against third parties, as there can be no proximate cause. Mendelovitz v. Vosicky, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1994, 40 F.3d 182. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 62

Debtor companies were not barred by in pari delicto doctrine, which foreclosed recovery by a claimant that was a participant in the alleged wrong, from bringing civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against a bank for participating in fraudulent transactions whereby debtors' corrupt insiders were able to loot the companies; when corrupt insiders worked with bank to structure the fraudulent transactions and to loot the companies, they were not acting within the scope of their employment, and therefore their acts and knowledge could not be imputed to debtors. In re Parmalat Securities Litigation, S.D.N.Y.2006, 412 F.Supp.2d 392. Action 4

Corporation alleged sufficient injury to establish standing to sue under civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); corporation asserted that fraudulent financial reports submitted by United States mail and interstate wire to corporation, through its board of directors, and other investors, caused corporation to ex- pend capital for investment in unauthorized purchase of substandard, less expensive water vending machines from company allegedly wholly owned and controlled by one of defendants, and in allegedly nonexistent water vending machines while obligating corporation to repay incurred debt. Water Intern. Network, U.S.A., Inc. v. East, M.D.Fla.1995, 892 F.Supp. 1477. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Corporation, its officer, and claimant to shares had standing to assert racketeering claim against tax exempt corporation, its officers and shareholders based on defendants' use and investment of racketeering income from racketeering at another corporation to the extent that it affected plaintiffs' business or property. Federal Informa- tion Systems, Corp. v. Boyd, D.D.C.1990, 753 F.Supp. 971. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

79. ---- Creditors, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

Alleged individual acts of mail fraud underlying alleged racketeering activity of insurance broker and agent for contractors that defaulted on loans made by lender under factoring agreement were proximate cause of lender's injury, as required to establish lender's standing to assert violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO); even if mail frauds against lender through factoring agreement directly promoted contractors' fraud against county, frauds against lender and county were intertwined, and lender was a target and intended victim of the alleged racketeering enterprise. Baisch v. Gallina, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 346 F.3d 366. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims arising out of third parties' failure to pay loans and actions to dilute value of stock securing such loans were not ripe, and lenders had no standing to pursue them, until they had first foreclosed on loans and thus determined extent to which stock was insufficient to make them whole. Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 322 F.3d 130. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Creditor of corporation had Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) standing to bring action for injuries that he suffered when hotel controlled by corporation was allegedly sold at a price below its market value; sale of the hotel for a higher price would have directly benefitted major creditors, because they would have been able to recover a greater percentage of the debts owed to them. Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Banks of Florida, Inc., C.A.11 (Fla.) 1998, 140 F.3d 898. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or-

ganizations 62

Obligors on $450,000 loan to bankrupt corporation did not have standing to bring Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against individuals allegedly responsible for looting corporation; alleged looting of corporation only harmed plaintiffs indirectly, and since plaintiffs were not primary creditors of corporation, plaintiffs did not become liable until alleged looting rendered it unable to pay its debts. Manson v. Sta- cescu, C.A.2 (Conn.) 1993, 11 F.3d 1127, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 292, 513 U.S. 915, 130 L.Ed.2d 206. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Oil suppliers that sustained injury significantly different from those of distributor's other creditors, when distributor fraudulently obtained large quantity of oil from suppliers and diverted it to other concerns prior to filing for bankruptcy relief, had standing to bring civil RICO action for damages they sustained as result. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1989, 875 F.2d 1271. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Since creditors alleged Ponzi scheme promoters had not frustrated their contractual rights by demanding payment of debts or obtaining judgment to enforce them, or shown that such efforts would necessarily be futile, they could not bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against scheme promoters. Burke v. Dowling, E.D.N.Y.1995, 944 F.Supp. 1036. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Obligors on loan to company lacked standing to bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit against defendants allegedly involved in scheme to loot company to point of bankruptcy, as their injuries were not proximately caused by alleged RICO conspiracy; company was person directly harmed by scheme, and obligors' injuries would be cured if company recovered its assets, as it would then be able to pay its debts, thereby relieving obligors of their obligation. Manson v. Stacescu, D.Conn.1993, 823 F.Supp. 76, affirmed 11 F.3d 1127, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 292, 513 U.S. 915, 130 L.Ed.2d 206. Conspiracy 17

In order for a judgment creditor to have standing to pursue Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims, he must allege a direct injury caused by reason of alleged racketeering in violation of the Act. Wooten v. Loshbough, N.D.Ind.1990, 738 F.Supp. 314, affirmed 951 F.2d 768. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 62

Creditor, whose claim could be fully satisfied by distribution from corporate debtor's bankruptcy estate, lacked standing to assert RICO claim, in that he could not show requisite “injury.” John L. Motley Associates, Inc. v. Rumbaugh, E.D.Pa.1989, 104 B.R. 683, reconsideration denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 61

Judgment creditor of debtor corporation lacked standing under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.] to sue for bankruptcy fraud committed against corporation itself in an attempt to hinder creditors generally. Dana Molded Products, Inc. v. Brodner, N.D.Ill.1986, 58 B.R. 576. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

80. ---- Depositors, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

That certain former depositors of insolvent savings and loan had deposits that were not fully covered by Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation insurance limit did not distinguish their claims from claims of other depositors, as would allow former depositors to bring individual claims against directors, officers, auditors and outside counsel of savings and loan under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). In re Sunrise Securities Litigation, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1990, 916 F.2d 874. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Banking institution, as opposed to its depositors generally, can be a victim of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation when the institution is defrauded in connection with the sale of certificates of deposit. Farmers & Merchants Nat. Bank v. San Clemente Financial Group Securities, Inc., D.N.J.1997, 174 F.R.D. 572. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

81. ---- Employees, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

Hourly employees who alleged that employer had used illegal immigrants to drive down their wages satisfied statutory standing element of their prima facie civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) case against employer; employer allegedly had engaged in widespread and knowing hiring and harboring of illegal aliens with express purpose and direct result of lowering wages of legal workers. Williams v. Mohawk In- dustries, Inc., C.A.11 (Ga.) 2005, 411 F.3d 1252, certiorari granted in part 126 S.Ct. 830, 546 U.S. 1075, 163 L.Ed.2d 705, certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted 126 S.Ct. 2016, 547 U.S. 516, 164 L.Ed.2d 776, on remand 465 F.3d 1277. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Employee whose health insurance coverage was cancelled when company officers diverted payroll deductions intended for insurance premiums to pay day-to-day expenses necessary to keep business afloat, was without standing to recover civil damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), in absence of evidence that employee or employee benefit plan suffered economic loss as a result of the officers' conduct; although group coverage was cancelled for nonpayment of premiums, coverage was reinstated by officers and employee was reimbursed for insurance claims which were denied by insurer during period of noncoverage. Mira v. Nuclear Measurements Corp., C.A.7 (Ind.) 1997, 107 F.3d 466. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 58

Worker who was injured by corporation's machine did not have standing to maintain RICO action against shareholders who allegedly depleted the corporation's assets with the result that there were insufficient funds available to compensate the worker. Wooten v. Loshbough, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1991, 951 F.2d 768. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Former insurance company employee lacked standing to bring civil RICO claim against former employer based on alleged injuries of termination and subsequent difficulty in finding employment, and based on alleged underlying offenses of mail and wire fraud, transportation of moneys taken by fraud, and receipt of unlawfully taken money; alleged injuries were not to business or property, and were not caused by the alleged offenses themselves. Vitone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., D.R.I.1996, 943 F.Supp. 192, reconsideration denied 954 F.Supp.

37. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Employee/shareholder, alleging that he had been coerced into working for less salary than he was otherwise entitled to, had standing to bring RICO claim against controlling shareholder of corporations; employee had alleged an injury to himself not shared by other shareholders. Coyer v. Hemmer, D.N.J.1995, 901 F.Supp. 872. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Employee who quit rather than participate in employer's allegedly fraudulent scheme lacked standing to assert Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against employer; employer's conduct was directed at others, and any injury to employee was merely incidental. Hoydal v. Prime Opportunities, Inc., E.D.Mich.1994, 856 F.Supp. 327. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Employee in broker's energy futures and options group was not proximately injured by alleged attempted extortion by broker and its affiliate to pressure employee to divulge confidential client information for benefit of affiliate investing money of broker's partners, and, thus, employee lacked standing to bring RICO action against affiliate; employee's own injuries would have been attributable to his refusal to participate in the allegedly fraudulent scheme, and any proximate injury would have been to broker's clients. Haviland v. J. Aron & Co., S.D.N.Y.1992, 796 F.Supp. 95, affirmed 986 F.2d 499, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 1945, 507 U.S. 1051, 123 L.Ed.2d 650. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Former employee could not claim injury under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for defendants' luring of employee away from her prior job on account of high salary they were able to offer her from alleged racketeering proceeds. Casper v. Paine Webber Group, Inc., D.N.J.1992, 787 F.Supp. 1480. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Former employee would not have standing to maintain private action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act for defendants' alleged tax fraud activity, since alleged diminution of employee's bonus as result of scheme to defraud Internal Revenue Service by putting improper expenses on employer's books and records only had tertiary effect on employee. Miller v. Helmsley, S.D.N.Y.1990, 745 F.Supp. 932. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Former employees of convenience stores, who alleged they were fired as part of conspiracy relating to extortion of confessions and payments by convenience store operator's loss prevention specialists, had standing to assert § 1962(d) RICO claims; it was only necessary that employees show they were injured by act in furtherance of conspiracy. Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., D.N.J.1989, 728 F.Supp. 1123. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Former employee who was injured by employer's alleged RICO violations only indirectly, when employer allegedly dismissed him for refusing to participate in such violations, did not have standing to bring civil RICO action. Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1989, 713 F.Supp. 72, affirmed 897 F.2d 21, 100

A.L.R. Fed. 655. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Former employees had standing to sue their former employer, a petroleum company, under RICO for their termination and resulting damage, where they alleged that the terminations were overt acts done in furtherance of a conspiracy to operate the company through a pattern of racketeering activity, even though such acts were not “predicate acts”; employees alleged that there was a conspiracy to violate RICO by operating the company in part by series of illegal bribes to officials of Middle Eastern countries, that part of the conspiracy was to cover up such illegalities by eliminating opposition within the company, and that their terminations were part of the coverup. Williams v. Hall, E.D.Ky.1988, 683 F.Supp. 639. Conspiracy 17

Former employee did not have standing to bring civil RICO action against corporation for alleged mail and tax fraud; possibility of employee's future tax prosecution was not sufficient injury to confer standing, and any injury from reduction in capital payout upon employee's termination was result of internal bookkeeping of corporation, rather alleged RICO violation of mailing fraudulent tax returns. Jones v. Baskin, Flaherty, Elliot and Man- nino, P.C., W.D.Pa.1987, 670 F.Supp. 597. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Truck driver had standing to sue his employer trucking company under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act, notwithstanding his failure to allege that company had been convicted of alleged predicate acts, that there was any nexus between trucking company and organized crime, or that truck driver had suffered distinct racketeering injury. Waldo v. North American Van Lines, Inc., W.D.Pa.1987, 669 F.Supp. 722. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Former sales representatives of chemical company had standing to bring treble damages action against company under this chapter upon allegations that they were discharged from employment for refusing to engage in commercial bribery pursuant to company policy. Callan v. State Chemical Mfg. Co., E.D.Pa.1984, 584 F.Supp. 619. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Employee lacked standing to bring claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against employer, since nexus between alleged RICO violations asserted by employee and any injuries to him was insufficiently close to say that one proximately caused the other; although employee alleged that he was fired because of actions he took to report and to stop allegedly illegal schemes, employee was not defrauded party and he was not target of any of acts pleaded as “predicate acts” in RICO claim. U.S. ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., D.Mass.2003, 2003 WL 21228801, Unreported, affirmed 360 F.3d 220, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 59, 543 U.S. 820, 160 L.Ed.2d 28. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

82. ---- Franchisees, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

Automobile dealership operators failed to allege concrete financial loss proximately caused by defendants' allegedly wrongful conduct, and so lacked standing to bring RICO suit, where operators alleged that defendants diverted more popular automobiles to dealerships which cooperated in false dealer sales reporting scheme and allocated less popular automobiles to operators because they did not cooperate in scheme, and this diversion impeded operators' ability to compete effectively and resulted in sale of their dealership at distressed price; operat-

ors did not point to specific sales which they would have made in absence of defendants' conduct and there was multitude of factors, including operators' and competitors' managerial decisions, apart from alleged wrongful conduct of defendants, which may have contributed to diminished profitability of operators' dealership. Sheperd v. American Honda Motor Co. Inc., N.D.Cal.1993, 822 F.Supp. 625. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 62

Plaintiff franchisees had standing to recover for alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation as long as they were injured through one or more predicate acts, even though they were not injured by remaining predicate acts of mail and wire fraud perpetrated on other franchisees. Giuliano v. Everything Yogurt, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1993, 819 F.Supp. 240. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

83. ---- Governmental entities, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act does not authorize state to obtain relief on account of fraud practiced against its residents. Dillon v. Combs, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1990, 895 F.2d 1175, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 670, 498 U.S. 1023, 112 L.Ed.2d 663. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Federal Government was not a “person” with standing to seek treble damages under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. U.S. v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1989, 879 F.2d 20. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Illinois Attorney General, who alleged violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act that injured some Illinois consumers, was not person allegedly injured in business or property, was not proper party in litigation, and, therefore, did not have standing pursuant to statute which gives standing to any person injured in business or property by reason of violation of racketeering statute. People of State of Ill. v. Life of Mid-America Ins. Co., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1986, 805 F.2d 763. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

State Director of Insurance, as statutory liquidator of insurer, had standing to maintain civil action under this section against officers and directors of parent corporation, who allegedly fraudulently continued insurer in business past its point of insolvency and looted insurer of its most profitable and least risky business, aggravating the insolvency. Schacht v. Brown, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1983, 711 F.2d 1343, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 508, 464 U.S. 1002, 78 L.Ed.2d 698, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 509, 464 U.S. 1002, 78 L.Ed.2d 698. Insurance 1407

Under Florida law, arbitration provision in telephone company's customer service agreement (CSA) was not substantively unconscionable, even though it precluded class action relief, where CSA provided for relief in small claims court as alternative to arbitration and allowed customers to seek attorney fees if authorized by applicable substantive law, and federal law permitted customer to file complaint with Federal Communications Commis- sion or to ask Attorney General to institute proceedings. Rivera v. AT & T Corp., S.D.Fla.2006, 420 F.Supp.2d 1312. Alternative Dispute Resolution 134(6)

Claim that accountants' misrepresentations and fraudulent omissions induced agencies of British government to invest capital in automobile manufacturer was not derivative of injury suffered by corporation, and therefore, successor to agencies had standing to assert Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims. Department of Economic Development v. Arthur Andersen & Co. (U.S.A.), S.D.N.Y.1996, 924 F.Supp. 449. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Kickback allegedly paid to former governor and illegal campaign contributions he allegedly accepted were insufficient to establish standing in state's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action. State of W.Va. v. Moore, S.D.W.Va.1995, 895 F.Supp. 864. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 57

United States government does not have standing to sue for damages to its business or property under RICO provision. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

While RICO action against utility was being pressed by, and all litigation costs were being paid by, county, county could not serve as proper class representative because its supervision of lawsuit may have been driven by its other dealings with utility. County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., E.D.N.Y.1989, 710 F.Supp. 1405, affirmed 907 F.2d 1295. Federal Civil Procedure 181

Under civil RICO act, FSLIC had standing to claim violation of Securities Exchange Act for which no implied cause of action existed. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Shearson-American Exp., Inc., D.Puerto Rico 1987, 658 F.Supp. 1331. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Revenue Division of the Michigan State Treasury Department was not “person” having standing to bring civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization action against state sales tax violator; federal courts would be barraged with state agencies' vindictive civil RICO actions against tax cheaters if there was any other result, and the Revenue Division had obtained judgment for amount of taxes owing, plus interest and penalties, in underlying criminal tax case; declining to follow Illinois Dept. of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir.). State of Mich., Dept. of Treasury, Revenue Div. v. Fawaz, E.D.Mich.1986, 653 F.Supp. 141, affirmed 848 F.2d 194. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Pennsylvania's setoff against defendant's pension of amount paid to “ghost” workers, who had been placed on State Senate's payrolls by defendant, did not preclude determination that Pennsylvania was “injured person” and, thus, did not bar further recovery in treble damages suit under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Com. of Pa. v. Cianfrani, E.D.Pa.1985, 600 F.Supp. 1364. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

84. ---- Guarantors, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

Guarantors did not have standing to maintain action against lender under either Bank Holding Company Act or Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; guarantors suffered only a derivative injury. Mid-State

Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1989, 877 F.2d 1333. Banks And Banking 521.1; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Guarantors of alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) victim lacked standing to bring RICO claims based on their status as loan guarantors. Grove Holding Corp. v. First Wisconsin Nat. Bank of Sheboygan, E.D.Wis.1992, 803 F.Supp. 1486. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Guarantor of debts of bankrupt corporation lacked standing to assert Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act claim on behalf of corporation as counterclaim to action on guaranty brought by Federal Deposit In- surance Corporation, since any injury incurred was actually sustained by corporation, and was sustained by guarantor only derivatively. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago v. Windham, E.D.Tex.1987, 668 F.Supp. 578, reconsideration denied 685 F.Supp. 152. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 62

85. ---- Heirs, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

Heirs lacked standing to bring RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) claim against defendants, on theory that size of their inheritance from grandmother's estate was reduced by defendants' stealing from grandmother during her lifetime, where complaint alleged only indirect injury because any harm to grandchildren flowed from misfortunes allegedly visited upon grandmother by defendants; estate suffered direct harm, not children as beneficiaries of family trust funded by residuary clause in will. Firestone v. Galbreath, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1992, 976 F.2d 279, rehearing denied , certified question answered 616 N.E.2d 202, 67 Ohio St.3d 87, answer to certified question conformed to 25 F.3d 323, on remand 895 F.Supp. 917. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Murder of competing corporations' executives arranged by organized crime leaders to maintain control of garbage carting industry did not cause injury to business or property of personal representatives of decedents and, thus, personal representatives were not entitled to sue leaders under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act; remedy was claim under New York wrongful death statute on behalf of distributees. Jerry Kubecka, Inc. v. Avellino, E.D.N.Y.1995, 898 F.Supp. 963. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Grandchildren had no standing to maintain Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action in their individual capacities or on behalf of trust against grandmother's accountants whose preparation of estate and gift tax returns allegedly caused depletion of assets that would otherwise have flowed to inter vivos trust through residuary clause in grandmother's will and would have been available to grandchildren as beneficiaries of that trust; however, grandmother's estate would have standing to pursue action for direct injuries caused by accountants. Firestone v. Galbreath, S.D.Ohio 1990, 747 F.Supp. 1556, affirmed in part 976 F.2d 279, rehearing denied , certified question answered 616 N.E.2d 202, 67 Ohio St.3d 87, answer to certified question conformed to 25 F.3d 323, on remand 895 F.Supp. 917. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

86. ---- Insurance administrators, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

Third party administrator (TPA) of pharmacy chain's self-insured benefit plan had standing to pursue civil Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against health maintenance organization (HMO) that pressured chain to change to HMO's TPA subsidiary in order to participate in HMO's pharmacy network; TPA's loss of its contract with chain was not derivative of any losses suffered by chain. Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., C.A.3 (Pa.) 1998, 140 F.3d 494, on remand 1999 WL 200667, on remand 1999 WL 200668. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

87. ---- Investors, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

Investor could not maintain civil RICO action in his own right or on behalf of shareholders for injury to corporation and consequent decline in stock price affecting shareholders generally caused by corporation's failure to disclose it had paid bribe to obtain subcontracts. Roeder v. Alpha Industries, Inc., C.A.1 (Mass.) 1987, 814 F.2d 22. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Investors in funding entities, created to provide funds for investment in corporations involved in grocery diversion business, had standing to bring suit alleging violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) directly against corporations, even though entities had also brought claims against corporations; entities had not sued until investors had done so, and had admitted that they had no real interest in litigation. Walco Investments, Inc. v. Thenen, S.D.Fla.1996, 947 F.Supp. 491. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 61

Investors had standing to maintain RICO conspiracy claim against drug manufacturer and its directors who allegedly engaged in mail and wire fraud by mailing false and materially misleading financial statements and causing those statements to be transmitted by wire communication, but did not have standing to maintain those claims against manufacturer's subsidiary and subsidiary's president, absent allegation that subsidiary and president committed any predicate acts of mail and wire fraud. In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. Securities Litigation, S.D.N.Y.1990, 733 F.Supp. 668. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Investors in limited real estate partnership did not have standing to bring civil RICO claim against corporation that allegedly induced them to invest in partnership under section of RICO prohibiting investment of racketeering proceeds in enterprise, where investor's alleged harm arose from alleged racketeering activities of corporation which induced them to invest in partnership, not from direct investment by corporation in partnership. Zim- mer v. Gruntal & Co., Inc., W.D.Pa.1989, 732 F.Supp. 1330. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

That investors in limited partnership lost tax benefits as a result of alleged fraud by limited partnership and its trading partners did not somehow make the IRS the real party in interest or deprive investors of standing to assert RICO claims; injuries alleged in complaint were direct injuries to the investors, while IRS was merely in- strumentality through which purported fraud was accomplished. Huang v. Sentinel Government Securities, S.D.N.Y.1989, 709 F.Supp. 1290. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Investors failed to allege any causal relationship between alleged violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act subsections proscribing certain uses of proceeds of racketeering activity and, thus, investors did not have standing to bring RICO action under those subsections. Schwartz v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, E.D.Pa.1988, 701 F.Supp. 92, affirmed 879 F.2d 859. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Investor in corporation lacked standing to bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act action against bank, which allegedly deposited checks drawn on corporation's account and forged by corporate employee; no acts by bank were asserted to have caused direct, rather than purely derivative, harm to investor. P.M.F. Services, Inc. v. Grady, N.D.Ill.1988, 681 F.Supp. 549. Corporations And Business Organizations 2129

Where primary investor and guarantor of loans to companies which succeeded defunct contractor, and successor of defunct contractor could only make out claim that they were indirectly injured by other contractors' activities in conspiring to rig bids on contract that surety for contractor had guaranteed, primary investor and successor lacked standing to bring private action under this chapter. Levey v. E. Stewart Mitchell, Inc., D.C.Md.1984, 585 F.Supp. 1030, affirmed 762 F.2d 998. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

88. ---- Intended victim, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

To hold defendant liable for mail fraud, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) plaintiff need not be primary victim, but only intended victim of scheme. Rodriguez v. McKinney, E.D.Pa.1995, 878 F.Supp. 744. Postal Service 35(5)

89. ---- Partners, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

Limited partner had standing to recover on claim that defendants conspired to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in their sale of limited partnership's assets and diversion of sales proceeds; jury found that partner's business and property interests in limited partnership were injured by overt acts committed in furtherance of RICO conspiracy. Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., C.A.7 (Ind.) 1996, 77 F.3d 951, rehearing denied. Conspiracy 17

Limited partner did not have standing to assert claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against principals and bank alleging “looting” of partnership's funds and wrongfully increasing mortgage lien on partnership's property, where only injury partner suffered was diminution of value of his investment in limited partnership. Attick v. Valeria Associates, L.P., S.D.N.Y.1992, 835 F.Supp. 103. Partnership 375

Investors in real estate limited partnerships did not have standing to bring RICO action against general partners and related entities arising from alleged scheme to defraud investors as investors failed to describe injury suffered by them as result of alleged RICO violation; investors' allegation that they were financially injured by amount of their funds invested in partnerships was not description of injuries precipitated by general partners' use and investment of proceeds of scheme, but, rather, description of injury in terms of investors' own use and investment. Gurfein v. Sovereign Group, E.D.Pa.1993, 826 F.Supp. 890. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 61

90. ---- Prisoners, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

Allegations that three Iraqi detainees were robbed by unnamed American soldiers upon their arrest, and that an unnamed employee stole a car from an unnamed detainee, were too attenuated to allege damage to business or property, as required to establish standing in detainees' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action alleging they were tortured by employees of private companies contracted to work in Iraqi prison; allegation pertained to detainees' arrest rather than to their interrogation. Saleh v. Titan Corp., D.D.C.2006, 436 F.Supp.2d 55. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Prisoners lacked standing to raise claim under civil remedies section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO), where they did not allege that they were injured in their business, and they did not have constitutional right to prison work assignments. Alley v. Angelone, E.D.Va.1997, 962 F.Supp. 827. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

91. ---- Shareholders, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

Shareholders of residential cooperative had standing to bring civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) action against sponsors of cooperative; generous reading of shareholders' complaint suggested that cooperative was formed by sponsors who, after transferring overvalued building in exchange for stock, sold stock to shareholders and, if this allegation were true, sponsor as promoter breached fiduciary duty to corporation and, as seller of stock, breached duty to shareholders. Ceribelli v. Elghanayan, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1993, 990 F.2d 62. Common Interest Communities 143; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 111

Shareholders lacked standing to bring suit under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for loss in value of their shares due to fraudulent transfer of loan proceeds, where any racketeering activity was directed against corporation rather than shareholders, shareholders' injuries were indistinct from injury to corporation and Louisiana law did not afford shareholders a private right of action. Whalen v. Carter, C.A.5 (La.) 1992, 954 F.2d 1087. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Shareholders did not have standing as individuals to bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action for diminution in value of their stock allegedly caused by racketeering activities conducted against corporation, although corporation was in dissolution, where certificate of dissolution had not been issued at time suit was brought. Sears v. Likens, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1990, 912 F.2d 889. Corporations And Business Organiz- ations 2031

Individual shareholders and debenture holders did not have standing under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act to bring action to recover for damages suffered by corporation and resulting in diminution in value of shares, absent showing of individual and direct injury. Flynn v. Merrick, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1989, 881 F.2d 446. Corporations And Business Organizations 2029; Corporations And Business Organizations 2470(3)

Shareholders did not have standing to assert individual RICO claims where only harm they suffered was derivative of that suffered by corporation; there was no special relationship between shareholders of subcontractor corporation and general contractor against whom claim was asserted that would have created special duty and any harm that shareholders suffered as guarantors of performance bonds of subcontractor corporation was derivative of harm to corporation. Sparling v. Hoffman Const. Co., Inc., C.A.9 (Alaska) 1988, 864 F.2d 635. Corporations And Business Organizations 2129

Shareholders, who alleged that corporation's involuntary bankruptcy was caused by pattern of racketeering activity by creditor, its affiliates, and other parties who allegedly aided creditor in its plan to force corporation into bankruptcy, lacked standing to assert claim against creditor, its affiliates, and other parties under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1962(a-c), 1964(c), in that legal injury, if any, was to corporation and not to shareholders. Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1986, 794 F.2d 843, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 579, 479 U.S. 987, 93 L.Ed.2d 582. Corporations And Business Organizations 2129

Shareholder did not have standing to maintain action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act on behalf of corporation on theory that he lost his employment when corporation was forced into bankruptcy as result of alleged fraud where acts of fraud were directed not toward shareholder as employee of corporation but rather to corporation as separate entity. Warren v. Manufacturers Nat. Bank of Detroit, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1985, 759 F.2d 542; Flynn v. Merrick, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1989, 881 F.2d. 446. Corporations And Business Organizations 2029

District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, under the effects test for determining applicability of the Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to extraterritorial conduct, over action brought by Cana- dian-based majority shareholder of Russian oil company, alleging substantive and conspiratorial RICO violations in connection with alleged takeover of company by foreign corporations, associations, and individuals, where alleged injuries were not incurred in the United States by American residents. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Industries, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2007, 540 F.Supp.2d 438, affirmed on other grounds 622 F.3d 148, withdrawn from bound volume , amended and superseded 631 F.3d 29, certiorari dismissed 133 S.Ct. 21, 180 L.Ed.2d 913. Federal Courts 192

Fact that “but for” the wrongdoing of members of board of directors and officers of corporation the corporation would not have been forced to pay out fine, penalties, and other fees that resulted from discovery and prosecution of the illegal conduct did not confer RICO standing on shareholders to bring derivative action. In re Tele- dyne Defense Contracting Derivative Litigation, C.D.Cal.1993, 849 F.Supp. 1384. Corporations And Business Organizations 2078

Whether matter was one of standing or real party in interest, major shareholders of corporation which managed, and had option to purchase, country club complex could not assert claim under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) for complex owner's violation of promise that property would not be further en- cumbered; shareholders were not injured in their “business or property” except through alleged injury to corporation, and any losses suffered by them were shared proportionally by other shareholders. Schrag v. Dinges, D.Kan.1993, 825 F.Supp. 954, affirmed 73 F.3d 374, on remand 1996 WL 473874, on remand 1996 WL 590915. Corporations And Business Organizations 2129

As general rule, shareholders of corporation do not have standing as individuals to bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action for diminution in value of their stock allegedly caused by racketeering activities conducted against corporation. Qantel Corp. v. Niemuller, S.D.N.Y.1991, 771 F.Supp. 1361. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Shareholders of a corporation do not have standing to sue for its derivative claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Insurance Consultants of America, Inc., Employee Pension Plan v. Southeastern Ins. Group, Inc., D.N.J.1990, 746 F.Supp. 390. Corporations And Business Organizations 2028

Shareholder lacked standing to bring RICO claim against corporate directors for conduct causing harm to corporation, though standing did exist to challenge conduct which harmed shareholder separately and distinctly from other shareholders. Grafman v. Century Broadcasting Corp., N.D.Ill.1989, 727 F.Supp. 432. Corporations And Business Organizations 1933

Shareholders cannot bring RICO action in their individual capacity to redress injuries inflicted upon their corporation, and this is so even when plaintiff is sole shareholder of injured corporation. Sound Video Unlimited, Inc. v. Video Shack Inc., S.D.N.Y.1988, 700 F.Supp. 127. Corporations And Business Organizations 2129

In accordance with general rule that injuries to a corporation, whether arising out of contract or tort, can not be maintained by shareholders and must be brought in corporate name, since shareholders' rights are derivative, only corporation may bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) action to redress injuries suffered by corporation. Howell Steel Co., Inc. v. Trustmark Nat. Bank, S.D.Miss.1987, 666 F.Supp. 930. Cor- porations And Business Organizations 2029

Damages sought by corporate shareholders in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) claim against bank, including money borrowed in order to lend funds to corporation, as required by bank to restructure corporate debts, represented shareholders' investment in the corporation, placing them in no better position than any other creditor of corporation, and did not raise any duty owed to them directly by bank, for purposes of shareholders' right to bring RICO claim separate from that of corporation. Howell Steel Co., Inc. v. Trustmark Nat. Bank, S.D.Miss.1987, 666 F.Supp. 930. Corporations And Business Organizations 2129

Minority shareholder in corporation challenging allegedly illegal tender offer lacked standing to bring RICO

claim other than on derivative basis. Coronet Ins. Co. v. Seyfarth, N.D.Ill.1987, 665 F.Supp. 661. Corporations And Business Organizations 2129

Question of whether shareholders of real estate investment trust have standing to assert claim pursuant to RICO based on alleged injury to the shareholders would be certified for appeal. Klapper v. Commonwealth Realty Trust, D.Del.1987, 662 F.Supp. 235. Federal Courts 660.5

Minority shareholders in real estate investment trust had standing to bring action against controlling stockholders of trust alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; minority shareholders alleged a diversion of dividends sufficient to constitute a direct injury. Klapper v. Commonwealth Realty Trust, D.Del.1987, 657 F.Supp. 948, stay granted , motion to certify appeal granted 662 F.Supp. 235. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Shareholder of close corporation had standing to bring RICO action against corporate directors where she alleged a conspiracy by directors to get her to sell her stock below value and that directors breached their fiduciary duty to her. Small v. Goldman, D.N.J.1986, 637 F.Supp. 1030. Corporations And Business Organizations 1933

Corporation's liquidation in bankruptcy did not provide shareholders with standing to bring civil RICO action premised on securities fraud on theory that they were “forced sellers” whose losses gave them standing where proximate causation between their alleged “forced sale” through the liquidation and alleged misrepresentations was lacking. Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1985, 623 F.Supp. 176, affirmed 794 F.2d 843, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 579, 479 U.S. 987, 93 L.Ed.2d 582. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Corporations which purchased waste-oil re-refining plants from defendants and which were shareholders of corporation organized to operate such plants had standing to sue defendants for rescission of contract and for alleged violation of this chapter, since allegations in the complaint and terms of the contract of sale raised issue of material fact that there was a direct contractual relation between the parties. Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, S.D.N.Y.1983, 566 F.Supp. 1466. Cancellation Of Instruments 27; Federal Civil Procedure 103.2

Complaint filed by corporation and current sole shareholder against former officer failed to adequately allege that omissions in interstate mailings and telephone calls that officer sent to shareholder were substantial factor in causation of shareholder's injuries, or that shareholder's reliance on those omissions was cause of his alleged injuries, and, thus, corporation and shareholder lacked standing to press claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) based on predicate acts of mail and wire fraud; corporation and shareholder did not allege that they were directly harmed by mail and wire fraud, only that their ability to discover and/or prevent officer's other wrongful acts of common-law fraud, looting of corporate assets, and diversion of corporate resources and opportunities, was somewhat impaired or limited. Red Ball Interior Demolition Corp. v. Pal- madessa, S.D.N.Y.1995, 874 F.Supp. 576. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

92. ---- Students, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

Inmate who received Pell Grants while taking courses from college did not have standing to allege that college's alleged actions in defrauding government of Pell Grants violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act, where inmate did not suffer present injury as result of college's alleged conduct and it was speculative at best as to whether he ever would; although inmate alleged that college's actions might affect his eligibility for Pell Grants in future, there was no certainty that inmate would continue his education, that he would be eligible for further funding, or that he would be deprived of that funding because of alleged actions of college. Abraham v. Marist College, S.D.N.Y.1989, 706 F.Supp. 294. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Students who allegedly suffered indebtedness, lost personal investment, and lost refunds as result of school's inducement to enroll so that federal student assistance grants and federally guaranteed student loan money could be fraudulently procured had standing to bring RICO action against school; alleged use of mail to misrepresent to government that schools were qualified to receive student assistance monies, to send students applications for money, and to receive monies paid out under program were all uses necessary to execute scheme, each of which constituted separate violation of mail fraud statute. Gonzalez v. North American College of Louisiana, Inc., S.D.Tex.1988, 700 F.Supp. 362. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

93. ---- Taxpayers, persons entitled to maintain action, practice and procedure generally

Taxpayers were not right parties to bring suit under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against defendant who violated the Act by paying money to employees of county board of appeals in order to obtain lower tax assessments for property of his clients; taxpayers were only indirectly injured parties when taxes had to be raised by county because of defendant's action. Carter v. Berger, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1985, 777 F.2d 1173. Counties 196(1)

Assuming recognition of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act taxpayer derivative action, Illinois taxpayer lacked standing to maintain such an action against county clerk and others based on violation of statutory notice and competitive bidding requirements for printing election ballots absent allegation that state's attorney's failure to institute a similar action was fraudulent, collusive or represented anything other than the honest exercise of his legal judgment and, also, taxpayer could not have standing to sue on his own behalf. O'Donnell v. Kusper, N.D.Ill.1985, 602 F.Supp. 619. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

94. Assignment, practice and procedure generally

Related insurance companies' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against employees, for perpetrating scheme to submit fraudulent insurance claims to companies, could be assigned to surety that had issued fidelity bond to companies. Federal Ins. Co. v. Parello, N.D.Ill.1991, 767 F.Supp. 157. As- signments 26

Assignment of cause of action to plaintiff from others was not fraudulently done to obtain jurisdiction and, since assignments were of all of the assets of the assignors and not simply assignments of right to action, they were sufficient to confer standing upon plaintiff to bring action alleging violations of this chapter and section 77a et

seq. of Title 15 in connection with land purchase option. Lopez v. Richards, S.D.Miss.1984, 594 F.Supp. 488. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57; Securities Regulation 135

95. Defendant, practice and procedure generally

Civil claim for treble damages brought by person injured in his business or property by reason of RICO-prohibited acts cannot be maintained against municipal corporation. Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., C.A.3 (N.J.) 1991, 937 F.2d 899. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Former employee failed to state cause of action against employer under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO), where her complaint named employer as both defendant and RICO enterprise. Few v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., D.N.H.2007, 498 F.Supp.2d 441. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 40

Labor organization was properly included as nominal defendant in action alleging violations of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by organization's officers, as inclusion of organization was necessary to effectuate relief sought by Government. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 738. Federal Civil Procedure 217

In civil RICO action, complaint lacking specific factual assertions with respect to defendant other than the one who signed documents containing alleged misrepresentations was insufficient to warrant holding that defendant was a potential primary violator or to support aider and abettor liability on mail fraud claim asserted as predicate act. Zola v. Gordon, S.D.N.Y.1988, 685 F.Supp. 354, on reargument 701 F.Supp. 66. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Party who was not alleged to have been conspirator or in any way implicated as wrongdoer, but at worst was innocent beneficiary of defendant's actions, could not be hailed into federal court as defendant via this section. Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., N.D.Ill.1984, 583 F.Supp. 221, affirmed 789 F.2d 589. Commerce 80

96. Death of party, practice and procedure generally

Civil RICO claims do not abate upon death of injured party; primary purpose of private right of action created by RICO was remedial. Faircloth v. Finesod, C.A.4 (S.C.) 1991, 938 F.2d 513. Abatement And Revival 52

Civil RICO claims survive death of the defendant. In re American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Dealerships Relations Litigation, D.Md.1996, 941 F.Supp. 528. Abatement And Revival 57

Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim is punitive in nature and, accordingly, does not survive death of defendant. Confederation Life Ins. Co. v. Goodman, E.D.Pa.1994, 842 F.Supp. 836. Abatement And Revival 57

Treble damages claim in civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was remedial and did not abate upon defendant's death and, thus, plaintiff was entitled to substitute executrix of defendant's estate as party. Holford USA Ltd., Inc. v. Harvey, S.D.N.Y.1996, 169 F.R.D. 41. Abatement And Re- vival 62.1; Federal Civil Procedure 356; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

97. Joinder of claims, practice and procedure generally

Florida's “economic loss theory” did not bar public housing tenants' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) claims, which were independent and separate from tenants' breach of lease claim. Kingston Square Tenants Ass'n v. Tuskegee Gardens, Ltd., S.D.Fla.1992, 792 F.Supp. 1566. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

98. Alternate remedies, practice and procedure generally

Plaintiff is not prohibited from bringing federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action, or from recovering treble damages under RICO, merely because same conduct which forms basis for RICO claim also forms basis for breach of contract claim, and compensatory damages for claims are identical. Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1991, 939 F.2d 1472. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 110

Where insurance company bringing conspiracy action under this section had common law remedies available to it that would fully redress its claimed injuries, conspiracy claim under section 1962 of this title would be dismissed. Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., D.C.Colo.1984, 582 F.Supp. 1299. Conspiracy 15

99. Rescission, practice and procedure generally

Claim for rescission of sale of security under § 12(2) of Securities Act of 1933 may be grounded on untrue statements and omissions that make memorandum misleading, whether or not plaintiff relied on memorandum or even read it, and may justify rescission, whether or not plaintiff was damaged; on other hand, claim under Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) requires both reliance and damage proximately caused by violation. Caviness v. Derand Resources Corp., C.A.4 (Va.) 1993, 983 F.2d 1295. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62; Securities Regulation 156

100. Exhaustion of remedies, practice and procedure generally

Estate beneficiaries were not required to exhaust state remedies before bringing federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against defendants who allegedly plundered estate assets. Glick- stein v. Sun Bank/Miami, N.A., C.A.11 (Fla.) 1991, 922 F.2d 666. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 55

Where federal court otherwise had jurisdiction, plaintiff, claiming that appraiser of property of a decedent's estate and other heirs engaged in pattern of conduct constituting fraud upon estate in violation of this chapter and

federal securities laws was not required to first exhaust state judicial remedies, nor was there any reason to dismiss or stay federal suit pending completion of state probate proceedings. Gunther v. Dinger, S.D.N.Y.1982, 547 F.Supp. 25. Action 69(3); Federal Civil Procedure 1741

Union member was not required to exhaust union's internal remedies available to him under district council's bylaws and constitution before he filed motion to enforce job referral rules in consent decree in government's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) suit against district council and certain of its former officers, since requiring him to pursue internal union remedy would delay judicial determination of merits of his claim that council's secretary-treasurer violated job referral rules. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.2004, 2004 WL 48885, Unreported. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.6

100a. Prerequisites to suit, practice and procedure generally

Lenders, who brought action alleging borrowers' violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state law fraud claims, had not yet pursued all of their contractual remedies, and therefore RICO claims were premature, requiring denial of motion to reinstate those claims, even though value of the collateral had been hugely diminished by borrowers' acts. Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, S.D.N.Y.2003, 274 F.Supp.2d 481, stay granted in part 275 F.Supp.2d 519, motion to dismiss appeal denied 115 Fed.Appx. 473, 2004 WL 2370656, affirmed in part , vacated in part and remanded 388 F.3d 39, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 2270, 544 U.S. 1044, 161 L.Ed.2d 1080. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

101. Abuse of process, practice and procedure generally

Coal companies did not engage in any “abuse of process” when they brought civil RICO action to recover for union members' alleged multiple acts of violence, where no evidence was presented that companies had attempted to achieve objective not intended by civil RICO provisions. MHC, Inc. v. International Union, United Mine Workers of America, E.D.Ky.1988, 685 F.Supp. 1370. Process 192

102. Jurisdiction, practice and procedure generally--Generally

District court had both subject matter jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction over former majority shareholders of Russian company, that maintained Russia's largest vanadium ore plant, to decide whether the All Writs Act authorized or required it to enjoin future actions in the United States, based on same underlying facts of alleged illegal takeover, and whether the Anti-Injunction Act precluded such an injunction, where shareholders asserted claims under federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Davis Intern., LLC v. New Start Group Corp., C.A.3 (Del.) 2007, 488 F.3d 597, on remand 2009 WL 1321900. Federal Courts 10.1; Federal Courts 86; Federal Courts 192

Disgorgement was not an available remedy under civil provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) providing district courts with jurisdiction only for forward-looking remedies that prevent and restrain violations of the Act; permitting disgorgement, a remedy aimed at past violations, would thwart Con- gress' intent in creating RICO's elaborate remedial scheme. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., C.A.D.C.2005, 396

F.3d 1190, 364 U.S.App.D.C. 454, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 126 S.Ct. 478, 546 U.S. 960, 163 L.Ed.2d 363. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 83

Lack of standing under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) does not divest the district court of jurisdiction over the action, because RICO standing, unlike other standing doctrines, is sufficiently intertwined with the merits of the RICO claim that such a rule would turn the underlying merits questions into jurisdictional issues. Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 318 F.3d 113, as amended , certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 532, 540 U.S. 1012, 157 L.Ed.2d 424, on remand 2005 WL 2064088. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Consent decree that resolved claims brought by United States against international union under civil remedies provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) gave Independent Review Board (IRB) authority to sanction misconduct of local union officers that affected local's ability to democratically elect its officers, even if union's business agents affected by officers' misconduct did not have actionable claims under LMRDA for impairment of their membership right to stand for election; IRB had authority to investigate and bring disciplinary charges when it learned of the scheme involving dues default, and suspected that the scheme brought reproach upon union. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2002, 315 F.3d 97, certiorari denied 123 S.Ct. 1900, 538 U.S. 998, 155 L.Ed.2d 824. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.6

Conduct in the United States prior to and after sale of French bank was not sufficient to give federal court subject matter jurisdiction over Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) fraud claims arising from the sale; it was alleged that false reports concerning New York office were prepared, that bank officer disclosed to buyers confidential information in the course of telephone calls to New York, that inaccurate audit was produced for New York office, and that actions were taken in New York to deprive sellers of their share in post- sale payments and transactions, but alleged corruption of bank officer by buyers occurred in France and his alleged acts of disloyalty to sellers occurred there. North South Finance Corp. v. Al-Turki, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1996, 100 F.3d 1046. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55

No exceptions to National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) primary jurisdiction applied and thus, employee's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims alleging that his supervisors intimidated him and harassed him into quitting his job in retaliation for his union activities were subject to NLRB's primary jurisdiction: Congress had not made exception to NLRB's primary jurisdiction for claims alleging extortion; second exception regarding “local interests” was inapplicable because claims involved relationship between two federal laws, as opposed to a state and federal law; and unfair labor practice issues implicated by complaint were not merely collateral to RICO claims. Tamburello v. Comm-Tract Corp., C.A.1 (Mass.) 1995, 67 F.3d 973, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1852, 517 U.S. 1222, 134 L.Ed.2d 952. Labor And Employment 1676(3)

District court was without jurisdiction to hear beneficiaries' claims against trustees of testamentary trust seeking relief for trustees' administration of trust and fraud predicated upon Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions (RICO) and state fraud law, where action was in nature of in rem or quasi in rem under Oklahoma law and law of Tenth Circuit and Carter County Court of State of Oklahoma had exercised jurisdiction over trust at least

five years prior to commencement of action and was actively exercising its jurisdiction at least three months after commencement of action. Cassity v. Pitts, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1993, 995 F.2d 1009. Courts 497

Sales of securities to investors located in United States in violation of terms of prospectus were predicate acts which occurred primarily in United States and therefore served as a basis of subject matter jurisdiction for foreign investors' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims. Alfadda v. Fenn, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 935 F.2d 475, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 638, 502 U.S. 1005, 116 L.Ed.2d 656. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Mere fact that Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim which provided basis for federal jurisdiction against defendant ultimately failed did not require district court to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over related Arkansas fraudulent conveyance claim; RICO claim was clearly substantial and conferred subject matter jurisdiction upon district court, state and federal claims arose from common nucleus of facts, and at time district court dismissed RICO action, it had already expended significant time and resources in impanel- ing jury and received extensive evidence directly relating to both federal and state law claims. First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Hollingsworth, C.A.8 (Ark.) 1991, 931 F.2d 1295. Federal Courts 18

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not apply to prevent federal court from considering Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against electric utility based on allegations of fraud in rate proceedings before state agency. County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1990, 907 F.2d 1295. Administrative Law And Procedure 228.1; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55

Ohio Department of Insurance did not have special competence over fraudulent misrepresentations by party to Administrative Services Only (ASO) contract, and district court thus properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit against that party notwithstanding claim that Department had primary jurisdiction. Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Northern Ohio, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1990, 900 F.2d 882, rehearing denied , on remand. Administrative Law And Procedure 228.1 ; Insurance 1027(1)

Investor in joint venture failed to establish that Russian bank had sufficient contacts with United States to permit exercise of personal jurisdiction over bank, consistent with due process, pursuant to rule authorizing district courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign defendants in investor's action for, inter alia, fraud, unfair business practices, and violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); investor did not show that bank solicited or conducted business in United States, or that it in any way targeted United States as potential market, and instead merely relied upon contacts of bank's subsidiaries, which could not be attributed to bank. Barantsevich v. VTB Bank, C.D.Cal.2013, 2013 WL 3188178. Constitutional Law 3965(7); Federal Courts 86

Financial institution from which borrowers had obtained the residential mortgage loan out of which all of their claims arose, and which had asserted counterclaim against borrowers' for breach of contract, was real party in interest with biggest stake in litigation among all of the defendants named, and was not “dispensable party,” whose nondiverse citizenship could be remedied as jurisdictional bar by dismissing it from suit under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure governing misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties. Wheeler v. Citigroup, S.D.N.Y.2013, 2013 WL 1403527. Federal Civil Procedure 144; Federal Courts 289; Federal Courts 306

Homeowner's action against title insurer, alleging insurer's failure to provide discounted “reissue” rate when home was refinanced within 10 years of homeowner obtaining valid title insurance, was not moot, though insurer tendered to homeowner the amount of the overage, plus interest, where insurer failed to offer homeowner the full amount she could conceivably obtain if the case proceeded to trial; insurer had not tendered anything for punitive damages, attorney fees, treble damages, or any other amounts homeowner might recover as additional damages pursuant to her claims for civil violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and under Maryland law for money had and received, negligence, and breach of contract. Winston v. Stewart Title and Guar. Co., D.Md.2013, 920 F.Supp.2d 631. Federal Courts 13

A ruling by the district court on mortgage business's claim that loan purchaser violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by making false claims with the San Diego District Attorney and the San Diego Sheriff alleging elder abuse and making false claims to mortgage regulators at the California Department of Corporations would not affect the state court judgment in purchaser's prior fraud action against mortgage company, in which purchaser dismissed case against the mortgage company in consideration of $23,000 payment by another party, and thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply to prevent the district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the RICO claim. William Villa v. Heller, S.D.Cal.2012, 885 F.Supp.2d 1042. Courts 509

District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, under the conduct test for determining applicability of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to extraterritorial conduct, over action brought by Canadian-based majority shareholder of Russian oil company, alleging substantive and conspiratorial RICO violations in connection with alleged takeover of company by foreign corporations, associations, and individuals, absent showing that conduct that was material to completion of alleged illegal scheme occurred in the United States and that conduct that occurred in the United States was direct cause of alleged injury. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Industries, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2007, 540 F.Supp.2d 438, affirmed on other grounds 622 F.3d 148, withdrawn from bound volume , amended and superseded 631 F.3d 29, certiorari dismissed 133 S.Ct. 21, 180 L.Ed.2d 913. Federal Courts 192

Failure to make showing of injuries occurring in District of Columbia, as required by long arm statute, precluded personal jurisdiction in suit by representative of company, alleging that son of principal violated Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), by arranging for her to be attacked by “hitman” as part of interference with prospective relationship under which representative would serve as exclusive case manager in qui tam action against company; physical injury damages were sustained by representative in California, where she lived, rather than District. Elemary v. Philipp Holzmann A.G., D.D.C.2008, 533 F.Supp.2d 116. Federal Courts 1037

District court lacked federal question subject matter jurisdiction over borrower's action against credit union that held a security interest in his automobile, corporation that repossessed his automobile, and others, alleging a claim for violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where the repossession

did not amount to a pattern of racketeering activity. Anderson v. Wiggins, D.D.C.2006, 460 F.Supp.2d 1. Feder- al Courts 197

District court would decline invoke primary jurisdiction doctrine to dismiss or stay action filed by senior citizen who purchased deferred annuity policies from life insurance company, alleging violations of the Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and common law civil conspiracy and unjust enrichment claims; all claims were within conventional expertise of judges, and none of them required the special expertise of a state insurance commission. Bendzak v. Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co., S.D.Iowa 2006, 440 F.Supp.2d 970. Annuities 30

District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over attorney's claims under §§§§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), based on alleged conspiracy between federal agencies and officers to place attorney under surveillance in order to harass and intimidate him in retaliation for his role as counsel in certain legal proceedings, where the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity for claims under §§§§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, and RICO. Jones v. National Communic- ation and Surveillance Networks, S.D.N.Y.2006, 409 F.Supp.2d 456, affirmed 266 Fed.Appx. 31, 2008 WL 482599. United States 125(9)

Debit cardholders failed to state a claim against bank under section of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) making it unlawful to invest income received from racketeering activities to acquire an interest in, establish, or operate an enterprise; complaint stated in conclusory terms that bank derived income from its racketeering activities by charging fees for banking services it provided on plaintiffs' accounts, but nowhere did it allege what bank did with that income, let alone that it invested that money in racketeering enterprise and that its investment caused plaintiffs' injury. OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe Intern., Inc., S.D.N.Y.2005, 354 F.Supp.2d 357, reconsideration denied 2005 WL 309758, opinion adhered to on reconsideration 2005 WL 309755. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 71

Kansas' one-action rule, which required that all negligence claims arising out of one occurrence be determined in one action, did not preclude assertion of Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against defendants after plaintiffs were not permitted to amend their complaint in prior action to add RICO claim. Mc- Cormick v. City of Lawrence, D.Kan.2004, 325 F.Supp.2d 1191, affirmed 130 Fed.Appx. 987, 2005 WL 1221632. Judgment 592

Lenders victimized in allegedly fraudulent loan transaction alleged distinct and palpable injuries, and therefore District Court was not divested of jurisdiction by dismissal on appeal of claims for violations of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), such that Court would retain supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law fraud claims; Court had original jurisdiction over some or all federal claims inasmuch as dismissal was based on failure to satisfy standard that lenders' injuries be clear and definite. Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, S.D.N.Y.2003, 274 F.Supp.2d 481, stay granted in part 275 F.Supp.2d 519, motion to dismiss appeal denied 115 Fed.Appx. 473, 2004 WL 2370656, affirmed in part , vacated in part and remanded 388 F.3d 39, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 2270, 544 U.S. 1044, 161 L.Ed.2d 1080. Federal Courts 18

Government's advertising, marketing, promotion and warning claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) against manufacturers of cigarettes and other tobacco-related entities did not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), even though the challenged conduct could have fallen within the reach of a number of overlapping statutes, including the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) and the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA); the overlapping statutes which authorized FTC jurisdiction over the alleged conduct did not inherently conflict with RICO. U.S. v. Philip Mor- ris Inc., D.D.C.2003, 263 F.Supp.2d 72, reconsideration denied 2003 WL 26051239. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) did not provide an appropriate basis for federal question jurisdiction, in intra-tribal dispute between plaintiffs of elected tribal council and defendants of appointed tribal council; allegations that members of appointed council engaged in required predicate acts of racketeering were based on appointed council's acts of taking control of tribal council, which Court lacked jurisdiction to determine. Sac and Fox Tribe of Mississippi in Iowa v. Bear, N.D.Iowa 2003, 258 F.Supp.2d 938, affirmed 340 F.3d 749. Federal Courts 197

Revenue rule, under which United States courts customarily refuse to enforce the revenue laws of foreign sovereigns, did not preclude exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over suits by European Community (EC) and numerous political subdivisions of the Republic of Colombia against major tobacco product manufacturers under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various state common law causes of action to recover damages sustained as a result of three separate conspiracies related to the smuggling of contraband cigarettes into the EC and Colombia; although measure of damages would be assessed, in part at least, with reference to the operation of foreign tax laws, in no event would foreign law be applied as the rule of decision. European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., E.D.N.Y.2001, 150 F.Supp.2d 456. Federal Courts 47.1

Allegations of fraudulent transfer of proceeds of sale of New York property in which plaintiff had interest to Swiss bank account controlled by her brothers, and transfer of money from Bahamas account jointly owned by plaintiff to New York account controlled by brothers, coupled with alleged communications among defendants constituting predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, satisfied conduct test for subject matter jurisdiction in Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action. Madanes v. Madanes, S.D.N.Y.1997, 981 F.Supp. 241. Federal Courts 197

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims arising from sale and reorganization of French bank did not support subject matter jurisdiction; the only United States conduct alleged to be relevant to the transaction, the closing of French bank's New York agency, did not directly cause plaintiffs' alleged harm, rather, any harm to plaintiffs was caused by sale of bank's assets in France to another French bank. Alfadda v. Fenn, S.D.N.Y.1997, 966 F.Supp. 1317, affirmed 159 F.3d 41. Federal Courts 192.10

District court had jurisdiction over claim that defendant automaker and employees of plaintiff automaker violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by stealing plaintiff's trade secrets while employees lived and worked in United States, even though alleged effect of defendants' action was injury to plaintiff's market position overseas. General Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua, E.D.Mich.1996, 948

F.Supp. 670. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55

Federal district court had supplemental jurisdiction over alleged Ponzi scheme investors' state law claims stemming from stand-in scheme whereby temporary investors were used to satisfy minimum subscription levels, which formed basis of investors' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against same defendants. Burke v. Dowling, E.D.N.Y.1995, 944 F.Supp. 1036. Federal Courts 15

Where conduct of labor organization was extortionate only by virtue of labor laws, claims by shareholders in labor organization of extortion under RICO fell within National Labor Review Board's jurisdiction; court would have to examine various employment agreements between shareholders and employees and labor organization in order to resolve extortion claims. Brennan v. Chestnut, D.Minn.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1469, affirmed 973 F.2d 644. Labor And Employment 1677(1)

In action to enforce union election rules imposed under consent decree approved by court in civil racketeering action against union, employer alleged to have violated election rules was subject to personal jurisdiction as a corporation residing in the United States, regardless of whether it had minimum contacts with the forum state or district. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL- CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 776 F.Supp. 144, affirmed 954 F.2d 801, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 2993, 505 U.S. 1205, 120 L.Ed.2d 870. Federal Courts 74

Doctrine of primary agency jurisdiction did not require district court to dismiss and defer to customs service in RICO action challenging alleged conspiracy to submit false statements indicating that trademark was owned solely by American corporation in order to obtain protection from Customs against unauthorized importation of gray market goods. Shaw v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1991, 776 F.Supp. 128, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1916. Administrative Law And Procedure 228.1; Customs Duties 22.5

Court of International Trade's exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions to contest denial of protest against customs service's exclusion of merchandise did not apply to RICO action in which importers sought monetary damages for alleged conspiracy to submit false statements indicating that trademark was owned solely by American corporation in order to obtain protection from customs against unauthorized importation of gray market goods. Shaw v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1991, 776 F.Supp. 128, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1916. Customs Duties 84(1)

Federal court had personal jurisdiction over Argentine corporation in RICO action in view of allegations that it caused letters and other documents containing fraudulent statements to be mailed and transmitted by wire in the United States, some of which communications concerned purported negotiation of shares of another corporation's stock which were at issue in the litigation, and that the other corporation was owned in part by a New York resident. Herbstein v. Bruetman, S.D.N.Y.1991, 768 F.Supp. 79. Federal Courts 84

Although counts alleging breach of fiduciary duty and fraud on part of claims adjuster failed to allege that adjuster and other defendants were citizens of different state than plaintiff as necessary to establish diversity juris-

diction, court had subject matter jurisdiction over counts as pendent state claims to counts alleging violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); jurisdiction was not dependent on existence of diversity of citizenship. Federal Ins. Co. v. Parello, N.D.Ill.1991, 767 F.Supp. 157. Federal Courts 15

Cause of action alleging common-law fraud, and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claims alleging predicate acts of mail and wire fraud occurring in part within Illinois, arose from tortious act of mailing of agreement and addendum to Illinois resident with intent of affecting his interests, for purposes of Illinois long-arm statute, but claim based on acquisition of interests through use of proceeds from pattern of racketeering did not allege that any interest in Illinois business was acquired and court thus did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants with respect to that claim. Cross v. Simons, N.D.Ill.1989, 729 F.Supp. 588. Courts 13.5(10)

In action brought under the federal securities laws and RICO, the jurisdictional inquiry focuses on a defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole, not merely with the forum state. Perez-Rubio v. Wyckoff, S.D.N.Y.1989, 718 F.Supp. 217. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55; Securities Regula- tion 131

It was for the International Trade Commission, not the district court, to resolve, in the first instance, questions of whether Commission order regarding importation of reclosable plastic bags was overbroad and whether over- breadth was due to defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct in misleading Commission; thus, action alleging that defendant violated Sherman Act and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act by unlawfully influencing Commission to issue overbroad exclusion order had to be stayed under doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Meditech Intern. Co. v. Minigrip, Inc., N.D.Ill.1986, 648 F.Supp. 1488. Action 69(7); Administrative Law And Procedure 228.1; Customs Duties 54

Alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act by certain interstate long distance telecommunication carriers in numerous states with respect to various charges and billing of practices involved telecommunication issues as to which the federal court was required to defer to the Federal Communications Commission under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In re Long Distance Telecommunication Litigation, E.D.Mich.1986, 639 F.Supp. 305. Telecommunications 976(2)

Action brought by operators of self service gasoline facility and convenience store against alleged franchisors for taking possession of leased franchise facilities and confiscating cash on hand, stock and other assets in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act would not be dismissed on ground court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because allegations didn't constitute pattern of racketeering. Cole v. Circle R. Conveni- ence Stores, Inc., M.D.La.1985, 602 F.Supp. 1108. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

In view of fact that in each alleged fraudulent representation, officers and directors of California corporation communicated with Illinois corporation in their roles as California corporation's principals, so that if officers and directors of California corporation did engage in pattern of racketeering activity in Illinois as alleged, it would be reasonable to infer that they also conducted California corporation's business through a pattern of racketeering activity in Illinois, personal jurisdiction could be asserted over officers and directors of California cor-

poration to adjudicate allegations under this chapter. Club Assistance Program, Inc. v. Zukerman, N.D.Ill.1984, 594 F.Supp. 341. Federal Courts 76.20

Complaint and subsequent motions by controlling shareholder of debtor arising from denial of debtor's right to convert to Chapter 11 did not plead or prove any of elements of action under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(b, d), including pattern of racketeering activity consisting of two or more predicate acts within the last ten years, of racketeering activity, acquisition or maintenance of interest in or control of “enterprise” within meaning of the Act, effect on interstate commerce, or an agreement to commit predicate acts of racketeering; therefore, district court jurisdiction of shareholder's complaint could not be predicated under the RICO statute. Zurkowsky v. Government Development Bank for P.R. (GDB), D.C.Puerto Rico 1985, 52 B.R. 1007. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Federal district court in New York did not have personal jurisdiction over foreign university under “transacting business” provision in long arm statute, in lawsuit under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), for plaintiff's failure to allege any facts relating to conspiracy that would have suggested connection between New York and university. Pieczenik v. Dolan, S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 23095553, Unreported. Federal Courts 76.35

103. ---- State court, jurisdiction, practice and procedure generally

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims. Tafflin v. Levitt, U.S.Md.1990, 110 S.Ct. 792, 493 U.S. 455, 107 L.Ed.2d 887, rehearing denied 110 S.Ct. 1942, 495 U.S. 915, 109 L.Ed.2d 305. Courts 489(9)

Hotel owner litigated its Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against telecommunications service provider in state court on the merits, as required for jurisdictional bar of Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply, when state court denied owner's motion to amend its answer to add RICO counterclaims in provider's action for breach of contract; state court judge addressed both owner's substantive allegations and its delay in filing motion, and owner's counsel recognized that denial of the amendment on the merits was possible. ITT Corp. v. Intelnet Intern., C.A.3 (N.J.) 2004, 366 F.3d 205. Courts 509

Jurisdiction over civil RICO action lay exclusively in federal courts, despite lack of express statutory language to that effect, given legislative history and consideration of several unique features of RICO definitional and remedial structure demonstrating that state court jurisdiction would obstruct strong federal interests in uniform substantive and procedural enforcement of integrated statutory scheme to control organized crime affecting interstate commerce. Chivas Products Ltd. v. Owen, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1988, 864 F.2d 1280. Courts 489(9)

District court would decline, based upon exceptional circumstances, to exercise jurisdiction over pro se mortgagor's action against mortgagee bank, various town officials, and state Executive Office of Environmental Af- fairs, for alleged civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations arising from the foreclosure of her home, where parallel state proceedings for the most part had been adjudicated and were pending before state Court of Appeals, mortgagor's state court complaint mirrored those in the complaint before

district court, state claims involved matters of state law that were fully capable of adjudication by the state courts in which jurisdiction first attached, and state-court litigation would be an adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt resolution of the issues between the parties. Mani v. United Bank, D.Mass.2007, 498 F.Supp.2d 406. Federal Courts 47.1

Defendant's counterclaim for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was not an appropriate basis for removal of plaintiff's state court breach of contract action to federal district court. UTrue, Inc. v. Page One Science, Inc., E.D.Va.2006, 457 F.Supp.2d 688. Removal Of Cases 25(1)

Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred federal district court from exercising jurisdiction over fraud, § 1983 and Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims brought by former husband against former wife and against receiver appointed, pursuant to divorce proceeding, to sell couple's real property and divide proceeds; claims were brought primarily to attack receiver's authority to act as receiver and thus were inextricably intertwined with state-court judgment in divorce proceeding, regardless of federal statutes cited. Huszar v. Zeleny, E.D.N.Y.2003, 269 F.Supp.2d 98. Courts 509

Exclusivity of New York's workers' compensation scheme did not preclude federal court from exercising jurisdiction over allegations of massive fraud orchestrated and participated in by unions, law firm and doctor, resulting in filing of some 600 fraudulent workers' compensation hearing loss claims, as federal court has exclusive responsibility to hear Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims. Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, S.D.N.Y.1994, 869 F.Supp. 1076, affirmed 66 F.3d 12. Courts 489(9)

Abstention from federal jurisdiction for federal civil RICO claim against executor of estate and trustee of residuary trust was appropriate under exceptional circumstances rule of Colorado River where state court had assumed jurisdiction over res represented by estate, consolidation of all litigation in state court would avoid piecemeal litigation, state court obtained jurisdiction first, concurrent jurisdiction existed over RICO claims, and pendent claims turned upon state substantive law. Lawrence v. Cohn, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 678, vacated 816 F.Supp. 191. Federal Courts 47.1

Under Texas law state court has no jurisdiction over civil violations under federal racketeering laws; jurisdiction is exclusively federal. Hampton v. Long, E.D.Tex.1988, 686 F.Supp. 1202. Courts 489(9)

Federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over civil litigation under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., N.D.Cal.1987, 662 F.Supp. 1507. Courts 489(1)

Federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over RICO claims; disagreeing with Broadway v. San Antonio Shoe, Inc., 643 F.Supp. 584 (S.D.Tex.); Nordberg v. Lord, Day & Lord, 107 F.R.D. 692 (S.D.N.Y.); County of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 574 F.Supp. 902 (N.D.Ill.); Ideal Stencil Machine & Tape Co. v. Merchior, 600 F.Supp. 185 (S.D.Ill.); Greenview Trading Co. v. Hershman & Leicher, P.C., 108 A.D.2d 468, 489 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1 Dept.); Morley v. Cohen, 610 F.Supp. 798 (D.Md.). Brandenburg v. First Maryland Sav. and Loan, Inc.,

D.Md.1987, 660 F.Supp. 717, affirmed 859 F.2d 1179. Courts 489(9)

Federal jurisdiction over claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is exclusive, and therefore such claim in removed state court suit was not a “separate and independent claim” upon which a right of removal to federal court could be predicated. Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration Ltd. - 1981A, E.D.Wash.1985, 604 F.Supp. 1365. Courts 489(1); Removal Of Cases 48.1

Bringing of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) claim in adversary proceeding does not require automatic withdrawal of action to district court. In re Adelphi Institute, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1990, 112 B.R. 534. Bankruptcy 2103

104. ---- Concurrent jurisdiction, practice and procedure generally

Civil RICO statute does not confer exclusive federal jurisdiction, but rather concurrent state and federal jurisdiction. McCarter v. Mitcham, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1989, 883 F.2d 196, rehearing denied. Courts 489(9)

State and federal courts share concurrent jurisdiction over RICO claims. Lou v. Belzberg, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1987, 834 F.2d 730, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 1302, 485 U.S. 993, 99 L.Ed.2d 512.

Utah state courts have jurisdiction concurrent with federal courts over civil RICO claims. Reeder v. Kermit Johnson, Alphagraphics, Inc., D.Utah 1989, 723 F.Supp. 1428. Courts 489(9)

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over civil claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Ritchie v. Carvel Corp., S.D.N.Y.1989, 714 F.Supp. 700. Courts 489(9)

State and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims. Jae-Soo Yang Kim v. Pereira En- terprises, Inc., E.D.La.1988, 694 F.Supp. 200, affirmed 873 F.2d 295. Courts 489(9)

Federal-state jurisdiction over civil RICO actions is concurrent. Contemporary Services Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., C.D.Cal.1987, 655 F.Supp. 885. Courts 489(1)

105. ---- State law claims, jurisdiction, practice and procedure generally

In suit between labor organizations, district court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that were equivalent of failed federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims and for tortious interference with contract. United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Build- ing and Const. Trades Dept., E.D.Wash.2012, 911 F.Supp.2d 1118. Federal Courts 16

District court had federal question jurisdiction over plaintiff's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act (RESPA) claims against credit solutions company and

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law quiet title claims, where his RICO and RESPA claims arose under federal law, and state law claims shared common nucleus of operative fact with those federal claims. Brock v. Thomas, E.D.Pa.2011, 782 F.Supp.2d 133. Federal Courts 15; Federal Courts 192

District court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims brought by attorney and his law firm against three former clients and clients' current legal counsel, arising out of clients' initiation of legal malpractice actions against attorney, where court dismissed for failure to state claim federal Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims which formed basis for its federal question jurisdiction. Curtis & Associates, P.C. v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., E.D.N.Y.2010, 758 F.Supp.2d 153, affirmed 443 Fed.Appx. 582, 2011 WL 4839089. Federal Courts 18

Plaintiff was not entitled to remand case after amending complaint to replace federal claims of conspiracy under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) with state common law conspiracy; there was evidence that complaint was amended to remove federal claims for sole purpose of manipulating a remand, federal court had ruled on seven motions and clerk's office had processed one hundred documents, state law claim arose from same facts and controversy over which court had federal jurisdiction, and claims did not raise novel or complex issues of state law. Payman v. Lee County Community Hosp., W.D.Va.2004, 338 F.Supp.2d 679. Fed- eral Courts 18; Removal Of Cases 101.1

District court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims asserted against title company, attorney for title company, and sales agents for real estate developer in action brought by purchasers of townhomes from developer following grant of summary judgment to defendants on civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations (RICO) claims asserted by purchasers. Menuskin v. Williams, E.D.Tenn.1996, 940 F.Supp. 1199, appeal dismissed 98 F.3d 1342, affirmed in part , reversed in part 145 F.3d 755. Federal Courts 18

Plaintiff may not convert state law claims into federal treble damage action under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) simply by alleging that wrongful acts or pattern of racketeering related to enterprise. Heden v. Hill, S.D.Tex.1996, 937 F.Supp. 1230. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Where claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) had been dismissed, it was inappropriate for court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims of fraud and legal malpractice. Man- ning v. Stigger, E.D.Ky.1996, 919 F.Supp. 249. Federal Courts 18

District court would not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over common law fraud claims against defendant, which arose solely under state law, in light of dismissal of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against defendant and early stages of litigation. Brooke v. Schlesinger, S.D.N.Y.1995, 898 F.Supp. 1076. Federal Courts 18

After dismissing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act claim, federal district court in New York would not exercise jurisdiction over action involving remaining claims under New York Not- for-Profit Corporation Law which Florida resident who was former director of charitable foundation had brought

in New York state court against other directors who were residents of New York and Virginia and which defendants had removed to federal district court, even assuming that parties were citizens of states in which they resided, and district court would remand action to state court. Trask v. Kasenetz, E.D.N.Y.1993, 818 F.Supp. 39. Federal Courts 18; Removal Of Cases 45; Removal Of Cases 101.1

Fact that plaintiffs' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim was based on allegations of Wisconsin law misrepresentation claims did not warrant federal district court declining supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under rule permitting district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction for state claim which substantially predominates over claim over which district court has original jurisdiction. Grove Holding Corp. v. First Wisconsin Nat. Bank of Sheboygan, E.D.Wis.1992, 803 F.Supp. 1486. Federal Courts 47.1

When defendants were entitled to summary judgment on all federal claims under federal securities laws and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), state law claims of common-law fraud and breach of fiduciary duty would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Kushner v. DBG Property Investors, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1161. Federal Courts 18

District court had subject matter jurisdiction with respect to count involving pendent state claim for common- law fraud, where count involved same factual allegations and parties as Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations (RICO) claim asserted in unchallenged prior count. Schrag v. Dinges, D.Kan.1992, 788 F.Supp. 1543. Federal Courts 15

Federal district court would continue to exercise pendent jurisdiction over securities fraud plaintiffs' state-law claims, where district court had declined to grant defendants' summary judgment motion with respect to RICO claims. Borden, Inc. v. Spoor Behrins Campbell & Young, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 695. Federal Courts 18

Federal district court, having determined that plaintiffs stated claim for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) conspiracy, would not dismiss Florida law claim for conspiracy. In re Sahlen & Asso- ciates, Inc. Securities Litigation, S.D.Fla.1991, 773 F.Supp. 342. Federal Courts 18

District court could exercise pendent jurisdiction over state-law claims that derived from common nucleus of operative facts that served as basis for claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Com-Tech Associates v. Computer Associates Intern., Inc., E.D.N.Y.1990, 753 F.Supp. 1078, affirmed 938 F.2d 1574. Federal Courts 15

Statutory grant of jurisdiction over racketeering suit did not grant pendent party jurisdiction over common-law claims against seller whose shareholder and former principal officers were being sued for racketeering. Steco, Inc. v. S & T Mfg., Inc., E.D.Pa.1990, 745 F.Supp. 305. Federal Courts 15

Where RICO claim is sole federal claim and there is no other basis for jurisdiction, all pendent claims should be dismissed. Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellis, D.Colo.1990, 732 F.Supp. 1540. Federal Courts 15

Neither 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331, which gives district courts original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, nor RICO statute provided jurisdictional power to district court to decide state-law claims against pendent parties over whom no independent basis for federal jurisdiction existed. Hall American Center Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Dick, E.D.Mich.1989, 726 F.Supp. 1083. Federal Courts 14.1

District court would not abstain from hearing case containing federal RICO as well as state contract and tort claims, despite parallel state litigation; district court would dismiss pendant state claims, federal claims had not been brought in state court and there was no assurance that claims could be brought there, there as no danger of inconsistent verdict as to property ownership, and parties had agreed on joint discovery plan for both federal and state proceedings. San Jacinto Sav. Ass'n v. TDC Corp. of Florida, M.D.Fla.1989, 707 F.Supp. 1577. Federal Courts 15; Federal Courts 47.1

District court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims for common-law fraud, breach of contract, tortious interference, and breach of fiduciary duty after federal claim alleging violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act had been dismissed before trial, where state issues substantially predominated case. Marriott Bros. v. Gage, N.D.Tex.1988, 704 F.Supp. 731, opinion supplemented on denial of reconsideration 717 F.Supp. 458, affirmed 911 F.2d 1105, rehearing denied. Federal Courts 18

Exercise of pendent party jurisdiction over state law claims against attorney's law partners for alleged breach of fiduciary duty to client would not have been appropriate in client's action against attorney under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, even though client's RICO claim was of sufficient substance to confer federal jurisdiction, and even though claims against attorney and claims against law partners may have derived from common nucleus of operative fact; law partners were not necessary parties in client's RICO action, and there was no suggestion that the district court had exclusive jurisdiction over client's RICO claims. Nicolazzi v. Colombik, N.D.Ill.1987, 670 F.Supp. 823. Federal Courts 15

Federal court retaining jurisdiction over cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act in regard to stock transaction would exercise pendent jurisdiction over various state law claims of breach of contract and fraud arising out of common nucleus of operative facts. Metropolitan Intern., Inc. v. Alco Standard Corp., M.D.Pa.1986, 657 F.Supp. 627. Federal Courts 15

Where plaintiffs failed to state claim under federal securities laws, thus also requiring dismissal of their claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, federal district court would not exercise pendent jurisdiction over their related state law claims. Nutis v. Penn Merchandising Corp., E.D.Pa.1985, 610 F.Supp. 1573 , reconsideration denied 615 F.Supp. 486, affirmed 791 F.2d 919. Federal Courts 18

Pendent jurisdiction over state claims in securities and RICO [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.] case would be retained, despite dismissal of the federal securities claims; as to the RICO defendants, the alleged predicate acts arose from same conduct underlying the state claims, supporting pendent claim jurisdiction, and as to the non- RICO defendants, exercise of pendent party jurisdiction was warranted, inasmuch as, inter alia, all the claims arose out of common nucleas of operative fact, namely, the fraudulent sale of securities. Morley v. Cohen,

D.C.Md.1985, 610 F.Supp. 798. Federal Courts 15

Even assuming that plaintiff stated a valid claim under this chapter against the nine defendants named in third count, district court would not exercise pendent party jurisdiction over the moving defendants, named only in the fifth cause of action predicated on the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 39 P.S. §§ 351-363, against whom there was no independent basis of federal jurisdiction; the prudential considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants did not provide sufficient reason for requiring the movants, who would not otherwise be in federal court, to litigate in that forum. Chas. Kurz Co. v. Lombardi, E.D.Pa.1984, 595 F.Supp. 373. Federal Courts 15

With respect to claims under this section, plaintiffs properly invoked court's federal question jurisdiction, and state common law claims were properly before court in light of doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Windsor Asso- ciates, Inc. v. Greenfeld, D.C.Md.1983, 564 F.Supp. 273. Federal Courts 15; Federal Courts 197

In suit under this section seeking recovery of damages resulting from allegedly fraudulent transaction involving defendants, the state and federal claims derived from a common factual nucleus and the exercise of pendent jurisdiction was otherwise appropriate; accordingly, the district court would retain jurisdiction over plaintiff's state claims. D'Iorio v. Adonizio, M.D.Pa.1982, 554 F.Supp. 222. Federal Courts 15

Under this section providing for jurisdiction of federal district court over claims arising under laws of the United States, district court had jurisdiction over plaintiff's civil claims under this chapter and federal securities laws, and state law claims were properly before court pursuant to its pendent jurisdiction. Gunther v. Dinger, S.D.N.Y.1982, 547 F.Supp. 25. Federal Courts 17; Federal Courts 196; Federal Courts 207

District court had federal question jurisdiction over action which had been removed from state court in which plaintiff alleged violation of civil provisions of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act arising from defendant's failure to pay plaintiff for merchandise ordered, and had supplemental jurisdiction over state law claim on account stated, which arose from same nucleus of operative fact. Headwear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Stange, D.Kan.1996, 166 F.R.D. 36. Federal Courts 15; Removal Of Cases 19(5)

District court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, in insureds' action alleging that insurers violated RICO and state law by failing to automatically pay refunds due for unearned portions of premiums paid on credit life and disability insurance policies issued in conjunction with insureds' second mortgage loans, where RICO claim was dismissed for failure to state claim and diversity jurisdiction did not exist. Hoban v. USLIFE Credit Life Ins. Co., N.D.Ill.1995, 163 F.R.D. 509. Federal Courts 18

Even if district court found that class-wide California state law claims of consumers alleging misrepresentations with respect to efficacy of hearing aids formed part of same case or controversy as claims under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), assertion of federal jurisdiction over state claims under court's supplemental jurisdiction was not proper, where RICO claims of four individual consumers were insignificant compared with class-wide relief potentially available to consumers under California consumer protection laws.

Martin v. Dahlberg, Inc., N.D.Cal.1994, 156 F.R.D. 207. Federal Courts 18

106. Pendent-party jurisdiction, practice and procedure generally

There is no pendent party jurisdiction in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) cases; RICO does not state that RICO plaintiff may bring related state law claims in federal court. Schrag v. Dinges, D.Kan.1993, 820 F.Supp. 565. Federal Courts 15

District court had no authority to exercise pendent-party jurisdiction in action brought under the Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as RICO does not contain an affirmative grant of such jurisdiction within its terms. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., N.D.Ill.1991, 759 F.Supp. 449. Federal Courts 15

107. Abstention, practice and procedure generally

Colorado River abstention did not apply in federal action alleging former governor and others engaged in racketeering in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); state action alleging uncon- stitutionality of state law was not parallel to federal racketeering action. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Blago- jevich, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2011, 638 F.3d 519, rehearing en banc granted in part, opinion vacated in part 649 F.3d 799, on rehearing 651 F.3d 722. Federal Courts 47.1

Business owner's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy claim against city development authority and developers, challenging condemnations associated with urban redevelopment project, was precluded by Rooker-Feldman doctrine, since Oklahoma courts had previously considered and rejected owner's claims that initial condemnation order had been obtained through fraud on part of city, and that property at issue was undervalued. Tal v. Hogan, C.A.10 (Okla.) 2006, 453 F.3d 1244, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1334, 549 U.S. 1209, 167 L.Ed.2d 81. Courts 509

Decision to abstain in case under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) due to pending divorce proceeding cannot be automatic; decision to abstain requires not only that certain preconditions be met, but also that district court reasonably find that such abstention is appropriate in case at hand. DeMauro v. De- Mauro, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1997, 115 F.3d 94. Federal Courts 47.1

District court did not have to abstain from ex-wife's action against her former husband and others claiming violations under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), fraud, and negligence; action implicated no Louisiana family law issues of child custody, alimony, visitation rights, separation, or divorce that could involve federal court in state affairs and did not involve attack on community property settlement. Calcasieu Marine Nat. Bank v. Grant, C.A.5 (La.) 1991, 943 F.2d 1453, rehearing denied. Federal Courts 47.1

Equitable considerations warranted dismissing creditor's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against officers within corporations wholly owned by debtor, which was duplicative of creditor's bankruptcy adversary proceedings in which creditor claimed security interests in substantially all assets of debt-

or's corporation; abstaining from the duplicative RICO action until after the bankruptcy court had determined the nature and extent of creditor's security interests in corporation would conserve judicial resources by avoiding having two federal courts simultaneously examining the same facts to resolve the same issue, bankruptcy proceedings would provide the most comprehensive resolution of creditor's security interests in corporation, timing and substance of the RICO action suggested that it was filed for reactive or tactical purposes, and creditor's right to a jury trial would not be violated by the bankruptcy court's adjudication of the claims in the bankruptcy adversary proceeding prior to adjudication of the legal claims in the RICO action, even though the bankruptcy court's determination would have preclusive effect in the RICO action. Ritchie Capital Management, L.L.C. v. Jeffries, D.Minn.2012, 849 F.Supp.2d 881, appeal dismissed. Federal Courts 47.1; Federal Courts 65

Former property owner's claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which sought damages arising out of loss of owner's home, were “inextricably intertwined” with state-court foreclosure judgment, since claims could succeed only if court implicitly or explicitly determined that state court wrongly decided foreclosure issue, and therefore Rooker-Feldman doctrine could apply to bar federal action in which former owner asserted RICO claims. Figueroa v. Merscorp, Inc., S.D.Fla.2011, 766 F.Supp.2d 1305, affirmed 477 Fed.Appx. 558, 2012 WL 1648879. Courts 509

District court could not invoke Burford abstention in action in which senior citizen, who purchased deferred annuity policies from life insurance company, requested relief in the form of compensatory damages, consequential and incidental damages, interest, and punitive damages, for alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), common law civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. Bendzak v. Mid- land Nat. Life Ins. Co., S.D.Iowa 2006, 440 F.Supp.2d 970. Federal Courts 47.1

Prior pending action doctrine did not preclude claims brought under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO) by professional wrestling promoter against licensing agents; even though concurrent state court action was nearly complete, federal abstention would not have avoided piecemeal litigation, since promoter would have been required to litigate RICO claims in federal court against other defendants, law of decision was federal, and federal forum was not inconvenient for any party. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Jakks Pacific, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2006, 425 F.Supp.2d 484, affirmed 328 Fed.Appx. 695, 2009 WL 1391807. Fed- eral Courts 47.1

Burford abstention doctrine did not apply in government's action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against two not-for-profit organizations created by the tobacco industry on ground that the relief the government sought would necessitate disrupting the New York administrative scheme for dis- mantling those two entities; the remedies sought mirrored and supplemented, rather than interfered with, New York's administrative efforts, adjudication of the RICO claims did not involve complex or significant issues of state law or policy in which New York had a substantial interest, and the case involved enforcement of a federal statute protecting the United States' paramount sovereign interests, which New York's administrative scheme did not address. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., D.D.C.2004, 319 F.Supp.2d 9. Federal Courts 47.1

Younger abstention doctrine warranted district court's abstention from fraud, § 1983 and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims brought by former husband against former wife and against re-

ceiver appointed, pursuant to divorce proceeding, to sell couple's property and divide proceeds; claims were brought primarily to attack receiver's authority to act as receiver, which was within state's important interest in resolution of divorce proceedings, receiver had not yet completed his duties, and former husband could have asserted federal civil rights claims in state court. Huszar v. Zeleny, E.D.N.Y.2003, 269 F.Supp.2d 98. Federal Courts 48

Disbarred attorney's Thirteenth Amendment, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, and defamation claims were barred by Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine, as they were inextricably intertwined with judgment issued by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (DCCA) in his disciplinary case. Thomas v. Knight, D.D.C.2003, 257 F.Supp.2d 86, affirmed 2003 WL 22239653. Courts 509

Federal district court would abstain, pursuant to Burford abstention doctrine, from exercising jurisdiction over wife's federal civil RICO action against husband's girlfriend alleging that girlfriend engaged in fraudulent scheme to divert wife's marital assets in favor of wife's state matrimonial action seeking an accounting of the disposition of marital funds allegedly wastefully dissipated; in course of making an equitable distribution, state court would necessarily determine property rights of the spouses and, as prerequisite to determining whether property had been wrongfully dissipated, determine whether any property at issue constituted marital property and issue of whether there had been injury to wife's property sufficient to allow standing under RICO turned on these issues pending before state court. Farkas v. D'Oca, S.D.N.Y.1994, 857 F.Supp. 300. Federal Courts 47.1

Colorado River abstention was appropriate in suit against law firm brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), considering that central dispute concerning ownership of corporation and limited partnership was subject of two pending state court actions, and possibility that district court would reach determination as to ownership which would conflict with determination of state courts. Weinstock v. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, S.D.N.Y.1993, 815 F.Supp. 127. Federal Courts 47.1

Federal district court would abstain from hearing customer's action against bank for breach of statutory and common-law duties of good faith and fair dealing, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and RICO violations in connection with real estate and financing transactions, in light of pendency of bank's previously filed state court action seeking foreclosure and deficiency judgment in which customer had filed cross-petition raising affirmative claims for, inter alia, fraud and breach of duty of good faith. Goerner v. Barnes, S.D.Tex.1990, 730 F.Supp. 767. Federal Courts 47.1

Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar former husband's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against his former wife, her attorney, state judges and others involved in his state divorce proceedings, who allegedly conspired to deny him an honest tribunal; former husband raised claims of judicial corruption that went to the heart of the administration and resolution of his divorce proceedings. Davit v. Davit, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2006, 173 Fed.Appx. 515, 2006 WL 786723, Unreported, rehearing en banc denied. Courts 509

108. Justiciability, practice and procedure generally

Even if action involving alleged improprieties regarding property of deceased religious leader and religious corporations fell within scope of this chapter, judicial consideration was precluded by freedom of religion clause of U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1 in that before it could be determined whether the challenged acts were wrongful, the court would be required to decide an issue of religious doctrine, namely right of succession to religious leadership. Congregation Beth Yitzhok v. Briskman, E.D.N.Y.1983, 566 F.Supp. 555. Federal Courts 13.15

109. Defenses, practice and procedure generally--Generally

The Supreme Court decision in Pasquantino v. United States, issued while petition for writ of certiorari in current action was pending, in which the Supreme Court held that the “revenue rule” barring enforcement of foreign tax judgments or unadjudicated tax claims was inapplicable to criminal prosecutions of smugglers, did not cast doubt on Court of Appeals' ruling in current action that revenue rule barred foreign governments' RICO claims against tobacco manufacturers for damages based on alleged conspiracies to smuggle contraband cigarettes into their countries, since current action was not brought by the United States, which was a key factor in the Supreme Court's holding that revenue rule was inapplicable to smuggling prosecutions. European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., C.A.2 2005, 424 F.3d 175, certiorari denied 126 S.Ct. 1045, 546 U.S. 1092, 163 L.Ed.2d 858. In- ternational Law 10.10

Finding that defendants were precluded from contesting certain facts related to their participation or conspiracy to participate in acts of racketeering for which they were convicted was not conclusive as to their liability in civil RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) suit since injury and causation elements were yet to be established. Buchanan County, Virginia v. Blankenship, W.D.Va.2007, 496 F.Supp.2d 715. Judgment 648; Judgment 715(3)

Summerlin rule, under which laches is not applicable when Government sues to enforce public interest, foreclosed affirmative defense of laches that cigarette manufacturers and other tobacco-related entities sought to assert in Government's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against them for unlawful conspiracy to deceive public. U.S. v. Philip Morris Inc., D.D.C.2004, 300 F.Supp.2d 61. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

“Passing on” defense would not be recognized in context of city's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO) claim against administrator of municipal employee deferred compensation plan; passing on defense, whereby defendant defends on ground that plaintiff suffered no injury because she “passed on” overcharge to her customers, is not viable in context of RICO cause of action. City of Philadelphia v. Public Em- ployees Ben. Services Corp., E.D.Pa.1994, 842 F.Supp. 827. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Computer system supplier's failure to provide conversion tape to help transfer information from supplier's computer system to another supplier's computer system would not support finding wrongful shutoff of computer system that would support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) civil claims, where original supplier had not contracted to provide conversion tapes to help its former clients transfer information to new

computer systems, so had no obligation to do so. American Computer Trust Leasing v. Jack Farrell Implement Co., D.Minn.1991, 763 F.Supp. 1473, affirmed and remanded 967 F.2d 1208, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 414, 506 U.S. 956, 121 L.Ed.2d 338. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Abortion protestors' moral beliefs on issue of abortion did not provide legal justification defense to suit by abortion clinic for damage to clinic's property, though protestors were not prohibited from presenting evidence to jury regarding their motive or intent. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, E.D.Pa.1988, 689 F.Supp. 465, affirmed 868 F.2d 1342, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 261, 493 U.S. 901, 107 L.Ed.2d 210, rehearing denied 110 S.Ct. 1515, 494 U.S. 1050, 108 L.Ed.2d 651, on remand 745 F.Supp. 1082. Trespass 23

Plaintiff in civil action could not recover for damages to property or business by reason of violation of this chapter because of rule that cause of action does not exist for civil conspiracy between corporation and its agents acting within scope of their employment. Landmark Sav. & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., E.D.Mich.1981, 527 F.Supp. 206. Conspiracy 8

110. ---- Double jeopardy, defenses, practice and procedure generally

Under doctrine of dual sovereigns, double jeopardy did not bar RICO action by federal government based on conduct that was object of earlier criminal prosecutions by state of New York. U.S. v. Private Sanitation In- dustry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Double Jeopardy 186

111. ---- Estoppel, defenses, practice and procedure generally

Complaints in current and prior actions against Russian consortia, insofar as claims arising from alleged illegal takeover of Russian company that maintained Russia's largest vanadium ore plant were concerned, were identical in all material respects and, thus, finding of forum non conveniens in prior action estopped company's former shareholders from relitigating their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims in current action. Davis Intern., LLC v. New Start Group Corp., C.A.3 (Del.) 2007, 488 F.3d 597, on remand 2009 WL 1321900. Judgment 654; Judgment 714(2)

Lender's claims against particular debtor under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in separate suit, to extent that those claims related to sale of collateral, were impermissible collateral attack on pri- or, final judgment of bankruptcy court, since bankruptcy court approved sale and found sale to be in good faith, for fair value, and in best interest of debtor and its creditors, and lender did not raise issue of fraud during bankruptcy or timely move to set aside bankruptcy sale. Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., LLC, C.A.8 (Mo.) 2004, 387 F.3d 721. Bankruptcy 3081

Arbitration panel's decision in favor of computer equipment seller on buyer's breach of contract claim collaterally estopped buyer from subsequently litigating claims of misrepresentation, interference, and violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as panel decided essential, underlying facts of those claims, buyer had full and fair opportunity to litigate issues in arbitration proceeding, and buyer had op-

portunity to appeal arbitration award by moving to vacate it, which was done. Central Transport, Inc. v. Four Phase Systems, Inc., C.A.6 (Mich.) 1991, 936 F.2d 256. Alternative Dispute Resolution 382

Attorney who was collaterally estopped from relitigating validity of state court contempt order and sanctions could not relitigate those claims by casting allegations as federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act claim. Polur v. Raffe, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1990, 912 F.2d 52, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 1389, 499 U.S. 937, 113 L.Ed.2d 446. Judgment 828.16(1)

Nature of RICO claim asserted in the instant case favored application of collateral estoppel to arbitration panel's fact finding, in that the predicate acts alleged in RICO claim were essentially an amalgamation of plaintiff's contractual, state law, and federal securities claims, and in that the contractual and state law allegations, relating to computation of interest charges on margin account and the excessiveness of such charges, were the same allegations as were presented to and necessarily decided by arbitration panel; also, the determination of those issues was directly within scope of contractual arbitration clause and arbitrators' expertise. Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., C.A.11 (Ga.) 1985, 763 F.2d 1352. Alternative Dispute Resolution 413

Where issue litigated and determined on prior suit adversely to investor was whether brokerage firm, through its employees, had made allegedly false and fraudulent representations in reliance on which investor purchased stock, and affirmative finding of that issue was essential element of any recovery by investor in present action instituted under this section, doctrine of collateral estoppel barred action. Berns v. O'Dell, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1984, 726 F.2d 409. Judgment 724

Smokers of light cigarettes failed to establish how 1,083 findings in prior civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) tobacco litigation were central to prior court's final judgment as to tobacco manufacturer and its parent, in action alleging that manufacturer and parent violated various state marketing and unjust enrichment statutes by fraudulently advertising light cigarettes, and thus the centrality of the adjudication element of collateral estoppel was not satisfied, where prior RICO action involved nine different cigarette companies and alleged decades-long enterprise to defraud consumers in six different ways. In re Light Cigarettes Mar- keting Sales Practices Litigation, D.Me.2010, 691 F.Supp.2d 239. Judgment 725(5)

Plaintiffs were collaterally estopped, in suit against neighbor for alleged violations of §§ 1983, Ninth and Four- teenth Amendments, and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and various torts, from challenging neighbor's version of events related to her report to Department of Children and Families (DCF) regarding plaintiffs' purported abuse of their own child, and thus neighbor was immune from suit under Connectic- ut law; judge at state court custodial hearing, at which plaintiffs were represented by counsel, found neighbor's version of events credible, which finding supported judge's conclusion that child was neglected by plaintiffs, and judgment removing child from home was based on that conclusion. S. v. Webb, D.Conn.2009, 602 F.Supp.2d 374. Infants 1518; Infants 2205

Doctrine of collateral estoppel applied in civil RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) suit, and thus any facts clearly established and essential to a defendants' convictions under the criminal RICO statute were precluded from relitigation in the civil RICO suit that was based on the same underlying conduct.

Buchanan County, Virginia v. Blankenship, W.D.Va.2007, 496 F.Supp.2d 715. Judgment 648

Cigarette manufacturers and other tobacco-related entities failed to establish false representation or misrepresentation element required to establish equitable estoppel they sought to assert as affirmative defense to Govern- ment's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against them for unlawful conspiracy to deceive public, although Government regulated the industry and allegedly encouraged marketing of reduced tar products, advised public that such products were safer than their counterparts, and required use of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) method for reporting and advertising tar and nicotine yields; none of these actions amounted to representations that defendants would not be later subject to suit under RICO or other statute. U.S. v. Philip Morris Inc., D.D.C.2004, 300 F.Supp.2d 61. Estoppel 62.2(4)

Fact that Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) in previous civil suit under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) focused on wrongdoing of parties other than savings and loan association's president did not judicially estop Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as manager of FSLIC Resolution Fund, from subsequently asserting position in action on fidelity bond that president was responsible for fraud committed upon association. F.D.I.C. v. CNA Cas. of Puerto Rico, D.Puerto Rico 1991, 786 F.Supp. 1082. Estoppel 68(2)

Previous convictions of defendants for racketeering conspiracy in connection with fraudulent scheme to obtain public contract for sewage disposal services collaterally estopped defendants from relitigating their guilt in subsequent civil racketeering conspiracy action. County of Oakland by Kuhn v. City of Detroit, E.D.Mich.1991, 776 F.Supp. 1211. Judgment 648

Raising fraud allegations against vendor of apartment complex as Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) and conspiracy actions did not prevent application of collateral estoppel after vendor had been unsuccessful in fraud action against purchaser in South Carolina court; predicate acts of mail and wire fraud were fully litigated in state court. Aries Realty, Inc. v. AGS Columbia Associates, S.D.N.Y.1990, 751 F.Supp. 444. Judgment 828.16(1)

Doctrinal collateral estoppel did not bar use of specific evidence to establish that defendants committed substantive offenses of distribution of cocaine, even though it paralleled evidence previously admitted during prior RICO prosecution of defendant, in which he was accused of participating in cocaine distribution conspiracy. U.S. v. Esposito, D.N.J.1989, 726 F.Supp. 991, affirmed 912 F.2d 60, rehearing denied , certiorari dismissed 111 S.Ct. 806, 498 U.S. 1075, 112 L.Ed.2d 1032. Judgment 751

RICO claim in federal district court was not barred by collateral estoppel; defendants did not adequately inform that court as to specific issues that arbitration board and state court decided, or compare those issues with issues before district court, but merely referred district court to arbitration hearing transcript. Reeder v. Kermit John- son, Alphagraphics, Inc., D.Utah 1989, 723 F.Supp. 1428. Alternative Dispute Resolution 406

New York court's dismissal on ground of laches of record company's motion to hold creditor in contempt for

failing to sell master recordings in compliance with prior state court order did not have collateral estoppel effect in record company's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act action in federal court. Creed Taylor, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1989, 718 F.Supp. 1171. Judgment 828.9(5)

Though local union and district council named as defendants in action under RICO civil remedies provision were not bound by collateral estoppel with respect to criminal trial of individual defendants in which they were not parties, evidence developed in course of criminal trial could be considered though union defendants were entitled to evidentiary hearing due to Government's substantial delay in seeking preliminary injunctive relief. U.S. v. Local 6A, Cement and Concrete Workers, Laborers Intern. Union of North America, S.D.N.Y.1986, 663 F.Supp. 192. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 78

Statement which plaintiffs made in response to interrogatories propounded by defendants in securities action and which was to effect that plaintiffs were not urging any claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act, but were only urging a claim for basic, fundamental securities fraud was contrary to RICO claim asserted by plaintiffs and was such as to require application of doctrine of judicial estoppel to preclude plaintiffs from thereafter pursuing RICO claim on ground that it had been been disavowed. Matek v. Murat, C.D.Cal.1986, 638 F.Supp. 775, affirmed 862 F.2d 720. Estoppel 68(2)

Collateral estoppel would not bar litigation of RICO claim in action brought subsequent to related fraud action where, at the time that the fraud action was brought, Second Circuit law precluded the RICO claim but that law was then changed by the Supreme Court. Schaafsma v. Marriner, D.Vt.1986, 634 F.Supp. 812. Judgment 739

City was collaterally estopped from asserting claims under federal and Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Acts and for common-law fraud in connection with contract to supply coal for use in city's electrical generation facility, since issue whether allegedly deceptive coal invoices were sent to city necessarily included issue whether contract had been breached by impermissible substitution of another coal producer, and the latter issue was decided against city in prior arbitration proceeding. City of Gainesville, Fla. v. Island Creek Coal Sales Co., N.D.Fla.1984, 618 F.Supp. 513, affirmed 771 F.2d 1495. Alternative Dispute Resolution 386

Federal court's exclusive jurisdiction over civil claims under this section did not foreclose application of collateral estoppel principles, in that issues with respect to which collateral estoppel was asserted were not uniquely raised in state proceedings by counterclaims of other intervening defendants, but were also highly relevant to affiliated corporations' case for injunctive relief, to which city and county were undeniably defendants, city and county should not be allowed to avoid collateral estoppel effect of findings of state court by asserting their own failure to contest and produce evidence on issues clearly raised by affiliated corporations with respect to their request for injunctive and declaratory relief, and city and county had a full and fair opportunity to be heard in state court on issues with respect to which estoppel was asserted. Cook County v. MidCon Corp., N.D.Ill.1983, 574 F.Supp. 902, affirmed 773 F.2d 892. Judgment 828.16(1)

Investor was collaterally estopped from relitigating issue of whether his purchase of stock was in reliance upon

false and fraudulent representations of stock broker since that issue had been determined adverse to investor in a prior action brought by brokerage firm to recover purchase price of the stock. Berns v. O'Dell, E.D.Mo.1983, 563 F.Supp. 1201, affirmed 726 F.2d 409. Judgment 720

Even if federal law did not govern claim by county that defendants' convictions under this chapter collaterally estopped them from denying that violation in a civil action for treble damages, state law would provide for collateral estoppel rule of court rendering conviction; therefore, federal collateral estoppel rules, which allow prior criminal conviction to work an estoppel in favor of government in subsequent civil proceeding, governed. Cook County v. Lynch, N.D.Ill.1982, 560 F.Supp. 136. Federal Courts 420; Judgment 648

Where court in civil action for damages arising from racketeering activities determined that defendants were estopped to deny that they violated this chapter's prohibition against affecting interstate commerce through pattern of racketeering activity, court had to determine what issues would be deemed precluded. Anderson v. Janovich, W.D.Wash.1982, 543 F.Supp. 1124. Judgment 751

Offensive collateral estoppel could not be applied to bar relitigation in civil context of a criminal violation of this chapter. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Caton's Estate, N.D.Ind.1982, 540 F.Supp. 673. Judgment 648

Consultant's role for employer, in recommending counter measures against union in order to counteract its corporate campaign and in gathering information to enable employer to oppose union's conduct, did not cause employer to bear equal fault for the harm done by union's alleged conspiracy, so as to entitle union to defense of in pari delicto in employer's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action; asserted conduct, which merely detailed employer's worried attempts to save the company, was not illegal and did not represent the type of inequitable, extortionate conduct allegedly perpetrated by union defendants in their conspiracy to violate the law. Smithfield Foods Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Intern. Union, E.D.Va.2008, 2008 WL 4681997, opinion corrected and superseded 254 F.R.D. 274. Action 4

Debtor's controlling shareholder, who had been afforded opportunity to appeal to district court and the Court of Appeals a bankruptcy judge's order denying right to convert to Chapter 11, was barred by collateral estoppel from relitigating issue pursuant to complaint alleging that bankruptcy judges and others violated the Racketeer- ing Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq., by denying debtor its right to convert from Chapter 7 to Chapter 11. Zurkowsky v. Government Development Bank for P.R. (GDB), D.C.Puerto Rico 1985, 52 B.R. 1007. Judgment 636

112. ---- Filed rate doctrine, defenses, practice and procedure generally

Filed rate doctrine precluded utility customers from suffering a legally cognizable injury sufficient to predicate a RICO civil action based on claim that utilities had obtained unreasonably high rate based on fraudulent misstatements to state rate-setting commissions as, under the filed rate doctrine, customers had no right to be charged a lower rate than they were actually charged. Taffet v. Southern Co., C.A.11 (Ala.) 1992, 967 F.2d 1483, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 657, 506 U.S. 1021, 121 L.Ed.2d 583. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Filed rate doctrine precluded telephone company's customers from recovering under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for company's alleged bribery of members of Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (PUC) in order to influence PUC in approving rate increase; relief which customers sought would disturb uniform rates and PUC's rate-making decisions, class was not necessarily entitled to forum to recover RICO damages, and another forum did exist for telephone customers to recover alleged overcharges. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., C.A.8 (Minn.) 1992, 954 F.2d 485, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 2306, 504 U.S. 957, 119 L.Ed.2d 228. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 9

Under filed rate doctrine, not-for-profit corporation that claimed to represent residential real estate owners in city did not suffer injury to its “business or property” as result of utility's alleged scheme to submit false information to Arizona Corporation Commission in order to secure approval of higher-than-proper utility rates, and, thus, corporation could not support claim under civil remedy provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO), where corporation and its members had paid legal rate approved by Commission. Sun City Taxpayers' Ass'n v. Citizens Utilities Co., D.Conn.1994, 847 F.Supp. 281, affirmed 45 F.3d 58, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 1693, 514 U.S. 1064, 131 L.Ed.2d 557. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Filed rate doctrine did not bar common-law fraud and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against telephone company based on company's alleged false advertising regarding costs of using its calling card, although company had filed tariff specifying its charges for use of calling card; liability issue did not involve what reasonable rate should be, but whether company committed fraud and violated RICO in inducing customers' use of calling cards, and determination of what rate should have been was relevant only in determining damages. Gelb v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., S.D.N.Y.1993, 813 F.Supp. 1022. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 110; Telecommunications 932; Telecommunications 992

RICO and state law claims based on allegations that ratepayers were forced to pay higher rates because telephone company and subsidiaries fraudulently induced state and federal regulatory commissions into approving higher rates by reporting and paying higher costs than necessary were barred by the filed rate doctrine. Wego- land, Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., S.D.N.Y.1992, 806 F.Supp. 1112, affirmed 27 F.3d 17. Telecommunications 932

Koegh doctrine, or “filed rate doctrine,” applied to bar Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and antitrust conspiracy claims brought by common carrier against its competitors. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, D.S.C.1992, 805 F.Supp. 1277, affirmed 998 F.2d 1009, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 553, 510 U.S. 993, 126 L.Ed.2d 454. Antitrust And Trade Regulation 896 ; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 1

Filed rate doctrine barred RICO claims against gas companies, state officials, and related parties based upon alleged fraudulent conduct and material misrepresentations occurring during rate setting proceedings; state regulatory agency was itself involved in alleged fraudulent conduct. Cullum v. Arkla, Inc., E.D.Ark.1992, 797 F.Supp. 725, affirmed 994 F.2d 842. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Filed rate doctrine precluded recovery under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against telecommunications company and others of damages measurable by comparison of Minnesota Public Utilities Com- mission approved rates and rates that allegedly would have been approved but for alleged wrongdoing of the company with respect to the Commission. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., D.Minn.1986, 648 F.Supp. 419, reconsideration denied 653 F.Supp. 908, affirmed 829 F.2d 648, certiorari granted 108 S.Ct. 1219, 485 U.S. 958, 99 L.Ed.2d 420, reversed 109 S.Ct. 2893, 492 U.S. 229, 106 L.Ed.2d 195, on remand 734 F.Supp. 879. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

113. ---- First amendment, defenses, practice and procedure generally

First Amendment did not protect union from liability under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) arising from its allegedly extortionate speech against employer. Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Intern. Union, E.D.Va.2008, 2008 WL 4610312, opinion corrected and superseded 593 F.Supp.2d 840. Constitutional Law 1830; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

First Amendment did not protect organization's activities in conducting demonstrations and picketing of television station and its advertisers, and in mailing letters in order to coerce station into providing free air time for organization's messages; activities conducted by organization were part of criminal act of extortion, and thus were not accorded First Amendment protection. Burnham Broadcasting Co. v. Williams, La.App. 4 Cir.1993, 629 So.2d 1335, writ denied 632 So.2d 770, 1994-0150 (La. 2/25/94), certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 69, 513 U.S. 814, 130 L.Ed.2d 25. Constitutional Law 1853; Constitutional Law 2137

114. ---- Immunity, defenses, practice and procedure generally

Civil action brought by county prosecutors against member of county's board of supervisors pursuant to Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was not intimately associated with judicial phase of criminal process, and prosecutors' actions were not analogous to those of a prosecutor, and therefore absolute immunity did not apply to protect prosecutors from § 1983 liability for claims arising out of RICO action; in bringing civil lawsuit under RICO, prosecutors were not engaging in conduct that only legal representative of government could take, and lawsuit, which essentially was harassing public-relations ploy, was filed and then quickly dismissed as part of long-running “political war” in county. Stapley v. Pestalozzi, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 2013, 2013 WL 4266907. District and Prosecuting Attorneys 10

Former Illinois governor was immune from civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit for his role in inducing the state legislature to adopt Horse Racing Acts and for signing those Acts into law, notwithstanding allegations of misconduct and regardless of whether the office held was legislative or executive, where governor's activity in influencing legislature was functionally legislative. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Blagojevich, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2011, 638 F.3d 519, rehearing en banc granted in part, opinion vacated in part 649 F.3d 799, on rehearing 651 F.3d 722. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

dicate acts supporting owner's claim that employees violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); weight of authority clearly prohibited employees' alleged conduct, so as to give them notice that alleged conduct violated the law. Robbins v. Wilkie, C.A.10 (Wyo.) 2006, 433 F.3d 755, certiorari granted 127 S.Ct. 722, 549 U.S. 1075, 166 L.Ed.2d 559, reversed and remanded 127 S.Ct. 2588, 551 U.S. 537, 168 L.Ed.2d 389, on remand 497 F.3d 1122. United States 50.10(1)

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act did not abrogate common-law absolute immunity protecting members of state legislature from suit relating to their performance of legislative activities; no such abroga- tion would be implied, absent clear congressional intent, and RICO was silent as to legislative privilege. Chap- pell v. Robbins, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1996, 73 F.3d 918. States 28(2)

Two Illinois legislators enjoyed official immunity with respect to civil complaint charging them with violating the Sherman Antitrust Act, sections 1 to 7 of Title 15. S.H.A. ch. 38, § 60-3, section 1983 of Title 42, this chapter and commission of common law torts of fraud, unfair competition, and interference in view of fact that causes of action focused on legislators' attempts to use their legislative positions to influence regulation of currency exchanges, a legitimate legislative activity. Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exchange Ass'n of Illinois, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1984, 729 F.2d 1128, certiorari dismissed 105 S.Ct. 375, 469 U.S. 976, 83 L.Ed.2d 342 . States 28(2)

Union's appearances before municipal governments could not be affirmative defense under Noerr-Pennington doctrine to employer's claims against union for violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state law, where union admitted that its intent in appearing before municipal bodies was prin- cipally to vex employer. Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Intern. Union, E.D.Va.2008, 2008 WL 4610312, opinion corrected and superseded 593 F.Supp.2d 840. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Loan purchaser's alleged communications with San Diego District Attorney, San Diego Sheriff, and California Department of Corporations were protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, under which those who petitioned the government for redress were immune from statutory liability for their petitioning conduct, so as to preclude mortgage business's claim against loan purchaser for allegedly violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by making false claims with the San Diego District Attorney and the San Diego Sheriff alleging elder abuse and making false claims to mortgage regulators at the California Department of Corporations. William Villa v. Heller, S.D.Cal.2012, 885 F.Supp.2d 1042. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 64

Non-profit animal rights organizations were not entitled to Noerr-Pennington immunity at motion to dismiss stage in circus owner's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit, in relation to organizations' litigation efforts in underlying Endangered Species Act (ESA) suit against circus owner, where circus owner's complaint was premised on allegations of bribery and deliberate misrepresentations on organizations' part in ESA action. Feld Entertainment Inc. v. American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, D.D.C.2012, 873 F.Supp.2d 288. Constitutional Law 1437(1); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions 64

State court judge was entitled to absolute immunity from debtor's claims for monetary damages under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) based on judge's entry of judgment against her in creditor's collection action, where claims were based on judicial actions that were not taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Rolfes v. MBNA America Bank N.A., D.S.D.2005, 416 F.Supp.2d 745, affirmed 219 Fed.Appx. 613, 2007 WL 911831. Judges 36

Judges who issued rulings that were adverse to litigants were entitled to absolute judicial immunity from liability in litigants' subsequent action alleging violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where alleged acts were judicial acts taken within each court's subject matter jurisdiction. Stone v. Baum, D.Ariz.2005, 409 F.Supp.2d 1164, motion to vacate denied 2006 WL 66668. Judges 36

Federal litigation immunity barred products liability plaintiffs' subsequent action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleging that defendant's fraudulent concealment of adverse testing data induced them to accept unreasonably low settlement offers. Matsuura v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., D.Hawai'i 2004, 330 F.Supp.2d 1101, reversed and remanded 431 F.3d 353, certiorari denied 126 S.Ct. 2861, 547 U.S. 1192, 165 L.Ed.2d 895, on remand 2006 WL 2734291. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 64

Civil claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by former state university football player against university and coaching officials in their official capacities, based on alleged illegal conduct in connection with exploitative football program, were barred by sovereign immunity under Eleventh Amend- ment. Gaines v. Texas Tech University, N.D.Tex.1997, 965 F.Supp. 886. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 64

State Health Planning and Development Agency (SHPDA) official was entitled to qualified immunity against medical center's Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim for issuance of “show cause” letter as to why center's certificate of need should not be revoked where center produced no fact specific case that demonstrated actions by SHPDA official were contrary to clearly established law; medical center's reliance on general conclusory allegations or broad legal truisms did not establish actionable RICO violation. Au- burn Medical Center, Inc. v. Peters, M.D.Ala.1996, 953 F.Supp. 1518. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 64

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as manager may not be sued under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). McNeily v. U.S., N.D.Tex.1992, 839 F.Supp. 418. Banks And Banking 505; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Federal land banks and production credit association, organized under Farm Credit Act, were immune from liability under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act as federal instrumentalities. Wiley v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, S.D.Ind.1987, 657 F.Supp. 964. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

City, being a municipal corporation capable of acting only through its officials, was immune by reason of public policy from treble damage provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act because any award would require payment by innocent taxpayers residing in city. Massey v. City of Oklahoma City, W.D.Okla.1986, 643 F.Supp. 81. Municipal Corporations 723

Past and present members of Nevada Gaming Commission and State Gaming Control Board were absolutely immune from civil suit brought pursuant to this section. Productions & Leasing v. Hotel Conquistador, Inc., D.C.Nev.1982, 573 F.Supp. 717, affirmed 709 F.2d 21. Gaming 4

Former husband who brought Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against state court judges involved in his divorce proceeding could not circumvent the judicial immunity doctrine by enforcing RICO's criminal provisions through its civil enforcement provision. Davit v. Davit, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2006, 173 Fed.Appx. 515, 2006 WL 786723, Unreported, rehearing en banc denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 57

115. ---- Unclean hands, defenses, practice and procedure generally

Affirmative defense of unclean hands was not available in employer's action against union for violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food and Com- mercial Workers Intern. Union, E.D.Va.2008, 2008 WL 4610312, opinion corrected and superseded 593 F.Supp.2d 840. Equity 65(1)

Affirmative defense of unclean hands is not available in a civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Intern. Union, E.D.Va.2008, 593 F.Supp.2d 840. Equity 65(1)

Insureds could not recover on civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against insurance broker based on broker's participation in kickback scheme involving insurance funds covering properties owned or controlled by insureds because they were equally responsible for the kickback scheme; insureds bore more than substantially equal responsibility for the kickback scheme because their agent knew about and fully participated in the scheme and concealed it from insurance company, the target of the scheme, and because their principal was aware of the scheme to overcharge insurance company. Meadowbrook-Richman, Inc. v. As- sociated Financial Corp., S.D.N.Y.2004, 325 F.Supp.2d 341. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Even if unclean hands doctrine could apply as defense when Government acted to enforce the Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) through civil action, Government's alleged conduct would not support unclean hands defense by cigarette manufacturers and tobacco-related entities in civil RICO action alleging unlawful conspiracy to deceive public, where alleged conduct consisted of Government scientists questioning whether smoking caused disease, failing to timely communicate to public its knowledge of properties of nicotine, subsidizing cigarette sales to servicemen, supporting domestic tobacco farming, encouraging smokers to switch to lower tar products and interfering with creation of safer cigarettes; no allegations were made that Gov-

ernment fraudulently misrepresented anything or committed mail and wire fraud. U.S. v. Philip Morris Inc., D.D.C.2004, 300 F.Supp.2d 61. Equity 65(2)

Developers who paid bribes to city officials for permits and approval could not maintain civil remedy suit under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as allowing wrongdoers to recover would be contrary to congressional intent and policy of RICO. Roma Const. Co., Inc. v. aRusso, D.R.I.1995, 906 F.Supp. 78, reversed 96 F.3d 566, on remand 1998 WL 156708. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Affirmative defense of unclean hands was not available to former mayor, city council members, and competing developers in developer's action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); unclean hands would not be allowed by itself to prohibit action which otherwise would advance RICO's board antiracket- eering policies. Bieter Co. v. Blomquist, D.Minn.1994, 848 F.Supp. 1446. Equity 65(1)

116. ---- Res judicata, defenses, practice and procedure generally

Under Illinois law, the state supreme court's decision rejecting constitutional challenges to the 2006 Racing Act did not have res judicata effect on federal suit involving constructive trust claim and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim based on enactment of Act; in the prior suit, casinos challenged the validity of the Racing Act under various provisions of the Illinois Constitution and the Takings Clause of the federal constitution, whereas the federal constructive-trust claim, in contrast, was based on allegations of a criminal pay-to-play conspiracy that unjustly enriched racetracks at the casinos' expense. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Blagojevich, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2011, 638 F.3d 519, rehearing en banc granted in part, opinion vacated in part 649 F.3d 799, on rehearing 651 F.3d 722. Judgment 828.15(1)

Doctor could have raised his claims for alleged violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and for civil conspiracy in his prior state-court action against hospital and its director, based on 10 purported predicate acts which occurred prior to filing of state action and which caused bulk of doctor's alleged injuries, including his alleged wrongful suspension, psychiatric evaluation, termination, and filing of false administrative report, and therefore, under Missouri law, res judicata applied to bar claims in subsequent federal action, notwithstanding doctor's allegations respecting additional predicate acts that purportedly occurred after state-court action was filed. Misischia v. St. John's Mercy Health Systems, C.A.8 (Mo.) 2006, 457 F.3d 800, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1258, 549 U.S. 1245, 167 L.Ed.2d 145. Judgment 828.15(1)

Res judicata precluded lender from claiming injury caused by fraud or misappropriation of assets in subsequent lawsuit under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) that lender failed to raise in prior bankruptcy proceeding, since lender was party to bankruptcy proceeding, and RICO claims arose out of same nucleus of operative facts in that lender believed that borrower held millions of dollars worth of inventory, equipment, and accounts receivable at time that it made loan to borrower and lender knew that borrower-debtor had misrepresented its position or somehow disposed of its assets when borrower filed for bankruptcy shortly thereafter and claimed to bankruptcy court that it did not hold such assets. Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., LLC, C.A.8 (Mo.) 2004, 387 F.3d 721. Judgment 585(2); Judgment 668(2)

Action by financing company against leasing company and its owner for breach of warranty, breach of contract, fraud, and violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was not barred by doctrine of res judicata; although there was prior suit involving same parties, financing company was not adverse party to leasing company and owner when agreed judgment was entered in previous suit. Heller Financial, Inc. v. Gram- mco Computer Sales, Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1996, 71 F.3d 518. Judgment 567; Judgment 704

Bank's suit alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, fraudulent concealment and civil conspiracy was barred by res judicata arising from prior third-party complaint by bank seeking indemnity and contribution from same defendants in government's civil action charging bank and others with knowingly filing false statement with the Small Business Administration (SBA) for purpose of obtaining SBA matching funds, as current case arose out of the same nucleus of operative fact as prior indemnity claim. Israel Discount Bank Ltd. v. Entin, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1992, 951 F.2d 311. Judgment 725(5)

Bankruptcy trustee's claim against debtor's son for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) in connection with funds in trust for which son was trustee would not have been “core proceeding” in bankruptcy; therefore, bankruptcy trustee's RICO claim against son was not barred under principles of res judicata by prior adversary proceeding wherein bankruptcy trustee sought determination that trust funds were property of the bankruptcy estate. Barnett v. Stern, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1990, 909 F.2d 973. Bankruptcy 2043(2); Judgment 713(2)

For purposes of determining applicability of res judicata in seller's action for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against shareholders, officers, directors and managing agents of bankrupt buyer's parent corporation, unity of parties did not exist between current action and buyer's and parent's bankruptcy proceedings; defendants were not successors in interest to bankruptcy debtors, defendants did not control whether claims asserted in present suit were brought in earlier proceeding, and although seller was party to bankruptcy action, it could not have brought its claims under Act against third parties in bankruptcy court. Howell Hydro- carbons, Inc. v. Adams, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1990, 897 F.2d 183, rehearing denied. Judgment 678(1)

Under Illinois law, shareholder who brought state court breach of contract suit was barred by res judicata from bringing subsequent federal RICO action based on fraud, where both theories of liability concerned the same transaction or series of facts. Mortell v. Mortell Co., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1989, 887 F.2d 1322. Judgment 828.16(3)

Where state court hearing foreclosure proceeding denied motion to amend answer to include affirmative defense

of fraud in the inducement, as opposed to fraud in the execution of the contract, claim of fraud in inducement was not adjudicated in the state court proceeding and, therefore, res judicata did not preclude federal court action on RICO claim which arguably was based on allegation of fraud in the inducement. George v. United Ken- tucky Bank, Inc., C.A.6 (Ky.) 1985, 753 F.2d 50, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 2024, 471 U.S. 1018, 85 L.Ed.2d 306, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 70, 474 U.S. 821, 88 L.Ed.2d 58. Judgment 828.16(4)

Dismissal of prior Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against law firm was res judicata in subsequent RICO action, where second action was brought by same plaintiff in the guise of plaintiff's financial company, and suits challenged the same conduct. Ying Qing Lu v. Lezell, D.D.C.2013, 919 F.Supp.2d 1. Judgment 585(2); Judgment 701

Res judicata did not preclude claims brought under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by professional wrestling promoter against licensing agents; state court's basis for dismissing concurrent action and entering default judgment for promoter was agents' discovery misconduct rather than merits, such dismissal was not final, and promoter never had opportunity to actually litigate counterclaims due to discovery abuses. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Jakks Pacific, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2006, 425 F.Supp.2d 484, affirmed 328 Fed.Appx. 695, 2009 WL 1391807. Judgment 828.9(5)

Under Alabama law, entry of judgment dismissing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) counterclaims in related litigation between parties did not present res judicata bar to RICO claims of marketer and its parent corporation against marketer's former parent corporation and former common director of both parent corporations, where present claims were based on different facts and alleged conduct under RICO which extended beyond filing date of RICO counterclaims in related litigation, rather than merely new damages under those counterclaims, and marketer and its parent did not assert claims based on the new conduct in amended counterclaims they subsequently filed in related litigation. Waddell & Reed Financial, Inc. v. Torchmark Corp., D.Kan.2003, 292 F.Supp.2d 1270. Judgment 828.15(1)

Under res judicata doctrine, relocated proprietor's dismissed action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) against city agency, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and related parties alleging conspiracy to defraud proprietor by evicting her from leased space prior to availability of federal relocation funds barred proprietor's subsequent § 1983 action against same defendants seeking relocation assistance allegedly due under Uniform Relocation Act (URA); two actions contained nearly identical factual allegations and arose from same set of facts, § 1983 claim could have been asserted in RICO action, and same evidence was necessary to sustain both actions. Burton v. Cleveland Empowerment Zone Office, N.D.Ohio 2003, 271 F.Supp.2d 1034, affirmed 102 Fed.Appx. 461, 2004 WL 1367275, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 661, 543 U.S. 1024, 160 L.Ed.2d 502, rehearing denied , rehearing denied 125 S.Ct. 1108, 543 U.S. 1132, 160 L.Ed.2d 1089. Judgment 585(2); Judgment 588

Women's organization stated claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in second amended complaint against abortion opponents, and thus, upon remand from Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, res judicata did not preclude organization from asserting RICO claim in third amended complaint; although not all named plaintiffs made claims against all named defendants in second amended complaint, and

although organization did not specifically state that it brought RICO claims in second amended complaint, it did plead specific facts and injury sufficient to state claim for relief under RICO because it alleged conduct that violated RICO, and that organization and its members were injured by that conduct. National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, N.D.Ill.1995, 897 F.Supp. 1047. Judgment 609

Doctrine of res judicata did not preclude oil well royalty interest holders from bringing class action against well lessee, alleging breach of contract, fraud, and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, claiming that lessee wrongfully deducted from royalty payments pro rata share of regulatory privilege fee imposed by Michigan statute; decision and settlement of prior actions against lessee did not address privilege fee. Hilliard v. Shell Western E & P, Inc., W.D.Mich.1995, 885 F.Supp. 169, reconsideration denied 1995 WL 549259.

Federal suit against accounting firm and partner in firm alleging securities fraud, violations of the Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and breach of fiduciary duty was barred by res judicata, arising from prior state court suit alleging negligent misrepresentation, professional malpractice and breach of contract against same defendants; parties were the same, judgment of state court was judgment on the merits, and state and federal claims arose from the same set of operative facts, namely, unprofitable investments made by investors on the advice of defendants; federal suit merely asserted different theories of liability from those asserted in state court. Kaufman v. BDO Seidman, W.D.Mich.1992, 787 F.Supp. 125, affirmed 984 F.2d 182. Judg- ment 828.15(1)

Seller of bakery adequately represented buyer's interest in prior litigation arising out of plaintiff's employment and, thus, plaintiff's RICO action against buyer based on same facts was barred by res judicata. Curtis v. Inter- state Brands Corp., M.D.La.1992, 782 F.Supp. 313. Judgment 677

Prior appellate ruling that parent corporation did not suffer direct, individual harm in connection with sale of subsidiary that differed from harm generally suffered by subsidiary's creditors and, thus, that subsidiary's bankruptcy trustee had standing to pursue fraud claims named, on res judicata grounds, subsequent RICO action by parent arising out of same factual situation; in prior action, parent alleged it had been fraudulently induced to sell subsidiary by concealment of defendant's financial domination and managerial control over buyer. Pepsico, Inc. v. Banner Industries, S.D.Ohio 1991, 773 F.Supp. 82. Judgment 548

Doctrine of res judicata prohibited retrial of racketeering and negligent misrepresentation claims after appeal was taken as to judgment on claims alleging securities fraud, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty and after Court of Appeals vacated judgment and ordered retrial. Ward v. Succession of Freeman, E.D.La.1990, 735 F.Supp. 692. Judgment 642

Conclusory allegations of fraudulent concealment regarding bank's particular role in alleged fraudulent scheme resulting in guarantor's decision to guaranty development loan did not insulate guarantor's RICO claim from res judicata effect of prior action on guaranty as guarantor's awareness, at time of guaranty action, of essential facts regarding alleged frauds created, at very least, duty to investigate matter further. Bin Saud v. Bank of New York, S.D.N.Y.1990, 734 F.Supp. 628, affirmed 929 F.2d 916. Judgment 739

Result in prior proceeding conducted by New York Public Service Commission to determine whether costs of building nuclear power plant were prudently incurred was not res judicata with respect to county's RICO claims which PSC had no jurisdiction to try. County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., E.D.N.Y.1989, 710 F.Supp. 1387, affirmed 907 F.2d 1295. Administrative Law And Procedure 501; Electricity 8.4

Decision of arbitration panels, in proceedings initiated by employer against stockbrokers, addressing predicate acts underlying RICO claims of brokers against employer could be given preclusive effect in RICO suit against employer, providing that elements necessary for preclusion were satisfied. Cullen v. Paine Webber Group, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1988, 689 F.Supp. 269. Alternative Dispute Resolution 424

Developer's prior federal court action against county officials which successfully challenged contracts under which it was forced to pay for collector-distributor road network serving its development barred subsequent RICO claim based on same events, where, although prior decision left issue of damages unresolved, developer did not subsequently suffer additional damages. HMK Corp. v. Walsey, E.D.Va.1986, 637 F.Supp. 710, affirmed 828 F.2d 1071, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 706, 484 U.S. 1009, 98 L.Ed.2d 657. Judgment 713(2)

In action against general partner of limited partnership seeking treble damages for violation of this chapter, federal securities law, and Pennsylvania common law, general partner could raise defense of res judicata based on prior arbitration award in plaintiff's favor which found that partnership committed both fraud and intentional and willful breach of lease. Sports Factory, Inc. v. Chanoff, E.D.Pa.1984, 586 F.Supp. 342.

Buyer's suit against bank and its agent for violations of this section was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, because buyer had already pursued a state court action seeking rescission of the contract of sale and restitution, the state court action alleged the same transactions and occurrences, and the claim under this chapter could have been pursued in the state court proceeding or, in the alternative, the action under this chapter could have been brought in federal court with the state law claims being asserted as pendent claims. Luebke v. Marine Nat. Bank of Neenah, E.D.Wis.1983, 567 F.Supp. 1460. Judgment 828.16(3)

Conviction of defendant under this chapter did not preclude his being held civilly liable in a private cause of action brought under this section. Farmers Bank of State of Del. v. Bell Mortg. Corp., D.C.Del.1978, 452 F.Supp. 1278. Criminal Law 1220

Under South Dakota law, debtor's principal's claim that attorney participated in conspiracy to defraud him, in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), was compulsory counterclaim in creditors' action alleging that entities and individuals affiliated with principal were participating in fraudulent transfers, and thus res judicata barred principal's RICO action against attorney and law firms, where there was logical relationship between state court actions and RICO counterclaim, and substantially same evidence supported both state court claims and RICO claim. Waldner v. North American Truck & Trailer, Inc., D.S.D.2011, 277 F.R.D. 401. Judgment 828.15(1)

Mortgagors' failure to pursue Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim in state court

mortgage foreclosure suit precluded subsequent action based on that claim in mortgagors' bankruptcy case in which mortgagee asserted claim, pursuant to doctrine of res judicata; RICO claim arose from facts which were included in state court counts that were finally adjudicated in mortgage foreclosure suit, and mortgagors could have pursued RICO claim in state court, as states have concurrent jurisdiction over RICO claims. Matter of Chapman, Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.1991, 132 B.R. 132. Judgment 828.21(2)

Although Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act violation was new label, where predicate acts to which plaintiffs pointed were mail fraud, securities fraud and bankruptcy fraud, plaintiffs offered no legitimate excuse for their failure to press their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims in prior adversary proceeding, and there was no suggestion that action which formed basis of instant suit was undiscover- able at time of adversary proceeding nor suggestion that previous proceeding lacked procedural mechanism which would enable plaintiffs to raise their claims in that proceeding, doctrine of res judicata barred instant action. Hotel Corp. of South v. Rampart 920, Inc., E.D.La.1985, 46 B.R. 758, affirmed 781 F.2d 901. Judgment 636

Doctrine of res judicata did not bar joint venturers' action against bankrupt venturer's accountants and inspecting engineers for common-law fraud and breach of fiduciary duties, despite federal court's previous dismissal of pri- or complaint by venturers on ground that complaint failed to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where jurisdiction was never assumed by federal court over state claims, which were available in federal court only through pendent jurisdiction. Browning Ave. Realty Corp. v. Rubin, N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.1994, 615 N.Y.S.2d 360, 207 A.D.2d 263, leave to appeal denied 650 N.E.2d 415, 626 N.Y.S.2d 756, 85 N.Y.2d 804. Judgment 829(3)

Bank which obtained judgment on notes against estate of deceased business owner was not barred by res judicata from asserting fraud and RICO claims against estate and business employees; different evidence was necessary to sustain fraud and RICO claims than was necessary to sustain claim on notes, and fraud and RICO claims arose, in part, after judgment on contract claim had been entered. Bank of Northern Illinois v. Nugent, Ill.App. 2 Dist.1991, 584 N.E.2d 948, 165 Ill.Dec. 514, 223 Ill.App.3d 1. Judgment 739

117. Limitations, practice and procedure generally--Generally

Appropriate statute of limitations to be applied in RICO civil enforcement actions was four-year statute of limitations applicable to Clayton Act civil enforcement actions; there was need for uniform statute of limitations for civil RICO, Clayton Act clearly provided far closer analogy than any available state statute, and federal policies that lay behind RICO and practicalities of RICO litigation made selection of four-year statute of limitations for Clayton Act actions most appropriate limitation period; abrogating Silverberg v. Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc., 787 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.); Burns v. Ersek, 591 F.Supp. 837 (D.Minn.); Tellis v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 805 F.2d 741 (7th Cir.); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir.); Teltronics Services, Inc. v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 587 F.Supp. 724 (E.D.N.Y.). Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., U.S.Pa.1987, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 483 U.S. 143, 97 L.Ed.2d 121. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 65

Financiers were not equitably estopped from asserting statute of limitations defense in creditors' action under

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleging that financiers conspired to defraud them by taking control of debtor company and absconding with its assets, despite creditors' contention that financiers lulled them into inaction when company, which was then controlled by financiers, sued company's former chief financial officer (CFO), who had allegedly participated in conspiracy, where company had previously filed unsuccessful suit against financiers for causing affiliated company to file bankruptcy and reject lease, and company's second suit did not conceal any facts. Cancer Foundation, Inc. v. Cerberus Capital Management, LP, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2009, 559 F.3d 671. Limitation Of Actions 13; Limitation Of Actions 104(2)

District court did not err in concluding that four-year statute of limitations for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim involving investment advice had run; prior to date more than four years from date of suit investor knew that advisor's recommended investments were losing large amounts of money, and that there was a pattern to bad advice. Caproni v. Prudential Securities, Inc., C.A.6 (Mich.) 1994, 15 F.3d 614, rehearing denied. Limitation Of Actions 95(3); Limitation Of Actions 100(12)

Requirement of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rule that aggrieved party commence arbitration proceedings within six-year period from disputed transaction is a reasonable limitation and is applicable to claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Roney and Co. v. Kassab, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1992, 981 F.2d 894. Alternative Dispute Resolution 412

Claim in amended complaint for violation of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act was not barred by statute of limitations, even though amended complaint was filed after two year statute of limitations for fraud in Kansas had expired, and even if amended complaint did not relate back to original complaint, as appropriate statute of limitations for civil RICO claims was four years. Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1989, 886 F.2d 1262. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Four-year Clayton Act statute of limitations, rather than two-year Illinois period for actions seeking statutory penalty, governed civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Tellis v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1986, 826 F.2d 477. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Investors' civil RICO claims, arising out of broker's alleged churning of accounts, were governed by four-year limitations period contained in Clayton Act. Davis v. A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc., C.A.5 (La.) 1987, 823 F.2d 105, on remand 687 F.Supp. 266. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Bulletin issued by pharmacy benefits manager (PBM) to city, which described increased costs for prescription drugs resulting from average wholesale price (AWP) markups, and which encouraged city to take mitigating measures, did not trigger limitations period for city to sue drug wholesaler under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) for scheme to increase prices; while bulletin may have conveyed knowledge to city of increased costs, it did not trigger duty to investigate whether these increased markups were result of fraud as opposed to normal markups in pharmaceutical industry. In re McKesson Governmental Entities Average Wholesale Price Litigation, D.Mass.2011, 767 F.Supp.2d 263. Limitation Of Actions 100(11)

Four year statute of limitations applied to civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim in New Jersey that was predicated on bribery of county official. County of Hudson v. Janiszewski, D.N.J.2007, 520 F.Supp.2d 631, as amended , reconsideration denied 2007 WL 4554227, affirmed 351 Fed.Appx. 662, 2009 WL 3387960. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim of real estate investor against other participants in mortgage investment scheme would be barred by civil RICO's four-year statute of limitations if, more than four years before investor filed action, he knew or should have known of his injury. Hodas v. Sherburne, Powers & Needham, P.C., D.Mass.1996, 938 F.Supp. 60, affirmed 114 F.3d 1169. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and antitrust claims asserted by developer of chest equalization radiography technology against competitors were timely, as alleged injuries arose from legal fees developer paid to defend itself in patent infringement proceedings and, although complaints in those proceedings were filed outside of four-year limitation period, complaints were not served on developer until within four-year period. B.V. Optische Industrie De Oude Delft v. Hologic, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1995, 909 F.Supp. 162, reconsideration denied 925 F.Supp. 162. Limitation Of Actions 119(3)

Plaintiff must bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim within four years from date it discovered or should have discovered injury to its business arising therefrom. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, E.D.N.Y.1995, 887 F.Supp. 473, remanded 101 F.3d 684, opinion after remand 111 F.3d 278. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Investors who brought private Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against limited partnerships filed complaints within permitted statute of limitations, where plaintiffs filed action within four years of Tax Courts' decision in case which rendered tax shelter investments worthless, as prior to that decision any claimed injury would have amounted to mere unsustainable conjecture, even though securities fraud actions accrued at time that plaintiffs received private placement memoranda. Rohland v. Syn-Fuel Associates-1982 Ltd. Partnership, S.D.N.Y.1995, 879 F.Supp. 322. Limitation Of Actions 58(1); Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Statute of limitations for civil suit under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is four years and begins to run when plaintiff knows or should know of injury. Small Business Admin. v. Echevarria, S.D.Fla.1994, 864 F.Supp. 1254. Limitation Of Actions 95(3); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 65

Most analogous statute, the four-year limitations period for Clayton Act, applies to civil actions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Scarabello v. Reichle, N.D.Ill.1994, 856 F.Supp. 404. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim could be pursued even though independent

claims for predicate acts upon which RICO claim is based are time barred. Gilmore v. Berg, D.N.J.1992, 807 F.Supp. 1176. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 5

Statute of limitations and laches doctrine were inapplicable to civil RICO action brought by government. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Limitation Of Ac- tions 11(1); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Claims of accused that, during criminal proceedings against him, he was deprived of his constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel and due process, that prejudicial evidence was improperly admitted, and that tran- scripts of criminal proceedings were fraudulently altered were not grounded in fraud and were not governed by six-year statute of limitations for fraud. Jacobs v. Coiro, S.D.N.Y.1991, 764 F.Supp. 321. Fraud 38

Limitations period for civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations is four years. Longden v. Sunderman, N.D.Tex.1990, 737 F.Supp. 968. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Investors did not justifiably rely on reassurances by promoters' agent not to worry about United States' lawsuit against other promoters to establish that scheme was abusive tax shelter, did not establish fraudulent concealment tolling statute of limitations, and received sufficient notice of racketeering claims when they learned of United States' lawsuit. Bausch v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., D.Md.1989, 728 F.Supp. 1201, affirmed in part 34 F.3d 1066. Limitation Of Actions 104(2)

Four-year statute of limitations precluded former shareholder of target corporation from bringing Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim against acquiring corporation, various corporate officers and directors, and others, more than four years after date tender offer was closed, arising out of allegedly fraudulent acquisition effectuated in part by tender offer to target corporation's shareholders by acquiring corporation's wholly owned subsidiary. Barkman v. Wabash, Inc., N.D.Ill.1987, 674 F.Supp. 623. Limitation Of Actions 99(2)

Two-year statute of limitations barred Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims brought by bank customers, whose funds were used by bank and vice-president in trust department without their consent to purchase a company's notes, absent factual allegations which might have tolled statute. Bachmeier v. Bank of Ravenswood, N.D.Ill.1987, 663 F.Supp. 1207. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Record precluded determination as to when rehabilitator of insurance company knew or should have known or discovered facts which formed basis of civil RICO complaint and, thus, precluded dismissal of complaint on basis of one-year prescriptive period of Louisiana general fraud statute. Bernard v. Rush, M.D.La.1986, 641 F.Supp. 730. Limitation Of Actions 180(7)

Two-year borrowed limitation period governing actions for damages or forfeiture from statutory penalty, not limitation period for fraud actions, would be applied to claim brought under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act in federal court in New York, which was obligated to apply period that would have been applied by federal courts in those states. Grosser v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1986, 639 F.Supp. 1293, affirmed 859 F.2d 148. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Suit for breach of contract and fiduciary duties in connection with partnership which was filed in 1984 was timely with respect to transactions which occurred in October of 1981; with respect to transactions which occurred earlier, they did not accrue for limitations purposes while the partnership continued and a fiduciary duty was owed to the plaintiffs partners by the managing partners. Spinelli, Kehiayan-Berkman, S.A. v. Imas Gruner, A.I.A., & Associates, D.C.Md.1985, 602 F.Supp. 372. Limitation Of Actions 95(1)

Debtor's principal knew or should have known during debtor's bankruptcy proceeding of law firms' alleged fraud in inducing him to engage in improper conduct during proceeding, and thus statute of limitation for principal's claims against firms under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) commenced at that time, even if principal was not aware of full scope of alleged RICO conspiracy at that time, where reasonable, objective person would have been aware of firms' actions and that false documents, improper handling of leases, and firms' actions in moving for and responding to motions occurred and that these actions could cause financial injury, and principal alleged no new and independent injuries involving firms after bankruptcy action's close. Waldner v. North American Truck & Trailer, Inc., D.S.D.2011, 277 F.R.D. 401. Limitation of Actions 95(3)

Debtor's federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) civil action against lender, who allegedly altered loan documents, was subject to four-year statute of limitations. In re Hill, Bkrtcy.N.D.Miss.1990, 120 B.R. 56. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

118. ---- Accrual of cause of action, limitations, practice and procedure generally

The question of when the limitations period begins to run on a civil action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) may not be decided by the injury and pattern discovery rule, under which a claim accrues only when the claimant discovers, or should discover, both an injury and a pattern of RICO activity. Rotella v. Wood, U.S.Tex.2000, 120 S.Ct. 1075.

Accrual of patient's civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), alleging that physicians and their related business entities improperly conspired to retain him at psychiatric facility, was not delayed until he discovered alleged pattern of racketeering activity, that is, until he learned that facility's parent company and one of its directors had pled guilty to charges of criminal fraud perpetrated through improper relationships and illegal agreements between company and its physicians; abrogating Caproni v. Prudential Securit- ies, Inc., 15 F.3d 614; Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F.2d 150;Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817; Bivens Gardens Office Building, Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546. Rotella v. Wood, U.S.Tex.2000, 120 S.Ct. 1075.

Creditors' action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleging that financiers conspired to defraud them by taking control of debtor company and absconding with its assets accrued, at latest,

when company was placed into bankruptcy and determined that it could not fulfill its obligations to creditors, rather than when creditors read magazine article that explained financiers' strategy, where trustee for note holders filed suit against debtor, during course of which company's former chief financial officer (CFO) testified that financiers had arranged to sell company. Cancer Foundation, Inc. v. Cerberus Capital Management, LP, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2009, 559 F.3d 671. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Four-year statute of limitations applicable to buyer's claims against sellers for selling defective steel buildings to take buyer's money in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) began to run no later than time of collapse of second building more than four years before filing of suit. Cory v. Aztec Steel Bldg., Inc., C.A.10 (Kan.) 2006, 468 F.3d 1226, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 2134, 550 U.S. 918, 167 L.Ed.2d 864. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

Property owner's §§ 1983 claim and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy claim against police officers and prosecutors, challenging the seizure of his automotive repair tools, trailers, and other equipment from his son-in-law's automotive shop, under the Fourth Amendment, accrued, for statute of limitations purposes, at the time of that the owner received constructive notice of the seizure, or at the latest, by the date that he filed a claim for return of his property, rather than on the date of the subsequent forfeiture proceeding; gravamen of the claim was that the defendants illegally seized his property, preventing him from using it. Kripp v. Luton, C.A.10 (Okla.) 2006, 466 F.3d 1171. Limitation Of Actions 95(3); Limitation Of Ac- tions 95(15)

For purpose of statute of limitations inquiry notice analysis in lawsuit under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as plaintiffs, subjectively did not exercise reasonable diligence to discover their injuries from investment in voluntary employee beneficiary associations (VEBAs) as tax-avoidance mechanism, by asking persons involved in running and operation of VEBAs if VEBAs were legitimate. Cetel v. Kirwan Fin- ancial Group, Inc., C.A.3 (N.J.) 2006, 460 F.3d 494, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1267, 549 U.S. 1207, 167 L.Ed.2d 78. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims asserted by owner of buildings against manufacturers of asbestos-containing materials (ACMs) accrued when owner should have known of alleged injuries sustained due to presence of ACMs in buildings, which was more than four years prior to date it brought suit against manufacturers, so claims were time-barred; owner was sophisticated company that operated large casualty insurance business and extensive estate investment business, government information and warnings on asbestos were available, and owner knew that asbestos was present in some of its buildings and that ACMs were sources of potential future hazards. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. U.S. Gypsum Co., C.A.3 (N.J.) 2004, 359 F.3d 226. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

“Separate accrual” limitations rule applied to health insurer's civil claims under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) stemming from alleged scheme to defraud by submitting fraudulent claims; each time insurer became obligated to pay a fraudulent insurance claim submitted by psychiatric hospital, insurer suffered an injury “to its business or property,” within the meaning of RICO, and it had not suffered an injury as the result of the submission of that claim until it became so obligated. Love v. National Medical Enterprises,

C.A.5 (Tex.) 2000, 230 F.3d 765, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied 239 F.3d 367. Limitation Of Actions 99(1)

Farmers should have known that manufacturer's alleged misrepresentations about oxygen-limiting capabilities of feed silos formed pattern of alleged racketeering activity, for purposes of determining limitations period on their civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims, at same time they should have discovered their alleged injuries such as depressed milk production, where they alleged they received advertising and magazines containing representations about silos' oxygen-limiting capabilities, and that manufacturer repeatedly made fraudulent misrepresentations about such capabilities. McCaleb v. A.O. Smith Corp., C.A.11 (Ala.) 2000, 200 F.3d 747. Limitation Of Actions 100(12)

Warehouse operators' Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) injury occurred when they abandoned their warehouse contract with freight forwarder, and claim accrued at that time, even though they did not discover alleged fraud until later. Detrick v. Panalpina, Inc., C.A.4 (Va.) 1997, 108 F.3d 529, certiorari denied 118 S.Ct. 52, 522 U.S. 810, 139 L.Ed.2d 17. Limitation Of Actions 99(1); Limitation Of Ac- tions 100(1)

Under “separate accrual” rule for determining when civil claim accrues under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), new claim accrues, triggering new four-year limitations period, each time plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, new injury caused by predicate RICO violations. Bingham v. Zolt, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1995, 66 F.3d 553, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1418, 517 U.S. 1134, 134 L.Ed.2d 543, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1891, 517 U.S. 1240, 135 L.Ed.2d 185, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1870, 517 U.S. 1230, 134 L.Ed.2d 967. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Utility's claims against generator manufacturer under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute accrued on date when utility should have known that manufacturer had delivered defective generators, as injury was not then in any sense speculative, though crankshafts of generators did not fail until seven years later. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Imo Industries Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1993, 6 F.3d 876. Limitation Of Ac- tions 95(3)

Four-year limitations period applicable to customer's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against bank, based on alleged pattern of racketeering in connection with loan transaction that ultimately forced his company into bankruptcy, commenced to run when customer discovered his injury, when he and others were indicted in connection with loan, rather than when customer became aware that bank had committed wire fraud upon him. Bontkowski v. First Nat. Bank of Cicero, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1993, 998 F.2d 459, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 602, 510 U.S. 1012, 126 L.Ed.2d 567. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Law enforcement officials' alleged manipulation of prosecution of indictee caught in undercover sting operation was not “overt act” that furthered alleged RICO conspiracy involved in sting operation, for purposes of extending limitations period for indictee's RICO actions against officials; since undercover sting operation had ended by the time indictee was prosecuted, prosecution could not have been in furtherance of ongoing conspiracy. Davis v. Grusemeyer, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1993, 996 F.2d 617. Limitation Of Actions 58(1); Limitation Of Ac-

tions 104(2)

Debenture holders were injured within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) when companies which guaranteed principal and interest on debentures defaulted; hence, regardless of when other RICO violations may have occurred, that RICO cause of action accrued at time of default and four-year statute of limitations began to run on action at that time. Cruden v. Bank of New York, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1992, 957 F.2d 961. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

With respect to each independent injury to plaintiff, civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) cause of action begins to accrue as soon as plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, both existence and source of his injury and that injury is part of pattern. Glessner v. Kenny, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1991, 952 F.2d 702. Limitation Of Actions 95(4.1)

With respect to each independent injury to plaintiff, civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) cause of action begins to accrue as soon as plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, both existence and source of his injury and that injury is part of pattern. Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, C.A.8 (Minn.) 1991, 924 F.2d 150. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Civil RICO actions are subject to rule of “separate accrual” for limitations purposes; under such rule, each time plaintiff discovers or should have discovered injury caused by RICO violation, new cause of action arises as to that injury, regardless of when actual violation occurred, and plaintiff must then bring action within four years of such accrual to recover damages for specific injury. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1988, 859 F.2d 1096, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1642, 490 U.S. 1007, 104 L.Ed.2d 158, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1643, 490 U.S. 1007, 104 L.Ed.2d 158. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Limitations period for workers' alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) injuries associated with workplace explosion began to run when workers suffered their alleged injuries on, and soon after, workplace explosion. Bradley v. Phillips Petroleum Co., S.D.Tex.2007, 527 F.Supp.2d 625, affirmed 337 Fed.Appx. 397, 2009 WL 1870936. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Buyer of allegedly counterfeit rare wine was on inquiry notice of alleged injury giving rise to civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) such that claim against auction house that sold wine accrued, and four-year limitations period thus began to run, no later than when buyer submitted wine for testing, where at time of testing buyer feared that wine was not authentic and auction house's role in controversy over whether wine was counterfeit was well publicized in press reports. Koch v. Christie's International PLC,

S.D.N.Y.2011, 785 F.Supp.2d 105, affirmed 699 F.3d 141. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Statute of limitations for former client to assert claim against criminal defense attorney under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) based on his alleged extortion of additional funds accrued when attorney made his second purportedly unjustified demand for fees, even if attorney's first demand constituted predicate act under RICO. Wade v. Gaither, D.Utah 2009, 623 F.Supp.2d 1277. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Four year limitation period for claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) seeking treble damages based upon insurers' alleged scheme to under-reimburse beneficiaries and medical care providers by manipulating “usual, customary, and reasonable” (UCR) data began to run no later than when plaintiff subscribers to certain health plans, out-of-network medical care providers, as assignees of certain subscribers' benefits claims, and medical associations, in their associational capacity on behalf of their members, filed original complaint that expressed actual knowledge of injuries. American Medical Ass'n v. United Healthcare Corp., S.D.N.Y.2008, 588 F.Supp.2d 432. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

The statute of limitations begins running on a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) civil claim according to the injury discovery accrual rule which ties accrual to the time when a plaintiff first knew or should have known of his injury. Dickey v. Kennedy, D.Mass.2008, 583 F.Supp.2d 183. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Even if each license granted as result of an allegedly corrupt bidding process was a separate Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) injury, limitations period on licensor's RICO claims, which were based on alleged loss suffered from being stuck with licenses that provided lower than competitive royalty rates, began to run no later than time when each license was granted where licensor gave those licenses to licensees without even permitting the incumbent bidders to compete, thereby foregoing hundreds of thousands of dollars of guaranteed payments, and/or sacrificing royalty rates far below what an intensely competitive market would have borne; while licensor alleged that it continued to receive the below-market royalties from those licenses to present day, those payments were not “new and independent” injuries for limitations purposes. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Jakks Pacific, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2007, 530 F.Supp.2d 486, affirmed 328 Fed.Appx. 695, 2009 WL 1391807. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

New Jersey county had inquiry notice of bribery scheme perpetrated on county by county executive and government contractors, for purpose of accrual of statute of limitations on claim under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO), upon notice of resignation by county executive or, at least, upon publication of numerous articles in local newspapers that reported alleged bribery scheme. County of Hudson v. Janiszewski, D.N.J.2007, 520 F.Supp.2d 631, as amended , reconsideration denied 2007 WL 4554227, affirmed 351 Fed.Appx. 662, 2009 WL 3387960. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Billboard advertising company's claims against competitor under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO), Clayton Act, and California's Cartwright Act accrued when city approved contracts providing that competitor would be able to rent and operate various billboard sites throughout city, rather than when com-

pany's principal expressed his suspicion that competitor was trying to undermine its deal with city and to extort it, where company suffered no injury until competitor succeeded in contracting with city. Bulletin Displays, LLC v. Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc., C.D.Cal.2007, 518 F.Supp.2d 1182. Limitation Of Actions 95(3); Limitation Of Actions 95(17)

Four-year statute of limitations on former insured's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against insurer and state agency that administered Medicaid program began to run when insured learned of insurer's and agency's alleged racketeering activities. Chisholm v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., D.Conn.2007, 514 F.Supp.2d 318. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Claims arising out of Jordanian government's seizure of a Jordanian bank were barred by four-year statute of limitations for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) civil conspiracy claims and District of Columbia's three-year limitations period for other tort claims, where complaint was not filed until nearly fifteen years after plaintiff became aware of the bank's seizure and had actual or inquiry notice of the alleged pattern of fraudulent activity. Chalabi v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, D.D.C.2007, 503 F.Supp.2d 267, affirmed 543 F.3d 725, 383 U.S.App.D.C. 207. Limitation Of Actions 100(12)

Cause of action for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) section which made it unlawful “for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity” accrued, and four-year limitations period began to run, when insurers paid no-fault insurance benefits to medical services providers for excessive or unnecessary services, services by unlicensed individuals, or services never rendered. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Valley Phys- ical Medicine & Rehabilitation, P.C., E.D.N.Y.2007, 475 F.Supp.2d 213, vacated in part on reconsideration 555 F.Supp.2d 335, certification denied 2008 WL 4856103. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

Four-year statute of limitations that applied to civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy action began to run when senior citizen purchased deferred annuity policies from life insurance company. Bendzak v. Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co., S.D.Iowa 2006, 440 F.Supp.2d 970. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim arising out of transaction which allegedly constituted “fraudulent scheme” by defendants to deprive former general partner of his ownership interests in limited partnership's technology, accrued less than two months after transaction at time that former general partner became sufficiently aware of the facts and circumstances to identify that he had been injured and that the injury arose out of actions taken by the defendants with respect to the ownership of the technology. Blystra v. Fiber Tech Group, Inc., D.N.J.2005, 407 F.Supp.2d 636. Limitation Of Actions 100(12)

Cause of action under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) accrued, and four-year limitations period began to run, based on conduct of presently or formerly practicing Pennsylvania attorneys and business entities through which they practiced law, in using alleged inaccurate descriptions of property belonging to individuals and entities to whom former owner transferred the property and enforcement proceedings to collect

back taxes from those individuals and entities, when former owner's family members were sued in an effort to collect back taxes due, since, on that date, former owner necessarily obtained notice sufficient to warrant further inquiry concerning any ongoing inaccurate description of property, and the allegedly misleading and false tax assessments. Gagliardi v. Kratzenberg, W.D.Pa.2005, 404 F.Supp.2d 858, affirmed on other grounds 188 Fed.Appx. 86, 2006 WL 1525380. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Town's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim for an illegally inflated purchase price for property which it purchased accrued, at the latest, on the date on which the purchase agreement was executed and title was closed on the property. Town of Poughkeepsie v. Espie, S.D.N.Y.2005, 402 F.Supp.2d 443, subsequent determination 2006 WL 236787. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

Expiration of four-year statute of limitations barred claim that franchisor of motivational system violated Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in process of inducing signing of franchise agreement; franchisee sent franchisor letter, outside of four-year period, complaining that earnings were coming nowhere near projections. Towne v. Robbins, D.Or.2004, 339 F.Supp.2d 1105, subsequent determination 2005 WL 139077. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Limitations period on employees' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against their second employer that, when they were participants in their first employer's employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), second employer fraudulently represented that it would provide substantially similar benefits to those provided by first employer in order to induce them to approve first employer's divestiture to second employer, commenced when they became participants in second employer's pension plan and had all information necessary to know of their alleged injury. Oechsner v. Connell Ltd. Partnership, S.D.N.Y.2003, 283 F.Supp.2d 926, affirmed 101 Fed.Appx. 849, 2004 WL 1340162. Limitation Of Actions 100(12)

Patient's civil action against health care facility under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), arising from care and treatment he received while in that facility, accrued no later than time of his discharge, as he knew, or should have known, by that time that he had suffered complained-of injuries. Porter v. Charter Medical Corp., N.D.Tex.1997, 957 F.Supp. 1427. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) arising out sale of financial security plans accrued when seller of the plans defaulted on its obligations, rather than date plans were purchased. Liner v. DiCresce, M.D.N.C.1994, 905 F.Supp. 280. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

Four-year limitations period applicable to homeowners' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against builder's employees who allegedly fraudulently passed off nonarchitects as architects to design and supervise home remodeling project did not commence to run when homeowners discovered fraud that served as basis of their RICO claim; period commenced to run when homeowners discovered or should have discovered injuries to their property arising from that fraud. Moeller v. Zaccaria, S.D.N.Y.1993, 831 F.Supp. 1046. Limitation Of Actions 100(12)

RICO cause of action accrues when plaintiff knew or should have known of last injury or last predicate act which is part of same pattern of racketeering. Gurfein v. Sovereign Group, E.D.Pa.1993, 826 F.Supp. 890. Lim- itation Of Actions 95(3)

Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims brought by estate of singer against singer's former legal and financial advisors were not barred by statute of limitations, despite fact that advisors' wrongful acts, and estate's awareness of wrongful acts all occurred more than four years prior to commencement of suit; key dates were when each separate injury arose and not when wrongful acts occurred or when estate became aware of wrongful acts and estate's injuries all arose within four years of commencement of lawsuit. Bing- ham v. Zolt, S.D.N.Y.1993, 823 F.Supp. 1126, affirmed 66 F.3d 553, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1418, 517 U.S. 1134, 134 L.Ed.2d 543, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1891, 517 U.S. 1240, 135 L.Ed.2d 185, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1870, 517 U.S. 1230, 134 L.Ed.2d 967. Limitation Of Actions 58(1); Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Four-year statute of limitations for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action began to run when insurer learned of alleged pattern of racketeering activity conducted by insured corporations, and not date that insurer first suspected underreporting of gross receipts by insureds. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Value Rent-A-Car Inc., S.D.Fla.1992, 814 F.Supp. 1084. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Borrowers' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against lender did not accrue, for limitations purposes, at time borrowers executed loan documents creating payment obligations, where borrowers alleged that lender repeatedly and arbitrarily altered terms of payment and amount owed; rather, cause of action accrued each time borrowers sustained monetary loss and they could maintain actions for any payments made within four years of their complaint. Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 213, affirmed 99 F.3d 401. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

Four-year statute of limitations for civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) action with respect to claim based upon accountant's sending of bills indicating unpaid balance when no unpaid balance existed began to run on date clients received bills indicating unpaid balance since clients were aware that they had never received previous bills. Zee-Bar, Inc. N.H. v. Kaplan, D.N.H.1992, 792 F.Supp. 895. Limitation Of Ac- tions 100(12)

Four-year statute of limitations for civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) action based upon accountant's alleged diversion of client's money paid to accountant for payment of client's taxes began to run on date on which client signed tax return; at that time it should have been clear to client based upon tax returns that portion of money paid to accountant was not accounted for in payment of taxes. Zee-Bar, Inc. N.H. v. Kaplan, D.N.H.1992, 792 F.Supp. 895. Limitation Of Actions 100(12)

Cause of action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) based on alleged fraudulent scheme by hotel corporation to acquire controlling interest in apartment building owned by partnership accrued when partnership principal learned that corporation which had acquired majority interest in partnership did not intend to make apartment building a “first-class” hotel but rather gained control of building to make a

short-term profit, notwithstanding plaintiffs' contention that predicate acts took place after that date, as alleged predicate acts related to different transaction proposed by partnership principal. Korman v. Trusthouse Forte PLC, E.D.Pa.1992, 786 F.Supp. 458. Limitation Of Actions 100(12)

Claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), asserted against alleged theocratic enterprise by committee established by that enterprise, accrued at time of only injury of which committee complained, enterprise's disbursement of committee funds to pay for brochure urging presidential pardon for enterprise leader, absent any claim of affirmative concealment of committee's operations from director involved in commencement of present action. Committee to Defend U.S. Constitution v. Moon, D.D.C.1991, 776 F.Supp. 568. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

A civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act claim accrues, and statute of limitations begins to run, as to each independent injury alleged when plaintiffs discovered or reasonably should have discovered existence and source of injury resulting from defendants' alleged wrongful acts and that the injury was part of pattern of racketeering activity. Randolph County Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Sutliffe, S.D.Ohio 1991, 775 F.Supp. 1113. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Insurer's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against claims adjuster for engaging in scheme to collect on fraudulent claims did not accrue until vice president of insurance company was informed by FBI that it suspected that claims adjuster and other defendants were involved in fraudulent scheme, and, thus, complaint filed within four years of discovery of fraud was timely. Federal Ins. Co. v. Parello, N.D.Ill.1991, 767 F.Supp. 157. Limitation Of Actions 100(12)

Where gravamen of RICO and civil rights claims against various court officials was that accused was im- prisoned subsequent to an unfair trial, claim accrued at the time of sentencing. Jacobs v. Coiro, S.D.N.Y.1991, 764 F.Supp. 321. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

Limitations period applicable to civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim brought by investors in condominium development against bank that allegedly concealed bad loan to development in connection with its conversion from savings and loan association to stock savings bank commenced to run when investors became aware of alleged pattern of racketeering activity, at time they hired counsel to investigate underlying transactions, rather when they initially invested in the development. Panna v. Firstrust Sav. Bank, D.N.J.1991, 760 F.Supp. 432. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Four-year statute of limitations on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action arising out of sale of airline ticket coupon books began to run no later than date on which defunct airline filed for bankruptcy protection; at that time, purchasers had notice that airline had been inadequately capitalized. Nakamoto v. Hartley, D.Hawai'i 1991, 758 F.Supp. 1357. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Statute of limitations on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim begins to run from

the time plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered their injury. Griffin v. McNiff, S.D.N.Y.1990, 744 F.Supp. 1237, affirmed 996 F.2d 303. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Plaintiffs' transfer of properties they had acquired in exchange should have triggered their discovery of alleged issuance of fraudulent title commitments, for purposes of determining whether four-year statute of limitations barred Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act action, even if plaintiffs could not have discovered “vast scheme” of fraud; plaintiffs discovered their injury when they learned of outstanding mortgages and liens on property. Zablocki v. Huber, E.D.Wis.1990, 743 F.Supp. 626. Limitation Of Actions 100(12)

It is injury, not racketeering activity, which triggers accrual of statute of limitations for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action. Landy v. Mitchell Petroleum Technology Corp., S.D.N.Y.1990, 734 F.Supp. 608. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

RICO claims accrue, for limitations purposes, only when plaintiff knows or should know of pattern of activity, and not when particular predicate offense has been committed against particular plaintiff. Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., D.N.J.1989, 728 F.Supp. 1123. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Four-year limitations period applicable to investors' civil RICO action against partners in partnership formed to manage and operate oil wells commenced to run when investors either discovered or should have discovered that they sustained injury from partners' alleged pattern of racketeering. McCool v. Strata Oil Co., N.D.Ill.1989, 724 F.Supp. 1232, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds 972 F.2d 1452, amended on rehearing in part. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Civil RICO cause of action accrues upon discovery of RICO injury by plaintiff. Reeder v. Kermit Johnson, Al- phagraphics, Inc., D.Utah 1989, 723 F.Supp. 1428. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

Federal court decision holding that county could be sued for racketeering activities served as notice to insurers that they could sue county for RICO violations in connection with conspiracy to conceal arson fraud, and limitations on RICO cause of action began to run on the date of the court order. Continental Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, Wash., W.D.Wash.1987, 690 F.Supp. 930, affirmed 877 F.2d 64. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Statutory period of limitation begins to run when plaintiff knows, or through exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of injury that underlies its cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tion Act, not the date of the last predicate act. Davis v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., W.D.La.1988, 687 F.Supp. 266. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Four-year statute of limitations on coal companies' civil RICO claims against union and individual members picketing at mine began to run only when plaintiffs knew or had reason to know of injury which was basis of action. MHC, Inc. v. International Union, United Mine Workers of America, E.D.Ky.1988, 685 F.Supp. 1370. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Under both federal and California law, statute of limitations for claims of negligence, negligent breach of fiduciary duty, interference with contractual relations, intentional breach of fiduciary duty, violation of Rule 10b-5 and violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act began to run when plaintiff either knew or had reason to know of defendants' wrongful conduct. Washington v. Baenziger, N.D.Cal.1987, 673 F.Supp. 1478. Limitation Of Actions 95(18); Limitation Of Actions 100(6)

Civil RICO actions are governed by two-year statute of limitations which begins to run when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury which is basis for his action. United Airlines, Inc. v. CEI Industries, Inc., N.D.Ill.1987, 654 F.Supp. 1209, reconsideration denied 664 F.Supp. 1216. Limitation Of Actions 95(3); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Debtor's principal knew or should have known of creditors' purportedly fraudulent scheme to force debtor into bankruptcy by time of debtor's bankruptcy filing and of state court actions against principal to recover on his personal guarantees, and thus principal's claims against creditors under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) commenced at that time, where principal alleged no new and independent injuries involving creditors after close of debtor's bankruptcy action and state court actions involving him. Waldner v. North American Truck & Trailer, Inc., D.S.D.2011, 277 F.R.D. 401. Limitation of Actions 95(3)

Poor performance of investment coupled with other “storm warnings” is sufficient notice of fraud to trigger statute of limitations in civil action under this chapter. Schrag v. Dinges, D.Kan.1993, 150 F.R.D. 664, affirmed 73 F.3d 374, on remand 1996 WL 473874, on remand 1996 WL 590915. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

A civil RICO cause of action begins to accrue as soon as plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, both existence and source of his injury and that injury is part of pattern. In re Highway Equipment Co., Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio 1993, 153 B.R. 186, subsequently affirmed 64 F.3d 663. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Statute of limitations on tenants' claims against landlord and its real estate broker-managing agent for alleged violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) began to run when at least some of tenants knew, or should have known, of alleged discrepancy between number of rooms for which they were billed for rent and number of rooms noted on certificate of occupancy, even if they did not know details of such dis- crepancies, and therefore claims, which were filed more than four years after tenants became aware of such injury, were barred on limitations grounds. Pharr v. Evergreen Gardens, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2004, 2004 WL 42262, Un- reported, reconsideration denied 2004 WL 487315, affirmed 123 Fed.Appx. 420, 2005 WL 181617. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

119. ---- Continuing acts, limitations, practice and procedure generally

Claims of singer's estate against singer's former legal and financial advisers, under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), were not time-barred though estate had actual knowledge of defendants' wrongful acts more than four years prior to suit, as defendants' conduct involved continuing series of fraudulent actions undertaken to divert and conceal assets and income and, under “separate accrual” rule, estate could recover damages for acts that took place within four years prior to suit. Bingham v. Zolt, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1995, 66

F.3d 553, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1418, 517 U.S. 1134, 134 L.Ed.2d 543, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1891, 517 U.S. 1240, 135 L.Ed.2d 185, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1870, 517 U.S. 1230, 134 L.Ed.2d 967. Limitation Of Actions 55(6); Limitation Of Actions 100(7)

Purchasers of allegedly defective residential oil furnaces did not bring civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) action against furnace manufacturers within applicable time limits as replacement of furnaces was not separate and independent injury from that known by purchasers before last date on which there was any predicate act of manufacturers; while cost of replacement of unit could be element of damage, mere continuation of damages into later period would not extend limitations period. Glessner v. Kenny, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1991, 952 F.2d 702. Limitation Of Actions 95(4.1)

Three-year statute of limitations on insurer's RICO and fraud claims against those who acquired policy began to run at time of state court trial on criminal charges related to alleged acts of fraud, despite insurer's contention that fraudulent scheme was “continuing tort”; at time of prosecution, insurer should have known or discovered facts underlying its fraud claim. UST Capital Corp. v. Charter Nat. Life Ins. Co., D.Mass.1986, 684 F.Supp. 757. Limitation Of Actions 100(12)

Claims that watch wholesaler violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Robinson- Patman Act and engaged in tortious interference with business relations were not barred by statute of limitations, despite claim that causes of action accrued when wholesaler allegedly first told watch retailer that it would be necessary to make special payments to ensure uninterrupted availability of products and maintenance of service; during period from first coercion until termination, wholesaler committed various disruptive acts, each of which had its own commencement date for limitations purposes. Maddaloni Jewelers, Inc. v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 21507529, Unreported. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

120. ---- Damages, limitations, practice and procedure generally

Nature of damages recoverable in RICO action does not affect accrual of cause of action or commencement of the limitations period. Volk v. D.A. Davidson & Co., C.A.9 (Mont.) 1987, 816 F.2d 1406. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

121. ---- Knowledge, limitations, practice and procedure generally

Fact that substantial number of putative class members, in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action alleging that manufacturers deceived smokers into believing that “light” cigarettes were more healthful than “full-flavored” cigarettes, were on notice of manufacturers' alleged fraud before class period, counseled against finding that common questions predominated, as required for class certification. McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2008, 522 F.3d 215. Federal Civil Procedure 182.5

For purpose of statute of limitations inquiry notice analysis in lawsuit under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), physicians and their professional corporations, as plaintiffs, objectively should have known that they had been injured by their investment in voluntary employee beneficiary associations (VEBAs),

which had been created, marketed, operated, and endorsed by individuals, corporations, and associations as tax- avoidance mechanism, when Internal Revenue Service (IRS) circulated Notice which made clear that VEBA plans were inconsistent with tax code, medical association stopped endorsing VEBA plans, and IRS undertook audits of some physicians. Cetel v. Kirwan Financial Group, Inc., C.A.3 (N.J.) 2006, 460 F.3d 494, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1267, 549 U.S. 1207, 167 L.Ed.2d 78. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Fixed-base operator at municipal airport's cause of action against airport commission and municipal officials for fraudulent inducement to contract under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and §§ 1983 accrued, and six and four year statutes of limitations began to run, when operator became aware gradually of the possibility of injury as business levels continued to fall short of anticipated goals. Barry Aviation Inc. v. Land O'Lakes Municipal Airport Com'n, C.A.7 (Wis.) 2004, 377 F.3d 682, on remand 2004 WL 2778437. Lim- itation Of Actions 100(12)

Accrual of building owner's civil claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against manufacturers of asbestos-containing materials (ACMs) did not require owner to have suffered actual, rather than potential, injury, such that it would not suffer injury until actual contamination required it to address or remedy the hazards posed, where owner sought damages for both past and future injuries, choosing to pursue redress under RICO for both monitoring and testing costs associated with potential contamination as well as costs for abatement and repair. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. U.S. Gypsum Co., C.A.3 (N.J.) 2004, 359 F.3d 226. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Investors in a limited partnership alleged to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) were on inquiry notice, more than four years prior to filing suit, that they sustained injury at the time the partnerships were formed, and the statute of limitations for their RICO action had consequently run; cautionary language in prospectuses and annual reports should have alerted the investors that they were misled. In re Mer- rill Lynch Ltd. Partnerships Litigation, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1998, 154 F.3d 56. Limitation Of Actions 100(11)

Statute of limitations on former wife's civil RICO claims against her ex-husband's attorney, for allegedly master- minding fraudulent scheme to conceal her husband's interest in medical practice through reorganization of practice and by making false statements in ex-husband's bankruptcy case, began to run, at the very latest, when former wife filed fraud complaint in bankruptcy case; at that time, former wife must have known that she had suffered injury, even though she may not have yet appreciated alleged “pattern of racketeering” out of which her injury arose. Grimmett v. Brown, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1996, 75 F.3d 506, 156 A.L.R. Fed. 755, certiorari granted 116 S.Ct. 2521, 518 U.S. 1003, 135 L.Ed.2d 1046, certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted 117 S.Ct. 759, 519 U.S. 233, 136 L.Ed.2d 674. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Limitation period for bringing civil action pursuant to Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against former members of board of directors of state corporation to guarantee deposits and sharehold- ings of member institutions for their roles in management of industrial loan and investment company that went insolvent began to run when receiver of company, that assigned its causes of action to plaintiff, brought state tort proceedings alleging that state employees conspired with officers and directors to defraud creditors of company, which demonstrated that receiver had knowledge of existence and source of injury. Association of Common-

wealth Claimants v. Moylan, C.A.8 (Neb.) 1995, 71 F.3d 1398. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

With respect to each independent injury to plaintiff, civil cause of action under RICO begins to accrue for purposes of statute of limitations as soon as plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered both existence and source of injury and that injury is part of pattern. Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines and Jonas, C.A.10 (Wyo.) 1990, 913 F.2d 817. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Four-year statute of limitations applicable to civil RICO actions accrued when plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of alleged fraud, unless statute was tolled. Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Madariaga, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1988, 851 F.2d 271. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

Convictions of bank officers for misapplying funds should have put depositors on notice that something was wrong, even though officers were not convicted of misapplying depositors' funds, and thus, limitation period on RICO suit by depositors against bank began to run as of such time, where bank's accountant, bank, and depositors' accountant claimed, at such time, that depositors owed bank money, but depositors failed to investigate bank charges to determine whether they were valid. La Porte Const. Co., Inc. v. Bayshore Nat. Bank of La Porte, Texas, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1986, 805 F.2d 1254. Limitation Of Actions 100(13)

Without more, circus owner's knowledge that elephant handler was employed by non-profit animal rights organization and that another such organization paid handler's traveling expenses to testify before various state legis- latures was insufficient to trigger four-year statute of limitations applicable to circus owner's Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against organizations and handler, in relation to organization's alleged bribery of handler for purposes of their underlying suit against circus owner regarding elephant treatment, where handler was paid bona fide wages to perform security services for organization, and payment of witness's travel expenses was expressly excluded from bribery statute's prohibitions. Feld Entertainment Inc. v. American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, D.D.C.2012, 873 F.Supp.2d 288. Limitation of Actions 95(3)

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) civil claim that had been based on injury that could have been discovered more than four years prior to filing of complaint was time barred. Dickey v. Kennedy, D.Mass.2008, 583 F.Supp.2d 183. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Insureds' civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) counterclaims against insurance broker based on its participation in kickback scheme involving insurance funds covering properties owned or controlled by company-related parties were time barred where complaint was filed more than four years after company-related parties discovered or should have discovered the alleged RICO injury; insureds knew about the general kickback scheme that was designed to defraud insurance company from the time of the scheme's inception and was also on notice from the time that insurance company stopped paying claims because insurance company received information that the invoices presented on claims for company properties had been inflated by the contractors. Meadowbrook-Richman, Inc. v. Associated Financial Corp., S.D.N.Y.2004, 325 F.Supp.2d 341. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Franchisee's claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) arising out of alleged insurance overcharges accrued when franchisee discovered or had reason to discover such overcharges. Maryland Staffing Services, Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., E.D.Wis.1996, 936 F.Supp. 1494. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Federal civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action brought by ERISA plan trustees against securities company and former employee of securities company were timely; it was not shown that plans knew or should have known more than four years prior to filing complaint that they had suffered injury and that injury was result of pattern of racketeering activity. District 65 Retirement Trust for Members of Bur- eau of Wholesale Sales Representatives v. Prudential Securities, Inc., N.D.Ga.1996, 925 F.Supp. 1551. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Claims against former business partner, bank, and other parties brought by Penobscot Indian Nation under Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) arising out of failed mobile home business venture were barred by four-year statute of limitations where Nation's business losses transpired over three-year period from purchase date to liquidation of business and Nation knew of such injury, at the latest, on date it signed agreements purporting to settle litigation, which was five years prior to commencement of suit. Penobscot Indian Na- tion v. Key Bank of Maine, D.Me.1995, 906 F.Supp. 13, affirmed in part , vacated in part and reversed in part 112 F.3d 538, rehearing en banc denied , certiorari denied 118 S.Ct. 297, 522 U.S. 913, 139 L.Ed.2d 229. Limit- ation Of Actions 95(3)

Knowledge by taxpayers who participated in limited partnership tax shelters that Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was challenging, as fictitious, trading activity between partnerships and entities established by tax shelter managers to serve as partnerships' agents in trades with third parties did not entail knowledge of fraudulent conduct by tax shelter managers, so that Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against managers was not time barred, in view of evidence that trading under tax shelter was intended to be managed, rather than at arm's length. 131 Main Street Associates v. Manko, S.D.N.Y.1995, 897 F.Supp. 1507. Limitation Of Actions 100(1)

Plaintiffs knew or should have known that they were being injured so as to trigger accrual of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims, even if cautionary language contained in private placement memoranda were not enough to trigger statute of limitations, where memoranda contained cautionary language and performance of limited partnerships was not as expected. Ackerman v. National Property Analysts, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1992, 887 F.Supp. 494. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Same facts which should have alerted farmers to alleged fraud by sellers of silo should have alerted them that alleged misrepresentations and injuries to dairy herd were part of a pattern, so as to commence running of statute of limitations on civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) claims. Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., D.Minn.1995, 875 F.Supp. 1342, affirmed 87 F.3d 231, certiorari granted 117 S.Ct. 725, 519 U.S. 1073, 136 L.Ed.2d 643, affirmed 117 S.Ct. 1984, 521 U.S. 179, 138 L.Ed.2d 373. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

For purposes of running of statute of limitations on civil RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions) claim asserting continuing fraud in denying plaintiff stock options and warrants allegedly due for provid-

ing financing and services in creation of bank holding company, plaintiff's assignors knew or should have known that they had been injured on date they were informed that all options and warrants had been reduced by 50%, and by date of receipt of minutes of meeting of bank's board of directors cancelling all options and warrants, they knew or should have known of the extent of their injuries so as to commence running of statute. Fine- berg v. Credit Intern. Bancshares, Ltd., D.Del.1994, 857 F.Supp. 338. Limitation Of Actions 100(12)

Once plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury, claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO) accrues even if plaintiff has not yet discovered pattern of racketeering. Scarabello v. Reichle, N.D.Ill.1994, 856 F.Supp. 404. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Discrepancy between written documents provided to sophisticated investors in limited partnerships and defendants' alleged oral representations regarding the fact that they had been paid no fees for recommending investments and that investments were safe and conservative was sufficient to put investors on inquiry notice of defendants' alleged fraud and to trigger statute of limitations on investors' fraud-based civil RICO claims. In re In- tegrated Resources, Inc. Real Estate Ltd. Partnerships Securities Litigation, S.D.N.Y.1994, 851 F.Supp. 556. Limitation Of Actions 100(12)

For purposes of determining date on which limitations period for filing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) claim began to run, once sophisticated investors were on inquiry notice, they were under obligation to learn more about alleged market conditions or file suit within limitations period. In re Integrated Resources Real Estate Ltd. Partnerships Securities Litigation, S.D.N.Y.1993, 850 F.Supp. 1105, reargument denied. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Limitations period for RICO cause of action begins to run when plaintiffs knew or should have known the elements; plaintiffs must be aware that each element comprising claim is present, although awareness of legal implication of facts, i.e., that there is cause of action, is unnecessary. Owens v. Wade, E.D.Pa.1992, 789 F.Supp. 168. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Warning signals in prospectus and sales materials for leased aircraft partnership, if read with care called for, were so specific and comprehensive so as to indicate to reasonable investor that additional inquiry was necessary so as to commence running of statute of limitations on fraud claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Harner v. Prudential Securities Inc., E.D.Mich.1992, 785 F.Supp. 626, affirmed 35 F.3d 565. Limitation Of Actions 100(13)

Investor's action against attorney for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in connection with audit of investor's tax returns was time barred, where investor had knowledge of problems with at least three of investments more than four years before complaint was filed. Wilder v. Meyer, S.D.Fla.1991, 779 F.Supp. 164. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Four-year statute of limitations applicable to actions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) begins to run when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the RICO injury which is the basis of

his action; rule precludes inequitable circumstance of barring complaint where plaintiff might discover his harm before facts are sufficient to make him aware that it was a “RICO injury.” Coal-Mac, Inc. v. JRM Coal Co., Inc., E.D.Ky.1990, 743 F.Supp. 499. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

RICO plaintiffs had actual notice of their claims and fact that other neighboring landowners were contemplating or in fact bringing suit more than four years prior to filing of RICO action when neighboring landowners filed action against companies involved in railroad right-of-way acquisition or when they saw newspaper article referring to coal company's construction of railroad spur more than four years prior to filing of plaintiffs' action against companies involved in allegedly fraudulent acquisition of property for railroad spur. Anderson v. Con- sol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., W.D.Pa.1990, 740 F.Supp. 1126, affirmed 945 F.2d 394, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 975, 502 U.S. 1075, 117 L.Ed.2d 139, affirmed 945 F.2d 395, affirmed 945 F.2d 396. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Limitation periods for federal securities fraud and RICO claims ran from date sophisticated investors purchased their limited partnership interests, rather than date on which investors claimed IRS report tipped them off as to nature and existence of alleged fraudulent conduct which they alleged could not have been discovered otherwise; offering memorandum, accompanying tax opinion, and exhibits revealed that facts upon which investors based their claims were repeatedly disclosed in such documents. Bender v. Rocky Mountain Drilling Associates, D.D.C.1986, 648 F.Supp. 330. Limitation Of Actions 100(12)

“Knowledge,” in context of question whether plaintiffs in action brought under this section had knowledge of their claim as would prevent tolling of applicable statute of limitations, does not mean personal knowledge or indisputable proof, but rather means such information, considering both its content and source, as would prompt a reasonably prudent person to undertake a lawsuit to enforce his or her claim. Creamer v. General Teamsters Local Union 326, D.C.Del.1984, 579 F.Supp. 1284. Limitation Of Actions 100(12)

Debtor's principal knew or should have known during debtor's bankruptcy proceeding of auditors' failure to inform him of allegedly fraudulent lease contracts and double-sold equipment contracts with banks and lending institutions at time of debtor's bankruptcy proceeding, and thus statute of limitation for principal's claims against auditors under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) commenced at time of debtor's bankruptcy, where leases were at issue in bankruptcy action, and principal alleged no subsequent injuries attributable to auditors. Waldner v. North American Truck & Trailer, Inc., D.S.D.2011, 277 F.R.D. 401. Limitation of Actions 95(3)

The statute of limitations for a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim begins to run no later than when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the RICO injury. Javier H. v. Garcia- Botello, W.D.N.Y.2006, 239 F.R.D. 342. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Landowner and investor should have discovered alleged fraud perpetrated against them by officer and director of bank in connection with real estate development more than four years before they filed civil RICO action, and therefore RICO claims were barred by statute of limitations; once plaintiffs' investments began to show poor performance, they had sufficient notice that fraud may have been involved. Schrag v. Dinges, D.Kan.1993, 150

F.R.D. 664, affirmed 73 F.3d 374, on remand 1996 WL 473874, on remand 1996 WL 590915. Limitation Of Ac- tions 100(13)

Commercial bribery activities of former employee, former licensing agent, and business partners had not been fraudulently concealed during limitations period for professional wrestling promoter's claim under Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and promoter had sufficient storm warnings for limitations period to run, where, among other things, promoter had received complaint from incumbent licensee that its bid on license renewal was not being seriously considered and another licensee had complained that promoter had granted license to defendant that had conflicted with promoter's prior agreement with that licensee. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Jakks Pacific, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2009, 328 Fed.Appx. 695, 2009 WL 1391807, Unreported. Limitation Of Actions 104(2); Limitation Of Actions 104(3)

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) plaintiffs failed to allege any facts which supporting an inference that any active misleading on the part of the defendant attorneys, law firms, and their insurer prevented the plaintiffs from recognizing the validity of their claims within the four-year statutory period or that the plaintiff's ignorance was not attributable to their own lack of reasonable due diligence, and thus, the limitations period was not tolled on the ground of fraudulent concealment. Pelullo v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, C.A.3 (Pa.) 2005, 131 Fed.Appx. 864, 2005 WL 1176971, Unreported. Limitation Of Actions 104(1)

122. ---- Last predicate act, limitations, practice and procedure generally

Third Circuit's “last predicate act” rule, under which civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action accrues when plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of last injury or last predicate act in pattern of racketeering activity, is not proper interpretation of RICO; such rule would significantly extend limitations period contrary to basic objective underlying limitations periods and contrary to purpose behind civil RICO of encouraging potential private plaintiffs diligently to investigate, and such rule is inconsistent with ordinary Clayton Act rule under which cause of action accrues when defendant commits act that injures plaintiff's business; abrogating, Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125 (C.A.3 1988). Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., U.S.Minn.1997, 117 S.Ct. 1984, 521 U.S. 179, 138 L.Ed.2d 373. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Four-year statute of limitations for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims generally runs from date plaintiff knew or should have known that elements of RICO cause of action existed; however, if as part of same pattern of racketeering activity there is further injury to plaintiff or further predicate acts occur which are part of same pattern, it runs from time when plaintiff knew or should have known of last injury or last predicate act which is part of same pattern of racketeering activity. Arab African Intern. Bank v. Ep- stein, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1993, 10 F.3d 168. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

A patent holder's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against an affiliate of a patent infringer accrued at time of the infringer's bankruptcy filing, rather than its bankruptcy liquidation; the filing was the “last predicate act which [was] part of the same pattern of racketeering activity.” A. Stucki Co. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., C.A.Fed. (Ohio) 1992, 963 F.2d 360, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1581. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

Four-year statute of limitations for civil action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) accrues when a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered his injury, and not when plaintiff knew or should have known about the last predicate act which is part of the same pattern of racketeering activity. Rodrig- uez v. Banco Cent., C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 1990, 917 F.2d 664. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Limitations period for civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim runs from date plaintiff knew or should have known that elements of civil RICO cause of action existed unless, as part of same pattern of racketeering activity, there is further injury to plaintiff or further predicate acts occur, in which case accrual period runs from time when plaintiff knew or should have known of last injury or last predicate act which is part of same pattern of racketeering activity; last predicate act need not have resulted in injury to plaintiff but must be part of same pattern. Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1988, 863 F.2d 1125. Limitation Of Actions 95(1)

Statute of limitations did not bar claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), or common law of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, brought by franchisee claiming wrongful inducement to enter into franchise agreement, to extent that claims involved inducements to renew agreement, made within limitations periods, as opposed to inducement to enter into original agreement, which occurred outside period. Towne v. Robbins, D.Or.2004, 339 F.Supp.2d 1105, subsequent determination 2005 WL 139077. Limitation Of Actions 58(1); Limitation Of Actions 99(1)

Four-year statute of limitations for action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) had run on RICO suit filed more than four years after date promoter of investment threatened investor with physical harm if investor persisted in seeking return of investment, and after date promoter promised 30% return on investment. Ageloff v. Kiley, S.D.Fla.2004, 318 F.Supp.2d 1157. Limitation Of Actions 170

Limitations period for civil RICO cause of action runs from date plaintiff knew or should have known that elements of civil RICO cause of action existed, unless as part of same pattern of racketeering activities, further predicate acts occur which are part of same pattern in which case accrual period shall run from time when plaintiff knew or should have known of last predicate act which is part of same pattern of racketeering activity. Crowe v. Smith, W.D.La.1994, 856 F.Supp. 1178, reversed 81 F.3d 155, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied 83 F.3d 421. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

When all necessary elements have occurred to make out a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO), and they have been or should have been discovered, the statute of limitations begins to run, even if further predicate acts occur. Korman v. Trusthouse Forte PLC, E.D.Pa.1992, 786 F.Supp. 458. Lim- itation Of Actions 95(3)

Since at least one sale constituting alleged fraud occurred within four years of the filing of racketeering action, action was not time barred. Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., D.Puerto Rico 1989, 727 F.Supp. 759, appeal dismissed 917 F.2d 664. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

Date of commission of last predicate act, upon which federal racketeering claim was founded, was not date that statute of limitations began to run on racketeering claim. Long Island Lighting Co. v. IMO Delaval, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1987, 668 F.Supp. 237. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

Alleged mailings of fraudulently obtained property tax assessment reductions, when last mailing occurred within statute of limitations, formed the predicate for timely filing of a claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act when it is alleged to be in furtherance of a continuing conspiracy to defraud. Cook County v. Berger, N.D.Ill.1986, 648 F.Supp. 433. Limitation Of Actions 177(3)

123. ---- Other claims, limitations, practice and procedure generally

Property owner's §§ 1983 claim and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy claim against prosecutors and others challenging the forfeiture of his seized property, on ground that the forfeiture process operated in violation of owner's due process rights by failing to give him fair notice of the proceeding, accrued, for limitations purposes, on the date of the forfeiture proceeding, rather than on the date of the seizure; the date of the forfeiture was the date that owner was permanently deprived of his property without notice. Kripp v. Luton, C.A.10 (Okla.) 2006, 466 F.3d 1171. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

Fact that alleged predicate acts of securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 were time barred did not render Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims brought by oil and gas well investors time-barred under four-year statute of limitations for RICO claims, in investors' action against well operator and related defendants, alleging that defendants engaged in fraudulent schemes in connection with investors' investments, where investors first discovered alleged fraud underlying RICO claims less than two years before they commenced litigation. Baker v. Pfeifer, S.D.Ohio 1996, 940 F.Supp. 1168. Limitation Of Actions 100(6)

Statute of limitations for securities fraud claims is not applicable to securities fraud claim asserted as predicate act in context of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Helman v. Murry's Steaks, Inc., D.Del.1990, 742 F.Supp. 860, reargument denied 743 F.Supp. 289. Securities Regulation 134

Fact that investors' securities claims were barred by statute of limitations did not bar RICO claim predicated on acts constituting RICO violations; there was no authority for proposition that predicate acts which were cognizable independent claims, substantively, but which were barred by statute of limitations, could not serve as predicate acts for RICO claim. Halperin v. Jasper, E.D.Pa.1989, 723 F.Supp. 1091. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 18

Injury allegedly suffered by tenants due to rent bills mailed within four-year limitations period for civil claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was identical to injury suffered when landlord and its real estate broker-managing agent allegedly unlawfully increased room counts and tenants' rent, and therefore continued mailing of purportedly unlawful rent bills did not trigger separate accrual rule for RICO claims, which provided for accrual of new claim, and new limitations period, each time plaintiff discovered or should have discovered new injury caused by predicate RICO violations, so as to make timely tenants' otherwise time-barred RICO claims against landlord and broker-managing agent. Pharr v. Evergreen Gardens, Inc.,

S.D.N.Y.2004, 2004 WL 42262, Unreported, reconsideration denied 2004 WL 487315, affirmed 123 Fed.Appx. 420, 2005 WL 181617. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

124. ---- Retroactivity, limitations, practice and procedure generally

Supreme Court decision in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., mandating application of four-year limitations period set out in the Clayton Act to civil RICO actions, applied retroactively to present civil RICO action; decision did not represent clear break from past precedent, and its application in present action was not inequitable. Lund v. Shearson/Lehman/American Exp., Inc., C.A.6 (Mich.) 1988, 852 F.2d 182. Courts 100(1)

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which amended Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) to disallow lawsuits that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities as a predicate act for a RICO action, applied retroactively to bar RICO claim based on fraud in connection with sale of securities which occurred prior to PSLRA's December 22, 1995, effective date. Columbraria Ltd v. Pimienta, S.D.Tex.2000, 110 F.Supp.2d 542. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Decision announcing uniform four-year limitations period for federal civil RICO claim could not be applied retroactively to claims that were timely filed under law as it existed at time of filing. Radcliffe v. Founders Title Co., M.D.Ga.1989, 720 F.Supp. 170. Courts 100(1)

Supreme Court decision in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc. that four-year statute of limitations applicable to Clayton Act civil enforcement actions applies to civil actions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act applied retroactively to RICO action; there was no settled expectation that would have operated as unfair surprise or burden upon parties to suit due to any retroactive application of decision. Gil- bert Family Partnership v. Nido Corp., E.D.Mich.1988, 679 F.Supp. 679. Courts 100(1)

125. ---- State law, limitations, practice and procedure generally

Six-year limitation period contained in Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act would be borrowed for Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim arising in that state even though case arose before Wiscon- sin statute was enacted and another Wisconsin statute provided that new statutes of limitations were to have prospective application only; no reasonable expectation would be violated by application of that statute, as question of which statute was applicable remained intensely contested and highly uncertain. Hemmings v. Barian, C.A.7 (Wis.) 1987, 822 F.2d 688. Limitation Of Actions 6(1)

Counts under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968] were barred even by more generous two-year securities fraud period [Ala.Code 1975, § 8-6-19(e)], where original receiver or successor receiver should have known of underlying causes of action more than two years prior to filing of respective claims. Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, La., C.A.11 (Ala.) 1986, 783 F.2d 1011. Limitation Of Actions 95(2)

California's three-year statute of limitations, West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 338, for actions based on statute was applicable to claims brought pursuant to this section, and because plaintiffs knew or had reason to know of injury which was the basis for their claim under this chapter more than three years before filing suit, the claim was time barred. Compton v. Ide, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1984, 732 F.2d 1429. Commerce 80; Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Complaint alleging common law fraud and a violation of this chapter arising from the purchase of a computer and accompanying software was subject to Missouri five-year period of limitations, V.A.M.S. § 516.120(5). Al- exander v. Perkin Elmer Corp., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1984, 729 F.2d 576. Commerce 80; Fraud 38

Six year statute of limitations applied to civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim in New Jersey that was predicated on breach of contract. County of Hudson v. Janiszewski, D.N.J.2007, 520 F.Supp.2d 631, as amended , reconsideration denied 2007 WL 4554227, affirmed 351 Fed.Appx. 662, 2009 WL 3387960. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Under California and Utah law, judicial proceedings privilege barred civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) claims against various defendants and their attorneys, based on allegations that they committed abuse of process and made fraudulent statements to courts in California and Utah in arguing that plaintiffs' claims arising from foreclosure proceedings were barred by the statute of limitations. Christonson v. U.S., D.Idaho 2006, 415 F.Supp.2d 1186. Attorney And Client 112; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 64

State statute of limitations applicable to civil RICO claims was Rhode Island's general ten-year statute of limitations applicable to all civil actions, except as otherwise specifically provided, rather than three-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for injuries to the person. Martin v. Fleet Nat. Bank, D.R.I.1987, 676 F.Supp. 423. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Four-year statute of limitations of Clayton Act, not Pennsylvania's two-year limitations period for common-law fraud, governed truck driver's claims against his employer trucking company under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Waldo v. North American Van Lines, Inc., W.D.Pa.1987, 669 F.Supp. 722. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Federal RICO claims against bank and related individuals were barred by Minnesota statute of limitations, whether two-year or six-year limitations period was applicable, where almost all facts giving rise to claim occurred approximately six years and three months prior to service of action. Baker v. Citizens State Bank of St. Louis Park, D.Minn.1987, 661 F.Supp. 1196. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

To extent that claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act were based on conspirators' alleged acts of violence, threatened violence, and intentional destruction of property, they were most analogous to the New York state law claims of intentional tort and, hence, were subject to a one-year statute of limitations, but to extent that claims could be read as seeking damages for injury to property, they were subject to the New

York three-year period of limitations, and to extent that claims were not analogous to any state law claim, they were subject to New York statute requiring that an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture be commenced within three years. Cahill v. Arthur Andersen & Co., S.D.N.Y.1986, 659 F.Supp. 1115, affirmed 822 F.2d 14. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Civil RICO claims brought in federal court sitting in Indiana are uniformly characterized as claims for statutory penalties so that two-year statute of limitations “for forfeiture of penalty given by statute,” rather than Indiana's six-year statute of limitations for fraud claims, is most analogous state statute of limitation; overruling State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F.Supp. 673 (N.D.Ind.). Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, N.D.Ind.1987, 656 F.Supp. 950. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Limitations period of five years under Ohio Corrupt Activity Act was applicable limitations period for civil RICO claim, as Act's definition of racketeering activity is drawn from RICO statute and as Act encompasses precise conduct alleged to be in violation of RICO in instant case. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., S.D.Ohio 1986, 656 F.Supp. 49. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim arising out of defendants' alleged wrongful termination of contract accrued when the contract was terminated; therefore, claim was barred by New York three- year statute of limitations governing actions to enforce liability created by statute. Getz v. Penthouse Intern., Ltd., S.D.N.Y.1987, 655 F.Supp. 1203. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

Under law of Virgin Islands, RICO action was governed by six-year limitations period applicable to action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture. Lawaetz v. Bank of Nova Scotia, D.Virgin Is- lands 1987, 653 F.Supp. 1278. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Hawaii's six-year statute of limitations [HRS § 657-1(4)] for personal actions of any nature whatsoever not specifically covered by laws of state was more analogous than statute [HRS § 657-11] providing for one-year statute of limitations whenever any federal statute provides for imposition of civil penalty or liquidated damages or imposes liability or any existing liability and statute does not specify period within which to bring suit to recover and applied to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968] claim. Mc- Carthy v. Pacific Loan, Inc., D.Hawai'i 1986, 629 F.Supp. 1102, appeal dismissed 789 F.2d 921. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Borrower's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(b, c)] claim was not barred by District of Columbia's three-year fraud statute of limitations, if borrower was first on notice of lender's alleged fraud and misrepresentation within three years of filing of action. Lawson v. Nationwide Mortg. Corp., D.D.C.1986, 628 F.Supp. 804. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

“Most analogous” Maryland statute of limitations [Md.Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings, § 5-101] to be applied to civil RICO claim for treble damages [18 U.S.C.A. § 1964] was three-year period for filing a “civil action at law,” with effect that instant action was timely filed. Morley v. Cohen, D.C.Md.1985, 610 F.Supp. 798.

Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

The three-year limitations period of M.S.A. § 80A.23, subd. 7, and not the six-year general fraud limitations period, would best effectuate policies of this chapter in case where most significant predicate act was alleged securities fraud. Burns v. Ersek, D.C.Minn.1984, 591 F.Supp. 837. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 65

Civil claim under this chapter based on allegations that defendants improperly acquired their interests in oil and gas lease obtained from a successful participant in federal oil and gas lottery which was conducted more than four years earlier was time barred under C.R.S. 13-80-108(1)(b). Victoria Oil Co. v. Lancaster Corp., D.C.Colo.1984, 587 F.Supp. 429. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Where exclusive bargaining agent during early months of 1978 filed several charges with the National Labor Relations Board claiming that employer, in order to assist rival union's organizational efforts, had discriminated in its hiring practices against applicants who were associated with bargaining agent and bargaining agent publicized these charges in a Feb. 16, 1978 letter to all affiliated locals in country, plaintiff employees had knowledge of their claim prior to December 1979 that delay in their hiring was occasioned by an allegedly collusive agreement between employer and rival union, and thus, action under this section filed in December, 1982, was barred by three-year limitations period of N.C.G.S. § 1-52(2). Seawell v. Miller Brewing Co., M.D.N.C.1983, 576 F.Supp. 424. Limitation Of Actions 95(14)

Since this chapter does not contain its own limitation period, federal courts are to look to most analogous state cause of action and apply appropriate limitation period. Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Corp., E.D.Pa.1983, 576 F.Supp. 234. Federal Courts 424

In civil action brought under this section, Indiana statute of limitations, IC 34-1-2-1, applied where plaintiff was corporation doing business in Indiana and res of defendant estate was located in Indiana, contract was consum- mated in Indiana, and property and related alleged fraudulent acts occurred in Indiana. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Caton's Estate, N.D.Ind.1982, 540 F.Supp. 673. Limitation Of Actions 2(1)

Ohio four-year statute of limitations for fraud, not six-year statute of limitations for liability created by statute, nor one-year statute of limitations for statute imposing penalty or forfeiture, applied to fraud complaint under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Steven Operating, Inc. v. Home State Sav., S.D.Ohio 1984, 105 F.R.D. 7. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

126. ---- Tolling, limitations, practice and procedure generally

Plaintiff must have exercised reasonable diligence in trying to discover his or her civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim in order to rely upon “fraudulent concealment” doctrine to toll limitations period or estop defendant from asserting limitations defense. Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., U.S.Minn.1997, 117 S.Ct. 1984, 521 U.S. 179, 138 L.Ed.2d 373. Limitation Of Actions 104(1)

Statute of limitations could not be equitably tolled, as to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims of physicians and their professional corporations who were injured by their investment in voluntary employee beneficiary associations (VEBAs) as tax-avoidance mechanism, on basis that physicians did not exercise reasonable due diligence to uncover relevant facts, where physicians merely asked persons involved in running and operation of VEBAs if VEBAs were legitimate after Internal Revenue Service (IRS) circulated No- tice which made clear that VEBA plans were inconsistent with tax code. Cetel v. Kirwan Financial Group, Inc., C.A.3 (N.J.) 2006, 460 F.3d 494, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1267, 549 U.S. 1207, 167 L.Ed.2d 78. Limitation Of Actions 104.5

Limitations period on building owner's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against manufacturers of asbestos-containing materials (ACMs) was not equitably tolled on ground of fraudulent concealment, in view of owner's failure to exercise reasonable diligence in discovering or investigating its injuries; owner had many other sources of information sufficient to place it on inquiry notice of its ACM-related injuries. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. U.S. Gypsum Co., C.A.3 (N.J.) 2004, 359 F.3d 226. Limitation Of Ac- tions 104.5

Evidence did not support proposed instruction on equitable tolling based on duress concerning limitations period applicable to civil actions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, in light of failure to present evidence that any of bank's alleged threats of economic injury were directed at filing of lawsuit. Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 30 F.3d 339. Limitation Of Actions 200(1)

Customer's incarceration did not equitably toll limitations period applicable to customer's civil Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against bank, based on alleged pattern of racketeering in connection with loan transaction that ultimately forced customer's company into bankruptcy; customer should have been able to garner necessary information bearing on his RICO claim despite his incarceration. Bontkowski v. First Nat. Bank of Cicero, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1993, 998 F.2d 459, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 602, 510 U.S. 1012, 126 L.Ed.2d 567. Limitation Of Actions 75

Law enforcement officials did not fraudulently conceal indictee's potential RICO claims against them, as required to equitably toll limitations period for RICO claims based on officials' conduct during undercover sting operation and prosecution of indictee; despite secretive nature of sting operation, indictee knew enough about officials' activities to make him chargeable with discovery of his RICO claims well before officials engaged in conduct on which fraudulent concealment claim was based. Davis v. Grusemeyer, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1993, 996 F.2d 617. Limitation Of Actions 104(2)

Equitable tolling based on fraudulent concealment did not apply to prevent statute of limitations from barring buyer of allegedly counterfeit rare wine from bringing civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) against auction house that sold wine, although auction house allegedly made false statements that it had authenticated wine and attempted to prevent another owner from cooperating with buyer's investigation of wine's authenticity, where buyer's civil RICO claim already was barred at the time auction house allegedly impeded buyer's investigation of wine's authenticity and buyer did not plead any alleged concealment

of facts by auction house had the purpose or effect of preventing discovery of buyer's claim. Koch v. Christie's International PLC, S.D.N.Y.2011, 785 F.Supp.2d 105, affirmed 699 F.3d 141. Limitation Of Actions 104(2); Limitation Of Actions 104.5

Statute of limitations on former property owner's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim predicated upon conduct of presently or formerly practicing Pennsylvania attorneys and business entities through which they practiced law, in using alleged inaccurate descriptions of property belonging to individuals and entities to whom former owner transferred the property and enforcement proceedings to collect back taxes from those individuals and entities, was not tolled under fraudulent concealment doctrine, where former owner did not exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the existence of his injury and its source. Gagliardi v. Kratzenberg, W.D.Pa.2005, 404 F.Supp.2d 858, affirmed on other grounds 188 Fed.Appx. 86, 2006 WL 1525380. Limitation Of Actions 104(1)

Four year statute of limitations on investors' civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for misuse of $350,000 of investment funds was not tolled, after investors had constructive notice of fraud due to defendants' promise of high rate of return and substitution of mortgage assignments for cash, even if fraud was actively concealed; investors failed to allege that they exercised due diligence after receiving constructive notice of fraud. Congregacion de la Mision Provincia de Venezuela v. Curi, E.D.N.Y.1997, 978 F.Supp. 435. Limitation Of Actions 100(13)

Investors in real estate limited partnerships, alleging RICO violations by promoters, failed to establish that statute of limitations had been tolled; they had failed to allege manner in which promoters' bringing of suit on their behalf against third parties had concealed nature of fraud, of which they were aware through failure of investment to deliver promised return of capital, or to state facts showing their due diligence in investigating circumstances that was thwarted by promoters' actions. Butala v. Agashiwala, S.D.N.Y.1996, 916 F.Supp. 314. Limita- tion Of Actions 179(2)

Four-year statute of limitations for civil claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corruption Act (RICO) by corporations which employed executives who were murdered, as part of organized crime leaders' attempt to maintain control of garbage carting industry, was equitably tolled, even though plaintiffs knew of injury on date of murders, in light of allegations that organized crime conspirators and their corporate entities concealed who arranged murders and the manner in which murders related to RICO enterprises. Jerry Kubecka, Inc. v. Avellino, E.D.N.Y.1995, 898 F.Supp. 963. Limitation Of Actions 104.5

Allegations that each defendant committed predicate act within four years prior to filing of complaint under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and that defendant's fraudulent concealment tolled applicable statute of limitations, was sufficient, at early stages of litigation, to withstand motion to dismiss on limitations grounds, but defendant could again address issue at later date by way of motion for partial summary judgment, if discovery indicated that any particular claim was barred by limitations. Lust v. Burke, D.Md.1994, 876 F.Supp. 1474. Federal Civil Procedure 1754; Federal Civil Procedure 1789

Where plaintiff alleges violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) based on sale

of stock for price below value, the due diligence which plaintiff must show to toll the statute, and duty of care plaintiff must meet to delay accrual of the action, are the same. Scarabello v. Reichle, N.D.Ill.1994, 856 F.Supp. 404. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Four-year statute of limitations applicable in RICO cases begins to run when plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered their injuries, even if they had not yet discovered alleged pattern of racketeering, unless circumstances support application of equitable tolling. Levine v. Prudential Bache Properties, Inc., N.D.Ill.1994, 855 F.Supp. 924. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Statute of limitations applicable to investors' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against organizers of shell corporation allegedly used to facilitate fraudulent securities trades with limited partnerships in which investors had purchased interests was not tolled as result of alleged fraudulent concealment; investors failed to inquire as to possible claims against organizers at time they became aware that their expected tax deductions had been disallowed, and did not allege of any affirmative acts of concealment by the organizers. Greenwald v. Manko, E.D.N.Y.1993, 840 F.Supp. 198. Limitation Of Actions 104(1)

Four-year statute of limitations for RICO actions had not expired so as to bar suit by Republic of Turkey seeking return of ancient coins allegedly smuggled from country; due to efforts to hide existence of coins, statute did not begin to run until existence of coins was discovered. Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, D.Mass.1992, 797 F.Supp. 64. Limitation Of Actions 104(2)

Action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) arising from defendants' purchase of land from plaintiffs for substantially less than sum for which they had three days earlier agreed to sell same land to second plaintiffs was not barred by applicable four-year statute of limitations, even though action was instituted more than four years after sale occurred; allegations of fraud stemmed from information supplied through plaintiff's land agent less than two years before action was filed, and plaintiff could not through exercise of reasonable diligence have discovered fraudulent acts or scheme alleged in action, as one defendant remained his agent for management of property until different manager was procured two years before complaint was filed. Caldas & Sons, Inc. v. Willingham, N.D.Miss.1992, 791 F.Supp. 614, affirmed in part , reversed in part 17 F.3d 123. Limitation Of Actions 100(6)

Four-year statute of limitations for bringing of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) civil actions is subject to equitable tolling. Borden, Inc. v. Spoor Behrins Campbell & Young, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 695. Limitation Of Actions 104.5

Stockholders who sold business in exchange for shares of common stock of purchasing company had “something close[ ] to actual notice” of purchaser's alleged pattern of fraudulent activity, and thus, statute of limitations on sellers' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims was not tolled by alleged fraudulent concealment; sellers received several reports, filed by purchaser with Securities Exchange Commission as required by law, which indicated that purchaser was in far different state financially than sellers alleged that purchaser had indicated. Solano v. Delmed, Inc., D.D.C.1991, 759 F.Supp. 847. Limitation Of Ac- tions 104(1)

Where investors never dealt with RICO defendant, they could have not have known that he had injured them before they knew that the person with whom they dealt had injured them, so that statute of limitations on RICO claim against defendant was subject to equitable tolling. Zola v. Gordon, S.D.N.Y.1988, 701 F.Supp. 66. Limita- tion Of Actions 95(1)

Clayton Act's tolling provisions applied to civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act suit when parallel criminal litigation was involved. Pension Fund-Mid-Jersey Trucking Industry v. Omni Funding Group, D.N.J.1988, 687 F.Supp. 962. Limitation Of Actions 105(1)

Regardless of whether defendant could be held vicariously liable for fraud perpetrated by his partners, vicarious liability principles could not be employed to toll, on fraudulent concealment theory, statute of limitations on investors' racketeering claims against him, where investors had not asserted that he had any involvement either in alleged racketeering or in concealment of fraudulent scheme at issue. In re Bushnell, Bkrtcy.D.Vt.2001, 271 B.R. 54. Limitation Of Actions 104(1)

Four-year statute of limitations of stock seller's fraud and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy claims against buyer was tolled until date seller first knew or had reason to know of its injury. Silva Run Worldwide Ltd. v. Gaming Lottery Corp., S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 22358805, Unreported. Lim- itation Of Actions 95(3); Limitation Of Actions 100(1)

127. ---- Waiver, limitations, practice and procedure generally

Physicians and their professional corporations, as plaintiffs, had not been prejudiced by failure of some individuals, corporations, and associations, as defendants, to raise statute of limitations in their answers to complaint which claimed violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), ERISA, and state law, in creation, marketing, operating, and endorsement of voluntary employee beneficiary associations (VEBAs), and thus defendants did not waive right to subsequently assert such defense, since other defendants had pleaded in their answer that claims were time-barred. Cetel v. Kirwan Financial Group, Inc., C.A.3 (N.J.) 2006, 460 F.3d 494, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1267, 549 U.S. 1207, 167 L.Ed.2d 78. Limitation Of Actions 182(5)

Defendant's plea of guilty to charges of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations impliedly waived right to assert any statute of limitations defense. Acevedo-Ramos v. U.S., D.Puerto Rico 1991, 787 F.Supp. 16, affirmed 961 F.2d 305, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 299, 506 U.S. 905, 121 L.Ed.2d 222. Crimin- al Law 273.4(1)

128. Discovery and inspection, practice and procedure generally

Where purchaser asserting civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against seller from whom she acquired boutique had three years in which to conduct discovery in support of her claims, purchaser was not entitled to further discovery and opportunity to correct procedural deficiencies in complaint, which failed to allege predicate acts of wire fraud with requisite particularity, before court dismissed purchaser's RICO claims; there was little indication that discovery requested by purchaser would have produced any inform-

ation that would have permitted her to allege requisite two interstate communications with particularity and purchaser failed to even allege interstate communications on information and belief. Cordero-Hernandez v. Hernan- dez-Ballesteros, C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 2006, 449 F.3d 240, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 964, 549 U.S. 1128, 166 L.Ed.2d 732. Federal Civil Procedure 1828

Time and subject matter restrictions imposed by district court on journalists who brought civil Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against defendants who allegedly participated in a bombing of a Costa Rican press conference did not deprive journalists of opportunity to conduct adequate discovery and did not prohibit discovery into causation; journalists had two-year investigative period and, after filing, had additional two years of discovery. Avirgan v. Hull, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1991, 932 F.2d 1572, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 913, 502 U.S. 1048, 116 L.Ed.2d 813. Federal Civil Procedure 1271

Granting investor in joint venture requested jurisdictional discovery with respect to Russian bank was not warranted in his action for, inter alia, fraud, unfair business practices, and violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); investor relied entirely upon attributing contacts of bank's subsidiaries to bank to establish personal jurisdiction over bank, but adduced no evidence supporting disregard of corporate structure to impute subsidiaries' contacts to bank, and bank proffered uncontroverted evidence showing that its subsidiaries were not its agents or alter egos, and that its subsidiary managed venture fund which provided money to joint venture. Barantsevich v. VTB Bank, C.D.Cal.2013, 2013 WL 3188178. Federal Civil Procedure 1275.5

Remedial order for labor union district council's violation of consent decree in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action relating to its job referral system would empower government to issue discovery demands and subpoenas to district council, its constituent local members, and contractors, to obtain documents and testimony, relating to their compliance with decree. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.2009, 618 F.Supp.2d 326, stay denied 2009 WL 2523882. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.6

Investors who asserted Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations against corporate officers based on predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, but failed to allege fraudulent acts with particularity, were entitled to conduct discovery, prior to ruling on motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, where investors provided an outline of a general scheme to defraud and established an inference that mail or interstate wire was used to transact the scheme, and there were multiple defendants who likely communicated among themselves, so that investors could not know about the particular communications without conducting discovery. Davila Uviles v. RYS Intern. Corp., D.Puerto Rico 2006, 443 F.Supp.2d 233. Federal Civil Procedure 1828

Cigarette manufacturer's inexcusable effort to subvert discovery process, in action by United States alleging violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), worked waiver of any privilege manufacturer had in memorandum written by its attorney, regarding modification of manufacturer's document retention policy in light of increasing litigation; manufacturer refused to produce or log memorandum for over two months before finally raising objections to production, and objections finally raised bordered on the frivolous. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., D.D.C.2004, 321 F.Supp.2d 87, stay granted 2004 WL 1242557, reversed and

remanded 387 F.3d 884, 363 U.S.App.D.C. 299. Federal Civil Procedure 1636.1

Defendant in government's action for alleged violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) did not make good faith effort to comply with orders requiring its production by set deadline of documents in its affiliate's possession, warranting conditional finding that defendant was in civil contempt of court, given that defendant failed to show that its pursuit of agreement from affiliate or intervention by their parent company was diligent, that defendant's retention of legal experts was untimely and accuracy of such experts' views on defendant's authority to compel production under foreign laws had not been fully tested, and that defendant did not show that production was impossible. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., D.D.C.2003, 287 F.Supp.2d 5, issued 2003 WL 22495729. Federal Civil Procedure 1640

District court would not allow civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) defendants to engage in any discovery or to conduct evidentiary hearing on issue of plaintiff's attorney fees under RICO, where district court was satisfied that plaintiff's documentation and detailed description with respect to legal fees and costs provided court with adequate record upon which to base award and defendants failed to demonstrate why already protracted litigation should be further extended to permit additional inquiries concerning attorney fees. Bingham v. Zolt, S.D.N.Y.1993, 823 F.Supp. 1126, affirmed 66 F.3d 553, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1418, 517 U.S. 1134, 134 L.Ed.2d 543, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1891, 517 U.S. 1240, 135 L.Ed.2d 185, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1870, 517 U.S. 1230, 134 L.Ed.2d 967. Federal Civil Procedure 1262.1; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 82

Defendants in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action were not entitled to discovery of all documents, relating to any agreements, loans, purchases, sales, transfers, commissions, or any other professional or business relationship by and between plaintiff and its parent company, and were not entitled to all sales and purchases invoices or documents relating to operating expenses of plaintiff; although plaintiff's allegations against defendants were wide ranging and covered lengthy period, this did not justify defendants' overly broad document requests. Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, D.Del.1992, 821 F.Supp. 232. Federal Civil Procedure 1588

Pension plan which sued bank that handled plan's investments was entitled to discover bank employee compensation manuals because such information was relevant to plan's claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, pursuant to which plan had to prove that bank profited from its alleged scheme to defraud. Nagel v. First of Michigan Corp., W.D.Mich.1991, 784 F.Supp. 429, dismissed. Federal Civil Procedure 1591

Government could not invoke informer's privilege to protect from pretrial disclosure names of union members who allegedly told government agent that they were victim's of extortion by local and various officials; proof of extortion was essential element of Government's civil case under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO), and agent's testimony as to what union members told him would be sole evidence concerning their state of mind, notwithstanding that union members allegedly feared reprisals, including being killed. U.S. v. Local 1804-1, Intern. Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1990, 753 F.Supp. 1158. Criminal Law 627.10(2.1)

With respect to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint which failed to state fraud with particularity as required by Rule, it was inappropriate to allow plaintiffs to proceed with discovery in an attempt to flesh out their conclusory allegations of fraud, where complaint did not outline the general contours of a fraudulent scheme, merely omitting dates, time and locations of alleged mail and wire fraud, but instead failed to name the victims of the alleged frauds or even to provide the vaguest description of the subject matter concerning them. Gott v. Simpson, D.Me.1990, 745 F.Supp. 765. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Civil racketeering count would not be dismissed, despite fact that it had little detail, in view of availability of broad scope of federal discovery to collect necessary details. Hurst v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., W.D.Pa.1985, 613 F.Supp. 1210. Federal Civil Procedure 633.1

Although United States oil company alleged that prior environmental litigation by indigenous people of Amazo- nian rain forest and their New York lawyer who obtained multi-billion dollar Ecuadorian judgment against company, was enterprise that violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), oil company could not compel two Ecuadorian representatives of indigenous people to require representatives' Ecuadorian lawyers for prior environmental litigation to appear for depositions in New York as alleged managing agents of RICO enterprise, in company's actions asserting RICO and declaratory claims, even though alleged enterprise constituted “person,” under federal rule authorizing deposition of any person, where company's notices of deposition were addressed to witnesses rather than enterprise, notices did not indicate that representatives were being served as representatives of enterprise, and even if notices had been addressed to enterprise, subpoenas would have been necessary as enterprise was not party. Chevron Corp. v. Salazar, S.D.N.Y.2011, 275 F.R.D. 422. Federal Civil Procedure 1323.1; Federal Civil Procedure 1351

Defendant in action involving civil claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) would be required to produce tax records to plaintiff over privacy objection, as information sought was relevant, especially to plaintiff's civil RICO claims, and defendant did not show that information sought was available from other sources; moreover, privacy impact of disclosure could be mitigated by protective order. A. Farber and Partners, Inc. v. Garber, C.D.Cal.2006, 234 F.R.D. 186. Privileged Communications And Confidenti- ality 372

Where party sought attorneys' fees as element of damages, and to extent that party was required to establish before court that attorney fees were reasonable at trial, court would not restrict at discovery stage manner in which party attempted to meet its evidentiary burden, in lawsuit under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state law, since court could ascertain reasonable fee from contemporaneous time records of counsel, opponent did not offer any affidavit or evidence in support of its assertions of undue burden, and description of alleged burden was not sufficiently specific to sustain any conclusion that relevance of fee information was significantly outweighed by burden imposed upon opponent. Waddell & Reed Financial, Inc. v. Torch- mark Corp., D.Kan.2004, 222 F.R.D. 450. Federal Civil Procedure 1272.1

In civil suit under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by buyer of chemical plant assets against seller, buyer would be precluded from taking discovery regarding seller's other plants and/or involvement in other real estate transactions unless and until it made threshold showing linking information sought

to alleged racketeering activity; buyer's assertion that evidence of fraudulent transactions not connected with subject sale was relevant to proof of “continuing threat” was unpersuasive. PMC, Inc. v. Ferro Corp., C.D.Cal.1990, 131 F.R.D. 184. Federal Civil Procedure 1272.1

Even if defendants in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action were unaware of discovery failures and plaintiff's renewed motion for default judgment, district court properly denied their motion to set aside default judgment entered against them as a discovery sanction, where the discovery abuses at issue did not amount to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Stooksbury v. Ross, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 2013, 2013 WL 2665596. Federal Civil Procedure 1278

129. Summary judgment, practice and procedure generally--Generally

District should grant motion to dismiss Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations claim only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with allegations. McLaugh- lin v. Anderson, C.A.2 (Conn.) 1992, 962 F.2d 187. Federal Civil Procedure 1811

Invocation of Fifth Amendment privilege by defendants in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action did not give rise to any legally cognizable inferences sufficient to preclude entry of summary judgment; negative inference, if any, to be drawn from assertion of Fifth Amendment did not substitute for evidence needed to meet burden of production. Avirgan v. Hull, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1991, 932 F.2d 1572, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 913, 502 U.S. 1048, 116 L.Ed.2d 813. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Plaintiffs, who were specifically instructed by statement of case order to include all facts upon which they would rely to initiate their complaint of alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), could not argue that they would have presented other facts with regards to defendants who did not move for summary judgment, and thus, district court could grant summary judgment in favor of nonmoving defendants as well as moving defendants. Marriott Bros. v. Gage, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1990, 911 F.2d 1105, rehearing denied. Fed- eral Civil Procedure 1939

Issue of whether liability for particular racketeering act extended to aiders and abettors could not be determined at summary judgment stage of government's action against manufacturers of cigarettes, and other tobacco-related entities, in which it sought to recover health care expenses incurred in treating patients for smoking-related illnesses, and to disgorge profits under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); rather, issue of such complexity and significance had to be determined at trial. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., D.D.C.2004, 327 F.Supp.2d 13. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether manufacturers of cigarettes and other tobacco-related entities suppressed development and marketing of less hazardous cigarettes, precluding summary judgment on lawsuit brought by United States under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). U.S. v. Philip MOrris USA, Inc., D.D.C.2004, 327 F.Supp.2d 8. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

United States was entitled to summary judgment as matter of law, dismissing affirmative defenses of res ju-

dicata, collateral estoppel, release, and accord and satisfaction asserted by tobacco companies in lawsuit brought by United States under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), since companies effectively failed to oppose government's motion as to those defenses. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., D.D.C.2004, 327 F.Supp.2d 1. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Genuine issues of material fact as to whether and to what extent British cigarette manufacturer participated in operation or management of alleged enterprise or conspired to do so precluded summary judgment in United States' action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleging unlawful conspiracy to deceive American public. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., D.D.C.2004, 321 F.Supp.2d 82. Federal Civil Pro- cedure 2509.5

Summary judgment for defendant not-for-profit organizations created by the tobacco industry, in government's action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against cigarette manufacturers and other tobacco-related entities, on basis that, as matter of law, even if the Government could prove the movants' liability under RICO, it could not establish the requirements for imposition of any remedy under RICO, would be premature and inappropriate, where the court had made no determination of liability. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., D.D.C.2004, 319 F.Supp.2d 9. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Genuine issue of material fact as to whether cigarette manufacturer's cooperation with government was sufficient to constitute withdrawal from tobacco industry's alleged conspiracy to deceive American public precluded summary judgment in United States' civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, D.D.C.2004, 316 F.Supp.2d 1. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Genuine issues of material fact as to the extent to which an oil corporation and its subsidiary were integrally involved in the actions and structure of a company owned by the subsidiary precluded summary judgment for them, on an agency theory, regarding human rights abuse claims and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO) claims asserted by Nigerian citizens; there was an extraordinarily close relationship between the defendants and the company prior to, during and after the attacks against protestors at issue, and there was an overlap between officers and directors; moreover, more than 20% of defendants' earnings were accounted for by the company's production, and defendants viewed unrest in Nigeria as directly affecting the company's oil production, and consequently the defendants' revenues. Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., N.D.Cal.2004, 312 F.Supp.2d 1229. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Material issues of fact as to extent of administrator's involvement in operation and management of municipal employee deferred compensation plan and city with respect to its plan-related functions, precluded judgment on the pleadings for plan administrator on city's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. City of Philadelphia v. Public Employees Ben. Services Corp., E.D.Pa.1994, 842 F.Supp. 827. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Fact question as to whether prescription drug wholesaler, rather than its repackager, owned excess drug “overages” sent with orders to be repacked, as required to support predicate acts of stealing, precluded summary judgment on claim that repackager's president and its associates conducted affairs of enterprise through pattern

of racketeering involving interstate transportation of stolen goods, receipt of stolen goods, mail and wire fraud, and money transactions resulting from unlawful activities. Independent Drug Wholesalers Group, Inc. v. Denton, D.Kan.1993, 833 F.Supp. 1507, reconsideration denied. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Civil RICO defendant failed to raise genuine issue of material fact, as would preclude summary judgment in favor of government, where predicate racketeering acts, consisting of threats against rival garbage carters, were clearly related to furtherance of illegal control of waste industry and defendant had embodied threat of domination of industry plagued with corruption for a decade. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suf- folk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 811 F.Supp. 808, affirmed 995 F.2d 375. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Motions for summary judgment that were filed at threshold of discovery in civil RICO action were premature and would be denied without prejudice. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Federal Civil Procedure 2532

Genuine issues of material fact existed, precluding summary judgment in RICO action, about whether customs service relied on alleged fraudulent information that watch trademark was owned solely by American corporation, and not jointly by American and foreign corporations under common control, for purposes of determining existence of alleged conspiracy to submit false statements to obtain customs service protection against unauthorized importation of gray market goods; even if trademark was originally recorded before submission of fraudulent information, customs had not yet revoked recordation of United States trademark. Shaw v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1991, 776 F.Supp. 128, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1916. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Material issues of fact precluded granting summary judgment to nursing home proprietor on Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and common-law fraud claims brought by union local arising out of proprietor's alleged failure to disburse money received by proprietor from state to bring employee wages up to industry-wide levels; local adduced evidence tracing disposition of parity monies received by nursing home, and whether proprietor divided parity monies for personal use was question material to both fraud and RICO claims. Local 144 Hotel, Hosp., Nursing Home and Allied Services Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO v. C.N.H. Management As- sociates, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1990, 752 F.Supp. 1195. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5; Federal Civil Procedure 2515

Material issues of fact existed, precluding summary judgment in a RICO action against a local union official and a union local linking them to an overall RICO conspiracy and many individual predicate acts of extortion and bribery. Amendolare v. Schenkers Intern. Forwarders, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1990, 747 F.Supp. 162. Federal Civil Pro- cedure 2509.5

130. ---- Causation, summary judgment, practice and procedure generally

Genuine issue of material fact existed as to issues of injury and causation, precluding summary judgment for drug manufacturer in putative class actions brought by individuals and entities who paid for a prescription drug used in the treatment of schizophrenia, alleging claims for violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) and various state consumer protection statutes, and claims for common law fraud and

unjust enrichment. In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, E.D.N.Y.2007, 493 F.Supp.2d 571. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5; Federal Civil Procedure 2515

Fact question regarding whether defendant's underpayment of landfill royalties to city was proximately caused by defendant's violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) precluded summary judgment on city's civil claim for damages under RICO. City of Chicago Heights, Ill. v. Lobue, N.D.Ill.1996, 914 F.Supp. 279. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Genuine issue of material fact regarding whether owners of commercial buildings were in zone of foreseeable plaintiffs and whether asbestos manufacturers' alleged actions in misrepresenting safety of asbestos to architects, contractors, and installers of buildings was substantial factor in causing owners' harm precluded summary judgment, for lack of proximate causation, in favor of manufacturers on owners' civil claim under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. U.S. Gypsum Co., D.N.J.1993, 828 F.Supp. 287. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

131. ---- Enterprise, summary judgment, practice and procedure generally

Non-profit organization that sued former employees, alleging Internet publication of defamatory statements concerning organization, failed to establish that employees acted as organized entity, as required to maintain claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); there was no formal organization, no individual took the role of leader, employees never conducted meetings or raised money, and employees each maintained their own websites. Gentle Wind Project v. Garvey, D.Me.2006, 407 F.Supp.2d 282. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 40

Only allegation against defaulting defendant, in action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), was participation in same enterprise as co-defendants, so that once summary judgment in favor of those co-defendants was granted, application for default judgment against the remaining defendant would be denied, lest the “unseemly and absurd” result follow that the enterprise conspiracy charge be sustained as to but one defendant. Gentle Wind Project v. Garvey, D.Me.2006, 407 F.Supp.2d 280. Federal Civil Procedure 2416

Genuine issue of material fact as to whether underwriter and fiscal agent for sanitary and improvement districts had sufficient operational or management control over districts to establish that they conducted affairs of districts as Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) “enterprise” precluded summary judgment on RICO claim alleging that agent and underwriters sold warrants issued by districts which they knew were destined for default, notwithstanding assertion that agent and underwriter were merely financial advisors. Neb- raska Sec. Bank v. Dain Bosworth, Inc., D.Neb.1993, 838 F.Supp. 1362. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Material issues of genuine fact existed with respect to existence of an enterprise as defined by this chapter, association of defendant printing company with such an enterprise, association of the alleged enterprise with organized criminal activity, the intent and knowledge of defendant concerning the underlying predicate acts and the existence of injury caused by alleged violation of this chapter, precluding summary judgment in favor of defend-

ant in action alleging the kickback scheme. Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Harco Graphics, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1983, 558 F.Supp. 83. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

132. ---- Fraud, summary judgment, practice and procedure generally

Material issues of genuine fact existed as to whether commercial nurserymen reasonably relied on testing data allegedly falsified by fungicide manufacturer in accepting settlement of claims against manufacturer in prior products liability litigation, precluding summary judgment in favor of manufacturer on nurserymen's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim based on fraudulent inducement. Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co., C.A.9 (Hawai'i) 2005, 431 F.3d 353, certiorari denied 126 S.Ct. 2861, 547 U.S. 1192, 165 L.Ed.2d 895, on remand 2006 WL 2734291. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Appraiser's testimony that she inflated value of purchasers' home raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether developers knowingly participated in the scheme to defraud and whether appraiser colluded with the developers in misrepresenting the fair market value, precluding summary judgment in favor of developers and appraiser on purchasers' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim based on their purchase of allegedly overvalued home. Wilson v. Parisi, M.D.Pa.2008, 549 F.Supp.2d 637. Federal Civil Proced- ure 2509.5

Genuine issue of material fact as to whether billboard advertising company fraudulently concealed its pattern of racketeering activity precluded summary judgment on limitations grounds in competitor's action alleging that company violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Clayton Act, and California's Cartwright Act by paying bribe to mayor in exchange for city billboard permits. Bulletin Displays, LLC v. Re- gency Outdoor Advertising, Inc., C.D.Cal.2007, 518 F.Supp.2d 1182. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether individuals and entities who paid for prescription drug used in treatment of schizophrenia relied on alleged mail and wire fraud by drug manufacturer in misrepresenting to medical and scientific communities the nature of drug's benefits and risks, precluding summary judgment on claims for violation of, and conspiracy to violate, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, E.D.N.Y.2007, 493 F.Supp.2d 571. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Material issues of fact existed, precluding summary judgment as to insurance company's right to recover unauthorized compensation losses against employee involved in fraudulent claim-processing scheme; parties disputed whether excess amount taken consisted entirely or partly of lawful bonuses. Corporacion Insular de Seguros v. Reyes-Munoz, D.Puerto Rico 1994, 849 F.Supp. 126. Federal Civil Procedure 2501

In fraud and RICO action against oil well lessee by lessors who alleged that lessee wrongfully withheld regulatory fees, for which lessors were not responsible, from lessors' royalty payments, there were issues of fact as to whether there were intentional misrepresentations and reliance, precluding summary judgment. Hilliard v. Shell Western E & P, Inc., W.D.Mich.1993, 836 F.Supp. 1365, reversed 149 F.3d 1183, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 608, 525 U.S. 1048, 142 L.Ed.2d 548.

Issues of material fact, precluding summary judgment on employees' civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations (RICO) action against employer for which they solicited investors for limited partnerships in exchange for general partnership interests, existed as to whether, over course of several years, allegedly fraudulent tax documents and financial statements sent through mail were prepared, and alleged oral misrepresentations over telephone were made, to further scheme to defraud employees. Greenberg v. Tomlin, E.D.Pa.1993, 816 F.Supp. 1039. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Evidence in magazine publisher's suit against its distributor in which publisher alleged that distributor violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in fraudulent scheme whereby distributor reduced its bills to certain wholesalers, charged wholesalers a service fee and also charged publisher for initial discount without accounting for its service fee, raised genuine issue of material whether memorandum written by distributor revealed fraudulent scheme, precluding summary judgment. Official Publications, Inc. v. Kable News Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1991, 775 F.Supp. 631. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Genuine issues of material fact existed as to insured's knowledge of its agent's retention of administrative/consulting fees from insurance premium payments and whether insurer, insurer's agent and insured's agent committed mail or wire fraud in connection with transaction precluding summary judgment in favor of insurer on insured's civil theft and RICO claims. LanChile Airlines v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. of North America, S.D.Fla.1991, 759 F.Supp. 811. Federal Civil Procedure 2501; Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

In action against bank and bank officials for violating this chapter by engaging in pattern of racketeering activity, issue of material fact existed on question whether mailings of bank statements to plaintiff were part of attempt to collect loans which plaintiff alleged it was fraudulently induced to assume, precluding summary judgment. Durante Bros. and Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat. Bank, E.D.N.Y.1983, 571 F.Supp. 489, affirmed in part , vacated in part 755 F.2d 239, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 3530, 473 U.S. 906, 87 L.Ed.2d 654, on remand 652 F.Supp. 101. Judgment 181(17)

133. ---- Injury, summary judgment, practice and procedure generally

Genuine issue of material fact as to whether billboard advertising company's alleged conduct in bribing city, col- luding to keep competitor out of bidding process, and contracting to take over sites that would obstruct view of competitor's billboards caused injury to competitor's business or property precluded summary judgment in competitor's action against company under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for lack of proximate cause. Bulletin Displays, LLC v. Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc., C.D.Cal.2007, 518 F.Supp.2d 1182. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Genuine issues of material fact existed as to the relation of third party payers (TPPs) for prescription drugs to pharmaceutical benefit managers (PBMs) who acted as agents for TPPs, whether drug manufacturer's actions influenced what physicians prescribed, and whether individuals and entities who paid for a prescription drug used in the treatment of schizophrenia sustained any damages, precluding partial summary judgment for individuals and entities in their putative class actions against drug manufacturer, alleging claims for violation of the Racket-

eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various state consumer protection statutes, and claims for common law fraud and unjust enrichment. In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, E.D.N.Y.2007, 493 F.Supp.2d 571. Federal Civil Procedure 2481; Federal Civil Procedure 2491.9; Federal Civil Proced- ure 2509.5; Federal Civil Procedure 2515

Genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether partnerships' managing agent's injurious predicate acts of mailing and wiring of misleading financial statements and transfers of partnerships' funds into one account where they were comingled furthered, facilitated, permitted or concealed an injury which could have occurred independently of managing agent's mailings and wirings, precluding summary judgment in favor of majority owner, managing agent, and other defendants on minority partners' claim under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) subsection prohibiting the operation of a legitimate business through racketeering. Lugosch v. Congel, N.D.N.Y.2006, 443 F.Supp.2d 254, reconsideration denied 2006 WL 2645125. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Genuine issue of material fact as to whether economic model used by United States to calculate gains realized by tobacco companies as result of their conspiracy to intentionally and willfully deceive and mislead American public about harmful nature of tobacco products, addictive nature of nicotine, and possibility of manufacturing safer and less addictive tobacco products was accurate, adequate, and appropriate precluded summary judgment in United States' action against tobacco companies under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to recover health care expenditures federal government had paid or would pay to treat tobacco-related illnesses. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., D.D.C.2004, 321 F.Supp.2d 72, reversed 396 F.3d 1190, 364 U.S.App.D.C. 454, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 126 S.Ct. 478, 546 U.S. 960, 163 L.Ed.2d 363. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

In context of civil action brought by funeral home under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against securities broker with which home invested clients' prepaid funds, material fact issues existed as to whether home sustained lost profits, or expectancy damages, and as to whether broker's conduct was cause of such loss, precluding summary judgment for broker. Frankford Trust Co. v. Advest, Inc., E.D.Pa.1996, 943 F.Supp. 531. Federal Civil Procedure 2490

134. ---- Limitations, summary judgment, practice and procedure generally

Genuine issue of material fact as to when smokers discovered or should have discovered that “light” cigarettes were no safer than regular cigarettes precluded summary judgment on limitations grounds in smokers' class action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleging that cigarette manufacturers induced them to buy “light” cigarettes by falsely representing that they would experience reduced health risks. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., E.D.N.Y.2006, 449 F.Supp.2d 992, reversed 522 F.3d 215. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Fact question as to when dairy farmers should have discovered both existence and source of their injury and that injury was part of pattern precluded summary judgment based on statute of limitations on farmers' Racketeer influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim based on silo manufacturer's misrepresentations that silos were air-tight. Valleyside Dairy Farms, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., W.D.Mich.1995, 944 F.Supp. 612. Federal

Civil Procedure 2509.5

Material issues of fact precluded summary judgment as to whether four-year RICO statute of limitations had run; there were conflicting allegations as to whether and on what date original owner of land, who had conveyed land to partnership in return for partnership interest, should have been aware he was being squeezed out of partnership as result of activities by his partners and others alleged to constitute racketeering. Crowe v. Smith, W.D.La.1994, 856 F.Supp. 1178, reversed 81 F.3d 155, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied 83 F.3d 421. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Summary judgment of RICO action based on limitations defense was precluded by fact issues as to whether or when alleged RICO injury, consisting of dilution of plaintiff's interest in family theatre business through use of intracompany funds to invest in new enterprises in which plaintiff held no interest, occurred and when plaintiff was or should have been aware of that injury. Jacobsohn v. Marks, N.D.Ill.1993, 818 F.Supp. 1187. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Investors' allegations of active concealment by successive parent corporations and sole stockholders of firm of investment advisors were sufficient to create genuine issue of material fact as to tolling, pursuant to equitable tolling doctrine, of applicable statute of limitations, on defendant's motion for summary judgment in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action; investors alleged that defendants affirmatively denied, in numerous SEC filings and filings with Federal Reserve Board, that it received payments from organizers and promoters of investment ventures, and other allegedly knowingly false statements made by officials of firm in attempt to conceal payments they were alleged to have received. Borden, Inc. v. Spoor Behrins Campbell & Young, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 695. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Issue of material fact as to when civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) plaintiffs knew or should have known of elements of their cause of action, including pattern of predicate acts, precluded summary judgment for defendants on statute of limitation grounds. Indianapolis Hotel Investors, Ltd. v. Aircoa Equity Interests, Inc., D.Colo.1990, 733 F.Supp. 1406. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

135. ---- Pattern of racketeering activity, summary judgment, practice and procedure generally

Buyer of preprinted business forms sufficiently alleged pattern of predicate acts to survive summary judgment on civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against seller's salesperson, based on salesperson's alleged agreement with buyer's employee to submit inflated invoices to buyer; evidence showed approximately seventy acts spread over almost two years and that unlawful acts recurred with regularity over at least fifteen months, and purposes, results, participants, and methods of commission of alleged acts were same. Cosmos Forms Ltd. v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1997, 113 F.3d 308. Federal Civil Pro- cedure 2509.5

Taking view most favorable to defendant/loan promoter, in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) case alleging securities fraud as predicate acts, there was evidence presenting fact issue as to whether investor had alleged “pattern” of racketeering activity; investor claimed to have been induced to make nine separ-

ate advances of cash, in connection with participation in loans, over 37-month period. Laker v. Freid, D.Mass.1994, 854 F.Supp. 923. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 80

Genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether commodities broker used the telephone in support of a scheme to churn bank's account and as to whether the broker's use of telephone constituted a pattern of racketeering activity, precluding summary judgment in favor of the broker and his employer on bank's RICO claim based on predicate offenses of wire fraud. Evanston Bank v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., N.D.Ill.1985, 623 F.Supp. 1014. Federal Civil Procedure 2490

136. ---- Predicate acts, summary judgment, practice and procedure generally

Genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bureau of Land Management (BLM) employees were merely enforcing the law or were using their otherwise lawful authority to extort right-of-way from ranch owner precluded summary judgment for employees, on ground of qualified immunity, as to owner's claim that employees' alleged violations of Hobbs Act constituted predicate acts supporting owner's claim that employees violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Robbins v. Wilkie, C.A.10 (Wyo.) 2006, 433 F.3d 755, certiorari granted 127 S.Ct. 722, 549 U.S. 1075, 166 L.Ed.2d 559, reversed and remanded 127 S.Ct. 2588, 551 U.S. 537, 168 L.Ed.2d 389, on remand 497 F.3d 1122. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Ranch owner's right against use of extortionate means, in violation of Hobbs Act, by Bureau of Land Manage- ment (BLM) employees who sought to obtain right-of-way across owner's property was clearly established, thus defeating employees' claim of qualified immunity as to owner's claim that Hobbs Act violations constituted predicate acts supporting owner's claim that employees violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); weight of authority clearly prohibited employees' alleged conduct, so as to give them notice that alleged conduct violated the law. Robbins v. Wilkie, C.A.10 (Wyo.) 2006, 433 F.3d 755, certiorari granted 127 S.Ct. 722, 549 U.S. 1075, 166 L.Ed.2d 559, reversed and remanded 127 S.Ct. 2588, 551 U.S. 537, 168 L.Ed.2d 389, on remand 497 F.3d 1122. United States 50.10(1)

No genuine issue of material fact existed sufficient to withstand summary judgment on claim of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) conspiracy, where plaintiffs did not identify any predicate acts that were subject of alleged conspiracy. Williams v. Prince Georges County Hosp. Center, D.Md.1996, 932 F.Supp. 687, affirmed 103 F.3d 122. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Fact issue as to whether value of any interstate shipment of stolen fitness equipment exceeded $5,000, as required to establish predicate act under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), precluded summary judgment on civil RICO claim based on the shipments. Federal Ins. Co. v. Ayers, E.D.Pa.1991, 772 F.Supp. 1503, reconsideration denied. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

137. ---- Racketeering activity, summary judgment, practice and procedure generally

Genuine issue of material fact regarding whether actions of seller of stock and related entities amounted to pattern of racketeering activity precluded summary judgment on purchasers' claims under Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), in light of evidence of number of distinct sales of stock alleged to involve same fundamental misrepresentation inflating value of shares and alleged continued efforts to sell interests based on inflated value. Azrielli v. Cohen Law Offices, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 21 F.3d 512. Federal Civil Proced- ure 2509.5

Summary judgment on pilots' RICO theory regarding pilots' union as vehicle for racketeering activities perpetrated by airline and pilot representing union in negotiations with airline was precluded by fact questions as to whether union posed continuing threat of engaging in racketeering activities, and as to whether defendant pilot's receipt of retirement benefits would constitute mail fraud or embezzlement or conversion, and thus as to whether he posed a continuing threat. Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Intern. AFL-CIO, C.A.5 (La.) 1990, 901 F.2d 404, modified on denial of rehearing , certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 244, 498 U.S. 895, 112 L.Ed.2d 203, on remand. Federal Civil Procedure 2497.1

Genuine issue of material fact as to whether alleged scheme on part of seller of truck parts to defraud seven departments of city over period of ten years, through thousands of invoices charging inflated prices, constituted “pattern of racketeering” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) precluded summary judgment for city on RICO claim; reasonable person could conclude that there was only one fraudulent scheme involved, i.e., seller fraudulently inflating prices on invoices for goods sold to city. City of Chicago v. Reliable Truck Parts Co., Inc., N.D.Ill.1993, 822 F.Supp. 1288, reconsideration denied 828 F.Supp. 40. Federal Civil Procedure 2510

Genuine issues of material fact existed, precluding summary judgment in creditor's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action, on whether alleged mail fraud and wire fraud used in scheme to defraud creditor into making loans for nonexistent purchases of automobiles amounted to “pattern” of racketeering activity. United Savers Acceptance Corp. v. Kelton, D.Vt.1991, 775 F.Supp. 141. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Issue of material fact as to whether attorney and accountant who prepared opinion letters for real estate limited partnership offering knowingly or recklessly participated in conduct of enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity, and whether such participation was effected by means of conspiracy, precluded summary judgment for attorney and account in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action brought by investors. Gilmore v. Berg, D.N.J.1991, 761 F.Supp. 358. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether physicians conducted racketeering activity through RICO enterprise, which was law firm, precluding summary judgment on civil RICO claims against physicians in connection with allegedly fraudulent automobile accident insurance scheme. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rosenfield, E.D.Pa.1988, 683 F.Supp. 106. Federal Civil Procedure 2515

Whether doctor caring for resident of home for the aged was associated with home with common purpose of engaging in alleged pattern of racketeering activity was fact question precluding summary judgment against doctor in resident's RICO claim based upon alleged efforts to evict resident from home. Khaimi v. Schonberger, E.D.N.Y.1987, 664 F.Supp. 54, affirmed 838 F.2d 1203. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether certain directors of issuer received income through a pattern of racketeering activity and used that money to buy issuer's notes, precluding summary judgment in their favor on claims seeking recovery for violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(a); however, remaining defendants were entitled to summary judgment in their favor on that issue. Ahern v. Gaussoin, D.C.Or.1985, 611 F.Supp. 1465. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

138. Jury trial, practice and procedure generally

Civil claim for conspiracy under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) may proceed to jury despite directed verdict on substantive RICO claim for conducting or participating in enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity. Neibel v. Trans World Assur. Co., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1997, 108 F.3d 1123. Conspiracy 21

Trial judge's determination that he was foreclosed from inquiring into certain extraneous matters allegedly considered by jury by rule protecting jury's deliberation process was not an abuse of discretion, since court instructed jury that deliberations were to be confined to evidence at trial, and jury foreman stated that he reminded jury of its duty to confine itself to the evidence; jury had allegedly considered existence of insurance to pay any judgment, effect of verdict on local economy, assessment of trial costs in event of a hung jury, and trebling of damages under RICO. Bolton v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1989, 871 F.2d 1266, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 83, 493 U.S. 823, 107 L.Ed.2d 49. Federal Civil Procedure 1974.1

Plaintiffs' use of statistical evidence rather than individualized proof to establish liability and damages did not violate cigarette manufacturers' Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in class action under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleging that manufacturers induced tens of millions of smokers to buy “light” cigarettes by falsely representing that they would experience reduced health risks. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., E.D.N.Y.2006, 449 F.Supp.2d 992, reversed 522 F.3d 215. Jury 31.2(1)

Cigarette manufacturers had no right to jury trial in government's action for mail and wire fraud and conspiracy under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); government's RICO claims did not exist in common law and were not analogous to common-law fraud and conspiracy claims, since mail and wire fraud statutes, alleged violation of which constituted predicate acts, did not require proof of reliance or damages or completion of scheme to defraud, and disgorgement of profits sought by government was equitable relief. U.S. v. Philip Morris, Inc., D.D.C.2002, 273 F.Supp.2d 3. Jury 14(1)

Action under this section seeking treble damages for persons injured by violations of section 1962 of this title was legal in nature and therefore U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 7 required jury trial on demand. NSC Intern. Corp. v. Ryan, N.D.Ill.1981, 531 F.Supp. 362. Jury 14(2)

139. Burden of proof, practice and procedure generally

Predicate acts perhaps need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt in a private treble damages action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; fact that the offending conduct is described by refer-

ence to criminal statutes does not mean that its occurrence must be established by criminal standards or that the consequences of a finding of liability in a private civil action are identical to the consequences of a criminal conviction. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., U.S.N.Y.1985, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 473 U.S. 479, 87 L.Ed.2d 346, dissenting opinion 105 S.Ct. 3292, 473 U.S. 479, 87 L.Ed.2d 346. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

In order to prevail, civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) plaintiff must establish that defendants conducted or participated in conduct of enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity, including mail fraud and extortion. McLaughlin v. Anderson, C.A.2 (Conn.) 1992, 962 F.2d 187. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to finding of liability in a civil RICO action. Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1987, 834 F.2d 1297, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 3241, 492 U.S. 917, 106 L.Ed.2d 588. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968] does not require anything more to make out civil claim than to make out criminal case. Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., C.A.3 (Pa.) 1985, 769 F.2d 940, on remand 643 F.Supp. 107; Fleischhauer v. Feltner, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1989, 879 F.2d 1290, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 1122, 493 U.S. 1074, 107 L.Ed.2d 1029, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 1473, 494 U.S. 1027, 108 L.Ed.2d 611. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 1

Standard of proof is lower in a civil proceeding brought pursuant to this section than it is in a criminal proceeding brought under this chapter. U. S. v. Cappetto, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1974, 502 F.2d 1351, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 1121, 420 U.S. 925, 43 L.Ed.2d 395. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79; Torts 436

To maintain RICO claim, plaintiff must prove that defendant participated in conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity. Abrams & Wofsy v. Renaissance Inv. Corp., N.D.Ga.1993, 820 F.Supp. 1519. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Counties which brought civil racketeering conspiracy action based on defendants' connection with fraudulent scheme to obtain public contract for sewage disposal services met burden of production on issues of injury or causal link between injury and defendants' conduct; counties' uncontroverted affiants stated that city water and sewage department charged counties rate that was linked to a number of factors, including sludge disposal costs that defendants aided in inflating and that injuries stemmed from defendants' RICO activities. County of Oak- land by Kuhn v. City of Detroit, E.D.Mich.1991, 776 F.Supp. 1211. Conspiracy 19

Elements of RICO claim remain same regardless of whether it is brought as criminal prosecution or civil suit, and only difference is burden of proof, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal prosecution and preponderance of the evidence in civil suit. Costantino v. TRW, Inc., N.D.Ohio 1991, 773 F.Supp. 34, affirmed in part , modified in part and remanded 13 F.3d 969, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Plaintiff, whose RICO action alleged a pattern of racketeering activity involving an investment account he held with defendant, a corporation engaged in commodities futures trading, did not meet his burden of proving that the parties' “forum selection” agreement was induced by fraud or that he would be denied his day in court or that enforcement of such agreement would unreasonably force him to litigate in another jurisdiction; accordingly, the agreement was a valid exercise of contractual rights. Deolalikar v. Murlas Commodities, Inc., E.D.Pa.1984, 602 F.Supp. 12. Contracts 141(3)

Preponderance of the evidence standard was appropriate burden of proof to be applied in civil action under this section where defendants did not face criminal sanctions or a risk of a significant deprivation of liberty or stigma, and nature of relief sought by government was equitable and remedial in nature, not punitive. U.S. v. Local 560, Intern. Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, D.C.N.J.1984, 581 F.Supp. 279, affirmed 780 F.2d 267, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 2247, 476 U.S. 1140, 90 L.Ed.2d 693. Com- merce 80

Even if standard of proof is lower in civil proceeding under this section than in criminal one, such does not relate to elements of crime but only to burden that plaintiff must bear in showing elements. Moss v. Morgan Stan- ley Inc., S.D.N.Y.1983, 553 F.Supp. 1347, affirmed 719 F.2d 5, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1280, 465 U.S. 1025, 79 L.Ed.2d 684. Commerce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Plaintiff seeking treble damages for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy must plead and prove by preponderance of evidence that: defendant personally agreed to violate at least two predicate acts; defendant willfully became member of such conspiracy; plaintiff suffered injury; and defendant proximately caused that injury. In re Windsor Plumbing Supply Co., Inc., Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y.1994, 170 B.R. 503. Conspiracy 1.1

140. Admissibility of evidence, practice and procedure generally

Testimony of other borrowers on coercion by bank was relevant and admissible in case in chief on borrowers' civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act to show bank's alleged wrongful intent to coerce restructuring of loan. Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 30 F.3d 339. Evidence 106(5)

Evidence in civil RICO action of defendant's finances and business dealings and transfer of funds, of SEC investigation, of IRS revenue reports, and of unhappy investors in a book project did not impermissibly put defendant's lifestyle and character on trial, nor did remarks during closing argument or use of chart by plaintiffs' counsel summarizing defendant's corporate affiliations. Morley v. Cohen, C.A.4 (Md.) 1989, 888 F.2d 1006. Evidence 106(5); Evidence 146

In civil RICO action, there was no abuse of discretion in excluding evidence of alleged discovery abuse by plaintiff, where documents in question were not listed in pretrial order nor had court been informed of them at any time prior to proffer, and proffered evidence would delay proceedings, requiring trial counsel's testimony and possible substitution of counsel. Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1987, 834 F.2d 1297, certiorari

denied 109 S.Ct. 3241, 492 U.S. 917, 106 L.Ed.2d 588. Federal Civil Procedure 1941

Erroneous admission of unauthenticated letters of alleged coconspirator caused serious prejudice to defendant and required new trial in action for damages under RICO, for common-law fraud, and for violation of Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, in view of little evidence against defendant and enorm- ous judgment against defendant as contrasted with amount for which plaintiff settled with author of the letters. Mayer v. Angelica, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1986, 790 F.2d 1315, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 891, 479 U.S. 1037, 93 L.Ed.2d 843. Federal Civil Procedure 2334

Proposed testimony of drug manufacturer's proffered experts met Daubert requirements for admission in suits alleging claims for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various state consumer protection statutes, and claims for common law fraud and unjust enrichment; each proffered expert was distinguished scientist whose expertise probably would be helpful in deciding relevant scientific and economic issues. In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, E.D.N.Y.2007, 493 F.Supp.2d 571. Evidence 508; Evidence 536

Certified public accountant (CPA) would not be permitted to render any opinion in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action regarding damages sustained by plaintiff or as to existence of fraud, given that testimony contained mathematical mistakes, that CPA made unsupported assertions and projections, that CPA deliberately ignored documents and figures which would strike a CPA in the face, and that CPA picked and chose among purported facts to maximize plaintiff's damages; however, court would consider permitting CPA or second CPA to present summary or calculation of damages after conclusion of plaintiff's case on liability, provided that summary or calculation was based on facts in evidence and was presented in clear and consistent manner. De Jager Const., Inc. v. Schleininger, W.D.Mich.1996, 938 F.Supp. 446. Evidence 555.9

Codefendant's incriminating testimony against defendant was admissible during remedy phase of civil RICO action, where testimony had been fully admitted into record and was relied upon to support liability findings in prior phase of trial. U.S. v. Local 1804-1 Intern. Longshoremen's Ass'n, S.D.N.Y.1993, 831 F.Supp. 177, affirmed in part , vacated in part 52 F.3d 1173, on remand 1996 WL 22377, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 934, 516 U.S. 1122, 133 L.Ed.2d 861. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 78

Clerk of United States District Court of New Jersey was not needed to authenticate various documents from pri- or criminal prosecution of defendant to support claim that government was barred by double jeopardy clause from obtaining monetary relief in civil RICO action, where same documents had already been admitted into evidence in liability phase of case and government did not dispute their authenticity. U.S. v. Local 1804-1 In- tern. Longshoremen's Ass'n, S.D.N.Y.1993, 831 F.Supp. 177, affirmed in part , vacated in part 52 F.3d 1173, on remand 1996 WL 22377, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 934, 516 U.S. 1122, 133 L.Ed.2d 861. Evidence 366(7)

Testimony of attorney who was ancillary administrator of singer's estate was admissible in estate's civil Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against singer's former legal and financial advisors; code of professional responsibility section precluding attorney from testifying as witness in action he is litigat-

ing was inapposite because attorney was not representing estate in RICO action, main areas addressed in attorney's direct testimony were clearly subjects in which he was personally involved, any conflict of interest attorney may have had went to his credibility and did not affect admissibility of his testimony and nature and extent of attorney's alleged conflicts of interest and bias were subject of extensive and vigorous cross-examination. Bingham v. Zolt, S.D.N.Y.1993, 823 F.Supp. 1126, affirmed 66 F.3d 553, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1418, 517 U.S. 1134, 134 L.Ed.2d 543, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1891, 517 U.S. 1240, 135 L.Ed.2d 185, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1870, 517 U.S. 1230, 134 L.Ed.2d 967. Attorney And Client 22; Witnesses 67

Deposition of a witness, who apparently worked with a Costa Rican agency allegedly equivalent to the FBI, in which testimony did not establish that witness had any familiarity with the document, but in which witness stated from memory that the letter concluded that one of the named defendants committed bombing alleged as predicate act for civil RICO claim, was unreliable and could not be considered to establish causation element of predicate act. Avirgan v. Hull, S.D.Fla.1988, 691 F.Supp. 1357, affirmed 932 F.2d 1572, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 913, 502 U.S. 1048, 116 L.Ed.2d 813. Evidence 320

Records of nonparty antiabortion group were admissible, in civil RICO suit by abortion clinic against protestors, in that number of protestors were affiliated with group and records were relevant to show planning or organization of predicate offenses. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, E.D.Pa.1988, 689 F.Supp. 465, affirmed 868 F.2d 1342, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 261, 493 U.S. 901, 107 L.Ed.2d 210, rehearing denied 110 S.Ct. 1515, 494 U.S. 1050, 108 L.Ed.2d 651, on remand 745 F.Supp. 1082. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 78

141. Questions for jury, practice and procedure generally

In civil action brought under this section by county against furnisher of office supplies, whether conduct of furnisher and its two employees was “enterprise” within meaning of this chapter was question for jury. Alcorn County, Miss. v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., C.A.5 (Miss.) 1984, 731 F.2d 1160. Commerce 80

142. Questions for court, practice and procedure generally

Legal cause determination in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action is properly one for court, taking into consideration such factors as foreseeability of particular injury, intervention of other independent causes, and factual directness of causal connection. Chisolm v. TranSouth Financial Corp., C.A.4 (Va.) 1996, 95 F.3d 331. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 80

District court, and not jury, determined amount of attorney fees awarded to civil Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) plaintiff. Bingham v. Zolt, S.D.N.Y.1993, 823 F.Supp. 1126, affirmed 66 F.3d 553, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1418, 517 U.S. 1134, 134 L.Ed.2d 543, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1891, 517 U.S. 1240, 135 L.Ed.2d 185, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1870, 517 U.S. 1230, 134 L.Ed.2d 967. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 82

Issue of whether plaintiff's business or property was injured by reason of unlawful predicate acts, as required for

standing to sue under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is question of law for the court, taking into consideration such factors as foreseeability of particular injury, intervention of independent causes and factual directness of causal connection. Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., W.D.Mo.1991, 773 F.Supp. 174, reversed 985 F.2d 383, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 2459, 508 U.S. 957, 124 L.Ed.2d 674. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 80

143. Instructions, practice and procedure generally

It was reversible error for district court to instruct jury in bank's civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act that bank's officers' participation in borrowers' alleged bank fraud could not be imputed to bank in determining whether bank's reliance on borrowers' actions was reasonable, where there was evidence that bank officers were aware of borrowers' purportedly fraudulent misrepresentations, and jury charge did not require bank to prove that it relied on misrepresentations or that officers were acting ultra vires. Bank of China, New York Branch v. NBM LLC, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2004, 359 F.3d 171, for additional opinion, see 89 Fed.Appx. 751, 2004 WL 322484, certiorari granted in part 125 S.Ct. 2956, 545 U.S. 1138, 162 L.Ed.2d 886, certiorari dismissed 126 S.Ct. 675, 546 U.S. 1026, 163 L.Ed.2d 545, on remand 2004 WL 1907308. Federal Courts 909; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 80

District court's instructions did not permit jury to find Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy solely upon proof that defendant agreed to commit predicate crimes; instructions separated enterprise from pattern of racketeering activity and carefully explained each element necessary for predicate offenses. U.S. v. Krout, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1995, 66 F.3d 1420, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 963, 516 U.S. 1136, 133 L.Ed.2d 884. Conspiracy 48.2(2)

Absence of instruction that informed jury of relationship between causation and reliance between prohibited conduct under RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) and plaintiff's injury provided no basis for reversal where there was plainly sufficient evidence for jury to find the required causation and reliance, although such an instruction would have been preferable. Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1992, 983 F.2d 350, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 2445, 508 U.S. 952, 124 L.Ed.2d 662. Federal Courts 911

Jury was properly instructed not to consider increase in value of diverted corporations in civil Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action, where defendants failed to proffer sufficient evidence on what portion of increase in value of corporations was attributable to their efforts and expenditures. Bingham v. Zolt, S.D.N.Y.1993, 823 F.Supp. 1126, affirmed 66 F.3d 553, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1418, 517 U.S. 1134, 134 L.Ed.2d 543, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1891, 517 U.S. 1240, 135 L.Ed.2d 185, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1870, 517 U.S. 1230, 134 L.Ed.2d 967. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 80

144. Weight and sufficiency of evidence, practice and procedure generally

Sufficient evidence established that each of defendant's three predicate acts were related to organized crime family's enterprise, as well as to each other, as required to satisfy the relatedness requirement in defendant's Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) prosecution; defendant was member of organized crime family, and as member, defendant orchestrated predicate acts of murdering two associates and participating in

loansharking operations. U.S. v. Daidone, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2006, 471 F.3d 371, post-conviction relief denied 2009 WL 2611943, affirmed 422 Fed.Appx. 26, 2011 WL 1878679, certiorari denied 132 S.Ct. 598, 181 L.Ed.2d 424. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

Jury could find that union members suffered damage to property as a result of concessions given by union in negotiations with employer, as result of employer's agreement to make improper pension payments to certain union negotiators, on the basis of circumstantial evidence that gaining personal pension benefits was of paramount concern to the negotiators and was a condition of their agreement to any settlement, that the negotiators brought up their personal pension requests more than once and discussed it intermittently throughout the negotiation process, that employer's vice president for employee relations presented detailed set of conditions under which employer would agree to pension requests and that, even after concessions were negotiated, union negotiators refused to sign agreement until they received assurances that their pension requests would be considered favor- ably. Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1994, 17 F.3d 1386, modified on rehearing 30 F.3d 1347, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 900, 513 U.S. 1110, 130 L.Ed.2d 784. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Jury could find that developer's injuries from city council's rejection of its development proposal were caused by alleged bribery of mayor and two members of the city council by other developers, despite claim that their votes would not have been sufficient to obtain approval of the development, based on the extent of mayor's alleged role in proceedings and her lobbying of city officials to oppose the project and attempts to persuade a major tenant of the proposed development to consider another site. Bieter Co. v. Blomquist, C.A.8 (Minn.) 1993, 987 F.2d 1319, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 81, 510 U.S. 823, 126 L.Ed.2d 50, on remand 848 F.Supp. 1446, on remand 156 F.R.D. 173. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 80

145. New trial, practice and procedure generally

Corporation could not be entitled to new trial based on trial court's failure to instruct jury concerning RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) requirement that, for securities law violation to serve as RICO predicate act, violation had to be willful where corporation did not request that specific instruction, did not object to trial court's instructions, and did not request that post-verdict interrogatory be submitted to jury on question of willfulness. Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1992, 983 F.2d 350, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 2445, 508 U.S. 952, 124 L.Ed.2d 662. Federal Civil Procedure 2336

Former students were entitled to new trial on damages in their RICO action against beauty college, based on conspicuous inconsistency between jury's judgment that college had violated RICO and its assessment of zero damages. Rosario v. Livaditis, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 963 F.2d 1013, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 972, 506 U.S. 1051, 122 L.Ed.2d 127. Federal Civil Procedure 2344

146. Arbitration, practice and procedure generally

Unreimbursed physicians could be compelled to arbitrate their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against managed-health-care organizations; open question of whether parties' arbitration

agreements, which precluded “punitive” damage awards, would be construed to limit arbitrator's authority to award treble damages available under RICO was for arbitrators to decide in first instance. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, U.S.2003, 123 S.Ct. 1531, 538 U.S. 401, 155 L.Ed.2d 578, on remand 333 F.3d 1247. Al- ternative Dispute Resolution 137; Alternative Dispute Resolution 143; Alternative Dispute Resolu- tion 198

Customers could effectively vindicate their civil RICO claim for treble damages against broker in arbitral forum, and thus, their predispute agreement with broker to arbitrate was enforceable as to RICO claim under the Arbit- ration Act. Shearson/American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, U.S.N.Y.1987, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 482 U.S. 220, 96 L.Ed.2d 185, rehearing denied 108 S.Ct. 31, 483 U.S. 1056, 97 L.Ed.2d 819, on remand 835 F.2d 1429. Altern- ative Dispute Resolution 413

Computer equipment buyer's claims against seller for breach of contract, fraud, and violation of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) arising out of sale of allegedly defective equipment fell within scope of arbitration clause, notwithstanding contention that arbitration clause was “centerpiece” of seller's alleged fraudulent scheme; clause was broad, covering any controversy or claim, including any claim of misrepresentation, arising out of or related to agreement, breach thereof, or furnishing of any equipment by seller, agreement including arbitration clause was entered into 15 years before sale at issue, and allegations of fraud related to inducement to make purchase, rather than inducement to enter agreement. Daisy Mfg. Co., Inc. v. NCR Corp., C.A.8 (Ark.) 1994, 29 F.3d 389. Alternative Dispute Resolution 145

Unavailability of treble damages under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) did not make forum selection and arbitration clauses, calling for application of English law in English forum, unenforceable in agreements entered into by investors in Lloyd's insurance syndicates; investors had adequate potential remedies in England, and there were significant disincentives to deter English issuers from unfairly exploiting American investors. Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1993, 996 F.2d 1353, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 385, 510 U.S. 945, 126 L.Ed.2d 333. Alternative Dispute Resolution 414; Contracts 127(4)

Arbitration provision in reinsurance agreement was not broad enough to cover RICO suit brought by State Dir- ector of Insurance, as liquidator of insurer, alleging conspiracy to defraud on part of other party to agreement by causing insurer to operate while insolvent and draining insurer of its most profitable business; suit did not involve interpretation of reinsurance agreement, as arbitration provision required, but rather wide-scale fraud perpetrated upon insurer. Washburn v. Societe Commerciale de Reassurance, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1987, 831 F.2d 149. In- surance 3626

Civil RICO claims are arbitrable. Nesslage v. York Securities, Inc., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1987, 823 F.2d 231.

RICO claims arising in international context are arbitrable; declining to follow Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Es- tabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir.); Rhoades v. Powell, 644 F.Supp. 645 (E.D.Cal.); Preston v. Kruezer, 641 F.Supp. 1163 (N.D.Ill.); Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 785 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir.). Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., Ltd., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1987, 815 F.2d 840. Al- ternative Dispute Resolution 510

Even where civil RICO claim is based on predicate act 10b-5 violations and those underlying 10b-5 claims are arbitrable, RICO claim is not arbitrable; declining to follow Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir.). Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., C.A.1 (Mass.) 1986, 806 F.2d 291. Alternative Dispute Resolution 412

Supreme Court decision holding that even when arbitrable securities claims are intertwined with nonarbitrable security claims, arbitration act requires district court to compel arbitration was applicable retroactively to Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims not already fully litigated between the parties. Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1986, 805 F.2d 1221, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 3211, 482 U.S. 928, 96 L.Ed.2d 698. Courts 100(1)

In suit between securities broker and customer concerning the balance owed by customer on a margin account, the district court properly required arbitrable state law contract claims to go to arbitration despite their being intertwined with an exclusively federal RICO claim. Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., C.A.11 (Ga.) 1985, 763 F.2d 1352. Alternative Dispute Resolution 414

Investors' claim against precious metals dealer for alleged violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO) required arbitration, under brokerage contract's arbitration clauses requiring arbitration of “any and all disputes, claims or controversies arising out of or relating to any transaction” between investors and dealer, even though agreement imposed remedial limitations insulating dealer from treble damages and attorney fees available under RICO and required investors to pay for at least half of arbitration costs, since arbitration agreement contained validity clause empowering arbitrator to decide scope and validity of arbitration agreement, including validity of remedial limitations. Monex Deposit Co. v. Gilliam, C.D.Cal.2009, 616 F.Supp.2d 1023. Alternative Dispute Resolution 414

Borrowers' motion, in action based on fraudulent loan transactions, to dissolve prohibition on their pursuit of certain Swiss arbitrations, would be granted; arbitrations would no longer interfere with Court's jurisdiction, inasmuch as final judgment had been entered on lenders' state law claims, and process of arbitration might allow lenders to reinstate their claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, S.D.N.Y.2003, 274 F.Supp.2d 481, stay granted in part 275 F.Supp.2d 519, motion to dismiss appeal denied 115 Fed.Appx. 473, 2004 WL 2370656, affirmed in part , vacated in part and remanded 388 F.3d 39, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 2270, 544 U.S. 1044, 161 L.Ed.2d 1080. Prohibition 31

Claims pertaining to coventurer's operation of oil and gas wells, which involved performance of its obligations and duties under joint venture and operating agreements, were subject to arbitration under clause allowing arbitration of any dispute or controversy arising out of or relating to joint venture agreement, regardless whether claims were styled as tort, contract, or Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims. UMC Petro- leum Corp. v. J & J Enterprises, Inc., W.D.Pa.1991, 758 F.Supp. 1069. Alternative Dispute Resolution 143

Arbitration panel, empowered by arbitration agreement to consider “any and all differences and disputes of whatsoever nature arising out of” charter could properly consider charterer's claim for treble damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Kerr-McGee Refining Corp. v. Triumph Tankers

Ltd., S.D.N.Y.1990, 740 F.Supp. 288, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds 924 F.2d 467, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 81, 502 U.S. 821, 116 L.Ed.2d 54. Shipping 39(7); Alternative Dispute Resolution 143

Customer's claims of securities fraud and federal RICO violations were arbitrable under the Federal Arbitration Act. Benoay v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., S.D.Fla.1988, 699 F.Supp. 1523. Alternative Dispute Resolution 412

Federal racketeering claims were arbitrable, even though law existing at time of agreement stated that federal racketeering claims were not arbitrable; United States Supreme Court decision that federal racketeering claims were arbitrable was retroactive. Araim v. PaineWebber, Inc., N.D.Ga.1988, 691 F.Supp. 1415. Alternative Dis- pute Resolution 121; Courts 100(1)

Former customer's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims and securities fraud claims against brokerage firm and stockbroker were subject to arbitration. Gilmore v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1987, 668 F.Supp. 314. Alternative Dispute Resolution 412

Claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act were arbitrable whether or not underlying predicate acts were arbitrable; declining to follow McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.); Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 797 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir.); Tashea v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 802 F.2d 1337 (11th Cir.); Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook, and Weeden, 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir.); calling into doubt Sacks v. Dean Witter, 627 F.Supp. 377 (C.D.Cal.); West v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 623 F.Supp. 26 (W.D.Wash.); Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F.Supp. 561 (N.D.Cal.). Hall v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., C.D.Cal.1987, 662 F.Supp. 468.

Claims that seller of right to conduct business under corporate name and its officers violated RICO by committing predicate acts of mail fraud and wire fraud were not subject to arbitration, where neither buyer nor seller sought to compel arbitration of claim, and officers of seller were not parties to arbitration agreement. J.D. Mar- shall Intern., Inc. v. Redstart, Inc., N.D.Ill.1987, 656 F.Supp. 830. Alternative Dispute Resolution 141; Al- ternative Dispute Resolution 143

The plaintiffs' RICO claims were subject to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act absent express congressional intent in either text or legislative history to exempt RICO cause of action from mandatory arbitration; declining to follow McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.). Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., W.D.Tex.1986, 650 F.Supp. 220, affirmed 805 F.2d 1221, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 3211, 482 U.S. 928, 96 L.Ed.2d 698. Alternative Dispute Resolution 121

State claims asserted in federal action under doctrine of pendent jurisdiction by stock brokerage customers who had signed agreements providing that any controversy arising out of accounts or transactions should be settled by arbitration, unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, were subject to arbitration, even though some of the federal claims were not subject to arbitration. Romyn v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., D.Utah 1986, 648

F.Supp. 626. Alternative Dispute Resolution 414

Claims for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act were arbitrable pursuant to arbitration clause in customer margin agreement with stockbroker; declining to follow Witt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 602 F.Supp. 867(W.D.Pa.); Jacabson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 605 F.Supp. 510 (W.D.Pa.); Universal Marine Insurance Co. v. Beacon Insurance Co., 588 F.Supp. 735 (W.D.N.Car.); Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F.Supp. 561 (N.D.Cal.); S.A. Mineracao Da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah International, Inc., 576 F.Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y.). Finne v. Dain Bosworth Inc., D.Minn.1986, 648 F.Supp. 337. Alternative Dispute Resolution 413

Customer's claim against broker under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, for “churning” customer's account, were subject to arbitration. Bob Ladd, Inc. v. Adcock, E.D.Ark.1986, 633 F.Supp. 241. Altern- ative Dispute Resolution 412

If arbitration of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization claims [18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)] is to be prohibited, it must be done by Congress, not by Court of Appeals. Brener v. Becker Paribas Inc., S.D.N.Y.1985, 628 F.Supp. 442. Constitutional Law 2503(1)

Customers' RICO claims against broker and brokerage firm with which the customers had agreement which contained standard arbitration clause were arbitrable. Bale v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., D.Minn.1986, 627 F.Supp. 650. Alternative Dispute Resolution 413

Claim of client of securities broker under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1964] were arbitrable. Sacks v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., C.D.Cal.1985, 627 F.Supp. 377. Alternative Dispute Resolution 412

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1964] are arbitrable. West v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., W.D.Wash.1985, 623 F.Supp. 26. Alternative Dispute Resolution 123

Where customer's securities and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims against securities broker and account executive were not arbitrable, and where common-law claims were factually identical to securities law and RICO claims, claims subject to arbitration under customer agreements would not be severed for arbitration. Witt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., W.D.Pa.1985, 602 F.Supp. 867. Alternative Dispute Resolution 412

Relevant arbitration clause in partnership agreement and applicable arbitration rule of options exchange did not require arbitration of plaintiff partners' claim against defendant partners for violation of this chapter; in light of general public interest in enforcement of this chapter to combat organized crime, plaintiffs were entitled to federal forum for claims under this chapter. Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, N.D.Cal.1984, 586 F.Supp. 561. Alternative Dispute Resolution 412; Partnership 82

Claims under this section were not subject to arbitration where resolution of such claims would have impact on society at large. S.A. Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Intern. Inc., D.C.N.Y.1983, 576 F.Supp. 566, amended on other grounds 579 F.Supp. 1049, affirmed 745 F.2d 190. Alternative Dispute Resolution 121

147. Attachment, practice and procedure generally

City established that its RICO treble damages claim had probability of success on merits such that attachment of defendants' property under New York law, due to possibility that they would attempt to conceal it so as to defraud creditors or to frustrate enforcement of judgment which might be rendered in city's favor, was proper, notwithstanding defendants' contentions that their criminal RICO convictions did not establish their civil liability because city would still have to prove that it had been injured in its business or property; RICO claim arose out of bribery of public officials such that city would be entitled to recover value of bribes and amounts paid under fraudulently procured contract, and collateral estoppel effect of criminal convictions established that city was likely to succeed on merits. City of New York v. Citisource, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1988, 679 F.Supp. 393. Attachment 111

City seeking to attach defendants' property in RICO treble damages action could not use the doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent defendants from litigating issues of fact they already litigated in a criminal RICO case under statute intended to facilitate enforcement of foreign judgments. City of New York v. CitiSource, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1988, 676 F.Supp. 546, on reargument 679 F.Supp. 393. Judgment 648

Creditor seeking attachment of debtor's assets under treble damages portion of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act was not entitled to attachment of that amount absent specification of single date, place or manner of communicating mail or wire fraud alleged. Filmtrucks, Inc. v. Earls, S.D.N.Y.1986, 635 F.Supp. 1158 . Attachment 102

Property insurer sufficiently demonstrated reasonable likelihood of success in establishing resulting injuries caused by submission of fraudulent insurance claims in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to justify attachment, even though specific amount of injury was not clear, where testimony depic- ted losses incurred as result of fraudulent claims by body shops. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Rodco Autobody, D.Mass.1991, 138 F.R.D. 328. Attachment 249

148. Forum selection, practice and procedure generally

District court was not required to address issues of unclean hands and estoppel before proceeding on Russian consortia's motion for dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds of removed action brought by former majority shareholders of Russian company, that maintained Russia's largest vanadium ore plant, for alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, arising from allegedly illegal takeover of company. Davis Intern., LLC v. New Start Group Corp., C.A.3 (Del.) 2007, 488 F.3d 597, on remand 2009 WL 1321900. Federal Courts 45

Russia was not a presently available adequate alternative forum for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-

tions Act (RICO) claims asserted by Canadian-based majority shareholder of Russian oil company against various defendants, arising from defendants' alleged takeover of company, and thus action should not have been dismissed on ground of forum non conveniens; even if defendants agreed to submit to jurisdiction of Russian courts, and Russian law provided comparable causes of action, Russian courts would consider issues involved in present action to be precluded by default judgment entered against shareholder in separate action brought by one defendant to invalidate portion of shareholder's equity interest in company. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access In- dustries, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2005, 416 F.3d 146, certiorari denied 126 S.Ct. 2320, 547 U.S. 1175, 164 L.Ed.2d 860, on remand 540 F.Supp.2d 438. Federal Courts 45

149. Attorney fees, practice and procedure generally

Res judicata and limitations issues raised in doctor's action against hospital and related defendants were subject to reasonable dispute, and, if he had prevailed on his broadest contentions, doctor's claims under Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) would have gone forward against all defendants, and therefore neither sanctions nor award of attorney fees for filing frivolous appeal from dismissal of action was warranted. Misischia v. St. John's Mercy Health Systems, C.A.8 (Mo.) 2006, 457 F.3d 800, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1258, 549 U.S. 1245, 167 L.Ed.2d 145. Federal Civil Procedure 2771(11); Federal Civil Procedure 2840

Attorney fees defendant incurred to defend against withdrawn violation of probation charge and possession of a controlled substance charge were non-compensable pecuniary losses related to personal injuries, and thus did not constitute a cognizable Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) injury, as required to provide a plaintiff with standing under RICO. Evans v. City of Chicago, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2006, 434 F.3d 916. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) allowing for award of costs and attorney fees to prevailing plaintiffs does not provide remedy for defendants who successfully defend against RICO suit. Sullivan v. Hunt, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2003, 350 F.3d 664. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 82

Prevailing defendants in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action were not entitled to attorney fees even though parties' three real estate contracts which were basis of action stated that prevailing party in action arising out of contract would be entitled to attorney fees where each plaintiff signed only one contract; RICO requires pattern of activity which could only be satisfied based on all three real estate contracts. Chang v. Chen, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1996, 95 F.3d 27. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 82

Party seeking attorney's fees in civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) has burden to establish entitlement to particular award by presenting adequate documentation of its efforts in the litigation. United HealthCare Corp. v. American Trade Ins. Co., Ltd., C.A.8 (Minn.) 1996, 88 F.3d 563. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 82

Award of attorney's fees in action by singer's estate alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, and other claims against singer's former legal and financial advisors was not excessive on grounds that certain expenses were unreasonable or that three of six charges were dismissed as time-barred, as estate submitted detailed accounting of claimed attorney's fees and, despite dismissal, estate obtained jury verdict and judgment against defendants. Bingham v. Zolt, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1995, 66 F.3d 553, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1418, 517 U.S. 1134, 134 L.Ed.2d 543, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1891, 517 U.S. 1240, 135 L.Ed.2d 185, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1870, 517 U.S. 1230, 134 L.Ed.2d 967. Federal Civil Procedure 2737.5; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 82

District court did not abuse its discretion by making substantial disallowances for deficient recordkeeping, rather than directing total denial of attorney fees and costs to victorious plaintiff in civil RICO action against inspectors for board of education's division of school buildings who required contractors to participate in kickback scheme in awarding maintenance and repair contracts. Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 28 F.3d 1335. Federal Civil Procedure 2737.5

Striking petition for attorney fees by successful plaintiff in federal RICO suit, based on noncompliance with local rules for making timely petition, was not abuse of discretion even if counsel overlooked time limit in local rules. Quick v. Peoples Bank of Cullman County, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1993, 993 F.2d 793. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 82

Attorney fees awarded to students who successfully sued beauty college for its alleged violations of RICO and the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act did not have to be reduced, on ground that majority of attorneys' time was devoted to RICO claims and that students were awarded no damages on RICO claims, where RICO claims were related to and arose out of same transaction as Fraud Act claim. Rosario v. Livaditis, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 963 F.2d 1013, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 972, 506 U.S. 1051, 122 L.Ed.2d 127. Antitrust And Trade Regulation 397

Attorney fees could not be denied under RICO fee-shifting provision on ground that supporting documentation was too extensive; when faced with extensive documentation, it would have been preferable for district court to require submitting party to organize time and material in meaningful way with comprehensive summary so that material was understandable and easily reviewable. FMC Corp. v. Varonos, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1990, 892 F.2d 1308. Federal Civil Procedure 2737.5

No “rule of proportionality” barred civil RICO plaintiffs who recovered $2,661 in damages from recovering attorney fees and costs in excess of $60,000. Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1989, 889 F.2d 466, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 1788, 494 U.S. 1068, 108 L.Ed.2d 790. Federal Civil Procedure 2737.5

Plaintiff who obtained a preliminary injunction in a civil action under this section but who then settled case was not entitled to an award of attorney fees, since only plaintiffs who obtain judgment on the merits are entitled to attorney fees under this chapter. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1984, 730 F.2d 905. Com- merce 80

Appellate fees of more than $170,000 for successfully defending the $250,000 jury verdict obtained on claims against rogue employee under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), for allegedly forging internal documents to allow his coconspirators to obtain payment for nonexistent goods, were dispropor- tionate to amount at stake, and had to be reduced by half when fixing a reasonable appellate fee award under fee-shifting provision of RICO. International Floor Crafts, Inc. v. Adams, D.Mass.2012, 847 F.Supp.2d 254. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 82

Fees paid to attorney to file Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action are not injury to business or property, required for standing to maintain RICO action. Walter v. Palisades Collection, LLC, E.D.Pa.2007, 480 F.Supp.2d 797. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Reimbursement of attorney fees would be appropriate sanction against attorney for filing frivolous civil Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit. Carousel Foods of America, Inc. v. Abrams & Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.2006, 423 F.Supp.2d 119. Federal Civil Procedure 2814

If given the opportunity to replead, insurance broker, who provided insurance-related services to counterdefend- ants on behalf of a number of projects, could seek recovery under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) of legal expenses incurred in other proceedings as a result of insureds' alleged RICO scheme since insurance broker could allege that his injury was proximately caused by RICO predicate acts; insurance broker could allege that he was an unwitting tool in insureds' criminal scheme to defraud HUD and project owners, and thus that his injuries were a foreseeable outcome of the misconduct and were solely the result of insureds' actions, and there was no risk of multiple recoveries. Burger v. Kuimelis, N.D.Cal.2004, 325 F.Supp.2d 1026. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Defendant was not entitled to exempt his attorney fees incurred in his criminal case and on appeal from disgorgement award in civil RICO action. U.S. v. Local 1804-1 Intern. Longshoremen's Ass'n, S.D.N.Y.1993, 831 F.Supp. 177, affirmed in part , vacated in part 52 F.3d 1173, on remand 1996 WL 22377, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 934, 516 U.S. 1122, 133 L.Ed.2d 861. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 83

Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) plaintiff's request for attorney fees and dis- bursements in amount of $3,564,033.48 would be reduced by 15% to $3,029,428.46; although district court did not challenge veracity of plaintiff's figures, it did question reasonableness of certain expenses, such as billing $24,108.75 in legal fees in single day and 23 hours charged by single attorney on single day. Bingham v. Zolt, S.D.N.Y.1993, 823 F.Supp. 1126, affirmed 66 F.3d 553, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1418, 517 U.S. 1134, 134 L.Ed.2d 543, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1891, 517 U.S. 1240, 135 L.Ed.2d 185, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1870, 517 U.S. 1230, 134 L.Ed.2d 967. Federal Civil Procedure 2742.5

There are eight elements that must be pled before plaintiff may avail himself or herself of enhanced damage and attorney fees provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO): that defendant, through commission of two of enumerated predicate acts, which constitute “pattern” of “racketeering activity,” directly or directly participates in conduct of “enterprise,” activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce, and that plaintiff was injured in his or her business or property by reason of such conduct. Porter v. Shearson Lehman Bros. Inc., S.D.Tex.1992, 802 F.Supp. 41. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Prevailing party in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action was not entitled to award of attorney fees for services which had been billed by attorneys as related to the representation of insurer in civil RICO lawsuit and on work involving issues which would benefit insurer in pending state court proceeding. Hertz Corp. v. Caulfield, E.D.La.1992, 796 F.Supp. 225. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 82

Base attorney fee award under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) would be reduced by 30% in light of numerous entries and difficulty in matching such entries with plaintiff's single successful claim; descriptions of legal work performed, were short, clipped and vague. Nu-Life Const. Corp. v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, Div. of School Bldgs. of Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, E.D.N.Y.1992, 795 F.Supp. 602, affirmed 28 F.3d 1335. Federal Civil Procedure 2737.5

Attorney fees incurred in settling claim against one defendant, rather than prosecuting claims against all defendants, would be disallowed in civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act for alleged federal and state securities violations. Thiem v. Sigler, W.D.Pa.1985, 651 F.Supp. 460. Federal Civil Procedure 2737.5

Plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of $16,390.44 incurred in collecting a settlement of a racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations action, for the period between entry of judgment for settlement amount and actual collection of the judgment, but not to any fees incurred outside that period, in view of the fact that fee award was based solely on settlement agreement and the fact that it once contained a RICO count, which was subsequently settled, was irrelevant. Johnson v. Old World Craftsmen, Ltd., N.D.Ill.1986, 638 F.Supp. 289. Federal Civil Procedure 2737.5

Trustee and other named defendants in suit brought by trust beneficiaries who alleged violations of this chapter were entitled to award of attorney fees, because counsel for plaintiffs omitted from the complaint relevant and indisputable facts within his knowledge, and it was apparent that the action was commenced in bad faith without adequate factual basis. King v. Lasher, S.D.N.Y.1983, 572 F.Supp. 1377. Federal Civil Procedure 2791

Fact that insurer obtained favorable settlement with insurance broker in suit under this chapter and would have been regarded as “prevailing party” under Equal Access to Justice Act, section 2412 of Title 28, Civil Rights At- torney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 section 1988 of Title 42, or section 2000e-5 of Title 42 did not entitle it to award of attorney fees under this section, because attorney fees are not available under this section when disposition is by settlement. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, E.D.N.Y.1983, 570 F.Supp. 908, affirmed 730 F.2d

905. Costs 194.25

Borrower's claims asserted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and under Pennsylvania law prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts and practices (UDAP) were meritless, and borrower accordingly would not be able to recover any fees for services performed solely in connection with those claims, although entire suit was settled in one package. In re Mattera, Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa.1991, 128 B.R. 107, affirmed 144 B.R. 687. Bankruptcy 2188

Federal district court did not abuse its discretion in its award of $55,000 in attorney fees and costs to defendants as prevailing party in RICO and Oregon state ORICO proceeding, in light of the number of motions, orders, and amended complaints filed in the action. Acro-Tech, Inc. v. Robert Jackson Family Trust, C.A.9 (Or.) 2003, 84 Fed.Appx. 747, 2003 WL 22783349, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 82; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 118

Time expended by former employee on claims asserted against former employers pursuant to Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was compensable as part of attorney fee award on successful claims under Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), even though RICO claims were dismissed as untimely, inasmuch as RICO claims rested on common core of fact and offered alternative legal ground for remedy actually obtained under FLSA claims. Tran v. Tran, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 67 Fed.Appx. 40, 2003 WL 21308620, Unrepor- ted. Labor And Employment 2403

Fifty percent reduction of attorney fees that were sought by plaintiff for travel time as part of attorney fee award under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was warranted pursuant to district court practice, which recognized that travel time was less productive than regular time. Group III Capital, Inc. v. Para- sol Group, Ltd., S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 1948801, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 82

150. Attorney representation, practice and procedure generally

Federal common law of attorney-client privilege applied to civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). In re Bieter Co., C.A.8 1994, 16 F.3d 929, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied. Federal Courts 416

District court would not exercise its inherent discretion to appoint guardian ad litem for prisoners who had been sued as party defendants in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action, notwithstanding that their incarceration might require some special proceedings to protect their interests, where private counsel had made special appearances for prisoners. Buchanan County, VA v. Blankenship, W.D.Va.2005, 406 F.Supp.2d 642. Prisons 310

Though law offices of attorney who was also one of three defendants in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) action were disqualified from representing the other defendants because of potential conflicts of interest arising from prior representation of plaintiff, attorney defendant, through his firm, was en-

titled to represent himself and could defend himself by disclosing information about those discrete disputes involving himself. Reading Anthracite Co. v. Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co., Inc., E.D.Pa.1991, 771 F.Supp. 113. Attor- ney And Client 21.15

Law offices were disqualified from representing defendants in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action where attorney who had been sole proprietor of firm had also been chief executive officer of plaintiff corporation and his law offices were located in, on the payroll of, and performed general legal services for plaintiff, as well as for defendants, which were competitors of plaintiff and entities in which attorney had an interest, even though there was no clear nexus between prior representation of plaintiff and the present litigation. Reading Anthracite Co. v. Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co., Inc., E.D.Pa.1991, 771 F.Supp. 113. Attorney And Client 21.5(1)

151. Judicial remedies or relief, practice and procedure generally

Once Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) liability is established, trial court has broad discretion in fashioning relief and is explicitly authorized to order any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1995, 44 F.3d 1082. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 82; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 83

Remedies of divestiture (with compensation) of defendant's interest in RICO enterprise and of disgorgement (without compensation) of the ill-gotten proceeds of racketeering activity may be appropriately ordered as measures of relief for government in civil RICO action; however, remedy of forfeiture of defendant's entire interest in enterprise--without demonstration by government that the entire interest constitutes tainted proceeds of racketeering activity--is inappropriate and unavailable. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 83

152. Contempt, practice and procedure generally

Where one of defendants refused to testify despite grant of immunity in proceeding brought pursuant to this section, and other defendants refused to obey court's order to appear for depositions, defendants were in contempt and were subject to appropriate sanctions. U. S. v. Cappetto, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1974, 502 F.2d 1351, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 1121, 420 U.S. 925, 43 L.Ed.2d 395. Federal Civil Procedure 1456; Witnesses 21; Witnesses 304(1)

Union's district council and its president would not be held in contempt for its failure to give prior notice of its intent to enter into collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) which eliminated requirement that certain contractors could not request services of particular carpenter on the job unless that carpenter had worked for requesting contractor within the past six months, as that failure did not violate a consent decree in civil litigation under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); consent decree did not apply to district council's negotiation of CBAs with contractors' associations. U.S. v. District Council of New York City, S.D.N.Y.2006, 409 F.Supp.2d 439, reconsideration denied 2006 WL 1586560, reversed and remanded 229 Fed.Appx. 14, 2007 WL 1157143, on remand 2007 WL 2265584, on remand 2007 WL 2324338, on remand 592 F.Supp.2d 708. Fed-

eral Civil Procedure 2397.6

Civil contempt sanctions, consisting of fine of $25,000 per day of noncompliance to be paid into court registry, were warranted to coerce compliance by defendant in action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) with court orders requiring production of documents in possession of defendant's affiliate, through either production or logging of privileged documents, with possibility of imposition of further contempt remedies if noncompliance continued past set date. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., D.D.C.2003, 287 F.Supp.2d 5, issued 2003 WL 22495729. Federal Civil Procedure 1640

153. Damages, practice and procedure generally--Generally

“Fluid recovery” plan, under which smokers would prove collective damages on class-wide basis and individual smokers would then claim shares of fund, would violate Rules Enabling Act and Due Process Clause if used in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action alleging that manufacturers deceived smokers into believing that “light” cigarettes were more healthful than “full-flavored” cigarettes, in that aggregate determination was likely to result in astronomical damages figure that would not accurately reflect number of smokers injured and would bear little or no relationship to amount of economic harm caused by manufacturers. McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2008, 522 F.3d 215. Constitutional Law 3981; Federal Civil Procedure 182.5

Damages to construction company due to competitors' conspiracy to rig bids for state construction contracts were not proximately caused by competitors' violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where it was possible that competitors would have won contracts absent bid-rigging scheme, and state was fully capable of pursuing appropriate remedies. James Cape & Sons Co. v. PCC Const. Co., C.A.7 (Wis.) 2006, 453 F.3d 396. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Insurer was entitled to damages in RICO action equal to the entire amount of its payment on fraudulent claims, regardless of any portion of the claims that might have been supportable in the absence of any fraud, as those making the claims was a material breach of the insurance contracts. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. P & B Autobody, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1994, 43 F.3d 1546. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Contractor was entitled to damages for lost profits on municipal contracts that it would have obtained but for racketeering conspiracy, where contractor sought damages in RICO action against inspectors for New York City Board of Education's division of school buildings, not from municipality for rejecting low bid. Terminate Con- trol Corp. v. Horowitz, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 28 F.3d 1335. Conspiracy 20

Damages awarded in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action arising out of vendors' filing of forged notice of release of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax lien, with result that title insurance company agreed to insure purchaser's title to property without exception for IRS's right of redemption, were properly calculated based on amount which insurer had to pay on policy, together with attorney fees incurred by insurer in litigating unsuccessful quiet title action against IRS, minus amounts that insurer received when IRS redeemed property. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Florida, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1991, 937 F.2d 447. Racketeer Influ-

enced And Corrupt Organizations 85

In action alleging Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act violations associated with participation in film investment program, investors' damages would be limited to amounts actually invested. Fleischhauer v. Feltner, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1989, 879 F.2d 1290, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 1122, 493 U.S. 1074, 107 L.Ed.2d 1029, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 1473, 494 U.S. 1027, 108 L.Ed.2d 611. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 85

Cigarette smoker's alleged damages for money spent purchasing cigarettes, for medical expenses, and for his physical and mental suffering from having chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), were not recoverable in a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against cigarette manufacturers, alleging that manufacturers used the mails, wire, radio and/or television in interstate commerce to misrepresent the harmful and addictive nature of cigarettes; such damages were for personal injury rather than injury to property or business interest. Bougopoulos v. Altria Group, Inc., D.N.H.2013, 2013 WL 3105100. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 85

Production company, alleging that entertainment booking agency and its agents violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision regarding pattern of racketeering activity, and that violation caused injury to company's business due to lost profits and harm to business reputation, was entitled to default judgment on claim under RICO provision authorizing civil damages action to any person injured in his business by reason of RICO violation, where defendants admitted allegations by virtue of their default. Loop Production v. Capital Connections LLC, S.D.N.Y.2011, 797 F.Supp.2d 338. Federal Civil Procedure 2415

Insureds and claimants did not always act together in collectively filing 24 fraudulent claims against eight automobile insurers in a four-year span in violation of section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) making it unlawful to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity affecting interstate commerce, and thus damages awards would be issued in separate judgments against each defendant specifying which amounts would be paid severally and which jointly. Puerto Rico American Ins. Co. v. Burgos, D.Puerto Rico 2008, 556 F.Supp.2d 86. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Revenue rule did not bar claims by Colombian national and regional governmental agencies against liquor manufacturers under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to recover lost revenues and profits resulting from enterprise's money laundering, even though it would be necessary for factfinder to recognize existence of Colombian tax laws and, to some extent, evaluate effects that evasion of such taxes had on parties' liquor revenues and profits, where it would not be necessary for court to rule on validity of Colombian tax laws. Republic of Colombia v. Diageo North America Inc., E.D.N.Y.2007, 531 F.Supp.2d 365, certificate of appealability 619 F.Supp.2d 7. International Law 10.10

“One satisfaction rule,” whereby plaintiff may not recover twice for same injury, did not preclude claims brought under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by professional wrestling promoter against licensing agents, alleging conspiracy to provide favorable licensing terms to promoter's licensees in exchange for unlawful payments from those licensees; to extent that promoter recovered on state counterclaims

and could not show that state claims arose from different facts or that injury suffered was different, state court recovery would be set off against any recovery on RICO claim. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Jakks Pacific, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2006, 425 F.Supp.2d 484, affirmed 328 Fed.Appx. 695, 2009 WL 1391807. Damages 15; Damages 63

Plaintiffs asserting claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act were not required to establish their damages through documentary evidence. OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe Intern., Inc., S.D.N.Y.2005, 380 F.Supp.2d 243. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Complaint of two union members failed to sufficiently allege nature of injuries they suffered from being denied a “racketeer-free” membership in union local, as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against international union and local union activists who allegedly conducted or conspired to conduct union affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity to place union local under emergency trusteeship to effectuate ouster of its principal officer; trusteeship had been found legal, and members did not allege concrete financial loss resulting from alleged racketeering. Anderson v. Ayling, E.D.Pa.2003, 297 F.Supp.2d 805, affirmed 396 F.3d 265. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

In determining extent of damages against defaulting defendant, defrauded investors were limited to damages demanded in original complaint, and were not entitled to damages based on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) claims in amended complaint, where investors' original complaint gave no notice that they sought treble damages under RICO, even though investors were cognizant that they may have had such a claim. In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, E.D.N.Y.1996, 948 F.Supp. 1154. Federal Civil Procedure 2422

Lost profits, or expectancy damages, are recoverable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), subject to proof of proximate causation and that damages are not speculative. Frankford Trust Co. v. Advest, Inc., E.D.Pa.1996, 943 F.Supp. 531. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Even though misrepresentations were mailed to another person, where they were received, read, and relied upon by buyers of feed storage system, and there was no evidence that addressee took any action that intervened to cause buyers' injury from alleged RICO violations by the seller, seller was liable for all damages, including those related to the addressee's decision to lease his system to the buyers. Martin v. A.O. Smith Corp., W.D.Mich.1996, 931 F.Supp. 543. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

City was not entitled to transfer of defendant's ill-gotten gains resulting from Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations; city was only entitled to recovery of its economic losses. City of Chicago Heights, Ill. v. Lobue, N.D.Ill.1996, 914 F.Supp. 279. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, investor could not recover for investments not made, or for lost future profits, based on investor's abandonment of investment technique, even though investor, as aspect of claims for damages relating to trading losses suffered, suffered damages from defendants' “squeeze”

of market which increased demand for notes, requiring plaintiff investors to pay inflated prices to purchase or borrow notes required to cover its short position, where investor did not attempt to leverage or finance further trading, abandoned butterfly trading strategy, made no effort to replace lost capital from existing or new sources if potentially profitable trades were to be made, and failed to establish with sufficient certainty a causal nexus between defendants' alleged RICO violations and the alleged loss of future profits. Three Crown Ltd. Partner- ship v. Salomon Bros., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1995, 906 F.Supp. 876. Fraud 60

Claim for damages from investment of racketeering income was deficient because borrowers did not allege that lender partnership or its agents invested racketeering income in any way which injured borrowers, though borrowers claimed that investment allowed lender and agents to continue their enterprise. R.C.M. Executive Gallery Corp. v. Rols Capital Co., S.D.N.Y.1995, 901 F.Supp. 630. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Jury was properly precluded from considering wife's intestate share of her husband's estate in assessing damages in estate's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against husband's former legal and financial advisors; advisors failed to proffer sufficient evidence to provide jury with sound basis for approximating with reasonable certainty amount of wife's entitlement and thus, any determination by jury as to such amount would be speculative and could not constitute proper basis for offset. Bingham v. Zolt, S.D.N.Y.1993, 823 F.Supp. 1126, affirmed 66 F.3d 553, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1418, 517 U.S. 1134, 134 L.Ed.2d 543, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1891, 517 U.S. 1240, 135 L.Ed.2d 185, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1870, 517 U.S. 1230, 134 L.Ed.2d 967. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 80

Video equipment company could recover lost profits for alleged RICO violation of second video equipment company arising out of the aborted merger of the two companies. Sound Video Unlimited, Inc. v. Video Shack Inc., S.D.N.Y.1988, 700 F.Supp. 127. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Where racketeering activity explicitly proscribed by this chapter is proven, damages may be awarded to appropriate plaintiff without proof that defendant is connected to organized crime. Mauriber v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1982, 546 F.Supp. 391. Commerce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 37

National prescription audit (NPA) data was reasonable proxy for what third-party payors (TPP) paid at retail for prescription drugs during class period and for assessing aggregate damages for entire consumer class period, and thus could be used by expert witness to determining aggregate TPP damages in action alleging that publisher of electronic drug pricing information and pharmaceutical wholesaler engaged in racketeering enterprise to fraudulently state average wholesale price (AWP) for prescription drugs, in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state law, despite contention that reliance on NPA data would lead to over- statement of aggregate damages due to inclusion of Medicaid and uninsured data; NPA data was frequently used source of data summarizing variety of business transactions, strategic behavior, and corporate activity of pharmaceutical manufacturers, there was close relationship between NPA data and actual TPP reimbursement figures for bellwether drugs, and it was possible to exclude Medicaid and uninsured data. New England Carpenters Health Benefits Fund v. First DataBank, Inc., D.Mass.2008, 248 F.R.D. 363. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt

Organizations 85

In action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleging that defendants failed to disclose existence of scheme to defraud customers of commodities firm by soliciting and stimulating excessive trading in commodities options, appropriate measure of damages was total amount of customers' out of pocket capital invested which they would not have invested but for alleged scheme. Waters v. International Precious Metals Corp., S.D.Fla.1996, 172 F.R.D. 479. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Damages sustained by investors in purported tax shelter, when IRS disallowed deductions claimed and assessed penalty against investors, were not type of damages recoverable in civil RICO action against entity which had induced them to invest in shelter; injuries sustained by investors were not injuries personally sustained as result of conduct, if any, violative of federal RICO statute. In re Securities Group 1980, Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.1991, 124 B.R. 875, subsequently affirmed in part , vacated in part 74 F.3d 1103. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 85

Investor sufficiently pleaded Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) standing to support jury's award of damages following entry of default judgment against owner of sham real estate entity involved in fraudulent real estate enterprise; plaintiff pleaded that, by virtue of the predicate acts, the value of the real estate entity in which he had invested was depleted, and that owner used sham entity as his alter ego to further the criminal enterprise of materially misrepresenting and artificially inflating property values and caused investor to unknowingly contribute capital and resources to the enterprise's scheme, resulting in the misappropriation of investor's funds and profits. Stooksbury v. Ross, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 2013, 2013 WL 2665596. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 59; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 62

Amendment of judgment rendered in boxing champion's favor was not warranted so as to reflect jury's purported intent to subsume damages from champion's claims for fraud and violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against promoters and their principal within damages that were awarded for breach of fiduciary duty when jury was instructed to list damages amount due for each claim and to make the prevailing party whole only once, and promoters and principal raised no objections to court's instruction or its explanation that it would add up amounts indicated by jury for each claim, did not seek clarification of verdict at the time it was rendered, did not show that jury departed from court's instructions, and failed to timely move to amend judgment. Panix Productions, Ltd v. Lewis, S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 21659370, Unreported. Federal Civil Pro- cedure 2651.1

District court was not required to conduct separate hearing to determine damages after granting creditor's motion for default judgment against borrower and related individual, based on their discovery violations and bad faith efforts to prolong litigation, inasmuch as damages were established with reasonable certainty through parties' declarations, affidavits, and exhibits, extensive documentary evidence before court relating to liability and damages, including underlying agreements attached to creditor's complaint, creditor's statement in support of its claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which contained extensive description of defendants' alleged activity and detailed allegations of relevant predicate acts, and court's knowledge of case acquired during more than two and one-half years that it had been pending. Group III Capital, Inc. v. Para-

sol Group, Ltd., S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 1948801, Unreported. Federal Civil Procedure 2421

154. ---- Indirect injury, damages, practice and procedure generally

Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.] directly injured party should receive complete recovery; indirectly injured party should look to recovery of directly injured party, not the wrongdoer, for relief. Carter v. Berger, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1985, 777 F.2d 1173. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

155. ---- Interest, damages, practice and procedure generally

District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest to investors on their Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against operators of a complex investment program, which purportedly allowed high income individuals to initially lease thoroughbred mares, breed those mares for a season and then keep the resulting foal, and also later provided alternative mineral investment opportunities, where operators unfairly delayed the course of litigation when several designated witness failed to show up for scheduled depositions without any explanation. In re ClassicStar Mare Lease Litigation, C.A.6 (Ky.) 2013, 2013 WL 3746220. Interest 39(2.20)

Trebled award of prejudgment interest under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) would be inappropriate, where award of treble damages, without trebled prejudgment interest, was adequate to compensate class plaintiffs for their damages. In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, E.D.N.Y.1996, 948 F.Supp. 1154. Interest 39(2.20)

Where court trebles damages pursuant to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), awarding prejudgment interest probably will be unnecessary as treble damages usually will be more than adequate compensation for actual damages suffered; however, exceptional circumstances may exist, where treble damages do not adequately compensate plaintiff for actual damage or where defendant unreasonably and unfairly has sought to delay or obstruct course of litigation, warranting imposition of prejudgment interest on RICO judgment. Bing- ham v. Zolt, S.D.N.Y.1993, 810 F.Supp. 100. Interest 39(2.20)

Prejudgment interest award is not necessary to fairly compensate successful RICO plaintiff. Nu-Life Const. Corp. v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, E.D.N.Y.1992, 789 F.Supp. 103. Interest 39(2.20)

Buyer which succeeded on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act claim brought against gas supplier was not entitled to recover prejudgment interest; multiple damages more than reimbursed buyer for any loss suffered from unavailability of funds. Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., E.D.La.1986, 642 F.Supp. 781. Interest 39(2.30)

Award of prejudgment interest on damages awarded to boxing champion for promoters' violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was not warranted, inasmuch as treble damages adequately compensated champion, and jury refusal's to award punitive damages indicated that conduct of promoters' prin-

cipal was not so egregious as to merit prejudgment interest on top of treble damages. Panix Productions, Ltd v. Lewis, S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 21659370, Unreported. Interest 39(2.20)

Creditor was not entitled to prejudgment interest in addition to treble damages that it was awarded against borrower and related individual pursuant to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), given creditor's failure to cite supporting authority and lack of specific provision in RICO statute allowing for interest award. Group III Capital, Inc. v. Parasol Group, Ltd., S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 1948801, Unreported. Interest 39(2.20)

156. ---- Predicate acts, damages, practice and procedure generally

Other than economic damages resulting from loss of free advertising on television show, damages that employer sought in its action against union under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and its state law claims alleging tortious interference with contract and unfair trade practices were reputational in nature, and thus employer was required under First Amendment to demonstrate that union's speech during its “corporate campaign” against employer was false and made with actual malice, even if union was engaging in extortionate practices; employer's claims for “direct” expenses realized as a result of union's corporate campaign, for customer specific lost profits, for nationwide lost profits, and for the cumulative abnormal returns on its stock price were significantly, and perhaps inextricably, linked with the contention that the union's conduct damaged employer's corporate reputation. Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers In- tern. Union, E.D.Va.2008, 585 F.Supp.2d 815. Antitrust And Trade Regulation 389(1); Constitutional Law 1912; Labor And Employment 1988; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85; Torts 242

Under Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), alleged mail and wire fraud on part of officers and directors of corporation, undertaken for purpose of monetizing assets and diverting assets for their benefit, were acts of securities fraud under §§ 10(b) which could not serve as predicate acts required for claim under Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Gatz v. Ponsoldt, D.Del.2003, 297 F.Supp.2d 719. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Measure of civil damages under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is harm caused by predicate acts constituting illegal pattern. County of Oakland by Kuhn v. Vista Disposal, Inc., E.D.Mich.1995, 900 F.Supp. 879. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Plaintiffs' allegation that they were “wrongfully deprived of substantial funds” as result of defendant's fraud was sufficient to allege damages to business or property as result of alleged fraud under RICO, since injury under RICO need not be separate from harm from predicate acts. Hilliard v. Shell Western E & P, Inc., W.D.Mich.1993, 836 F.Supp. 1365, reversed 149 F.3d 1183, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 608, 525 U.S. 1048, 142 L.Ed.2d 548. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Damages under this section are available only for injuries suffered by reason of violation of this chapter and not

by reason of the predicate violation; where only damages asserted by defendants were those arising out of mail fraud, treble damages under this section were not recoverable. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, N.D.Ill.1983, 577 F.Supp. 111, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds 747 F.2d 384, certiorari granted 105 S.Ct. 902, 469 U.S. 1157, 83 L.Ed.2d 917, affirmed 105 S.Ct. 3291, 473 U.S. 606, 87 L.Ed.2d 437, dissenting opinion 105 S.Ct. 3292, 473 U.S. 479, 87 L.Ed.2d 346, on remand 662 F.Supp. 590. Commerce 80

The “by reason of” language of this chapter does not limit recovery to damages distinct from those caused by predicate acts. Crocker Nat. Bank v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., N.D.Cal.1982, 555 F.Supp. 47. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 82

157. ---- Punitive damages, practice and procedure generally

Long-distance telephone service provider's act of including in its long-distance bills fees charged by company that conducted telephone gambling game, which provider had agreed to bill and collect for company, in violation of federal and state racketeering statutes, was sufficiently reprehensible to find that award of punitive damages would not be excessive under the Due Process Clause; provider's conduct was deceitful and involved repeated actions, and could be deemed as designed to exploit unsophisticated customers, and there was little evidence that provider acted to shut down gambling line until it was sued. Kemp v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., C.A.11 (Ga.) 2004, 393 F.3d 1354. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 118

District court could reduce from $1 million to $250,000 punitive damages awarded to singer's estate in action alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations against singer's former legal and financial advisors and was not required to vacate entire award, based on postjudgment finding that RICO cause of action could not support punitive damages, as aggregate punitive damages award was preferred, due to risk that separate awards would result in higher total, and award was not so high as to shock judicial conscience and constitute denial of justice. Bingham v. Zolt, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1995, 66 F.3d 553, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1418, 517 U.S. 1134, 134 L.Ed.2d 543, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1891, 517 U.S. 1240, 135 L.Ed.2d 185, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1870, 517 U.S. 1230, 134 L.Ed.2d 967. Damages 94.10(1)

Provider of letter of credit was entitled to recover punitive damages on proof of falsified documents being submitted to permit drawing down letter of credit which substantiated fraud and conversion claims, but which was insufficient to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Holmberg v. Morrisette, C.A.8 (Minn.) 1986, 800 F.2d 205, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 1953, 481 U.S. 1028, 95 L.Ed.2d 526. Banks And Banking 191.30

Where county chose, through its complaint, to seek equitable remedy of cancellation or rescission of contract rather than legal remedy of contract damages, and county did not seek actual damages based upon tort law, county had no claim for punitive damages in action against furnisher of office supplies arising from illegal purchases of those supplies by county official. Alcorn County, Miss. v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., C.A.5 (Miss.) 1984, 731 F.2d 1160. Damages 87(2)

To determine whether relief is punitive and thereby precluded by Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) provision defining civil remedies that limited liability to disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, court must consider how much money is disgorged and how such amount is calculated. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, D.D.C.2004, 316 F.Supp.2d 19. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 83

Punitive damage award based on civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations would not be appropriate, where plaintiff received $800,000 on its RICO claims which was trebled by trial court to $2,400,000. Bingham v. Zolt, S.D.N.Y.1993, 823 F.Supp. 1126, affirmed 66 F.3d 553, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1418, 517 U.S. 1134, 134 L.Ed.2d 543, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1891, 517 U.S. 1240, 135 L.Ed.2d 185, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1870, 517 U.S. 1230, 134 L.Ed.2d 967. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 85

Punitive damages are not proper under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) since Act already provides for treble damages. Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, D.Del.1992, 821 F.Supp. 232. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Award of treble damages adequately compensated prevailing plaintiff estate in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action for actual damages suffered, so that estate was not entitled to prejudgment interest on its RICO recovery; there was evidence that value of diverted estate assets was actually enhanced during period of wrongdoing, estate did not allege that defendants charged excessive or unduly high fees for their services, and estate had been awarded $1 million in punitive damages against one of defendants. Bing- ham v. Zolt, S.D.N.Y.1993, 810 F.Supp. 100. Interest 39(2.20)

Claim for punitive damages could be asserted in civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) despite availability of treble damages. Com-Tech Associates v. Computer Associates Intern., Inc., E.D.N.Y.1990, 753 F.Supp. 1078, affirmed 938 F.2d 1574. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 85

Unsuccessful bidder, which alleged that navy contractor obtained navy contracts through low bids and costs achieved by improper disposal of hazardous wastes, could not seek punitive damages under either RICO or Cali- fornia Business & Professions Code; civil remedy provision of RICO provided for treble damages which were themselves punitive in character and unsuccessful bidder's relief under California statute was limited to equitable relief, including restitution. Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., N.D.Cal.1989, 720 F.Supp. 805. Antitrust And Trade Regulation 392; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Punitive damages are not appropriate in addition to treble damages provided by RICO. Moravian Development Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., E.D.Pa.1986, 651 F.Supp. 144. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Buyer of money certificates established that issuer and its president acted with gross fraud or with willful disreg-

ard for rights of buyer and four other individuals who were taken in by scheme so as to be entitled to award of punitive damages, but buyer would be awarded $50,000 punitive damages rather than requested $150,000 punitive damages, in light of fact that buyer had received treble damages award for the Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act violation. Al-Kazemi v. General Acceptance & Inv. Corp., D.D.C.1986, 633 F.Supp. 540 . Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Claim for punitive damages in action alleging that person who performed accounting and auditing services for corporate investment group aided and abetted fraud, mismanagement and waste of corporate assets, and violations of this chapter would not be dismissed where each of the counts stated claims upon which relief could be granted. Kranzdorf v. Green, E.D.Pa.1983, 582 F.Supp. 335. Accountants 10.1; Commerce 80

158. ---- Settlement, damages, practice and procedure generally

Investors could not maintain Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action where they received, in settlement, amount they lost in investments; investors suffered no damages as resulted of alleged violation. Commercial Union Assur. Co., plc v. Milken, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 17 F.3d 608, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 198, 513 U.S. 873, 130 L.Ed.2d 130. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

159. ---- Taxes, damages, practice and procedure generally

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.] applies to tax frauds, and government may recover losses from underpayment of taxes; fact that government may have recouped loss by raising rate of tax does not defeat its recovery. Carter v. Berger, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1985, 777 F.2d 1173. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Revenue rule barred claims by Colombian national and regional governmental agencies against liquor manufacturers for damages under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) resulting from lost liquor taxes in connection with manufacturers' alleged enterprise with illegal narcotics traffickers to launder proceeds of illegal narcotics sales and to illegally smuggle liquor into Colombia. Republic of Colombia v. Diageo North America Inc., E.D.N.Y.2007, 531 F.Supp.2d 365, certificate of appealability 619 F.Supp.2d 7. International Law 10.10

160. ---- Treble damages, practice and procedure generally

The “by reason of” language of the treble damages and attorney fee provision under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which provides that “[a]ny person injured by reason of a violation of [the enterprise activity provision] of this chapter may sue therefor,” requires a showing of both “but for” causation and proximate cause; that is, a plaintiff must show that but for the defendants' conduct he would not have been injured, and he must also show some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged. Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, Inc. of Peoria, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2004, 388 F.3d 990. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) defendants were not entitled to put before jury

RICO's treble damage and attorney fees provisions, despite their claim that they were deprived of valuable im- peachment material that would demonstrate that plaintiffs' witnesses had motive to lie in order to obtain bonanza of treble damage awards as well as attorney fees; plaintiffs were seeking over $5 million in compensatory damages plus punitive damages, and defendants were free to argue that amount of damages before trebling provided powerful incentive to fabricate. HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 22 F.3d 41. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 78

Congress did not intend to grant treble-damages remedy to people or firms injured as a consequence of being used as a tool of criminal enterprise. Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1982, 686 F.2d 449, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 177, 459 U.S. 880, 74 L.Ed.2d 145, on remand 601 F.Supp. 336. Damages 227

Supplemental briefing would be required on whether civil treble damages under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) would be calculated on total amount of funds insurer and manager of company that packaged various types of insurance coverage to sell to union workers allegedly diverted from company, or calculated on amount of funds allegedly owed to company after accounting for monies insurer and manager had paid before company had filed civil RICO suit, absent determination that insurer or manager were liable under RICO. EMC Nat. Life Co. v. Employee Benefits Systems, Inc., S.D.Iowa 2011, 827 F.Supp.2d 979. Federal Civil Procedure 611.15

Reference that subscribers to certain health plans and out-of-network medical care providers, as assignees of certain subscribers' benefits claims, had been deprived of “hundreds of millions of dollars or more” was not clearly defined damages amount, as required for claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) seeking treble damages based upon insurers' alleged scheme to under-reimburse beneficiaries and medical care providers by manipulating “usual, customary, and reasonable” (UCR) data, since amount stated was estimate, and therefore was neither clear nor definitive. American Medical Ass'n v. United Healthcare Corp., S.D.N.Y.2008, 588 F.Supp.2d 432. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Long distance service provider, held liable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for its practice of hiding additional end-user charge from pay telephone owners so as to avoid having to pay contractually-owed commissions, was liable to owners for treble damages in addition amounts awarded for breach of contract, plus owners' reasonable attorney fees. Regency Communications, Inc. v. Cleartel Communications, Inc., D.D.C.2004, 304 F.Supp.2d 1. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), city was entitled to three times total of overbilling by defendant for quantities of water treatment chemical that were never delivered. City of Chicago Heights, Ill. v. Lobue, N.D.Ill.1996, 914 F.Supp. 279. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Treble damages of more than 1.3 million dollars were awarded against attorney in civil RICO damages suit arising from attorney's embezzlement of funds entrusted to attorney while acting as executor of estate and under power of attorney. D'Orange v. Feely, S.D.N.Y.1995, 894 F.Supp. 159, affirmed 101 F.3d 1393, certiorari denied 118 S.Ct. 309, 522 U.S. 919, 139 L.Ed.2d 238. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), treble damages are mandatorily assessed upon finding of liability. Resolution Trust Corp. v. S & K Chevrolet, C.D.Ill.1994, 868 F.Supp. 1047. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Former European distributors of product used to treat wastewater and aquarium water were liable under RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) and Ohio Corrupt Activities Act to seller for compensatory damages in excess of $3.9 million, representing treble the amount of sum of unpaid product, lost profits on product itself and on on-site activation system, and consequential damages in form of travel and employee time, based on their theft of trade secrets and use of those secrets for their own profit. General Environmental Science Corp. v. Horsfall, N.D.Ohio 1992, 800 F.Supp. 1497, affirmed in part , vacated in part 25 F.3d 1048, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 358, 513 U.S. 947, 130 L.Ed.2d 312, on subsequent appeal 53 F.3d 331. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 118

Subrogated surety would be permitted to recover treble damages and counsel fees under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Federal Ins. Co. v. Ayers, E.D.Pa.1990, 760 F.Supp. 1118. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 82; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Imposition of treble damages under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was mandatory for violation of the Act. MDO Development Corp. v. Kelly, S.D.N.Y.1990, 735 F.Supp. 591. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Person who engaged in fraudulent telemarketing scheme was liable for treble damages under RICO despite district court's observation that it would not have supposed her acts were sufficiently analogous to those of organized crime figure as to justify finding of RICO violation. Banco de Ponce v. Negron, E.D.N.Y.1989, 726 F.Supp. 926, affirmed 923 F.2d 842, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 964, 498 U.S. 1087, 112 L.Ed.2d 1050. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Potential liability to proposed class of $3.4 billion, which, when trebled under RICO would result in a total liability of $10.2 billion, demonstrated substantial probability that plaintiffs' claims, if sustained, would exceed utility's assets, as required for class action certification on ground that adjudication with respect to individual members of the class would as practical matter substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., E.D.N.Y.1989, 710 F.Supp. 1407, affirmed 907 F.2d 1295. Fed- eral Civil Procedure 182.5

In civil cases involving finite scheme that concerns limited number of victims and injuries, plaintiff should not be permitted to use RICO's weapons of treble damages and attorney fees. Revlon, Inc. v. S. Rauch Marketing, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1987, 661 F.Supp. 262. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Television corporation and its owner could not recover treble damages under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1962(d) and 1964(c), from another corporation and its officers and directors for losses sustained in telecast of heavyweight prizefight, in that any “conspiracy” on part of other corporation and its officers and directors extended to single prizefight telecast and did not contemplate separate criminal episodes that constituted a “pattern.” Medallion TV Enterprises Inc. v. SelecTV of California, Inc., C.D.Cal.1986, 627 F.Supp. 1290, affirmed 833 F.2d 1360, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 3241, 492 U.S. 917, 106 L.Ed.2d 588. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Proper measure of damages in county's action to recover treble damages under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against defendant, who was convicted of participating in conspiracy to obtain fraudulent real estate tax assessment reductions, was entire salaries of corrupt officials during period of bribery scheme, where it was not possible to apportion damages between all potential defendants. Cook County v. Lynch, N.D.Ill.1985, 620 F.Supp. 1256. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Fact that corporation pled guilty to various crimes arising out of incident which gave rise to derivative action on behalf of corporation under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962, did not preclude corporation from recovery treble damages under RICO. Lewis on Behalf of Nat. Semi- conductor Corp. v. Sporck, N.D.Cal.1985, 612 F.Supp. 1316. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55

Subsec. (c) of this section is essentially penal and treble damages are not recoverable against Federal Deposit In- surance Corporation as receiver of defunct bank and it would be unjust to permit such an award, for innocent depositors and creditors would be punished, rather than the putative wrongdoer, the bank. Summers v. Federal De- posit Ins. Corp., W.D.Okla.1984, 592 F.Supp. 1240. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Sales representatives who brought action for treble damages under this chapter were not entitled to seek damages for mental anguish, loss of confidence and self-esteem, or harm to their business reputations and standing in their occupations, as treble damages under this chapter were recoverable only for injuries to business and property. Callan v. State Chemical Mfg. Co., E.D.Pa.1984, 584 F.Supp. 619. Damages 57.12; Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Pursuant to statute, damages for violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) awarded by jury to boxing champion against promoters and their principal had to be trebled. Panix Productions, Ltd v. Lewis, S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 21659370, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

161. Contribution, practice and procedure generally

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) authorized district court to order former union officer to contribute toward cost of monitorship of union, which was designed to oversee operations of union until it was cleansed of all racketeering and organized crime influence, and honest elections could be held; it was well within court's equity powers to conclude that officer, having engaged in conduct that corrupted union, should bear part of cost of eliminating that corruption. U.S. v. Sasso, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2000, 215 F.3d 283, on remand 230 F.Supp.2d 275. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 82

Ordering former union officer to contribute to costs of monitoring union, to assure that no Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) activity occurred, was proper, to prevent and restrain future RICO offenses; following imprisonment of officer, he made hundreds of communications with persons associated with organized crime, the union, and persons who had previously made illegal payments to corrupt union officials, and it would be equitable for officer to bear cost of eliminating corruption he engaged in. U.S. v. Sasso, E.D.N.Y.2001, 230 F.Supp.2d 275. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 82

Former bank directors who were named as defendants in action in which civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and other claims were brought in connection with alleged scheme by international banking firm to acquire ownership and maintain control of directors' banks were not entitled to contribution or indemnity from codefendants; RICO defendant is not entitled to contribution or indemnity, and directors could

not obtain common law indemnification for their intentional tortious acts. First American Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, D.D.C.1996, 948 F.Supp. 1107. Contribution 5(6.1); Indemnity 64

Indemnification is not available for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) liability; it would be contrary to public policy for court to allow intentional tort-feasor to escape liability. Sequa Corp. v. Gelmin, S.D.N.Y.1994, 851 F.Supp. 106. Indemnity 64

Vice-president of corporation that sold equipment to city, as defendant in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action based on alleged breach of agreement to make payments into escrow account, could not seek contribution from city, absent claim that city acted with scienter required by RICO. O & K Tro- jan, Inc. v. Municipal & Contractors Equipment Corp., S.D.N.Y.1990, 751 F.Supp. 431. Contribution 5(6.1)

Third-party complaint by production credit association seeking indemnification or contribution from third-party defendants who association alleged negligently opened a brokerage account for plaintiff and negligently failed to warn of the risks of hedging would be dismissed, insofar as it sought to hold third-party defendants liable for indemnity or contribution on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims. Jacobson v. Western Montana Production Credit Ass'n, D.Mont.1986, 643 F.Supp. 391. Contribution 9(5); Indemnity 64

Civil remedy provision of Federal Racketeering Act did not provide, or authorize district court to provide, for contribution and/or indemnity between alleged coconspirators. Seminole Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Tanner, M.D.Fla.1986, 635 F.Supp. 582. Contribution 5(6.1); Indemnity 64

There is no right of contribution under civil liability provisions of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq. Boone v. Beacon Bldg. Corp., D.C.N.J.1985, 613 F.Supp. 1151. Contribu- tion 5(6.1)

162. Divestiture, practice and procedure generally

Defendant in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action was not entitled to stay pending appeal of district court order finding that defendant was subject to RICO liability based upon bribery in connection with waste disposal business, enjoining defendant from participating in waste disposal business, violating RICO, and associating with his codefendants for any commercial purpose, and directing defendant to divest his interests in various enterprises and to disgorge proceeds derived from his unlawful conduct into court administered fund; defendant did not establish substantial possibility that district court's summary judgment regarding liability would be reversed on appeal, while defendant might suffer irreparable harm from divestiture of his companies, interests of the government and public in terminating the control of trash handling by criminal conspirators weighed heavily against granting a stay, and because of scope of relief ordered against defendant, his appeal would be heard on expedited basis. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1995, 44 F.3d 1082. Federal Courts 686

It was premature to consider whether divestiture or a reporting requirement in any form would be appropriate in

case where district court had merely enjoined further gambling activities pendente lite and had not as yet ruled on requests for divestiture and reporting. U. S. v. Cappetto, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1974, 502 F.2d 1351, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 1121, 420 U.S. 925, 43 L.Ed.2d 395. Federal Courts 767

Government's request for “divestiture,” which did not contemplate compensation to defendant, was authorized to extent that such relief was equitable remedy that furthered remedial goals of civil remedies provision of RICO, even though not expressly listed in such provision. U.S. v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, E.D.N.Y.1988, 683 F.Supp. 1411, affirmed 879 F.2d 20. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 83

Divestiture and civil forfeiture are discretionary sanctions to be used by the government and court to fashion equitable remedies under this chapter. U. S. v. Barber, S.D.W.Va.1979, 476 F.Supp. 182. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 83

163. Equitable remedies, practice and procedure generally--Generally

Tobacco-related trade organizations could not participate in future violations of Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO), and thus government's request for injunction barring them from participating in future RICO violations was moot, where organizations' dissolution had been ordered in settlement agreement, and organizations exited only to wind up their respective affairs. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., C.A.D.C.2009, 566 F.3d 1095, 386 U.S.App.D.C. 49, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 3501, 177 L.Ed.2d 1090, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 3502, 177 L.Ed.2d 1090, rehearing denied 131 S.Ct. 57, 177 L.Ed.2d 1142, on remand 787 F.Supp.2d 68. Injunction 1066; Injunction 1495

District court was empowered under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(a)] to remove union's executive board from office and replace it with a temporary trustee in order to remedy abuses of defendants, some of who were members of executive board, in conducting union's affairs through a pattern of racketeering. U.S. v. Local 560 of Intern. Broth of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1985, 780 F.2d 267, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 2247, 476 U.S. 1140, 90 L.Ed.2d 693. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 84

District court's remedial order containing resolution of labor union district council's violation of consent decree in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action relating to union's job referral system would not apply to any existing construction contracts and instead would govern any construction contract entered into after order was filed with Clerk of Court. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.2009, 592 F.Supp.2d 708, entered 618 F.Supp.2d 326, stay denied 2009 WL 2523882. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.6

Cigarette manufacturers that violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by fraudulently misrepresenting adverse health effects of active smoking, addictiveness of nicotine and cigarette smoking, their manipulation of cigarettes' nicotine content, health risks attached to light and low tar cigarettes, their marketing to youth, and adverse health effects of second-hand smoke would be required to issue corrective state-

ments to prevent and restrain them from making fraudulent public statements on smoking and health matters in future, even though prior settlement agreement precluded some manufacturers from making any “material misrepresentation of fact regarding the health consequences of using any Tobacco Product,” where manufacturers had made material misstatements regarding health effects of smoking for over fifty years, manufacturers continued to make fraudulent affirmative statements on smoking and health issues, and additional corrective statements were necessary to prevent current and future advertisements from becoming part of continuing deception. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., D.D.C.2006, 449 F.Supp.2d 1, for additional opinion, see 449 F.Supp.2d 1, clarified 477 F.Supp.2d 191, on reconsideration in part 783 F.Supp.2d 23, stay pending appeal denied 449 F.Supp.2d 988, stay granted 2006 WL 4608645, affirmed in part , vacated in part 566 F.3d 1095, 386 U.S.App.D.C. 49, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 3501, 177 L.Ed.2d 1090, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 3502, 177 L.Ed.2d 1090, rehearing denied 131 S.Ct. 57, 177 L.Ed.2d 1142, on remand 787 F.Supp.2d 68, clarified 778 F.Supp.2d 8, appeal dismissed 686 F.3d 839, 402 U.S.App.D.C. 41, clarification denied 793 F.Supp.2d 164. In- junction 1495

Carting companies which were defendants in civil RICO action concerning Long Island carting industry were properly subjected to carting industry monitorship established by previous consent judgment; trial court's discretion to restrain future violations included authority to direct continued oversight of defendants. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Association of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1996, 914 F.Supp. 895. Federal Civil Proced- ure 2397.6

Availability to government of remedy of restitution in civil RICO case follows from broad equitable power be- stowed upon federal courts by RICO statute. U.S. v. Local 1804-1 Intern. Longshoremen's Ass'n, S.D.N.Y.1993, 831 F.Supp. 177, affirmed in part , vacated in part 52 F.3d 1173, on remand 1996 WL 22377, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 934, 516 U.S. 1122, 133 L.Ed.2d 861. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 83

Plaintiff in civil RICO action is not entitled to equitable relief in the form of declaratory judgment, order com- pelling return of property, or an injunction. Miller v. Affiliated Financial Corp., N.D.Ill.1984, 600 F.Supp. 987. Declaratory Judgment 81; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 83

In action under this chapter arising out of defendants' activities in connection with lending to small businesses and obtaining warrants for stock of those businesses, even if paragraph of complaint seeking return of “excessive” consideration allegedly paid to defendants, as well as sums lost due to defendants' exercise of warrants, was demand for equitable restitution, it described a form of relief available to private plaintiff under this section. DeMent v. Abbott Capital Corp., N.D.Ill.1984, 589 F.Supp. 1378. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 83

While treble damages could be awarded in private action brought under this section equitable remedies were not available. Kaushal v. State Bank of India, N.D.Ill.1983, 556 F.Supp. 576. Commerce 80; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 82

164. ---- Accounting, equitable remedies, practice and procedure generally

By establishing, through collateral estoppel, effect of defendants' convictions under this chapter, that defendant knowingly profited from scheme involving breach by county officials of their fiduciary duty to county, county made requisite showing to force an equitable accounting by defendant for such profits and imposition of constructive trust in its favor thereon. Cook County v. Lynch, N.D.Ill.1982, 560 F.Supp. 136. Account 4; Judgment 648; Trusts 110

165. ---- Constructive trust, equitable remedies, practice and procedure generally

Constructive trust would be imposed against money in possession of defendant's spouse where it was undisputed that spouse had received $150,000 of stolen funds from victim and would be unjustly enriched by continued possession of it. Corporacion Insular de Seguros v. Reyes-Munoz, D.Puerto Rico 1994, 849 F.Supp. 126. Trusts 91

By establishing, through collateral estoppel effect of defendants' convictions under this chapter, that defendant knowingly profited from scheme involving breach by county officials of their fiduciary duty to county, county made requisite showing to force an equitable accounting by defendant for such profits and imposition of constructive trust in its favor thereon. Cook County v. Lynch, N.D.Ill.1982, 560 F.Supp. 136. Account 4; Judgment 648; Trusts 110

166. ---- Indemnity, equitable remedies, practice and procedure generally

Bank was not entitled to indemnity from various officers of savings and loan association for its potential liability to association with respect to association's RICO claim arising from bank's sale of promissory notes secured by real estate mortgages, since right to indemnity did not arise either as implied cause of action under RICO or as part of federal common law. Central Illinois Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dupage County Bank of Glendale Heights, N.D.Ill.1985, 622 F.Supp. 1493. Indemnity 64

167. ---- Grievance procedure, equitable remedies, practice and procedure generally

Employers and roofers union, which had existed for many years as criminal-dominated organization, would be required to adopt grievance procedure, subject to court approval, that would be exclusive grievance procedure to resolve disputes between union and its members and employers; individual union officers and employees had been convicted of criminal violations, including RICO violations, and union had not had grievance procedure, but had settled grievances through physical confrontations and attacks. U.S. v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and Waterproof Workers Ass'n, E.D.Pa.1988, 686 F.Supp. 1139, appeal dismissed 871 F.2d 401, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 363, 493 U.S. 953, 107 L.Ed.2d 350, application denied 824 F.Supp. 559. Labor And Employment 1006; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 82

168. ---- Injunction, equitable remedies, practice and procedure generally

Reasonable likelihood existed that cigarette manufacturers would commit future violations of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and thus district court had jurisdiction to maintain its prior injunctions after subsequent passage of Tobacco Control Act that subjected manufacturers to comprehensive regulat-

ory oversight of Food and Drug Administration (FDA), since there was reasonable likelihood that RICO violations would continue despite oversight by FDA, there were significant parts of injunctive order that Control Act did not cover, injunctions could be enforced differently, and scope of Control Act itself was unclear. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., C.A.D.C.2012, 686 F.3d 832, 402 U.S.App.D.C. 34. Antitrust and Trade Regulation 282

Master settlement agreement (MSA) between cigarette manufacturers and 46 states and District of Columbia did not eliminate reasonable likelihood of future Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations by manufacturers, so as to preclude need for injunctive relief under RICO, even though MSA prohibited them from participating in “enterprise” or committing any “predicate acts,” where manufacturers began to evade and violate MSA's prohibitions almost immediately after signing it, some MSA provisions were scheduled to ex- pire, manufacturers continued to deny dangers of secondhand smoke, market “low tar” cigarettes as healthier alternative to quitting, and deny manipulating nicotine delivery and marketing to youth, and manufacturers' essential position on relationship of smoking and health remained virtually unchanged. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., C.A.D.C.2009, 566 F.3d 1095, 386 U.S.App.D.C. 49, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 3501, 177 L.Ed.2d 1090, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 3502, 177 L.Ed.2d 1090, rehearing denied 131 S.Ct. 57, 177 L.Ed.2d 1142, on remand 787 F.Supp.2d 68. Injunction 1495

“Revenue rule,” barring suits to enforce foreign tax judgments or unadjudicated tax claims, barred European Community (EC), its member nations, and departments of Colombia from bringing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit against tobacco companies who allegedly engaged in smuggling activities, seeking injunctive relief to enjoin or abate claimed violations of foreign tax laws, where such relief would require evaluation and interpretation of foreign tax laws, and would have effect of extraterritorially enforcing plaintiffs' tax laws just as directly as would their claims for damages. European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2004, 355 F.3d 123, vacated 125 S.Ct. 1968, 544 U.S. 1012, 161 L.Ed.2d 845, on remand 424 F.3d 175. International Law 10.10

Civil remedies provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) authorizes injunctive relief at the behest of both the Attorney General and private plaintiffs, authorizes interim measures when the At- torney General sues, and authorizes private treble damages for private plaintiffs, but not the United States. Na- tional Organization For Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2001, 267 F.3d 687, certiorari granted in part 122 S.Ct. 1604, 535 U.S. 1016, 152 L.Ed.2d 619, certiorari granted in part 122 S.Ct. 1605, 535 U.S. 1016, 152 L.Ed.2d 619, reversed 123 S.Ct. 1057, 537 U.S. 393, 188 A.L.R. Fed. 741, 154 L.Ed.2d 991, on remand 91 Fed.Appx. 510, 2004 WL 375995. Injunction 1453; Injunction 1495; Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 82; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Enjoining defendant from participating directly or indirectly in carting industry and associating with codefendants or known members and associates of organized crime for any commercial purpose was within scope of RICO's civil remedies. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1993, 995 F.2d 375. Injunction 1495

Permanent injunction prohibiting union member from participating in union affairs satisfied requirement of

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) that injunction make appropriate provision for rights of third parties, where evidence showed that absolute removal of union member was necessary to remove influence of organized crime from union, and the only detriment to other union members was that they would be unable to associate with removed member. U.S. v. Local 560 (I.B.T.), C.A.3 (N.J.) 1992, 974 F.2d 315. Labor And Employment 2129

District court had jurisdiction, under exception to jurisdiction-stripping provisions of Norris-LaGuardia Act, to issue injunction in labor dispute between local union and employers' organization in order to further remedial purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by enjoining arbitration of union's grievance that organization would violate its collective bargaining agreement by entering into proposed consent judgment with government. Local 1814, Intern. Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1992, 965 F.2d 1224, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 406, 506 U.S. 953, 121 L.Ed.2d 331. Labor And Employment 2034

District court had authority to impose decree against roofers' union, whose leaders had violated RICO provisions by conducting affairs of union through pattern of racketeering and by conspiring to participate in and conduct affairs of union through pattern of racketeering, to enjoin individual defendants from participating in union's affairs and continuing to be employed in construction industry within union's jurisdiction and to govern union operation, pursuant to RICO section authorizing district courts to prevent and restrain violations by issuing appropriate orders. U.S. v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and Waterproof Workers Ass'n, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1989, 871 F.2d 401, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 363, 493 U.S. 953, 107 L.Ed.2d 350. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 98

Court did not have authority to issue injunction against virtually any transfer of assets by RICO defendants without court's express approval or plaintiff's knowledge. In re Fredeman Litigation, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1988, 843 F.2d 821, rehearing denied 847 F.2d 840. Injunction 1232

Injunctive relief may not be granted to a private plaintiff in a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act suit. Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1986, 796 F.2d 1076, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 1336, 479 U.S. 1103, 94 L.Ed.2d 187. Injunction 1495

To obtain preliminary injunction under this section there must be established likelihood of irreparable harm. Trane Co. v. O'Connor Securities, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1983, 718 F.2d 26. Injunction 1495

It was plainly the intention of Congress in adopting this section to provide for injunctive relief against violations of substantive provisions without any requirement of a showing of irreparable injury other than injury to public which Congress found to be inherent in conduct made unlawful. U. S. v. Cappetto, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1974, 502 F.2d 1351, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 1121, 420 U.S. 925, 43 L.Ed.2d 395. Injunction 1563

There is no private right to injunctive relief in civil action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO). Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., D.Md.2009, 593 F.Supp.2d 788. Injunction 1195

Private litigants did not have right to seek injunctive relief under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO). American Medical Ass'n v. United Healthcare Corp., S.D.N.Y.2008, 588 F.Supp.2d 432. In- junction 1505

In government's action alleging that cigarette manufacturers and tobacco-related trade organizations violated, and continued to violate, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in conspiracy to deceive American public about, inter alia, health risks of low-tar cigarettes, and to manipulate design and composition of cigarettes in order to sustain nicotine addiction, defendants were not entitled to clarification of order which permanently enjoined them from committing any act of racketeering relating in any way to the manufacturing, marketing, promotion, health consequences, or sale of cigarettes in the United States, where defendants had more than sufficient notice of the illegal conduct that was prohibited under the injunction. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., D.D.C.2007, 477 F.Supp.2d 191. Injunction 1611

Existence of Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between tobacco companies and all 50 states did not eliminate reasonable likelihood of future Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations by companies, so as to preclude equitable relief, including injunction and disgorgement, against companies under RICO, inasmuch as District Court was not prepared to accept assumptions that companies would comply with MSA's terms and that MSA had adequate enforcement mechanisms in event of noncompliance. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, D.D.C.2004, 316 F.Supp.2d 6. Injunction 1382; Injunction 1495; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 83

Court had authority, under both its general equitable powers and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO), to issue a preliminary injunction preventing Turkish corporations and their principals from disposing of their assets pending adjudication of damages claims by sellers of cellular telephone equipment; the relief sought, transfer to the court's registry of shares in a Turkish cellular telephone company pledged as collateral for the sellers' loans to the company and restraints on the defendants' ability to further transfer or dilute the stock, were equitable remedies sought in aid of preserving an asset in which the sellers had an acknowledged equitable interest. Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, S.D.N.Y.2002, 202 F.Supp.2d 239, remanded 322 F.3d 130. Injunction 1495

Class action plaintiffs representing women who have or will seek family planning services in Puerto Rico failed to establish likelihood of success on their claims under RICO section pertaining to conspiracy and under RICO section making it unlawful for person employed by enterprise to conduct or participate in conduct of such enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity so as to be entitled to preliminary injunction against individuals and organizations who vigorously oppose abortion and who have coordinated antiabortion demonstrations. Libertad v. Welch, D.Puerto Rico 1993, 854 F.Supp. 19. Abortion And Birth Control 130

Government was entitled to injunction permanently enjoining defendants found liable for civil RICO violations from committing any racketeering acts and from having any dealings, directly or indirectly, with any members or associates of organized crime for any commercial purpose or with any labor organization; injunction was narrowly tailored to avoid any interference with defendants' constitutional rights. U.S. v. Local 1804-1 Intern. Longshoremen's Ass'n, S.D.N.Y.1993, 831 F.Supp. 177, affirmed in part , vacated in part 52 F.3d 1173, on re-

mand 1996 WL 22377, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 934, 516 U.S. 1122, 133 L.Ed.2d 861. Injunction 1495

District court is empowered to enter reasonable injunctions against RICO violators and to restrict their future business activities. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Injunction 1495

Challenge to government's requested injunctive relief in action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO), that new general election be held at defendant labor organization, was premature on motion to dismiss. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 738. Injunction 1547

Ordinary standards for granting declaratory or injunctive relief did not apply to proceeding in which Govern- ment sought enforcement of consent decree provision for rank-and-file election of international union officers pursuant to consent decree that provided for court-appointed officials to oversee election; nominating conven- tion would provide for first rank-and-file secret ballot election for international office in history of union, con- vention represented culmination of almost two years of work, and millions of dollars of union members' funds had already been spent in course of election, demonstrating unique circumstances that made it appropriate for district court to exercise its equitable power to issue declaratory and injunctive relief. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 764 F.Supp. 787, reversed 940 F.2d 648, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 76, 502 U.S. 819, 116 L.Ed.2d 50, affirmed 940 F.2d 648, remanded 817 F.Supp. 337, affirmed 14 F.3d 183. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.6

Permanent injunction against union business agent's further participation in affairs of union was “reasonable” restriction within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) section that was necessary, in light of business agent's furtherance of organized crime family's efforts to maintain control of union. U.S. v. Local 560 (I.B.T.), D.N.J.1991, 754 F.Supp. 395, affirmed 974 F.2d 315. Labor And Employment 2130

Private injunctive relief was unavailable under RICO. Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., D.N.J.1989, 728 F.Supp. 1123. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 82

Injunctive relief is not available under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's civil provision. Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, D.Conn.1989, 726 F.Supp. 371, vacated on other grounds 915 F.2d 92, rehearing denied, on remand 792 F.Supp. 161. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 82

Private civil RICO plaintiff could not obtain injunctive relief to prevent defendants from dissipating assets. First Nat. Bank and Trust Co., Rogers, Arkansas v. Hollingsworth, W.D.Ark.1988, 701 F.Supp. 701. Injunction 1495

Court has power under RICO to enter reasonable injunctions restricting RICO violators' future business activities. U.S. v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, E.D.N.Y.1988, 683 F.Supp. 1411, affirmed

879 F.2d 20. Injunction 1495

Government was entitled to preliminary injunctive relief in its action under civil remedies provision of Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act from participation in union affairs by individuals convicted of conspiracy to participate and participation in pattern of racketeering activity, as well as those indicted who had not yet gone to trial. U.S. v. Local 6A, Cement and Concrete Workers, Laborers Intern. Union of North Amer- ica, S.D.N.Y.1986, 663 F.Supp. 192. Injunction 1495

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation could seek injunctive relief under Colorado Organized Crime Act in action to recover funds allegedly diverted from bank as result of fraudulent scheme, regardless of whether such relief was available under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ant- onio, D.Colo.1986, 649 F.Supp. 1352, affirmed 843 F.2d 1311. Banks And Banking 508

Target corporation, as injured party, was not entitled to injunction under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act against offering group's alleged acts of securities fraud in violation of Act, where racketeering claim was substantially identical to claims under Williams Act disclosure requirements [15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d, e) ] and Exchange Act margin regulations, and target showed little probability of success on those claims. Revlon, Inc. v. Pantry Pride, Inc., D.C.Del.1985, 621 F.Supp. 804.

Injunctive relief was not available to private plaintiffs in action under this chapter arising out of defendants' activities in connection with lending to small businesses and obtaining warrants for stock of those businesses. DeMent v. Abbott Capital Corp., N.D.Ill.1984, 589 F.Supp. 1378. Injunction 1363

Since it was unlikely that bank could establish that defendant committed two acts of racketeering activity within ten years, bank was not entitled to preliminary injunction to prevent defendant from violating section 1962 of this title. University Bank and Trust Co. v. Gladstone, D.C.Mass.1983, 574 F.Supp. 1006. Injunction 1495

Oil company seeking damages, under section 1962 of this title prohibiting racketeering activity, from two defendants for allegedly stealing gasoline, was not entitled, under this section providing that district courts have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this title prohibiting racketeering by issuing appropriate orders, to a preliminary injunction restraining defendants from disposing of or transferring their tangible assets or property without further order of the district court priorly approving such disposition or transfer. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Gleave, W.D.N.Y.1982, 540 F.Supp. 81. Injunction 1495

In action under this chapter, district court could enter preliminary injunction freezing assets of a corporation in an effort to protect stockholders, although any order to freeze assets had to be applied with extreme care so that it would not prejudice rights of independent innocent third parties who were investors by depriving defendant corporations of their ability to generate profits. USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., W.D.Ky.1982, 539 F.Supp. 807, affirmed 689 F.2d 94. Injunction 1469; Injunction 1495

Evidence and factual allegations indicating illegal gambling activity more than six months previously were in-

sufficient to support inference of continued existence of particular policy wheel or participation of named defendants in policy wheel sought to be enjoined, and court could not find likelihood that named defendants would continue to participate in policy wheel sought to be enjoined; injunctive relief was thus not appropriate. U. S. v. Winstead, N.D.Ill.1976, 421 F.Supp. 295. Injunction 1374

Jurisdiction pursuant to this section may be invoked to prevent or restrain allegedly illegal enterprises not otherwise connected with legitimate business. U. S. v. Winstead, N.D.Ill.1976, 421 F.Supp. 295. Injunction 1495

Government's petition for an order to restrain, pending final disposition of the case charging defendants with engaging in patterns of racketeering activity, the transfer or other disposition by defendants of any property or other interests which would be subject to forfeiture upon conviction would be denied, as the entry of a restraining order at the present time in light of the nature of the case and the particular facts involved would be substantially prejudicial to the defendants; specifically, the order sought would be incompatible with the presumption of inno- cence enjoyed by defendants, and there had been no showing nor even an allegation that any defendant was seeking to transfer or dispose of any property interest which might be involved in the case. U. S. v. Mandel, D.C.Md.1976, 408 F.Supp. 679. Injunction 1495

Defendants in adversary proceeding raising claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) established that granting them requested preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, based on releases that they previously obtained in settlement of prior litigation between parties, served the public interest, both by conserving judicial resources and by enforcing releases into which adversary plaintiffs had voluntarily entered. National Rural Utilities Co-op. Finance Corp. v. Prosser, Bkrtcy.D.Del.2011, 467 B.R. 59, report and recom- mendation adopted 2013 WL 1182220. Injunction 1495

Injunction would issue restraining debtor's controlling shareholder from relitigating issue of whether bankruptcy judge's denial of debtor's right to convert from Chapter 7 to Chapter 11 denial violated the Racketeering Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq., where debtor had previously appealed denial of motion to convert to district court and the Court of Appeals, and controlling shareholder had repeatedly filed motions and several actions before the District Court asserting same claim. Zurkowsky v. Government Develop- ment Bank for P.R. (GDB), D.C.Puerto Rico 1985, 52 B.R. 1007. Injunction 1167

District court's granting of preliminary injunction, barring secured creditor from foreclosing on its security interest in real property owned by defendants in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action was not abuse of discretion; plaintiff was likely to succeed on its claim that transfer of notes to secured creditor was illegitimate, plaintiff would not be able to enforce the RICO judgment, and would thus suffer irreparable harm, if secured creditor was allowed to sell property, and injunction was in public interest. Stooksbury v. Ross, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 2013, 2013 WL 2665596. Injunction 1495

169. ---- Limitations, equitable remedies, practice and procedure generally

If RICO action under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(a), granting jurisdiction to order equitable relief, is regarded as con-

current to action for damages under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c), providing for treble damages, then equity would withhold its remedy if legal right was barred by local statute of limitations. Electronic Relays (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Pascente, N.D.Ill.1985, 610 F.Supp. 648, on reconsideration. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

169a. ---- Particular cases, equitable remedies, practice and procedure

Fair and equitable remedy for district council's violation of consent decree in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action relating to union's job referral system would include abolishing request system in its present form, allowing contractor to select particular carpenters for job up to but not in excess of 67 percent of total work force, and restoring six-month provision contained in job referral rule; that resolution would recognize contractors' economic and competitive concerns by allowing them to select most of carpenter work force on any particular project while restoring out-of-work list as meaningful source of employment for carpenters seeking work. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Car- penters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.2009, 592 F.Supp.2d 708, entered 618 F.Supp.2d 326, stay denied 2009 WL 2523882. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.6

170. Stay of actions, practice and procedure generally

Efficiency and judicial economy justified stay of racketeering claims, which were based on predicate violations of rule that prohibited fraud in connection with purchase or sale of security, while securities fraud claims were being arbitrated, where racketeering claim was subject to no statute requiring district court to proceed on claim and where racketeering claim could be governed or streamlined by arbitration of securities fraud claims. Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., C.A.1 (Mass.) 1986, 807 F.2d 16. Alternative Dispute Resolu- tion 414

Temporary stay was warranted of circus operator's action against animal rights organizations, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in connection with organizations' prosecution of action alleging operator's treatment of its Asian elephants violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), until the court made a determination on the merits of the ESA action; court had rejected operator's RICO claim as a counterclaim to the ESA action because it found the claim was made with a dilatory motive, would cause undue delay, and would prejudice the plaintiffs in the ESA action, operator would not be prejudiced by stay, operator's damages in RICO action, namely attorney fees in ESA action, were not ascertainable, court's interest in judicial economy and efficiency would be served by imposition of stay, as would the public interest in resolution of ESA action. Feld Entertainment, Inc. v. A.S.P.C.A., D.D.C.2007, 523 F.Supp.2d 1. Action 69(5)

Stay of injunction pending appeal was not warranted following judgment for government in its Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit against cigarette manufacturers and tobacco-related trade organizations alleging conspiracy to deceive public about, inter alia, health effects of smoking and health benefits from low-tar cigarettes, and culminating in order for corrective statements; it was likely that young people exposed to defendants' advertising, and others, would be directly harmed in event of stay, and manufacturers' anticipated loss of market share did not constitute irreparable harm warranting stay. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., D.D.C.2006, 449 F.Supp.2d 988. Federal Courts 685

Stay of ERISA breach of fiduciary duty and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action pending interlocutory appeal was not warranted, even though there were grounds for interlocutory appeal, as that conclusion alone did not establish that stay applicants had shown that they were substantially likely to succeed on appeal, action had been delayed a number of years since underlying events, and public interest was better served by continuing litigation. District 65 Retirement Trust for Members of Bureau of Wholesale Sales Repres- entatives v. Prudential Securities, Inc., N.D.Ga.1996, 925 F.Supp. 1551. Federal Courts 686

Federal district court exercising Burford abstention would stay wife's federal civil RICO action against husband's girlfriend pending resolution of wife's state matrimonial action, rather than dismiss federal action; dismissal was inappropriate because dismissal, even without prejudice, created risk that wife would be time barred from reinstating federal suit if state matrimonial proceeding did not result in final decision on the merits. Farkas v. D'Oca, S.D.N.Y.1994, 857 F.Supp. 300. Federal Courts 65

Employer's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action alleging that former employee and employee's brother had stolen and sold employer's equipment would be stayed on ground that concurrent state criminal prosecution charging brother with receiving stolen property would require him to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, despite claims that there was no “unity of interest” between state and employer, that criminal prosecution related to only small part of civil action, and that brother had reflexively asserted insufficient “blanket privilege.” Bruner Corp. v. Balogh, E.D.Wis.1993, 819 F.Supp. 811. Action 69(5)

Unsuccessful bidder's suit against navy contractor for violation of federal and state laws based on allegations of improper disposal of hazardous wastes would not be stayed pending determination of state criminal proceeding against contractor in view of unsuccessful bidder's interest and public interest in expeditious resolution of the action. Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., N.D.Cal.1989, 720 F.Supp. 805. Action 69(5)

Stay of federal RICO action based on same facts as employee's state court fraud and breach of contract claims was appropriate; employee chose to sue in state court approximately two years before he sought federal forum, and there existed substantially likelihood that state court litigation, when combined with any necessary determination by federal court of preclusive effects of state court judgment, would dispose of claims presented in employee's federal case. Shaw v. Williams, N.D.Ill.1987, 676 F.Supp. 168. Action 69(5)

Brokerage firm and stockbroker were entitled to stay of securities fraud and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act action brought by former customer where arbitrable claims dominated lawsuit. Gilmore v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1987, 668 F.Supp. 314. Alternative Dispute Resolution 414

It was appropriate to stay, rather than dismiss, insurer's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act action against owner and mortgagee pending resolution of owner's and mortgagee's actions in state court under policy and under theory that insurer refused to pay in bad faith. Terra Nova Ins. Co. Ltd. v. DiStefano, D.R.I.1987, 663 F.Supp. 809. Action 69(5)

RICO action of purchaser of right to conduct business under corporate name against seller and its officers would

be stayed pending arbitration of purchaser's breach of contract claim against seller, where predicate offenses alleged in RICO claim were based entirely on transactions underlying breach of contract claims, and stay of action would not deprive purchaser a forum for its RICO claim. J.D. Marshall Intern., Inc. v. Redstart, Inc., N.D.Ill.1987, 656 F.Supp. 830. Alternative Dispute Resolution 196

By modifying stay under section 362 of Title 11, so as to allow plaintiffs to proceed in district court with actions under Security Act of 1933, section 77a et seq. of Title 15, and Security Exchange Act of 1934, section 78a et seq. of Title 15, and under this chapter, bankruptcy court was not abdicating duty to determine dischargeability of debt, but, rather, was deferring such determination until district court determined liability. In re Hoffman, Bkrtcy.Okl.1983, 33 B.R. 937.

171. Self-incrimination, practice and procedure generally

The district court permissibly drew negative inference from refusal of any of the defendants to answer questions relating to the operation of restaurant, in proceeding to determine whether to appoint receiver for restaurant to ensure the collection of taxes from defendants who had been convicted of skimming the restaurant's receipts; the proceeding was civil in nature, and in the civil context, the negative inference did not violate the Fifth Amend- ment. U.S. v. Ianniello, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1987, 824 F.2d 203. Receivers 38

Codefendant's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to deposition regarding letters allegedly written by him to defendant did not provide foundation for admission of the unauthenticated letters against defendant, in action for damages under RICO, for common-law fraud, and for violation of Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. Mayer v. Angelica, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1986, 790 F.2d 1315, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 891, 479 U.S. 1037, 93 L.Ed.2d 843. Evidence 378(1)

Witness, who was joined as defendant in amended complaint asserting, inter alia, civil claims for violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, was entitled to assert in deposition privilege against self- incrimination. Gatoil, Inc. v. Forest Hill State Bank, D.C.Md.1985, 104 F.R.D. 580. Witnesses 297(1)

172. Costs, practice and procedure generally

Fact that jury determined that insurer suffered no Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) injury established, as a matter of law, that defendants prevailed on insurer's RICO claim for purposes of award of costs. Zenith Ins. Co. v. Breslaw, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1997, 108 F.3d 205. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 80

Fact that Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act expressly provided for award of costs to plaintiffs did not limit general discretion of district court to award costs to defendants as prevailing party in RICO action. O'Ferral v. Trebol Motors Corp., C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 1995, 45 F.3d 561. Federal Civil Procedure 2735

Costs of receivership for restaurant were properly assessed against the Government; purpose of the receivership

was to prevent skimming from restaurant's receipts during pendency of litigation so as to ensure that true receipts would be reflected on restaurant's books for purposes of collecting taxes, and thus, benefit of receivership was enjoyed by the public. U.S. v. Ianniello, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1987, 824 F.2d 203. Receivers 200

Fee-shifting provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was broad enough to permit award to prevailing party of its appellate fees. International Floor Crafts, Inc. v. Adams, D.Mass.2012, 847 F.Supp.2d 254. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 82

Litigation costs incurred by buyer of hydroelectric power in prior action against seller were not caused by seller's violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and thus litigation costs could not be recovered in instant RICO action, and damages issue in instant action was not distinct from damages issue in earlier action, for purposes of determining whether buyer was estopped from bringing fraud claim against employees of seller; buyer's legal fees stemmed from its decision to file breach of contract action. Miller Hydro Group v. Popovitch, D.Me.1994, 851 F.Supp. 7. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) plaintiff was entitled to recover as costs expenses for process service in the amount of $100,176.26, the cost of a videotaped deposition and replay of the deposition at trial the amount of $648.60, and other expenses amounting to $917.36, which were not unreasonable in light of length and complexity of proceedings. Hertz Corp. v. Caulfield, E.D.La.1992, 796 F.Supp. 225. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 82

Fee of trustee appointed for local union after court found that individuals connected with the union had violated RICO was to be paid by the union and not by the federal Government, even for services rendered following election ordered by the court. U.S. v. Local 560, Intern. Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Help- ers of America, D.N.J.1990, 731 F.Supp. 1206. Labor And Employment 1085(1)

Minority shareholder's success in obtaining discovery and pretrial settlement of his minor claim for wages did not justify awarding him prevailing party status, for purposes of award of costs, in his action against corporation, majority shareholder, and bookkeeper, given that minority shareholder failed to obtain relief on his major claims, for alleged breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO), and his limited pretrial success was insignificant in the context of relief sought by entire complaint. Tyler v. O'Neill, C.A.3 (Pa.) 2004, 112 Fed.Appx. 158, 2004 WL 2297148, Unreported. Corporations And Business Organizations 1582; Corporations And Business Organizations 1594

173. Disciplinary proceedings----Generally, practice and procedure generally

Charge against union member listing specific member of criminal organization with whom union member supposedly associated and association's time frame was sufficiently specific; association allegedly violated union constitution. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1130, affirmed 964 F.2d 1308. Labor And Employment 1046(3)

Law of the case considerations precluded ruling, on motion for directed verdict, that word “individuals” in associated in fact phrase of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision defining “enterprise” did not include corporations or other legal entities, where court had previously advised plaintiffs that they could associate in fact various corporations and natural persons with regard to their RICO claim, and parties conformed presentation of evidence in reliance on court's ruling. Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., D.Puerto Rico 1991, 777 F.Supp. 1043, affirmed 990 F.2d 7. Federal Courts 949

174. ---- Persons bound, disciplinary proceedings, practice and procedure generally

Individual union officers and members were bound by disciplinary provisions of consent decree entered in litigation involving alleged influence of organized crime on union. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1123. Federal Civil Pro- cedure 2397.5

175. ---- Defenses, disciplinary proceedings, practice and procedure generally

Union official failed to establish defense under article of union constitution providing that elected officials could not be disciplined for activities or actions known generally by a membership when official was last elected, in light of official's denial of charge up until disciplinary hearing. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1133, affirmed 970 F.2d 1132. Labor And Employment 1071

176. ---- Estoppel, disciplinary proceedings, practice and procedure generally

Union official's guilty plea to criminal charge collaterally estopped him from contesting facts underlying disciplinary charge arising from same incident. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1133, affirmed 970 F.2d 1132. Judgment 648

177. ---- Limitations, disciplinary proceedings, practice and procedure generally

Consent decree entered in litigation involving alleged influence of organized crime on union does not contain statute of limitations on disciplinary proceedings, against union officers and members. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1123. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.6

178. ---- Admissibility of evidence, disciplinary proceedings, practice and procedure generally

Union employee failed to show that hearsay statements admitted in union disciplinary proceedings, brought pursuant to consent decree between United States and union which settled civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), were unreliable; declaration of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent were not hearsay because union employee's counsel was able to cross-examine agent, and hearsay statements admitted at hearing corroborated each other or were corroborated by reliable independent sources. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, C.A.2 (N.Y.)

1994, 19 F.3d 816, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 199, 513 U.S. 873, 130 L.Ed.2d 130. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.6

Hearsay statements of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent and members of criminal organization were reliable, as they corroborated one another and, accordingly, statements were properly considered by court- appointed independent administrator in disciplinary proceedings against union member. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1130, affirmed 964 F.2d 1308. Labor And Employment 1046(6)

179. ---- Credibility of witnesses, disciplinary proceedings, practice and procedure generally

District court would not substitute its assessment of union member's credibility for that of independent administrator appointed to oversee remedial provisions of consent decree designed to rid union of influence of organized crime, so as to credit member's testimony in disciplinary proceedings denying any involvement with organized crime; independent administrator credited signed statement of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent, which was corroborated by associates of member of criminal organization with whom union member had allegedly associated. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer- ica, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1130, affirmed 964 F.2d 1308. Labor And Employment 1047(4)

180. ---- Findings of administrator, disciplinary proceedings, practice and procedure generally

Evidence was sufficient to support finding of Independent Administrator, under consent decree between United States and labor union which settled civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), that union employee associated with organized crime figure and thus was subject to discipline; crime figure hired union employee to do bookkeeping work for vending machine company, crime figure was arrested for laundering illegal gambling money through vending machine company, and crime figure often telephoned union employee at work. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 19 F.3d 816, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 199, 513 U.S. 873, 130 L.Ed.2d 130. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.6

Court will overturn findings of independent administrator appointed to oversee remedial provisions of consent decree designed to rid union of influence of organized crime when court determines that findings are, on basis of all evidence, arbitrary or capricious. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1133, affirmed 970 F.2d 1132. Federal Civil Proced- ure 2397.6

District court will overturn findings of independent administrator appointed to oversee remedial provisions of consent decree in action against union influenced by organized crime when court determines that findings are, on basis of all evidence, arbitrary or capricious. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1130, affirmed 964 F.2d 1308. Labor And Employment 1047(4)

Newly discovered evidence offered by union member did not provide any basis for setting aside finding of independent administrator appointed pursuant to consent decree that member had knowingly affiliated with organized crime figures; documents stating that officer had not violated federal labor laws, that he did not qualify as member of organized crime, and that he could not be prosecuted for misconduct did not address charge sustained against him. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1127, affirmed 956 F.2d 1161. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.6

Evidence supported findings of independent administrator appointed pursuant to consent decree that officers of union local deceived members and defrauded union by back-dating petitions to amend local bylaws and falsifying minutes, by concealing disapproval of purported amendments that raised officers' salaries, and by withholding knowledge that they had given union property to persons connected to organized crime. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1123. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.6

181. ---- Sanctions, disciplinary proceedings, practice and procedure generally

In disciplinary proceedings pursuant to consent decree settling civil racketeering charges against union, Inde- pendent Review Board (IRB) may rely on hearsay so long as it is reliable; hearsay is reliable for the purposes of an IRB hearing if it is corroborated by other hearsay or nonhearsay evidence, includes specific detail, or is made under oath. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2002, 315 F.3d 97, certiorari denied 123 S.Ct. 1900, 538 U.S. 998, 155 L.Ed.2d 824. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.6

Rule 11 sanctions were not warranted in suit alleging Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy to defame businessman, even though there were a number of inconsistencies between plaintiff's original and amended complaints; court would not impute bad faith to plaintiff for purposes of imposing sanctions where ample grounds existed for dismissing the complaint on substantive grounds. Hourani v. Mirtchev, D.D.C.2013, 2013 WL 1901013. Federal Civil Procedure 2771(11)

Creditor was entitled to Rule 11 sanctions for its costs and attorney fees associated with defending debtors' suit alleging that creditor violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by filing of proof of claims and other presentations to bankruptcy court, which allegedly resulted in wrongful and illegal sale of debtors' lawsuits to creditor, where debtors had litigated claim in five previous lawsuits, and prior action had been dismissed on res judicata grounds. Stone v. Baum, D.Ariz.2005, 409 F.Supp.2d 1164, motion to vacate denied 2006 WL 66668. Federal Civil Procedure 2789; Federal Civil Procedure 2814

Suspension of union official for 24 months on charge that official had violently threatened local member with physical harm and economic ruin was neither arbitrary nor capricious, despite official's agreement with court- appointed investigations officer calling for three-month suspension, as agreement, while approved by court- appointed independent administrator, had been rejected by district court. U.S. v. International Broth. of Team- sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1133, affirmed 970 F.2d 1132. Labor And Employment 1071

Court-appointed independent administrator's decision to discipline union officer for bringing reproach upon union by taking Fifth Amendment and refusing to answer questions during deposition was not “state action” and, thus, did not violate Fifth Amendment. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1133, affirmed 970 F.2d 1132. Constitutional Law 3942

Entry of default judgment against defendants as a discovery sanction was warranted in action alleging violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); defendants' failure to comply with discovery orders was willful and in bad faith, plaintiff was prejudiced by defendants' actions in avoiding discovery, and district court had specifically warned defendants, after imposing a less-severe sanction, that a default judgment could result from continued noncompliance. Stooksbury v. Ross, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 2013, 2013 WL 2665596. Feder- al Civil Procedure 1278

On union member's motion to impose monetary sanctions upon union district council's secretary-treasurer, for violating consent decree in government's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) suit against district council and certain of its former officers, briefing was required on issue of whether secretary- treasurer's conduct with respect to shop steward job referrals violated consent decree, since evidentiary record before motion court only included affidavits or briefs of parties' counsel. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.2004, 2004 WL 48885, Unre- ported. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.6

Trial court exercised its discretion to not award sanctions, which were sought by both parties against each other, defendant's motion for sanctions being based on claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and plaintiff's motion for sanctions for having to respond to defendant's motion for sanctions, since case was resolved after single motion to dismiss that was not fully briefed, claims by either side were not objectively baseless, and there was no showing of bad faith by either side. Bowman Import/Export, Ltd. v. F.J. Elsner & Co. North America Ltd., S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 21543522, Unreported. Federal Civil Procedure 2771(11); Federal Civil Procedure 2774(8)

182. ---- Sanctions barring office holding, disciplinary proceedings, practice and procedure generally

In disciplinary proceedings pursuant to consent decree settling civil racketeering charges against union, substantial evidence supported findings of Independent Review Board (IRB), in support of order upholding charges and sanctions brought against them, that former local union officers brought reproach upon the union through scheme to require business agents to make dues payments on untimely basis, thereby depriving them of right to run for election to union office; scheme secretly narrowed field of possible officers, partially insulated officeholder from challenge, and thereby impaired system of open competitive election to union office. U.S. v. Inter- national Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2002, 315 F.3d 97, certiorari denied 123 S.Ct. 1900, 538 U.S. 998, 155 L.Ed.2d 824. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.6

Union official's claim that his actions were not “corrupt,” and that his suspension was therefore inappropriate because misdemeanor to which he had pleaded guilty was not offense for which he could be barred from union

office under statute prohibiting certain persons from holding office was frivolous. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1133, affirmed 970 F.2d 1132. Labor And Employment 1071

183. Trusteeship, practice and procedure generally

Intervention of court-appointed trustee of local labor union under either RICO statute or Labor Management Re- porting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) may be essential where significant pattern of racketeering is found which threatens or stymies self-government in labor movement. U.S. v. Local 6A, Cement and Concrete Workers, Laborers Intern. Union of North America, S.D.N.Y.1993, 832 F.Supp. 674. Labor And Employment 1085(1); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 12

Evidence as to illegal practices including efforts to evade detection and prosecution, extensive corruption of union local's officers and involving the membership, persistence of corruption over number of years despite changes in leadership, and a distinct lack of effort to eliminate corruption by means such as independent auditing, periodic investigations, effective grievance procedures, and independent monitoring of elections, indicated likelihood of continued corruption warranting appointment of a permanent trustee to investigate corruption and RICO violations. U.S. v. Local 295 of Intern. Broth. of Teamsters, E.D.N.Y.1992, 784 F.Supp. 15. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 84

184. Harmless or prejudicial error, practice and procedure generally

Hydroelectric company was not prejudiced by any error in district court's dismissal of claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) asserted against contractor which built facility in excess of capacity specified by contract, so as to trigger bonus provisions of contract; jury finding of no damages on fraud claim under Maine law suggested that same outcome would have occurred under RICO claim, inasmuch as damage claims under RICO would not be broader than damage claims under fraud. Combustion Engineering, Inc. v. Miller Hydro Group, C.A.1 (Me.) 1993, 13 F.3d 437. Federal Courts 907

Jury instruction's reference to few weeks or months being sufficient to constitute substantial period of time for purposes of finding continuity necessary to establish RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) pattern was error; however, error was harmless where related predicate acts that jury found proven spanned approximately two years. Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1992, 983 F.2d 350, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 2445, 508 U.S. 952, 124 L.Ed.2d 662. Federal Courts 908.1; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 80

It was error to aggregate three defendants as a single “person” with shared RICO liability in complaint, even if that was only a shorthand way of stating that each of the three defendants was a RICO person individually. In re American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Dealerships Relations Litigation, D.Md.1996, 941 F.Supp. 528. Indictment And Information 81(1); Indictment And Information 82

185. Consent decrees, practice and procedure generally

Prohibition against union members associating with members of organized crime groups, in consent decree between United States and labor union which settled civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO), does not prohibit association only for improper purposes. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 19 F.3d 816, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 199, 513 U.S. 873, 130 L.Ed.2d 130. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.6

On remand from Court of Appeals decision finding that union violated consent decree in civil Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action relating to its job referral system when it entered into collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) that made it impossible to comply with job referral rules incorporated in- to both consent decree and union by-laws, district court's power to fashion broad equitable remedy was derived from All Writs Act and justified alteration of CBAs if necessary. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.2009, 592 F.Supp.2d 708, entered 618 F.Supp.2d 326, stay denied 2009 WL 2523882. Federal Courts 10.1

Contrary to union's interpretation, paragraph of consent decree in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO) case against union's district council did not require prior written notice to government only of intended changes in district council's bylaws, such that council did not need to give notice of any changes in job referral rules. U.S. v. District Council of New York City, S.D.N.Y.2006, 409 F.Supp.2d 439, reconsideration denied 2006 WL 1586560, reversed and remanded 229 Fed.Appx. 14, 2007 WL 1157143, on remand 2007 WL 2265584, on remand 2007 WL 2324338, on remand 592 F.Supp.2d 708. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.5

Consent decree between government and association of stevedores, owners, and operators of ocean-going ves- sels, in civil RICO action concerning organized crime on New Jersey and New York waterfronts, would be approved; association was merely nominal defendant not alleged to have engaged in racketeering, and association agreed under decree not to knowingly employ anyone appearing on list of RICO violators promulgated by district court and to report any violations of decree to government. U.S. v. Local 1804-1, Intern. Longshoremen's Ass'n, S.D.N.Y.1993, 831 F.Supp. 192. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.2

Pursuant to the All Writs Act, government and/or administrator appointed by court to govern affairs of local union and ensure there would be no further violations of consent decree enjoining union officers from engaging in racketeering activity and associating with organized crime figures could apply to court for relief as against non- parties to consent decree or order of appointment, including, international union, employers of local union members, and any other nonparty who might be in position to interfere with implementation of consent decree or appointment order and, upon such application, court could grant relief necessary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent frustration of consent decree and appointment order. U.S. v. Local 1804-1, S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 221851, Unreported, affirmed 77 Fed.Appx. 542, 2003 WL 22037274. Federal Courts 10.1

for election; misconduct deprived business agents of their rights as members to run for election to union office, secretly narrowed field of possible officers, partially insulated officeholder from challenge, and thereby impaired system of open competitive election to union office. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2002, 51 Fed.Appx. 25, 2002 WL 31398780, Unreported, published at 315 F.3d 97, certiorari denied 123 S.Ct. 1900, 538 U.S. 998, 155 L.Ed.2d 824. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.6

III. COMPLAINT

Acquisition or control, injury 220 Agreement, conspiracy 215 Aiding and abetting 255 Amendment of complaint 257 Amendment of cross claims 274 Causation 213 Closed ended scheme, pattern of racketeering activity 238 Competitive injury 221 Conclusory allegations 254 ConspiracyConspiracy - Generally 214 Conspiracy - Agreement 215 Conspiracy - Dismissal of complaint 263 Conspiracy - Particularity and specificity 233 Continuity, pattern of racketeering activity 239 Convictions, predicate acts 249 Counterclaims 271, 272 Counterclaims - Generally 271 Counterclaims - Dismissal of counterclaims 272 Cross claims 273 Dismissal of complaint 262-270 Dismissal of complaint - Generally 262 Dismissal of complaint - Conspiracy 263 Dismissal of complaint - Equitable remedies 264 Dismissal of complaint - Inconvenient forum 265 Dismissal of complaint - Necessary parties 266 Dismissal of complaint - Other claims 267 Dismissal of complaint - Prejudice 268 Dismissal of complaint - Res judicata 269 Dismissal of complaint - State law claims 270 Dismissal of counterclaims 272 Distinct from pattern of racketeering, enterprise 218 Distinct from persons, enterprise 217 Enterprise 216-218

Enterprise - Generally 216 Enterprise - Distinct from pattern of racketeering 218 Enterprise - Distinct from persons 217 Equitable remedies, dismissal of complaint 264 Extortion, predicate acts 250 Fraud generally, particularity and specificity 234 Inconvenient forum, dismissal of complaint 265 Incorporation by reference 212 Indirect injury 222 Injury 219-228 Injury - Generally 219 Injury - Acquisition or control 220 Injury - Competitive injury 221 Injury - Indirect injury 222 Injury - Miscellaneous alleged injuries 228 Injury - Personal injury 223 Injury - Predicate act injury 224 Injury - Racketeering activity injury 225 Injury - Racketeering enterprise injury 226 Injury - Racketeering proceeds injury 227 Intent, knowledge, or scienter 229 Interstate commerce 230 Investment of racketeering proceeds, injury 227 Knowledge 229 Mail and wire fraud, particularity and specificity 235 Mail and wire fraud, predicate acts 251 Miscellaneous alleged injuries, injury 228 Miscellaneous complaints insufficient 261 Miscellaneous complaints sufficient 260 Necessary and requisite allegations 211 Necessary parties, dismissal of complaint 266 Number of acts, pattern of racketeering activity 240 Number of victims, pattern of racketeering activity 241 Open ended scheme, pattern of racketeering activity 242 Organized criminal activity 231 Other claims, dismissal of complaint 267 Participation, pattern of racketeering activity 243 Particularity and specificity 232-236 Particularity and specificity - Generally 232 Particularity and specificity - Conspiracy 233 Particularity and specificity - Fraud generally 234 Particularity and specificity - Mail and wire fraud 235 Particularity and specificity - Statutory provision 236 Pattern of racketeering activity 237-247 Pattern of racketeering activity - Generally 237

Pattern of racketeering activity - Closed ended scheme 238 Pattern of racketeering activity - Continuity 239 Pattern of racketeering activity - Number of acts 240 Pattern of racketeering activity - Number of victims 241 Pattern of racketeering activity - Open ended scheme 242 Pattern of racketeering activity - Participation 243 Pattern of racketeering activity - Relatedness of acts 244 Pattern of racketeering activity - Single scheme 245 Pattern of racketeering activity - Single transaction 246 Pattern of racketeering activity - Time period of acts 247 Personal injury 223 Persons distinct from enterprise 217 Predicate act injury 224 Predicate acts 248-251 Predicate acts - Generally 248 Predicate acts - Convictions 249 Predicate acts - Extortion 250 Predicate acts - Mail and wire fraud 251 Prejudice, dismissal of complaint 268 Racketeering activity 252 Racketeering activity injury 225 Racketeering enterprise injury 226 Racketeering proceeds injury 227 Relatedness of acts, pattern of racketeering activity 244 Reliance 253 Res judicata, dismissal of complaint 269 Single scheme, pattern of racketeering activity 245 Single transaction, pattern of racketeering activity 246 State law claims, dismissal of complaint 270 Statutory provision, particularity and specificity 236 Striking of allegations 256 Supplemental complaint 258 Supplemental statement 259 Time period of acts, pattern of racketeering activity 247 Use of racketeering proceeds, injury 227

211. Necessary and requisite allegations, complaint

Each element of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation and its predicate acts of racketeering must be alleged with particularity. Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., C.A.10 (Okla.) 1992, 956 F.2d 982. Federal Civil Procedure 636

To avert dismissal for failure to state a claim, civil and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint must, at a bare minimum, state facts sufficient to portray specific instances of racketeering activity within reach of RICO statute and causal nexus between that activity and harm alleged. Miranda v. Ponce

Federal Bank, C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 1991, 948 F.2d 41. Federal Civil Procedure 1811

Complaint alleging that purchasers of condominium office unit entered into contract with developer to reconvey the unit so that developer could lease unit to third party, that unit owner had no intent to perform contract at time it was entered into, that developer entered into the lease agreement in reliance on contract with unit owner, and that unit owner exacted money from developer on threat of causing developer economic harm which would stem from nonperformance of the lease agreement was sufficient to allege extortion under Va.Code 1950, § 18.2-59 and thus to support claim for civil violation of this chapter. Battlefield Builders, Inc. v. Swango, C.A.4 (Va.) 1984, 743 F.2d 1060. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 8

Plaintiff's complaint against foreclosing bank and others failed to state claim under this section, in absence of allegations that defendants were associated with or employed by an enterprise, in absence of allegations of collection of unlawful debt or a pattern of racketeering activity, and in absence of identification of a predicate offense. Rae v. Union Bank, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1984, 725 F.2d 478. Commerce 80

Although concerns motivating district court to limit scope of this chapter were legitimate, district court misinter- preted elements essential to pleading cause of action under this section by indicating that this chapter does not embrace ordinary violators charged with common law fraud actions or federal securities law violations as the predicate offenses. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1983, 719 F.2d 5, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1280, 465 U.S. 1025, 79 L.Ed.2d 684. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10; Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Even if defendant's claim of constitutional violations in state court convictions was not dismissed on ground that habeas corpus relief was sole federal remedy, defendant did not establish actionable Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation where he did not name section of RICO statute violated in papers and failed to meet particularized pleading requirements for private action under RICO. Molina v. State of N.Y., E.D.N.Y.1995, 956 F.Supp. 257. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

To state cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), plaintiff must show that: (1) defendants (2) through commission of two or more acts (3) constituting pattern (4) of racketeering activity (5) directly or indirectly invest in, or maintain interest in, or participate in (6) enterprise (7) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1994, 899 F.Supp. 974, appeal granted 44 F.3d 1082, affirmed 47 F.3d 1158, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 50, 516 U.S. 806, 133 L.Ed.2d 15. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 3

In order to state claim, under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), plaintiff must allege conduct of an enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity and must show injury to its business or property. General Elec. Co. v. Lyon, D.Mass.1995, 894 F.Supp. 544. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 69

To state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), there must be “person,” “enterprise,” and “pattern of racketeering activity” and those elements must be pled separately in complaint. Dudley Enterprises, Inc. v. Palmer Corp., N.D.Ill.1993, 832 F.Supp. 221. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 3; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

To recover for acquiring or maintaining interest in or control of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, plaintiffs must allege nexus between control of enterprise, alleged racketeering activity, and alleged injury. Hughes v. Technology Licensing Consultants, Inc., W.D.Pa.1992, 815 F.Supp. 847. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

To state claim for relief under § 1962(c) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, complaint must allege: existence of enterprise affecting interstate commerce; that defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise; that defendant participated, either directly or indirectly, in the conduct or affairs of the enterprise; and that he or she participated through pattern of racketeering activity that must include the allegation of at least two racketeering acts. Constitution Bank v. DiMarco, E.D.Pa.1993, 815 F.Supp. 154. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 3

Claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision making it unlawful for person employed by or associated with enterprise affecting interstate commerce from conducting enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity, must allege existence of enterprise affecting interstate commerce, that defendant was employed by or associated with enterprise, that defendant participated, either directly or indirectly, in conduct or affairs of enterprise and that defendant participated through pattern of racketeering activity that must include allegation of at least two racketeering acts. Marrazzo v. Bucks County Bank and Trust Co., E.D.Pa.1993, 814 F.Supp. 437. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Findings of whether documents relied upon by Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) plaintiffs were mailed or sent by wire communications are made by jury, and not required to be alleged in complaint. In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, E.D.N.Y.1993, 812 F.Supp. 338. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 75

To state cause of action under RICO, plaintiffs must allege that defendant, through commission of two or more acts constituting “pattern” of “racketeering activity,” directly or indirectly invested in, or maintained an interest in, or participated in an “enterprise” the activities of which affect interstate commerce. Morin v. Trupin, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 711, on reconsideration 809 F.Supp. 1081, on reargument 823 F.Supp. 201. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 3

Pension plan participants did not have viable RICO claim against employer based on employer's miscomputation of participants' lump-sum distributions, absent any allegation regarding existence of enterprise and pattern of racketeering activity. Costantino v. TRW, Inc., N.D.Ohio 1991, 773 F.Supp. 34, affirmed in part , modified in part and remanded 13 F.3d 969, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 34

Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), to make out a claim, plaintiff must allege: existence of enterprise affecting interstate commerce; that defendant was employed by or associated with enterprise; that defendant participated in affairs or conduct of enterprise; and that defendant participated through pattern of racketeering activity. Federal Ins. Co. v. Ayers, E.D.Pa.1991, 772 F.Supp. 1503, reconsideration denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Actions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) are subject to same pleading standards as other actions in determining whether plaintiff has stated claim upon which relief can be granted. Young v. West Coast Indus. Relations Ass'n, Inc., D.Del.1991, 763 F.Supp. 64, affirmed 961 F.2d 1570. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

To state claim for damages under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) plaintiff must plead that defendant, through two or more acts constituting pattern of racketeering activity, directly or indirectly invests in, or maintains interest in, or participates in enterprise the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce. Certilman v. Hardcastle, Ltd., E.D.N.Y.1991, 754 F.Supp. 974. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

In order to have standing in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) case, plaintiff must show that its injury was “by reason of” commission of predicate acts constituting pattern of racketeering activity directly or indirectly vesting in or maintaining interest in enterprise, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce. Philan Ins. Ltd. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1990, 748 F.Supp. 190, reargument denied 755 F.Supp. 94. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Necessary ingredient of every successful RICO claim is an element of criminal activity. Babst v. Morgan Kee- gan & Co., E.D.La.1988, 687 F.Supp. 255. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 5

There are eight elements which must be pled before a plaintiff may avail himself of the enhanced damage and attorney fees provision of this section: (1) that defendant (2) through commission of the two of the enumerated predicate acts, (3) which constitute a “pattern” of (4) “racketeering activity,” (5) directly or indirectly participates in the conduct of (6) an “enterprise,” (7) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce, and that (8) plaintiff was injured in his business or property by reason of such conduct. Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., N.D.Ga.1983, 572 F.Supp. 667. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Complaint, brought under this chapter, which charged defendants with fraudulent, illegal and corrupt activities in providing medical treatment and related medical services to patients contained deficiencies of not containing pleading of any specific violation of section 1962 of this title which contains prohibited activities as required by this section, not containing separate conspiracy theory pleading, not containing pleading of a “pattern of racketeering activity” consisting of two or more predicate acts within the previous ten years, not containing pleading of an effect on interstate commerce, and not containing pleading of an “enterprise;” thus, plaintiffs were required to amend their complaint within 30 days. Ralston v. Capper, E.D.Mich.1983, 569 F.Supp. 1575. Federal Civil Procedure 840; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

To be entitled to relief for RICO violation, complaint should describe how affairs of enterprise were connected through pattern of racketeering activity, how plaintiff was damaged, and how those damages were proximately caused by RICO violation. O'Rear v. American Family Life Assur. Co., M.D.Fla.1991, 139 F.R.D. 418. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Bare allegation of violation of this chapter, in conjunction with equally inadequate factual allegations, were insufficient to state a claim under this chapter. Waldo v. North American Van Lines, Inc., W.D.Pa.1984, 102 F.R.D. 807. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

212. Incorporation by reference, complaint

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint's incorporation by reference of dismissed indictment against former officer of labor organization was not prejudicial, but simply served to describe Government's allegations against official; Government alleged that official took illegal payoffs on numerous occasions and indictment simply spelled out those occasions. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicin- ity of United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 738. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 70

213. Causation, complaint

Buyers of sports trading cards, who alleged that manufacturer engaged in illegal gambling in violation of Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in marketing its limited edition cards by randomly inserting them into its trading card packages, failed to allege adequately causation element of RICO standing; buyers asserted that they paid money for trading cards, but failed to allege that such money was paid for chance at limited edition card. Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1998, 138 F.3d 602, rehearing denied. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Used car purchasers adequately alleged proximate cause for purposes of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against financing company which was premised on mail fraud where financing company allegedly sent purchasers fraudulent notices of private sale of purchaser's repossessed vehicles, vehicles were actually sold according to prior arrangement for price well below market value, and vehicles were then resold for market value. Chisolm v. TranSouth Financial Corp., C.A.4 (Va.) 1996, 95 F.3d 331. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Plaintiff, former CEO of target corporation, failed to allege Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation based on alleged fraudulent concealment by defendant corporation of Recapitalization Plan, where several factors acted as intervening direct causes of plaintiff's injury: the plaintiff voluntarily gave up protections against further encroachment by acquiring corporation; the market value of target corporation fell dra- matically due to recession and business losses not caused by defendant corporation; plaintiff's holdings in target corporation fell below amount set in Voting Agreement as triggering termination clause; and plaintiff himself agreed to rescind voting agreement and retire as Chairman and CEO, giving up right to veto defendant corporation's purchases of target corporation's stock, to seek competitive bidders, and to designate target's directors. Powers v. British Vita, P.L.C., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1995, 57 F.3d 176. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza-

tions 62

Claim by shareholders of large publicly held corporation, that certain of his chief officers had engaged in pattern of racketeering damaging reputation of former director who was about to become competitor, did not meet caus- ality requirements for RICO claim; “necessary result” of scheme was not to harm corporation, nor was such harm “foreseeable,” as although corporation was damaged by having to pay $8 million, harm did not come about because of alleged conspiracy, but because of its failure. In re American Exp. Co. Shareholder Litigation, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 39 F.3d 395. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

To maintain cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), plaintiff must show not only that defendant's violation was “but for” cause of his injury, but also that it was proximate cause. Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Lerner, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1994, 31 F.3d 924. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 62

Minority and woman-owned business enterprises, charging that prime contractors engaged in scheme to evade federal and state set aside regulations, failed to make sufficient allegations of proximate causation under Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in asserting they were deprived of subcontracts because prime contractors' bad conduct deprived other prime contractors of specified projects. Imagineering, Inc. v. Kie- wit Pacific Co., C.A.9 (Wash.) 1992, 976 F.2d 1303, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 1644, 507 U.S. 1004, 123 L.Ed.2d 266. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Employees of Navy aircraft maintenance contractors, who alleged that contractors intentionally and continuously underpaid legally required minimum wages and fringe benefits, failed to state claim against contractors under provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) making it unlawful to acquire control of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, where employees did not allege that their purported injury was caused by acquisition of enterprise. Danielsen v. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Center, Inc., C.A.D.C.1991, 941 F.2d 1220, 291 U.S.App.D.C. 303. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Investors in oil and gas limited partnerships, whose investments were wiped out and who claimed that they invested only because of RICO violations by promoters, failed to sufficiently allege loss “by reason of” promoters' violations, and thus failed to state claim under RICO. Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1990, 892 F.2d 680, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 2590, 496 U.S. 906, 110 L.Ed.2d 270. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Depositors failed to sufficiently allege requisite causal connection between loss of interest income, from accounts at insolvent savings and loan association, and alleged pattern of racketeering activity engaged in by former officers and directors of the Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corporation; therefore, civil complaint brought against former MSSIC offices and directors, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, had to be dismissed. Brandenburg v. Seidel, C.A.4 (Md.) 1988, 859 F.2d 1179. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Allegation that due to investigator conspiracy to interfere with witness, portion of insurance proceeds available from aviation company's insurance went to pay investigator's fees thereby depleting final settlement amount paid to plaintiff injured in airplane crash sufficiently demonstrated causal connection between alleged conduct of investigator and plaintiff's alleged injuries to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)]. Miller v. Glen & Helen Aircraft, Inc., C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1985, 777 F.2d 496. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Complaint by State Director of Insurance, as statutory liquidator of insurer, to recover for alleged violations under this chapter by officers, directors and parent corporation who allegedly fraudulently continued insurer in business past the point of insolvency and looted insurer of its most profitable and least risky business, sufficiently alleged a causal nexus between proscribed conduct and insurer's damage to meet the requirements of this section. Schacht v. Brown, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1983, 711 F.2d 1343, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 508, 464 U.S. 1002, 78 L.Ed.2d 698, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 509, 464 U.S. 1002, 78 L.Ed.2d 698. Commerce 80

Defendants' alleged conduct in attracting investors to supposedly diversified investment funds that, in reality, did nothing more than feed money into a securities fraud Ponzi scheme, and conspiring to conceal the feeder funds' true natures, did not satisfy the proximate cause requirement for a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, where plaintiff admitted that the Ponzi scheme operated independently of defendants' conduct, and that the influx of cash from defendants' conduct, at most, extended the duration of the Ponzi scheme. Picard v. Kohn, S.D.N.Y.2012, 907 F.Supp.2d 392. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions 62

Insurers sufficiently alleged injury and causation elements to support their civil Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against various doctors and health care providers, alleging schemes to fraudulently obtain insurance proceeds intended to pay for medical services for people injured in automobile accidents, by alleging that defendants joined together in professional corporations to perpetrate fraudulent scheme that bilked money from insurers by misrepresenting that corporations were eligible to receive reimbursement under New York's no-fault automobile insurance law, and by requesting payment for services that were neither medically necessary nor compensable. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lyons, E.D.N.Y.2012, 843 F.Supp.2d 358. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 59; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 62

Alleged harm purchasers of resort property suffered, in that they were promised that resorts would be completed with high-end amenities, which were never provided, was caused by the developers' failure to satisfy their obligations, rather than by lenders' predatory lending scheme in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO); although purchasers alleged that lenders had scheme to make predatory, non-recourse loans to high-end real estate developments by means of mail and wire fraud, scheme did not proximately cause purchasers' injuries, as required by RICO. Gibson v. Credit Suisse AG, D.Idaho 2011, 787 F.Supp.2d 1123. Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 62

Former employees who sued construction companies and principal, alleging that employment of undocumented aliens depressed their wages, failed to plead that companies' purported harboring of aliens proximately caused their injuries, as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO);

complaint failed to aver that depression of employees' wages was directly caused by defendants' hiding their illegal alien employees from government. Nichols v. Mahoney, S.D.N.Y.2009, 608 F.Supp.2d 526. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Connection between tobacco vendor's injury and Indian tribes' alleged sale of untaxed cigarettes to non-tribe members through pattern of racketeering activity was too attenuated to sustain civil claim under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); direct victim of allegedly illegal sales was state, and ascertaining how much of vendor's lost profits were attributable to tribes' alleged RICO activities would be highly complex matter. Gristede's Foods, Inc. v. Unkechauge Nation, E.D.N.Y.2007, 532 F.Supp.2d 439. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Intervening acts did not break chain of causation between liquor manufacturers' alleged participation in enterprise for laundering proceeds of illegal narcotics sales and injuries suffered by Colombian national and regional governmental agencies as result of manufacturers' violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even if Columbia law encouraged smuggling, and distributors and other middlemen smuggled and sold liquor after manufacturers sold it to them, where agencies alleged that manufacturers actively managed enterprise engaged in smuggling and downstream sales, controlled exact methods and means by which they were paid for liquor products, and dictated that their criminal customers route payments to them through intermediary distributors, shippers, and other cut outs. Republic of Colombia v. Diageo North America Inc., E.D.N.Y.2007, 531 F.Supp.2d 365, certificate of appealability 619 F.Supp.2d 7. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 62

Cotton farmers' allegations sufficiently alleged causal link between their injury and alleged Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation, as required to state claim for the use or investment of income from pattern of racketeering activity against agricultural marketing cooperative; farmers alleged that, as a result of the cooperative's actions in deducting interest costs from real estate development from cotton sales, they lost profits generated from the cooperative marketing and sales of cotton. Andrews Farms v. Calcot, Ltd., E.D.Cal.2007, 527 F.Supp.2d 1239. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Complaint, which alleged that bank's material omissions lulled Italian debtor's innocent insiders into a false sense of security in the health of the company such that innocent insiders did not act to investigate fraudulent transactions whereby corrupt insiders were able to loot the company, sufficiently alleged transaction causation and loss causation elements of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. In re Parmalat Securities Litigation, S.D.N.Y.2006, 412 F.Supp.2d 392. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 75

Family of peace activist who was run over and killed by a military bulldozer in the Gaza Strip, and a number of Palestinians who lived in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, failed to allege a direct causal relationship between manufacturer's design, manufacture, and export of military bulldozers used by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to destroy homes of Palestinians and their alleged injuries, as would support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) claim against manufacturer, where IDF did not need to use manufacturer's products to demolish houses; rather, conduct of the IDF soldiers was the independent, intervening cause. Corrie v. Caterpil-

lar, Inc., W.D.Wash.2005, 403 F.Supp.2d 1019, affirmed 503 F.3d 974. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 62

Out-of-state internet cigarette vendors' failure to file reports with state pursuant to Jenkins Act could be construed as misrepresentations resulting in injury to city, and thus fact that reports were not required to be filed with city did not warrant dismissal of city's claims against vendors under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) for failure to sufficiently plead causation, where city alleged predicate acts of wire and mail fraud arising from vendors' advertising that sales to city residents as “tax-free,” state relied on vendors to file reports, and city relied on state to provide it with information. City of New York v. Cyco.Net, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2005, 383 F.Supp.2d 526. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Distributor's civil claim which was based on mail and wire fraud and brought against its competitor, alleging that competitor created an improper competitive advantage by not charging sales tax to customers and by filing fraudulent sales tax returns, failed to plead transaction causation as required to state valid claim against under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even though distributor alleged its business was harmed by competitor's actions; distributor did not and could not allege that it relied upon competitor's alleged misrepresentations in its sales tax returns. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, S.D.N.Y.2003, 254 F.Supp.2d 464, vacated 373 F.3d 251, on remand 2005 WL 911470, certiorari granted 126 S.Ct. 713, 546 U.S. 1029, 163 L.Ed.2d 567, reversed in part , vacated in part 126 S.Ct. 1991, 547 U.S. 451, 164 L.Ed.2d 720, on remand 2009 WL 1883272. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Plaintiff who asserts mail fraud as predicate act in civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO) need only allege “but for” causation and proximate causation in order to state RICO claim, and need not allege actual, detrimental reliance on predicate acts of fraud. Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., D.Mass.1998, 18 F.Supp.2d 70. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Allegations in investors' civil RICO complaint, that they stood to lose approximately $1,440,000 as result of illegal actions of alleged RICO enterprise in connection with real estate venture, did not sufficiently allege required causal connection between alleged predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, which occurred in August of 1991, and loss of investors' interest in real estate venture, as result of foreclosure action commenced roughly four years later, where complaint mentioned at least eight factors not connected with alleged acts of mail or wire fraud which intervened to substantially cause foreclosure. Bernstein v. Misk, E.D.N.Y.1997, 948 F.Supp. 228. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Since investors and creditors in alleged Ponzi scheme alleged predicate acts of fraud as basis of their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against scheme, promoters, bank that funded hotel projects in which they invested, bank's law firm, corporation formed to consolidate hotel management contracts, and its shareholder and director, they had to plead injury and causation with particularity. Burke v. Dowling, E.D.N.Y.1995, 944 F.Supp. 1036. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Alleged injury to federal employees as result of health benefit plan contractor using money from secret discounts with health care providers to finance promotional pamphlets or to somehow pressure more care providers

into agreeing to accept payment at discounted rates was too far removed to flow from contractor's use or investment of racketeering income, and, thus, allegations of injury were not cognizable under statute prohibiting use or investment of income derived from pattern of racketeering activity. Bridges v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass'n, D.D.C.1996, 935 F.Supp. 37. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Developers' complaint adequately alleged causation element of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against defendants alleged to have illegally dumped waste on developers' property and to have removed or facilitated removal of sand and gravel from property without authorization, which was then sold for money or property; developers pled that administrative fines, cleanup costs and loss of profits were both factually and proximately caused by alleged RICO violations. Colony at Holbrook, Inc. v. Strata G.C., Inc., E.D.N.Y.1996, 928 F.Supp. 1224. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint adequately alleged that invoicing fraud scheme to loot company and concealment of its financial consequences were direct and substantial, as well as foreseeable causes of company vice president's injury; it was alleged that company's comptroller concealed financial evidence of invoicing fraud, which enabled fraud to continue, thereby increasing shortfall in factoring arrangement with bank and subjecting vice president to increased liability on his personal guaranty, and it was also alleged that invoicing fraud and its concealment destroyed company and deprived vice president of opportunity to manage company back to health, causing him to lose his investment and personal profits. Brooke v. Schlesinger, S.D.N.Y.1995, 898 F.Supp. 1076. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Abortion clinics pled necessary “proximate causation” and standing to bring both substantive and conspiracy charges against abortion opponents under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO); clinics alleged that defendants conspired to use force to induce clinic staff and patients to stop working and obtain services elsewhere, and that conspiracy injured clinics' business and/or property interests, and clinics' allegations set forth examples that were connected to each specific defendant and that showed injury to clinics. National Or- ganization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, N.D.Ill.1995, 897 F.Supp. 1047. Conspiracy 18; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 75

To state cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), complaint must allege “proximate cause,” that is, that predicate acts were substantial factor in sequence of responsible causation and that injury is reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as natural consequence. Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, S.D.N.Y.1994, 869 F.Supp. 1076, affirmed 66 F.3d 12. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Regardless of predicate act employed, complaint for violation civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) must allege reliance and damages proximately caused by violation of civil RICO. Chisolm v. Charlie Falk Auto Wholesalers, Inc., E.D.Va.1994, 851 F.Supp. 739, vacated 95 F.3d 331. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

To sustain civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim under any of subsections of RICO section delineating prohibited activities, plaintiff must plead and prove that his alleged injury was caused

by violative conduct described in particular statutory subsection upon which he relies. Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, D.Del.1992, 821 F.Supp. 232. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Limited partners' conclusory allegation that they suffered as result of racketeering activity consisting of mail and securities fraud could not satisfy requirements for pleading proximate causation in RICO action; no facts supported the allegation. Sable v. Southmark/Envicon Capital Corp., S.D.N.Y.1993, 819 F.Supp. 324. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Residents of adult care facility for mentally and emotionally disturbed people adequately alleged that racketeering activities of facility, its owners and operators proximately caused injuries to residents; residents alleged that defendants defrauded residents by charging them maximum allowable charge for adult home services while providing inadequate services and that to carry out the alleged scheme, defendants had fraudulent communications through the mail with state agency which permitted defendants to retain operating certificate and that defendants used the wires to bilk residents of their supplemental security income (SSI) funds. Trautz v. Weisman, S.D.N.Y.1993, 819 F.Supp. 282. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Allegations of causation by Jamaican official who was indicted as result of alleged scheme to bribe Jamaican Tourist Board were insufficient to state civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) claim against persons involved in bribery scheme; official did not allege that bribery scheme was intended to result in his indictment. Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., D.Conn.1992, 793 F.Supp. 404, affirmed in part , reversed in part 79 F.3d 234, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 66, 519 U.S. 816, 136 L.Ed.2d 27, certified question answered 692 A.2d 709, 240 Conn. 300. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Condominium owners, who alleged that developer, financial institutions and others conspired to cover up alleged structural defects in condominium building, failed to meet basic pleading requirement for maintaining Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action that proximate cause be established between racketeering predicate acts and injuries; no allegation was made of how any injury arose from alleged fraudulent mailings nor was there any allegation of injury to condominium owners by financial institutions' disbursement of money based upon alleged fraudulent certifications. Benet-Soto v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., D.Puerto Rico 1992, 791 F.Supp. 914. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Complaint in civil action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) sufficiently alleged facts to suggest that alleged mailings by defendant caused or contributed to plaintiffs' claimed injuries, so as to state claim for which relief could be granted. Schrag v. Dinges, D.Kan.1992, 788 F.Supp. 1543. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

To state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) section which prohibits conducting or participating in enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity, plaintiff must allege, among other things, that its injuries were proximately caused by alleged racketeering activity of defendant. Browning Ave. Realty Corp. v. Rosenshein, S.D.N.Y.1991, 774 F.Supp. 129. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Investors adequately alleged causation for injury running from defendant's alleged RICO violation by alleging that, through a pattern of racketeering activity, the defendants acquired interest in or control of an investment company that, in so acquiring the interest, defendants disseminated materially false and misleading statements to investors and others, and that it was through the frauds that a capitalized investment company was formed and that the general partners were able to gain their piece of the partnership. Berk v. Ascott Inv. Corp., E.D.Pa.1991, 759 F.Supp. 245. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Allegation that attorney for seller of interests in gas wells/leases prepared and recorded fraudulent mortgages as part of scheme to mislead investors as to value of assets owned by seller had no relationship to actual fraudulent misrepresentations in sale of gas wells/leases that allegedly caused injury to investors, and thus, failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) cause of action against attorney. Martin v. Brown, W.D.Pa.1990, 758 F.Supp. 313. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Allegation that defendant had engaged in course of racketeering activity to create and sustain junk bond market was insufficient to state racketeering cause of action absent showing of causal connection between defendant's alleged activities and plaintiffs' losses as purchasers of stock in fund which invested in junk bonds; complaint did not demonstrate that defendant's behavior caused plaintiffs' loss any more than it caused loss to other persons who were indirectly injured in junk bond market. Miller v. New America High Income Fund, D.Mass.1991, 755 F.Supp. 1099, affirmed 36 F.3d 170. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Utility company, in alleging that supplier of pressure containment system designed for use in company's nuclear power station violated section of RICO making it unlawful for person to invest income derived from pattern of racketeering activity in an enterprise, sufficiently alleged proximate cause requirement; company alleged funds gained through supplier's fraudulent misstatements enabled supplier to enhance its ability to market its system and related services to company and that company was injured because of its purchase of system and related services and equipment. Long Island Lighting Co. v. General Elec. Co., E.D.N.Y.1989, 712 F.Supp. 292. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 16

Investors who did not allege that they made initial investments as a result of anything which law firm for partnerships did or said or that they made any subsequent payments as a result of anything which the law firm did or said and who did not identify any communications between themselves in the law firm and did not allege that they suffered any damage as a result of the defendants' activities did not state a RICO claim against the law firm. Morin v. Trupin, S.D.N.Y.1989, 711 F.Supp. 97. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

State Department of Revenue failed to allege sufficient causal connection between alleged fraudulent activity of corporate taxpayer's chairman of the board in attempting to avoid sales tax and Department's loss of tax revenue to support civil claim under section of RICO prohibiting use or investment of racketeering income in enterprise engaged in interstate commerce; Department failed to allege that it had been injured by defendant's use or investment of unpaid tax dollars. People of State of Ill. ex rel. Hartigan v. Flisk, N.D.Ill.1988, 702 F.Supp. 189. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 16

By alleging both transaction and loss causation as result of defendants' alleged predicate securities fraud in sale

of securities and solicitation of proxies for corporate merger, plaintiff satisfied causation requirement to support civil RICO claims against individuals for engaging in alleged pattern of racketeering activity. Lazzaro v. Man- ber, E.D.N.Y.1988, 701 F.Supp. 353. Securities Regulation 60.47

Investors' allegations that limited partnership interests they purchased became worthless and that partnership promoters marketed interests using offering memorandum that omitted material information in violation of federal securities laws--were insufficient to establish element of proximate causation necessary to state viable claim under RICO civil damages provision; there was not even suggestion of relationship between harms claimed by investors and securities laws violations, and no allegation that promoters' omissions led to decline in value of investors' interests. Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp., N.D.Ill.1988, 699 F.Supp. 161, affirmed 892 F.2d 680, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 2590, 496 U.S. 906, 110 L.Ed.2d 270. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Telecommunications consulting firm and its president adequately alleged causal connection between competitors' conduct in assembling information packets to support challenges to worthiness of firm's clients as tentative selectees for cellular mobile radio system licenses and selling those packets to disappointed applicants and injury resulting in damage to firm's reputation in telecommunications industry; therefore, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim was adequately alleged. Lewis v. Lhu, D.D.C.1988, 696 F.Supp. 723. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 60

Investors who were allegedly harmed following announcement that trader had engaged in illegal insider trading failed to state cause of action against trader under RICO, absent allegation that their injuries arose from commission of alleged RICO violations. Sperber v. Boesky, S.D.N.Y.1987, 672 F.Supp. 754, affirmed 849 F.2d 60. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Investment group which alleged acts of mail and wire fraud as predicate acts of racketeering under Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act failed to plead satisfactorily that defendant's conduct induced investors to invest or caused them to sustain loss, and thus amended consolidated complaint failed to meet civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act causation requirements. In re Gas Reclamation, Inc. Securities Litiga- tion, S.D.N.Y.1987, 663 F.Supp. 1123. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Investors' allegations that stock brokerage's investment of racketeering proceeds in its New Jersey office proximately caused their injury by creating incentive for, and rewarding successful completion of fraud, and by permitting continued defrauding of investors was insufficient to state cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, in that allegations did not sufficiently allege how investment of racketeering proceeds caused investor's injury. DeMuro v. E.F. Hutton, S.D.N.Y.1986, 662 F.Supp. 308. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 71

Buyer alleged adequate causation of injury by investment and stated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act claim based on assertion that defendants committed fraud by offering him certain art plates and screens for investment while at same time misrepresenting their value; buyer alleged injury by contending that his money, which was derived from the fraud, was used to continue the “enterprise.” Snider v. Lone Star Art

Trading Co., Inc., E.D.Mich.1987, 659 F.Supp. 1249, on reconsideration 672 F.Supp. 977. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

RICO complaint in which city alleged that damage occurred to its sewer system because corrupted sewer inspectors did not detect or report improper tie-ins between private sewer lines and city sewer system adequately alleged proximate causal relation between contractor's alleged misconduct in paying bribes and city's alleged injuries, regardless of whether contractor who caused the injury was privately employed. City of New York v. Joseph L. Balkan, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1987, 656 F.Supp. 536. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Complaint, alleging that defendants infused funds gained from several acts of securities fraud into parent corporation and acquired and managed parent corporation through acts of securities fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud and, then, conducted campaign to eliminate challenger to subsidiary's dominant position in market for financial printing services, resulting in injury to challenger's business, alleged sufficient causation to state civil RICO action. Pandick, Inc. v. Rooney, N.D.Ill.1986, 632 F.Supp. 1430. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

To allege tort under this chapter, a plaintiff must allege that injuries he sustained were caused by the distinctive violation of this chapter, and not simply by commission of the predicate offenses, and in other words, plaintiff must plead a “RICO injury” or a “racketeering enterprise injury.” Guerrero v. Katzen, D.C.D.C.1983, 571 F.Supp. 714. Commerce 80

Plaintiffs' allegations that their monetary losses were result of defendants' innumerable acts of securities fraud were sufficient to state a cause of action under this section by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this title setting out proscribed activities. Kimmel v. Peterson, E.D.Pa.1983, 565 F.Supp. 476. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Allegations that limited partnerships were enterprises and that defendants conducted enterprises' affairs through pattern of racketeering activities, that is, mail and wire fraud, which conduct injured plaintiffs, sufficiently set forth elements of the claim under this chapter, including necessary causal connection between plaintiff's injuries and violation of this section. Eisenberg v. Gagnon, E.D.Pa.1983, 564 F.Supp. 1347. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Claim under this chapter, which at best alleged injury that arose only by reason of predicate securities law violations by broker and its employees, did not allege required injury “by reason of” violation of this chapter and thus customer did not have standing to bring action for treble damages under this section against broker and its employees. Harper v. New Japan Securities Intern., Inc., C.D.Cal.1982, 545 F.Supp. 1002. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

214. Conspiracy, complaint--Generally

Foreign country made insufficient allegations of agreement with foreign banking entities to state conspiracy

claim against domestic banking entities under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), for allegedly participating in scheme to assist former military officer in illegally diverting government funds for his personal use, absent any allegation that domestic entities had any knowledge of essential nature of scheme. Re- public of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., C.A.11 (Fla.) 1997, 119 F.3d 935. Conspiracy 18

Although rental equipment company's allegations indicated that some economic pressure was applied to induce exhibition contractor to rent equipment from plaintiff's competitor and that threats of violence were made, complaint did not establish that contractor lacked reasonable opportunity to avoid threatened consequences in some other way, and thus complaint stated claim against contractor for conspiracy to conduct or participate in affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity. MCM Partners, Inc. v. Andrews-Bartlett & Associates, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1995, 62 F.3d 967, on remand 1997 WL 306577. Conspiracy 18

Claim by real estate developer and its broker against tenants' association, association's president, and association's attorneys for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy failed to state claim, where their allegations provided no basis for inferring any conspiracy broader than defendants' alleged scheme to prevent or delay sale of apartment building or to secure “ransom” for allowing sale to proceed. Ed- mondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass'n, C.A.D.C.1995, 48 F.3d 1260, 310 U.S.App.D.C. 409. Conspiracy 18

Allegations by investors that defendant was an agent for the corporation and a contact link between investors and defendants, that defendant was instrumental in convincing investors to make investments, and that defendant received commissions for referral of new investment clients stated claim against defendant for Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy. Davila Uviles v. RYS Intern. Corp., D.Puerto Rico 2006, 443 F.Supp.2d 233. Conspiracy 18

Prisoners could not recover under civil remedies section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where they failed to allege a single act on part of defendants to support conspiracy claim. Alley v. An- gelone, E.D.Va.1997, 962 F.Supp. 827. Conspiracy 18

Bald assertion of criminal activity was insufficient to state claim for conspiracy to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Manning v. Stigger, E.D.Ky.1996, 919 F.Supp. 249. Conspiracy 18

Insurers' complaint sufficiently alleged that employee of insured trucking company's insurance agent knowingly engaged in direction of company's affairs, for purposes of stating claim against him under Racketeering Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) based on allegations that company, agent, employee and others made intentional misrepresentations in obtaining and maintaining property and casualty policies issued to company by the insurers, even though he was employed by agent. Seneca Ins. Co. v. Commercial Transp., Inc., M.D.Pa.1995, 906 F.Supp. 239. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Abortion clinics and women's organization adequately pleaded predicate RICO acts with respect to abortion op-

ponent, even though there were no allegations that he committed any substantive acts against plaintiffs in his own right; he was alleged to be conspirator in pro-life enterprise that allegedly agreed to violently close clinics that provided abortion services, and thus, he could be liable for conspiring with those other defendants. National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, N.D.Ill.1995, 897 F.Supp. 1047. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Allegations that plastics manufacturer conspired with its subsidiary and engaged in acts of mail and wire fraud to deprive company that made products for joint venture formed by manufacturer's former employees of raw ingredient essential for its business were insufficient to state cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO), absent allegation of any activity on part of subsidiary constituting RICO violation. General Elec. Co. v. Lyon, D.Mass.1995, 894 F.Supp. 544. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 73

Former officers, directors, and attorneys of failed savings and loan association, who alleged that law firm which had represented borrowers entered into conspiracy with principal objective the conversion of money from savings and loan association by false and fraudulent acts, pretenses, and misrepresentations, failed to sufficiently allege “pattern of racketeering activity” as required to state cause of action under RICO; it was alleged only that law firm intentionally defrauded savings and loan association and, incidently, that officers, directors, and attorneys sustained injury, and there was no threat of repetition sufficient to establish open-ended continuity pattern, as association was in receivership. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer, E.D.Pa.1993, 836 F.Supp. 1123. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Fact that corporation did not specifically allege in RICO complaint that defendants “knowingly” joined enterprise, did not render complaint insufficient to state claim for conspiracy, where type of conspiracy alleged necessarily required knowing participation. Corporacion Insular de Seguros v. Reyes Munoz, D.Puerto Rico 1993, 826 F.Supp. 599. Conspiracy 18

Bare allegations of residents of adult care facility for mentally and emotionally disturbed people that individual owners/operators conspired to conduct facility's affairs through pattern of racketeering, when considered with factual allegations regarding facility's management and specific actions of one owner/operator and facility manager in renewing operating certificate while facility provided substandard care, stated cause of action for Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy. Trautz v. Weisman, S.D.N.Y.1993, 819 F.Supp. 282. Conspiracy 18

Franchisees failed to provide factual basis to support their claim of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) conspiracy by franchisor and its principal; at most, franchisees had alleged that some of coconspirators, who were not named as defendants, may have deposited certain letters in the United States mails or made certain telephone calls, which did not provide basis to believe that they ever intended to agree to commit any fraudulent acts. Giuliano v. Everything Yogurt, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1993, 819 F.Supp. 240. Conspiracy 18

Alleged intracorporate conspiracy was actionable under RICO; corporations' former employees alleged that em-

ployer and current employees committed acts of mail and wire fraud against consumers, that they extorted employees to keep them employed and keep scheme undercover, and that they used former employees' discharge by subsequent employer as example to prevent employees from leaving, and the allegations indicated that corporate veil was acting to shield corporation infiltrated at highest levels by racketeering activity. Hughes v. Technology Licensing Consultants, Inc., W.D.Pa.1992, 815 F.Supp. 847. Conspiracy 2

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy claims alleging that almost all the defendants “conspired to violate provisions of Title 18, United States Code, § 1962” through private sanitation industry association and carting industry enterprises, respectively, and that each of the defendants “agreed to commit two or more predicate acts” were insufficient except as to the one defendant for which complaint clearly set forth two particular predicate offenses he allegedly agreed to commit and claims were insufficient as to all defendants so far as they did not set out basis for inference that alleged predicate offenses constituted pattern of racketeering activity as to any one defendant or even that two predicate acts with respect to which any defendant allegedly entered into agreements constituted a pattern. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suf- folk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Conspiracy 18

Joint venturer who brought Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against engineer who made inspection reports on joint venture project to mortgage lender had failed to sufficiently allege that engineer violated or committed any underlying intentional tort or predicate act in violation of substantive RICO provisions or committed any fraud, so any conspiracy claim under New York law or RICO asserted against engineer would fail; complaint alleged only that engineer abetted managing venturer by approving requests for payments when engineer knew or should have known that project could not be completed for balance of construction loan remaining and that requests for payment contained blatant falsities and inconsistencies of which engineer could not have been unaware. Browning Ave. Realty Corp. v. Rosenshein, S.D.N.Y.1991, 774 F.Supp. 129. Conspiracy 18

Grandchildren did not sufficiently plead existence of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy by defendants who allegedly diverted assets from grandmother's estate that would have passed under residuary clause to inter vivos trust of which grandchildren were beneficiaries. Firestone v. Gal- breath, S.D.Ohio 1990, 747 F.Supp. 1556, affirmed in part 976 F.2d 279, rehearing denied , certified question answered 616 N.E.2d 202, 67 Ohio St.3d 87, answer to certified question conformed to 25 F.3d 323, on remand 895 F.Supp. 917. Conspiracy 18

Radio station owner operator that alleged that defendants engaged in business of illegally modifying radio units, for a fee, to allow unauthorized listeners to obtain and enjoy programming on subcarrier frequencies that could not be received by general public had not stated RICO conspiracy claim; there was no allegation of agreement to commit predicate acts and insufficient allegation of predicate acts to state claim for RICO violation, and no allegation that defendants had knowledge that their acts, if illegal, were part of pattern of racketeering activity. Greek Radio Network of America, Inc. v. Vlasopoulos, E.D.Pa.1990, 731 F.Supp. 1227. Conspiracy 18

Complaint which alleged that brokerage firm and individual were part of a conspiracy spanning several years to artificially increase and maintain the price of certain securities, the defendants received income from the profits

derived from that scheme, and that the income was used to continue the operation of the conspiracy and of another brokerage firm stated a claim under RICO. Epstein v. Haas Securities Corp., S.D.N.Y.1990, 731 F.Supp. 1166. Conspiracy 18

Allegations of conspiracy to manipulate a number of stocks over a number of years using the same modis op- erandi and causing serious financial loss to many unwitting investors were adequate to allege continuity or threat of continuing racketeering acts. Epstein v. Haas Securities Corp., S.D.N.Y.1990, 731 F.Supp. 1166. Conspiracy 18

Complaint alleging that defendants participated in affairs of enterprise and were personally involved in commission of multiple predicate acts adequately alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) conspiracy. Cross v. Simons, N.D.Ill.1989, 729 F.Supp. 588. Conspiracy 18

Contractor's RICO claim against union, following union's organization of secondary boycott of contractor's suppliers during attempt to coerce contractor to sign collective bargaining agreement, contained reasonable inference of conspiracy to control affairs of the enterprise sufficient to state a cause of action. C & W Const. Co. v. Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 745, AFL-CIO, D.Hawai'i 1988, 687 F.Supp. 1453. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 15

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act conspiracy petition against attorney, which incorporated factual allegations of petitions alleging particular statutory violations by employee and bank, in wresting control of company from its founder, by alleging that attorney agreed to participate in employee's fraud with understanding and knowledge that employee's plan was in violation of Act, was sufficient to state cause of action under conspiracy section of Act. Odesser v. Continental Bank, E.D.Pa.1987, 676 F.Supp. 1305. Conspiracy 18

A RICO conspiracy allegation requires at least pleading of existence of one or more overt acts by defendant in furtherance of conspiracy and assent of each defendant to conspiracy; bare allegation that defendants conspired to violate § 1962(a-c) does not set forth proper claim of conspiracy under § 1962(d). NL Industries, Inc. v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., D.Kan.1986, 650 F.Supp. 1115. Conspiracy 18

Amended complaint for fraud under RICO, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c), which included allegations that bank actively conspired with contractor to hoodwink contractor's suppliers, subcontractors and guarantors, and that bank coer- cively used its power as creditor to dictate to contractor how it would run certain aspects of its business in order to show participation in or control of contractor's affairs, sufficiently stated cause of action to withstand motion to dismiss. Heritage Ins. Co. of America v. First Nat. Bank of Cicero, N.D.Ill.1986, 629 F.Supp. 1412. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Allegations that officials of corporation acted in furtherance of scheme to defraud failed to set forth proper claim of conspiracy under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(d)]. Van Dorn Co., Cent. States Can Co. Div. v. Howington, N.D.Ohio 1985, 623 F.Supp. 1548. Conspiracy 18

Allegations that all defendants, including officer, director and stockholder of corporate defendant, conspired and agreed to violate provisions of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act by devising a schedule for monthly charges for certain items for which defendants would claim reimbursement from Oklahoma Department of Human Services, that defendants compiled false information and records showing amounts and costs of these items, that defendants mailed these false and fraudulent claims to Department, and that defendants received payment therefore from Department were sufficient to state civil cause of action for conspiracy to violate RICO. State of Okl. ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v. Children's Shelter, Inc., W.D.Okla.1985, 604 F.Supp. 867. Con- spiracy 9

Allegations of course of conduct in which payments in form of interests in businesses were extracted as price for extending loans and of agreement between plaintiff's co-owner and bank loan officer that loan officer and or his company would receive a substantial increase in his or its interest in newspaper upon plaintiff co-owner abandoning newspaper venture in favor of other co-owner were adequate to plead conspiracy to violate provisions of this chapter. Joseph v. Algemene Bank Nederland, N.V., W.D.Pa.1984, 592 F.Supp. 141. Conspiracy 43(6)

Allegation of a conspiracy between employee of brokerage firm and brokerage firm to violate this chapter failed to state a claim for civil conspiracy under this section. Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., E.D.Pa.1983, 581 F.Supp. 88. Conspiracy 18

Mere negligence or even recklessness by brokerage firms in supervising trading of plaintiff's accounts, such as was alleged, did not allege essence of an independent conspiratorial enterprise consisting of either firm and broker, based upon a mutual, and nefarious, gain from broker's illicit activities, as required by this chapter. Da- kis on Behalf of Dakis Pension Plan v. Chapman, N.D.Cal.1983, 574 F.Supp. 757. Commerce 80

In the absence of an allegation that seven bank officials conspired to conduct a corporation's racketeering activities, plaintiffs failed to state a private cause of action under this chapter; however, allegations that bank officers and principal shareholder of corporation which was indebted to bank conducted and operated corporation, that is, the enterprise, by a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of numerous acts of mail fraud aimed at prospective purchaser of corporation stated a private action under this chapter. Kaushal v. State Bank of India, N.D.Ill.1983, 556 F.Supp. 576. Commerce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

To state claim for RICO conspiracy, complaint should describe alleged agreement to perform at least two predicate acts, describe how plaintiff was damaged, and how those damages were proximately caused by conspiracy to violate RICO. O'Rear v. American Family Life Assur. Co., M.D.Fla.1991, 139 F.R.D. 418. Conspiracy 18

Consumers who brought action against business services corporation, dealers and infomercial actor, stemming from leasing of e-commerce services and products, properly alleged that corporation and dealer conspired to further or facilitate predicate racketeering acts, as required to maintain RICO claim; complaint charged that corporation's leases were linchpin of schemes to defraud consumers, that corporation determined both content of leases and means by which they were enforced, and that dealer expended substantial sums of money in developing e-

commerce product at issue. Zito v. Leasecomm Corp., S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 22251352, Unreported. Conspir- acy 18

215. ---- Agreement, conspiracy, complaint

Investors failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) conspiracy claim against limited partnership's attorney and real estate appraiser, where complaint did not allege conspiracy or agreement, and did not plead facts sufficient to infer assent to contribute to common enterprise. Baumer v. Pachl, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1993, 8 F.3d 1341. Conspiracy 18

Complaint which failed to plead specifically any agreement to commit predicate acts of racketeering failed to establish a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act conspiracy claim. Tel-Phonic Services, Inc. v. TBS Intern., Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1992, 975 F.2d 1134. Conspiracy 18

Charge in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action that defendants who delivered to purchasers defective furnace units had agreement and knowledge of fraud which could be reasonably inferred from relationship of defendants as interrelated corporate entities was not sufficient to state conspiracy claim under RICO absent allegations that any corporations were set up specifically to perpetrate fraud; even if agreement to commit predicate acts could be inferred, mere agreement would not support conspiracy charge. Glessner v. Kenny, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1991, 952 F.2d 702. Conspiracy 18

RICO civil conspiracy complaint, at the very least, must allege specifically an agreement to commit at least two predicate acts. Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1990, 897 F.2d 21, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 655. Conspiracy 18

Alleged frauds of title insurance company agents and the allegedly unlawful actions involved in the clean-up of the fraud by title insurance company's majority stockholder were unrelated, and therefore did not qualify as a pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as required to establish a civil claim against majority stockholder; according to allegations, the underlying frauds were perpetrated to misappropriate money and/or property, and by contrast, the clean-up actions were undertaken to lessen the negative effect on the majority stockholder's business in other states and to cover up the stockholder's involvement and liability under a reinsurance treaty, which permitted stockholder to exercise extensive control over the title insurance company. Albright v. Attorney's Title Ins. Fund, D.Utah 2007, 504 F.Supp.2d 1187. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Complaint alleging defendants were associated with each other through enterprise, and agreed and conspired to conduct and participate, directly or indirectly, in affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), failed to allege conspiracy agreement with sufficient particularity; nothing on face of complaint would connect series of unrelated predicate acts, or suggest defendants entered into agreement with each other to commit those acts. Moore v. Guesno, W.D.N.Y.2007, 485 F.Supp.2d 300, affirmed 301 Fed.Appx. 17, 2008 WL 5082982. Federal Civil Procedure 633.1

Automobile insurer adequately pled factual support for alleged agreement among physicians giving rise to claim of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy involving conducting and billing insurer for unnecessary diagnostic testing of insureds, by alleging that each defendant knew of, agreed to, and acted in furtherance of conspiracy's overall objective by facilitating submission of fraudulent bills to insurer for unnecessary medical services and that defendant physicians were part of RICO enterprise involving unnecessary testing. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. CPT Medical Services, P.C., E.D.N.Y.2005, 375 F.Supp.2d 141. Con- spiracy 18

Developers stated claim for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy against defendant who was allegedly part of illegal scheme to defraud developers during period from 1989 to 1993, which scheme involved acts of unauthorized removal and sale of soil, and deposit of waste material on developers' property; allegations supported inference that defendant knowingly agreed with contractors and excavators to participate in conspiracy. Colony at Holbrook, Inc. v. Strata G.C., Inc., E.D.N.Y.1996, 928 F.Supp. 1224. Con- spiracy 18

Savings and loan association receiver's allegations that insurance agent issued temporary insurance binders that were later cancelled after automobile dealership received financing from savings and loan and that both agent and other conspirators knew that binders would eventually be cancelled because most of the borrowers were un- insurable, were sufficient to state claim under RICO conspiracy section, since allegations were sufficient to infer that all conspirators implicitly agreed to carry out scheme on behalf of enterprise. Resolution Trust Corp. v. S & K Chevrolet Co., C.D.Ill.1996, 918 F.Supp. 1235, opinion vacated in part on reconsideration 923 F.Supp. 135. Conspiracy 18

In order to state claim for RICO conspiracy, plaintiffs must claim that each alleged conspirator agreed to commit at least predicate acts of racketeering activity. R.C.M. Executive Gallery Corp. v. Rols Capital Co., S.D.N.Y.1995, 901 F.Supp. 630. Conspiracy 18

Corporation adequately pled existence of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) “conspiracy” by alleging facts from which jury might infer that defendants, by words or actions, manifested agreement with one another to conspire in furtherance of common purpose of RICO enterprise. Water Intern. Network, U.S.A., Inc. v. East, M.D.Fla.1995, 892 F.Supp. 1477. Conspiracy 1.1

Core of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy is agreement to commit predicate acts and, therefore, complaint must allege, at minimum, agreement among all defendants to commit the two requisite predicate acts. Naso v. Park, S.D.N.Y.1994, 850 F.Supp. 264. Conspiracy 18

Tax shelter investors' complaint alleging that outside attorneys knowingly agreed with promoter of tax shelters to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and personally committed and agreed to commit racketeering acts stated cause of action under RICO conspiracy provision. Morin v. Trupin, S.D.N.Y.1993, 835 F.Supp. 126. Conspiracy 18

To show cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act conspiracy subsection, plaintiff must allege that: there was agreement to commit predicate acts of fraud; and defendants had knowledge that those acts were part of pattern of racketeering activity conducted in such a way as to violate one of the preceding subsections. Constitution Bank v. DiMarco, E.D.Pa.1993, 815 F.Supp. 154. Conspiracy 18

Insurer's complaint--alleging that insureds defrauded insurer by misrepresenting monthly statements, via United States mail and wires interstate, to insurer, such that insureds were entitled to rebate or refund of premium or premium deposit--implied group operation, which would require consent and participation of number of individuals, and therefore, sufficiently alleged agreement necessary to support charge of conspiracy under federal and Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statutes. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Value Rent-A-Car Inc., S.D.Fla.1992, 814 F.Supp. 1084. Conspiracy 18

Complaint alleging with specificity agreement to rig bid for milk distribution scheme in violation of antitrust laws, using postal system to further scheme, sufficiently alleged agreement violating federal RICO to meet particularity requirement for pleading fraud, though complaint did not allege specific agreement to use mails. State of Ga. ex rel. Bowers for Use and Ben. of Camden County School Dist. v. Dairymen, Inc., S.D.Ga.1991, 813 F.Supp. 1580. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Complaint was sufficient to plead a conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) where complaint set forth facts that allowed conclusion that defendants allegedly agreed to commit and did commit requisite predicate acts of racketeering activity. Official Publications, Inc. v. Kable News Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1991, 775 F.Supp. 631. Conspiracy 18

Allegations by investors, read in totality, suggested that officers and directors of corporation and public accounting firm entered agreement to violate provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as required for RICO conspiracy, even though investors did not specifically allege explicit pact to commit pattern of racketeering; each complaint detailed scheme collectively and knowingly carried out by defendants to overstate financial condition of corporation, and maintain artificially high market price for stock. In re Sahlen & Associates, Inc. Securities Litigation, S.D.Fla.1991, 773 F.Supp. 342. Conspiracy 18

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim was deficient in that it failed to allege any facts demonstrating knowing agreement involving each of defendants to commit at lease two predicate acts. Metro Furniture Rental, Inc. v. Alessi, S.D.N.Y.1991, 770 F.Supp. 198. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 72; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Allegations that defendants agreed with plaintiff's employee to commit predicate acts charged, in furtherance of schemes to defraud plaintiff, constituted adequate pleading of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy. Farberware, Inc. v. Groben, S.D.N.Y.1991, 764 F.Supp. 296. Conspiracy 18

Former employees failed to state claim for conspiracy to violate RICO, absent allegations of specific facts that each of individual defendants, by words or actions, manifested agreement to commit two or more predicate acts;

it was not clear how, or if, each defendant participated in alleged conspiracy, or extent and nature of roles of each defendant. Laverpool v. New York City Transit Authority, E.D.N.Y.1991, 760 F.Supp. 1046. Conspiracy 18

Limited partnership formed to fund development and marketing of computer software program did not adequately allege conspiracy to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by merely in- corporating by reference allegations of fraud set forth in earlier complaint; there were no allegations of specific facts that each defendant, by words or actions, manifested agreement to commit two or more of predicate acts alleged. Com-Tech Associates v. Computer Associates Intern., Inc., E.D.N.Y.1990, 753 F.Supp. 1078, affirmed 938 F.2d 1574. Conspiracy 18

Plaintiffs alleging racketeering conspiracy on part of defendants were not required in their pleadings to allege defendants' overt assent to conspiracy; any requirement that plaintiffs allege defendant's assent to conspiracy could be met through inference from each defendant's act in furtherance of conspiracy. Federal Information Sys- tems, Corp. v. Boyd, D.D.C.1990, 753 F.Supp. 971. Conspiracy 18

Complaint failed to allege the elements of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy, where complaint did not allege that defendants agreed to commit two predicate crimes or to participate in the conduct of a RICO enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, and did not support inference that such an agreement existed and where, in any event, acts alleged did not amount to a pattern of racketeering activity. Gott v. Simpson, D.Me.1990, 745 F.Supp. 765. Conspiracy 18

Complaint which contained no allegations that RICO defendant agreed, with conspirators or anyone else, to the commission of two predicate acts did not state claim for RICO conspiracy. First Nat. Bank of Louisville v. Lust- ig, E.D.La.1989, 727 F.Supp. 276. Conspiracy 18

To establish a conspiracy claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962, plaintiff must allege existence of either agreement to commit a substantive violation of RICO, such as conducting affairs of enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, or an agreement to participate in predicate acts. Lewis on Behalf of Nat. Semiconductor Corp. v. Sporck, N.D.Cal.1985, 612 F.Supp. 1316. Conspiracy 2

In action asserting civil claim under this chapter against magazine publishers in connection with door-to-door subscription sales, allegation that publishers contracted with subscription agents was not enough to impose liability on publishers as principals by way of a conspiracy, in the absence of allegation that each member of the conspiracy agreed to participate in what he knew to be a collective venture directed toward a common goal, or allegation that each of the individual publishers came to an agreement with subscription agents to engage in criminal activity. Laterza v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1984, 581 F.Supp. 408. Commerce 80

216. Enterprise, complaint--Generally

Construction companies that conspired to rig bidding for state contracts did not manage or control agency that awarded contracts, and thus did not participate in conduct of criminal enterprise for purposes of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even though agency awarded projects by computer program designed to accept lowest bid, where companies had no control over manner in which agency went about awarding contract. James Cape & Sons Co. v. PCC Const. Co., C.A.7 (Wis.) 2006, 453 F.3d 396. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Complaint's failure to identify any Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise, distinct from named person, was fatal for RICO claim; even though complaint alleged existence of enterprise, it never squarely identified one, and possibility that a defendant/corporation was the enterprise was undermined by complaint's repeated contention that defendant/corporation was a RICO person. Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., C.A.1 (Mass.) 1996, 103 F.3d 186. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Allegations of purchasers of retail grocery stores that vendors and finance company engaged in fraudulent scheme when they jointly induced plaintiffs to purchase the stores while the vendors were planning to raise prices and pursue draconian short-term cost-cutting strategies during interim between acceptance of the bids and transfer of the stores were sufficient to state a claim for “association-in-fact enterprise” under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act; alleged racketeering activity consisted of acts indictable under the federal mail and wire fraud statute and constituted predicate acts of racketeering. River City Markets, Inc. v. Fleming Foods West, Inc., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1992, 960 F.2d 1458. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

“Enterprise” consisting of four persons leagued in conspiracy to defraud investor was injected into litigation alleging violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute too late to permit that conspiracy to sustain finding of RICO “enterprise”; complaint specified enterprise consisting of one of the four individuals and his accounting firm, pretrial order and pretrial briefs similarly specified enterprise, no mention was made during trial of enterprise consisting of the four conspirators themselves, and no motion to amend pleadings was made. Burdett v. Miller, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 957 F.2d 1375, amended on denial of rehearing. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Complaint alleging Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations did not plead association in fact sufficiently to satisfy RICO's enterprise requirement, although complaint conclusorily alleged that defendants constituted enterprise ostensibly engaging in business of buying, selling, mortgaging, hypothecating, exchanging, and pledging properties located in various states; complaint contained no allegations articulating how defendants might have comprised part of ongoing organization or functioned as continuing unit, and no fact-specific allegations tied together New York and Texas transactions that had occurred at different times. Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp., C.A.1 (Mass.) 1991, 942 F.2d 34. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 73

Employees of Navy aircraft maintenance contractors, who alleged that contractors intentionally and continuously underpaid legally required minimum wages and fringe benefits, failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against contractors premised on status of United States Navy as RICO

“enterprise,” where employees made no allegation that contractors were participating in operation or management of Navy. Danielsen v. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Center, Inc., C.A.D.C.1991, 941 F.2d 1220, 291 U.S.App.D.C. 303. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

It is essential to plead precisely in a RICO case the enterprise alleged and the RICO section allegedly violated. Reynolds v. East Dyer Development Co., C.A.7 (Ind.) 1989, 882 F.2d 1249. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Businessman's RICO complaint based on claims that two associates engaged in scheme to appropriate his legitimate real estate investment and development business adequately alleged an enterprise distinct from the persons involved; complaint could be read to allege that RICO defendants named were only members of a larger enterprise that included the plaintiff. Jacobson v. Cooper, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1989, 882 F.2d 717, on remand. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Complaint by savings and loan alleged acquired nexus between savings and loan enterprise and former president's racketeering activity sufficient to meet enterprise requirement under civil RICO statute; when former president committed alleged predicate acts of mail fraud, he acted in his capacity as president, and acts of mail fraud were all related to activities of savings and loan. Sun Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1987, 825 F.2d 187. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

In a civil suit under this chapter, plaintiff's complaint identifying four entities which plaintiff believed were the “enterprises” that had been marshalled against it satisfied rules of pleading. Seville Indus. Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp., C.A.3 (N.J.) 1984, 742 F.2d 786, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 1179, 469 U.S. 1211, 84 L.Ed.2d 327. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

District court erroneously required shareholder who unwittingly sold stock of “target” company on open market prior to public announcement of tender offer and who alleged that buyers of stock violated section 1962 of this title to allege facts showing that “enterprise” had “independent economic significance from the pattern of racketeering activity.” Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1983, 719 F.2d 5, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1280, 465 U.S. 1025, 79 L.Ed.2d 684. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Estate of insured failed to satisfy pleading with particularity requirement for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against long-term care insurer and affiliated corporations; complaint did not identify with particularity the participants in the alleged enterprise, it failed to specifically allege the predicate acts of mail or wire fraud allegedly committed by each defendant, and it failed to specifically allege nexus between the alleged fraud and harm to insured. Burke v. Ability Ins. Co., D.S.D.2013, 926 F.Supp.2d 1056. Fed- eral Civil Procedure 636

Insurance company failed to allege any enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as required to state civil RICO claim alleging pattern of racketeering activity by software-development company that allegedly engaged in mail and wire fraud when it misrepresented its ability to deliver usable

policy-administration software to insurance company, where insurance company failed to name any third-party actors separate from software company and its employees. Tri-State Consumer Ins. Co., Inc. v. LexisNexis Risk Solutions Inc., N.D.Ga.2011, 823 F.Supp.2d 1306. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 47

Purchasers of commercial real property failed to allege facts showing that each defendant exerted control over alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise; their broad, conclusory assertions that individual defendants controlled or were alter egos of corporate defendants and that they were “agents or officers” of corporate defendants were insufficient. Ozbakir v. Scotti, W.D.N.Y.2011, 764 F.Supp.2d 556. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Investors adequately pled existence of enterprise in their action alleging that bank violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by participating in foreign currency trading companies' scheme to defraud investors, where bank was also engaged in separate and ongoing legitimate business, and investors contended that companies were able to carry on their role in enterprise, in part, by bank's role in executing monetary transfers by wire. Gonzales v. Lloyds TSB Bank, PLC, C.D.Cal.2006, 532 F.Supp.2d 1200. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Colombian national and regional governmental agencies sufficiently alleged organizational structure in their action alleging that liquor manufacturers participated in enterprise for laundering proceeds of illegal narcotics sales, in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even though complaint did not identify by name all of enterprise's participants, or explain how enterprise participants other than manufacturers fit into enterprise's hierarchy, where complaint included concrete allegations to effect that enterprise's members continued in enterprise's hierarchy, organization, and activities throughout enterprise's duration, provided significant detail as to how manufacturers exercised control over enterprise, described balance of enterprise's membership and structure, provided significant information about enterprise's activities, and alleged that enterprise has existed continuously for more than twelve years. Republic of Colombia v. Diageo North America Inc., E.D.N.Y.2007, 531 F.Supp.2d 365, certificate of appealability 619 F.Supp.2d 7. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Government's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint against labor union, its officers, and various members of crime families failed to plead a cognizable association-in-fact enterprise operating on the New York/New Jersey waterfront and the Port of Miami; complaint contained virtually no allegations regarding the structure and organization of the alleged enterprise, and left a plethora of unanswered questions regarding the membership, purpose, and structure of that entity. U.S. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, E.D.N.Y.2007, 518 F.Supp.2d 422. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Customers of affiliated medical transcription companies properly alleged that senior executives were involved in the operation and control of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise where complaint identified an ongoing and continuing association-in-fact consisting of both companies as the enterprise that executives used to conduct a pattern of racketeering activities by artificially inflating invoices for transcription services to customers. South Broward Hosp. Dist. v. MedQuist Inc., D.N.J.2007, 516 F.Supp.2d 370, stay denied 2007 WL 4547492, affirmed in part 258 Fed.Appx. 466, 2007 WL 4394391. Racketeer Influenced And

Corrupt Organizations 73

Client and its shareholders alleged existence of an enterprise sufficiently to state a claim against law firm that had been client's corporate counsel for violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where they alleged that attorneys employed by the law firm were members of the enterprise, and that the law firm was vicariously liable for their actions because it received profits from their activities. Design Pal- lets, Inc. v. GrayRobinson, P.A., M.D.Fla.2007, 515 F.Supp.2d 1246. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 42

Patentee failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against distributors of allegedly infringing gutter products obtained from competing manufacturer; patentee failed to plead facts sufficient to show that distributors were involved in the operation, management or direction of the alleged enterprise, as opposed to the mere performance of their own routine business affairs, failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activity, and also failed to allege facts that demonstrated actual or threatened continued criminal activity. GP Industries, LLC v. Bachman, D.Neb.2007, 514 F.Supp.2d 1156. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 69

Website owner's allegation that non-profit internet archive organization collaborated with and relied on various donations from other archive services was insufficient to claim existence of enterprise under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), absent allegation that these entities and archive functioned with a decision-making framework, had a mechanism for making decisions or functioned as a continuing unit. Internet Archive v. Shell, D.Colo.2007, 505 F.Supp.2d 755. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Investors who sued ambulance services, affiliates and officers, alleging that they were induced to invest through series of misrepresentations, failed to aver that defendants acquired or maintained control in enterprise, as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); complaint did not aver that defendants acquired interests in legitimate companies other than their own. DeFazio v. Wallis, E.D.N.Y.2007, 500 F.Supp.2d 197. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Trust beneficiary failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against trust's attorneys since he failed to properly allege that the trust's attorneys operated or managed alleged RICO enterprise; notwithstanding beneficiary's assertions to the contrary, complaint itself indicated that the attorneys were not acting other than as counsel. Walter v. Drayson, D.Hawai'i 2007, 496 F.Supp.2d 1162, affirmed 538 F.3d 1244. Attorney And Client 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Foreign corporations and their sole shareholder failed to allege the existence of an enterprise for Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) purposes, in action against former managers and advisors, arising out of their alleged unauthorized sale of corporate assets to other foreign corporations, where plaintiffs' amended complaint simply grouped together all of the individuals and entities involved in the racketeering acts and called them an enterprise, and there was no indication that the group was an “ongoing organization” as opposed to an ad hoc collection of entities and individuals who each happened to have been involved in one scheme or another against plaintiffs, since no participant was alleged to have acted for benefit of any other parti-

cipant. Cedar Swamp Holdings, Inc. v. Zaman, S.D.N.Y.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 444. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Home improvement company satisfied notice-pleading requirement for enterprise element of claim under Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against its former independent-contractor salesman and other defendants; company alleged that a group of individuals and corporations existed for purpose of allowing its members to engage in sham construction projects which the group had no intention of completing and to conceal the unlawful conversion of funds from company, and that each group member participated in conduct and control of enterprise. SKS Constructors, Inc. v. Drinkwine, E.D.N.Y.2006, 458 F.Supp.2d 68. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 73; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Law firm's letter to plaintiff's attorney reiterating its client's legal position in simple contract dispute pending in state court was not an activity “in furtherance of a [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act] RICO enterprise,” regardless of whether client's legal position was meritless, and thus letter could not justify attorney's filing of civil RICO action against law firm. Carousel Foods of America, Inc. v. Abrams & Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.2006, 423 F.Supp.2d 119. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Foreign bank failed to sufficiently plead its “enterprise” claim against domestic bank, under the Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), in action for alleged participation in customer's money-laundering scheme, where foreign bank did not adequately allege that the domestic bank took part in the operation or management of the alleged scheme or that domestic bank was a central figure in the operation. Dubai Islamic Bank v. Citibank, N.A., S.D.N.Y.2003, 256 F.Supp.2d 158. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Allegations that medical clinics were enterprises which were used in insurance fraud scheme, in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), did not support claims for conducting RICO enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity against attorney who allegedly participated in scheme by mailing false medical records, bills, and other documents supporting fraudulent insurance claims, given absence of allegation suggesting that attorney directed or controlled clinics; rather, allegations amounted to mere participation in predicate offenses in conjunction with enterprise, which was insufficient to state claim against attorney. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Diamante, D.Mass.2001, 138 F.Supp.2d 47. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Allegations in investors' civil RICO complaint, that defendants, various other individuals and their various related companies had combined, in association-in-fact, to defraud investors in connection with real estate transaction, did not sufficiently allege RICO enterprise, by not providing sufficient detail to permit court to identify enterprise's membership, structure, or functional unity. Bernstein v. Misk, E.D.N.Y.1997, 948 F.Supp. 228. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Ponzi scheme investors' allegations that bank that financed hotel projects in which they invested assisted in preparing misleading offering memoranda, that bank helped initiate scheme to syndicate property which it owned and through which it was losing considerable money, and that bank exerted substantial control over scheme promoters as result of debts promoters owed to bank, alleged that bank participated in operation or management of

enterprise, as required to bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim for conducting business enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity. Burke v. Dowling, E.D.N.Y.1995, 944 F.Supp. 1036. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Buyer of securities of toy manufacturer did not state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim arising out of alleged misrepresentations that manufacturer was about to enter into lucrative contract; buyer had failed to allege or establish separate enterprise. Klein v. Opp, E.D.Pa.1996, 944 F.Supp. 396, affirmed 118 F.3d 1576. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Claimant's RICO claim, alleging enterprise consisting of unnamed automobile dealerships and third entity involved in consumer finance, had to be dismissed for failing to state essential RICO element of enterprise; only factual allegation made was that third entity prescribed printed form on which retail installment contracts executed by automobile dealers must be written in order for third entity to consider purchasing the contracts. Moore v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., N.D.Ill.1995, 897 F.Supp. 378. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

To plead existence of “enterprise” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), it is sufficient simply to identify it; enterprise may be informal association with common purpose of making money from alleged schemes. Water Intern. Network, U.S.A., Inc. v. East, M.D.Fla.1995, 892 F.Supp. 1477. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

City failed to adequately allege that municipal employee deferred plan was association in fact enterprise, for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against plan administrator; city never coherently set forth constituency of alleged association. City of Philadelphia v. Public Employees Ben. Services Corp., E.D.Pa.1994, 842 F.Supp. 827. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Holders of warrants and bonds issued by sanitary improvement districts did not have to prove that underwriter and fiscal agent of districts used “undue means” such as bribery to gain control over districts in order to establish Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim but, rather, holders had only to establish “some” control over RICO enterprise, regardless of whether such control was acquired legally or otherwise. Nebraska Sec. Bank v. Dain Bosworth, Inc., D.Neb.1993, 838 F.Supp. 1362. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Complaint under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) that named individuals and specific predicate acts allegedly performed by those individuals in furtherance of scheme to obtain financial gain alleged conspiracy to commit criminal acts and established “enterprise” element of RICO. Dudley Enterprises, Inc. v. Palmer Corp., N.D.Ill.1993, 832 F.Supp. 221. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Corporation sufficiently alleged existence of enterprise to state civil RICO claim against corporate insiders and others based on embezzlement of large sums through insurance fraud; corporation alleged existence of association in fact which had organized framework for making decisions, and, although allegations came close to as-

serting conclusions, they were not so plainly insufficient as to warrant dismissal. Corporacion Insular de Seguros v. Reyes Munoz, D.Puerto Rico 1993, 826 F.Supp. 599. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Video store franchisees' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint, which failed to allege whether franchisor or its parent corporation were enterprise or liable person, failed to state claim, regardless of whether contours of enterprise could be determined during discovery. Dudley Enterprises, Inc. v. Palmer Corp., N.D.Ill.1993, 822 F.Supp. 496. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Plaintiff's complaint averring that two individuals and corporations, some of which individuals had ownership interest in and some of which they did not, adequately alleged “enterprise” within meaning of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, D.Del.1992, 821 F.Supp. 232. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Claim that trustee had abused positions of trust to which he had been appointed by county surrogate's court, did not state cause of action under RICO; there was no allegation that trustee had managerial or supervisorial role within surrogate's court, as necessary to support claim that he had conducted affairs of surrogates court, which was allegedly RICO “enterprise,” through pattern of racketeering activity. U.S. v. Altman, S.D.N.Y.1993, 820 F.Supp. 794. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Mortgagee's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against mortgage broker and borrowers, for alleged misrepresentations as to value of collateral and ability of borrowers to service debt, failed to adequately plead existence of requisite “enterprise,” where complaint did not specify how defendants joined together as group to perpetrate frauds alleged, or plead any facts regarding continuity of structure or personnel of borrower enterprise; conclusory allegation that defendants shared common fraudulent purpose and plans over six-year period was insufficient. First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding, Corp., S.D.N.Y.1993, 820 F.Supp. 89, affirmed 27 F.3d 763, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 728, 513 U.S. 1079, 130 L.Ed.2d 632. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Franchisees adequately alleged existence of “enterprise” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO); franchisees alleged that franchisor and its principal, together with franchisor's affiliate and shareholders, directors and employers of franchisor and affiliate, engaged in pattern of racketeering activity to defraud prospective franchisees. Giuliano v. Everything Yogurt, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1993, 819 F.Supp. 240. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Insurer's complaint alleging that insured corporations acted in concert in devising and executing scheme to defraud insurer and obtain money by engaging in series of fraudulent misrepresentations via United States mail and wires, that same individual was president and shareholder of both insured corporations, and that at all relevant times, insureds engaged in, or their activities affected, interstate commerce sufficiently alleged “enterprise” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Value

Rent-A-Car Inc., S.D.Fla.1992, 814 F.Supp. 1084. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Borrowers adequately alleged racketeering “enterprise” consisting of bank and its employees, who allegedly left employment but continued to function as a unit with a common purpose after they went to work for another bank. Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 213, affirmed 99 F.3d 401. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 40

Government adequately alleged “enterprise” element for 43 of 44 RICO claims against corporations and local union under plain meaning of statute, and that element was also properly pleaded as to the remaining claim involving “carting industry enterprise” even though adequacy of that part of pleading was slightly less obvious in that enterprise pleaded was not a “legal entity.” U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Hydroelectric power plant developer failed to sufficiently allege existence of statutorily required enterprise to state civil RICO claim against employees of turnkey contractor; enterprise was alleged to be comprised of contractor and its employees, but developer did not allege how individuals comprised part of ongoing organization or functioned as continuing unit. Miller Hydro Group v. Popovitch, D.Me.1992, 793 F.Supp. 24. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Corporation's RICO claim, which alleged that another corporation acquired control over it by virtue of pattern of racketeering activity did not adequately allege RICO “enterprise”; under governing statute, enterprise element is not sufficiently alleged when association of individuals conducting racketeering activity includes corporation in association with its employees, agents, or affiliated entities acting on corporation's behalf. Pagnotti Enterprises, Inc. v. Beltrami, M.D.Pa.1992, 787 F.Supp. 440. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Engineer who made inspection reports on joint venture project to mortgage lender was not sufficiently alleged to have been part of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise with managing venturer to support RICO claim by joint venturer against engineer; complaint alleged only that engineer knew or should have known that project could not be completed for balance of construction loan remaining when managing venturer's monthly applications for payments were approved, but engineer's unrebutted affidavit stated that he was not required to certify any costs to lender, and loan increases were negotiated between lender and managing venturer alone. Browning Ave. Realty Corp. v. Rosenshein, S.D.N.Y.1991, 774 F.Supp. 129. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Limited partnership and its members satisfied “enterprise” requirement of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) by alleging that partnership was enterprise but that defendants unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly participated in conduct of affairs of partnership through pattern of racketeering activity. Com-Tech Associates v. Computer Associates Intern., Inc., E.D.N.Y.1990, 753 F.Supp. 1078, affirmed 938 F.2d 1574. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

To establish civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) claim, plaintiff must plead

conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity. Atlantic Gypsum Co., Inc. v. Lloyds Intern. Corp., S.D.N.Y.1990, 753 F.Supp. 505. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Although plaintiff need not allege in his complaint information sufficient to prove existence of an enterprise, plaintiff must allege the identity of the enterprise, and that identification must necessarily include details about the structure of the enterprise, in order to assert a violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Segreti v. Lome, N.D.Ill.1990, 747 F.Supp. 484. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Investors, which alleged that brokerage firm was enterprise through which its principals committed securities fraud, and that principals conducted the affairs of the brokerage firm both through their status as officers and directors and their actual participation in the day-to-day management of operations, sufficiently alleged existence of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise. Wiley v. Hughes Capital Corp., D.N.J.1990, 746 F.Supp. 1264. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

To state a civil claim for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) statute based on participation or conduct, plaintiff must allege conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Griffin v. McNiff, S.D.N.Y.1990, 744 F.Supp. 1237, affirmed 996 F.2d 303. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 73

Insurer's allegations of association-in-fact enterprise as result of three defendants acting together to conspire, sell, and transport stolen goods was sufficient to plead necessary existence of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise, even though insured did not plead elements sufficient to prove enterprise existed; insurer brought action based on payment to insured on crime policy as result of alleged RICO violations by defendants. Federal Ins. Co. v. Ayers, E.D.Pa.1990, 741 F.Supp. 1179, reconsideration denied 760 F.Supp. 1118. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Contractor failed to show that owner of property for proposed construction project occupied anything related to “position” with contractor as required to show necessary enterprise to state civil Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act claim. Newport Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., E.D.La.1990, 739 F.Supp. 1078, vacated on other grounds 941 F.2d 302, rehearing denied 946 F.2d 893, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 1175, 502 U.S. 1096, 117 L.Ed.2d 420, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Allegations in civil RICO complaint, that defendant had conspired with others to maintain interest in and control over union local and to cause its affairs to be conducted through interrelated pattern of racketeering activity, were sufficient to put defendant on notice that local was RICO “enterprise,” though complaint did not expressly state that local was enterprise. U.S. v. Gigante, D.N.J.1990, 737 F.Supp. 292. Conspiracy 18

Manufacturer adequately alleged RICO enterprises composed of its purchasing agent and its individual suppliers, as well as an enterprise composed of the agent and all the suppliers, where manufacturer alleged that each enterprise had a common purpose to obtain commercial advantage and “defraud” manufacture through the pre-

dicate acts of illegal bribery of the purchasing agent by the suppliers, and the enterprises had no obvious terminating goal or date and continued after commission of the predicate acts. Federal Paper Bd. Co., Inc. v. Amata, D.Conn.1988, 693 F.Supp. 1376. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Investors failed to satisfy “enterprise” requirement and failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act claim against brokerage firm and others, investors alleged that they were induced by certain misrepresentations to establish investment account with firm and purchased certain securities in order to churn account, and as such, investors had at best alleged a short-lived churning scheme which had discrete goal of generating excessive commissions. Lowenbraun v. L.F. Rothschild, Unterberg, Towbin, S.D.N.Y.1988, 685 F.Supp. 336. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Civil RICO plaintiffs' allegations, that group of 20 hospitals were used by defendants as an enterprise to conduct a pattern of racketeering activity, and that enterprise was at all times engaged in interstate commerce, adequately pled an enterprise. Does 1-60 v. Republic Health Corp., D.Nev.1987, 669 F.Supp. 1511. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Limited partners' allegations that managing partner made misrepresentations to induce limited partners to invest in partnership and then five years later carried out second scheme to fraudulently divert limited partnership opportunity for his own profit were insufficient to satisfy relatedness or continuity aspects of enterprise requirement of claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Anderson v. Lowrey, S.D.N.Y.1987, 667 F.Supp. 105. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Complaint satisfied “enterprise” requirement and stated claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act subsections making it unlawful to invest funds derived from pattern of racketeering activity in enterprise engaged in interstate commerce, and prohibiting operation of or acquisition of interest in enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, where complaint alleged that enterprise consisted of manufacturing corporation, an unincorporated operating unit of corporation, a dissolved wholly owned subsidiary of corporation, various employees of one or more of those entities and various independent contractors, engineers and like individuals working with corporation or on corporation's behalf in various capacities on public promotion of product line in question. In re Dow Co. Sarabond Products Liability Litigation, D.Colo.1987, 666 F.Supp. 1466. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Allegation, in action brought under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act for damages associated with theft of artworks, that individual alleged to have stolen and sold painting and his roommate constituted “enterprise” was too vague and conclusory to be accepted as well-pleaded, for failure to assert any specific acts or dates in support of allegation. Ichiyasu v. Christie, Manson & Woods Intern., Inc., N.D.Ill.1986, 637 F.Supp. 187. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Alleged violations of RICO [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.] did not state a claim against defendant insurers, even though those insurers could help make up the association-in-fact through which insurance broker operated, where there was no allegation that the defendant insurers participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, and allegations of conspiracy between broker

and insurers were wholly conclusory. UNR Industries, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., N.D.Ill.1985, 623 F.Supp. 1319. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Substantive proscriptions of the RICO statute [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.] apply to outsiders as well as insiders, and thus cosmetic company's complaint against printer which had allegedly overcharged cosmetic company in order to make kickback payments to one of the company's employees did not have to allege that the cosmetic company was involved in the operation and management of the RICO enterprise. Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Harco Graphics, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1984, 621 F.Supp. 689. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Absent a special reason to impose stringent standard on pleading of “enterprise” engaged in racketeering activity under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962, basic liberal pleading rules set forth in Rule 8 must govern, and plaintiff is not required to make detailed showing of an enterprise. Lewis on Behalf of Nat. Semiconductor Corp. v. Sporck, N.D.Cal.1985, 612 F.Supp. 1316. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Complaint which failed to allege either “enterprise” or “racketeering enterprise injury” failed to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Arndt v. Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., S.D.Cal.1984, 603 F.Supp. 674. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Complaint alleging that defendants violated this chapter by misrepresenting that they were performing their obligation to issue insurance on behalf of plaintiff failed to state claim for relief where there was no allegation of existence of criminal enterprise and failure to plead fraudulent scheme underlying mail fraud and wire fraud allegations. River Plate Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. Jay-Mar Group, Ltd., S.D.N.Y.1984, 588 F.Supp. 23. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Italian corporation's action seeking damages for wrongful attachment failed to state claim under this section where there was no specification of identity of person or enterprise involved. Bulk Oil (Milano) S.R.L. v. Sun Intern. Ltd., S.D.N.Y.1983, 584 F.Supp. 43, affirmed 742 F.2d 1431. Commerce 80

Plaintiffs, who alleged that defendants were a group of business associations which shared the common purpose of defrauding plaintiffs of their commissions on the sale of institutional furnishings to a Saudi Arabian family corporation, properly pleaded cause of action under this section. Soper v. Simmons Intern., Ltd., N.D.N.Y.1983, 582 F.Supp. 987, transferred to. Commerce 80

Paragraphs in complaint asserting a civil claim under this section which described cash field subscription sales device and which alleged a common purpose as well as a continuity of structure and personnel sufficiently alleged an “enterprise” as defined in section 1961 of this title; however, plaintiffs' general assertion that combination of defendants constituted an “enterprise,” without allegations as to continuity of structure or personnel was insufficient. Laterza v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1984, 581 F.Supp. 408. Commerce 80

Complaint alleging attorneys' fraudulent scheme to purchase and sell confidential legal information belonging to

group of charities adequately alleged “enterprise” for purposes of establishing pattern of racketeering activity under this chapter. Beth Israel Medical Center v. Smith, S.D.N.Y.1983, 576 F.Supp. 1061. Commerce 80

Where clients of broker alleged that broker and his two brokerage firms formed an enterprise when they associated in order to offer and sell securities to the clients, they sufficiently alleged existence of an enterprise within meaning of this chapter. Austin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., W.D.Mich.1983, 570 F.Supp. 667. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Congress did not intend that statutory scheme under this chapter would allow “enterprise” to be sufficiently pleaded whenever plaintiff avers that any two or more otherwise unassociated individuals agree to commit two or more acts of business fraud, since this would effectively eliminate enterprise element of this chapter and drastically expand federal jurisdiction over all business torts which involve use of the mails or telephones. Seville Indus. Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp., D.C.N.J.1983, 567 F.Supp. 1146, affirmed in part , reversed in part 742 F.2d 786, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 1179, 469 U.S. 1211, 84 L.Ed.2d 327. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Industrial machinery owner's complaint, which merely asserted that corporate defendants and their alleged controlling persons were enterprises without clarifying whether all four defendants comprised one enterprise or whether each constituted an “enterprise,” which did not mention any identifiable structure that encompassed all four defendants, and which did not allege existence of ascertainable structure distinct from alleged racketeering activity, failed to allege existence of “ongoing organization” as required to meet “enterprise” requirement. Seville Indus. Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp., D.C.N.J.1983, 567 F.Supp. 1146, affirmed in part , reversed in part 742 F.2d 786, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 1179, 469 U.S. 1211, 84 L.Ed.2d 327. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Executor of nursing home resident's estate sufficiently alleged existence of “enterprise” to state Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims for charging of excessive fees under nursing home's pharmaceutical policies, where executor proposed several different enterprises consisting of various combinations of nursing home operator and related corporations. Rohlfing v. Manor Care, Inc., N.D.Ill.1997, 172 F.R.D. 330. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

To adequately allege enterprise element of RICO claim, complaint should state name of legal entity or individuals comprising association-in-fact which allegedly constitutes enterprise, name employees if enterprise is sole proprietorship, or common purpose and continuity of structure and personality if enterprise is association- in-fact, describe structure, purpose, function, and course of conduct of enterprise, state manner in which defendant associated with enterprise, and describe how activities of enterprise affect interstate commerce. O'Rear v. American Family Life Assur. Co., M.D.Fla.1991, 139 F.R.D. 418. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 73

Allegation that creditor concealed Chapter 11 debtor's postpetition transfers to it in attempt to defraud other creditors failed to sufficiently allege RICO cause of action absent showing of requisite “enterprise”; alleged enterprise had only one goal which terminated with last of allegedly unauthorized transfers. In re Sattlers, Inc.,

Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y.1988, 82 B.R. 229. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Complaint alleging that defendants made decision together and worked cooperatively did not adequately plead “enterprise” element of federal and Oregon state RICO claims; rather, allegation was one of conspiracy and did not satisfy standard that enterprise must, at minimum, have some sort of structure for the making of decisions and some mechanisms for controlling and directing the affairs of the group on an on-going rather than an ad hoc basis. Acro-Tech, Inc. v. Robert Jackson Family Trust, C.A.9 (Or.) 2003, 84 Fed.Appx. 747, 2003 WL 22783349, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 115

Corporation engaged in commercial real estate management stated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) claim against former president, and brokers engaged to procure insurance coverage for managed properties, by alleging that president and brokers formed common enterprise for purpose of fraudulently appropriating excess premium payments and premium refunds. RD Management Corp. v. Samuels, S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 21254076, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

217. ---- Distinct from persons, enterprise, complaint

There was no problem with respect to naming lender bank as an enterprise and as a defendant in action for alleged violations of civil provisions of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act as long as individuals remained as defendants in count charging those violations and bank was only named as an enterprise in those counts so that there was no overlap between an enterprise and those named as defendants. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1986, 804 F.2d 970, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Present and former residents of retirement community had failed to state claim against corporation which owned and operated community under this chapter in count of complaint seeking equitable relief from corporation where count placed corporation in role of “person” responsible for conducting affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity but did not clearly set forth allegation that retirement community was “enterprise” acted upon by such person, and thus failed to allege “enterprise” distinct from culpable “person.” Bennett v. Berg, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1982, 685 F.2d 1053, on rehearing 710 F.2d 1361, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 527, 464 U.S. 1008, 78 L.Ed.2d 710, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint failed to plead conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity; complaint offered no discernible link between defendant's alleged threats against plaintiff and his role in operating and managing putative RICO enterprise, failed to tie automobile “accident” allegedly orchestrated by defendant to anything other than his personal hatred for plaintiff and his desire to end her involvement in qui tam action against him, and did not explain how alleged hiring of “hitman” to obtain records from plaintiff flowed from or facilitated defendant's management or operation of putative RICO enterprise. Elemary v. Philipp Holzmann A.G., D.D.C.2008, 533 F.Supp.2d 116. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Investors who sued ambulance services, affiliates and officers, alleging that they were induced to invest through series of misrepresentations, failed to aver separate and district enterprises, as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); complaint averred that RICO enterprise and persons engaging in pattern of racketeering activity were same. DeFazio v. Wallis, E.D.N.Y.2007, 500 F.Supp.2d 197. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Lender and others met the definition of “person,” for purpose of debtors' civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, where debtors separately identified each defendant in the complaint and alleged how each defendant was integrally involved in establishing the real estate trust, which was the subject of the action. Williams v. Equity Holding Corp., E.D.Va.2007, 498 F.Supp.2d 831. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 64

Oil corporation and its subsidiary were not alter egos of a company owned by the subsidiary, so as to support imposition of liability, on an alter ego theory, regarding human rights abuse claims asserted by Nigerian citizens; there was no evidence that incorporation was undertaken in bad faith or that observing the corporate form would achieve an inequitable result, despite any inability of the Nigerians to recover for their losses against the company. Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., N.D.Cal.2004, 312 F.Supp.2d 1229. Corporations And Business Organizations 1061

As alleged by mortgagor on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, subsidiary-parent relationship between mortgage company and its parents showed that there was integrated operational relationship between entities and mortgage company's activities were not distinct from parents, such that mortgagor's pleadings violated RICO distinctiveness requirement; parents created mortgage company for purpose of originating and servicing mortgages, that business generated significant revenues that was transferred to parents, and parent then used money to benefit all the parent's businesses, including mortgage company. Deane v. Wey- erhaeuser Mortg. Co., D.Mass.1997, 967 F.Supp. 30. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Former students claiming that college received income from pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in scheme to make profits from tuition and fees obtained from students for educational services that were not received failed to allege RICO person which was distinct from RICO enterprise, and, thus, failed to show “conduct” sufficient to state claim for racketeering activity through enterprise, where students admitted that college was only known defendant and that other unknown agencies of defendant would be identified when known. Schaeffer v. Ascension College, Inc., M.D.La.1997, 964 F.Supp. 1067. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Allegations in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint sufficiently pled RICO person distinct from RICO enterprise by alleging that employees and agents of corporation had formed association-in-fact to use corporation as vehicle through which they could conduct their racketeering activities and obtain money from various lenders through predicate acts of mail and wire fraud; complaint pled enterprise distinct from corporation. First Interregional Advisors Corp. v. Wolff, S.D.N.Y.1997, 956 F.Supp. 480. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Allegations in car buyer's civil RICO complaint against company which financed his acquisition of car, its affiliated corporation and their officers and directors, for allegedly force placing insurance in excess of that allowed by parties' contract and overcharging car buyer for this force placed insurance, did not sufficiently identify RICO enterprise distinct from RICO defendants, where it was clear from allegations in complaint that alleged racketeering acts would have been carried out in same manner, as result of corporate structure existing between parties, whether or not they were connected to any enterprise. Moore v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., N.D.Ill.1997, 949 F.Supp. 673. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

RICO plaintiff's pleadings failed to distinguish the “person” liable under RICO from the “enterprise” to which racketeering activity was connected where person was car dealership that allegedly kept plaintiff's car and sold it for parts, but plaintiff did not distinguish dealership as person from enterprise in which it was engaged. Bonton v. Archer Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., S.D.Tex.1995, 889 F.Supp. 995. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 73

Allegations that oil well lessee wrongfully withheld regulatory fees from payments owed to lessors of mineral rights were sufficient to state claim under RICO, even if lessee was both “person” and “enterprise” within meaning of RICO provision that prohibited acquisition or maintenance of interest in enterprise through pattern of racketeering. Hilliard v. Shell Western E & P, Inc., W.D.Mich.1993, 836 F.Supp. 1365, reversed 149 F.3d 1183, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 608, 525 U.S. 1048, 142 L.Ed.2d 548. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 39

Investors could not maintain action for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) concerning alleged securities fraud, absent demonstration of complete distinction of identity between enterprise and person alleged to have caused harm, and absent showing of pattern of racketeering activity sufficient to fulfill continuity requirements of RICO claim. Martin v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., W.D.N.C.1991, 820 F.Supp. 980, affirmed 993 F.2d 228. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Bidder in mortgage auction of real estate failed to allege actionable violation of Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) concerning bank's alleged refusal to convey title; bidder failed to show by concrete allegation a distinction between persons alleged to have acted and enterprise that was subject of their action, an essential ingredient of claim, and did not establish any causal link between any loss he incurred and the alleged wrongful conduct. Cutler v. F.D.I.C., D.Me.1992, 818 F.Supp. 19. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Bank failed to allege separate “person” and “enterprise,” as required to state RICO cause of action against inspectors that allegedly conspired to make fraudulent inspection reports about bank's floor plan security interest; bank merely alleged existence of conspiracy, but did not allege existence of any separate enterprise. Falmouth Nat. Bank v. Equifax Services, Inc., D.Mass.1993, 812 F.Supp. 275. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 73

Employee adequately pled existence of association-in-fact enterprise separate from his employer, as required to

bring claim against employer under section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) proscribing conduct of affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering; employee alleged shared purpose between his employer and its merchandise suppliers. Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., W.D.Mo.1991, 773 F.Supp. 174, reversed 985 F.2d 383, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 2459, 508 U.S. 957, 124 L.Ed.2d 674. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Allegations in cable television provider's complaint, that alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) enterprise had committed predicate acts of mail and wire fraud in course of providing its customers with descrambling devices to obtain premium channels without charge, were not sufficient to state claim against enterprise under RICO, as complaint failed to allege RICO person distinct from RICO enterprise. Ocean- ic Cablevision, Inc. v. M.D. Electronics, D.Neb.1991, 771 F.Supp. 1019. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 47

Allegation that “association-in-fact” of corporation and its agents constituted “enterprise” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) sufficiently alleged existence of “enterprise,” even though “association-in-fact” was made up of persons already subject to liability for same acts allegedly performed by enterprise, where corporation and its agents were only “enterprise” when they associated with each other. American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Intern. Importing Enterprises, Ltd., E.D.Pa.1990, 755 F.Supp. 1292. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Allegation that securities fraud defendants committed Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation was insufficient to state cause of action absent allegations that defendants were distinct from enterprise which was used for racketeering purposes. In re VMS Securities Litigation, N.D.Ill.1990, 752 F.Supp. 1373. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Fact that defendants in insurer's private cause of action alleging violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) were individuals and alleged enterprise was association in fact of three defendants did not preclude finding that person and enterprise were different entities necessary to state RICO claim. Federal Ins. Co. v. Ayers, E.D.Pa.1990, 741 F.Supp. 1179, reconsideration denied 760 F.Supp. 1118. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Allegation that brokers and broker-dealer firm together constituted separate “association in fact,” without facts supporting that conclusory allegation, was insufficient to establish enterprise separate and distinct from person alleged to have violated law for purposes of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act action. Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., N.D.Ill.1988, 695 F.Supp. 959. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 44

In civil RICO action, allegations that characterized insurance consultant, intermediate insurance broker, and insurer as both “enterprises” and “persons” did not render complaint invalid for RICO purposes. Connors v. Lex- ington Ins. Co., E.D.N.Y.1987, 666 F.Supp. 434. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Complaint which alleged that sellers of partnership interests in operation of garden apartment complex both individually and jointly constituted “enterprise” was insufficient to state RICO [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.] claim, as it did not clearly define enterprise, in that individual could not simultaneously be enterprise and person who conducted affairs of enterprise, and it failed to allege nexus between each defendant in enterprise, since it did not differentiate among defendants. Anisfeld v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1986, 631 F.Supp. 1461. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Customer failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim against broker dealer and stockbroker, where customer alleged that stockbroker and broker dealer were both “persons” within meaning of the statute and that they constituted an “enterprise,” as it was undisputed that stockbroker acted as broker dealer's agent when he dealt with customer, so that customer was obligated to allege a separate enterprise. Minnesota Odd Fellows Home Foundation v. Engler & Budd Co., D.Minn.1986, 630 F.Supp. 797. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Customer's RICO complaint against securities brokerage houses failed to state a claim where it alleged that the securities houses were both a “person” and an “enterprise.” Weizman v. Adornato, E.D.N.Y.1985, 625 F.Supp. 1101. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Allegation that stockholders acted and conducted affairs of company through a pattern of racketeering activity was sufficient to demonstrate both existence of culpable persons distinct from enterprise and existence of an enterprise distinct from culpable persons. Media General, Inc. v. Tanner, W.D.Tenn.1985, 625 F.Supp. 237. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Health maintenance organization's civil RICO complaint against insurance broker and excess insurer failed to sufficiently allege an “enterprise” which had a separate and sufficiently lasting identity apart from the “person” or “persons” who allegedly received any income from it, who had any interest in it, or who were employed or associated with it, where the enterprise, characterized as a “union” of the broker and the insurer, allegedly existed solely to defraud the health maintenance organization and was thus indistinguishable either from the “persons” or from the “pattern of racketeering activity.” Chicago HMO v. Trans Pacific Life Ins. Co., N.D.Ill.1985, 622 F.Supp. 489. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

RICO [18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)] claim against defendant corporation would be dismissed, absent allegation that the corporate entity itself was associated with an “enterprise” that was not the same entity; allegations simply that the corporation, the named defendant, was an enterprise and that its agents perpetrated predicate fraudulent acts did not meet requirement that a RICO “person” and a RICO “enterprise” be distinct entities. Tarasi v. Dravo Corp., W.D.Pa.1985, 613 F.Supp. 1235. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Plaintiffs did not, and presumably could not, allege “person” separate from “enterprise” as required to set forth civil action against corporate defendants under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Griffin v. O'Neal, Jones & Feldman, Inc., S.D.Ohio 1985, 604 F.Supp. 717. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 73

Purchaser of corporation failed to state a cause of action under this chapter against bank, where complaint alleged that bank was both the “person” whose conduct this chapter proscribes and the “enterprise,” as vehicle for pattern of racketeering activity. Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., S.D.N.Y.1984, 581 F.Supp. 350. Commerce 80

Government's characterization, in civil complaint alleging violations of this chapter of group of individual defendants as a “person” in some instances, particularly as to section 1962(b) of this title prohibiting any person from acquiring any interest in an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce, while also characterizing it as an “enterprise” in others, particularly as to section 1962(c) of this title prohibiting a person employed by or associated with any enterprise from conducting or participating in conduct of such enterprise's affairs through racketeering, was not incongruous or inconsistent with this chapter, and thus was proper. U.S. v. Local 560, Intern. Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, D.C.N.J.1984, 581 F.Supp. 279, affirmed 780 F.2d 267, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 2247, 476 U.S. 1140, 90 L.Ed.2d 693. Commerce 80

218. ---- Distinct from pattern of racketeering, enterprise, complaint

Present and former residents of retirement community, who alleged that operator and founder of community, various not-for-profit corporations allegedly controlled by community's founder, community's mortgage lender, community's former accountants and attorneys, and certain officers and directors of various not-for-profit organizations conspired to, and did in fact, defraud them with result that residents faced loss of “life care” which they expected to receive in return for initial endowment fee plus monthly service fee, sufficiently alleged existence of enterprise distinct from pattern of racketeering to assert claims for relief based on this section. Bennett v. Berg, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1983, 710 F.2d 1361, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 527, 464 U.S. 1008, 78 L.Ed.2d 710, on remand. Commerce 80

Developers adequately alleged “enterprise” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even though enterprise was allegedly not distinguished from predicate acts themselves; complaint alleged that defendants were engaged in systematic scheme whereby excavators would excavate developers' land in excess of what was authorized and then let other defendants, for a fee, dump waste materials at sites, and that defendants then transported excavated material which was sold for profit. Colony at Holbrook, Inc. v. Strata G.C., Inc., E.D.N.Y.1996, 928 F.Supp. 1224. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Stock brokerage firm, which employed broker who allegedly “churned” accounts for personal gain, was an “enterprise” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, where plaintiff specifically pled it was firm's unnecessary trading in securities which formed basis of claim; plaintiffs' pleading of fraudulent and narrow aspect of firm's normal activities, trading in securities, met requirement that plaintiffs plead separate economic existence of enterprise from its alleged pattern of racketeering. Robinson v. Kidder, Peabody and Co., Inc., E.D.Mich.1987, 674 F.Supp. 243, appeal dismissed 841 F.2d 1127. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Enterprise element of civil RICO claim [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1962(c), 1964] was sufficiently plead to withstand motion to dismiss, by virtue of allegations that defendants constituted an association-in-fact type of enterprise, that defendants were associated together for common purpose of marketing and selling securities, and that the enter-

prise was an ongoing organization separate and distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity in which it allegedly engaged. Morley v. Cohen, D.C.Md.1985, 610 F.Supp. 798. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 73

Violation is not set forth simply by alleging that enumerated felonies have been committed; if enterprise that plaintiff is relying upon is criminal partnership of defendants, plaintiff must establish that there is something more to partnership than commission of underlying felonies. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., S.D.N.Y.1983, 553 F.Supp. 1347, affirmed 719 F.2d 5, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1280, 465 U.S. 1025, 79 L.Ed.2d 684. Commerce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Including two corporations in the alleged enterprise did not satisfy requirement, for stating federal and Oregon state RICO claims, that the enterprise be a separate entity apart from the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages, where plaintiffs failed to allege either that a system of authority existed in a separate enterprise or that defendants utilized a structure apart from the predicate acts to distribute the proceeds of the racketeering activity. Acro-Tech, Inc. v. Robert Jackson Family Trust, C.A.9 (Or.) 2003, 84 Fed.Appx. 747, 2003 WL 22783349, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 115

219. Injury, complaint--Generally

To state claim for damages under this chapter, plaintiff must allege that defendant has violated substantive provision of this chapter and that he was injured in his business or property by reason of violation of said provision. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1983, 719 F.2d 5, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1280, 465 U.S. 1025, 79 L.Ed.2d 684. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Book buyers failed to specify the roles of the defendants, failed to adequately plead enterprise theories, and failed to specify an actionable, identifiable racketeering activity, as required to plead a civil Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim with requisite particularity against authors, publisher, and marketers, based on their alleged ongoing scheme to defraud buyers by misrepresenting contents of the books as nonfiction. Pfau v. Mortenson, D.Mont.2012, 858 F.Supp.2d 1150. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Allegations by insured that automobile insurers were an enterprise, or affiliate of an enterprise, that affected interstate commerce by the sale of automobile insurance, that the enterprise was ongoing, that insurers acted in capacities outside the alleged fraudulent activities, that insurers acted systematically, arbitrarily and unreasonably denied full payment of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits to insureds, and that they used the United States mail in furtherance of their scheme of unlawfully denying full PIP benefits, did not state civil claim for Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, absent allegations that insureds' injuries resulted from the investment of the income derived from the alleged racketeering activity. Johnson v. GEICO Cas. Co., D.Del.2007, 516 F.Supp.2d 351. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Employer and participant in ERISA disability insurance plan, who alleged that insurers fraudulently induced

them to purchase coverage that insurers never intended to provide in administering plan, did not plead injury cognizable in civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) based on alleged diminished value of policies, where they had not sought benefits from insurers, and their loss was thus tied to a speculative denial of benefits in undeterminable amount; their premium payments alone could not constitute cognizable injury, absent ability to demonstrate that insurers' actions resulted in receipt of fewer benefits than promised. Impress Communications v. Unumprovident Corp., C.D.Cal.2003, 335 F.Supp.2d 1053. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

To state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), plaintiff must allege, in addition to defendant's violation of substantive provisions of RICO, that there has been some injury to his business or property by reason of defendant's violation of such provisions. Morin v. Trupin, S.D.N.Y.1993, 832 F.Supp. 93. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

In order to state civil claim for damages under RICO, plaintiff must first allege violation of substantive RICO statute and must then allege injury in business or property by reason of the violation. W.E. Darin Const. Enter- prises, Inc. v. Detroit Coke Co., W.D.N.Y.1993, 814 F.Supp. 325. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 69; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

In order to satisfy his or her pleading burden under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), plaintiff must first allege violation of substantive RICO statute; plaintiff must further allege that he or she was injured in his or her business or property by reason of a violation of the substantive statute. Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., D.Conn.1992, 793 F.Supp. 404, affirmed in part , reversed in part 79 F.3d 234, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 66, 519 U.S. 816, 136 L.Ed.2d 27, certified question answered 692 A.2d 709, 240 Conn. 300. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 75

Complaint failed to state a claim under the first two subsections of the prohibited activities section of RICO where it did not allege that plaintiff was injured in his business or property by reason of the alleged violations. Bingham v. Zolt, S.D.N.Y.1988, 683 F.Supp. 965. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Plaintiffs bringing civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act action are not required to allege injury resulting from RICO violations, but rather, plaintiffs who have pled injury from predicate acts have met RICO requirements. In re Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1987, 73 B.R. 346. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

220. ---- Acquisition or control, injury, complaint

Magazine publisher which brought suit against its distributor for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of distributor's fraudulent business practices failed to state a claim under section of the Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) prohibiting the acquisition of an interest in or control of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, where publisher failed to allege any connection between alleged racketeering activity and interest of distributor in a criminal enterprise; rather, complaint suggested that distributor was a le-

gitimate business engaged in fraudulent business practices; it never asserted that distributor's alleged criminal conduct enabled it to obtain an interest or control of any enterprise. Official Publications, Inc. v. Kable News Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1991, 775 F.Supp. 631. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

To state claim under sections 1962(b) and 1964(c) of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), plaintiff must allege injury from defendant's acquisition or control of interest in RICO enterprise. U.S. Concord, Inc. v. Harris Graphics Corp., N.D.Cal.1991, 757 F.Supp. 1053. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 58

Plaintiff corporation, its officer, and claimant to shares stated racketeering cause of action against tax exempt corporation, its officers and shareholders by alleging that defendants used information illegally obtained to threaten plaintiffs to force certain corporate actions, an allegation of an attempt to “control” plaintiff corporation through a pattern of racketeering, namely extortion. Federal Information Systems, Corp. v. Boyd, D.D.C.1990, 753 F.Supp. 971. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Complaint which did not suggest that defendant's profits from their supposed pattern of racketeering activity were used to acquire control of corporation which plaintiffs invested but which, rather, alleged that plaintiffs took the money and ran did not state a cause of action under RICO for use of pattern of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise. Bernstein v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1988, 702 F.Supp. 962, vacated in part 714 F.Supp. 1285. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 16

Plaintiff failed to adequately plead RICO and Oregon state ORICO claims by alleging that defendants gained control of business through racketeering activity, where allegations that defendants exercised control over the business as stock owners were negated by fact that defendants' stock purchase was legal, and allegations that the business lease and accounting services were induced by fraud were too general and lacked necessary particularity. Acro-Tech, Inc. v. Robert Jackson Family Trust, C.A.9 (Or.) 2003, 84 Fed.Appx. 747, 2003 WL 22783349, Unreported. Federal Civil Procedure 636; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74; Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 115

221. ---- Competitive injury, complaint

In order for State Director of Insurance, as statutory liquidator of insurer, to recover for alleged violations under this chapter by officers, directors and parent corporation who allegedly continued insurer in business past its point of insolvency and looted insurer of its most profitable and least risky business, it was not necessary that director allege a competitive injury. Schacht v. Brown, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1983, 711 F.2d 1343, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 508, 464 U.S. 1002, 78 L.Ed.2d 698, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 509, 464 U.S. 1002, 78 L.Ed.2d 698. Commerce 80

Allegation of commercial or competitive injury is not required to allege kind of injury supporting standing to bring civil action under this section. Bennett v. Berg, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1982, 685 F.2d 1053, on rehearing 710 F.2d 1361, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 527, 464 U.S. 1008, 78 L.Ed.2d 710, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Allegations that employees of plaintiff automaker were induced by defendant automaker to steal plaintiff's trade secrets alleged an injury for which plaintiff could recover under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). General Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua, E.D.Mich.1996, 948 F.Supp. 670. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 60

222. ---- Indirect injury, complaint

Tenants of one development who might argue that they were injured by having incurred higher costs than they would have incurred had another developer's proposal been accepted by city had an injury which was too remote to be the proximate cause of alleged RICO violations in connection with the defeat of the proposal. Bieter Co. v. Blomquist, C.A.8 (Minn.) 1993, 987 F.2d 1319, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 81, 510 U.S. 823, 126 L.Ed.2d 50, on remand 848 F.Supp. 1446, on remand 156 F.R.D. 173. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Complaint did not assert viable racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations (RICO) claim based on plaintiffs' status as shareholders, where plaintiffs made no direct allegation of direct or individual injury to their business or property resulting from their status as shareholders, rather than from their status as employees. Brennan v. Chestnut, C.A.8 (Minn.) 1992, 973 F.2d 644. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Shareholders stated cause of action for violation of RICO against principals of issuer, for racketeering activities involving false representations in connection with sale of issuer's securities, even though it was argued that shareholders' claim of fraud on market meant that shareholders sustained only indirect injuries, and not direct injuries as required by RICO; while shareholders' reliance on market made their reliance on representations indirect, their alleged injuries through representations were direct. In re MTC Electronic Technologies Shareholders Litigation, E.D.N.Y.1995, 898 F.Supp. 974, vacated in part on reconsideration 993 F.Supp. 160. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

223. ---- Personal injury, complaint

Complaint which alleged that demand letter from cable television companies which threatened legal action for signal piracy in the event of nonpayment was extortionate in nature, failed to state a claim of injury to the plaintiff's “business or property,” as required by the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; plaintiff only alleged injury in nature of mental distress, not an injury “in his business or property.” Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1987, 834 F.2d 1163. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Pro se plaintiff alleged facts demonstrating injury to her business or property, required for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) standing, by asserting that she could not work for a period due to physical injuries she sustained; it could be inferred that someone earning her living through provision of personal services would suffer some reduction in income while “incapacitat[ed]” and unable to “function.” Elemary v. Phil- ipp Holzmann A.G., D.D.C.2008, 533 F.Supp.2d 116. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Cancer patients asserting personal injury and financial loss incident to that personal injury, as result of hospitals' false advertisements regarding efficacy of proposed treatment, did not demonstrate a proprietary type of injury sufficient to maintain Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Gotlin v. Lederman, E.D.N.Y.2005, 367 F.Supp.2d 349, affirmed 483 Fed.Appx. 583, 2012 WL 1506024. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Smokers' complaint, which alleged that tobacco companies violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) by conspiring to cause smokers to be addicted to cigarettes requiring smokers to incur expense of purchasing nicotine patches to cure addiction, did not allege injury to “business or property” within meaning of RICO and, thus, failed to state a claim; economic consequences of personal injury such as cigarette addiction were not compensable under RICO. Allman v. Philip Morris, Inc., S.D.Cal.1994, 865 F.Supp. 665. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

224. ---- Predicate act injury, complaint

To state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) subsection prohibiting investment of income derived from pattern of racketeering activity, plaintiff must plead specific injury to plaintiff caused by investment of income into the racketeering enterprise, distinct from any injuries caused by predicate acts of racketeering. Vemco, Inc. v. Camardella, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1994, 23 F.3d 129, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 579, 513 U.S. 1017, 130 L.Ed.2d 495. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Failure to allege any racketeering enterprise injury distinct from predicate mail and wire fraud acts did not provide basis for dismissing action under the Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968] for failure to state a claim. Kempe v. Monitor Intermediaries, Inc., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1986, 785 F.2d 1443. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Franchisees adequately alleged injury related to conspiracy by franchisor and its principal for purposes of Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy claim; franchisees claimed that they lost money due to defendants' overt acts of mail fraud and wire fraud in furtherance of alleged conspiracy. Giuliano v. Everything Yogurt, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1993, 819 F.Supp. 240. Conspiracy 18

Fact that act causing plaintiffs' alleged injuries is not predicate act of racketeering is irrelevant to standing of RICO conspiracy plaintiff since RICO conspiracy does not require actual commission of predicate act. Hughes v. Technology Licensing Consultants, Inc., W.D.Pa.1992, 815 F.Supp. 847. Conspiracy 17

In order to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) section prohibiting investment of racketeering income to establish or operate enterprise, plaintiff must allege injury from use or investment of income derived from racketeering activity; allegations of injury from predicate acts alone are insufficient to state cause of action. Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Kapoor, N.D.Ill.1993, 814 F.Supp. 720. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

To successfully plead claim for civil relief under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision making it unlawful for person to use or invest income derived from pattern of racketeering activity in an enterprise, plaintiff must allege injury resulting from investment of racketeering income, as distinct from injury from predicate acts themselves. Marrazzo v. Bucks County Bank and Trust Co., E.D.Pa.1993, 814 F.Supp. 437. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

A civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act complaint must allege distinct RICO injury, an injury caused by a RICO violation, not just one caused by some of essential elements of RICO violation. Doxie v. Ford Motor Credit Co., S.D.Ga.1984, 603 F.Supp. 624. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

For purposes of this chapter, a pattern of racketeering activity includes two or more acts of mail and/or wire fraud; therefore, a plaintiff under this chapter must allege more than injury from predicate acts of mail and/or wire fraud. Furman v. Cirrito, S.D.N.Y.1984, 578 F.Supp. 1535, affirmed 741 F.2d 524, vacated 105 S.Ct. 3550, 473 U.S. 922, 87 L.Ed.2d 672, on remand 779 F.2d 36. Commerce 80

Even assuming that some injury beyond that attributable simply to predicate racketeering acts must be alleged to state cause of action for treble damages under subsec. (c) of this section, complaint which alleged attorneys' fraudulent scheme to purchase and sell confidential legal information belonging to group of charities was sufficient to state cause of action, as injury alleged to have been suffered by charities as result of fraudulent scheme was pervasive, ongoing, and debilitating to conduct of their legal affairs as a whole. Beth Israel Medical Center v. Smith, S.D.N.Y.1983, 576 F.Supp. 1061. Commerce 80

In action brought by Belgian supplier of equipment to aerospace and defense industries against New York exporter of aviation parts alleging that exporter sent inflated copies of purchase orders and credit memos thereby receiving reimbursement in excess of its actual costs, counts in complaint alleging violations of this chapter failed to state cause of action, in that there was no allegation of an injury as recognized under this chapter apart from that which would have resulted directly from alleged predicate acts of mail fraud and wire fraud. Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., E.D.N.Y.1983, 574 F.Supp. 963, affirmed 741 F.2d 482, certiorari granted 105 S.Ct. 901, 469 U.S. 1157, 83 L.Ed.2d 917, reversed 105 S.Ct. 3275, 473 U.S. 479, 87 L.Ed.2d 346, dissenting opinion 105 S.Ct. 3292, 473 U.S. 479, 87 L.Ed.2d 346. Commerce 80

Even though mention was made of State Commerce Commission, it was clear from complaints of city and county that these municipal corporations were seeking redress solely for injuries caused by underlying mail fraud offenses which allegedly facilitated transfer to corporation of property properly belonging to utilities and public and, by their own characterization, injuries supposedly sustained by city and county were caused by defendants' scheme, through use of the mails, to defraud consumers of their right to receive adequate and efficient utility service at just and reasonable rates, and thus they failed to allege injuries caused by reason of violation of this section. Cook County v. MidCon Corp., N.D.Ill.1983, 574 F.Supp. 902, affirmed 773 F.2d 892. Commerce 80

In securities fraud action in which investor invoked this chapter, it was sufficient for plaintiff to allege injury

caused by predicate acts of securities fraud without alleging particular “racketeering injury” above and beyond that caused by securities fraud. Mauriber v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1983, 567 F.Supp. 1231. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

225. ---- Racketeering activity injury, complaint

Homeowners who alleged that real estate developer had conducted racketeering enterprise in which he misled them into purchasing homes they could not afford, by fraudulently asserting that homes would be entitled to various tax abatements and mortgage credit certificates, and that title companies and mortgage lenders had conspired with developer to defraud homeowners and realize maximum profits, claimed injuries directly attributable to developer's alleged substantive violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and thus could maintain civil RICO conspiracy claims against title companies and mortgage lenders, even if title companies and lenders did not manage corrupt enterprise. Smith v. Berg, C.A.3 (Pa.) 2001, 247 F.3d 532. Con- spiracy 13

Plaintiff was not required to allege specific “racketeering-type” injury or injury separate from predicate act itself to state cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; it was sufficient to allege injuries caused by conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity. Simon Oil Co., Ltd. v. Norman, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1986, 789 F.2d 780. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Plaintiff bringing action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.] need allege no independent “racketeering injury” apart from injury caused by predicate acts of fraud. Zap v. Frankel, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1985, 770 F.2d 24. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Judgment creditor failed to allege that it suffered injury resulting from bank's alleged investment of fees and charges it retained from judgment debtor's accounts, as required to allege Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) violation through use of income derived from pattern of racketeering activity to invest in enterprise. Super Vision Intern., Inc. v. Mega Intern. Commercial Bank Co., Ltd., S.D.Fla.2008, 534 F.Supp.2d 1326. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Automobile insurer sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact from alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) conspiracy involving agreement among physicians to conduct unnecessary diagnostic testing of insureds who had been involved in accident by alleging it suffered more than $2.5 million in damages as result of physicians' predicate acts of mail fraud by submitting bills for unnecessary services allegedly within personal injury protection (PIP) coverage. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. CPT Medical Services, P.C., E.D.N.Y.2005, 375 F.Supp.2d 141. Conspiracy 18

Racketeering injury was not a requirement to state a RICO [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.] claim; injury caused by predicate acts was sufficient. Tarasi v. Dravo Corp., W.D.Pa.1985, 613 F.Supp. 1235. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Civil RICO [18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)] plaintiffs would not be required to establish injury separate and distinct from those injuries caused by the predicate acts underlying the RICO charge; that is, court would not require a separate racketeering injury to have been alleged in order to sufficiently plead a violation of RICO. Morley v. Cohen, D.C.Md.1985, 610 F.Supp. 798. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Plaintiff manufacturer's failure to allege that defendant had been convicted of predicate act or that manufacturer had suffered distinct racketeering injury required dismissal of that portion of its action seeking recovery under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Bridge C.A.T. Scan Associates v. Ohio-Nuclear Inc., S.D.N.Y.1985, 608 F.Supp. 1187. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 19

Plaintiffs sufficiently allege injury pursuant to RICO when they allege injury as a result of the predicate acts that comprise the pattern of racketeering activity and need not set forth a particular racketeering injury; declining to follow Sedima v. Imrex, 741 F.2d 482; Bankers Trust v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511; and Furman v. Cirito, 741 F.2d 524. Ross v. Omnibusch, Inc., W.D.Mich.1984, 607 F.Supp. 835. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 63

Plaintiff in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act action must allege a racketeering injury, that is, an injury different in kind from that occurring as a result of the predicate acts themselves. Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, La., N.D.Ala.1985, 606 F.Supp. 1348, affirmed 783 F.2d 1011. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

To state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, there must be criminal convictions on underlying predicate offenses or conviction under Act, and plaintiff must allege “racketeering injury,” which is injury different in kind from that occurring as result of predicate acts or not simply caused by predicate act, but also caused by activities which Act was designed to deter. Modern Settings, Inc. v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1985, 603 F.Supp. 370. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 19

Plaintiffs adequately pled “racketeering injury” by alleging that Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act violation caused them $790,826.11 in damages, even if there was no injury alleged beyond that resulting from underlying acts of racketeering. Banowitz v. State Exchange Bank, N.D.Ill.1985, 600 F.Supp. 1466. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Civil RICO claim would be dismissed where plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege any injury to their business or property by reason of violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act which was different in kind from that occurring as result of the predicate acts themselves; alternatively, RICO claim would be dismissed since plaintiffs failed to allege prior RICO criminal convictions of defendants for the conduct involved in the civil action. Gardner v. Surnamer, E.D.Pa.1984, 599 F.Supp. 477. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ-

izations 59

Plaintiff who alleged that bank misled her into believing that her bank accounts would yield highest interest rate allowed by law failed to state a claim to permit her to recover for lost interest under this chapter, since she failed to sufficiently allege injury attributable to a “pattern” of racketeering composed of predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, as opposed to injury attributable merely to individual acts themselves. Margolis v. Republic Nat. Bank of New York, S.D.N.Y.1984, 585 F.Supp. 595. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Borrower who alleged that lender fraudulently overcharged interest was not deprived of standing to sue lender under this section as a result of the character of his alleged injury, because borrower alleged that he sustained injury as a victim of a crime which was part of an alleged pattern of racketeering activity. Morosani v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, N.D.Ga.1984, 581 F.Supp. 945. Commerce 80

Customers of carpet cleaning company could not recover on their claim against the company under this chapter based on allegations that defendant substituted glass imitations for diamonds in personal jewelry while operating under the cover of cleaning carpets in their apartments, in view of customers' failure to assert any injury resulting from a violation of section 1962 of this title as distinguished from the predicate acts that constituted racketeering activity. Gitterman v. Vitoulis, S.D.N.Y.1983, 579 F.Supp. 423. Commerce 80

As part of claim under this chapter, clients of broker alleged that there were misrepresentations upon which they relied to their detriment as part of racketeering activity; insofar as those allegations raised matters not contained in criminal mail and wire fraud charges, predicate offenses alleged by clients, they alleged injury arising out of pattern of racketeering activity as required under this chapter, and not commission of predicate offenses. Austin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., W.D.Mich.1983, 570 F.Supp. 667. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Industrial machinery owner's complaint, which alleged that owner suffered direct injury from defendants' alleged racketeering activity, would not be dismissed for failure to allege separate and distinct “racketeering injury.” Seville Indus. Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp., D.C.N.J.1983, 567 F.Supp. 1146, affirmed in part , reversed in part 742 F.2d 786, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 1179, 469 U.S. 1211, 84 L.Ed.2d 327. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Consumers who brought action against business services corporation, dealers and infomercial actor, stemming from leasing of e-commerce services and products, properly alleged that defendants' purported racketeering acts were “but for” cause of their injuries, as required to maintain RICO claim; complaint charged that consumers were damaged by being enticed to sign leases by corporation's various associates, and by subsequently being forced, by corporation's collection practices, to make payments under those leases. Zito v. Leasecomm Corp., S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 22251352, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

226. ---- Racketeering enterprise injury, complaint

District court had original jurisdiction to support the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over investors' state

law claims against banks, even though investors' claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) were dismissed for failure to plead proximate causation between alleged RICO violation and investors' injuries. Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 318 F.3d 113, as amended , certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 532, 540 U.S. 1012, 157 L.Ed.2d 424, on remand 2005 WL 2064088. Federal Courts 18

Allegation by Colombian national and regional governmental agencies that liquor manufacturers purchased new businesses to further their money laundering enterprise was sufficient to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) that manufacturers suffered an acquisition or maintenance injury separate and apart from the injury suffered as a result of the predicate acts of racketeering, where complaint claimed that purchase of businesses injured agencies by allowing manufacturers to broaden and deepen enterprise and its effects. Republic of Colombia v. Diageo North America Inc., E.D.N.Y.2007, 531 F.Supp.2d 365, certificate of appealability 619 F.Supp.2d 7. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Failure of golf cart distributor to allege that it suffered any injury as result of manufacturer's acquisition of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, precluded claim that manufacturer violated Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in connection with its conduct toward distributor. Club Car, Inc. v. Club Car (Quebec) Import, Inc., S.D.Ga.2003, 276 F.Supp.2d 1276, affirmed 362 F.3d 775, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied 111 Fed.Appx. 1003, 2004 WL 1585294, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 618, 543 U.S. 1002, 160 L.Ed.2d 461. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Employment agencies, which alleged that one of their employees and president and single shareholder of a competitor participated in a scheme to defraud them and that defendants used the mails and the wires in conducting the enterprise involved on two or more occasions, sufficiently alleged a racketeering enterprise injury in accordance with Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Systems Research, Inc. v. Random, Inc., N.D.Ill.1985, 614 F.Supp. 494. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Investors in limited partnership satisfied requirement under this chapter of alleging racketeering enterprise injury, when investors alleged that defendants initially committed securities violations in sale of partnership interest and in dissemination of misleading information regarding note assumption agreements, defendants' ability to harm investors was enhanced by funds generated from those violations, and defendants used funds from fraudulent sale to one group partnership in aid of their scheme to defraud other group partnerships. Clute v. Dav- enport Co., D.C.Conn.1984, 584 F.Supp. 1562. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Oil and gas investors who were allegedly victims of securities and mail and wire fraud were not thereby entitled to bring civil action under this section for treble damages, absent any allegation or showing that investors' losses were racketeering enterprise injury of sort that this chapter was enacted to remedy and deter. Bruns v. Ledbetter, S.D.Cal.1984, 583 F.Supp. 1050. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Valid complaint for violation of this chapter must allege racketeering enterprise injury, which is not necessarily competitive injury. Willamette Sav. & Loan, a Div. of American Sav. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Finance Co., D.C.Or.1984, 577 F.Supp. 1415. Commerce 80

Allegations that plaintiff suffered injury to her business or property by reason of defendants' racketeering activity in violation of section 1962 of this title was sufficient to state a cause of action under this section notwithstanding fact that plaintiff did not allege a “racketeering enterprise injury,” that is, some injury above and beyond that caused by the predicate acts which constituted the “racketeering activity.” Swanson v. Wabash, Inc., N.D.Ill.1983, 577 F.Supp. 1308. Commerce 80

Complaint filed by beneficiaries of an estate and trust failed to state a claim against trustee under this chapter, because beneficiaries' only alleged injury was the loss of estate or trust property resulting from alleged predicate crimes, and no additional injury, resulting from the operation or acquisition of an enterprise through alleged racketeering acts, was set forth in the complaint, and complaint did not allege the intent necessary for an indictable offense under the predicate crimes. King v. Lasher, S.D.N.Y.1983, 572 F.Supp. 1377. Commerce 80

To recover treble damages under this section, plaintiff must allege racketeering enterprise injury, that is, commercial injury caused by conduct of enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity. Johnsen v. Ro- gers, C.D.Cal.1982, 551 F.Supp. 281. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Standing to bring civil damages action pursuant to this section requires allegation that plaintiff suffered “racketeering enterprise injury.” Landmark Sav. & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., E.D.Mich.1981, 527 F.Supp. 206. Criminal Law 1220

227. ---- Racketeering proceeds injury, complaint

Allegations that white supremacists were attempting to take over organizations dedicated to promoting Southern culture failed to allege type of either specific investment-backed injury or acquisition-based injury required to state claim under federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Confederate Memorial Ass'n, Inc. v. Hines, C.A.D.C.1993, 995 F.2d 295, 301 U.S.App.D.C. 395, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Plaintiff seeking civil damages for alleged violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) must allege facts tending to show that he or she was injured by use or investment of racketeering income. Nugget Hydroelectric, L.P. v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1992, 981 F.2d 429, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 2336, 508 U.S. 908, 124 L.Ed.2d 247. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Pleading by purchasers of allegedly defective furnaces that manufacturers derived income from fraudulent sale of defective units and that those racketeering profits were reinvested in business which enabled further fraudu-

lent sales did not meet requirement of allegation of injury specifically by use or investment of income necessary to state civil RICO claim under § 1962(a). Glessner v. Kenny, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1991, 952 F.2d 702. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Employees of Navy aircraft maintenance contractors, who alleged that contractors intentionally and continuously underpaid legally required wages and fringe benefits, failed to state claim against contractors under provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) making it unlawful to use or invest income derived from pattern of racketeering activity in enterprise, where employees failed to allege injury arising from use or investment of racketeering income. Danielsen v. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Center, Inc., C.A.D.C.1991, 941 F.2d 1220, 291 U.S.App.D.C. 303. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Failure of golf cart distributor to allege that it suffered any injury, from manufacturer's alleged investment of racketeering income in any enterprise, precluded claim that manufacturer violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in connection with its conduct toward distributor. Club Car, Inc. v. Club Car (Quebec) Import, Inc., S.D.Ga.2003, 276 F.Supp.2d 1276, affirmed 362 F.3d 775, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied 111 Fed.Appx. 1003, 2004 WL 1585294, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 618, 543 U.S. 1002, 160 L.Ed.2d 461. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

In action under provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) prohibiting investment of racketeering income, plaintiff's failure to allege that defendant invested income derived from pattern of racketeering activity and that plaintiff was injured by reason of defendant's investment of racketeering income will result in dismissal of plaintiff's claim. Protter v. Nathan's Famous Systems, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1996, 925 F.Supp. 947 . Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Calling card holders' allegations that telephone company misrepresented that its calling card was “free,” when in fact company imposed substantial surcharge for its use, and received income from that unlawful use and invested it in operation of company was insufficient to state claim under provision of Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision prohibiting investment of racketeering income in any enterprise, absent allegation of injury by reason of investment of racketeering income. Gelb v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., S.D.N.Y.1993, 813 F.Supp. 1022. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

In order to state a viable claim under section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) proscribing use or investment of racketeering income in an enterprise, plaintiffs must allege separate and traceable injury stemming directly from defendants' alleged use or investment of illegally obtained income in the RICO enterprise. Arioli v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., E.D.Mich.1993, 811 F.Supp. 303. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Complaint was insufficient to state claim under RICO section requiring showing that defendant used or invested racketeering income to acquire or maintain interest in alleged enterprise, where vast majority of allegations in complaint related to investments made by plaintiffs in limited partnerships promoted by some of the defendants, not to investments by defendants; though there were allegations of purportedly excessive fees and improper

sales, expenditures and bills, there was no allegation of the requisite investment of the resulting funds. O&G Carriers, Inc. v. Smith, S.D.N.Y.1992, 799 F.Supp. 1528. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 71

To state claim under RICO for investing income derived from pattern of racketeering activity to acquire interest in, establish, or operate enterprise, plaintiff must allege injury arising from use or investment of income derived from racketeering. Adler v. Berg Harmon Associates, S.D.N.Y.1992, 790 F.Supp. 1222. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

To have standing to sue for violation of provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), stating that it is illegal to use or invest income derived from pattern of racketeering activity to acquire interest in or to operate enterprise engaged in interstate commerce, it is necessary to allege injury caused by actual investment or use of proceeds of racketeering activity, as opposed to merely alleging injury caused by predicate acts. Casper v. Paine Webber Group, Inc., D.N.J.1992, 787 F.Supp. 1480. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 62

Corporation which alleged that defendants who sought to take over corporation converted and misappropriated its assets could not bring action under RICO statute prohibiting use or investment of income obtained from pattern of racketeering activity; valid claim under statute is stated only when plaintiff specifically alleges injury caused by use or investment of racketeering income. Pagnotti Enterprises, Inc. v. Beltrami, M.D.Pa.1992, 787 F.Supp. 440. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

To state a claim under section of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) prohibiting acquiring or maintaining of an interest in or control of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, plaintiff must allege an injury resulting from such acquisition or control. Official Publications, Inc. v. Kable News Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1991, 775 F.Supp. 631. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Plaintiff's allegation that defendants invested racketeering income in criminal enterprise that injured plaintiff was sufficient to state a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Official Publications, Inc. v. Kable News Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1991, 775 F.Supp. 631. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 71; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Plaintiff bringing action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) must plead injury proximately caused by investment of income derived from pattern of activity, rather than merely injury resulting from underlying acts of racketeering themselves; RICO does not prohibit mere receipt of racketeering activity, but only prohibits one receiving such income from investing or using it in specified manner. In re Sah- len & Associates, Inc. Securities Litigation, S.D.Fla.1991, 773 F.Supp. 342. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Investor sufficiently alleged that officer of corporation invested income derived from pattern of racketeering activity to acquire interest in or operate an enterprise, as required under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (RICO), by alleging that officer was part of enterprise which had violated RICO by obtaining monies from investing public through fraudulent securities offerings and sales of stock and investing income in acquisition, establishment, or operation of enterprise. In re Sahlen & Associates, Inc. Securities Litigation, S.D.Fla.1991, 773 F.Supp. 342. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Investors, who failed to allege that public accounting firm invested any monies derived from fraudulent securities scheme, failed to set forth legal basis for claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against accounting firm. In re Sahlen & Associates, Inc. Securities Litigation, S.D.Fla.1991, 773 F.Supp. 342. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint failed to allege injury suffered by reason of use or investment of racketeering proceeds; complaint referred only to those injuries suffered as result of underlying alleged racketeering activity. Moffatt Enterprises, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., W.D.Pa.1990, 763 F.Supp. 143. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Investors failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against stock brokerage firm when investors failed to allege that firm was a principal in pattern of racketeering activity or aided and abetted that activity and failed to allege that they had been injured by use or investment of income derived from pattern of racketeering activity or proceeds thereof, in enterprise in, or affecting, interstate commerce. Denison v. Kelly, M.D.Pa.1991, 759 F.Supp. 199. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Chemical corporation's complaint, which did not allege that corporation was injured by reason of competitor's use or investment of income earned on sales of product allegedly derived from misappropriation of corporation's trade secret, but only from the alleged misappropriation, failed to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) section prohibiting certain investments of income derived from pattern of racketeering activity. R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v. Nalco Chemical Co., N.D.Ill.1990, 757 F.Supp. 1499. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

When asserting violation under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision relating to investment of racketeering income, plaintiff must allege that its injury results from defendant's use or investment of plaintiff's money or property in enterprise engaged in interstate commerce. American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Intern. Importing Enterprises, Ltd., E.D.Pa.1990, 755 F.Supp. 1292. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 58

Investor failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) cause of action against pres-

ident of securities brokerage firm where investor failed to allege that he sustained injury by reason of president's use or investment of income derived from alleged pattern of racketeering; investor alleged only that he was injured by racketeering acts. Craig v. First American Capital Resources, Inc., N.D.Ill.1990, 740 F.Supp. 530. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

RICO provision prohibiting investment of proceeds from racketeering in an enterprise does not, standing alone, state a cause of action and plaintiff must also meet requirements of RICO provision setting forth civil remedies. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1962(a), 1964(c). Williamson v. Simon & Schuster, a Div. of Gulf & Western Corp., S.D.N.Y.1990, 735 F.Supp. 565. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 16

Purchasers of real estate lots did not have standing to seek redress for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act section making it unlawful for any person to receive any income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity; injuries alleged in complaint consisted of money paid on land purchase contracts as well as amounts paid in maintenance and country club membership fees and those injuries did not arise from investment or use of racketeering profits. Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., D.Puerto Rico 1989, 727 F.Supp. 759, appeal dismissed 917 F.2d 664. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 16

Auto lessees did not allege sufficient injury resulting from investment or use in enterprise of unlawfully derived income to support civil RICO claim against auto leasing company by alleging that leasing company invested proceeds of alleged pattern of racketeering activity back into itself as requisite “enterprise;” complaint did not allege any injury apart from particular injury to lessees that allegedly flowed from predicate acts of pattern of racketeering activity. Penn v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., E.D.Pa.1989, 725 F.Supp. 1339. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 16

Plaintiff failed to establish that it was injured by reason of defendants' use of investment income derived from racketeering or by defendants' acquisition or control of interstate enterprise, as was required to state civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Midwest Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz, N.D.Ill.1989, 716 F.Supp. 1087, affirmed 976 F.2d 1016. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 16

Investors in mortgage pool certificates asserting that defendants used or invested income derived from racketeering activity in RICO enterprise and maintained an interest in entity which promoted mortgage pools through pattern of racketeering activity were not required to allege that injury was caused, not just by predicate acts of racketeering, but also by investment of and use of funds in enterprise or acquisition or maintenance of defendants' interest in or control of enterprise. In re National Mortg. Equity Corp. Mortg. Pool Certificates Securities Litiga- tion, C.D.Cal.1987, 682 F.Supp. 1073. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Insurer which brought RICO action had sufficiently alleged injury under section proscribing use or investment of income derived from pattern of racketeering activity in enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate commerce, to permit maintenance of civil suit; insurer had contract under which pharmacy agreed to provide insurer's subscribers with prescription drugs and insurer agreed to pay pharmacy, and insurer claimed individual who operated pharmacy invested proceeds from false and fraudulent claims he submitted to insurer in pharmacy and used pharmacy to conduct his racketeering activities. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania v.

Nardone, W.D.Pa.1988, 680 F.Supp. 195. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Allegation that money obtained through sale of allegedly stolen painting was used or invested as income derived from racketeering activity in enterprise failed to meet standard of particularity in order to sustain Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim in failing to say how, where, or when money was used or reinvested. Ichiyasu v. Christie, Manson & Woods Intern., Inc., N.D.Ill.1986, 637 F.Supp. 187. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Complaint which alleged injury by reason of underlying fraud and which at most alleged that defendant insurance company used pattern of racketeering activity to purchase shopping center at unfairly low price but alleged nothing about investment of proceeds of racketeering activity in an enterprise and which did not allege that individual defendant used or invested income he received, presumably from pattern of racketeering, in any proscribed activity failed to state violation of this chapter. Guerrero v. Katzen, D.C.D.C.1983, 571 F.Supp. 714. Commerce 80

228. ---- Miscellaneous alleged injuries, injury, complaint

Termination of corporation's president, allegedly in furtherance of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) conspiracy, was not independently wrongful under any substantive provision of RICO, and, thus, injury caused by such act was not sufficient to give rise to cause of action under RICO; abrogating Khur- ana v. Innovative Health Care Systems, Inc., 130 F.3d 143; Schiffels v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 978 F.2d 344; Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162. Beck v. Prupis, U.S.Fla.2000, 120 S.Ct. 1608.

Sports trading card buyers who asserted that manufacturer engaged in illegal gambling in marketing its limited edition cards by randomly inserting such cards into packages of trading cards failed to allege injury required for standing under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) when they alleged merely that purported class members were injured in their business or property by manufacturer's RICO violations; buyers received precisely what they bargained for in buying card packages, and did not allege that value of cards received was less than consideration paid. Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1998, 138 F.3d 602, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Used car purchasers adequately alleged injury for purposes of their civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) claim against financing company where financing company was allegedly involved in mail fraud scheme in which purchaser's repossessed automobiles were sold at price substantially below market value to partner in scheme, vehicles were later resold for market price, and purchasers were not informed of those transactions so that excess funds generated by sale of collateral were withheld and purchasers remained obligated to pay phantom deficiencies. Chisolm v. TranSouth Financial Corp., C.A.4 (Va.) 1996, 95 F.3d 331. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Quick-lube franchisor failed to state cause of action against motor oil supplier under section 1962(b) of this title making it unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain interest in enterprise engaged in interstate commerce arising out of its entering into joint venture with franchisor's competitor;

franchisor failed to explain what additional injury resulted from supplier's interest or control of joint venture enterprise and failed to allege specific nexus between control of any enterprise and alleged racketeering activity. Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., C.A.3 (N.J.) 1993, 4 F.3d 1153. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 49; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Minority and woman-owned business enterprises failed to make sufficient allegations that they were injured in their businesses “by reason of” prime contractors' conduct to establish standing under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) with respect to their claims that prime contractors engaged in scheme to evade federal and state set aside regulations, as complaint alleged only speculative injury. Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pacific Co., C.A.9 (Wash.) 1992, 976 F.2d 1303, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 1644, 507 U.S. 1004, 123 L.Ed.2d 266. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Advisor providing advice to equipment manufacturer regarding sales in Iran did not state cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act with regard to manufacturer's refusal to continue advisory contracts; there was no indication of any scheme to defraud advisor and no injury was suffered. Dresser Indus- tries, Inc. v. Pyrrhus AG, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1991, 936 F.2d 921, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 10; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Racketeering complaint failed to make clear how lender's alleged fraud in connection with forcing developers into bankruptcy and failing to tell bankruptcy court of homeowners' interests injured business or property of homeowners who moved into defective homes; alleged bankruptcy fraud occurred after owners moved into their homes. Arzuaga-Collazo v. Oriental Federal Sav. Bank, C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 1990, 913 F.2d 5. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Injury from defendants' investment of racketeering income had to be pleaded in order for investors to recover for violation of statutory prohibition against investment of income derived from pattern of racketeering activity. Ou- aknine v. MacFarlane, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1990, 897 F.2d 75. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Former employee failed to plead injury resulting from employer/parent and subsidiary companies' violations of RICO statute through alleged investment of unlawfully collected fees or securities and wire fraud through which companies ostensibly conducted enterprise; such unlawful acts did not result in employee's loss of initial job with previous employer or loss of current job but rather, such violations injured only customers. Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., C.A.3 (Del.) 1989, 885 F.2d 1162. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Allegations of property owners association that developers' acts of mail fraud injured association by causing cost of maintaining roads in subdivision to increase alleged sufficient injury to support its standing to pursue its Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968] action. Terre Du Lac Ass'n, Inc. v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1985, 772 F.2d 467, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1460, 475 U.S. 1082, 89 L.Ed.2d 718, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1461, 475 U.S. 1082, 89 L.Ed.2d 718. Common Interest Communities

144; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Plaintiff's allegation that it had been deprived of various sums of money by defendants' activities constituted “injur[y] in [its] business or property” within meaning of this section. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1984, 741 F.2d 511, vacated 105 S.Ct. 3550, 473 U.S. 922, 87 L.Ed.2d 673, on remand 779 F.2d 36. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Injury alleged by county, including unauthorized purchase at inflated prices, procured by bribery and threats, and payment for goods never received, fell within scope of civil action under this chapter. Alcorn County, Miss. v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., C.A.5 (Miss.) 1984, 731 F.2d 1160. Commerce 80

Home mortgagor's allegations that she was injured in her “property” when bombarded with threats via mail communication and when she received harassing telephone calls made to her home telephone number, and her allegations that her physical symptoms from emotional distress were displayed and initiated on her property, did not involve injury to business or property, as would be required for civil recovery under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), in action against holder of mortgage loan and loan servicer, relating to denial of mortgagor's requests for loan modification, and the servicing of the loan; mortgagor was attempting to cre- atively construe personal injuries suffered in her home as injuries to her property. Echeverria v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, M.D.Fla.2012, 900 F.Supp.2d 1299, affirmed 2013 WL 3752138. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 59

Labor organization representing carpenters and joiners, together with six subordinate bodies and nineteen individual members, failed to allege injury to business or property as required to bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; while they provided specific factual allegations that property was damaged through alleged acts of vandalism they failed to plead that any of that property belonged to union or to any named plaintiff, and it was not sufficient to plead that overall pattern of illegal activity harmed plaintiffs including economic injury such as job loss, involuntary payment of dues and, for union, loss of dues and members. United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Building and Const. Trades Dept., E.D.Wash.2012, 911 F.Supp.2d 1118. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 59

Allegations by former agent of limited liability corporation that various businesses and organization that provided business reliability ratings to consumers misrepresented organization's true business purpose in an effort to extort membership fees and glean marketable personal information were insufficient to plead link between such conduct and alleged harm to agent's corporation of defamatory business ratings, as required for agent's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Chubirko v. Better Business Bureau of Southern Piedmont, Inc., W.D.N.C.2011, 763 F.Supp.2d 759. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 62

Pro se plaintiff alleged facts demonstrating injury to her business or property, required for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) standing, by asserting destruction of her professional reputation and hence, her source of income, due to bid-rigging scheme; complaint alleged that, when fraud came to light,

plaintiff, an innocent dupe, was tainted by her close association with the schemers and consequently lost significant professional credibility and opportunities. Elemary v. Philipp Holzmann A.G., D.D.C.2008, 533 F.Supp.2d 116. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Claim by Colombian governmental agencies that liquor manufacturers and distributors participated in enterprise to launder proceeds of illegal narcotics sales and to illegally smuggle liquor into Colombia sufficiently alleged damages resulting from money laundering and tax evasion to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO); agencies alleged that enterprise permitted Colombian importers to purchase liquor from defendants and/or their agents with United States dollars that were acquired at discounted price, that portion of discount resulted from amount of Colombian taxes that importers were unlawfully evading through enterprise, and that price discount that Colombian importers paid for their goods was passed along to consumers, resulting in fewer sales of agencies' competing products. Republic of Colombia v. Diageo North America Inc., E.D.N.Y.2007, 531 F.Supp.2d 365, certificate of appealability 619 F.Supp.2d 7. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 59

Although licensor's loss of business opportunity to pursue competitive licensing offers, due to bribes allegedly paid its licensing agents, was injury compensable under New York fraud law, alleged injury was not sufficiently quantifiable to establish standing under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); calculation of damages from any such lost opportunities would necessarily require some proof as to what non-corrupt bidding process would have yielded, and net profits to licensor from corruption-free bidding process would depend on a number of factors that could not be projected. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Jakks Pacific, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2007, 530 F.Supp.2d 486, affirmed 328 Fed.Appx. 695, 2009 WL 1391807. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Commercial mortgagors, who occupied the premises as tenants pursuant to sale-leaseback agreement with a purchase option, which agreement between mortgagors and mortgagees had been executed when mortgagors had defaulted under the mortgage, did not establish that mortgagees' alleged violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) proximately caused their injury from losing ownership of the building, as required for standing to bring civil action under RICO, in absence of evidence that mortgagors had the financial resources to cure their defaults during sale-leaseback period and to exercise the purchase option. Uni-Rty Corp. v. Guangdong Bldg., Inc., S.D.N.Y.2006, 464 F.Supp.2d 226. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Complaint sufficiently alleged, for purposes of civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO), that asbestos-abatement contractor suffered tangible injury as a result of alleged illegal actions of competitors and their owners and operators, which purportedly subverted municipal bidding process and denied contractor opportunity to bid and perform city work, given allegations that contractor was only state- licensed asbestos-abatement company with its principal place of business in city and enjoyed preferential bidding status which allowed it to obtain city contracts even when it was not lowest bidder, that contractor previously was awarded city asbestos contracts and was qualified and ready to provide services needed by city, and that, had it been allowed to bid, its bid would have been lower than those of companies associated with defendants. Astech-Marmon, Inc. v. Lenoci, D.Conn.2004, 349 F.Supp.2d 265. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 75

Complaint which failed to plead that allegedly defrauded investors were injured as a result of any actions on the part of state university's regents or employees, failed to state a claim for violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); investments occurred before the university or its employees had any contact with the allegedly fraudulent company. Simon v. Weaver, S.D.N.Y.2004, 327 F.Supp.2d 258. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Former campaign treasurer who brought action against law firm and attorneys, stemming from their purported failure to disclose source of campaign funds, adequately alleged direct relation between injurious conduct and injury asserted, as required to establish standing to bring claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO); complaint averred that fraudulent campaign contribution reports provided foundation for obstruction of Federal Election Commission (FEC) investigation, which directly implicated treasurer, be- smirched his professional reputation, and cost him business. Clark v. Stipe Law Firm, L.L.P., W.D.Okla.2004, 320 F.Supp.2d 1207. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Landowners' allegation that they would lose fair market value of their property if it were acquired by village officials through threatened eminent domain was insufficient to state concrete injury for purposes of their Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint alleging that village officials conducted enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity. Pelfresne v. Village of Rosemont, N.D.Ill.1998, 22 F.Supp.2d 756. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Alleged Ponzi scheme investors who did not describe debts owed to them by corporation formed to consolidate management contracts of hotels in which they invested or circumstances in which debts arose did not allege sufficient injury to bring Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim based on distribution of that corporation's assets. Burke v. Dowling, E.D.N.Y.1995, 944 F.Supp. 1036. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 75

Allegations that municipality is seeking to vindicate its interests in “general economy” or in its “ability to carry out its functions” do not state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) section providing claim for any person injured in his “business or property” by reason of prohibited activity. City of New York v. JAM Consultants, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1995, 889 F.Supp. 103. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 75

Former manager for department store's automotive center failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) action against department store for using wires and mails to create sales program within automotive service centers which required employees to take customers' money through false pretenses where manager's allegations conclusively demonstrated that he did not believe information department store promulgated about lawfulness of its sale tactics and he could thus not have been harmed by false information which he did not believe. Cardwell v. Sears Roebuck and Co., D.S.C.1993, 821 F.Supp. 406. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Mortgagee asserting Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against mortgage broker, based upon alleged misrepresentations regarding value of collateral and ability of borrowers to service

debt, could not allege RICO injury with regard to mortgages already in default and being foreclosed upon; if mortgagee successfully foreclosed on loans it would not sustain any injury from them, and RICO injury cannot be contingent upon instigation or outcome of related litigation. First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding, Corp., S.D.N.Y.1993, 820 F.Supp. 89, affirmed 27 F.3d 763, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 728, 513 U.S. 1079, 130 L.Ed.2d 632. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Former director of charitable foundation failed to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions (RICO) Act against other directors; complaint alleged that other directors had engaged in self-dealing and had fraudulently attempted to extort releases from former director and her son for claims arising out of the self- dealing, but complaint did not adequately allege mail or wire fraud, alleged frauds fell short of establishing “pattern” of racketeering activity, plaintiff did not allege that foundation was injured in its business or property, and plaintiff failed to show injury to herself, as alleged attempted extortion failed. Trask v. Kasenetz, E.D.N.Y.1993, 818 F.Supp. 39. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Insurer's allegations that insured corporations used and invested income received through pattern of racketeering activity to operate their rental car businesses which caused damages to insurer and that investment of income fraudulently obtained allegedly enabled insureds to perpetrate operation of enterprise and continue to defraud insurer satisfied pleading requirement for injury under both federal and Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statutes; insurer's allegations did not simply track language of statute, but provided detailed factual account of how enterprise functioned to accomplish its purpose. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Value Rent-A-Car Inc., S.D.Fla.1992, 814 F.Supp. 1084. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 115

Complaint was insufficient to allege requisite RICO injury in defendants' alleged use of racketeering income to acquire or maintain interest in alleged enterprise, where plaintiffs' claim was not that they were injured by defendants' investment in enterprise, but that alleged predicate acts induced plaintiff to invest in limited partnerships, and plaintiffs did not allege any damages other than loss of investments. O & G Carriers, Inc. v. Smith, S.D.N.Y.1992, 799 F.Supp. 1528. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Claim by Republic of Turkey, that ancient coins belonging to nation had been smuggled from country and acquired by defendants, was a sufficient allegation of damage to property to satisfy RICO requirements. Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, D.Mass.1992, 797 F.Supp. 64. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Allegations that accountant made bulk mailings on letterhead in which both partners' licensing status was misrepresented failed to establish predicate act for purposes of civil RICO claim, absent any indication of who may have been injured by accountant's misrepresentation or how such injury occurred. Zee-Bar, Inc. N.H. v. Kaplan, D.N.H.1992, 792 F.Supp. 895. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

no harm to Committee's business or property, and remaining acts, including allegation that enterprise disbursed $179,783 from Committee's account to pay press for brochure advocating pardon of enterprise leader, posed no threat of continuing racketeering activity. Committee to Defend U.S. Constitution v. Moon, D.D.C.1991, 776 F.Supp. 568. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 28

Joint venturer had not alleged facts demonstrating losses or demonstrating that losses were caused by joint venture's accountant, as opposed to managing venturer, so as to support claim against accountant under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) section which prohibits conducting or participating in an enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity. Browning Ave. Realty Corp. v. Rosenshein, S.D.N.Y.1991, 774 F.Supp. 129. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Former wife's claim that former husband failed to disclose information regarding his corporation did not allege required harm to property interest of former wife necessary to sustain action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; at time that disclosures were required to be made, wife did not have any interest in corporation, as interest arose only as part of later divorce decree awarding her 20 percent interest in appreciation of corporation from outset of marriage until date of decree. Capasso v. CIGNA Ins. Co., S.D.N.Y.1991, 765 F.Supp. 839. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint filed by customers of “meeting planning” organization sufficiently alleged damages, though conferences contracted for took place as scheduled, where complaint alleged that funds were given to organization in reliance on statements that such funds would be used only for conference-related purposes, and that significant amounts of funds were in fact not used for those purposes. Todaro v. Orbit Intern. Travel, Ltd., S.D.N.Y.1991, 755 F.Supp. 1229. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Investors in tax-advantaged limited partnerships failed to satisfy requirement of pleading damage “by reason of” violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act through use of fraud to obtain bank loans; investors had not alleged, nor was it facially apparent from complaint, that misrepresentations to banks, through United States mails, to obtain loans or loan extensions caused economic harm to investors as opposed to banks. Morin v. Trupin, S.D.N.Y.1990, 747 F.Supp. 1051. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Franchisees pleaded sufficient damages to maintain civil RICO claim against franchisors; franchisees claimed that franchisors, through their agreements with franchisees and among themselves, forced franchisees to pay more money than they otherwise would have been required to pay had individual franchisor not received portion of fees paid directly to corporate franchisor. Reeder v. Kermit Johnson, Alphagraphics, Inc., D.Utah 1989, 723 F.Supp. 1428. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Maker of note sufficiently alleged injury to business or property to establish his standing to sue in civil RICO action, despite unenforceability of note, where maker alleged he paid sums to bank for various reasons, including desire to protect his financial reputation, and that he had been damaged “in person and property” by being forced to pay monies to bank pursuant to bank's demands, by incurring or paying taxes and other expenses on

real property that he was required to accept, and by having to show debt claimed by bank as liability. Meyer v. First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Dickinson, D.N.D.1987, 698 F.Supp. 798. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Travel agency's allegation that outside sales agent's sale of discount fare tickets and subsequent conversion of those tickets to nondiscounted tickets without obtaining price differential subjected agency to liability to defrauded air carriers was insufficient to meet “injury” requirement for bringing civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt and Organizations Act action; that some airlines might seek to collect funds at some future date was insufficient basis for injury claim. Anitora Travel, Inc. v. Lapian, S.D.N.Y.1988, 677 F.Supp. 209. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Allegations that nuclear reactor manufacturer used racketeering activity income in operation of its own corporate enterprise and in acquisition of interest and operation of another enterprise failed to establish that plaintiff suffered injury “by reason of” company's action to state claim under § 1962(a) of RICO. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., S.D.Ohio 1986, 656 F.Supp. 49. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Union members did not suffer direct injury in their individual capacities necessary for them to recover in civil RICO action for union official's alleged misappropriation of union funds; any harm suffered by members through misappropriation of their dues or loss of effective representation was incidental to loss suffered by union. Bass v. Campagnone, D.R.I.1987, 655 F.Supp. 1390, affirmed 838 F.2d 10. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 62

Owners did not suffer injury in their business or property by reason of violation of RICO as result of bank's foreclosure of second mortgage; owners had already assigned subject property to bank at time allegedly forged “letter of direction” allowing foreclosure was executed. Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, C.D.Ill.1985, 651 F.Supp. 17. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Former employee who brought private civil RICO action against employer failed to establish that he suffered business or property injury as required under RICO where he alleged that employer harassed and abused him because he refused to participate in scheme to defraud employer's customers and that harassment rendered employee permanently unable to perform any gainful employment. Kouvakas v. Inland Steel Co., N.D.Ind.1986, 646 F.Supp. 474. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Insurers which issued performance and payment bonds on public contracts sufficiently stated claim of fraud against bank acting as escrow agent under Racketeer Influence Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c), by alleging series of false promises, coupled with diversion of funds received on basis of those promises, by escrow agent involving five separate escrow agreements executed on four separate occasions, each of which related to separate public contract over six-month period. Heritage Ins. Co. of America v. First Nat. Bank of Cicero, N.D.Ill.1986, 629 F.Supp. 1412. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Sufficient proprietary damage was alleged in RICO complaint to extent that plaintiffs' purported injuries consisted of lost wages. Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union, Local 95 of Laborers' Intern. Union of North America, S.D.N.Y.1985, 627 F.Supp. 176. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Allegations by female carpenter's apprentice that actions of two officers of union local forced her out of her job as a carpenter and disabled her from pursuing such work in the future properly alleged injury to “business or property” within meaning of RICO 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c). Hunt v. Weatherbee, D.Mass.1986, 626 F.Supp. 1097 . Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Computer equipment manufacturer's allegations that defendants' fraud conspiracy in connection with purchase of computer equipment caused injury to manufacturer's business reputation and customer good will, in addition to causing loss of revenues, satisfied “injury” requirement of provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c)] providing that in order for plaintiff to have standing to bring RICO claim, he must allege “injury in his business or property” by reason of violation of RICO. Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Burts, D.C.Md.1984, 612 F.Supp. 441. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Subsec. (c) of this section permits recovery of any injuries to business or property resulting from pattern of racketeering activity, but where alleged fraudulent scheme to misuse counterclaimant's trading and credit facilities did not result in any injury to counterclaimant, but, rather, injuries claimed, i.e., expense of litigation and damage to its reputation, resulted from 16 lawsuits filed against counterclaimant by counterdefendant, there was failure to state claim for relief under this section. Maryville Academy v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., Inc., N.D.Ill.1981, 530 F.Supp. 1061. Commerce 82.6; Criminal Law 1220; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 59

229. Intent, knowledge, or scienter, complaint

Foreign country made insufficient allegations of scienter on part of domestic banking entities to plead wire fraud, money laundering, or other predicate acts required for claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO), for allegedly participating in scheme to assist former military officer in illegally diverting government funds for his personal use, where foreign country did not allege any knowledge by domestic banking entities that funds were illegally obtained, but merely alleged that domestic entities were acting in concert with, and secretly controlled by, foreign entities. Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., C.A.11 (Fla.) 1997, 119 F.3d 935. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Allegations by potential borrower that would-be lender tried to mislead it into believing that parties' commercial loan transaction was final, and that lender provided borrower with misleading sample guaranty in connection with parties' previous loan negotiations, did not provide sufficiently strong inference of fraudulent intent to satisfy heightened pleading requirements of rule governing the pleading of fraud, thus requiring dismissal of borrower's common-law fraud and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims; most of the proposed guaranty's terms challenged by borrower were contained in sample guaranty, although in slightly different form, and, even though lender's representative initially told borrower that personal guaranties would not be required to finalize loan, he followed up with written proposal that made clear that several conditions had to be met before lender could make firm offer, proposal indicated that unconditional guaranties were yet to be de-

termined, proposal explicitly stated that it did not constitute commitment by lender, and proposal even contem- plated possibility that borrower might fail credit check altogether. S.Q.K.F.C., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic TriCon Leas- ing Corp., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1996, 84 F.3d 629. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Bondholder's allegations that trust company engaged in mail fraud and wire fraud, as predicate acts under Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, by paying interest to Mexico in violation of Debt Readjustment Agreement after its bonds were to have been retired, did not provide adequate basis for requisite inference of scienter, and at most bondholders alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1987, 820 F.2d 46, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 698, 484 U.S. 1005, 98 L.Ed.2d 650, rehearing denied 108 S.Ct. 1588, 485 U.S. 1030, 99 L.Ed.2d 903. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Customers of affiliated medical transcription companies adequately alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy claims against companies' senior executives; complaint described the broad objectives of the conspiracy to establish a billing system and use the system to create and transmit fraudulent invoices and to operate the companies' association-in-fact that served as the enterprise to fraudulently obtain illegal profits from their medical transcription services, that executives conspired and agreed to conduct the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity and that executives were among the defendants who “knowingly and intentionally” delivered or faxed fraudulent invoices. South Broward Hosp. Dist. v. MedQuist Inc., D.N.J.2007, 516 F.Supp.2d 370, stay denied 2007 WL 4547492, affirmed in part 258 Fed.Appx. 466, 2007 WL 4394391. Conspiracy 18

Complaint which failed to allege that university's regents or employees had knowledge of alleged violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by person with whom investors invested their money, failed to state a claim for aiding and abetting a RICO violation; alleged violations occurred before the state university or its employees had any contact with the person alleged to have run the fraudulent scheme. Si- mon v. Weaver, S.D.N.Y.2004, 327 F.Supp.2d 258. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Village could not be found liable, under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), for participation in allegedly illegal scheme to ticket and fine motorists; as village was not a natural person, it could not have requisite criminal intent to engage in RICO predicate offenses. Wood v. Incorporated Village of Patchogue of New York, E.D.N.Y.2004, 311 F.Supp.2d 344. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Allegations that secretary mailed specific letters “knowing” that they contained false representations that nonexistent notes, mortgages, and assignments did in fact exist failed to allege any particulars from which reasonable person could deduce that secretary had such actual knowledge of falsity, let alone factual circumstances giving rise to strong inference that she had requisite fraudulent intent, and thus was insufficient to support civil Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim. Rosenheck v. Rieber, S.D.N.Y.1996, 932 F.Supp. 626. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Allegations that defendants were “dishonest, reckless and deceptive” and “knew or should have known” that particular statement was false satisfied scienter requirement of mail fraud and wire fraud statutes, as those stat-

utes are violated when party misrepresents material fact with “deliberate disregard” of truth or with “reckless in- difference” to truth. Giuliano v. Everything Yogurt, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1993, 819 F.Supp. 240. Postal Service 48(4.3); Telecommunications 1014(12)

Insurer's complaint, alleging that insured corporations, operating rental car businesses, submitted reports each month to insurer in which insureds allegedly misrepresented number of automobiles insured under policies and misrepresented monthly gross receipts, that insureds certified to insurer that information on reports was true and correct, and that insureds knew insurer would rely on alleged misrepresentations contained in reports in calculating total premium that insureds owed, adequately alleged facts and circumstances indicating scienter for purposes of insurer's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims premised upon violations of mail and wire fraud statutes. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Value Rent-A-Car Inc., S.D.Fla.1992, 814 F.Supp. 1084. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Joint venturer had not sufficiently alleged factual foundation for conclusory allegations of scienter or any motive or basis to infer intent by engineer who inspected joint venture project for mortgage lender to participate in alleged fraud to satisfy requirements for pleading fraud in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim asserted by joint venturer against engineer; it was not alleged that false statements were contained in any of the engineer's reports, and allegations that the engineer knew or should have known and could not have been unaware that the managing venturer was providing substantially different, inaccurate reports to the joint venturer were not sufficient to show specific intent by engineer to defraud joint venturer. Browning Ave. Realty Corp. v. Rosenshein, S.D.N.Y.1991, 774 F.Supp. 129. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Allegations that accountants' partners, partners' firms, and John Does were controlling persons liable for alleged securities fraud perpetrated by accountants did not adequately identify role of each individual defendant in racketeering; complaint did not allege that partners had knowledge of or condoned alleged fraud. Myers v. Finkle, E.D.Va.1990, 758 F.Supp. 1102, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds 950 F.2d 165. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Complaint which alleged that defendants acted with the intent to defraud or willful and reckless disregard for plaintiff's interests or scienter adequately alleged criminal intent necessary for a RICO action. Babst v. Morgan Keegan & Co., E.D.La.1988, 687 F.Supp. 255. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 3

Claim that automobile insurer and its chief executive officer (CEO) had devised scheme to defraud insurance broker and claims handler by inducing broker to market insurer's group insurance in order to gain dominant market share in livery insurance market, had cancelled group policies intending to later charge broker's customers higher premium rates, and had revealed intention to file RICO action against broker to brokers' competitors was insufficient to support racketeering activity based upon fraud under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO); there was no evidence that insurer did not intend to follow through with its obligations under agreement at time it executed the policies or that it filed civil suit intending to destroy and recapture broker's business for its own benefit. Highlands Ins. Co. v. PRG Brokerage, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2004, 2004 WL 35439, Unre- ported. Insurance 1648

230. Interstate commerce, complaint

Plaintiffs' allegations that alleged racketeering activities of enterprise of city, county, and officials affected in- trastate commerce within one state were not sufficient for district court to reasonably infer impact of enterprise on interstate commerce, as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Moore v. Guesno, W.D.N.Y.2007, 485 F.Supp.2d 300, affirmed 301 Fed.Appx. 17, 2008 WL 5082982. Commerce 82.60

Allegation in complaint that alleged RICO enterprise had an affect on interstate commerce and that defendants used receipts of illegal activities to purchase business in another state were sufficient to state nexus between alleged enterprise and interstate commerce required to support civil RICO claim. Corporacion Insular de Seguros v. Reyes Munoz, D.Puerto Rico 1993, 826 F.Supp. 599. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Maker of note sufficiently alleged effect on interstate commerce to state civil RICO claim against bank official, in connection with alleged scheme to get maker to execute note; district court could not say that maker would be unable to show any facts indicating that bank, as RICO enterprise, was engaged in interstate commerce, or that its activities affected interstate commerce. Meyer v. First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Dickinson, D.N.D.1987, 698 F.Supp. 798. Commerce 82.60

Plaintiffs did not adequately allege the effect on interstate commerce or facts from which one could reasonably infer an effect on interstate commerce to state cause of action under RICO, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(a-c), with respect to an investment in a limited partnership. Weft, Inc. v. G.C. Inv. Associates, E.D.N.C.1986, 630 F.Supp. 1138, affirmed 822 F.2d 56. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Civil RICO claim against bank required claim against an “enterprise” engaged in activities affecting interstate commerce in addition to claim against bank when bank was charged as culpable “person”; it would be improper for trial court to infer on its own that bank holding company had requisite interstate commerce connection. Dun- ham v. Independence Bank of Chicago, N.D.Ill.1986, 629 F.Supp. 983. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 73

Allegations of attorneys' fraudulent scheme to purchase and sell confidential legal information belonging to group of charitable health care institutions which received payments from federal government and interstate insurers and purchased supplies and equipment in interstate commerce sufficiently alleged facts showing that criminal enterprise in which attorneys purportedly participated affected interstate commerce for purposes of action against attorneys under this section. Beth Israel Medical Center v. Smith, S.D.N.Y.1983, 576 F.Supp. 1061. Commerce 80

If debtor who claimed that bank's activities, including charging higher interest rates, were fraudulent activities, corrupt activities, and racketeering activities were viewed as the “enterprise” for purposes of stating cause against bank under this section bank might be considered as the “person” that so participated in conduct of owner's affairs; however, absent allegations that debtor's “enterprise” if any was engaged in or that its activities af-

fected, interstate commerce, owner's action would fail under this chapter. Fields v. National Republic Bank of Chicago, N.D.Ill.1982, 546 F.Supp. 123. Commerce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

231. Organized criminal activity, complaint

Allegation of tie to organized crime is not prerequisite to civil complaint under this chapter. Alcorn County, Miss. v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., C.A.5 (Miss.) 1984, 731 F.2d 1160. Commerce 80

It was not necessary that subcontractor on federal construction project allege that materials supplier was involved in organized crime to state cause of action under this chapter; it was enough that subcontractor asserted that alleged mail and wire fraud constituted pattern of racketeering activity and that supplier was enterprise through which other defendant conducted his racketeering activities. Owl Const. Co., Inc. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., C.A.5 (La.) 1984, 727 F.2d 540, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 118, 469 U.S. 831, 83 L.Ed.2d 61. Commerce 80

Corporations controlled by organized crime leaders were put on notice of claims against them under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, for murder of competitors' executives in effort to maintain control of garbage carting industry, by allegations that leaders caused murders on behalf of corporations. Jerry Kubecka, Inc. v. Avellino, E.D.N.Y.1995, 898 F.Supp. 963. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Allegations that lenders forced borrowers to sign blank and incomplete documents, which were later altered to reflect greater debt repayment obligations and which obligated borrowers to pay more money than they owed and to make all repayments at higher interest rate went beyond mere hard bargaining and were sufficient to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim based on extortion. Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 213, affirmed 99 F.3d 401. Torts 436

Absence of allegations in complaint that defendant was affiliated with, or engaged in, some type of organized crime was not fatal to a civil racketeering claim. State of Okl. ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v. Children's Shelter, Inc., W.D.Okla.1985, 604 F.Supp. 867. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

Plaintiff failed to state a valid civil claim under this chapter, in that no organized crime connection was alleged and defendants' alleged churning was actionable under the Securities Act of 1933, section 77a et seq. of Title 15 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 78a et seq. of Title 15. Aliberti v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., D.C.Mass.1984, 591 F.Supp. 632.

Complaint under this chapter which contained no allegation of any fact which would connect activities of defendant with criminal activities of an organized nature failed to state a claim under this chapter. American Sav. Ass'n v. Sierra Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, D.C.Colo.1984, 586 F.Supp. 888. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 3

Link to organized crime is not necessary to state a civil claim under this chapter. In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton and Co., Inc. Securities Litigation, E.D.Pa.1984, 583 F.Supp. 1388. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 37

In civil action alleging violation of this chapter, it is not necessary for plaintiff to allege that defendant has connection with organized crime. Willamette Sav. & Loan, a Div. of American Sav. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin- ance Co., D.C.Or.1984, 577 F.Supp. 1415. Commerce 80

Application of treble damages provisions of this section was not barred by civil plaintiff's failure to allege and prove defendant's ties to organized crime. B.F. Hirsch, Inc. v. Enright Refining Co., D.C.N.J.1983, 577 F.Supp. 339, affirmed in part , vacated in part 751 F.2d 628, on remand 617 F.Supp. 49. Commerce 80

In criminal cases, prosecution need not prove a defendant's involvement in organized crime in order to impose penalties under this chapter; as a result, this chapter does not require that a connection between defendant and organized crime must be alleged in order to maintain civil claim for treble damages under this section. In re Ac- tion Industries Tender Offer, E.D.Va.1983, 572 F.Supp. 846. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 98

In securities fraud action in which investor invoked this chapter by alleging that defendants engaged in acts of “fraud in the sale of securities” and that those activities constituted “pattern of racketeering activity,” it was not necessary for investor to allege that defendants were affiliated with organized crime. Mauriber v. Shearson/ American Exp., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1983, 567 F.Supp. 1231. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

In order to state a claim under this chapter for federal securities law violations, plaintiffs must allege some link to organized crime, however defined. Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., C.D.Cal.1983, 566 F.Supp. 636. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Civil complaint under this chapter would be dismissed for failure to allege link between organized crime and defendants allegedly engaged in mail fraud. Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Services, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1983, 558 F.Supp. 1348. Commerce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

Plaintiff's failure to plead defendants' involvement in organized crime was not fatal to her civil claim under this chapter. Gunther v. Dinger, S.D.N.Y.1982, 547 F.Supp. 25. Commerce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 37

Land purchasers' claim against developers under this chapter for treble damages for securities fraud and misrepresentations in context of real estate transactions did not state cause of action where developers were not involved with organized crime. Adair v. Hunt Intern. Resources Corp., N.D.Ill.1981, 526 F.Supp. 736. Securities Regulation 154.1

This chapter requires neither pleading nor proof of nexus of purported racketeering activity with organized crime. Engl v. Berg, E.D.Pa.1981, 511 F.Supp. 1146.

232. Particularity and specificity, complaint--Generally

Shareholder's complaint, charging company officials with violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO), was sufficiently specific; complaint provided dates, names, places and details of each transaction. Gintowt v. TL Ventures, E.D.Pa.2002, 239 F.Supp.2d 580. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 70

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims which were not pled clearly enough for district court to determine their tenability were dismissed without prejudice; pleading was neither short and concise nor simple and precise and complaint failed to specify required dates of predicate acts. Behette v. Saleeby, E.D.N.Y.1994, 842 F.Supp. 657. Federal Civil Procedure 1837.1

Allegations that defendants, over a two and one-half-year period, had engaged in a number of illegal acts, including stealing merchandise from plaintiff's storeroom, were sufficient to satisfy continuity requirement of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), despite failure of plaintiff to allege specific date on which predicate activity began. Executive Photo, Inc. v. Norrell, S.D.N.Y.1991, 765 F.Supp. 844. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 115

Former employees' allegations of “predicate acts” of bribery of arbitrator of employee's dismissal case and of bribery to obtain license for employer's contract drug testing facility were insufficient to state RICO claim against public employer where complaint did not specify whether acts alleged to constitute “bribery” violated federal or state law, did not state whether allegedly bribed persons were federal or state officials and did not detail the circumstances so as to permit determination of whether acts constituted “bribery” or determination of which of several possible state robbery statutes was involved. Laverpool v. New York City Transit Authority, E.D.N.Y.1991, 760 F.Supp. 1046. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Claim that individuals serving as corporate directors during period in which at least five alleged misstatements were issued to the public engaged in pattern of racketeering activity was proper only as to those directors against whom specific allegations of misconduct were made. In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, E.D.N.Y.1990, 747 F.Supp. 850. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Civil RICO complaint identified alleged predicate acts with sufficient particularity, where complaint not only specified the type of predicate acts committed, including extortion, but identified approximate date, participants, victims, and general methods by which acts were committed. U.S. v. Gigante, D.N.J.1990, 737 F.Supp. 292. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

In complaint alleging civil RICO violation, plaintiff must identify specifically each person alleged to be liable under RICO; merely collectivizing defendants in alleged pattern of racketeering activity will not suffice. Weisz- mann v. Kirkland and Ellis, D.Colo.1990, 732 F.Supp. 1540. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations

Plaintiffs who file civil actions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act need not present allegations as specific as criminal bill of particulars, nor establish probable cause to believe that defendant committed predicate racketeering offenses. Frank E. Basil, Inc. v. Leidesdorf, N.D.Ill.1989, 713 F.Supp. 1194. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Predicate RICO offense of interstate transportation of stolen property was sufficiently alleged when complaint alleged that defendant stole more than 85 checks and transported them from Indiana to Illinois even though none of checks was said to have exceeded $5,000; alleged transactions, though serial in form, were so related that they could be charged as single offense. P.M.F. Services, Inc. v. Grady, N.D.Ill.1988, 687 F.Supp. 398. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7; Receiving Stolen Goods 2

In complaint alleging violation of civil RICO statute, plaintiff must specifically identify each person who is alleged to be liable under RICO; merely collectivizing defendants in alleged pattern of racketeering activity will not suffice. Wichita Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Landmark Group, Inc., D.Kan.1987, 657 F.Supp. 1182. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

In alleging civil RICO violation, necessary predicate acts need not be alleged with enough specificity to show there is probable cause that crimes were committed; rejecting Bache, Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc v. Tracy Collins Bank &Trust, Co., 558 F.Supp. 1042 (D.Utah); Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F.Supp. 667 (N.D.Ga.). Cin- cinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., S.D.Ohio 1986, 656 F.Supp. 49. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 70

Civil complaint alleging violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act which did not actually specify the RICO enterprise was so vague and unclear as to require dismissal of RICO claims arising under subsection proscribing participation in the conduct of interstate enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity by person employed by or associated with any enterprise affecting interstate commerce. Richter v. Sudman, S.D.N.Y.1986, 634 F.Supp. 234. Federal Civil Procedure 633.1

Minority shareholders' complaint charging majority shareholder and certain officers and directors with making certain mailings, in connection with proposed corporate merger, that misrepresented market price, omitted material financial information, etc. stated cause of action under this chapter although a more definite statement was required identifying with particularity the alleged conduct which qualified as a pattern of racketeering activity. Umstead v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., M.D.N.C.1984, 578 F.Supp. 342. Commerce 80

Claim under this chapter must be pled with the same particularity that is required in pleading of fraud; furthermore, it is necessary that either a prior conviction or probable cause be alleged with reference to the predicate acts. Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., N.D.Ga.1983, 572 F.Supp. 667. Federal Civil Procedure 633.1

To properly plead an action for civil treble damages under this chapter, a party must allege two acts of

“racketeering” with enough specificity to show there is probable cause that crimes were committed. Bache Hal- sey Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Co., D.C.Utah 1983, 558 F.Supp. 1042. Commerce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Federal civil rule requiring particularity in averments of fraud or mistake applied to RICO claim only to extent that claim was based on racketeering acts involving fraud, so not every element of RICO had to be pled with particularity; in respects other than fraud allegations, liberal notice pleading philosophy of federal rules applied. Towers Financial Corp. v. Solomon, N.D.Ill.1989, 126 F.R.D. 531. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Creditors' allegations that legal and financial professionals assisted debtors in orchestrating and then concealing pre-petition transfer of assets intended to deprive creditors of any recovery in Chapter 13 proceeding did not satisfy level of particularity necessary to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Ad-X Intern., Inc. v. Kolbjornsen, C.A.10 (Colo.) 2004, 97 Fed.Appx. 263, 2004 WL 887354, Unrepor- ted. Federal Civil Procedure 636

233. ---- Conspiracy, particularity and specificity, complaint

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy allegations which contained no more specificity than defectively pleaded substantive RICO claims alleged in complaint were themselves defective. Ozbakir v. Scotti, W.D.N.Y.2011, 764 F.Supp.2d 556. Conspiracy 18

Plaintiff, who sought to recover those monies he donated to not-for-profit monastery sufficiently alleged a Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy where he alleged in specific detail the acts of the defendants in making false representations to the general public through website, the sale and distribution of publications and other media and the solicitation of donations while representing themselves as members of a particular monastic order, and the invitation to individuals such as plaintiff to join the monastery and donate their personal property, based on the representation that monastery was affiliated with the monastic order. Hoyle v. Dimond, W.D.N.Y.2009, 612 F.Supp.2d 225. Conspiracy 18

Plaintiffs made only conclusory assertions that there was an “organized racket and scheme” among State of Con- necticut, its Judicial Branch, its Office of the Attorney General, its Department of Public Safety (DPS), and its Department of Children and Families (DCF) to get plaintiffs to “pay homage as well as money to attorneys and various state agencies in form of fees and costs,” and thus assertion was insufficient to state claim for damages under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) related to underlying state court proceeding that resulted in removal of plaintiffs' child from home, and placement with DCF, as a result of alleged abuse. S. v. Webb, D.Conn.2009, 602 F.Supp.2d 374. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Real property owner proceeding pro se asserted sufficient facts to state claim of conspiracy against municipal building inspector on claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) on allegations that at least implied that hearing officer and receiver were working with inspector in order to extort property owner and other owners by condemning buildings with intention of forcing owners to sell to inspector's associates at reduced price or mortgaging those properties in receivership, inflating expenses, and selling them

without any equity payment to owners. Dickey v. Kennedy, D.Mass.2008, 583 F.Supp.2d 183. Conspiracy 18

Complaint alleging racketeering conspiracy sufficiently placed defendants on notice of composition of conspiracy, some or all of its broad objectives, and defendants' role. Hughes v. Technology Licensing Consultants, Inc., W.D.Pa.1992, 815 F.Supp. 847. Conspiracy 18

Rule 9(b) standards for particularity applied to predicate acts in Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tion Act (RICO) conspiracy count. Atlantic Gypsum Co., Inc. v. Lloyds Intern. Corp., S.D.N.Y.1990, 753 F.Supp. 505. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Sufficiency of pleading of RICO conspiracy claim is not subject to higher pleading standard of civil rule for fraud claims. In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, E.D.N.Y.1990, 747 F.Supp. 850. Conspiracy 18

It is not sufficient for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy complaint to allege in conclusory fashion that defendants conspired, without providing facts setting forth the existence of a conspiracy. Segreti v. Lome, N.D.Ill.1990, 747 F.Supp. 484. Conspiracy 18

Elements of alleged conspiracy under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act that go to existence of enterprise, existence of pattern of racketeering, and existence of continuity do not need to be pled with particularity, unlike predicate acts involving fraud, and must only meet requirements of rule that complaint contain short and plain statement showing that pleader is entitled to relief. Azurite Corp. Ltd. v. Amster & Co., S.D.N.Y.1990, 730 F.Supp. 571. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 15

Predicate acts necessary to establish a conspiracy claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962, are not required to be pled with sufficient specificity to establish probable cause that they were committed by defendants. Lewis on Behalf of Nat. Semiconductor Corp. v. Sporck, N.D.Cal.1985, 612 F.Supp. 1316. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Allegations by purchasers of limited partnership interests that brokerage firm individually and in conspiracy with others engaged in pattern of racketeering activity within meaning of RICO provision and that firm conspired to conduct its own affairs and those of limited partnership through pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of RICO provision, were not sufficiently specific to satisfy minimal pleading requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, since complaint did not contain allegations providing factual support for broad allegations of conspiracy. Alfaro v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., E.D.Pa.1985, 606 F.Supp. 1100. Federal Civil Procedure 633.1

Allegations in complaint with respect to cause of action entitled “Civil Conspiracy to Defraud” and cause of action which alleged conspiracy under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act were set forth with sufficient specificity to state claim for relief, despite assertion that former cause of action must fail since predicate tort for conspiracy, namely presentation of false and fraudulent claims to a government agency, was subject

of another cause of action. State of Okl. ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v. Children's Shelter, Inc., W.D.Okla.1985, 604 F.Supp. 867. Federal Civil Procedure 636

In order to sufficiently allege a conspiracy under this chapter, a party must allege two acts of “racketeering” with enough specificity to show there is probable cause to believe that crimes were committed. Laterza v. Amer- ican Broadcasting Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1984, 581 F.Supp. 408. Conspiracy 18

In alleging under this chapter a civil conspiracy, it is necessary to plead fraudulent conspiracy with enough specificity to inform defendants of facts forming basis of conspiracy charge. Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Corp., E.D.Pa.1983, 576 F.Supp. 234. Conspiracy 18

234. ---- Fraud generally, particularity and specificity, complaint

Although rule that fraud must be pled with particularity requires that plaintiff in a suit brought under the Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provide only a general outline of the alleged fraud scheme, sufficient to reasonably notify the defendants of their purported role in the scheme, the complaint must, at minimum, describe the predicate acts with some specificity and state the time, place, and content of the alleged communications perpetrating the fraud. Midwest Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 976 F.2d 1016. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Particularity requirement for pleading circumstances constituting fraud applies to pleading of fraud as predicate act in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act claim. Tel-Phonic Services, Inc. v. TBS In- tern., Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1992, 975 F.2d 1134. Federal Civil Procedure 636

In pleading RICO violations, litigant must allege time, place and content of all false representations. Lally v. Crawford County Trust & Sav. Bank, Denison, Iowa, C.A.8 (Iowa) 1988, 863 F.2d 612. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

RICO fraud complaint pled fraud with sufficient particularity to withstand motion to dismiss; complaint described false and misleading corporate reports, press releases and offering circulars, provided date of each publication, specific description of representations made, why representations were false, and how all of individual defendants aided in preparation and dissemination of the false statements. Blake v. Dierdorff, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1988, 856 F.2d 1365. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Present and former residents of retirement community, who asserted claims for relief based on this section, alleging that community and founder, various not-for-profit corporations controlled by founder, community's mortgage lender, community's former accountants and attorneys, and certain officers and directors of various not-for-profit organizations conspired to, and did in fact, defraud residents with result that residents faced loss of “life care” which they expected to receive in return for initial endowment fee plus monthly service fee, alleged fraud with sufficient particularity, with exception of certain specified allegations, to state claim for relief. Ben- nett v. Berg, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1983, 710 F.2d 1361, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 527, 464 U.S. 1008, 78 L.Ed.2d 710, on remand. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Consumers had to allege what specific information they or their physicians had about off-label use of drug, extent to which they relied upon that information, how that information relied upon was fraudulent, when drug was prescribed, purchased, and administered, whether those actions would have been taken but for misrepresentations or concealment of drug's ineffectiveness, and ascertainable loss they suffered in direct relation to alleged fraudulent conduct to satisfy heightened pleading requirements to state a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) claim that manufacturer and marketer engaged in fraudulent and deceptive scheme to unlawfully market off-label use of drug. In re Actimmune Marketing Litigation, N.D.Cal.2009, 614 F.Supp.2d 1037, affirmed 464 Fed.Appx. 651, 2011 WL 6887072. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Pro se allegations that municipal building inspector had attempted to extort real property of owner through mail fraud in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) were sufficiently particular to satisfy rule that required pleading of claims of fraud with particularity, where owner stated that employee had sent false information to attorney general's office during particular time period and one misstatement was that “common halls were missing, broken not working.” Dickey v. Kennedy, D.Mass.2008, 583 F.Supp.2d 183. Fed- eral Civil Procedure 636

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint alleged conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity with requisite particularity for fraud: complaint alleged that defendant “organized a phantom equipment-lending transaction” and arranged for another defendant to act as putative lessee, and that lessee laundered money obtained in bid-rigging scheme. Elemary v. Philipp Holzmann A.G., D.D.C.2008, 533 F.Supp.2d 116. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Claims asserted by alien that Texas notaries public held themselves out as being able to represent alien in immigration matters, although they were not so authorized, and that they committed acts of mail fraud, by knowingly sending false and misleading information by mail to federal immigration authorities, and attaching immigration forms that were notarized by the notaries, did not plead predicate acts of fraud with particularity, as required to state civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, absent specific allegations as to whether the attached forms were prepared in a legal sense by the notaries, whether those specific forms contained false or misleading information, and when the alleged instances of fraud occurred. de Pacheco v. Martinez, S.D.Tex.2007, 515 F.Supp.2d 773. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Allegations that the purchasers of a new construction home responded to a newspaper advertisement, that they visited some defendant's office, that they were contacted by sellers and shown homes by the seller, that somebody represented that their home was worth $145,425 even though the defendants knew this was not true, and that somebody prevented them from accessing the home during construction did not state predicate fraud claims with particularity, as required to state claim for civil violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO), absent identification of the individuals that met with the purchasers, the company the individuals represented, the date of the meetings, the individuals who misrepresented the value of the homes, or the content of the print advertisement to which sellers responded. Silverstein v. Percudani, M.D.Pa.2006, 422 F.Supp.2d 468, affirmed 207 Fed.Appx. 238, 2006 WL 3521892. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Purchasers of certain parcels of property failed to plead circumstances surrounding alleged fraud committed by

vendor and “middle man” with sufficient particularity to adequately plead fraud that constituted basis for their claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Ohio Corrupt Activities Act, and their common law fraud claims, against vendor. Bird v. Delacruz, S.D.Ohio 2005, 411 F.Supp.2d 891. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Consumers asserting claims against credit counseling companies under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) in connection with their administration of debt management plans (DMP) were required to allege with particularity that at least some individually-identified communications were substantively fraudulent in nature and were also transmitted through mail or wire communication. Limpert v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., E.D.N.Y.2004, 328 F.Supp.2d 360, amended on reconsideration in part 2004 WL 3395347, subsequent determination 2004 WL 3395346. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Vendors who supplied goods and services to insolvent manufacturer failed to plead mail fraud, as predicate act for claim of violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), with particularity required under rules of civil procedure; vendors did not identify time, place, or even method, means, or mode, of any misrepresentations concerning manufacturer's intention to pay for goods received on credit, or identify anyone who purportedly made misrepresentations. Webster Industries, Inc. v. Northwood Doors, Inc., N.D.Iowa 2004, 320 F.Supp.2d 821. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Allegation that mortgage lender violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by participating in scheme to prepare false loan applications for minority home purchasers in order to generate income through points and fees was not pled with sufficient particularity, where purchasers did not indicate which loans contained fraudulent statements, extent to which lender participated in scheme, and character of lender's involvement in each fraud. Wilson v. Toussie, E.D.N.Y.2003, 260 F.Supp.2d 530. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Claimant stated claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) with sufficient particularity; misrepresentations forming basis for RICO charge were adequately pled for securities fraud purposes, and complainant alleged that defending parties had acted in concert with one another to violate laws. Hollings- worth v. Iwerks Entertainment, Inc., M.D.Fla.1996, 947 F.Supp. 473. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Bank, in suit against another bank and its directors in connection with depositor's alleged check-kiting scheme, failed to allege predicate acts of bank fraud with requisite particularity to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) claim, where plaintiff did not indicate when particular acts of fraud or conversion took place and which of outside directors were involved. Bank of Vermont v. Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co., D.Vt.1995, 906 F.Supp. 221. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Borrowers failed to allege with particularity agreement by lender partnership to commit requisite predicate acts of racketeering activity that would support RICO conspiracy claim; assertions in case statement that partnership and its agents conspired to defraud borrowers, assented to fraudulent activities, and were aware of usurious monthly loan payments were insufficient because they did not provide adequate basis from which to infer conspiracy. R.C.M. Executive Gallery Corp. v. Rols Capital Co., S.D.N.Y.1995, 901 F.Supp. 630. Conspiracy

Allegations of complaint in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit against company's comptroller provided comptroller with notice of fraudulent acts with which he was charged, and thus, pleaded fraud with adequate particularity; comptroller was alleged to have prepared false financial reports on daily basis and to have instructed employees to lie to plaintiff, company's vice president, in event that he called to inquire about number of charge-backs, which actions furthered fraudulent invoicing scheme to loot company by hiding its effects from vice president. Brooke v. Schlesinger, S.D.N.Y.1995, 898 F.Supp. 1076. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Investors' complaint under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against alleged planner of fraudulent investment scheme alleged fraud with sufficient particularity, since allegations of time, place and nature of incidents of allegedly fraudulent conduct gave defendant adequate notice of investors' claims so as to enable him to prepare adverse pleading. Lust v. Burke, D.Md.1994, 876 F.Supp. 1474. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) complaint which specifically alleged that defendants engaged in laundering of monetary instruments on at least two occasions contained sufficiently particular averment of predicate act of fraud. Independent Drug Wholesalers Group, Inc. v. Denton, D.Kan.1993, 833 F.Supp. 1507, reconsideration denied. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Plaintiffs alleging RICO violation for which predicate acts are acts of fraud must plead at least two acts of racketeering to meet particularity requirement for pleading fraud as RICO claim requires pattern of racketeering activity. Gurfein v. Sovereign Group, E.D.Pa.1993, 826 F.Supp. 890. Federal Civil Procedure 636; Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Video store franchisees failed to allege facts supporting claims against franchisors for common-law fraud and RICO with required particularity; complaint failed to set forth circumstances of fraud, including time and place of fraud, contents of omissions or misrepresentations, and identity of party perpetrating a fraud. Dudley Enter- prises, Inc. v. Palmer Corp., N.D.Ill.1993, 822 F.Supp. 496. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Franchisees' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint against franchisor satisfied rule requiring particularity in pleading of fraud, even though many of allegations may not have been actionable fraud due to involvement of statements of opinion, sales talk and puffery or projections of anticipated income and expenses and future conduct, and even though exact dates of communications and respective speakers or writers were not all specified; complaint viewed in light most favorable to franchisees alleged some fraudulent acts. Giuliano v. Everything Yogurt, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1993, 819 F.Supp. 240. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Insurer's complaint alleging that insured corporations operating rental car businesses deliberately deceived insurer by underreporting amount of gross receipts derived from vehicles covered by policies on monthly basis, thereby defrauding insurer of earned premium due under policies, and that this alleged deception was done by

mailing, via the United States mail, fraudulent fleet reports and fraudulently calculated premium payments pleaded fraud with sufficient particularity; although insurer's allegations of fraud were far from model of particularity, in that insurer did not allege specific times, dates or places for all of alleged predicate acts, complaint stated who made fraudulent allegations and why representations were fraudulent, alleged general time frame in which misrepresentations were allegedly made, stated that mails and wires were used to communicate misrepresentations interstate, and described alleged scheme in considerable detail. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Value Rent- A-Car Inc., S.D.Fla.1992, 814 F.Supp. 1084. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Complaint alleged with sufficient particularity willful violation of Securities Exchange Act as Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate act for complaint alleging fraud in sale of securities, where complaint alleged that plaintiffs lost $15.7 million dollars due to their reasonable reliance on materially misleading financial statements prepared by and distributed to public with consent of accounting firm, and also alleged specific facts permitting inferences that firm intended to deceive, in that firm allegedly drew up and certified false and misleading financial disclosures. In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, E.D.N.Y.1993, 812 F.Supp. 338. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Fraud allegations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) count of complaint against general partners in limited partnership and dealer manager for securities offering satisfied particularity requirements of civil rule, even though complaint was not a model of pleading and some allegations were made upon “information and belief”; complaint provided adequate description of time, content, and place of allegedly false representations and was sufficiently specific to enable defendants to file a meaningful answer. Wegbreit v. Mar- ley Orchards Corp., E.D.Wash.1991, 793 F.Supp. 957, reinstatement granted 793 F.Supp. 965. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Investors claiming securities fraud as predicate crime supporting RICO claim in connection with sale of limited partnership interests in real estate venture, failed to establish that in-house attorney for partnership was “controlling person” of partnership, as required to take advantage of relaxation of requirement that specific acts of fraud be stated in pleading; investors had made conclusory statement that attorney was control person without asserting that he was involved in day-to-day management and operation of partnership. Morin v. Trupin, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 711, on reconsideration 809 F.Supp. 1081, on reargument 823 F.Supp. 201. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, predicated on acts of securities fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud was subject to dismissal, where securities fraud violations were not adequately alleged and allegations of predicate acts of mail and wire fraud were not pled with sufficient particularity. Connolly v. Havens, S.D.N.Y.1991, 763 F.Supp. 6. Federal Civil Procedure 1781

Where Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim is based on predicate act of fraud, factual basis establishing elements of predicate act must comport with rule requiring pleading of fraud with particularity. Certilman v. Hardcastle, Ltd., E.D.N.Y.1991, 754 F.Supp. 974. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Reinsurer's alleged deprivation of property interest and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)

causation, as well as scienter, as to individual defendants who were working as managers for ceding insurers complied with particularity requirements for pleading fraud, even though reinsurers failed to show that ceding insurers themselves were responsible vicariously for the actions of the individual defendants. Philan Ins. Ltd. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1990, 748 F.Supp. 190, reargument denied 755 F.Supp. 94. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Allegations of fraudulent transactions asserted by marketer of video games against developer of video games, arising from those parties' joint venture, were lacking with respect to time and place; period in which fraudulent transactions allegedly occurred could have been anywhere between mid-1987 to October of 1989, and marketer, as participant to agreement, could allege more specific time period. P & P Marketing, Inc. v. Ditton, N.D.Ill.1990, 746 F.Supp. 1354. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Racketeering complaint, which failed to specify with particularity what numerous defendants did, failed to satisfy particularity requirement for pleading fraud. Beauford v. Helmsley, S.D.N.Y.1990, 740 F.Supp. 201. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Allegations of RICO fraud were pleaded with sufficient particularity, where plaintiffs indicated source, time and place of alleged misrepresentations, and claimed that as a result of alleged misrepresentations, they were per- suaded to invest a substantial amount of capital in corporation leading to loss of at least $1,000,000. Kuczynski v. Ragen Corp., S.D.N.Y.1989, 732 F.Supp. 378. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Limited partner, which alleged that general partner had continuously misappropriated assets of partnership since its inception by diverting partnership funds to general partner and away from limited partner, failed to state a RICO claim against accounting firm which general partner selected as auditor, based on allegation that firm assisted in general partner's scheme to defraud limited partner of its rightful share of profits; with respect to accounting firm, limited partner failed to allege fraud with particularity; complaint's allegations of firm's “awareness” of misappropriations were conclusory and vague. Wait Radio by Rosenfield v. Price Waterhouse, N.D.Ill.1988, 691 F.Supp. 102. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Investors' allegations, that brokers made false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises as to merit, worth, substance and value of investments, while knowing that they were false when made, failed to plead fraud with specificity as required for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act claim based upon predicate offense of fraud. Davis v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., W.D.La.1988, 687 F.Supp. 266. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Complaint alleging that accounting firm participated in pattern of racketeering activity failed to state RICO claim with sufficient particularity where accounting firm's alleged securities fraud that formed predicate act of RICO claim was not specific enough to sustain fraud claim under federal securities law. Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen, Rosenthal & Rosenberg, D.Conn.1986, 651 F.Supp. 877. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Fraud allegations, included in pattern of racketeering portion of RICO complaint brought against operators of

mortgage pools, were pled with sufficient particularity where complaint listed investments allegedly purchased by each investor and identified role of each defendant in alleged fraud in manner sufficient to allow defendants to prepare responsive pleadings. In re National Mortg. Equity Corp. Mortg. Pool Certificates Securities Litiga- tion, C.D.Cal.1986, 636 F.Supp. 1138. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Fraud alleged as part of pattern of racketeering activity which was particularly within corporate directors and accountant's knowledge as to time, place, and content of false representations did not need to be pleaded with particularity in racketeering complaint. Papai v. Cremosnik, N.D.Ill.1986, 635 F.Supp. 1402. Federal Civil Proced- ure 636

Fraud allegations are sufficient for purpose of stating Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations claim if they place defendant on notice of precise misconduct with which defendant is charged and are sufficient to safeguard defendant against spurious charges of immoral and fraudulent behavior. LSC Associates v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp., E.D.Pa.1986, 629 F.Supp. 979. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Complaint, which alleged misrepresentation by partnership's senior partner over course of seven years and in connection with nebulous “financial information” and “statements,” was improper under pleading requirement of Civil Procedure Rule 9(b). Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v. Alexander Grant & Co., S.D.N.Y.1985, 627 F.Supp. 1023. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Plaintiff's claims of fraud and misrepresentation in trademark infringement action were pled with sufficient particularity to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; plaintiff alleged that defendant sent letter to plaintiff essentially stating that defendant was moving forward on certain project, and went on to specify how this statement misled plaintiff and how defendant benefitted from statement. Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1985, 619 F.Supp. 1167. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Alleged fraudulent predicate acts underlying civil RICO [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961, 1962(c)] claim were plead with sufficient specificity, in accordance with Federal Civil Rule 9(b), to put defendants on notice of what conduct was charged. Morley v. Cohen, D.C.Md.1985, 610 F.Supp. 798. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Count under section 1962 of this title did not comply with requirement that fraud be pleaded with particularity where complaint basically alleged that defendant's “wrongfully led the plaintiffs to believe” certain facts and “wrongfully led the public and in particular various customers * * * to believe” certain facts, but there was no description of any particular act, time, place, participant or what possible indictable offense was committed. Carbone, Inc. v. Proctor Ellison Co., D.C.Mass.1984, 102 F.R.D. 951. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Allegations in complaint filed by third party that had guaranteed Chapter 11 debtors' loans and mortgaged certain of his property for debtor's benefit, against lender that allegedly concealed information regarding debtor's true financial condition while debtor's principal purportedly converted its assets, did not allege predicate acts of fraud with requisite particularity to satisfy federal pleading requirements in cause of action under the federal racketeering statute. In re Target Industries, Inc., Bkrtcy.D.N.J.2005, 328 B.R. 99. Bankruptcy 2162

Heightened pleading requirements for fraud claims applied to former husband's Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against his former wife, her attorney, state judges and others involved in his state divorce proceedings, where former husband purported to allege fraudulent activity among all defendants, in connection with alleged conspiracy to deny him an honest tribunal. Davit v. Davit, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2006, 173 Fed.Appx. 515, 2006 WL 786723, Unreported, rehearing en banc denied. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Construction contractor, alleging contract losses due to insurers' scheme to issue fraudulent construction bonds, failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, absent allegation of single contract lost within limitations period because of defendants' alleged racketeering activities. Apollon Water- proofing & Restoration, Inc. v. Bergassi, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2004, 87 Fed.Appx. 757, 2004 WL 206211, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Dismissal of commercial automobile insurer's fraud claims against insurance broker, its chief executive officer (CEO), and claims handler, for failing to plead allegations with sufficient particularity, warranted dismissal of insurer's claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in which insurer alleged that defendants engaged in racketeering activity of committing fraud in livery driver insurance market. Highlands Ins. Co. v. PRG Brokerage, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2004, 2004 WL 35439, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 70

235. ---- Mail and wire fraud, particularity and specificity, complaint

Property owner did not plead mail and wire fraud with sufficient particularity to satisfy predicate acts requirement for civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where he made only bald assertion that unspecified defendants used United States mails to fraudulently convey their interests in properties, that defendants used Postal Service by mailing unspecified materials, and that defendants used wire communications. Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, C.A.1 (R.I.) 1997, 118 F.3d 886, certiorari denied 118 S.Ct. 1165, 522 U.S. 1148, 140 L.Ed.2d 176. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Allegations in car buyers' complaint, that bank which financed their acquisition of vehicles failed to accurately disclose that the charges it added to amount financed, pursuant to clause in parties' agreement authorizing bank to purchase casualty insurance on car buyers' behalf, also included additional premium for insurance coverage that bank obtained against car buyers' malfeasance, did not allege predicate act of mail fraud with sufficient particularity to state civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); notices that car buyers received, which indicated that bank had purchased insurance to protect its interest as lender in vehicles, were sufficiently general and nonspecific that they could not be regarded as false statements of fact in- dicative of mail fraud. Kenty v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A., C.A.6 (Ohio) 1996, 92 F.3d 384, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Complaint alleging Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations that did not supply detail as to when allegedly fraudulent mail and wire communications occurred, where they took place, or what they contained was not sufficiently specific to satisfy rule requiring party to plead fraud with particularity. Fein- stein v. Resolution Trust Corp., C.A.1 (Mass.) 1991, 942 F.2d 34. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 70

Hospital asserting Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against medical group failed to specify requisite facts relating to alleged use of mails; letter potentially satisfying requirement of two predicate acts was hand-delivered, not sent through mails, and asserted time period regarding other use of mails, “from 1986 up through the present,” was insufficiently specific. Lancaster Community Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1991, 940 F.2d 397, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 1168, 502 U.S. 1094, 117 L.Ed.2d 414. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Investors' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim against broker and account representative was fatally flawed by failure to plead basic elements of alleged predicate acts of mail fraud with sufficient particularity and failure to allege that injuries stemmed directly from alleged use or investment of illegally obtained income by broker and account representative. Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., C.A.6 (Ohio) 1990, 899 F.2d 485. Federal Civil Procedure 636; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70; Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Securities fraud plaintiffs alleged use of mails with sufficient particularity to withstand motion to dismiss their RICO complaint; allegations, supported by affidavit, that limited partnership in which plaintiffs had invested, which developed and sold business lecture radio cassettes, used mails to sell subscriptions to video cassette lib- raries for tax shelter purposes was sufficient pleading of use of mails. Durham v. Business Management Asso- ciates, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1988, 847 F.2d 1505. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

RICO violations were pled with sufficient specificity, by allegations referring to parties initiating racketeering activity, allegations of specific activities of misappropriation of trade secrets and method of use of mails to further misappropriation as part of racketeering activity, and allegation that monies obtained from misappropriation of trade secrets through wire/mail were used to further defendants' racketeering activity. Formax, Inc. v. Hostert, C.A.Fed. (Ill.) 1988, 841 F.2d 388, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1939. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Dismissal should not be automatic once lower court determines that rule requiring party to plead fraud with particularity was not satisfied in connection with Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act predicate acts of mail and wire fraud; if, for example, specific allegations make it likely that defendant used interstate mail or telecommunications facilities and specific information as to use is likely in exclusive control of defendant, court should make second determination as to whether claim as presented warrants allowance of discovery and, if so, thereafter provide opportunity to amend defective complaint. New England Data Services, Inc. v. Becher, C.A.1 (R.I.) 1987, 829 F.2d 286. Federal Civil Procedure 1789

Third party payers (TPPs) with prescription drug benefit plans containing cost-sharing provisions failed to allege mail and wire fraud as Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate acts with requisite specificity by alleging that pharmaceutical companies which jointly marketed branded drug approved to treat schizophrenia “engaged in an intentional scheme to defraud plaintiffs and the class by reporting benchmark prices to reporting agencies while failing to account for the routine waiver of co-pays,” but they would be granted leave to replead RICO claim with respect to that theory of fraud; as drafted, complaint offered virtually no specifics concerning Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC) and Average Wholesale Price (AWP) for drugs, not

defining either or relationship between them and alleging in general terms that drug companies controlled price at which wholesalers or large retailers bought prescription drugs from them and reimbursement benchmark used to determine amount to be paid for drugs by public and private health benefit providers and stating that either by directly determining AWP or WAC figures, branded drug manufacturers “cause to be published” certain “widely-used and nearly ubiquitous” benchmark prices for payments and reimbursements, unarticulatedly implying that AWP and WAC were those benchmarks. American Federation of State, County and Mun. Employees Dist. Council 37 Health & Sec. Plan v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., S.D.N.Y.2013, 2013 WL 2391999. Federal Civil Procedure 636; Federal Civil Procedure 1838

Workers had to allege particulars of prior lawsuit, identification of content of any misstatements used in mails or wires associated with that litigation, and statements to workers made with intent that workers would rely on them, to state viable claim for mail or wire fraud under heightened pleading requirement with regard to prior lawsuit as predicate act with regard to workers' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim that resulted from subsequent workplace explosion. Bradley v. Phillips Petroleum Co., S.D.Tex.2007, 527 F.Supp.2d 625, affirmed 337 Fed.Appx. 397, 2009 WL 1870936. Federal Civil Procedure 636; Telecom- munications 1014(12)

Former students at private school and former attendees of school's summer camp sufficiently alleged that school's employees and agents engaged in mail and wire fraud with purpose of obtaining money or property, as required to satisfy racketeering activity element in their civil suit under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) in relation to alleged concealment of school's knowledge of football coach's sexual abuse of students; plaintiffs alleged that fraud was motivated by defendants' desire to derive substantial revenue from, inter alia, alumni contributions and tuition payments, and that defendants acted with specific intent to defraud, as well as alleging manner in which each statement was fraudulent with sufficient particularity. Zimmer- man v. Poly Prep Country Day School, E.D.N.Y.2012, 888 F.Supp.2d 317. Federal Civil Procedure 636; Postal Service 35(10); Telecommunications 1014(12)

The rule that requires that claims alleging fraud be pleaded with particularity extends to pleading predicate acts of mail and wire fraud under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Dickey v. Kennedy, D.Mass.2008, 583 F.Supp.2d 183. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Investors pled with sufficient particularity claim that bank committed wire fraud by assisting operators of Ponzi scheme to complete monetary wire transfers, even though investors did not provide specific dates of transfers, where investors provided time frame for transfers and general allegations as to entities involved in transfers, alleged that transfers were part of ongoing scheme, and claimed that bank was aware of Ponzi scheme. Gonzales v. Lloyds TSB Bank, PLC, C.D.Cal.2006, 532 F.Supp.2d 1200. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Cotton farmers' claim that agricultural marketing cooperative engaged in mail fraud under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleged fraud with sufficient particularity by alleging that cooperative mailed a final settlement to cotton farmers which misrepresented final price per pound of cotton, and failed to disclose interest costs related to property development unrelated to cooperative's marketing role. Andrews Farms v. Calcot, Ltd., E.D.Cal.2007, 527 F.Supp.2d 1239. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Even if criminal indictments alleging predicate mail and wire fraud acts were sufficiently incorporated into Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint, bare allegations in those criminal indictments were not sufficiently specific to satisfy the heightened pleading requirement that applies to allegations of mail or wire fraud; portions of the criminal indictments that identified specific telephone calls or mailings purportedly made in furtherance of the alleged racketeering schemes simply stated the dates and the identities of the participants or addressees in various alleged telephone conversations or mailings without identifying what specific statements were made or explaining how those statements furthered the allegedly fraudulent scheme or artifice. U.S. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, E.D.N.Y.2007, 518 F.Supp.2d 422. Federal Civil Procedure 636

In order to implicate mail and wire fraud statutes in claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO), allegations of medical service providers and pharmacies, that mail and wire communications were not necessarily misleading, but nevertheless were sent in furtherance of fraudulent scheme, had to be ac- companied by particularized description of scheme and how communications, though facially innocent, furthered scheme to defraud providers and pharmacies, as predicate acts, by calculating provider payments and subscriber benefits in manner in which providers were consistently underpaid and subscribers under-served. Sanchez v. Triple-S Management Corp., D.Puerto Rico 2006, 446 F.Supp.2d 48, affirmed 492 F.3d 1, certiorari denied 128 S.Ct. 806, 552 U.S. 1076, 169 L.Ed.2d 606. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Mortgagor's conclusory allegation that financial professionals engaged in mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud in connection with her mortgage did not plead predicate acts of racketeering activity with sufficient particularity to support her claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where complaint did not provide any explanation of how, precisely, mortgagor believed professionals engaged in fraud. Welch v. Centex Home Equity Co., L.L.C., D.Kan.2004, 323 F.Supp.2d 1087, reconsideration denied 224 F.R.D. 490. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Mechanics of underlying mail fraud scheme were pleaded with sufficient particularity in employer's complaint against employee for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where complaint outlined employee's role in scheme as insuring that there was no outside review of carrier company's false invoices by routing invoices directly to himself, approving false invoices, and causing checks to be issued to carrier company for services not rendered, and employer attached 32 page exhibit specifying fraudulent invoice numbers, check numbers, and check amounts. General Cigar Co., Inc. v. CR Carriers, Inc., M.D.Ala.1996, 948 F.Supp. 1030. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Complaint alleging that franchisor concocted scheme to defraud franchisee by overcharging it for insurance did not plead, with sufficient particularity, fraud, or the mail and wire fraud alleged as Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate acts; complaint did not indicate who made decision to overcharge, when that decision was made, or any of the circumstances surrounding the alleged scheme, but rather simply re- iterated generic allegation that one or more of the individual defendants and/or unknown individuals within their control either made the decision or participated in the process by which decision to execute alleged scheme was made. Maryland Staffing Services, Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., E.D.Wis.1996, 936 F.Supp. 1494. Federal Civil Pro- cedure 636

If RICO claim is based upon predicate acts of wire fraud, circumstances of fraud must be specifically alleged, including content, date, and place of alleged representation and identity of speaker or writer, although malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of mind may be averred generally. State Wide Photocopy, Corp. v. Tokai Financial Services, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1995, 909 F.Supp. 137. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 70

Assertion of mail or wire fraud, in support of claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), failed to allege that anyone actually made false statement or misrepresentation and thus did not plead allegation of fraud with sufficient particularity. Byer Industries, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., D.D.C.1995, 888 F.Supp. 1. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Automobile manufacturer pled mail and wire fraud predicates of Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against suppliers with sufficient particularity; manufacturer alleged that suppliers intentionally and knowingly stockpiled precious metals provided to them for use in production of coated “bricks” for catalytic converters and overstated reports of metal use, that suppliers manipulated testing or reporting of amount of metal absorbed onto bricks, and that each and every communication suppliers sent to manufacturer, and other similarly situated manufacturers, fraudulently overstated amount of metals used, even though manufacturer did not enumerate each of the hundreds of communications regarding amount of metals used. General Motors Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc., E.D.Wis.1994, 855 F.Supp. 1005. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Plaintiffs could not maintain Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action since they failed to plead with any particularity how and when defendants used wires and mails to defraud plaintiffs, they made many allegations solely upon information and beliefs, and they failed to allege but-for and proximate causation. Aizuss v. Commonwealth Equity Trust, E.D.Cal.1993, 847 F.Supp. 1482. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Complaint alleging without further detail, in support of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) wire fraud claim, that phone calls and telecopier transmissions of various documents were used by generic drug producing corporation's president to perpetuate alleged fraud regarding status of corporation's drug application submissions and quality of its research, and thus its prospective future, failed to satisfy requirements of Rule mandating particularity in pleading of fraud claims. Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Kapoor, N.D.Ill.1993, 814 F.Supp. 720. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Particularity requirement for pleading RICO predicate acts of mail and wire fraud was not satisfied by erection contractor's allegations, even though defendants allegedly hired contractor with knowledge that no funding was available, and even though at least 12 other contractors allegedly fell victim to same scheme; allegations did not set forth particulars as to respect in which representations were fraudulent or how mails or wires were utilized to convey such representations, and allegations did not support strong inference of knowledge that representations of payment were false. W.E. Darin Const. Enterprises, Inc. v. Detroit Coke Co., W.D.N.Y.1993, 814 F.Supp. 325. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Borrowers' allegations of mail fraud and wire fraud as predicate acts under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (RICO) were sufficiently particularized to withstand motion to dismiss, even if borrowers would have difficulty proving allegations; borrowers alleged that lender's officers presented borrowers with incomplete documents and fraudulently represented that obligations would be the same as prior loans, that borrowers were induced to borrow additional money based on misrepresentations about interest rate, that one officer used borrowers' debt obligations to pressure borrowers into selling automobile below cost, and that lender repeatedly refused to provide regular statements documenting nature of obligations. Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 213, affirmed 99 F.3d 401. Federal Civil Procedure 1811

Charged acts of wire fraud, mail fraud, and securities fraud committed during course of asserted fraudulent scheme to distribute unregistered securities were not alleged with sufficient particularity, in civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where investors merely alleged that broker dealer communicated, or caused communications to be made, by wire or mail, and failed to allege basis for claim of recklessness under scienter element of securities fraud. In re Laser Arms Corp. Securities Litigation, S.D.N.Y.1989, 794 F.Supp. 475, affirmed 969 F.2d 15. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Plaintiffs failed to state time, place and content of alleged mail and wire communications so as to meet specificity requirements for pleading fraud in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) action. Zee-Bar, Inc. N.H. v. Kaplan, D.N.H.1992, 792 F.Supp. 895. Federal Civil Procedure 636

High bidder at bank foreclosure auction failed to allege mail and wire fraud with sufficient particularity in his civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) count against bank and its officers, where he failed to provide time, place, and content of mail and wire communications made as part of alleged scheme to defraud. Cutler v. F.D.I.C., D.Me.1992, 781 F.Supp. 816. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Fact that some of plaintiff's allegations were based on information and belief did not defeat claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) based on predicate acts of mail and wire fraud; because allegations involved deception by defendant, factual basis for fraud lay with defendants, justifying a complaint that pleaded fraud partially based upon information and belief. Official Publications, Inc. v. Kable News Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1991, 775 F.Supp. 631. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Allegations by investors that management of corporation committed mail fraud, wire fraud, and securities fraud, as predicate acts under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), were sufficient to satisfy particularity requirement, and were allegations of pattern of racketeering activity; alleged misstatements to public and private investors occurred repeatedly over several year period, all in furtherance of alleged fraudulent scheme. In re Sahlen & Associates, Inc. Securities Litigation, S.D.Fla.1991, 773 F.Supp. 342. Federal Civil Pro- cedure 636

Plaintiff alleging violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) failed to specify time, place, speaker and content of misrepresentations and communications alleged to constitute mail and wire

fraud, as required by rule requiring particularity in pleading of fraud. Metro Furniture Rental, Inc. v. Alessi, S.D.N.Y.1991, 770 F.Supp. 198. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Dismissal of RICO claims based on predicate acts of mail and wire fraud was warranted, where time, date, place, and content of alleged misrepresentations was not pled with sufficient specificity that inference of fraud could be drawn by court. Comwest, Inc. v. American Operator Services, Inc., C.D.Cal.1991, 765 F.Supp. 1467. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Former employees' amended complaint failed to sufficiently allege wire fraud as predicate act of “racketeering activity” for purposes of RICO; no facts were alleged showing motive for committing fraud and clear opportunity to do so and, further, complaint was devoid of any allegations of participants, place, method or any circumstances of alleged fraud. Laverpool v. New York City Transit Authority, E.D.N.Y.1991, 760 F.Supp. 1046. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

To adequately plead mail fraud as predicate act under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), plaintiff must allege harm to property right, direct reliance upon fraudulent misrepresentation by defendants and causation; even though reliance is not an element of criminal mail fraud, when mail fraud is plead as a RICO predicate, reliance and causation must be pled. Daley's Dump Truck Service, Inc. v. Kiewit Pacific Co., W.D.Wash.1991, 759 F.Supp. 1498, affirmed 976 F.2d 1303, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 1644, 507 U.S. 1004, 123 L.Ed.2d 266. Postal Service 48(4.1)

Plaintiff bringing action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) failed to sufficiently allege substantive acts of mail and wire fraud; while plaintiff made liberal use of term “fraudulently,” plaintiff failed to expressly allege that any of defendants acted with intent to defraud, and plaintiff's intertwining conclusory allegations of fraud and conspiracy made it impossible for defendant to frame adequate response to complaint. R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v. Nalco Chemical Co., N.D.Ill.1990, 757 F.Supp. 1499. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Financing entity's allegations that equipment seller committed mail fraud by mailing correspondence, proposals, and agreements that contained false representations designed to induce entity to finance buyer's purchase of equipment did not satisfy specificity requirement for pleading predicate acts under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). U.S. Concord, Inc. v. Harris Graphics Corp., N.D.Cal.1991, 757 F.Supp. 1053. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Governing standards for pleading mail and wire fraud under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) were satisfied by detailed allegations contained in amended complaint which alleged that corporate directors engaged in scheme to defraud and injure corporation, assisted another in misappropriating corporate assets, caused corporation to breach representations and covenants to lenders and others and be in default under terms of financing agreements, and concealed their allegedly improper activities and assisted another person in concealing his. Harris v. Wells, D.Conn.1991, 757 F.Supp. 171. Postal Service 48(4.3); Telecommunica- tions 1014(12)

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint failed to meet requirement of specificity concerning commission of predicate acts; complaint did not allege time, place or substance of each purported act of mail or wire fraud and did not attempt to set forth how alleged predicate acts formed “pattern of racketeering,” how they were continuing or likely to continue, or how they were related to each other; moreover, complaint did not adequately ground RICO claims in particular section of RICO statute. McCoy v. Goldberg, S.D.N.Y.1990, 748 F.Supp. 146. Federal Civil Procedure 636; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 70

Requirement of particularity in mail fraud pleadings in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action does not require plaintiff to plead every date and place of mailing, particularly where knowledge would be in possession of defendants, but it does require that documents involved be pled with particularity, and where there are multiple defendants, connections must be made between various defendants and alleged acts of mail fraud. Landy v. Mitchell Petroleum Technology Corp., S.D.N.Y.1990, 734 F.Supp. 608. Federal Civil Pro- cedure 636

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) plaintiffs, alleging that defendants committed predicate acts by intentionally providing plaintiff investors with false financial projections regarding hotel ventures, pled predicate acts with sufficient particularity where complaint alleged proximate time mail fraud occurred for different ventures, what information was contained in projections, who prepared each projection and to whom each projection was mailed, and how transactions formed and fit pattern. Indianapolis Hotel Investors, Ltd. v. Aircoa Equity Interests, Inc., D.Colo.1990, 733 F.Supp. 1406. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Predicate mail and wire fraud acts alleged were not pled with sufficient particularity to support RICO claim arising from alleged diversion of reinsurance premiums; the complaint was pleaded almost exclusively on information and belief, it was not established that the necessary facts were peculiarly within the defendants' knowledge, and a strong inference that the defendant insurance brokers possessed the requisite fraudulent intent was not established. Philan Ins. Ltd. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1989, 712 F.Supp. 339. Federal Civil Pro- cedure 636

Paragraph of RICO civil action complaint stating that in furtherance of allegedly fraudulent tax shelter scheme, defendants used or caused to be used the telephone on numerous occasions and thereby violated wire fraud statute would be dismissed, where complaint nowhere gave any details about purported telephone calls, such as approximately when they were made, for what purpose, or who was called, and there was no allegation that telephone calls were interstate calls. Balabanos v. North American Inv. Group, Ltd., N.D.Ill.1988, 708 F.Supp. 1488 . Federal Civil Procedure 1811

Mail and wire fraud violations, when treated by plaintiff as “predicate act,” under civil provision of RICO statute, must be pleaded with specificity and particularity required for all fraud claims. Sendar Co., Inc. v. Mega- ware Inc., S.D.N.Y.1989, 705 F.Supp. 159. Federal Civil Procedure 636

RICO complaint based on mail or wire fraud alleged fraud with sufficient particularity, by setting out scheme to defraud explicitly and alleging how mails and interstate wires were used in furtherance of scheme; failure to

state dates and times of receipt of alleged kickbacks was not fatal, as defendants had been appraised of nature of action against them. Georgia Gulf Corp. v. Ward, N.D.Ga.1987, 701 F.Supp. 1556. Federal Civil Procedure 636

To satisfy the particularity requirements of pleading fraud, where violation of mail and wire fraud statutes are alleged as predicate acts of RICO claim and there are allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, it must be alleged with particularity how particular mailing or transaction furthered fraudulent scheme, the relevant acts of each defendant including facts constituting scienter, and an explanation of each particular defendant's duty to plaintiff. Celpaco, Inc. v. MD Papierfabriken, D.Conn.1988, 686 F.Supp. 983. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Plaintiffs who alleged mail fraud as one of the predicate acts against accounting firm accused of RICO violation but who failed to specifically plead the mail fraud violations did not allege any violation of RICO with the required particularity. Farlow v. Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co., W.D.Okla.1987, 666 F.Supp. 1500. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Instances of wire fraud alleged in private civil RICO complaint lacked necessary specificity and particularity to support showing of probable cause of intent to defraud, where telexes attached to complaint evidenced normal transaction between two corporations of exchange of capital for stock, without allegation of any fact that would lead to alleged conclusion that transactions were sham since corporation receiving stock received nothing for its money, there was no allegation of facts to show how wire transfers of funds that were allegedly made in order to effectuate unlawful scheme advanced scheme, and complaint allegations that to effectuate fraudulent scheme defendants used, or caused to be used, telephones, telexes, and wire transfers on numerous other occasions, contained no precise dates, but stated dates would be discovered in course of discovery. Banco de Desarrollo Agro- pecuario, S.A. v. Gibbs, S.D.Fla.1986, 640 F.Supp. 1168. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations complaint which was filed by Federal Deposit Insurance Cor- poration as liquidating agent of bank with security interest in corporation's stock, which challenged sale of corporation's assets, which alleged fraudulent transaction, subsequent distribution of assets, respective roles played by each party in transaction, concealment, and basic outline of scheme to defraud, required further amendment to reflect which parties did what with respect to predicate acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, and securities fraud, but otherwise satisfied particularity requirements for pleading racketeering violation based on predicate acts for pattern of racketeering activity by enterprise that affected interstate commerce. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Kerr, W.D.N.C.1986, 637 F.Supp. 828. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Civil RICO complaint, describing scheme to defraud and defendants' conduct in furtherance of that scheme, alleging specific acts which constituted securities fraud and identifying perpetrators of the acts, adequately informing defendants which federal securities laws were alleged to have been violated and how they were allegedly violated, and giving sufficient detail concerning acts of wire and mail fraud, satisfied requirement that fraud be pled with particularity and notice-pleading philosophy of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Pandick, Inc. v. Rooney, N.D.Ill.1986, 632 F.Supp. 1430. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Automobile dealer failed to meet particularity requirements of Federal Civil Rule 9(b) in alleging Racketeer In-

fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim against Japanese automobile manufacturer and other dealers, based on acts of mail and wire fraud in submission and acceptance of false allocation cards and bribery and extortion in connection with acceptance and filing of false orders. Gregoris Motors v. Nissan Motor Corp. In USA, E.D.N.Y.1986, 630 F.Supp. 902. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Lender's complaint against bank was insufficient to state a claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968, based upon predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, as allegations of fraud did not specify dates or contents of alleged mail and wire transmissions and otherwise did not show with sufficient particularity the indictability of bank and other defendants. Grant v. Union Bank, D.Utah 1986, 629 F.Supp. 570. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Plaintiff filing civil suit under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and relying upon mail fraud as alleged racketeering activity failed to plead mail fraud with particularity by stating time, place, and contents of purported false representations as well as what in each of statements were false and misleading and factual basis for believing defendant acted with intent to defraud; thus, complaint would be dismissed. Doxie v. Ford Motor Credit Co., S.D.Ga.1984, 603 F.Supp. 624. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Where plaintiffs alleging mail and wire fraud as predicate acts under this chapter complaint set forth when various mailings occurred, their contents, nature of misrepresentations made, to whom they were sent, and, at least in several instances, by whom they were forwarded, allegation met specificity requirement of rule 9(b), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Title 28, governing fraud pleadings, even though complaint did not provide detail concerning instances of wire fraud and relied to some extent upon pleadings based upon information and belief. Rich-Taubman Associates v. Stamford Restaurant Operating Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1984, 587 F.Supp. 875. Federal Civil Procedure 636

To plead mail and wire fraud as predicate acts of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, complaint must allege with particularity participation in scheme to defraud and knowing use of interstate mails and interstate wires to further the scheme and must delineate specifics of each purported use of mail and wires, including time, place, speaker, and content of alleged fraudulent misrepresentations as well as manner in which misrepresentations were fraudulent. Browning Ave. Realty Corp. v. Rosenshein, S.D.N.Y.1992, 142 F.R.D. 85. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Employer's racketeering complaint against former employees and their companies failed to satisfy particularity requirement for pleading mail and wire fraud; complaint did not allege what confidential information or trade secrets were misappropriated, by whom information or secrets were misappropriated, how information or secrets were misappropriated, or when information or secrets were misappropriated; and complaint asserted certain facts upon information and belief without giving basis for information and belief. Duracell Inc. v. SW Consultants, Inc., N.D.Ga.1989, 126 F.R.D. 571. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Mail and wire fraud, which were alleged as predicate acts for claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) against Chapter 11 debtors, were not pleaded with sufficient particularity, where pleadings were made only on “information and belief,” virtually no facts were alleged to support plaintiff's beliefs,

and plaintiff did not specify precise role that each debtor played in alleged scheme to defraud. In re Windsor Plumbing Supply Co., Inc., Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y.1994, 170 B.R. 503. Federal Civil Procedure 636

236. ---- Statutory provision, particularity and specificity, complaint

Residential building contractor's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) allegations, against various defendants involved in the financing of contractor's purchase of three residential lots, lacked required particularity, as it was impossible to determine exactly how defendants allegedly violated RICO. Jones v. Luthi, D.S.C.2008, 586 F.Supp.2d 595, affirmed 324 Fed.Appx. 253, 2009 WL 1144147. Federal Civil Proced- ure 636

Failure to plead specific statutory subsection may alone constitute grounds to dismiss Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint, because it fails to inform defendants of unlawful conduct in which they allegedly engaged; pleading specific subsection is important because enterprise requirements are different depending upon which subsection is allegedly violated. B.V. Optische Industrie De Oude Delft v. Holo- gic, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1995, 909 F.Supp. 162, reconsideration denied 925 F.Supp. 162. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

237. Pattern of racketeering activity, complaint--Generally

Drug manufacturer sufficiently alleged pattern of racketeering by other manufacturers, their employees, and Food and Drug Administration employees with similar objective of expediting abbreviated new generic drug applications for self-gain to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), though allegations were insufficient to support claim of single, global pattern of racketeering activity with common goal of profiting illegally at manufacturer's expense. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Matkari, C.A.4 (Md.) 1993, 7 F.3d 1130, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1533, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1307, 510 U.S. 1197, 127 L.Ed.2d 658. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Physician and his clinic failed to plead “pattern of racketeering activity” necessary to state civil Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against insurer, its counsel, and its litigation consultant, even though physician alleged that predicate acts of mail fraud might be related to overall scheme of denying insureds' claims for unconventional cancer treatment at clinic and putting clinic out of business; all of predicate acts took place during course of litigation between insurer and physician, which had ended. In re Burzynski, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1993, 989 F.2d 733. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Plumbing contractor made insufficient allegations of a pattern of racketeering activity to state a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against a bank and a loan officer for their alleged scheme of defrauding contractors through the vehicle of loan defaults and subsequent repossession of secured collateral. Terry A. Lambert Plumbing, Inc. v. Western Sec. Bank, C.A.8 (Neb.) 1991, 934 F.2d 976, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Fact that “pattern” is alleged does not necessarily satisfy pleading requirements of RICO statute. U.S. Textiles,

Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1990, 911 F.2d 1261. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Alleged investment fraud scheme which allegedly was carried out by several individuals and two separate entities, oil company and bank, and which involved repetition of similar misrepresentations to more than 20 investors, constituted “pattern” of fraudulent activity sufficient for claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat. State, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1987, 832 F.2d 36. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Complaint alleging that defendants, knowing that oil wholesaler's operator was psychologically incapacitated and desiring to injure their competitors by getting them to extend credit to wholesaler that wholesaler could not repay, inveigled wholesaler's operator into selling oil to defendants below wholesaler's cost, and that defendants used mails and telephone for purpose of executing alleged scheme adequately alleged “pattern of racketeering activity” to state claim under this chapter notwithstanding that defendants' contract was with wholesaler rather than wholesaler's operator herself. Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Companies, Inc., C.A.7 (Wis.) 1984, 727 F.2d 648. Commerce 80

Cotton farmers' allegation that chief executive officer (CEO) and president of agricultural marketing cooperative, who was also the long-time chief financial officer (CFO), “directed the commission of and/or aided and abetted the commission of two or more acts of racketeering activity,” was sufficient to allege that CEO had controlled cooperative, as an element to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim under provision prohibiting any person from conducting the affairs of an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce through pattern of racketeering activity. Andrews Farms v. Calcot, Ltd., E.D.Cal.2007, 527 F.Supp.2d 1239. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Investors who sued ambulance services, affiliates and officers, alleging that they were induced to invest through series of misrepresentations, failed to aver that defendants received any income derived from pattern of racketeering activity to use or invest, as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); although complaint averred that defendants used and invested income derived from pattern of racketeering activity in one or more interstate enterprises, it did not identify entity in which defendants invested racketeering income separate and apart from purported racketeering enterprise. DeFazio v. Wallis, E.D.N.Y.2007, 500 F.Supp.2d 197. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Former campaign treasurer who brought action against law firm and attorneys, stemming from their purported failure to disclose source of campaign funds, adequately alleged pattern of racketeering activity, as required to establish standing to bring claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where complaint averred series of steps in fraudulent campaign contribution reporting, which provided foundation for obstruction of Federal Election Commission (FEC) investigation. Clark v. Stipe Law Firm, L.L.P., W.D.Okla.2004, 320 F.Supp.2d 1207. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Allegations by banking corporation were sufficient to allege requisite pattern of racketeering activity on part of attorneys who had advised corporation in connection with acquisition of bank, which later gave rise to criminal

charges, based on acts of wire and mail fraud by attorneys, and thus to state civil Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; corporation alleged with specificity various acts of wire and mail fraud by attorneys that were part of long-term association for criminal purposes and were neither isolated events nor sporadic activity, and which involved injury to multiple victims. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. v. Clif- ford, D.D.C.1997, 964 F.Supp. 468. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Patient who had been treated for bulimia and other disorders by psychologist and counselor failed to establish pattern of racketeering activity on part of psychologist, counselor, and their employer, as required to recover in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action; complaint failed to identify either enterprise or persons engaged in unlawful conduct, and also failed to indicate specific provisions of RICO statute that had been violated, provide list of responsible defendants, and describe in detail pattern of racketeering activity. Lujan v. Mansmann, E.D.Pa.1997, 956 F.Supp. 1218. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Video store franchisee alleged pattern of racketeering activity against franchisors based on mail and wire fraud predicate acts that continued after franchise relationship was terminated; pattern was established by allegations of fraudulent mailings and telephone conversations occurring over period of several years and separate schemes against plaintiffs and other franchisees that caused distinct injuries. Dudley Enterprises, Inc. v. Palmer Corp., N.D.Ill.1993, 832 F.Supp. 221. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Heating contractor failed to state cause of action against customers and other contractors who filed complaints against contractor with North Carolina State Board of Examiners of Plumbing, Heating and Fire Sprinkler Con- tractors under civil penalty provisions of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); complaint failed to allege requisite racketeering activity or existence of pattern of racketeering activity. Pippen v. Scales, M.D.N.C.1993, 822 F.Supp. 305, affirmed 30 F.3d 130. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 70; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Borrower sufficiently alleged pattern of racketeering activity to support civil RICO claim against bank which lent her money for automobile purchase by claiming that bank used numerous insurance agents and numerous automobile dealers to defraud numerous customers of their right to notice of defenses they had under federal law against bank's collection of loans on automobile transactions that went bad. Brown v. LaSalle Northwest Nat. Bank, N.D.Ill.1993, 820 F.Supp. 1078. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

In determining whether pattern of racketeering activity has been adequately pled, court must initially consider whether plaintiff can show both that predicate acts of racketeering are related and that the amount to threat of continued criminal activity. Marrazzo v. Bucks County Bank and Trust Co., E.D.Pa.1993, 814 F.Supp. 437. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Attorney and adoption agency which she had created failed to adequately allege a pattern of racketeering activity by law firm, attorney, and another association which provided financial aid to mothers giving up children for adoption and for children; acts alleged were either not predicate acts, were not committed in furtherance of a

scheme, or were mere conclusory allegations. Broyles v. Wilson, M.D.La.1993, 812 F.Supp. 651, affirmed 3 F.3d 439. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

In order to prove a pattern of racketeering activity, a plaintiff asserting a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim must show that predicate acts making up the pattern were related either to one another or to an external event or circumstance, and that there was sufficient continuity or threat of continuity among the predicate acts, in order to satisfy RICO's pattern requirements. Koal Industries Corp. v. Asland, S.A., S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 1143. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Pattern requirement's sub-elements of continuity and relationship are primarily and emphatically fact-bound inquiries, and “continuity” and “relatedness” may even be proven by facts external to racketeering acts themselves; thus, only rarely will RICO complaint on its face fail to allege the sub-elements with such sufficiency that it will appear beyond doubt plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114 . Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

RICO claim brought by corporation against another corporation which was attempting to acquire substantially all of its assets failed to allege requisite pattern of racketeering activity; complaint essentially alleged that defendant failed to purchase plaintiff's stock pursuant to oral agreement which transferred possession and control of corporation to defendants, an allegation which does not state a RICO cause of action. Pagnotti Enterprises, Inc. v. Beltrami, M.D.Pa.1992, 787 F.Supp. 440. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Taxpayers failed to allege sufficient pattern of racketeering activity to state civil claims under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against Internal Revenue Service (IRS) employees for allegedly falsifying documents and thereby enabling IRS to extort money, even assuming claim lay against federal officials for official misconduct, where Tax Court, in underlying tax litigation, upheld with minimal adjustments tax assessments imposed against taxpayers and determined there was no falsification of documents. Hefti v. Mc- Grath, E.D.Mo.1992, 784 F.Supp. 1426, amended on reconsideration. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 25

Complaint adequately alleged “pattern of racketeering activity” on part of members of alleged Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise comprised of labor organization, its constituent local unions, and its benefit trust funds; complaint alleged pattern of payoffs to organization and local union officials and continuing extortion of union members' rights. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 738. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Investor failed to state cause of action against account representative and brokerage firms for violation of Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); investor failed to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. Cooperativa Ahorro y Credito Aguada v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., D.Puerto Rico 1991, 777 F.Supp. 153 , reconsideration denied 799 F.Supp. 261, reversed 993 F.2d 269, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 1792, 514 U.S. 1082, 131 L.Ed.2d 720, on remand 942 F.Supp. 735. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz-

ations 72

Allegations of investors in condominium development concerning savings and loan association's alleged concealment of bad loan used to finance development in connection with association's attempt to convert to stock savings bank met test of “continuity plus relationship” necessary to establish pattern of racketeering activity in support of investors' civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against bank; investors alleged there were multiple schemes, one to defraud them into purchasing partnership interest in the development and the other to defraud the public into buying bank stock through fraudulent concealment of problem loan. Panna v. Firstrust Sav. Bank, D.N.J.1991, 760 F.Supp. 432. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 28

Chemical corporation's complaint against competitor under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) failed to satisfy pattern requirement, as it did not establish that racketeering activity constituted competitor's regular way of doing business, despite allegation that competitor had committed wrongs against other competitors which were comparable to alleged misappropriation of chemical corporation's trade secret; allegations of comparable wrongs did not suggest that competitor had carried stolen product samples across state lines or used mails or telephone in execution of scheme to defraud other competitors. R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v. Nalco Chemical Co., N.D.Ill.1990, 757 F.Supp. 1499. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegations in plaintiff's complaint, that defendant and one of plaintiff's employees had participated in scheme to remove merchandise from plaintiff's warehouse and to sell it interstate commerce, did not allege threat of continued racketeering activity sufficient to satisfy RICO “pattern” requirement; RICO scheme appeared to depend on employee's continued employment with plaintiff, a fact which appeared extremely unlikely in light of allegations in complaint. Executive Photo, Inc. v. Norrell, S.D.N.Y.1991, 756 F.Supp. 798. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

In securities fraud case, investor's federal and Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims were sufficient even though investor failed to specifically allege existence of “pattern of racketeering activity” and “enterprise.” Knight v. E.F. Hutton and Co., Inc., M.D.Fla.1990, 750 F.Supp. 1109. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Complaint brought on behalf of bankruptcy estate of corporation alleging acts of profiteering and self-dealing by those who sold securities in the corporation alleged acts which shared sufficient continuity and relationship to

establish the existence of a pattern of racketeering activity for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) purposes. Insurance Consultants of America, Inc., Employee Pension Plan v. Southeastern Ins. Group, Inc., D.N.J.1990, 746 F.Supp. 390. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

In order to state a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, plaintiff must plead a basis from which to infer that alleged acts of racketeering activity were neither isolated nor sporadic. Griffin v. McNiff, S.D.N.Y.1990, 744 F.Supp. 1237, affirmed 996 F.2d 303. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 72

Investors in partnership sufficiently pleaded relationship and continuity and, thus, sufficiently pleaded pattern of racketeering, assuming predicate acts were sufficiently pled, with respect to law firm which prepared legal opinions which appeared in offering memoranda of partnerships, promoter of partnerships, principal in promoter, broker of interests in the partnership, patentee for new oil reclamation process and licensor of oil reclamation by alleging distribution of materials relating to partnerships and sale of interests to investors and that those persons acting in consort to detriment of investors over a period of years. Landy v. Mitchell Petroleum Technology Corp., S.D.N.Y.1990, 734 F.Supp. 608. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

“Pattern” is essential element of claim of both RICO claim and RICO conspiracy to conduct enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity. Pyramid Securities, Ltd. v. International Bank, D.D.C.1989, 726 F.Supp. 1377, affirmed 924 F.2d 1114, 288 U.S.App.D.C. 157, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 85, 502 U.S. 822, 116 L.Ed.2d 57. Conspiracy 28(3); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Defendant auto leasing company's relationship to financial institutions utilized by it in collecting rental fees, that were allegedly fraudulently understated to plaintiff auto leasing customers in manner involving wire or mail fraud, was not participation in or conduct of financial enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity and thus would not support RICO claim; alleged utilization by leasing company of financial institution in allegedly carrying out racketeering activity failed because affairs of credit card companies or banking institutions could not be viewed as being conducted through pattern of racketeering activity on basis of claim. Penn v. Alamo Rent- A-Car, Inc., E.D.Pa.1989, 725 F.Supp. 1339. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Franchisees sufficiently alleged continuity, relationship, and hence a pattern of racketeering activity, to maintain civil RICO claim against franchisor; in addition to alleging multiple acts committed against franchisees over several years, franchisees alleged that franchisors' fraudulent acts and nondisclosures continued as to other franchisees. Reeder v. Kermit Johnson, Alphagraphics, Inc., D.Utah 1989, 723 F.Supp. 1428. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Civil RICO complaint must set forth two or more acts of racketeering which have sufficient interrelationship and sufficient continuity or threat of continuity to constitute pattern. West Mountain Sales, Inc. v. Logan Mfg. Co., N.D.N.Y.1989, 718 F.Supp. 1084. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Allegations that defendants wrongfully diverted plaintiff's business clients and employees and used plaintiff's

trucks for defendants' own deliveries were sufficient to establish pattern of racketeering activity for purposes of civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Midwest Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz, N.D.Ill.1989, 716 F.Supp. 1087, affirmed 976 F.2d 1016. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Chiropractor alleged facts constituting “pattern” of racketeering activity under RICO by asserting insurer was defrauding him through denials of claims; each claims denial was distinct occurrence and scheme was ongoing. Bumgarner v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., D.Kan.1988, 716 F.Supp. 493. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Investor who alleged instances of securities, mail, and wire fraud by entity with which plaintiff investor claimed defendant was associated within meaning of RICO provision had sufficiently alleged facts which would establish pattern of racketeering activity to state civil RICO claim. King v. Gandolfo, M.D.Fla.1989, 714 F.Supp. 1180. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 32

Utility company, in bringing RICO claim against supplier of pressure containment system designed for use in company's nuclear power station, alleging violation of RICO provision prohibiting any person employed by or associated with enterprise from conducting or participating in conduct of enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity, sufficiently alleged RICO pattern of racketeering activity; company set forth several incidents, occurring over number of years, of supplier's allegedly fraudulent mail and wire communications concerning its pressure containment systems, each of which were related in that they all referred to supplier's alleged cover-up of problems with hydrodynamic forces. Long Island Lighting Co. v. General Elec. Co., E.D.N.Y.1989, 712 F.Supp. 292. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act complaint failed to adequately plead “pattern” requirement; plaintiff merely alleged that 1,503 separate acts of fraud were committed by brokerage firm and that there was a likelihood that other accounts would be churned because firm's agent, who handled plaintiff's account, was still employed by firm. Woodruff v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., D.Neb.1989, 709 F.Supp. 181. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Complaint which alleged a scheme involving the divestiture of corporation stock at inflated prices contemporan- eously with the waste of company assets did not adequately allege a RICO pattern of racketeering or conspiracy violation. Bernstein v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1988, 702 F.Supp. 962, vacated in part 714 F.Supp. 1285. Conspiracy 18; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Maker of note sufficiently alleged pattern of racketeering activity for purposes of civil RICO claim against bank official, where maker alleged that official asked him to execute note as favor in order to satisfy bank examiners, told him that his obligations would later be satisfied without personal liability to him, subsequently disregarded those statements and informed him that he was personally liable on note, made erroneous entries in bank records to corroborate assertion of personal liability, and followed this same practice with respect to two other persons. Meyer v. First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Dickinson, D.N.D.1987, 698 F.Supp. 798. Racketeer Influenced And

Corrupt Organizations 27

For purposes of motion to dismiss, investors' allegations that brokerage firm and broker invested income derived from their racketeering activity in brokerage firm did not state RICO claim for maintaining interest in enterprise, absent showing that racketeering activities were cause in fact of acquisition or maintenance of interest allegedly obtained through pattern of racketeering activity. Capalbo v. PaineWebber, Inc., N.D.Ill.1988, 694 F.Supp. 1315 . Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Investor could not maintain action against broker and broker's representative and under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act section making it unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain any interest in or control over any enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce; investor failed to allege that either broker or representative had, through a pattern of racketeering, acquired or maintained control of broker and even if investor so alleged, he would not have had standing to sue since he would not suffer any injury as a result of violation. Leonard v. Shearson Lehman/American Exp. Inc., E.D.Pa.1988, 687 F.Supp. 177. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 16

Allegations that affiliated accounting firms issued several fraudulent reports on corporation's financial statements, in violation of § 10b, and used mails in preparing and disseminating such statements, in furtherance of ongoing scheme to defraud investors, were sufficient to plead “pattern of racketeering activity,” for purposes of civil RICO claim. Department of Economic Development v. Arthur Andersen & Co. (U.S.A.), S.D.N.Y.1988, 683 F.Supp. 1463. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Multiple acts of mail frauds alleged in several jurisdictions were sufficient to constitute a “pattern” of racketeering activity for a civil RICO claim, in light of the continuity and nature of the alleged relationship between the RICO defendants and an insolvent insurer. State of N.C. ex rel. Long v. Alexander & Alexander Services, Inc., E.D.N.C.1988, 680 F.Supp. 746. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Guarantor of debts of bankrupt corporation failed to state a claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act against Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation since guarantor failed to allege that “income” was used to acquire an “interest” in or control of an “enterprise” and made no allegation of a “pattern of racketeering activity” or an “enterprise” in his RICO counterclaim to FDIC's action on the guaranty. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago v. Windham, E.D.Tex.1987, 668 F.Supp. 578, reconsideration denied 685 F.Supp. 152. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 16

Condominium purchaser alleged sufficient predicate acts to constitute a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act action; there was initial telephone call to purchaser to give him condominium unit, purpose of alleged gift was to assure other purchasers from a list that purchaser had purchased unit and trusted developers, at least one person from list made purchase, and there was a second scheme to induce purchaser to purchase unit, rather than receive it as a gift, multiple misrepresentations were made with respect to that scheme, and purchaser suffered damages. Hodges v. H & R Investments, Ltd., N.D.Miss.1987, 668 F.Supp. 545. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Complaint satisfied pattern requirement and stated claim against manufacturer under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act by alleging two fraudulent schemes, manufacturer's efforts to market two distinct lines of products. In re Dow Co. Sarabond Products Liability Litigation, D.Colo.1987, 666 F.Supp. 1466. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

In determining whether civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act complaint is sufficient, court may consider number and variety of predicate acts, length of time over which they were alleged to be committed, number of victims, whether multiple schemes are alleged, and nature and diversity of injuries alleged to determine whether continuity plus relationship standard has been met. Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v. Integ- rated Resources, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1987, 662 F.Supp. 1499. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Allegations that directors of saving and loan association established five limited partnerships and one general partnership, authorized and/or accepted several allegedly illegal personal loans, paid themselves extravagant fees and salaries, and solicited and received kickbacks stated a claim under RICO. Brandenburg v. First Mary- land Sav. and Loan, Inc., D.Md.1987, 660 F.Supp. 717, affirmed 859 F.2d 1179. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 69

Plaintiffs' allegations that bank sustained its fraud upon them over at least a year via phones, mail, and various transportation modes and that bank falsely represented itself as top priority creditor to bankruptcy court as part of single design to restructure improvidently granted construction loan sufficiently pled pattern of racketeering activity necessary to support RICO claim, based on length of time involved and number of victims targeted. Lawaetz v. Bank of Nova Scotia, D.Virgin Islands 1987, 653 F.Supp. 1278. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Complaint alleging several instances where sellers misrepresented and omitted important facts concerning corporation's financial status in order to induce buyer to purchase stock could be construed as claiming that sellers participated in an ongoing scheme to conceal corporation's tax liabilities from seller through a series of fraudulent tax filings and, as such, was sufficient to allege “pattern of racketeering activity” necessary to state a civil cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Gerson v. Rapoport, N.D.N.Y.1987, 651 F.Supp. 395. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Allegations, that officer and principal shareholder of debtor entered into agreement with others to transfer stock owned by debtor to third party so it would be safe from claims of debtor's creditors during debtor's bankruptcy proceedings, that individuals and debtor conveyed the same stock to third party which pledged stock to relieve individuals of personal liability in connection with lawsuit, and that attorney acting as counsel to law firm representing debtor and officer shareholder bribed judge before whom actions involving funds in escrow account in which creditor had security interest were pending, were sufficient to satisfy “pattern” requirement of civil RICO action by creditor against officer-principal shareholder and attorney, who were alleged to have played major roles in commission of predicate acts alleged. Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, S.D.N.Y.1986, 648 F.Supp. 17, on reargument 676 F.Supp. 496, reversed on other grounds 859 F.2d 1096, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1642, 490 U.S. 1007, 104 L.Ed.2d 158, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1643, 490 U.S. 1007, 104 L.Ed.2d 158. Racketeer Influ-

enced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Telephone conversations made by buyer during course of his transaction with seller over repair of vehicle were only incidentally connected to complained of billing scheme and, in absence of having furthered that scheme, were insufficient to meet minimal requirements for a wire fraud claim and, even if they were sufficient to meet those requirements, were insufficient to establish necessary pattern of racketeering activity to state a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Wolin v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac, Inc., N.D.Ill.1986, 636 F.Supp. 890. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31; Telecommunications 1014(8)

Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations complaint which alleged that partners used fraudulent means to set up business of operating musical theater, that partners lied as to potential profitability, that partners issued false stock, that partners employed investor and refused to pay investor, and that several separate episodes of fraudulent use of mails or wire were committed alleged multiple episodes evincing regular, ongoing course of conduct as required to state racketeering claim. Papai v. Cremosnik, N.D.Ill.1986, 635 F.Supp. 1402. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Complaint, alleging that false and misleading proxy materials were mailed to shareholders and to Securities and Exchange Commission, that fraud was committed in the filing of various statements with the Commission, and that each of these mailings and filings was done with a common purpose, sufficiently pled a “pattern” of racketeering activity to state civil RICO action. Pandick, Inc. v. Rooney, N.D.Ill.1986, 632 F.Supp. 1430. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Customer had failed to assert two predicate acts which were sufficiently related to constitute a pattern in connection with the conduct of an ongoing enterprise, as required to sustain federal or state RICO claims [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.; West's F.S.A. § 895.01 et seq.], where asserted violations which plaintiff sought to amend securities action to add were the same claims based on the same legal theories as those which had been previously asserted and dismissed for failing to state a claim, and only a single claim of misrepresentation against defendant securities brokerage remained in action. Zerman v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1986, 628 F.Supp. 1509. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Physician failed to make a showing of fraud against bank which made loans to corporation that were guaranteed by physician, and, thus, did not establish a “pattern of racketeering activity” necessary to support a civil RICO claim against bank. Rojas v. First Bank Nat. Ass'n, E.D.N.Y.1985, 613 F.Supp. 968. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

In action in which plaintiffs asserted claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act in connection with brokers' alleged “churning” of commodities accounts, allegations that brokers mailed monthly statements and other documents to plaintiffs and used telephone wires to communicate with plaintiffs supported theory that brokers committed predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, and thus plaintiff sufficiently alleged a pattern of racketeering activity. Roche v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., M.D.Pa.1984, 603 F.Supp. 1411. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegations of defendants' scheme to defraud plaintiffs by selling them investment notes in insolvent company by use of letters or mails to accomplish fraudulent scheme were sufficient to allege “pattern of racketeering” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Banowitz v. State Exchange Bank, N.D.Ill.1985, 600 F.Supp. 1466. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

To state a claim for damages under this section, a plaintiff must do more than simply allege performance of at least two predicate acts listed in this chapter within a ten-year period; plaintiff's injuries must derive from “pattern of racketeering activity” which violates this chapter rather than directly from the underlying acts which combine to constitute that pattern. Bulk Oil (ZUG) A.G. v. Sun Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1983, 583 F.Supp. 1134, affirmed 742 F.2d 1431, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 129, 469 U.S. 835, 83 L.Ed.2d 70. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Investors' allegation that defendants repeatedly made fraudulent statements concerning plaintiffs' investments in cable television companies met requirement to state claim under this chapter that defendants participated in enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, and thus investors stated cause of action for violation of section 1962(c) of this title declaring it unlawful for person employed by or associated with enterprise to conduct such enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity. Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Corp., E.D.Pa.1983, 576 F.Supp. 234. Commerce 80

Where plaintiff merely alleged against corporate defendant fraud in connection with transfer of certain corporate assets, but did not allege pattern of “racketeering” activity, plaintiff failed to state cause of action against corporation under this chapter. Friedlander v. Nims, N.D.Ga.1983, 571 F.Supp. 1188, appeal dismissed 747 F.2d 1467, affirmed 755 F.2d 810. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Insureds' allegation that insurers' and underwriter's activities in refusing to pay claims without valid reasons in order to force persons to compromise their claim for amount less than they were entitled to and that defendants' use of United States Postal Service in furtherance of that scheme amounted to “pattern of racketeering activities” as defined and prohibited by section 1962 of this title insufficiently alleged pattern of racketeering activity. Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, E.D.Mich.1983, 564 F.Supp. 352. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Complaint seeking treble damages pursuant to this section for two alleged thefts of personal jewelry by employees of carpet-cleaning service stated a claim on which relief could be granted where plaintiffs claimed that defendants engaged in a “pattern of racketeering activity” through their participation in an “enterprise,” and alleged that carpet-cleaning service and individual defendants operated as organized criminal gang and conspired to gain entry to apartments as ostensible carpet cleaners so that they could steal jewelry. Gitterman v. Vitoulis, S.D.N.Y.1982, 564 F.Supp. 46. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Since use of the mails in the establishment and operation of certain company, stock purchase, and the payment of excessive salaries may well have been an integral part of defendants' scheme to defraud, there was alleged, for the time being, in the absence of a record, a sufficient “pattern of racketeering activity” in suit under this chapter seeking recovery of damages resulting from allegedly fraudulent transactions involving the various de-

fendants. D'Iorio v. Adonizio, M.D.Pa.1982, 554 F.Supp. 222. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Element of violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) that a defendant must conduct or participate in the conduct of enterprise's affairs “through a pattern of racketeering activity” requires the pleading to allege a substantial nexus between the affairs of the enterprise and the pattern of racketeering activity. Farmers & Merchants Nat. Bank v. San Clemente Financial Group Securities, Inc., D.N.J.1997, 174 F.R.D. 572. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

In general, to plead violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), complaint must allege defendant's conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, and “pattern of racketeering activity” consists of at least two predicate racketeering acts committed within ten-year period, with the acts being indictable under any of several federal and state laws, and the two predicate acts are necessary but not sufficient to allege a violation, as the “pattern” requirement means that the predicate acts must be related and must amount to or otherwise constitute threat of continuing racketeering activity. Zahran v. National Guardian Life Ins. Co., N.D.Ill.1994, 157 F.R.D. 443. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

To adequately plead pattern of racketeering activity, complaint should state each alleged RICO predicate act by defendant, state specific statutory section violated, state how predicate acts in combination satisfy relatedness and continuity requirements, allege either series of related acts extended over substantial period of time or related predicate act involving distinct threat of long-term activity, include time, place and how pattern of acts occurred, and state how mail or wire fraud played integral role in scheme. O'Rear v. American Family Life Assur. Co., M.D.Fla.1991, 139 F.R.D. 418. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Consumers who brought action against business services corporation, dealers and infomercial actor, stemming from leasing of e-commerce services and products, failed properly to allege that defendants engaged in pattern of racketeering activity, as required to maintain RICO claim; incoherence of pleading with respect to nature of predicate acts alleged against defendants precluded finding that pattern had in fact been alleged. Zito v. Leasecomm Corp., S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 22251352, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 72

238. ---- Closed ended scheme, pattern of racketeering activity, complaint

Allegation of eleven month pattern of racketeering lasting at most from time defendants allegedly induced plaintiff to accept promissory note, until sale of corporate defendant to company controlled by another defendant, was insufficient to show closed-ended pattern of racketeering activity, and thus plaintiff failed to support its claim that defendants violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in scheme to loot corporate defendant's assets to frustrate plaintiff's collection of promissory note. GICC Capital Corp. v. Technology Finance Group, Inc., C.A.2 (Conn.) 1995, 67 F.3d 463, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 2547, 518 U.S. 1017, 135 L.Ed.2d 1067. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Complaint charging fraud under vendor agreement for purchase and lease of electronic credit card processing equipment failed to allege closed-ended continuity sufficient to satisfy pattern requirement for stating claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where alleged predicate acts took place over time span of less than nine months, very few acts of mail or wire fraud were alleged, only one scheme was alleged, and alleged injuries were not distinct. Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Services, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1994, 20 F.3d 771. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint's failure to allege legally-sufficient racketeering acts lasting for more than four months by precluded licensor, which alleged a scheme to deprive it of the intangible right of honest services from its licensing agent through an agreement calling for licensing agent to act on licensees' behalf in obtaining licenses from licensor, from alleging substantive RICO cause of action based on closed-ended continuity. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Jakks Pacific, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2007, 530 F.Supp.2d 486, affirmed 328 Fed.Appx. 695, 2009 WL 1391807. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 29

Plaintiff home improvement company satisfied requirement of pleading closed-ended continuity, for purposes of continuity requirement for a pattern of racketeering activity, as element of claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); company alleged that in 17-month period in which one defendant served as its independent-contractor salesman, the salesman and other defendants defrauded company and engaged in broader scheme to defraud company's customers, which scheme involved numerous incidents and victims. SKS Constructors, Inc. v. Drinkwine, E.D.N.Y.2006, 458 F.Supp.2d 68. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 29

Investor that brought action to recover money it paid to purchase bank note that later proved non-existent sufficiently alleged “closed-ended” pattern of racketeering in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO); complaint alleged that defendants' continuing misrepresentations allowed them to effect misappropriations of investor's assets and lulled investors into not seeking return of their money, predicate acts alleged were part of complex scheme involving many participants, and those acts took place over course of more than two years. Local 875 I.B.T. Pension Fund v. Pollack, E.D.N.Y.1998, 992 F.Supp. 545. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Partners in real estate partnership failed to allege closed-ended pattern of racketeering activity necessary to state civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against former partner and former partner's corporations; partners alleged that defendants filed four fraudulent tax returns on behalf of two partnerships, but alleged only four incidents which occurred over three-year period, and alleged scheme had single, wrongful narrow goal and did not threaten future activity. Feirstein v. Nanbar Realty Corp., S.D.N.Y.1997, 963 F.Supp. 254. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Conduct occurring over closed end period of four months was insufficient to establish continuity among predicate acts, as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Manning v. Stig- ger, E.D.Ky.1996, 919 F.Supp. 249. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Complaint alleging that general partner and sales agent for limited partnerships organized for purpose of investing in certain real estate projects engaged in kickback scheme was insufficient to provide basis for deciding that scheme would meet RICO's closed-ended continuity requirement for purposes of divining pattern of racketeering activity under RICO. Levine v. Prudential Bache Properties, Inc., N.D.Ill.1994, 855 F.Supp. 924. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Allegation of threat of future criminal activity on part of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Practices Act (RICO) defendants was not necessary where plaintiff pled existence of closed end scheme of repeated conduct over ten-month period. Farberware, Inc. v. Groben, S.D.N.Y.1991, 764 F.Supp. 296. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegations of a single, closed-ended offering of securities in a company, although affecting numerous individuals and consisting of numerous predicate acts, did not allege a pattern of racketeering for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Insurance Consultants of America, Inc., Employee Pension Plan v. Southeastern Ins. Group, Inc., D.N.J.1990, 746 F.Supp. 390. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 72

239. ---- Continuity, pattern of racketeering activity, complaint

Minority shareholders' claim that company's directors and lawyers engaged in single scheme to accomplish the discrete goal of transferring company's assets to another corporation failed to allege continuity, as required to satisfy the pattern requirement for a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Bixler v. Foster, C.A.10 (N.M.) 2010, 596 F.3d 751. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Allegations of scheme to loot corporate defendant's assets to frustrate plaintiff's collection of promissory note, that defendants would have continued to loot corporate defendant if not for fact that all available funds had already been looted, and that another defendant would have continued to transfer money overseas had plaintiff not commenced litigation were not sufficient to plead “open-ended” pattern of racketeering activity for Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims; plaintiff did not allege that nature of defendants' conduct itself gave rise to threat of continuity, alleged scheme was inherently terminable, and allegation as to overseas transfer of money was entirely speculative. GICC Capital Corp. v. Technology Finance Group, Inc., C.A.2 (Conn.) 1995, 67 F.3d 463, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 2547, 518 U.S. 1017, 135 L.Ed.2d 1067. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

In connection with claim that defendants violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in scheme to loot corporate defendant's assets to frustrate plaintiff's collection of promissory note, plaintiff's allegation that transfer of corporate defendant's subsidiary to holding company for no consideration, without disclosing it to plaintiff prior to plaintiff's acceptance of promissory note, was insufficient to plead violations of mail and wire fraud statutes, as required to support allegation of closed-ended continuity of racketeering activity. GICC Capital Corp. v. Technology Finance Group, Inc., C.A.2 (Conn.) 1995, 67 F.3d 463, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 2547, 518 U.S. 1017, 135 L.Ed.2d 1067. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Corporation's allegations against its former officers under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), failed to satisfy open-ended form of continuity requirement, even though plaintiffs alleged that defendants' conduct involved acts of mail fraud and wire fraud, and cause false truck weight tickets to be made and sent by telecopy; none of the defendants were alleged to have been involved in specific kickback episode, no dates were given, no acts were specified from which it could be inferred that the mails or interstate communications were involved, and generally allegations that officer was involved in series of kickbacks were not pled with the particularity required by Rule of Civil Procedure regarding allegations of fraud and mistake. Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1995, 65 F.3d 1523. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Alleged single fraudulent scheme by contractor to misrepresent guaranteed price in building contract and later to extort higher price from project owner, lasting only 17 months, was insufficient to show “continuity” required for pattern of racketeering activity and, consequently, project owner failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) cause of action against contractor. Vemco, Inc. v. Camardella, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1994, 23 F.3d 129, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 579, 513 U.S. 1017, 130 L.Ed.2d 495. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Borrower failed to allege requisite “pattern of racketeering activity” necessary to state claim against bank under RICO for bank's use of loan proceeds to offset past due amount on prior loans; although borrower alleged that bank had promised not to use proceeds of new loans for offset, borrower failed to show that any alleged predicate racketeering activities amounted to proposed threat of continued criminal activity. Thornton v. First State Bank of Joplin, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1993, 4 F.3d 650. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegation of single act in which securities fraud lasted over a period of a few months did not satisfy continuity requirement of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Miller v. Gain Financial, Inc., C.A.7 (Ind.) 1993, 995 F.2d 706. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Developer's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint failed to allege that general contractor engaged in continuing criminal activity and thus failed to state a RICO claim; contractor's diversion of funds intended for payment to subcontractors occurred over a six-month period and threatened no future criminal conduct and was nothing more than an “ordinary” scheme to defraud. 420 East Ohio Ltd. Partnership v. Cocose, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 980 F.2d 1122. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Company which alleged that defendants engaged in fraudulent scheme to divert customers and employees away from it in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) failed to satisfy “continuity” prong of pattern requirement; effort to divert customers and employees was a one-shot scheme that lasted at most, nine months, and scheme had none of the trappings of a long-term criminal operation that carried with it a threat to society. Midwest Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 976 F.2d 1016. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Claim by religious organization that attorneys, who successfully represented party in tort action against church, and expert witnesses who testified on that party's behalf, violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) by obtaining religious materials to prosecute state case and threatening to reveal that confiden-

tial information for litigation leverage, while meeting RICO relatedness requirement, did not satisfy “continuity” requirement or show required pattern of racketeering activity; only goal was successful prosecution of suit so there could be no threat of activity continuing beyond completion of that suit. Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1992, 971 F.2d 364. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Complaint which alleged that first fraudulent conduct by developers directed at RICO plaintiff occurred in Janu- ary and that the last acts took place in the summer months of the same year did not meet the continuity requirement for RICO claim; fraudulent inducements and extortion which was allegedly perpetrated against him was not conduct which, by its nature, demonstrated a threat of indefinite proper activity and was not shown to be a normal way of doing business for the defendants. Vild v. Visconsi, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1992, 956 F.2d 560, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 99, 506 U.S. 832, 121 L.Ed.2d 59. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 29

Even if Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint contained more specificity regarding time, place, and contents of allegedly fraudulent mail and wire communications, complaint failed to adequately allege pattern of racketeering activity; complaint described two sets of transactions stemming from formation of joint ventures which were allegedly part of scheme to defraud involving 1986 property acquisitions in New York and 1988 property swap in which Texas properties were conveyed, but two largely distinct groups of participants were involved in those two sets of transactions and transactions were not shown to be continued criminal activity. Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp., C.A.1 (Mass.) 1991, 942 F.2d 34. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegations of complaint failed to satisfy continuity prong of RICO's pattern requirement; actions alleged were narrowly directed toward single fraudulent goal, involved single perpetrator, and only one set of victims. Menasco, Inc. v. Wasserman, C.A.4 (Md.) 1989, 886 F.2d 681. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Allegations that civil RICO defendants involved in converting apartment complex to condominiums mailed fraudulent documents to thousands of persons and that there was reason to believe that similarly fraudulent mailings would be made over an additional period of years were sufficient to allege a RICO “pattern”; amended complaint contained sufficient allegations to reveal continuity or the threat of continuity and set forth acts that could not be deemed isolated or sporadic as a matter of law. Beauford v. Helmsley, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1989, 865 F.2d 1386, vacated on other grounds 109 S.Ct. 3236, 492 U.S. 914, 106 L.Ed.2d 584, on remand 893 F.2d 1433. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Franchisee's allegations against franchisor, corporation which acquired franchisor, and acquiring corporation's parent, failed to state RICO cause of action as matter of law because pleadings did not assert that corporate defendants posed continuous threat as RICO persons; franchisee alleged as pattern of racketeering activity nothing more than numerous predicate acts which were necessary segments of otherwise lawful commercial endeavor, and claim that method of franchise termination fraudulently violated contractual rights or legal duties did not plead RICO violation. Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., C.A.5 (La.) 1988, 855 F.2d 241, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1531, 489 U.S. 1079, 103 L.Ed.2d 836. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations

Residential building contractor presented no evidence of defendants' ongoing way of doing business, as required to demonstrate continuity and establish a pattern of racketeering activity in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against defendants involved in the financing of and construction on contractor's purchase of three residential lots. Jones v. Luthi, D.S.C.2008, 586 F.Supp.2d 595, affirmed 324 Fed.Appx. 253, 2009 WL 1144147. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Purchasers bringing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim based on alleged scheme to defraud them in connection with sale of commercial real property failed to satisfy “continuity” requirement for pattern of racketeering activity through closed-ended pattern, even though time period from first defendant's acquisition of subject property to time tenants stopped paying rent after plaintiffs' purchase was three and one half years; relevant period was time during which predicate activity occurred, not time during which underlying scheme operated or underlying dispute took place, there were only three months during which defendants mailed letters and otherwise communicated with plaintiffs by means of mails and wires regarding purported value of premises, even assuming that defendants' alleged use of mails or wires over period of one year and nine months was in furtherance of scheme and that such acts could be viewed as racketeering activity, that time period did not suggest a continuing scheme, and other factors also weighed against finding that continuity had been alleged. Ozbakir v. Scotti, W.D.N.Y.2011, 764 F.Supp.2d 556. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Allegations by purchasers of custom homes that vendor, mortgage lender, and others developed a scheme to defraud based on obtaining inflated appraisals of homes and selling them at above-market prices, that they executed it by mail, with least three specific predicate acts of mailing and other general uses of the mail and interstate wires were sufficient to allege continuous pattern of racketeering activity, as required to state civil Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Johnson v. KB Home, D.Ariz.2010, 720 F.Supp.2d 1109. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

A plaintiff asserting a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim can satisfy the requirement that criminal activity is on-going by alleging: (1) a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time that amount to a threat of continued criminal activity, known as “the closed-ended approach,” or (2) that the racketeering acts themselves include a specific threat of repetition extending indefinitely into the future or are a part of an ongoing entity's regular way of doing business, known as “the open-ended approach.” Dickey v. Kennedy, D.Mass.2008, 583 F.Supp.2d 183. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Debtors failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activity in connection with real estate trust set up by lender, as required to establish civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; although debtors asserted specific fraudulent acts directed towards themselves, including three acts of mail fraud and one act of wire fraud over a period of one year, there was no assertion of ongoing fraudulent acts toward debtors or others, or that a sufficient threat of continued criminal activity or multiple schemes existed. Williams v. Equity Holding Corp., E.D.Va.2007, 498 F.Supp.2d 831. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Home improvement company satisfied requirement of pleading open-ended continuity, for purposes of continuity requirement for a pattern of racketeering activity, as element of claim under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO); company alleged that its former independent-contractor salesman and other defendants were engaged in a home improvement business which, while it was not criminal in nature, it was operated solely through predicate acts of mail and wire fraud. SKS Constructors, Inc. v. Drinkwine, E.D.N.Y.2006, 458 F.Supp.2d 68. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Town failed to allege sufficient continuity or threat of continuity to plead pattern of racketeering in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against vendors based single transaction wherein it purchased property at allegedly inflated price; predicate RICO acts of the complaint revolved around the common plan of vendors and defendant town officials to overcharge the town for the purchase and renovation of the vendors' property, which was accomplished by multiple acts of bribery, mail fraud and bank fraud. Town of Poughkeepsie v. Espie, S.D.N.Y.2005, 402 F.Supp.2d 443, subsequent determination 2006 WL 236787. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Savings and loan association receiver sufficiently alleged pattern of racketeering activity, where complaint set forth sufficient factual allegations from which it could be inferred that mail fraud was automobile dealership's regular way of conducting business; automobile dealership must have regularly mailed motor vehicle insurance binders, certificates, and termination notices to its customers, as well as motor vehicle titles and certificates of origin to Secretary of State, inference could be drawn that scheme could have continued in future, and complaint alleged savings and loan association as victim. Resolution Trust Corp. v. S & K Chevrolet Co., C.D.Ill.1996, 918 F.Supp. 1235, opinion vacated in part on reconsideration 923 F.Supp. 135. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 72

Corporation's allegations of repeated acts of mail and wire fraud over 22-month period of solicitations of investors, which were allegedly based on knowingly false and misleading representations as to financial profitability of water vending machines, purchase of which was alleged purpose of solicitations, satisfied “continuity” requirement of “pattern of racketeering activity” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Water Intern. Network, U.S.A., Inc. v. East, M.D.Fla.1995, 892 F.Supp. 1477. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Plaintiffs asserting RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) cause of action sufficiently alleged continuity of enterprise to establish pattern of criminal activity by alleging bank fraud and mail fraud that could be part of organizational entity's regular way of doing business, despite contention that RICO liability must be based on large organization with many criminal objects and many victims. Stiller v. Sumter Bank and Trust Co., M.D.Ga.1994, 860 F.Supp. 835. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Union member established “pattern” of racketeering activity, necessary to state claim against union business agent under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where he alleged numerous instances in which business agent committed extortionate acts in violation of Hobbs Act, and he might have been able to establish that extortionate conduct was union's regular way of conducting enterprise and thus that threat of continuing racketeering activity existed. O'Rourke v. Crosley, D.N.J.1994, 847 F.Supp. 1208. Racketeer Influenced

And Corrupt Organizations 72

Shareholders bringing derivative action against officers and directors of corporation under RICO, failed to establish “pattern” of racketeering activity; alleged racketeering activity consisted of officers and directors contacting one individual, to have false stories circulated regarding former officer and director, with entire process involving five persons and taking only six months. In re American Exp. Co. Shareholder Litigation, S.D.N.Y.1993, 840 F.Supp. 260, affirmed 39 F.3d 395. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Evidence that pharmaceutical drug repackaging contractor engaged in series of transactions in which it processed individual shipments of pharmaceuticals for plaintiff and two other prescription drug wholesalers and took excess drug “overages” without authorization was sufficient showing of “continuity” to withstand summary judgment on claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) that contractor's president and associates conducted affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering. Independent Drug Wholesalers Group, Inc. v. Denton, D.Kan.1993, 833 F.Supp. 1507, reconsideration denied. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Allegations that computer supplier paid kickbacks to employee of computer purchaser to approve invoices for goods and services that were never provided and to divert business to other vendors with which supplier was associated were sufficient to establish “continuity” element required to make out “pattern of racketeering activity,” where allegations spanned four year period, and supplier's actions allegedly involved 33 fraudulent invoices, payments to purchaser's employee, connecting employee to representatives of other vendors, submission of numerous invoices by those vendors to purchaser, and creation of vendor owned by employee and supplier's president. Edison Elec. Institute v. Henwood, D.D.C.1993, 832 F.Supp. 413. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Alleged fraudulent conduct by franchisor and its principal satisfied “continuity” aspect of “pattern” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); defendants' alleged acts of mail and wire fraud extended over two-year period, and franchisee alleged that defendants' normal course of conducting legitimate business was to defraud franchisees. Giuliano v. Everything Yogurt, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1993, 819 F.Supp. 240. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Allegation that one group of defendants participated in one scheme with respect to bond markets and that other defendants participated in a similar scheme in the next month did not adequately allege continuity necessary for pattern of racketeering activity. Three Crown Ltd. Partnership v. Caxton Corp., S.D.N.Y.1993, 817 F.Supp. 1033. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Purchasers of apartment complex failed to establish pattern of racketeering activity requirement of Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); purchasers' allegations did not implicate any concern with long-term criminal conduct. Monarch Normandy Square Partners v. Normandy Square Associates Ltd. Partner- ship, D.Kan.1993, 817 F.Supp. 908. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Continuity requirement for pattern of racketeering activity was adequately pleaded by allegations that defendants conspired to defraud consumers and engaged in extortion to prevent employees from leaving and disclosing scheme and that scheme to defraud consumers was still continuing, even though former employees alleged that scheme to extort was concocted and executed within three days; allegations raised question whether fraud was defendants' regular way of doing business. Hughes v. Technology Licensing Consultants, Inc., W.D.Pa.1992, 815 F.Supp. 847. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege pattern of racketeering activity under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations (RICO) Act where plaintiff has not shown that racketeering predicates are related and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. Constitution Bank v. DiMarco, E.D.Pa.1993, 815 F.Supp. 154. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Insurer's allegations that insureds engaged in several acts of mail and wire fraud between same parties over at least two-year period satisfied continuity standard required to establish pattern of racketeering activity under federal and Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statutes. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Value Rent-A-Car Inc., S.D.Fla.1992, 814 F.Supp. 1084. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 104

Borrowers adequately alleged continuity of pattern of racketeering activity by alleging that predicate acts and mail and wire fraud and of extortion spanned period of more than ten years, even if there was no basis to infer that lender would continue to employ fraud and extortion; alleged conduct was neither isolated nor sporadic. Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 213, affirmed 99 F.3d 401. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Condominium owners, who alleged that developer, financial institutions, and others conspired to cover up alleged structural defects in condominium building resulting in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO), failed to plead required pattern of racketeering activity; other than condominium owners' conclusory statements and repeated use of statutory phrase, there were no factual allegations that acts of racketeering activity in any way constituted or posed threat of continued activity. Benet-Soto v. Chase Manhat- tan Bank, N.A., D.Puerto Rico 1992, 791 F.Supp. 914. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegations that sellers of business engaged in fraudulent misrepresentations regarding value of business' assets and extent of its debt to induce plaintiff to purchase business was not sufficient to establish pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) absent any evidence that alleged conduct occurred over extended period of time or that there existed threat of continued fraudulent activity. Gutenkauf v. Mills-Jennings Co., D.Mont.1990, 784 F.Supp. 1520, affirmed 953 F.2d 1387. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Joint venturer who brought Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim failed to sufficiently allege continuity with respect to engineer who provided inspection reports on joint venture project to mortgage lender; engineer had no association with project once it was complete, and joint venturer had not alleged any nexus known to engineer between his reports to lender and managing venturer's substantially differ-

ent, inaccurate reports to joint venturer of which engineer was unaware, so continual fraud over closed period of time had not been sufficiently alleged. Browning Ave. Realty Corp. v. Rosenshein, S.D.N.Y.1991, 774 F.Supp. 129. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Limited partnership investors' allegations that accounting firm was involved with tax opinions and reports on projections contained in private placement memorandums for limited partnerships did not indicate threat of continuing criminal activity necessary to state racketeering claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO). Duke v. Touche Ross & Co., S.D.N.Y.1991, 765 F.Supp. 69. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 71

Allegations that defendant conspired for two and one-half years and that, during that period of time, minimum of two truckloads of stolen equipment were sold and transported across state lines did not preclude existence of ongoing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise. Federal Ins. Co. v. Ayers, E.D.Pa.1990, 741 F.Supp. 1179, reconsideration denied 760 F.Supp. 1118. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Allegation of two and one-half years association of defendants for purposes of selling and transporting at least two truckloads of stolen goods was sufficient to state continuous pattern of racketeering activity as necessary to bring claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Federal Ins. Co. v. Ayers, E.D.Pa.1990, 741 F.Supp. 1179, reconsideration denied 760 F.Supp. 1118. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Continuity requirement for showing pattern of racketeering activity under RICO was not satisfied by allegations that plan purchaser terminated pension plan and retained approximately $25,000,000 in excess assets through actions over slightly more than two years. Hutchinson v. Wickes Companies, Inc., N.D.Ga.1989, 726 F.Supp. 1315 . Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Allegations concerning fraudulent scheme to sell interest in one particular oil well by persons involved in business of selling such interests to general public on continuing basis were sufficient to state civil RICO claim. Amsler v. Corwin Petroleum Corp., S.D.N.Y.1989, 715 F.Supp. 103. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 28

Plaintiff's allegations that defendants misrepresented franchise investment during negotiations from January through August 1984, when plaintiffs purchased their first set of development rights, and that plaintiff relied on those same representations in purchasing other development rights five weeks later failed to allege continuity element of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim inasmuch as goal of alleged scheme was short-lived and straightforward. Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v. Integrated Resources, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1987, 662 F.Supp. 1499. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Allegations that savings and loan foreclosed on property in which it held priority lien, purchased property at auction and resold property seven days later, were insufficient to establish pattern of racketeering activity under

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act in view of the fact that actions of the savings and loan even if involving a number of allegedly fraudulent acts, did not evidence any threat of continuing racketeering activity or the involvement of an organized criminal enterprise. Meadow Ltd. Partnership v. Heritage Sav. and Loan Ass'n, E.D.Va.1986, 639 F.Supp. 643. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Complaint by bank and surety company, which allegedly were induced to provide financing for limited partnerships, did not satisfy “pattern” requirement for racketeering activity under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, where bank and surety company provided financing for several partnerships, but financing was provided as a package so that actions taken to realize financing lacked characteristic of continuity. Vereins- Und Westbank AG v. Carter, S.D.N.Y.1986, 639 F.Supp. 620. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Complaint which failed to plead the required continuity of racketeering activity thus failed to state a claim for a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act violation. Bruno v. Starr, C.A.5 (La.) 2006, 182 Fed.Appx. 297, 2006 WL 1307570, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

240. ---- Number of acts, pattern of racketeering activity, complaint

County sufficiently alleged only one alleged predicate act of racketeering on part of software provider, that provider engaged in bribery of county employee, and thus county failed to make required showing of pattern of racketeering activity to support its civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in relation to formation and performance of implementation services agreement. County of Marin v. De- loitte Consulting LLP, N.D.Cal.2011, 836 F.Supp.2d 1030. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 26

Complaint did not support claims against minister and church elders for alleged conspiracy to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) when church member alleged that minister and elders used threats to induce member to drop lawsuit against another church member and ultimately suspended member's leadership position within church, inasmuch as such allegations asserted only one predicate act of racketeering, allegations did not establish extortion in violation of Hobbs Act, and member did not allege requisite injury to his business or property. Davis Lee Pharmacy, Inc., v. Manhattan Central Capital Corp., E.D.N.Y.2004, 327 F.Supp.2d 159. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

To state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), plaintiffs must plead commission of at least two predicate acts that were related and that amounted to, or threatened likelihood of, continued criminal activity, in order to show that defendant engaged in “pattern of racketeering activity.” Volmar Dis- tributors, Inc. v. New York Post Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1995, 899 F.Supp. 1187. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegations that, upon information and belief, defendants knowingly furnished false and fraudulent invoices for work, labor and services that were never performed or that were overbilled with knowledge that said invoices

would be submitted for draw-down payment did not plead “pattern of racketeering activity” so as to support claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where plaintiff failed to specify two specific false or fraudulent invoices from each affiliate of defendant and provided no facts upon which its information and belief were based. Attick v. Valeria Associates, L.P., S.D.N.Y.1992, 835 F.Supp. 103. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegations that defendants mailed fraudulent invoices or purchase orders in furtherance of fraudulent sales and purchases scheme on at least ten specific dates within 11-month period adequately alleged pattern of repeated criminal acts so as to establish pattern under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) involving similar purposes, participants, and methods of commission. Farberware, Inc. v. Groben, S.D.N.Y.1991, 764 F.Supp. 296. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Allegations of three-year association of corporation and its officers for purpose of defrauding purchaser of corporation's accounts receivable of its money, during which defendants allegedly committed 46 overt acts in violation of federal mail and wire fraud and securities statutes, adequately pled pattern of racketeering activities and stated civil claim for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Intern. Importing Enterprises, Ltd., E.D.Pa.1990, 755 F.Supp. 1292. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Complaint alleging that over a period of two and one-half months defendants engaged in four separate acts of mail and wire fraud as a part of a single scheme of short duration to defraud plaintiffs did not support conclusion that defendants' business was regularly conducted using mail and wire fraud, so as to establish “pattern of racketeering activity” in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit. Gott v. Simpson, D.Me.1990, 745 F.Supp. 765. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegations that between 8 and 18 predicate acts occurred over seven-month period satisfied relatedness and continuity requirements for pleading pattern of racketeering activity, if period of seven months was substantial period of time; alleged acts of wire and mail fraud, attempted extortion, interstate or international travel in order to extort kickback and contract concessions, attempted witness tampering, and attempted bribery of witness had same purpose and victim. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, Inc., D.Or.1990, 730 F.Supp. 1525. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Investor's allegations that investment adviser and others made 18 mailings that falsely overstated value of investor's account were sufficiently related and continuous to indicate pattern and enterprise involving interstate commerce, for purposes of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Wellington Intern. Commerce Corp. v. Retelny, S.D.N.Y.1989, 727 F.Supp. 843. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

To state cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, there must be allegations of at least two criminal acts of racketeering activity. Ferdinand Drexel Inv. Co., Inc. v. Alibert, E.D.Pa.1989, 723 F.Supp. 313, affirmed 904 F.2d 694, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 154, 498 U.S. 856, 112 L.Ed.2d 120. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Allegation of more than 20 incidents of mail and wire fraud over period of more than two years, in order to induce plaintiffs to pay inflated prices for buildings involved, was sufficient to allege pattern of racketeering activity, as element of RICO claim. San Jacinto Sav. Ass'n v. TDC Corp. of Florida, M.D.Fla.1989, 707 F.Supp. 1579 . Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

To properly allege existence of pattern of racketeering activity, under civil provision of RICO statute, complaint must include allegations that defendant has committed two or more “predicate” acts. Sendar Co., Inc. v. Mega- ware Inc., S.D.N.Y.1989, 705 F.Supp. 159. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Allegation that defendants committed six predicate acts of mailing was insufficient to allege pattern of racketeering, for purposes of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim; all mailings were part of one scheme which was intended to deprive one victim of benefits of a contract. Singh v. Curry, N.D.Ill.1987, 667 F.Supp. 603, on reconsideration, vacated 866 F.2d 432. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Allegation of six separate but related acts of wire and mail fraud which involved only one victim and which could be considered one extended scheme or criminal episode sufficiently alleged a pattern of racketeering activity within RICO. Bush Development Corp. v. Harbour Place Associates, E.D.Va.1986, 632 F.Supp. 1359. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Alleged multiple acts of mail and wire fraud involving misrepresentations intended to injure competitor's competitive opportunities satisfied Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's “pattern of racketeering activity” requirement. SJ Advanced Technology & Mfg. Corp. v. Junkunc, N.D.Ill.1986, 627 F.Supp. 572. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c)], by former shareholder against coshareholder resulting from latter's embezzlement of corporate funds sufficiently alleged pattern of racketeering activity where it alleged over 20 predicate acts stretched out over a two-year period each of which involved same or similar purpose. Graham v. Slaughter, N.D.Ill.1985, 624 F.Supp. 222. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Allegation of only one RICO predicate act precluded civil RICO claim. Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1985, 623 F.Supp. 176, affirmed 794 F.2d 843, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 579, 479 U.S. 987, 93 L.Ed.2d 582. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Corporation promoting cable system failed to state claim under this chapter by merely alleging that city council president was bribed by other promoters at a fundraiser; such action would constitute only one single act of unlawful activity and not a pattern of racketeering activity. Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie, W.D.Pa.1981, 537 F.Supp. 6. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

241. ---- Number of victims, pattern of racketeering activity, complaint

Assuming that alleged mail fraud perpetrated by attorney on client was sufficient to establish predicate acts for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), acts did not show requisite pattern of racketeering activity necessary to state cause of action under RICO; client had alleged a general scheme of attorney to bill as much as he could for routine appellate matter, against one victim, consisting of three acts covering a time frame of over two months, with a definite ending, a type of short-term closed-end fraud that did not constitute a pattern, and there was an insufficient threat of future actions to support claim that open-ended scheme was involved. McDonald v. Schencker, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1994, 18 F.3d 491. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 31

Allegations in shareholders' complaint, that defendants had injured shareholders in their business by fraudulently looting debtor corporation's bankruptcy estate, did not sufficiently assert “pattern of racketeering activity” to state RICO claim; predicate acts that shareholders alleged involved essentially similar fraudulent acts, committed over period of less than one year, that were directed at single victim and resulted in single injury. Wade v. Hopper, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1993, 993 F.2d 1246, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 193, 510 U.S. 868, 126 L.Ed.2d 151. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 30

Civil RICO plaintiffs' allegations, that defendants defrauded 60 individuals, sufficiently pled a pattern. Does 1-60 v. Republic Health Corp., D.Nev.1987, 669 F.Supp. 1511. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 30

Securities purchasers failed to allege “pattern of racketeering activity” by investment of brokerage house; plaintiff purchasers, a brother and sister were only victims of alleged scheme, sole participant was single broker, purpose and result of alleged activity was quite specific, to defraud these particular purchasers, alleged method of commission was at all times the same, churning and manipulation of trading accounts, all acts arose out of single contractual transaction, purchasers' authorization of brokerage house to trade their accounts, and there was no allegation that activity was likely to occur in other context. Roberts v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., D.Mass.1986, 653 F.Supp. 406. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

242. ---- Open ended scheme, pattern of racketeering activity, complaint

Corporation's allegations against its former officers under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) satisfied open-ended form of continuity requirement, where corporation alleged that extorting kickbacks had become officers' regular way of doing business and threatened to continue into the future, in that defendants were involved in demanding kickbacks from four companies with which plaintiff corporation did business, distributing and reinvesting the proceeds, and falsifying transportation reports; activities were made possible by defendants' employment status, were directed at variety of plaintiff's suppliers, and were not connected to consummation of any particular transaction. Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1995, 65 F.3d 1523. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Licensor's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint, which alleged an inherently

terminable scheme that was focused on illegally obtaining licenses for action figures and for videogames but did not allege that racketeering acts were defendants' regular way of conducting their otherwise ongoing legitimate businesses, failed to plead open-ended continuity; even though the complaint detailed defendants' alleged misconduct for six years after the granting of the last license, there was no allegation that defendants schemed to pursue any other licenses from licensor or any other vendor. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Jakks Pa- cific, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2007, 530 F.Supp.2d 486, affirmed 328 Fed.Appx. 695, 2009 WL 1391807. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegation that defendant bank acted to defraud plaintiff bank into assuming liability on single account was clearly insufficient to support claim of open-ended continuity of pattern of racketeering for purposes of alleged violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); threat of repeated fraud could not be inferred from single alleged scheme and plaintiff did not offer sufficient allegations to suggest that alleged scheme was representative of way in which defendant's business was generally conducted. China Trust Bank of New York v. Standard Chartered Bank, PLC, S.D.N.Y.1997, 981 F.Supp. 282. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 28

Franchisee of fast food restaurants adequately alleged continuing pattern of racketeering activity in its action against franchisor for violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); although franchisee's claim that franchisor defrauded it over course of three months was inadequate to establish continuing racketeering activity, claim that other franchisees were also defrauded into purchasing unprofitable franchises gave rise to inference that franchisor might have open-ended scheme to defraud with threat of repetition. Protter v. Nathan's Famous Systems, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1996, 925 F.Supp. 947. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 72

Allegations that defendants committed several acts of mail and wire fraud over period of more than one year in furtherance of scheme to defraud plaintiffs in real estate transaction were insufficient to allege pattern of racketeering, as was required for claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; scheme involved one victim, group of perpetrators and limited goal of fraud and breach of contract in one real estate transaction; although allegations on their face also supported open-ended scheme, allegations failed to provide any factual support for contention that defendant's fraudulent activity would continue in future and allegations of future opportunities to commit fraud were not sufficient to support finding of continuity or threat of continuity or to satisfy requirement that averments of fraud be stated with particularity. Continental Realty Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1990, 729 F.Supp. 1452. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

243. ---- Participation, pattern of racketeering activity, complaint

Petition which alleged that union official made threats to employer and its employees, and that strikers committed violent acts during recognition strike, was a sufficient allegation of union's participation in conduct of the employer's business, through a pattern of racketeering activities, to state a cause of action under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, C.A.D.C.1988, 839 F.2d 782, 268 U.S.App.D.C. 103, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 309, 488 U.S. 926, 102 L.Ed.2d 328, vacated 109 S.Ct. 3235, 492 U.S. 914, 106 L.Ed.2d 583, on remand 883 F.2d 132, 280 U.S.App.D.C. 60, rehearing granted. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Complaint which alleged that defendants “established, conducted and participated in an enterprise * * * which engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity and affected interstate commerce” stated cause of action under this chapter sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss. Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1983, 713 F.2d 1272. Commerce 80

Judgment creditor's allegations that bank facilitated debtor's transfers, furthered scheme to make debtor lawsuit- proof, allowed debtor to transfer his Panamanian residence to debtor-controlled company, and refused to comply with consent form executed by debtor which allowed verification of funds in accounts in Panama, or otherwise provide information about debtor's accounts to creditor, did not allege sufficient facts to show that bank participated in operation or management of alleged enterprise itself, as required to state Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against bank. Super Vision Intern., Inc. v. Mega Intern. Commercial Bank Co., Ltd., S.D.Fla.2008, 534 F.Supp.2d 1326. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Investors adequately pled that bank participated in affairs of enterprise to defraud investors by means of Ponzi scheme, in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where investors alleged that bank completed monetary wire transfers used in scheme, despite its awareness of scheme. Gonzales v. Lloyds TSB Bank, PLC, C.D.Cal.2006, 532 F.Supp.2d 1200. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Cotton farmers' allegations were sufficient to state a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim for agricultural marketing cooperative's maintenance or control of an interest in an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity; farmers alleged that cooperative generated income from their fraudulent scheme to deduct monies from members for a real estate development which led to the maintenance and control of the enterprise, that the venture into real estate saddled the members with $23 million in interest costs over two decades ultimately expensed to the members, and that such activity was part of maintaining the cooperative. Andrews Farms v. Calcot, Ltd., E.D.Cal.2007, 527 F.Supp.2d 1239. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Allegations that chief financial officer (CFO) of subsidiary executed several agreements on behalf of subsidiary at the time he allegedly knew that parent was involved in a fraudulent scheme to provide plaintiffs with inflated invoices and was “instrumental in the implementation and continuation” of the fraudulent scheme satisfied Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) pleading requirement that CFO was involved in the operations and management of the RICO enterprise, which was the parent-subsidiary association-in-fact, and participated in a pattern of racketeering activity; additionally, that pleading requirement was satisfied as to another senior executive who allegedly “delivered or cause to be delivered” the artificially inflated invoices for transcription services. South Broward Hosp. Dist. v. MedQuist Inc., D.N.J.2007, 516 F.Supp.2d 370, stay denied 2007 WL 4547492, affirmed in part 258 Fed.Appx. 466, 2007 WL 4394391. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Majority stockholder of title insurance company did not direct the activities of or participate in the alleged fraud of title insurance company's agents, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO) “operation or management” test determining whether stockholder participated in the conduct of the affairs of a

RICO enterprise as to establish civil liability, absent any evidence that stockholder had any role in directing the fraudulent affairs, or that stockholder had any knowledge of the frauds, or had any involvement in responding to the frauds, before the frauds had been committed. Albright v. Attorney's Title Ins. Fund, D.Utah 2007, 504 F.Supp.2d 1187. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Town failed to state a viable Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against vendors of property which it purchased at an allegedly inflated price since it failed to adequately plead that vendors participated in and controlled the enterprise; allegations effectively treated the vendors as victims of RICO enterprise activity directed by town board members, who manipulated the town board for their direct financial and political gain, and not holders of an interest in or control of the alleged RICO enterprise. Town of Poughkeepsie v. Espie, S.D.N.Y.2005, 402 F.Supp.2d 443, subsequent determination 2006 WL 236787. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Investors failed to state racketeering claim against wife of co-defendant, based on allegations that co-defendant was involved in fraudulent investment schemes, and that wife executed deed of trust on property jointly owned with co-defendant, she intended to not honor that obligation and to conceal fraudulent nature of particular alleged mortgage scheme, and that she committed bankruptcy fraud by concealing obligations under deed of trust; there was no claim that wife participated in directing operation or management of affairs of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise, or that she participated in such affairs through “pattern” of racketeering activity. Lust v. Burke, D.Md.1994, 876 F.Supp. 1474. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 50

Allegation that lead lender exercised “actual control” over developer and development was sufficient, under “operation and management” test, to state claim under section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) prohibiting conduct of affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity. Bowdoin Const. Corp. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat. Bank, N.A., D.Mass.1994, 869 F.Supp. 1004, affirmed 94 F.3d 721. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Predicate acts were related to activities of enterprise so as to sufficiently allege participation in or conduct of plaintiff's affairs under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, where defendant allegedly corrupted, through racketeering activities, negotiation of contracts entered into as regular part of plaintiff's business. Farberware, Inc. v. Groben, S.D.N.Y.1991, 764 F.Supp. 296. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Collectivizing defendants in alleged pattern of racketeering activity will not suffice; complaint must identify each person who is alleged to be liable. Myers v. Finkle, E.D.Va.1990, 758 F.Supp. 1102, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds 950 F.2d 165. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Grandchildren did not adequately allege accountants' participation in association-in-fact enterprise element of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim for alleged depletion of assets in grandmother's estate that would have flowed through residuary clause of grandmother's will to inter vivos trust of which grandchildren were beneficiaries; grandchildren merely alleged that accountants participated in alleged conspir-

acy over indefinite span of years that involved multiplicity of transactions, but did not allege time frame of accountants' participation, specific transactions in which accountants may have acted improperly, or precise nature of claimed impropriety. Firestone v. Galbreath, S.D.Ohio 1990, 747 F.Supp. 1556, affirmed in part 976 F.2d 279 , rehearing denied , certified question answered 616 N.E.2d 202, 67 Ohio St.3d 87, answer to certified question conformed to 25 F.3d 323, on remand 895 F.Supp. 917. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Automobile dealer, which alleged that automobile manufacturer, its agents and employees participated in conduct of its own and dealer's affairs by conspiring to use the mails to transmit distribution booklets containing false representations of manufacturer's allocation methods and that manufacturer and its wholly owned subsidiary acquired and maintained a security interest in assets of the dealer by using the mails to transmit matter containing false representations, failed to state claims for violations of three subsections of RICO for reasons that the complaint did not properly plead an enterprise, failed to allege sufficiently the required degree of participation in the affairs of an enterprise and failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activity. John Peterson Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., D.C.Minn.1985, 613 F.Supp. 887. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 73

Alleged use of the mails by the defendant savings association to further a fraudulent scheme in connection with consumer credit loan to plaintiffs was not a basis for obtaining civil damages under this section where the plaintiffs, though alleging an enterprise, failed to allege any person associated with the enterprise who was conducting the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Bays v. Hunter Sav. Ass'n, S.D.Ohio 1982, 539 F.Supp. 1020. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Consumers who brought action against business services corporation, dealers and infomercial actor, stemming from leasing of e-commerce services and products, failed properly to allege that actor “conducted” purported illegal enterprises, as required to maintain RICO claim, since complaint failed to charge any facts indicating that actor had some part in directing enterprises' affairs. Zito v. Leasecomm Corp., S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 22251352, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

244. ---- Relatedness of acts, pattern of racketeering activity, complaint

Complaint failed to allege “pattern of racketeering activity” within scope of RICO statute; complaint alleged several instances of criminal behavior including bribe, several false statements, cover-up, and possibly unlawful access to confidential information taking place over a comparatively short period of time and comprising single effort to obtain and keep a single Defense Department contract, plus a single fraudulent conveyance several years later in effort to avoid later court judgment; latter alleged incident was too unrelated to be part of a racketeering pattern. Apparel Art Intern., Inc. v. Jacobson, C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 1992, 967 F.2d 720. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Real property owner proceeding pro se adequately alleged pattern of criminal activity by municipal building inspector in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) on allegations that various individuals had been separately targeted through repetitions of similar criminal conduct in condemning buildings with intention of forcing owners to sell to inspector's associates at reduced price with respect to three properties

over three-year period. Dickey v. Kennedy, D.Mass.2008, 583 F.Supp.2d 183. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Ostensible predicate acts of wire fraud and mail fraud allegedly committed by principal of marketing companies in order to acquire complete control over invention were not sufficiently related to constitute pattern of racketeering activity necessary to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even though principal had allegedly made false representations to third party to induce him to produce infomercials for one of his companies, and had purportedly acquired Asian marketing companies in order to conceal profits, where misrepresentations to infomercial producer were not in any relevant way related to misrepresentations principal made to inventor, and Asian companies were not acquired for purpose of defrauding inventor. Market- ing Products Management, LLC v. Healthandbeautydirect.com, Inc., D.Md.2004, 333 F.Supp.2d 418. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Predicate acts of mail and wire fraud alleged in support of church member's claims against minister and church elders for conspiracy to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) were too remote in time, purpose, and method of commission to be considered as part of same pattern of racketeering activity in which minister and elders allegedly engaged by threatening member to induce him to drop his lawsuit against another church member, in that mail and wire fraud allegations pertained to alleged forging of member's name on loan documents that was basis for lawsuit underlying threats. Davis Lee Pharmacy, Inc., v. Manhattan Cent- ral Capital Corp., E.D.N.Y.2004, 327 F.Supp.2d 159. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Shareholder's complaint charging company officials with violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO) adequately alleged predicate acts, relatedness, and pattern of racketeering activity; complaint provided both detailed factual allegations as well as narrative describing pattern of activity and relatedness of many predicate acts to each other in carrying out scheme. Gintowt v. TL Ventures, E.D.Pa.2002, 239 F.Supp.2d 580. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint sufficiently alleged related racketeering predicates in scheme to move assets from trusts and accounts in which plaintiff had right of access to trusts and accounts in which she did not; complaint alleged that enterprise had one victim, plaintiff, and that it existed for sole purpose of defrauding her of her rightful share of assets of family business, and complaint identified core

group of actors responsible for master minding and perpetrating this scheme. Madanes v. Madanes, S.D.N.Y.1997, 981 F.Supp. 241. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

In action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) arising out of sale of worthless land patents, complaints sufficiently alleged that racketeering acts were related; alleged acts of mail and wire fraud were all for same or similar purpose of defrauding plaintiffs, and participants were essentially the same group of persons and method of commission was by false statements. Manning v. Stigger, E.D.Ky.1996, 919 F.Supp. 249. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Receiver of investment trust, suing trustees under RICO, satisfied requirement that there be relationship between predicate acts, necessary in order to show pattern of racketeering activities; receiver had alleged that trustees had caused trusts to acquire leases and make loan with improper purpose in each case of generating excessive profit for trustees. Friedlob v. Trustees of Alpine Mut. Fund Trust, D.Colo.1995, 905 F.Supp. 843. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 32

RICO plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead relationship between alleged episodes of criminal activity, as required to show pattern of racketeering activity, where alleged episodes did not have similar purposes, results, victims, and methods of commission; predicate acts asserted were merely isolated instances of wrongdoing directed at achieving separate and discreet goals, rather than related or connected acts that could rise to required level of continuity, and there was no allegation of ongoing threat of continued criminal activity. Bonton v. Archer Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., S.D.Tex.1995, 889 F.Supp. 995. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Corporation sufficiently alleged pattern of racketeering activity to state civil RICO claim for embezzlement of large sums of money by members of its management acting in concert with various third parties; complaint alleged related predicate acts amounting to criminal activity. Corporacion Insular de Seguros v. Reyes Munoz, D.Puerto Rico 1993, 826 F.Supp. 599. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Relatedness prong for “pattern” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was adequately alleged by franchisees claiming that franchisor and its principal defrauded plaintiffs and other franchisees for common purpose of earning illicit franchising fees, and that defendants' fraud involved similar victims in sense that all of alleged victims were engaged in obtaining franchises from franchisor. Giuliano v. Everything Yogurt, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1993, 819 F.Supp. 240. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Former employee did not have standing to pursue claim against former employer, employer's parent corporation, and former supervisor under provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) with respect to her hiring, where predicate acts allegedly perpetrated in process of hiring were not part of same pattern of racketeering activity, involving mail and wire fraud and securities and tax law violations, which was carried out for purpose of defrauding government and employer's shareholders. Casper v. Paine Webber Group, Inc., D.N.J.1992, 787 F.Supp. 1480. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

245. ---- Single scheme, pattern of racketeering activity, complaint

Independent contractor failed to allege pattern of racketeering activity on part of public housing authority, as required to sustain RICO claim in connection with authority's alleged acts of mail and wire fraud falsely inducing contractor to bid for and provide security services when authority did not in fact intend to award contractor the service contract; contractor alleged only one general scheme, that of ousting it from provision of security services, alleged only one victim, itself, and alleged only one type of injury, failure to secure and retain business. Triad Associates, Inc. v. Chicago Housing Authority, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1989, 892 F.2d 583, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 129, 498 U.S. 845, 112 L.Ed.2d 97. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Allegation that investment company participated in only one scheme following its breach of contract for financing ethanol plant construction was insufficient to state a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act. Phenix Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, F.A. v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., C.A.8 (Iowa) 1988, 856 F.2d 1125, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1340, 489 U.S. 1066, 103 L.Ed.2d 810. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Lenders' alleged conduct in transmitting false statements to borrower by telephone, fax, and e-mail did not amount to a pattern of racketeering activity for purposes of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO) prohibition against conducting an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt; rather, lenders' alleged conduct was best characterized as a single effort to deceive borrower regarding the loan. Ellipso, Inc. v. Mann, D.D.C.2008, 541 F.Supp.2d 365. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Investors sufficiently alleged that bank engaged in pattern of racketeering activity, for purposes of Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), in connection with its clients' operation of Ponzi scheme; bank allegedly permitted clients to commingle investors' funds after it became aware of scheme, then transferred funds on clients' behalf at least twice within one-year span to other corporations formed by clients and to off- shore accounts, and scheme's perpetrator accepted numerous wire transfers from investors in furtherance of single ongoing scheme. Gonzales v. Lloyds TSB Bank, PLC, C.D.Cal.2006, 532 F.Supp.2d 1200. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Mortgagors/vendors, who brought suit against alleged perpetrators of foreclosure rescue scam involving a sale- leaseback transaction, failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activities within meaning of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); single, limited fraudulent scheme did not constitute a pattern, and whatever the vendors believed that defendants may or may not have done to others in the past or what they may be disposed to do in the future was purely a matter of speculation. Johnson v. Wheeler, D.Md.2007, 492 F.Supp.2d 492. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Buyer of generic drug producing corporation adequately pled “pattern” of racketeering activity for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even though alleged acts of corporation's president, regarding filing of false data with Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in connection with drug applica-

tions, all related to single scheme and involved single victim, the buyer; in reliance upon president's specific misrepresentations, buyer purchased large blocks of corporation's stock in several separate transactions, each of which inflicted distinct economic injury to buyer. Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Kapoor, N.D.Ill.1993, 814 F.Supp. 720. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Investors in commodity pool limited partnerships failed to establish continuity required to establish Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) pattern; transfers of funds from limited partnerships to registered securities broker-dealer, which were assertedly fraudulent activity at issue, were apparently in response to crisis situation and despite multiplicity of predicate acts and victims alleged fraud was part of single scheme and investors suffered only one distinct injury as a result of scheme. Davis v. Coopers & Lybrand, N.D.Ill.1992, 787 F.Supp. 787. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Complaint which alleged only one objective, i.e., acquisition of bank stock prior to merger, and which alleged that criminal activity in connection with the merger lasted only a few months and was directed to no more than ten individuals did not show a pattern of racketeering. Sheridan v. Weinberger, M.D.Pa.1991, 767 F.Supp. 92. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Allegations that employer attempted to establish pattern of antiunion activity and to deceive or defraud employees and deprive them of right to democratic participation in decision to unionize did not state claim under Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) where predicate acts were based primarily on mail and wire fraud occurring over period of 18 months in relation to single scheme; no evidence was presented to show that conduct would recur in future as necessary to meet continuity requirement. McDonough v. Gencorp, Inc., S.D.Ill.1990, 750 F.Supp. 368. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) plaintiff's failure to adequately plead pattern of racketeering precluded recovery on his conspiracy claim; allegations of complaint indicated that there was one scheme to defraud one victim through multiple acts of mail and wire fraud occurring over period of approximately three and one-quarter years, and there were no credible allegations that defendants engaged in fraudulent activities in past or threatened to do so in the future. Cross v. Simons, N.D.Ill.1989, 729 F.Supp. 588. Conspir- acy 18

Employer failed to sufficiently allege pattern of racketeering activity to state civil RICO claim against former employee and his subsequent employer; employer alleged only single scheme to turn subsequent employer into successful business at expense of first employer, and alleged scheme lacked threat of continuity necessary to establish pattern of racketeering activity. Rochester Midland Corp. v. Mesko, E.D.Mich.1988, 696 F.Supp. 262. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Shareholder derivative suit plaintiffs' allegations of component acts of mail fraud scheme were sufficient to plead “pattern” of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, where they alleged that each mailing by corporation of fraudulent testing results to federal government was done in furtherance of “same or similar purpose,” which was to defraud government and increase corporation's profitability;

there was no requirement that they show multiple fraudulent schemes; rejecting National Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F.Supp. 828 (N.D.Ill.). Lewis, on Behalf of Nat. Semiconductor Corp. v. Sporck, N.D.Cal.1986, 646 F.Supp. 574. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Allegation that cosmetics marketing company was withholding commissions from sales of cosmetics manufacturing company's products failed to establish that marketers were involved in more than one criminal episode as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act to establish “pattern” of racketeering activity. B.J. Skin & Nail Care, Inc. v. International Cosmetic Exchange, Inc., D.Conn.1986, 641 F.Supp. 563. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Complaint which alleged that drug manufacturer had defrauded thousands of persons by selling an appetite suppressant under the representation that it was effective for 18 hours and then had sold the same suppressant under a representation that it was effective for 15 hours alleged only a single attempt to intentionally misrepresent through packaging and advertisements the performance of a single product and thus did not allege a pattern of racketeering as required for RICO. Savastano v. Thompson Medical Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1986, 640 F.Supp. 1081. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Investors who brought civil action alleging, inter alia, violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act against corporation and its shareholders, officers, directors, and persons otherwise affiliated with the corporation in which investors had invested had failed to plead “pattern of racketeering” activity required to sustain RICO claims by asserting four separate but related fraudulent schemes of inducing persons to raise funds for corporation, inducing investors to place their money in escrow, concealing premature withdrawal of escrow funds, and further expending escrowed funds, that were all part of single scheme of raising money for corporation without apparent regard for interests of potential investors. Richter v. Sudman, S.D.N.Y.1986, 634 F.Supp. 234. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Allegations that computer software program licensee committed a number of mail and wire fraud violations in furtherance of a scheme to obtain software program and market it under a different name failed to establish a “pattern of racketeering activity” sufficient to state cause of action under civil racketeering statute [18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c)] in that there was only one criminal episode involved. Fleet Management Systems, Inc. v. Archer- Daniels-Midland Co., Inc., C.D.Ill.1986, 627 F.Supp. 550. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

246. ---- Single transaction, pattern of racketeering activity, complaint

Alleged misrepresentation by company of its hand tool division's true financial condition to buyer of division did not constitute pattern of racketeering activity in civil RICO action; company's several acts of mail and wire fraud resulted in single transaction, only one victim was defrauded on only one occasion, there was no threat of continuing fraudulent activity by company after division was sold, and case did not involve repeated infliction of economic injury. SK Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1988, 852 F.2d 936, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 3241, 492 U.S. 918, 106 L.Ed.2d 589. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Allegation that automobile liability insurer and its attorney committed several acts of mail fraud over a period of several years in furtherance of an overall scheme to defraud insureds was insufficient to state a civil cause of action against insurer under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act when alleged acts all related to insureds' attempt to settle one claim under uninsured motorist policy and, hence, were insufficient to establish distinctness necessary to support continuity aspect of required pattern of racketeering. Elliott v. Chicago Motor Club Ins., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1986, 809 F.2d 347. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Billboard advertising company's alleged collusion with city officials to keep competitor out of bidding process for city contracts satisfied pattern requirement for claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), despite company's contention that alleged activity consisted of single campaign donation to city's mayor, where competitor and alleged enterprise participants engaged in predicate acts, such as Hobbs Act violations, over three month period, and company continued to threaten to use contracts it acquired during that period as potential liability for city and competitor. Bulletin Displays, LLC v. Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc., C.D.Cal.2007, 518 F.Supp.2d 1182. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Arrestee's allegation that deputy sheriffs kidnapped and falsely arrested him was insufficient to demonstrate pattern of racketeering activity necessary to establish claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where all acts complained of occurred during single incident. Curry v. Baca, C.D.Cal.2007, 497 F.Supp.2d 1128. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Shareholders failed to state claim that directors of corporation had engaged in a closed-ended RICO conspiracy, involving repeated racketeering activities within confined period of time; shareholders were required to show pattern of activity, and only claimed a single incident, the alleged conspirators' fraudulent inducement to shareholders to place shares in escrow in belief that proceeds of public offering following creation of escrow would be used to build a plant, and shareholders could not use other incidents involving cover-up of initial fraud toward establishment of pattern. Barsam v. Pure Tech Intern., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1994, 864 F.Supp. 1440, vacated pursuant to settlement 907 F.Supp. 79. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Nursing home seller's allegations concerning multiple acts of fraud were insufficient to make out viable claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) where all acts were part of single, discreet, and otherwise lawful commercial transaction that purportedly resulted in single economic injury. Interwest Med- ical Corp. v. Longterm Care Foundation of America, N.D.Tex.1990, 748 F.Supp. 467. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Failure of RICO plaintiffs to allege more than a single episode of wrongdoing in defendants' attempt to deprive plaintiffs of employee's services, foreclosed their RICO claim, notwithstanding their allegation that four fraudulent acts were performed to complete the scheme. Pillar Corp. v. Enercon Industries Corp., E.D.Wis.1988, 694 F.Supp. 1353. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Acquiring corporation failed to allege “pattern” of racketeering activity, and thus, failed to state Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim arising out of purchase of acquired corporation's stock; all alleged predicate acts were directed toward goal of completion of sale of stock to single purchaser and once sale was

concluded, potential for fraud ended. Windswept Corp. v. Fisher, W.D.Wash.1988, 683 F.Supp. 233. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

247. ---- Time period of acts, pattern of racketeering activity, complaint

Investors, alleging that lender bank and others committed several acts of mail fraud over a period of several years in furtherance of an overall scheme to defraud, satisfied both continuity and relationship aspects of pattern requirement to state a cause of action under civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act where acts of mail fraud were distinct, some related to two separate foreclosure sales that occurred two years apart, while others related to allegedly fraudulent statements made in connection with initial loan transaction, and were ongoing over a period of nearly four years in addition to being distinct. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1986, 804 F.2d 970, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Closed-ended continuity method for alleging pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was satisfied with respect to licensor's complaint against its licensing agent and licensees based on alleged scheme to deprive licensor of the intangible right of honest services from licensing agent through an agreement calling for licensing agent to act on licensees' behalf in obtaining licenses from licensor; licensor claimed that there were separate, albeit related, efforts to procure different toy and videogame licenses between November 1995 and June 1998, each of which resulted in cognizable injury, rather than a single scheme that involved one victim suffering from cumulative injuries, and the racketeering acts extended from November 1995, when the licensees first linked the perfumed doll deal to agent's assistance in obtaining additional licenses, and continued until August, 1998, when licensees made its last bribery payment to agent. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Jakks Pacific, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2007, 530 F.Supp.2d 486, affirmed 328 Fed.Appx. 695, 2009 WL 1391807. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Client and its shareholders alleged a pattern of racketeering activity sufficiently to state a claim against law firm that had been client's corporate counsel for violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where they alleged related predicates occurring over a period of three and a half years, which was a substantial period of time. Design Pallets, Inc. v. GrayRobinson, P.A., M.D.Fla.2007, 515 F.Supp.2d 1246. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Prospective automobile dealers adequately alleged pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against attorney by alleging pattern of extortion in form of monthly demands for payments for three-year period under threat of denying dealers ability to operate their business, and by alleging that attorney, in concert with executives of manufacturer, engaged in long-running and widespread scheme to extract kickbacks from dealers and prospective dealers. In re American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Deal- erships Relations Litigation, D.Md.1997, 965 F.Supp. 716. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

students for educational services that were not received failed to properly plead pattern of racketeering activity sufficient to state RICO claim, where students failed to list elements of predicate offense and explain specifically how college violated statute, specifically plead two acts of racketeering activity in last ten years, to plead mail fraud and bank fraud with particularity or to distinguish between pattern of racketeering activity and enterprise. Schaeffer v. Ascension College, Inc., M.D.La.1997, 964 F.Supp. 1067. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegations in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint, that defendants had participated in scheme to defraud several lenders into extending financing to defendants' business by means of numerous predicate acts of mail and wire fraud occurring over period of almost 14 months, and that these predicate acts of fraud were a regular way that enterprise conducted its ongoing legitimate business of buying accounts receivable, sufficiently pled the required pattern of racketeering activity on both an open-ended and closed-ended continuity theory. First Interregional Advisors Corp. v. Wolff, S.D.N.Y.1997, 956 F.Supp. 480. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Buyers of securities who claimed that price had been artificially inflated through series of sham transactions failed to state that there had been pattern of racketeering activities, as required to state cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision prohibiting conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity; pleadings tended to show that improper trading activity took place over two month period, and under prior cases at least 12 month period of racketeering activity was required. In re Blech Securities Litigation, S.D.N.Y.1996, 928 F.Supp. 1279. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Investors in alleged Ponzi scheme adequately alleged that scheme operators' bank participated, at least indirectly, in operation or management of affairs of scheme operator through pattern of racketeering activity for substantial period of time by managing its accounts at bank, and thus stated claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA) for using pattern of racketeering activity in conduct of affairs of enterprise. Brooks v. Bank of Boulder, D.Colo.1996, 911 F.Supp. 470. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Corporation did not state cause of action against prospective investors, under RICO; required continuity was not established, as corporation alleged only one scheme, i.e., to steal controlling interest in corporation, corporation was only victim, and seven months that alleged scheme existed was insubstantial period under RICO Act. Wobble Light, Inc. v. McLain/Smigiel Partnership, N.D.Ill.1995, 890 F.Supp. 721. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Limited partnerships were not entitled to granting of motion to dismiss investors' Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims on grounds that investors failed to plead “pattern of racketeering activity,” where complaints clearly alleged that defendants' scheme to induce plaintiffs to invest in partnerships extended over an eight-year time period, and that defendants' fraudulent conduct began in 1981 and 1982 with initial offering of partnerships and continued through administration of partnerships and concealment of fraud through 1980s. Rohland v. Syn-Fuel Associates-1982 Ltd. Partnership, S.D.N.Y.1995, 879 F.Supp. 322. Racket-

eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Complaint met the “pattern” requirement for alleging Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) liability against accounting firm, despite contention of firm that each of its audits was “self-contained unit” which could not form basis of continuous pattern; alleged acts by firm, occurring over a two-year period, were related and continuous. In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, E.D.N.Y.1993, 812 F.Supp. 338. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Purchaser of bank notes did not make sufficient allegations of continuity and activity of criminal nature between bank note printer and auction house necessary to establish pattern of racketeering activity, where limited goal of scheme alleged by purchaser was sale of printer's archives and misrepresentations upon which purchaser relied took place over period of less than one year. Barrett v. U.S. Banknote Corp., S.D.N.Y.1992, 806 F.Supp. 1094. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Racketeering acts of bribery, interstate transportation of stolen vehicle, and arson that were alleged to have common purpose of facilitating control of carting industry by carting cartel and to have occurred over several years furnished basis on which relatedness and continuity could be inferred; thus, required RICO element of pattern was properly pleaded as to that defendant. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Investors in limited partnership failed to allege sufficient continuity to state civil Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against limited partnership's corporate manager, manager's corporate parent, and officer of both corporations in relation to corporate parent's buy out of limited partnership interests, where, at most, predicate acts of wire and mail fraud occurred over period of four months and threatened no future criminal conduct. Hoffman Elec., Inc. v. Emerson Elec. Co., W.D.Pa.1991, 754 F.Supp. 1070. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Employer's allegations about employee's misappropriation of trade secrets and use of such secrets by foreign competitors was sufficient to allege pattern of racketeering activity, as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); employer alleged that one competitor engaged in predicate acts over 13-month period and intended to build plant that would use trade secrets, and other competitor engaged in ten months of predicate acts. Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Min. & Smelting Co., Ltd., N.D.Ohio 1990, 750 F.Supp. 838. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegations in civil RICO complaint, that defendant had conspired with others to commit series of predicate acts for period of approximately nine years in attempt to maintain interest in and control over union local, were sufficient to satisfy RICO's pattern requirement. U.S. v. Gigante, D.N.J.1990, 737 F.Supp. 292. Conspiracy 18

Racketeering plaintiff need not allege more than one scheme, but predicate acts must extend over period of more than few weeks or months, unless there is threat of future criminal conduct. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, Inc., D.Or.1990, 730 F.Supp. 1525. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Complaint which alleged predicate acts over a period of just eight months and a fraud arising out of a single, specialized agreement did not adequately allege continued criminal activity or the threat of continued criminal activity for RICO purposes. Bigay v. Taco Maker, Inc., D.Puerto Rico 1990, 730 F.Supp. 463. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Cable television network failed to adequately plead facts indicating that cable affiliate's conduct presented threat of continuity sufficient to establish pattern of racketeering activity under RICO; although alleged predicate acts were sufficiently interrelated, racketeering activity alleged spanned only three and one-half months, it involved relatively few purported criminal acts and few participants in uncomplicated scheme directed only at network, and there was no indication of any threat of continuing criminal activity by affiliate after purpose of its alleged fraudulent scheme was essentially accomplished. USA Network v. Jones Intercable, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1990, 729 F.Supp. 304. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Restaurant manager's acts of depositing approximately 91 checks due to restaurant with forged payees and endorsements to manager's own account violated RICO and entitled corporate restaurant owner to treble damages and award of attorney fees and expenses; corporation and its banquet and party operations and personnel constituted enterprise, the enterprise was engaged in interstate commerce and activities affecting interstate commerce in view of its purchase of supplies from out of state and customers from other states, and pattern of forgery and endorsements continued for two or three years. MDO Development Corp. v. Kelly, S.D.N.Y.1989, 726 F.Supp. 79, amendment denied 735 F.Supp. 591. Federal Civil Procedure 2737.5; Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 39; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Complaint of electric energy generation and transmission cooperative, although alleging single, albeit lengthy and complex scheme with but single victim, sufficiently alleged that for-profit public utility committed numerous acts of mail and wire fraud over several years to conceal true extent of construction delays and financial dif- ficulties, and to induce cooperative to continue participation in project after cooperative agreed to partially finance project, and thus complaint alleged pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Wabash Valley Power Ass'n, Inc. v. Public Service Co. of Indiana, Inc., S.D.Ind.1988, 678 F.Supp. 757. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

248. Predicate acts, complaint--Generally

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's (PSLRA) RICO Amendment bars a plaintiff from asserting a civil RICO claim premised upon predicate acts of securities fraud, including mail or wire fraud, even where the plaintiff could not bring a private securities law claim against the same defendant. MLSMK Inv. Co. v. JP Mor- gan Chase & Co., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2011, 651 F.3d 268. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 11

Casino operators did not commit predicate criminal acts when they used shuffle-at-will countermeasure to card- counting by blackjack players when count was favorable to players, as required for such practice to support players' claims for violations of federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), New Jer- sey RICO statutes, and RICO provisions of New Jersey Casino Control Act; state regulation allowed casinos, at their discretion, to shuffle at conclusion of any round of play, and, even if regulation was improper exercise of state commission's authority, casino could not be subject to RICO liability for following regulation prior to its

invalidation. Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., C.A.3 (N.J.) 2000, 232 F.3d 173, certiorari denied 121 S.Ct. 2000, 532 U.S. 1038, 149 L.Ed.2d 1003. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 103

Court of Appeals would not construe Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act complaint as containing elements of obstruction of justice as “predicate acts” where that argument was presented for first time at appellate oral argument and where complaint had been pending for more than two years after motion to dismiss was filed. Pujol v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 1987, 829 F.2d 1201. Federal Courts 612.1

The alleged creation and funding of companies in order to hide assets allegedly stolen from investors in Ponzi scheme did not, without more, qualify as a predicate offense under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO). Picard v. Kohn, S.D.N.Y.2012, 907 F.Supp.2d 392. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations 10

Allegations that charitable organization extorted some unnamed business partner at an unknown time, that the organization failed to report the transfer of funds from the United States to Serbia, and that law firm's attorneys committed fraud and other predicate acts did not state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, absent specific allegations that the predicate acts were related or that there was threat of future criminal conduct or series of predicate acts occurring over substantial period of time. Robertson v. Cartinhour, D.D.C.2012, 867 F.Supp.2d 37. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 29

County sufficiently alleged predicate act of bribery to support its civil claims against provider under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in relation to formation and performance of implementation services agreement by alleging that provider engaged in discussions with county employee regarding potential future employment in exchange for employee's assistance in securing additional consulting funds as part of agreement. County of Marin v. Deloitte Consulting LLP, N.D.Cal.2011, 836 F.Supp.2d 1030. Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations 9

Complaint alleging that liquor manufacturers participated in enterprise for laundering proceeds of illegal narcotics sales, in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), adequately pled Travel Act predicate acts, where complaint referred to manufacturers' employees' trips to Aruba to meet with distributors and criminal customers for purpose of negotiating liquor prices and to Columbia for purpose of monitoring manufacturers' distribution chain, complaint included specific facts about those trips, including names of some individuals who participated in them and substance of discussions held, trips were essential to overall scheme, manufacturers were alleged to have actively managed enterprise and knowingly received proceeds of illegal narcotics sales, and alleged scheme was claimed to have operated continuously over many years. Republic of Colombia v. Diageo North America Inc., E.D.N.Y.2007, 531 F.Supp.2d 365, certificate of appealability 619 F.Supp.2d 7. Commerce 82.10

Website owner's allegation that non-profit internet archive organization received pecuniary benefit from the ma-

terial it copied from her website by acquiring continuing grant awards and donations, unjust enrichment, and the expectation of acquiring additional intellectual property was sufficient to sustain claim of criminal copyright infringement as Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate act in owner's racketeering action against archive. Internet Archive v. Shell, D.Colo.2007, 505 F.Supp.2d 755. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim asserted by investors against corporation's officers could not rest on alleged predicate act of securities fraud, where officers were not criminally convicted for securities fraud. Davila Uviles v. RYS Intern. Corp., D.Puerto Rico 2006, 443 F.Supp.2d 233. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Clients' allegations claiming that they had been damaged as a result of legal and financial professionals' alleged scheme to market fraudulent tax shelters were actionable as a securities fraud, and therefore, under Private Se- curities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), clients could not rely on them as predicate acts for a Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; defendants allegedly contacted clients, as part of their scheme, precisely because of client's sale of stock, and took advantage of their knowledge of client's planned securities transaction to induce him to take part in tax shelter transaction. Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., S.D.N.Y.2004, 341 F.Supp.2d 363, amended on reconsideration 2004 WL 2403911. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7; Securities Regulation 60.19

Company failed to identify particular conduct committed by vice presidents formerly employed by company that constituted predicate acts of racketeering activity, as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleging that vice presidents and third party companies engaged in pattern of racketeering activity by conspiring to submit false invoices to company for payment and splitting profits; invoices that company identified as allegedly transmitted did not identify sufficient details regarding transmission via mail or wire or explain how a vice president's isolated transmission furthered their overall fraudulent scheme. Tierney and Partners, Inc. v. Rockman, E.D.Pa.2003, 274 F.Supp.2d 693. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Abortion clinics and women's organization sufficiently alleged RICO predicate acts with respect to antiabortion group; group was alleged to be member of antiabortion enterprise, and to have orchestrated “National Day of Rescue” which affected plaintiff clinics individually and to have made class-wide threats of force and violence against all clinics that provided abortion services. National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, N.D.Ill.1995, 897 F.Supp. 1047. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Plaintiffs asserting RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) cause of action stated claim for bank fraud as predicate criminal act, despite contention that bank was not actual or intended victim of defendants' scheme, by alleging that bank was exposed to potential civil liability or other loss in connection with undersecured loans to defendants, and that defendant misrepresented his authority to bank in diverting and embezz- ling funds. Stiller v. Sumter Bank and Trust Co., M.D.Ga.1994, 860 F.Supp. 835. Banks And Banking 100

Grandchildren's claims of fraud arising out of family members' alleged transfers of grandmother's property that

depleted grandmother's estate alleged at most constructive fraud, not actual fraud and, thus, were insufficient to serve as predicate offenses for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action arising out of transfers of assets that would have passed under residuary clause of grandmother's will to inter vivos trust of which grandchildren were beneficiaries. Firestone v. Galbreath, S.D.Ohio 1990, 747 F.Supp. 1556, affirmed in part 976 F.2d 279, rehearing denied , certified question answered 616 N.E.2d 202, 67 Ohio St.3d 87, answer to certified question conformed to 25 F.3d 323, on remand 895 F.Supp. 917. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 70

Investors in hotel partnership, although satisfying requirements of showing a pattern of racketeering activity, failed to state circumstances of predicate acts with necessary particularity. In re U.S. Grant Hotel Associates, Ltd. Securities Litigation, S.D.Cal.1990, 740 F.Supp. 1460. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Investor had failed to allege predicate acts under RICO upon which pattern of racketeering activity could be found through allegations of churning of commodities account, as commodities were not securities, and after court had dismissed investor's securities claims in connection with deposits and withdrawals from ready assets account. Romano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., E.D.La.1986, 638 F.Supp. 269, affirmed 834 F.2d 523, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 2846, 487 U.S. 1205, 101 L.Ed.2d 883. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Complaint which alleged that defendants, through a series of acts, fraudulently induced plaintiffs to invest in a limited partnership in violation of the federal securities law and continued to conduct the affairs of the partnership in fraudulent manner adequately alleged the commission of two or more acts and the existence of an enterprise for purposes of RICO, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(a-c). Weft, Inc. v. G.C. Inv. Associates, E.D.N.C.1986, 630 F.Supp. 1138, affirmed 822 F.2d 56. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Members of real estate partnership, who alleged that corporation, individual, and others, which had allegedly agreed to provide construction financing, but failed to so provide, had committed several acts of mail fraud and wire fraud by using mails and telephones to make promises and misrepresentations, clearly alleged two or more predicate acts required to state Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations claim, even if those acts were in furtherance of only one intended transaction or objective. LSC Associates v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp., E.D.Pa.1986, 629 F.Supp. 979. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

RICO complaint alleging that defendant conducted enterprise through pattern of racketeering was sufficient to state claim, though elements of predicate act were not alleged. Tarasi v. Dravo Corp., W.D.Pa.1985, 613 F.Supp. 1235. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Complaint grounded solely in securities fraud actions did not state cause of action under this chapter, alleged fraudulent conduct being merely predicate act of racketeering activity prohibited by this chapter. Richardson v. Shearson/American Express Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1983, 573 F.Supp. 133. Commerce 80

Records from appraiser's and his wife's personal accounts at banks and brokerage firms were relevant, and therefore discoverable, in civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in which money laundering was a predicate act for RICO claims alleging a conspiracy by town tax assessor, appraisers, and employees in plaintiff's corporate tax department to inflate plaintiff's real property tax assessments in order to induce plaintiff to hire the appraisers, at excessive fees, to reduce the assessments, with the employees receiving kickbacks from the fees; while alleged money laundering violations may have been complete before appraiser transferred funds from his business accounts to wife's personal accounts, subsequent transactions from personal accounts could constitute additional money laundering violations and could provide or lead to evidence of additional kickbacks. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Camarata, W.D.N.Y.2006, 238 F.R.D. 372. Federal Civil Pro- cedure 1581; Federal Civil Procedure 1586; Privileged Communications And Confidentiality 407

Consumers who brought action against business services corporation, dealers and infomercial actor, stemming from leasing of e-commerce services and products, failed properly to allege that defendants engaged in predicate criminal acts, as required to maintain RICO claim; complaint described diverse and overlapping schemes and activities that were impossible to identify with various defendants, and portions of complaint containing allegations of violations of state civil consumer protection laws did not constitute RICO predicates. Zito v. Leasecomm Corp., S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 22251352, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 70

249. ---- Convictions, predicate acts, complaint

It is not necessary to allege defendant has been convicted of one of enumerated offenses, commonly referred to as “predicate acts,” in order to bring civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim. Rindal v. Seckler Co. Inc., D.Mont.1992, 786 F.Supp. 890. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 5

Civil RICO [18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)] allegations that defendants used mail and wire services to transmit false statements to further fraudulent sale of securities were sufficient to withstand dismissal motion; in particular, it was not necessary that there have been allegations of criminal convictions of the predicate acts to establish a “pattern of racketeering activity.” Morley v. Cohen, D.C.Md.1985, 610 F.Supp. 798. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Prior criminal conviction of defendant of underlying predicate offenses is not prerequisite to private civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hardin, E.D.Tenn.1985, 608 F.Supp. 348. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 19

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act action by brokerage house against investor alleging conspiracy to manipulate market for securities could not stand where there was no allegation that investor was convicted of any predicate act. Rooney Pace, Inc. v. Reid, S.D.N.Y.1985, 605 F.Supp. 158. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Absence of allegations in complaint that officer of corporation was convicted of underlying predicate acts was

not fatal to civil cause of action against officer under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. State of Okl. ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v. Children's Shelter, Inc., W.D.Okla.1985, 604 F.Supp. 867. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 19

Allegations that account managers fraudulently misvalued assets and liquidated investors' account in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act did not state claim under Act, in absence of allegation of criminal convictions on underlying predicate offenses or under Act, or of allegation of racketeering injury. Mod- ern Settings, Inc. v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1985, 603 F.Supp. 370. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Civil action under this chapter is not required to include allegations of criminal convictions of the alleged racketeering activity or a separate and distinct racketeering injury to constitute a cognizable cause of action. Ora Corp. v. Vinson, D.C.S.C.1984, 596 F.Supp. 1546. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Plaintiffs seeking civil recovery under this section were not required to allege defendants had been convicted of the predicate offenses comprising the pattern of racketeering activity. In re Longhorn Securities Litigation, W.D.Okla.1983, 573 F.Supp. 255. Commerce 80

Limited partners' counterclaim under this chapter asserted against defendant limited partnership and related parties failed to satisfy requirements of pleading a prior criminal conviction and alleging a racketeering injury and therefore failed to satisfy tests for pleading civil liability under this chapter. In re Lion Capital Group, Bkrt- cy.S.D.N.Y.1984, 44 B.R. 690. Federal Civil Procedure 636

250. ---- Extortion, predicate acts, complaint

Pleading was insufficient to allege Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate act of extortion in violation of federal or New York law where complaint did not identify the victims of the alleged extortion and indicate that some use or threat of force, however indirect, was used to compel their consent to part with property. U.S. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, E.D.N.Y.2007, 518 F.Supp.2d 422. Extortion 33

Police officer failed to plead viable Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against his superiors based on use or threatened use of authority in unlawful manner because conduct alleged was clearly not chargeable under Massachusetts extortion statute and officer claimed violations of extortion statute as predicate acts. Broderick v. Roache, D.Mass.1990, 751 F.Supp. 290. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 70

Racketeering complaint alleging instructions to Oregon corporation to pay kickback, California corporation's refusal to perform contract for shipments of logs unless Oregon corporation paid kickback, and threat to tear up contract unless Oregon corporation made various contract concessions stated attempted extortion, interstate or international travel in order to extort kickback and contract concessions, and predicate acts under RICO, although allegations concerning fear could have been stated more strongly. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling

Consultants, Inc., D.Or.1990, 730 F.Supp. 1525. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Person who alleged that he granted security interest in property to secure promissory note given to cover over- draft of his wife's employer because his wife had been threatened with prosecution if he did not do so adequately alleged blackmail or extortion as a racketeering activity under RICO. Ford v. Citizens and Southern Nat. Bank, N.D.Ga.1988, 700 F.Supp. 1121. Extortion 19

251. ---- Mail and wire fraud, predicate acts, complaint

Companies that sued city development authority and developers, challenging urban redevelopment project, failed to adequately aver that developers acquired or maintained interest in or control of authority or city council through alleged predicate acts of wire fraud, as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); such acts, at best, demonstrated misrepresentation rather than control. Tal v. Hogan, C.A.10 (Okla.) 2006, 453 F.3d 1244, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1334, 549 U.S. 1209, 167 L.Ed.2d 81. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Corporate salesman did not adequately plead predicate act of mail and wire fraud to support his Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against corporate officers and directors by alleging that corporate president stated that shares of stock given to salesman in settlement of salesman's action against corporation would be registered, and that corporation subsequently registered shares for president and other corporate managers, but not for salesman; that allegation did not bear on president's intent when settlement was executed. Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1993, 12 F.3d 1170. Postal Service 48(4.3); Telecommunica- tions 1014(12)

Physician and his clinic adequately alleged predicate acts on part of insurer, its counsel, and its litigation consultant in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action; physician alleged that, through mails, insurer and counsel sent false letter to other insurers regarding clinic's unconventional cancer treatment, counsel filed fraudulent pleadings in action against physician, consultant filed false federal grant applications, defendants provided false information about clinic to federal investigators, and insurer denied coverage to its own insureds for treatment at clinic. In re Burzynski, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1993, 989 F.2d 733. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Alleged shareholder failed to produce any evidence to support his contention that former attorney for corporation and former president intended to participate in any fraudulent scheme to induce alleged shareholder to buy another shareholder's stock and, accordingly, failed to establish mail and wire fraud as predicate acts for Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Pelletier v. Zweifel, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1991, 921 F.2d 1465, rehearing denied 931 F.2d 901, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 167, 502 U.S. 855, 116 L.Ed.2d 131. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Allegations by former agent of limited liability corporation that various businesses and organization that provided business reliability ratings to consumers engaged in mail and wire fraud, as well as money laundering, were insufficient to plead with specificity predicate acts constituting a pattern of racketeering activity, as re-

quired for agent's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, absent allegations as to the contents of the allegedly fraudulent wirings and mailings. Chubirko v. Better Business Bureau of Southern Piedmont, Inc., W.D.N.C.2011, 763 F.Supp.2d 759. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Attorney's allegations that three of his former clients and their current legal counsel engaged in “litigation activities,” such as mailing legal documents and requests for adjournments, in connection with their “phony” and “frivolous” legal malpractice actions against attorney, were insufficient to plead predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, as required to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; allegations at best attempted to make out malicious prosecution claim. Curtis & Associates, P.C. v. Law Offices of David M. Bush- man, Esq., E.D.N.Y.2010, 758 F.Supp.2d 153, affirmed 443 Fed.Appx. 582, 2011 WL 4839089. Postal Service 35(10); Telecommunications 1014(8)

Licensor sufficiently alleged that licensing agent owed it right of honest services to state wire and mail fraud claims during period before agent was hired as exclusive licensing agent, by virtue of its employment to negoti- ate licensing agreements that would maximize licensor's profits, and licensor sufficiently alleged that agent deprived licensor of such services by its double-dealing with licensees. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Jakks Pacific, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2007, 530 F.Supp.2d 486, affirmed 328 Fed.Appx. 695, 2009 WL 1391807. Postal Service 35(9); Telecommunications 1014(10)

Client and its shareholders alleged predicate acts of racketeering activity, i.e., mail and wire fraud, sufficiently to state a claim against law firm that had been client's corporate counsel for violation of the Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where they alleged that attorneys employed by the firm sent various documents, via United States mail and/or e-mail, which contained intentional misrepresentations concerning operation and leadership of client, that law firm failed to disclose information about client to shareholder, and that law firm owed a fiduciary duty to them and that this failure to disclose caused them harm. Design Pallets, Inc. v. GrayRobinson, P.A., M.D.Fla.2007, 515 F.Supp.2d 1246. Postal Service 35(10); Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 70; Telecommunications 1014(8)

Investors who sued ambulance services, affiliates and officers, alleging that they were induced to invest through series of misrepresentations, failed to aver predicate acts of mail fraud with specificity, as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); complaint did not explain what purported solicitation forms were, what information they contained, when documents were mailed, or who sent them. De- Fazio v. Wallis, E.D.N.Y.2007, 500 F.Supp.2d 197. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Debtors met particularity requirement for pleading mail fraud and wire fraud as predicate acts, in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against lender and others, where the complaint alleged that defendants used the mails and interstate telephone system in furtherance of a pattern of racketeering activity and collection of unlawful debt and to otherwise defraud plaintiffs, and the complaint outlined the alleged scheme to defraud them of their home and pled a time frame for the scheme, specific persons, entities, and times connected with the fraud, and the general contents of the alleged fraudulent communications between defendants and the debtors. Williams v. Equity Holding Corp., E.D.Va.2007, 498 F.Supp.2d 831. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Home improvement company satisfied requirement of pleading with particularity the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, in action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against its former independent-contractor salesman and other defendants; complaint alleged that mail and wire fraud were undertaken in furtherance of scheme to defraud company of payments made by its customers and also alleged a series of credit card charges made in connection with scheme to order raw materials with no intention of paying, and complaint set forth, in detail, payments and charges made, dates and amounts of checks, and dates upon which credit was alleged to have been fraudulently obtained. SKS Constructors, Inc. v. Drinkwine, E.D.N.Y.2006, 458 F.Supp.2d 68. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Insurer did not engage in mail or wire fraud, as predicate act to claim brought by medical service providers and pharmacies against insurer under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), by providing explanation of payments (EOPs), explanation of benefits (EOBs), circulars, and remittances to providers, which alerted providers to possibility that they were not getting paid to extent they should have been paid, and which otherwise did not contain any misleading information. Sanchez v. Triple-S Management Corp., D.Puerto Rico 2006, 446 F.Supp.2d 48, affirmed 492 F.3d 1, certiorari denied 128 S.Ct. 806, 552 U.S. 1076, 169 L.Ed.2d 606. Postal Service 35(10); Telecommunications 1014(8)

Allegations by investors that corporation's officer engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity involving the predicate acts of mail fraud and wire fraud did not state claim against officer under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), absent allegations of the time, place, and content of the alleged fraudulent communications,. Davila Uviles v. RYS Intern. Corp., D.Puerto Rico 2006, 443 F.Supp.2d 233. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Consumers adequately pled claim that credit counseling agencies committed predicate acts of mail and wire fraud in connection with their scheme to induce them to pay exorbitant up-front and monthly fees for debt management plans (DMP) that agencies would never implement, in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where consumers alleged that defendants engaged in scheme to appropriate hundreds of dollars from individual consumers under guise of debt management, repeatedly used both telephone and mail to conduct their fraudulent scheme, and intended to defraud them, and that they reasonably relied on defendants' misrepresentations. Baker v. Family Credit Counseling Corp., E.D.Pa.2006, 440 F.Supp.2d 392. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Inasmuch as mailing of allegedly fraudulent invoice was not cause of injuries suffered by clients as result of attorney's allegedly negligent handling of their case, alleged mail fraud resulting from sending of invoices was not predicate act of racketeering that could support civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) claim. Kirk v. Heppt, S.D.N.Y.2006, 423 F.Supp.2d 147. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

With respect to her civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against county defendants, physician's assistant failed to plead predicate act of mail fraud even if her CPR cards had been altered or forged, thereby becoming false or “fraudulent” representations sent to heart association since the CPR cards were not themselves alleged to be the means of obtaining money or property, and were not such as to “reasonably influ-

ence a person to part with money or property.” MacArthur v. San Juan County, D.Utah 2005, 416 F.Supp.2d 1098, appeal dismissed 495 F.3d 1157. Postal Service 35(8)

Bank's failures to disclose certain matters to innocent insiders of Italian debtor company relevant to certain allegedly fraudulent transactions were alleged in sufficient detail to state claim for mail and wire fraud as civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate acts; complaint alleged that bank was debtor's financial advisor and thus had a fiduciary duty under North Carolina law to disclose such information. In re Parmalat Securities Litigation, S.D.N.Y.2006, 412 F.Supp.2d 392. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Automobile insurer sufficiently alleged agreement to commit predicate acts to state claim for Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy against treating physicians who acted in “support role” by alleging that physicians conspired and agreed with others to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in scheme to conduct unnecessary diagnostic testing of insureds who had been in automobile accidents through a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of repeated violations of the federal mail fraud statute, by submitting fraudulent bills for unnecessary testing. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. CPT Medical Services, P.C., E.D.N.Y.2005, 375 F.Supp.2d 141. Conspiracy 18

Where communications that were pled by plaintiff as predicate acts of wire fraud in support of her civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) all occurred in Puerto Rico, and did not extend across state lines, such communications could not violate federal wire fraud statute and were insufficient to qualify as predicate acts required by RICO. Hernandez v. Ballesteros, D.Puerto Rico 2004, 333 F.Supp.2d 6, affirmed 449 F.3d 240, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 964, 549 U.S. 1128, 166 L.Ed.2d 732. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10; Telecommunications 1014(12)

Allegations in investors' civil complaint under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), that defendants had on more than two occasions illegally used United States mails and made phone calls in furtherance of scheme to defraud investors in connection with real estate transaction, did not sufficiently allege predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, where all of the parties in question were New York residents, and where conclusory language in investors' allegation was unsupported by facts in body of complaint. Bernstein v. Misk, E.D.N.Y.1997, 948 F.Supp. 228. Fraud 41; Telecommunications 1014(12)

Allegations that defendants used interstate wires “on numerous occasions” to misrepresent sales levels of limited partnership and that defendants “periodically” misrepresented financial status of partnership through use of interstate wires between Florida, New York, and Illinois, were insufficient to constitute predicate acts under Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); court was left to speculate as to which specific defendant made use of wires on each particular occasion and dates of such use, as well as exact frequency of such use. Bajorat v. Columbia-Breckenridge Development Corp., N.D.Ill.1996, 944 F.Supp. 1371. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Developers failed to plead predicate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) acts of mail and wire fraud with requisite particularity regarding alleged scheme to remove soil from and deposit waste ma-

terials at construction site; complaint failed to set forth general content, date, or place of any alleged misrepresentations and identity of persons making them, failed to connect alleged fraud to individual defendants, and provided no supporting allegations upon which developers' information and belief was founded. Colony at Hol- brook, Inc. v. Strata G.C., Inc., E.D.N.Y.1996, 928 F.Supp. 1224. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Former employee was precluded from bringing suit against principal officer of employer, under RICO, alleging that he had been misled into continuing to work for corporations without compensation based upon oral promise that he would be paid; there were no allegations that mail fraud or wire fraud was involved, as necessary to show “pattern of racketeering activity.” Coyer v. Hemmer, D.N.J.1995, 901 F.Supp. 872. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Plaintiff failed to allege predicate acts to meet pattern element of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tion Act (RICO), where plaintiff failed to demonstrate reliance on any representation or omission by defendant, and thus failed to allege any cognizable acts of mail and wire fraud. Gruntal & Co., Inc. v. San Diego Bancorp, S.D.N.Y.1995, 901 F.Supp. 607. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Oil well royalty interest holders failed to state claim against well lessee, for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision prohibiting acquiring or maintaining interest in or control of enterprise affecting interstate commerce through pattern of racketeering activity, by alleging that lessee engaged in series of predicate acts of mail fraud by mailing royalty checks and other documents to holders without disclosing that lessee was deducting state statutory privilege fee; holders did not allege that lessee's mail fraud caused lessee to gain or maintain control of enterprise to holders' injury. Hilliard v. Shell Western E & P, Inc., W.D.Mich.1995, 885 F.Supp. 169, reconsideration denied 1995 WL 549259. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims failed to articulate any predicate acts upon which liability could attach, absent viable allegations concerning contents of purported mail and wire fraud, or any justifiable reliance thereon; plaintiffs failed to describe content of interstate letters and telephone calls relied upon, and fact that defendants communicated amongst themselves about something did not constitute “mail fraud” or meet particularity standards required for pleading fraud. Scheiner v. Wallace, S.D.N.Y.1994, 860 F.Supp. 991. Federal Civil Procedure 636; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Complaint alleging two specific instances of mail fraud as RICO predicate act offenses satisfied particularity requirements for pleading fraud; plaintiff's alleged that defendant wrote letter to state official on specified date and that defendant again furthered conspiracy when using mail he wrote to state agency informing agency that permit applicant's proposed municipal solid waste landfill site did not comply with county plan. Pine Ridge Recyc- ling, Inc. v. Butts County, Ga., M.D.Ga.1994, 855 F.Supp. 1264. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Incidents alleged in insureds' complaint were insufficient to constitute predicate acts of mail or wire fraud in support of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act claims against underwriters and others; facts asserted failed to establish predicate act or any tainted illegality, mail or wire fraud should have been pled with particularity, and insureds failed to articulate single fraudulent statement that was allegedly transmitted or

received by wire. Scheiner v. Wallace, S.D.N.Y.1993, 832 F.Supp. 687. Postal Service 48(4.1); Telecom- munications 1014(12)

Plaintiff pled underlying Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate acts of mail and wire fraud with sufficient particularity, despite fact that plaintiff did not allege substantial number of specific instances when defendants utilized mail or wire facilities in furtherance of their alleged fraudulent scheme; plaintiff alleged that various members of alleged RICO enterprise had telephone conversations over interstate telephone lines in connection with fraudulent contract proposals which were submitted by defendants to plaintiff and that fraudulent contract proposals, invoices, and time sheets were sent by United States mail, all allegedly in furtherance of defendants' racketeering scheme. Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, D.Del.1992, 821 F.Supp. 232. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Borrowers adequately alleged scheme to defraud element of mail fraud as predicate act under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by alleging that lenders repeatedly made misrepresentations and omissions as to meaning of “prime rate” used to compute interest rate, rate of interest charged on multiple loans, material terms for repayment, and total amount of debt to be repaid; alleged fraudulent scheme was not limited to inducement of original loans, but included repeated refusal to provide information and use of higher interest rates than those promised. Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 213, affirmed 99 F.3d 401. Postal Service 35(11.1)

When mail and wire fraud are alleged as predicate acts for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) purposes, time, place, speaker, and content of allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations must be specified, manner in which alleged misrepresentations were fraudulent must be alleged, fraudulent intent must be alleged, and specifics of purported use of mails and wires must be alleged. Browning Ave. Realty Corp. v. Rosenshein, S.D.N.Y.1991, 774 F.Supp. 129. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Mail and wire fraud predicates of racketeering action were not pleaded by limited partnership investors' allegations that accounting firm and partnerships' promoters intentionally used mail delivery or wire communications in furtherance of fraudulent scheme or aiding and abetting of it and that uses of mail included transmittal of firm's private placement memorandums, tax opinion, and financial reports. Duke v. Touche Ross & Co., S.D.N.Y.1991, 765 F.Supp. 69. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Failure to allege use of interstate wires in pleading alleging wire fraud as predicate offense for Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act precluded claim. Marriott Bros. v. Gage, N.D.Tex.1988, 704 F.Supp. 731, opinion supplemented on denial of reconsideration 717 F.Supp. 458, affirmed 911 F.2d 1105, rehearing denied. Telecommunications 1014(12)

Tenant's failure to allege any predicate acts based on mail fraud precluded her from stating RICO claim; although tenant alleged that defendants committed numerous predicate acts of mail fraud by mailing her bills for attorney fees that she alleged were illegal, tenant alleged nothing fraudulent about the billed amounts. Chambers v. Habitat Co., C.A.7 (Ill.) 2003, 68 Fed.Appx. 711, 2003 WL 21377492, Unreported, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 1064, 540 U.S. 1119, 157 L.Ed.2d 913. Federal Civil Procedure

636

252. Racketeering activity, complaint

Allegations in borrower's complaint, that lender engaged in scheme or artifice to defraud by mailing out letters to working-class borrowers who generally lacked high degree of mathematical acumen implying that lender was prepared to offer them additional loans, when in fact what lender was offering was opportunity to refinance existing loans at cost far in excess of that of new borrowing, were sufficient to state civil RICO claim based on alleged predicate acts of mail fraud, even absent any violation of Truth in Lending Act or existence of fiduciary relationship between lender and borrower. Emery v. American General Finance, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1995, 71 F.3d 1343, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied , on remand 938 F.Supp. 495. Postal Service 35(10)

Surgeon's complaint challenging summary suspension of his staff privileges at hospital failed to state claim under civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); surgeon failed to allege violation of any of predicate acts set forth in RICO and, thus, could not establish “racketeering activity” under statute, nor had surgeon alleged at least two predicate acts of racketeering activity that were related and posed threat of continued criminal activity, as required to plead requisite “pattern” of racketeering activity. Canady v. Providence Hosp., D.D.C.1995, 903 F.Supp. 125. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70; Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegations which were basis of fraud, securities fraud and fraudulent inducement claims in sale of business did not demonstrate predicate acts of racketeering activity necessary to establish claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where court previously determined that same allegations had no factual support. Gutenkauf v. Mills-Jennings Co., D.Mont.1990, 784 F.Supp. 1520, affirmed 953 F.2d 1387. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Alleged violations of New York Penal Law consisting of first-degree grand larceny and first-degree falsifying of

business records with respect to construction project did not satisfy definition of “racketeering activity” for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) purposes, and such violations accordingly would not satisfy RICO's predicate act requirement. Browning Ave. Realty Corp. v. Rosenshein, S.D.N.Y.1991, 774 F.Supp. 129. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 10

Civil RICO plaintiffs, in conclusorily pleading mail fraud, wire fraud, interstate transportation of stolen property, extortion, embezzlement, false pretenses, and violations of Nevada insurance and racketeering laws, thereby failed to sufficiently plead racketeering acts underlying their claim for relief; embezzlement, false pretenses, and violation of state insurance or racketeering laws may not constitute racketeering activity under RICO, and allegations as to other underlying acts were not pled with sufficient particularity, in that actual wrongdoers were not identified and there was no indication as to times or places of alleged criminal acts. Does 1-60 v. Republic Health Corp., D.Nev.1987, 669 F.Supp. 1511. Federal Civil Procedure 636; Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Complaint by computer equipment manufacturer alleging that, in connection with conspiracy to defraud manufacturer of money owed for purchase of equipment, defendants misappropriated to themselves deposits toward purchase of manufacturer's equipment, sold manufacturer's equipment to purchasers outside intended resale area, passed worthless checks through mails, misrepresented corporation as authorized dealer for manufacturer after termination of manufacturer's contract, and tried to blackmail manufacturer by conditioning repayment of monies owed on manufacturer's continuing to ship equipment after termination of contract, sufficiently alleged “racketeering activity” under provisions of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961(1), 1962(b, c)]. Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Burts, D.C.Md.1984, 612 F.Supp. 441. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Failure of customer, in suit against broker-dealer and its registered representative, to allege a link with organized crime, racketeering activity or a distinct racketeering enterprise injury did not preclude her from maintaining a count under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, where complaint set forth the requisite inferences of racketeering activity involving fraud in the sale of securities, and the complaint's asserted RICO injury was sufficient. Finn v. Davis, S.D.Fla.1985, 602 F.Supp. 801. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Securities fraud allegations of at least two acts of fraud by individual defendant in connection with purchase and sale of securities satisfied “racketeering activity” pleading requisite, even though allegations were not premises on connection between defendant and organized crime. Somerville v. Major Exploration, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1983, 576 F.Supp. 902. Commerce 80

Bankruptcy judge's actions in denying debtor's petition for conversion of proceedings from Chapter 7 to Chapter 11 was not “racketeering activity” so as to support claim by debtor's controlling shareholder against bankruptcy judge and others alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.; rather, judge was carrying out legal responsibility in reaching decision whether to allow conversion, given debtor's failure to resolve problems with principal secured creditor in two previous reorganization

cases and lack of change in circumstances. Zurkowsky v. Government Development Bank for P.R. (GDB), D.C.Puerto Rico 1985, 52 B.R. 1007. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

253. Reliance, complaint

Plaintiff asserting a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim predicated on mail fraud need not show as an element of its claim that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations; abrogating VanDenBroeck v. CommonPoint Mortgage Co., 210 F.3d 696 (C.A.6 2000); Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F.3d 1350 (C.A.11 2002). Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., U.S.2008, 128 S.Ct. 2131, 553 U.S. 639, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Used car purchasers failed to allege they actually relied on financing company's allegedly fraudulent mailings and, thus, purchaser's Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim which was based upon financing company's mail fraud had to be dismissed. Chisolm v. TranSouth Financial Corp., C.A.4 (Va.) 1996, 95 F.3d 331. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Judgment creditor did not rely to its detriment on bank's alleged misrepresentations regarding judgment credit- or's accounts, as required to support creditor's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim predicated on mail and wire fraud, rather, creditor did not believe bank's representations and acted accordingly, by hiring private investigators and attempting to reach debtor's holdings through Panamanian court system. Super Vision Intern., Inc. v. Mega Intern. Commercial Bank Co., Ltd., S.D.Fla.2008, 534 F.Supp.2d 1326. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Allegation that defendant watch importers deceived Customs in order to preclude plaintiff from importing watches was sufficient to state claim for mail fraud, as predicate offense in RICO suit; requirement of reliance was satisfied by allegation that Customs was deceived by defendants' mailed misrepresentations, resulting in plaintiff's injury, regardless of whether plaintiff himself detrimentally relied upon misrepresentations. Shaw v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1989, 726 F.Supp. 969. Postal Service 35(2)

254. Conclusory allegations, complaint

General conclusory allegations that defendants had helped to carry on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO) enterprise, without sufficient allegation that defendants had participated in any predicate acts of mail or wire fraud, were not sufficient, in civil RICO action, to satisfy special pleading requirements for allegations of fraud. First Interregional Advisors Corp. v. Wolff, S.D.N.Y.1997, 956 F.Supp. 480. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Companies' conclusory allegations of multiemployer pension fund trustees' interstate use of mails and telephones and physical travel to various states were insufficient to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) for conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity; companies did not clearly allege essential elements of alleged predicate crimes of kickbacks to person involved with employee benefit plan, mail fraud, wire fraud and conversion of funds by labor organization. Chicago Truck Drivers, Help-

ers and Warehouse Workers Union (Independent) Pension Fund v. Brotherhood Labor Leasing, E.D.Mo.1996, 950 F.Supp. 1454, amended on denial of reconsideration 974 F.Supp. 751, affirmed 141 F.3d 1167. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Vague and conclusory allegations that persons conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise through actions taken by unnamed persons at unspecified times and places were not sufficient to state a Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Buck Creek Coal, Inc. v. United Workers of America, S.D.Ind.1995, 917 F.Supp. 601. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Purchasers' bald and conclusory allegations concerning vendors' alleging fraud in connection with sale of apartment complex in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) did not meet requirement that fraud be pleaded with particularity. Monarch Normandy Square Partners v. Normandy Square Asso- ciates Ltd. Partnership, D.Kan.1993, 817 F.Supp. 908. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Conclusory allegations that defendants conspired with each other to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) are insufficient to state conspiracy; rather, complaint must allege facts implying agreement under which each defendant committed at least two predicate acts. Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 213, affirmed 99 F.3d 401. Conspiracy 18

Investors' general, conclusory claims about misrepresentations and omissions in private placement memoranda for limited partnerships with respect to conflicts of interest, fees, and expenses were insufficient to allow investors to prevail in actions brought against promoter, law firm and others under federal securities laws and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Kushner v. DBG Property Investors, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1161. Securities Regulation 60.53

Conclusory allegation in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint that defendants had perpetrated “similar frauds against others” was insufficient to satisfy Rule requiring that fraud be pleaded with particularity. Gott v. Simpson, D.Me.1990, 745 F.Supp. 765. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Conclusory allegation that plaintiff was charged usurious rates by defendant was not adequate to show an attempt to collect an unlawful debt in violation of RICO. Blount Financial Services, Inc. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., E.D.Tenn.1986, 632 F.Supp. 240, affirmed 819 F.2d 151. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Statement of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968] plaintiff that market studies it conducted were valuable and are a trade secret misappropriated by defendant corporation and its officers was a conclusion and not a factual allegation sufficient to state claim under RICO. Van Dorn Co., Cent. States Can Co. Div. v. Howington, N.D.Ohio 1985, 623 F.Supp. 1548. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Plaintiff's allegations that state defendants participated in a conspiracy whose object was to acquire plaintiff's in-

terest in a showroom extravaganza through a pattern of racketeering was too vague and conclusory to state a cause of action and in any event this chapter was not intended to cover such a circumstance. Productions & Leasing v. Hotel Conquistador, Inc., D.C.Nev.1982, 573 F.Supp. 717, affirmed 709 F.2d 21. Conspiracy 18

255. Aiding and abetting, complaint

Borrower stated civil RICO claim against bank that financed her purchase of automobile by alleging that bank, in order to avoid informing customers of their rights under Federal Trade Commission regulations, hid its referral relationship with insurance agents and automobile dealers; even if only dealers had direct duty to comply with regulations, borrower sufficiently alleged that bank aided and abetted violation of that duty as part of scheme to defraud to charge predicate acts of mail and wire fraud. Brown v. LaSalle Northwest Nat. Bank, N.D.Ill.1993, 820 F.Supp. 1078. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Even if “fraud in sale of securities” Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action imposed RICO liability only on parties to actual sale of securities, plaintiffs alleged with sufficient particularity facts that accounting firm aided and abetted, and conspired in actual sale of securities, where complaint alleged that accountant with firm assisted with preparation of registration statements knowing such statements to be materially false and knowing that certain defendants would realize inflated proceeds. In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litiga- tion, E.D.N.Y.1993, 812 F.Supp. 338. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

For joint venturer to recover from joint venture's accountant for aiding and abetting wire and mail fraud alleged as predicate acts for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, joint venturer had to allege that its injury was direct or reasonably foreseeable result of conduct complained of. Browning Ave. Re- alty Corp. v. Rosenshein, S.D.N.Y.1991, 774 F.Supp. 129. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Allegations by investors that public accounting firm consented to inclusion of its reports on corporation's false financial statements in registration statements and other reports and knowingly concealed true financial condition were sufficient to set forth requisite intent to aid and abet violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by assisting at least two underlying predicate acts of fraud. In re Sahlen & Asso- ciates, Inc. Securities Litigation, S.D.Fla.1991, 773 F.Supp. 342. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 50

256. Striking of allegations, complaint

Alleged Ponzi scheme investors' allegations relating to alleged bankruptcy fraud would be stricken from complaint as immaterial to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims, given that investors failed to plead bankruptcy fraud allegations with particularity, complaint did not allege that any investor suffered injury cognizable under RICO as result of such acts, and bankruptcy fraud allegations were not relevant to continuity and relatedness requirements of RICO. Burke v. Dowling, E.D.N.Y.1995, 944 F.Supp. 1036. Fed- eral Civil Procedure 1126

Plaintiff's demand for punitive damages would not be stricken in plaintiff's complaint alleging civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims and state law claims, including claims for common- law fraud and willful breach of fiduciary duty; although punitive damages were not proper under RICO, state law claims were ones to which punitive damages could properly be appended. Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, D.Del.1992, 821 F.Supp. 232. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85

Portions of civil RICO complaint alleging associations of certain defendants with organized crime and containing information about criminal charges previously brought against defendants were not “immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter” and thus would not be stricken from complaint. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Federal Civil Procedure 1127

Inclusion in the complaint of criminal pleas are not subject to a motion to strike where they form the factual basis for alleged racketeering acts, in a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action. Javier H. v. Garcia-Botello, W.D.N.Y.2006, 239 F.R.D. 342. Federal Civil Procedure 1127

Paragraph in complaint seeking damages under this chapter for fraudulent activities would not be stricken as containing immaterial matter when paragraphs referred to payments made by certain defendants to officials of International Longshoremen's Association, in light of fact that plaintiff's theory was apparently that defendants used funds generated by fraudulent billing of plaintiff to make illegal payments to labor officials and it could not be said there was no logical connection between bribery of union officials and fraudulent billing of plaintiff. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, S.D.N.Y.1982, 94 F.R.D. 48. Federal Civil Procedure 1126

257. Amendment of complaint

District court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' second motion for extension of time in which to amend their complaint to replead Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim after RICO claim was dismissed for failure to set forth predicate acts of mail and wire fraud with particularity, where court had originally granted extension of three weeks, discovery had been underway for five months, plaintiffs did not request second extension until day amended complaint was due, and plaintiffs indicated that ten day extension would be sufficient. Nitro Distributing, Inc. v. Alticor, Inc., C.A.8 (Mo.) 2009, 565 F.3d 417, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 1074, 558 U.S. 1114, 175 L.Ed.2d 887. Federal Civil Procedure 1838

Trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow plaintiffs to amend their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint to allege reliance on defendant's allegedly fraudulent letter where it was possible that plaintiffs could plead facts showing reliance and no discovery had been conducted nor had complaint been previously substantively amended. Chisolm v. TranSouth Financial Corp., C.A.4 (Va.) 1996, 95 F.3d 331. Federal Civil Procedure 839.1

District court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend complaint, even though district court concluded that amendment of plaintiff's complaint would be futile, where no responsive pleadings were filed, and district court assumed incorrectly that closed-ended form of continuity required to establish Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) claim could not be established absent showing that predicate acts

occurred during period lasting more than one year, and that open-ended continuity could not be established because plaintiff had terminated the defendants' employment. Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1995, 65 F.3d 1523. Federal Civil Procedure 825; Federal Civil Procedure 851

Outdoor advertising company was not entitled to amend complaint against competitor to state cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) or a civil conspiracy claim under South Car- olina law; those theories were available to company ten years before when it initially brought suit and statute of limitations had expired on both claims. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Advertising, Inc., C.A.4 (S.C.) 1992, 974 F.2d 502. Federal Civil Procedure 840

District court did not abuse its discretion in denying journalists opportunity to file third amended complaint in their civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action where journalists acknowledged that amended complaint would not have altered claims or added new parties, causes of action, or additional relief. Avirgan v. Hull, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1991, 932 F.2d 1572, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 913, 502 U.S. 1048, 116 L.Ed.2d 813. Federal Civil Procedure 851

It was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to permit plaintiff to amend complaint charging employer with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which led to his alleged wrongful termination, where complaint made clear that plaintiff lacked standing because his injury was caused by alleged wrongful termination, and was not the result of alleged predicate acts of racketeering; it would not have been possible for plaintiff to amend complaint to allege a completely new injury that would confer standing to sue without contradicting any of the allegations of his original complaint. Reddy v. Litton Industries, Inc., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1990, 912 F.2d 291, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 332, 502 U.S. 921, 116 L.Ed.2d 272. Federal Civil Pro- cedure 851

Plaintiff's failure to incorporate separately alleged mail and wire fraud allegations within count alleging violation of the Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968] was readily correct- able by amendment, and did not justify dismissal of action for failure to state a claim. Kempe v. Monitor Inter- mediaries, Inc., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1986, 785 F.2d 1443. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Plaintiffs seeking private civil damage remedy of RICO [18 U.S.C.A. § 1964] were entitled to amend their pleadings and attempt to reallege mail and wire fraud allegations with more specificity under liberal reading of complaints required by the notice pleading theory underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 1 et seq.], where the allegations were not sufficiently specific to state a cause of action under RICO [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968]. Ray v. Karris, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1985, 780 F.2d 636. Federal Civil Procedure 636; Federal Civil Procedure 839.1

Where shareholder did not have standing to maintain action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act, district court did not err in denying shareholder's motion to amend his complaint to add new defendants and new claims. Warren v. Manufacturers Nat. Bank of Detroit, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1985, 759 F.2d 542. Federal Civil Procedure 286; Federal Civil Procedure 841

It was not abuse of discretion to refuse to permit purchasers of residential realty to file fourth amended complaint adding claim under this section against subdivision developers where motion was not filed until after developers completed must of their discovery in anticipation of trial date less than two months hence. Darms v. McCulloch Oil Corp., C.A.8 (Ark.) 1983, 720 F.2d 490. Federal Civil Procedure 840

Foreign corporations and their sole shareholder were not entitled to leave to file an amended complaint, in action against former managers and advisors, arising out of their alleged unauthorized sale of corporate assets to other foreign corporations, where plaintiffs failed to indicate what new allegations they would make or how they would cure their defective Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, and plaintiffs' proposed new allegations, which purportedly showed continuity of defendants' pattern of racketeering, would not strengthen the RICO claim that the disparate players involved in defendants' purported schemes formed an ongoing organization or functioned as a unit. Cedar Swamp Holdings, Inc. v. Zaman, S.D.N.Y.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 444. Federal Civil Procedure 851

Complaint filed by company, describing former vice presidents' scheme to defraud it by conspiring with other entities to submit false invoices for company's payment and to split profits, satisfied normal federal pleading standards but did not satisfy peculiar pleading requirements of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and warranted dismissal without prejudice to allow company to file amended complaint accompan- ied by RICO case statement that court would consider as part of amended pleading. Tierney and Partners, Inc. v. Rockman, E.D.Pa.2003, 274 F.Supp.2d 693. Federal Civil Procedure 1838; Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 70

Although prior ruling dismissing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims with respect to two limited partnerships limited case to single investor and his claims relating to one partnership, investor could amend complaint to add additional investors and additional facts; plaintiff had standing to assert RICO claim alleging single scheme whereby all three funds were involved, although he was limited in recovery to the injury he suffered with respect to the one fund. Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., W.D.Pa.1996, 947 F.Supp. 180, on subsequent appeal 161 F.3d 156, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 1460, 526 U.S. 1067, 143 L.Ed.2d 546. Federal Civil Procedure 392; Federal Civil Procedure 839.1

District court would not grant plaintiff's leave to amend RICO complaint after dismissal, where plaintiff's failure to plead requisite particulars with respect to named defendants stood in striking contrast to highly particularized allegations against absent bankrupt parties, complaint was of great length, and plaintiffs' counsel testified as to time and investigation that went into preparation of initial complaint. Rosenheck v. Rieber, S.D.N.Y.1996, 932 F.Supp. 626. Federal Civil Procedure 1838

Even if plaintiff in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action could not file amended complaint joining additional defendants as matter of right, district court would exercise its discretion and allow joinder of these parties since additional defendants would not be prejudiced by court's allowing their joinder; most discovery had not yet been completed in action due to discovery disputes and court would issue new scheduling order, such that additional defendants would not be forced to complete discovery in four weeks as provided for in old scheduling order. Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, D.Del.1992, 821

F.Supp. 232. Federal Civil Procedure 131

Plaintiffs in securities fraud and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action would be given leave to file a properly pleaded RICO claim against founder of company, notwithstanding assertion of founder that he would suffer “tremendous prejudice” because he was named in conspiracy claim for first time; claim of founder that he could not have anticipated and did not explore in discovery allegation of conspiracy was implausible, in that litigation had been going on against former directors of company and officers for over four years, and, thus, each of company's insiders should have anticipated that plaintiffs would allege they conspired and participated in racketeering enterprise. In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, E.D.N.Y.1993, 812 F.Supp. 338. Federal Civil Procedure 842

Although complaint asserting claim for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute met requirement of sufficient facts to withstand motion to dismiss, plaintiff was required to file statement of facts in accordance with format set up by court. Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Finance Corp., M.D.Fla.1991, 775 F.Supp. 1460. Federal Civil Procedure 671

Plaintiff would not be granted leave to replead, upon dismissal of complaint, where action had been pending against one defendant for more than two years, discovery had been extensive, depositions of most of the principals had been taken, and record provided no basis to believe that further discovery would supply basis for further pleading. Browning Ave. Realty Corp. v. Rosenshein, S.D.N.Y.1991, 774 F.Supp. 129. Federal Civil Pro- cedure 1838

Evidence of mail and wire fraud presented at trial was not raised with sufficient particularity that could permit amendment of limited partner's complaint to include cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act; evidence about letters and telephone calls did not show that parties tried RICO claim by express or implied consent and was insufficient to put limited partnership on notice that limited partner was claiming RICO violations. Schibuk v. Poinciana-Regency Ltd. Partnership, S.D.N.Y.1991, 764 F.Supp. 878. Federal Civil Procedure 837

Court would dismiss RICO “count” unless plaintiffs within 30 days filed amended complaint to cure defects which included failure to state of what or whom alleged “enterprise” consisted. Hall American Center Asso- ciates Ltd. Partnership v. Dick, E.D.Mich.1989, 726 F.Supp. 1083. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 34

Defendant in federal civil RICO suit was entitled to amend and supplement answer by adding affirmative defenses. Thomas v. Brown, N.D.Ga.1989, 708 F.Supp. 336. Federal Civil Procedure 839.1

Civil RICO complaint failed to properly allege pattern of racketeering activity in connection with issuance of bonds to finance cost of acquiring and constructing retirement facility, but plaintiffs would be given 15 days to amend RICO allegations to satisfy requirements that complaint identify with sufficient specificity the nature and content of alleged predicate acts and the relationship of the various defendants to those acts and that scienter ne-

cessary for predicate acts to constitute securities fraud be alleged. Montcastle v. American Health Systems, Inc., E.D.Tenn.1988, 702 F.Supp. 1369. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Plaintiff, executrix in RICO action alleging fraud arising from sale of art master, was required to amend her petition and include specific allegations that defendants had used wires or mail in furtherance of their scheme. Fair- cloth v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., D.S.C.1988, 682 F.Supp. 837, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds 938 F.2d 513. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Whether civil RICO plaintiff acted with due diligence with respect to alleged fraudulent concealment of his cause of action, thereby tolling four-year limitations period, could not be determined on record, and, in view of retroactive application of four-year period to plaintiff's claim, plaintiff would be permitted to amend complaint in attempt to cure statute of limitations problems. Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., Inc., E.D.Mich.1987, 672 F.Supp. 977. Limitation Of Actions 192(3)

Review of pleadings filed by contractor, which pleadings were based on alleged negligence of United States in administering construction contracts between contractor and tribal housing authority, indicated that contractors could not cure failure to state claim under RICO, and thus, dismissal of complaint would be with prejudice. Snowbird Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S., D.Idaho 1987, 666 F.Supp. 1437. Federal Civil Procedure 1837.1

Vendor and prospective purchaser of mining property bringing RICO suit against those involved in county court system and others would be denied leave to file amended complaint essentially repeating allegations of original complaint but adding 25 additional defendants to ever-expanding theory of conspiracy on ground that purposes of lawsuit were suspect, additional defendants would only compound costs and inconvenience incurred by present defendants, and that vendor and purchaser were parties in ten suits arising from same basic evidence. Damiani v. Adams, S.D.Cal.1987, 657 F.Supp. 1409. Federal Civil Procedure 392

Union members were entitled to amend their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims in complaint against union, even though leave to amend was not requested until eve of trial, since adequate reasons for delay existed, much of proposed amendment merely incorporated other allegations of original complaint into the RICO claim, and original complaint stated RICO cause of action. Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95 of Laborers' Intern. Union of North America, S.D.N.Y.1985, 624 F.Supp. 678. Federal Civil Procedure 840; Federal Civil Procedure 841

Plaintiff's 15-month delay after commencement of litigation in seeking amendment of complaint and prejudice to defendant outweighed plaintiff's right to have its claim alleging violation of RICO [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.] heard on the merits, and thus, plaintiff's motion for leave to amend complaint would be denied, even though proposed amendment alleging RICO violation did state a cause of action against the defendant, where plaintiff's request to amend was inexcusably late since it had enough facts to bring the RICO count when it filed its first amended complaint, defendant would have to undertake substantial new discovery in resisting the count, and counts of the first amended complaint already sought damages plaintiff could recover and treble under the proposed RICO count. UNR Industries, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., N.D.Ill.1985, 623 F.Supp. 1319. Federal Civil Procedure 840

Where plaintiff in civil suit under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act suggested existence of enterprise not yet pled, plaintiff would be granted leave to amend complaint so that, if enterprise consisted of association of fact, such enigmatic association might be identified and pled. Tryco Trucking Co., Inc. v. Belk Store Services, Inc., W.D.N.C.1985, 608 F.Supp. 812. Federal Civil Procedure 251

Although plaintiffs alleged that defendants appeared on franchise premises, dispossessed plaintiffs of such and confiscated various things on premises, which actions would be sufficient to constitute criminal activity under Louisiana law which could possibly be punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, and therefore constituted “racketeering activity” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, where plaintiffs failed to allege that defendants committed same acts against another franchisee, complaint failed to state claim upon which relief could be granted under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act however, in interest of justice, plaintiffs were given time to amend complaint to set forth allegations that defendants had committed acts against another franchisee. Cole v. Circle R. Convenience Stores, Inc., M.D.La.1985, 602 F.Supp. 1108. Federal Civil Procedure 839.1; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Although plaintiffs had been warned that if amended complaint was filed and it still fell short of meeting requirements for cause of action under this chapter, judge would not hesitate to award fees, if justified, defendants were not entitled to fees upon dismissal of amended complaint, where, given complexity and, previously, rather unclear status of this section, it could not be said that there was no legal or factual basis for claims made by plaintiffs in their amended complaint, or that they acted in bad faith by filing amended complaint after original complaint was dismissed. Gramercy 222 Residents Corp. v. Gramercy Realty Associates, S.D.N.Y.1984, 591 F.Supp. 1408. Federal Civil Procedure 2737.5

Amending complaint to allege that broker was engaged in an ongoing independent enterprise, apart from his formal employment by two brokerage firms, that itself was fueled by profits from the securities violations, and that this enterprise depleted plaintiff's investments would satisfy pattern required of this chapter. Dakis on Be- half of Dakis Pension Plan v. Chapman, N.D.Cal.1983, 574 F.Supp. 757. Commerce 80

In securities fraud action brought by buyers of limited partnership interests in insolvent coal mining partnership, amended complaint failed to state cause of action against any of the defendants under this chapter. Noonan v. Granville-Smith, S.D.N.Y.1981, 537 F.Supp. 23. Commerce 82.6; Criminal Law 1220; Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Migrant farm workers were entitled to leave to amend their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint against farm owners and labor contractors, in order to correctly identify existing defendants. Javier H. v. Garcia-Botello, W.D.N.Y.2006, 239 F.R.D. 342. Federal Civil Procedure 392

Amendment to complaint alleged that corporation played knowing role in alleged bribery scheme so as to cure deficiency in prior complaint in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and common- law action alleging that corporation engaged in racketeering in connection with sale of helicopters to Saudi Ara- bia; amendment presented new allegations from which it could be inferred that corporation knowingly assented

to and furthered bribery scheme involving other defendants. Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., D.D.C.1993, 152 F.R.D. 419. Federal Civil Procedure 841

Plaintiff would be allowed to assert RICO obstruction of justice claim in fourth amended complaint, based upon defendants' alleged hiring of attorneys who had earlier formed attorney-client relationship with party whose investigation and attempted expose led to filing of original complaint; plaintiff did not know about hiring of attorneys until after third amended complaint was prepared. Murray v. Sevier, D.Kan.1993, 149 F.R.D. 638. Federal Civil Procedure 841

Plaintiffs were entitled to amend complaint to assert additional claim against defendant under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act, even though motion to amend was filed three years after case was originally brought; there was no prejudice based on need of defendant to move for summary judgment and conduct additional discovery when motion was filed only four months before scheduled trial date since trial had been post- poned. Hill v. Equitable Bank, N.A., D.Del.1985, 109 F.R.D. 109. Federal Civil Procedure 840; Federal Civil Procedure 842

Plaintiffs, who alleged that defendants entered into a conspiracy to induce them and other investors to purchase units in oil and drilling programs by fraudulent misrepresentations and charged that defendants thereby violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, the General Busi- ness Law of the state of New York, the Oklahoma Securities Act and the common law, were not entitled to amend their complaint to add a civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. In re Osage Exploration Co., S.D.N.Y.1984, 104 F.R.D. 45. Federal Civil Procedure 841

Customer, who sought to recover more than $50,000,000 in damages allegedly arising out of collapse of silver market, would not be allowed to amend his complaint to add so-called Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act cause of action, which failed to state a claim. Fustok v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1984, 103 F.R.D. 601. Federal Civil Procedure 851

Plaintiffs were not entitled to amend a complaint in a products liability case to assert a claim under this chapter based on allegations that manufacturer implemented a scheme of fraudulent advertising through the use of the United States mails where plaintiffs had knowledge of sufficient facts underlying allegations in proposed cause of action under this chapter long ago and delayed unnecessarily in raising them and this chapter limits injury to injury in one's business or property and cautions against extending this chapter to personal injury arising out of a tort. Morrison v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., D.C.D.C.1984, 101 F.R.D. 743. Federal Civil Procedure 840

Federal district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiffs' leave to amend their RICO claim on grounds of futility of amendment and fact that plaintiffs previously amended the complaint, where plaintiffs' “Second Amended Complaint (Corrected)” was in fact the fourth complaint plaintiffs had filed in the action, plaintiffs were represented by counsel, and the filing followed court order that explained in detail what needed to be pleaded. Acro-Tech, Inc. v. Robert Jackson Family Trust, C.A.9 (Or.) 2003, 84 Fed.Appx. 747, 2003 WL 22783349, Unreported. Federal Civil Procedure 851

258. Supplemental complaint

Inclusion of labor organization's new officers in supplemental complaint alleging violations of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) did not violate union members' First Amendment rights of association to elect officers of their choice; if new officers were free of wrongdoing, pendency of suit did not impact union members' First Amendment rights. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 738. Constitutional Law 1449; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

259. Supplemental statement, complaint

While RICO complaint did not correlate any one of the 39 defendants to any one of the 195 racketeering acts, 70-page supplementary document submitted by government indicating precisely what predicate act each defendant was alleged to have committed or to have aided and abetted would be treated as “more definite statement” and adequately provided notice to each defendant of particular racketeering acts he was alleged to have committed. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Factual statement similar to bill of particulars is needed in pleadings seeking civil treble damages under this chapter. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Co., D.C.Utah 1983, 558 F.Supp. 1042 . Commerce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

260. Miscellaneous complaints sufficient

Plaintiffs were not unreasonable in considering that their allegations, that city council member engaged in acts with city and city employees to secure participation in city contracts for firms advancing their political and financial objectives for period of at least 18 months, stated racketeering claim and, thus, district court abused its discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions in favor of city council member for bringing frivolous claim. Brubaker v. City of Richmond, C.A.4 (Va.) 1991, 943 F.2d 1363. Federal Civil Procedure 2771(11)

Sales representatives of defendant corporation stated RICO cause of action against corporation by alleging that through use of false price book and rebate schemes defendant was able to retain funds which were rightfully payable to plaintiffs as commissions, that defendant was able to retain those funds and use those funds in its operations, and that plaintiffs were injured by such operation of defendant. Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., C.A.4 (Va.) 1990, 896 F.2d 833, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Allegations defendant engaged in acts of influencing witness, bribing witness, wire fraud, and obstruction of justice in connection with personal injury suit brought against aviation company stated claim under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c), which prohibits person involved in enterprise engaged in interstate commerce from conducting affairs through pattern of racketeering activity. Miller v. Glen & Helen Aircraft, Inc., C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1985, 777 F.2d 496. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Complaint by State Director of Insurance, as statutory liquidator of insurer, sufficiently alleged a violation under

this chapter by officers, directors and parent corporation, who allegedly fraudulently continued insurer in business past its point of insolvency and looted insurer of its most profitable and least risky businesses, aggravating the insolvency. Schacht v. Brown, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1983, 711 F.2d 1343, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 508, 464 U.S. 1002, 78 L.Ed.2d 698, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 509, 464 U.S. 1002, 78 L.Ed.2d 698. Commerce 80

Former employee's complaint, alleging, inter alia, that former co-workers provided false and/or misleading information to state agency in effort to wrongfully deny her benefits, that such actions amounted to mail fraud and wire fraud, that wrongful denial of benefits was achieved by extortion in form of threats that she would lose her insurance policy, and that alleged predicate acts occurred within last seven years, stated cause of action against former co-workers under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Few v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., D.N.H.2007, 498 F.Supp.2d 441. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Injuries allegedly suffered by dinnerware and cookware seller when operators of website allegedly created or solicited false and defamatory consumer complaints about seller were actionable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); seller alleged that it lost customers, that customers rescinded sales contracts, that its reputation was injured as a result of the contents of the website, and that users of the site expressly stated that they withheld business from seller after viewing the website. Hy Cite Corp. v. badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., D.Ariz.2005, 418 F.Supp.2d 1142. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Competitive local telephone exchange carrier (CLEC) stated claim that Incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC) required by Telecommunications Act to share its facilities with CLEC engaged in racketeering activity, for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), by submitting false billings and information regarding line losses caused by customer cancellations; intent to deceive was not ruled out as possibility, CLEC could be found to have relied on information even though it knew some was false, there was possibility that ILEC maintained itself through racketeering activities, and that CLEC sustained injury as result of activities. Z-Tel Communications, Inc. v. SBC Communications, Inc., E.D.Tex.2004, 331 F.Supp.2d 513. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Latvian corporation stated cause of action against principals of American representative, claimed to have defrauded corporation; facts tended to show that one principal had signed corporate resolution as president of local subsidiary of corporation when she was never appointed to that position, and that defendants represented to bank that they were authorized signatories on corporation's bank account when they were not, and that they engaged in unauthorized transfers of over $2 million from corporation's account to accounts of corporation of which they were principals, all of which tended to show they had agreed to commit predicate acts in furtherance of design to defraud. Nafta v. Feniks Intern. House of Trade (U.S.A.) Inc., E.D.N.Y.1996, 932 F.Supp. 422. Fraud 41

Nonunion newspaper distributors stated claims, under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), for violations of Taft-Hartley Act and Hobbs Act by alleging that labor representative accepted payments from publishers, who were employers, which were offered with the intent of influencing labor representative with respect to his duties as a union officer and that labor representative used extortion to secure distribution rights for publishers by threatening labor unrest if his demands were not met. Volmar Distributors, Inc. v. New York Post Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1995, 899 F.Supp. 1187. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations

Allegation by abortion clinics and women's organization that they were forced to give up their right to conduct business relationships in Wisconsin due to abortion opponents' allegedly illegal activities was sufficient to state valid claim for relief under Wisconsin's extortion statute; thus, plaintiffs' allegation that defendants violated Travel Act based on violations of Wisconsin statute, and that such violation was predicate RICO act, was well- pled. National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, N.D.Ill.1995, 897 F.Supp. 1047. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70; Torts 436

Shareholder stated RICO claim against officers and directors of corporation to the extent that he alleged that he was fraudulently induced to purchase additional shares of corporation at inflated price. Chanoff v. U.S. Surgical Corp., D.Conn.1994, 857 F.Supp. 1011, affirmed 31 F.3d 66, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 667, 513 U.S. 1058, 130 L.Ed.2d 601, affirmed 33 F.3d 50. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Plaintiff's RICO complaint sufficiently alleged the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud necessary to support claim in that complaint explained how specific mailings and telephone calls advanced and executed defendants' schemes to defraud plaintiff. Update Traffic Systems, Inc. v. Gould, E.D.N.Y.1994, 857 F.Supp. 274. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Utility companies sufficiently alleged “nuclear suppliers” enterprise and “owner, group” enterprise, pattern of racketeering activity and participation by manufacturer of nuclear power plant systems in affairs of each enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity so as to state claim that manufacturer violated Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) subsection making it unlawful for person employed by enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce to participate in conduct of such enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., D.S.C.1993, 826 F.Supp. 1549. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Plaintiff's complaint stated civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against individual defendant, where complaint averred that individual was owner of defendant company, that company performed painting work for plaintiff on legitimate basis prior to alleged participation of company and individual in scheme to defraud plaintiff, and that said participation took form of kickback scheme, whereby business was awarded to company and individual was allowed to overcharge plaintiff in exchange for payments made by company and individual. Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, D.Del.1992, 821 F.Supp. 232. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Franchisees' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint sufficiently averred that franchisor and its principal acted with specific intent to defraud; complaint alleged that defendants were motivated to defraud franchisees as part of scheme to obtain franchising fees and that they had clear opportunity to defraud prospective franchisees by manipulating financial figures pertaining to various franchise opportunities. Gi- uliano v. Everything Yogurt, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1993, 819 F.Supp. 240. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 70

No improper fractionalization of civil cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act occurred where different factual and legal theory of recovery was presented under each allegation of substantive violation and separate conspiracy counts alleged alternative “enterprises.” County of Oakland by Kuhn v. City of Detroit, E.D.Mich.1992, 784 F.Supp. 1275. Federal Civil Procedure 671

Complaint alleging that various swimming pool disinfection companies and association to which they belonged committed mail fraud in course of their activities to discredit competitor was sufficient to allege RICO cause of action. California Int'l Chemical Co. v. Neptune Pool Service, Inc., M.D.Fla.1991, 770 F.Supp. 1530. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Corporation, its officer, and claimant to shares stated racketeering cause of action based on claim of mail and wire fraud against tax exempt corporation and its shareholders and officers by alleging that tax exempt corporation, officers and shareholders defrauded a nonprofit corporation devoted to advocacy of animal rights by misleading it as to purpose of tax exempt organization thereby obtaining money for private purposes of tax exempt corporation to harass and harm plaintiff corporation, its officer, and claimant to shares. Federal Information Sys- tems, Corp. v. Boyd, D.D.C.1990, 753 F.Supp. 971. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Purchaser of penny stocks in secondary market stated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against brokers who allegedly failed to disclose that stock price included excessive mark-up; brokerage house was clearly referred to in complaint as enterprise, purchaser sufficiently alleged scienter on part of all brokers and purchaser alleged facts sufficient to infer that brokers as regular business practice knowingly charged excessive mark-ups in violation of federal securities laws. Farley v. Baird, Patrick & Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1990, 750 F.Supp. 1209. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Investors sufficiently alleged criminal predicate acts to support claim against bank under federal Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act where they alleged that oil company committed numerous predicate acts of wire fraud, mail fraud, and fraud in sale of securities and that bank was member of scheme to defraud investors. McCarthy v. Barnett Bank of Polk County, M.D.Fla.1990, 750 F.Supp. 1119. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

In civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), nature of defendants' alleged scheme to obtain money from plaintiff by submitting false invoices concerning actual costs of electronic components for plaintiffs' video game was adequately alleged to notify defendants of nature of allegedly fraudulent transactions at issue, and defendants were also given adequate notice of relevant time period involved and representations at issue; defendants were informed that during certain period they caused their corporation to use United States mails and interstate wires in discussion, sending, and payments of invoices for components and that plaintiff made payment though mail. P & P Marketing, Inc. v. Ditton, N.D.Ill.1990, 746 F.Supp. 1354. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Racketeering complaint sufficiently notified each officer and director of part played in allegedly fraudulent scheme; complaint extensively described all alleged predicate acts of fraud and described role of each defendant

as acquiescing in misconduct and negligently and wrongfully failing to supervise corporation and internal accounting and auditing. Shields on Behalf of Sundstrand Corp. v. Erickson, N.D.Ill.1989, 710 F.Supp. 686. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Plaintiff's RICO claims against competitors alleging false comparative advertising were pled with sufficient particularity insofar as plaintiff specified defendants involved in each incident, and the nature of the misrepresentations. Construction Technology, Inc. v. Lockformer Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1989, 704 F.Supp. 1212, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1401. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Clinic sufficiently attributed to defendants mailings, forming predicate acts of mail fraud which underlied its RICO claim against its former physician and his new health care organization for alleged diversion of fees due it from former patients, where complaint described acts involved and provided defendants with sufficient information to answer the allegations; where defendants allegedly executed their scheme by contacting patients rather than clinic, clinic could not be expected to have further details of fraud prior to discovery. Hinsdale Women's Clinic, S.C. v. Women's Health Care of Hinsdale, N.D.Ill.1988, 690 F.Supp. 658. Postal Service 35(20)

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations suit, alleging securities fraud by stock broker by his alleged churning of plaintiffs' accounts, described churning activities with requisite specificity to inform defendants of wrongful behavior, where suit alleged beginning and ending dates of plaintiffs' trading accounts, account numbers, average equity account values, total average account values, number of transactions, dollar total of purchases, turnover ration, and commissions paid. Robinson v. Kidder, Peabody and Co., Inc., E.D.Mich.1987, 674 F.Supp. 243, appeal dismissed 841 F.2d 1127. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Allegations that bid for construction of roof was submitted by contractor intentionally misrepresenting its status as eligible bidder, that officers and corporate owner of contractor created false account payable and took other action to preclude owner from recovering for defective materials and workmanship, and that capital of the contractor was drained in order to defraud the owner and others stated a claim cognizable under RICO. United Air- lines, Inc. v. CEI Industries, Inc., N.D.Ill.1987, 654 F.Supp. 1209, reconsideration denied 664 F.Supp. 1216. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Securities investors stated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act cause of action against securities broker, stockbroker, and branch office manager by alleging that they engaged in pattern of racketeering activity by churning investors' account and making false and misleading statements through the enterprise of local branch office and that investors were damaged and incurred financial loss due to scheme to defraud. Adams v. Swanson, D.Or.1985, 652 F.Supp. 762. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Cause of action under RICO was stated by allegations that defendant engaged in fraudulent scheme to convert plaintiff's gold and silver and used his company to do so and that he used the telephone in causing the plaintiff to send its metal to the defendant's company. U.S. Metal & Coin Co. v. Burlock, E.D.N.Y.1986, 652 F.Supp. 37. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

User of mortar additive stated claim against producer of mortar additive on ground that producer violated RICO by committing mail fraud despite contention that RICO claims were inappropriate in products liability setting, as complaint went beyond limits of traditional product liability suit. Moravian Development Corp. v. Dow Chemic- al Co., E.D.Pa.1986, 651 F.Supp. 144. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Automobile dealer's allegations that foreign car franchisees, regional distributor, and importer participated in unlawful car allocation practices involving false sales reports, by use of mail and wire fraud, to boost both distributor's and franchisees' allocation of cars were sufficient to state cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Jim Forno's Continental Motors, Inc. v. Subaru Distributors Corp., N.D.N.Y.1986, 649 F.Supp. 746. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Judgment creditor's allegations that defendants prevented her from collecting judgment on her products liability claim against company by stripping company of ability to survive judgment stated claim under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Wooten v. Loshbough, N.D.Ind.1986, 649 F.Supp. 531, on reconsideration 738 F.Supp. 314, affirmed 951 F.2d 768. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Complaint which alleged scheme to defraud starting with “back dated” sale of general manager's corporation to co-op, or approximate point at which co-op began making unauthorized loans to general manager, and which alleged that various managers and directors of corporations, along with attorneys and accountants, through pattern of racketeering activity, damaged co-op by foisting off on it worthless asset driving it into insolvency stated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act cause of action. Robertson v. White, W.D.Ark.1986, 633 F.Supp. 954. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Complaint alleging account executive of securities firm conducted unauthorized trading in options and participated in malicious liquidation of customer's account was sufficient to state cause of action against account manager under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c), creating civil cause of action for conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity. Modern Settings, Inc. v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1986, 629 F.Supp. 860 . Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Allegations by lessee of master sound recording that lessor and record distributors entered into agreement that lessor would lure prospective investors to buy master recordings and then refer those investors to record distributors, that distributors would take certain fees from investors and then refuse to take action until proof of title was provided, and that lessor would thereupon refuse to furnish evidence of title were sufficient to state conspiracy cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Hirt v. UM Leasing Corp., D.C.Neb.1985, 614 F.Supp. 1066. Conspiracy 18; Fraud 43

Complaint by customer against stockbroker and brokerage firm stated a civil action under the Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c), where customer alleged that conduct outlined in complaint constituted a pattern of racketeering activity that had injured him and his property, and he also alleged mail fraud as a predicate offense. Binkley v. Sheaffer, E.D.Pa.1985, 609 F.Supp. 601. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegations of omissions and misrepresentations which were sufficient to state claims under section 78j of Title 15 were sufficient to state claims under this chapter. In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton and Co., Inc. Securities Lit- igation, E.D.Pa.1984, 583 F.Supp. 1388. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Complaint alleging that former vice-president of debtor in bankruptcy, while employed by debtor and, later, by a newly formed corporation to which one of debtor's customers transferred contracts almost immediately after debtor filed for bankruptcy, conducted and participated in conduct of debtor's affairs and/or newly formed corporation's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity stated valid cause of action under this chapter. Bern- stein v. IDT Corp., D.C.Del.1984, 582 F.Supp. 1079. Commerce 82.6

Where plaintiff stated claims for several acts of fraud in sale of securities, and third count of complaint incorporated all prior allegations and proceeded to allege a pattern of racketeering, based on the earlier accounts, plaintiff alleged a pattern of racketeering within purview of this chapter. Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., E.D.Pa.1983, 581 F.Supp. 88. Commerce 80

Allegations by New York Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets that slaughterhouse and principals thereof, through repeated instances of underweighting and misgrading slaughtered cattle and through use of the mails and wire communications, defrauded both the farmers whose cattle were slaughtered and the New York State Brucellosis Indemnity Program and that operation of the slaughterhouse affected interstate commerce were sufficient to plead claim for relief under this chapter. Gerace v. Utica Veal Co., Inc., N.D.N.Y.1984, 580 F.Supp. 1465. Commerce 80

Complaint alleging that plaintiffs were defrauded out of substantial sums of money thereby suffering injury in “their business or property” within meaning of this section and that plaintiffs were defrauded by defendants acting jointly as “enterprise” and that defendants conducted affairs of that enterprise “through a pattern of racketeering activity” was sufficient to state claim under this section. Windsor Associates, Inc. v. Greenfeld, D.C.Md.1983, 564 F.Supp. 273. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Complaints which alleged that certain individual defendants were “persons” who conducted affairs of two interstate “enterprises,” i.e., two banks, through “patterns of racketeering activity” consisting of several acts of mail fraud adequately described violation of this chapter to state claim for relief. Lode v. Leonardo, N.D.Ill.1982, 557 F.Supp. 675. Commerce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

In civil suit under this chapter and federal securities laws, allegations that appraiser destroyed accurate appraisals of property in decedent's estate and substituted fraudulent appraisals for purpose of justifying transfer of estate property at deflated prices and allegations that appraiser fraudulently converted assets of the estate for his own benefit were sufficient to state claim for relief against appraiser. Gunther v. Dinger, S.D.N.Y.1982, 547 F.Supp. 25. Commerce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11; Securities Regula- tion 60.51(1)

Action brought by buyer of low pressure, high speed, flexible couplings installed in main propulsion units of lighter-aboard-ship vessel owned by buyers for damages involving alleged failures of couplings did not state claim on which relief could be granted under this section. Waterman S. S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., E.D.La.1981, 527 F.Supp. 256. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Allegations by bankruptcy trustee that debtor fraudulently concealed assets from trustee and continued to run mortgage business surreptitiously after he filed for bankruptcy, that other defendants actively conspired with debtor and assisted him in his scheme, and that scheme constituted numerous acts of bankruptcy fraud satisfied requirement under Rule 9(b) regarding pleading of predicate fraudulent acts in a Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act action, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq. Kremen v. Blank, D.C.Md.1985, 55 B.R. 1018. Feder- al Civil Procedure 636

261. Miscellaneous complaints insufficient

Allegations in car buyers' complaint, that bank which financed their acquisition of vehicles failed to accurately disclose that the charges it added to amount financed, pursuant to clause in parties' agreement authorizing bank to purchase casualty insurance on car buyers' behalf, consisted only of premium originally paid by bank for insurance coverage with no deduction for rebates that bank received from insurer, did not allege predicate act of mail fraud with sufficient particularity to state civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO); bank was contractually authorized to pass ‘premiums and finance charges’ and not just the “cost” of obtaining insurance on to car buyers, and car buyers nowhere alleged that bank represented that it was charging them only the actual cost of obtaining insurance on their vehicles. Kenty v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A., C.A.6 (Ohio) 1996, 92 F.3d 384, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied. Federal Civil Pro- cedure 636

Office building subtenant failed to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) as it failed to allege direct injury as result of defendants' alleged fraudulent transfer of building in order to inflate its ostensible value and inflate subtenant's rent, notwithstanding subtenant's contention that master tenant was simply conduit through which injury passed, via pass-through clause of sublease, with no independent effect on damages; complaint demonstrated that pass-through clause was not “automatic,” and, even assuming that clause determined precise amount of damages, district court would be forced to determine whether and how much of rent increase was due to alleged RICO violation and to other independent factors. Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Lerner, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1994, 31 F.3d 924. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Complaint which alleged that defendants violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) when they engaged in scheme to defraud plaintiff by routinely undercharging customer for metal grinding services via false invoices sent through the mail fell short of fraud specificity standard by failing to identify specific dates on which defendant sent false invoices. Midwest Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 976 F.2d 1016. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Successful bidder on Housing and Urban Development public housing project failed to state civil Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim for alleged mail fraud scheme to force bidder off project; alleged prebid fraud to induce bid was unrelated to alleged scheme to force bidder off project, letter from HUD

employee temporarily disqualifying bidder's project manager was only predicate act attributable to that defendant, letter changing financing terms was not part of alleged postbid mail fraud scheme, letter instructing bidder to not start construction until construction loan closed was not part of fraudulent scheme, and bidder failed to link allegedly inflated schedule of values ny architects to any predicate act. McLaughlin v. Anderson, C.A.2 (Conn.) 1992, 962 F.2d 187. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Evidentiary deficiencies precluding determination that commodity future commission merchant and its principal had violated Commodity Exchange Act by manipulating market for live cattle futures, so as to cause cash sellers of cattle to receive lower prices, also precluded finding of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation; it was not shown that defendants were responsible for decline in cattle prices or that futures prices in subject month were below level that normal market forces would have produced. Utesch v. Dittmer, C.A.8 (Iowa) 1991, 947 F.2d 321, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 1764, 503 U.S. 1006, 118 L.Ed.2d 425. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Condominium sales agent did not adequately allege predicate acts of extortion and travel in interstate commerce to commit “unlawful activity” such as extortion and, thus, failed to state RICO claim; agent admitted that no one “took” her sale commissions without her consent, and she did not specify nature of any alleged threats made during telephone conversation. Elliott v. Foufas, C.A.5 (La.) 1989, 867 F.2d 877. Extortion 19; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 8

Third party payers (TPPs) with prescription drug benefit plans containing cost-sharing provisions failed to state plausible claim that pharmaceutical companies that jointly marketed branded schizophrenia drug violated Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by causing misrepresentations to be made at time of point of sale transaction when, as instructed by those companies, pharmacist electronically charged health benefit provider full benchmark price without accounting for existence of co-pay subsidies; complaint alleged omission by defendants, not misrepresentation, even though it did not allege nature of or basis for duty to disclose information concerning which of plaintiffs' insureds had used co-pay coupons issued by defendants and purchases on which they did so or duty to instruct pharmacies to convey that information to TPPs at point of sale.. Americ- an Federation of State, County and Mun. Employees Dist. Council 37 Health & Sec. Plan v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., S.D.N.Y.2013, 2013 WL 2391999. Fraud 17; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 10

Franchisees failed to state claim against franchisor and affiliated defendants under RICO provision prohibiting use of pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an interest in or control of any enterprise since they failed to allege that any of those entities gained control over the enterprise as a result of racketeering activity. Cottman Transmission Systems, LLC v. Kershner, E.D.Pa.2008, 536 F.Supp.2d 543. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Government could not plead essential elements of its Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims by attaching hundreds of pages of pleadings in prior civil and criminal cases, with no guidance as to which specific allegations were intended to be deemed incorporated; government's failure to specifically identify which portions of the hundreds of pages of exhibits it intended to incorporate by reference into the com-

plaint made it impossible for the court or the defendants to ascertain the nature and extent of the incorporation, and the purported incorporation was therefore invalid. U.S. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, E.D.N.Y.2007, 518 F.Supp.2d 422. Federal Civil Procedure 628

Nonprofit corporation, that claimed losses from fees spent mitigating reputational damage caused by its president's misappropriation of funds, failed to allege cognizable Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act injuries, where nonprofit corporation's injuries were merely result of public's mistrust of nonprofit corporations's remaining management and poor oversight record of its board, rather than intended result of president's embezzlement scheme. Aramony v. United Way of America, S.D.N.Y.1997, 969 F.Supp. 226. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Plaintiffs failed to state a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, where they only speculated that discovery would show defendant was a party to misrepresentations by mail, wire, and telephone, they neither specifically identified fraudulent circumstances nor the identity of persons who made and received any alleged misrepresentation, and they failed to allege any deceptive act or reliance on any misrepresentation by defendant as required by mail fraud statute. Gagliardi v. Ward, N.D.N.Y.1997, 967 F.Supp. 67. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Allegations in borrower's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint against finance company based on misleading solicitation of loans could not support borrower's two other claims of mail fraud involving other borrowers, supporting pattern of racketeering activity, absent allegation that other borrowers received any such solicitation through the mail, or that either borrower made loan payments through the mail. Emery v. American General Finance, Inc., N.D.Ill.1997, 952 F.Supp. 602, affirmed 134 F.3d 1321, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 57, 525 U.S. 818, 142 L.Ed.2d 44. Postal Service 35(6)

Seller of telephone calling cards failed to maintain cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations (RICO) Act against providers of long-distance telephone service; sellers failed to establish that any misrepresentations by providers in regard to “down time” were connected to any individual defendant, date or place of any of false statements, circumstances showing conscious behavior or specific intent to defraud, failed to allege facts which show motive for committing fraud and opportunity to do so, and content of items mailed, and did not specify how each of items was false or misleading. SMS Marketing & Telecommunications, Inc. v. H.G. Telecom, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1996, 949 F.Supp. 134. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Employer failed to state a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act conspiracy claim against unions and union members and officials, where no predicate acts or pattern of racketeering were sufficiently alleged, and employer alleged no facts by which an agreement to commit a substantive RICO offense could have been supported. Buck Creek Coal, Inc. v. United Workers of America, S.D.Ind.1995, 917 F.Supp. 601. Conspiracy 18

RICO complaint's allegations that partnership and its employees conspired in associated-in-fact enterprise did not establish, in any way, that alleged activity amounted to anything more than employees carrying on business

of partnership, and thus, claim was so deficient that it would not be allowed to go to trial; complaint alleged elsewhere that employees were acting within scope or authority as agents of partnership. R.C.M. Executive Gal- lery Corp. v. Rols Capital Co., S.D.N.Y.1995, 901 F.Supp. 630. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 73

Union member failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against union business manager pursuant to Hobbs Act, where union member failed to allege that business manager engaged in any extortionate conduct which was directed at him. O'Rourke v. Crosley, D.N.J.1994, 847 F.Supp. 1208. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Investors' allegations concerning seller's allegedly misleading statements in connection with sale of oil and gas limited partnership failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, absent showing that offering materials or suitability standards contained any misleading facts or omissions in violation of federal securities fraud statute and rule. Porter v. Shearson Lehman Bros. Inc., S.D.Tex.1992, 802 F.Supp. 41. Securities Regulation 60.53; Securities Regulation 60.54

Buyers of all terrain vehicles (ATV's) who claimed that manufacturer's created and cultivated false impression that ATV's were safe for recreational use by entire families failed to state claim for wire and mail fraud, as predicate acts of claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); each specific allegation described general or exaggerated assertions made by manufacturers about characteristics of their product which a reasonable consumer would not have interpreted as a factual claim upon which he or she could have relied; moreover, to extent that manufacturer's slogans made affirmative representations, representations were mere sales puffing. In re All Terrain Vehicle Litigation, C.D.Cal.1991, 771 F.Supp. 1057, affirmed in part and remanded 978 F.2d 1265, affirmed in part 979 F.2d 755. Postal Service 35(10); Telecommunications 1014(12)

Claim that employers attempted to repudiate collective bargaining agreement did not allege any misrepresentation, deceitful omission or any other deceptive practice that could have misled union and employees and, thus, union and employees failed to allege mail and wire fraud as predicate acts in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action; conduct alleged clearly showed employers' intent to “get rid” of union and become nonunion operations. Young v. West Coast Indus. Relations Ass'n, Inc., D.Del.1991, 763 F.Supp. 64, affirmed 961 F.2d 1570. Postal Service 35(10); Telecommunications 1014(12)

Investors failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) cause of action against corporation and directors and controlling persons; investors merely incorporated securities fraud claim allegations and then repeated in conclusory fashion language of RICO statute. Certilman v. Hardcastle, Ltd., E.D.N.Y.1991, 754 F.Supp. 974. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Physician complaining of summary suspension of hospital privileges failed to state a claim for relief under RICO where she did not allege any facts demonstrating injury flowing from the commission of predicate acts of mail fraud or extortion and did not allege facts demonstrating threat of continuing mail fraud and extortion necessary to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity, and did not definitively allege an enterprise. Boczar v.

Manatee Hospitals & Health Systems, Inc., M.D.Fla.1990, 731 F.Supp. 1042. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Plaintiff's RICO claims against competitors alleging misappropriation of technology were not pled with sufficient particularity, insofar as plaintiff based allegations on “information and belief” but did not demonstrate that specific facts were peculiarly accessible to defendants, and plaintiff failed to specify role of each defendant in the misappropriation. Construction Technology, Inc. v. Lockformer Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1989, 704 F.Supp. 1212, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1401. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Investors' allegations, that brokerage firm and broker received income from churning investors' accounts and used such income in conduct of their own operations, did not state cause of action against brokerage firm and broker for violation of RICO provision prohibiting any person from employing pattern of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain any interest in or control of any enterprise. Capalbo v. PaineWebber, Inc., N.D.Ill.1988, 694 F.Supp. 1315. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Broad allegations that each defendant aided and abetted commission of all predicate acts listed were insufficient to satisfy RICO requirement that at least two acts of racketeering per defendant be alleged. U.S. v. Bonanno Or- ganized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, E.D.N.Y.1988, 683 F.Supp. 1411, affirmed 879 F.2d 20. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Allegations in buyers' complaint, that defendants joined together to promote and sell research and development services, were sufficient to plead existence of enterprise, for purposes of civil RICO claim arising from purchase of research and development services, but were not sufficiently particular to plead racketeering activity element of RICO claim; buyers were required to allege with particularity time, place and contents of fraudulent actions, identity of each actor and specific role each played and whether particular defendant was being sued as principal or as aider or abettor. Ius v. Butcher, D.Or.1987, 680 F.Supp. 343. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 73

Contractor, which claimed that United States, through the Department of Housing and Development, negligently failed to disclose to contractor prior irregularities and inadequacies in administration of contracts at Indian reser- vation, failed to allege identifiable scheme to defraud, and thus failed to state claim under RICO based on alleged fraudulent use of United States mails and telephone wires. Snowbird Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S., D.Idaho 1987, 666 F.Supp. 1437. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Complaint by investor alleging civil RICO violations by investment corporation were inadequate and thus required amendment, where allegations failed to demonstrate nature of correspondence in interstate commerce, who made correspondence and when, contents of correspondence, or which activities investor complained of. Wichita Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Landmark Group, Inc., D.Kan.1987, 657 F.Supp. 1182. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations complaint, which was filed by farmers after Federal Land Bank

commenced foreclosure, which failed to allege that any farm credit system defendant or any federal reserve system defendant was associated with enterprise other than banks, which failed to allege any facts to support claim that debt was unlawful, and which failed to allege facts to show that scheme to defraud was intended or devised in violation of mail and wire fraud statutes, failed to state claim. Schroder v. Volcker, D.Colo.1986, 646 F.Supp. 132, affirmed 864 F.2d 97. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Plaintiffs in RICO action predicated on wire and mail fraud did not adequately allege the fraudulent or deceptive nature of any act or omission by defendants in connection with sale of collateral securing Mexican railroad bonds where all bondholders were fully apprised of distributions of interest which had previously been made to the country of Mexico, regardless of any misstatement to that effect by bond trustee, agents and any inconsistent justifications of the trustee for making the payments could not have induced bondholders to act or refrain from acting. Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., S.D.N.Y.1986, 645 F.Supp. 675, on reargument 650 F.Supp. 48, affirmed 820 F.2d 46, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 698, 484 U.S. 1005, 98 L.Ed.2d 650, rehearing denied 108 S.Ct. 1588, 485 U.S. 1030, 99 L.Ed.2d 903. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Discharged school principal's attorney's actions, in requesting continuances in state court action brought by principal, requesting and receiving of legal fees for work allegedly never done, testifying in principal's breach of contract suit against labor organization, and failure to file suit ten years ago based on allegations raised currently, failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim or conspiracy which would give rise to suit under federal civil rights statute. McCutcheon v. Foreman, N.D.Ill.1986, 641 F.Supp. 612. Civil Rights 1395(8)

Complaint filed by buyer in connection with repairs to his automobile, charged in accordance with a manual based on amount of time manufacturer considered such repairs should take, rather than time repairs did in fact take, resulting in allegedly inflated labor bill, was insufficient to state a claim against seller under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act in absence of allegations of racketeering or a pattern of racketeering activity. Wolin v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac, Inc., N.D.Ill.1986, 636 F.Supp. 890. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 7

Allegation that securities firm and its subsidiary were responsible for acts of their employees was insufficient to state cause of action against securities firm and subsidiary for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act provision [18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)] authorizing civil action against person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, who conducts or participates, directly or indirectly, in conduct of such enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt, absent allegation that securities firm or its subsidiary committed any predicate racketeering offenses. Modern Settings, Inc. v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1986, 629 F.Supp. 860. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Fraud complaint that defendant used telephone and mail service to make misrepresentation was founded on garden variety business fraud and was not matter falling within realm traditionally considered criminal, and thus, failed to state civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Butler Mfg. Co. v. Con- vey-All, Inc., N.D.Ala.1985, 605 F.Supp. 1203. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Complaint under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act which alleged that defendants engaged in pattern of “racketeering activity” as that term is defined in the statute and that the acts caused injury to plaintiff failed to state cause of action for damages under RICO, absent allegation of violation of substantive provision of RICO and absent allegation of injury by reason of violation of substantive provision. Sheftelman v. Jones, N.D.Ga.1984, 605 F.Supp. 549, reconsideration denied 636 F.Supp. 263. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 63

Where plaintiffs failed to state claim against union attorneys on theory that union attorneys willfully converted union funds by failing to turn over fees received by attorneys in their private capacities when they represented class of union members, civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act arising out of that conduct was legally insufficient. White v. Fosco, D.C.D.C.1984, 599 F.Supp. 710. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Complaint which simply asserted that defendant used the mails or wires “in connection with his business enterprise” was insufficient to show how the defendant used the mails or wire communications in furtherance of a scheme to defraud and thus insufficient to state a claim under this section. Caliber Partners, Ltd. v. Affeld, N.D.Ill.1984, 583 F.Supp. 1308. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Wire fraud as predicate offense under this chapter was inadequately pled by insurance company against its former employee, where accusation of wire fraud was premised on telephone calls to company's policyholders in which false representations about company were allegedly made, but there was no allegation that former employee was one of representatives of rival insurance company making calls or that he was responsible for acts of those representatives. Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., D.C.Colo.1984, 582 F.Supp. 1299. Commerce 80

Complaint which did not allege any garden variety fraud as the predicate for a claim under this chapter but which alleged a failure to produce money for a business venture as agreed, which alleged that the failure to produce the money was the result of fraud, and which alleged that four letters were mailed as part of the scheme did not adequately allege the mail fraud which was assertedly the predicate for the claim under this chapter. Serig v. South Cook County Service Corp., N.D.Ill.1984, 581 F.Supp. 575. Commerce 80

Allegations of churning by brokerage firm did not state a claim under this section. Divco Const. & Realty Corp., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., S.D.Fla.1983, 575 F.Supp. 712. Commerce 80

Brokerage firms' alleged negligence in monitoring trading activity by their internal guidelines was insufficient to support claim against firms under this chapter, in that plaintiff did not, nor could she on the facts as stated, allege more than respondeat superior liability on either firm's part in any securities violation committed by broker, and, even were her complaint to allege sufficient complicity by either, or both firms, to state a securities violation on their parts, more than their commission of these predicate acts had to be pled. Dakis on Behalf of Dakis Pension Plan v. Chapman, N.D.Cal.1983, 574 F.Supp. 757. Commerce 80

Complaint grounded solely in securities fraud actions did not state cause of action under this chapter, alleged

fraudulent conduct being merely predicate act of racketeering activity prohibited by this chapter. Richardson v. Shearson/American Express Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1983, 573 F.Supp. 133. Commerce 80

Complaint, in which investor alleged that there had been churning, trading in unsuitable programs, violation of exchange rules, misrepresentations and omissions, controlling person liability as aiders and abettors and for failure to supervise, all in violation of federal securities laws, did not state cause of action under subsec. (c) of this section, in view of fact that purposes and intent of this chapter were not directed towards such alleged activities and that sufficient remedies were available to investor under federal and state securities laws and the common law. Noland v. Gurley, D.C.Colo.1983, 566 F.Supp. 210. Commerce 80

Where complaint under this chapter against broker did not allege that he ever had any ownership interest in brokerage partnership alleged as the “enterprise,” nor was it alleged that he used 5 percent commission he earned on plaintiffs' transactions to invest in partnership, plaintiffs failed to adequately allege, on part of broker, violation of section 1962 of this title prohibiting an individual from using money received through a pattern of racketeering to invest in the enterprise. Kimmel v. Peterson, E.D.Pa.1983, 565 F.Supp. 476. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 71

Complaint alleging that attorneys violated this chapter by assisting pro se defendants in state court action failed to state claim for relief; limited assistance attorneys provided in preparing pleadings for pro se defendants did not constitute any form of fraud but was wholly proper, especially where law firm had to appear for one of the defendants in the state court action. Martin-Trigona v. D'Amato & Lynch, S.D.N.Y.1983, 559 F.Supp. 533. Commerce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Claim of civil violation of this chapter by stockbroker, who advised certain of his customers to buy target corporation's stock and purchased target corporation's stock for his own account based upon nonpublic information regarding planned tender offer obtained through unauthorized disclosure of investment banker's employee, failed to state cause of action where claim rested on mere fact that stockbroker had been convicted of violating some of provisions listed by this chapter as underlying felonies. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., S.D.N.Y.1983, 553 F.Supp. 1347, affirmed 719 F.2d 5, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1280, 465 U.S. 1025, 79 L.Ed.2d 684. Commerce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Principal of debtor and corporation, who alleged that court-appointed participants in debtor's bankruptcy fraudulently failed to disclose certain information to principal and corporation, failed to state cause of action for fraud, as predicate act under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), absent any allegation that representatives were in fiduciary or similar relationship of trust with principal and corporation. Delorean v. Cork Gully, E.D.Mich.1990, 118 B.R. 932. Fraud 44

Misstatement in judicial petition cannot give rise to cause of action under RICO's civil fraud provisions, absent allegation that petition is attempt to subvert or corrupt judicial process. In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., N.D.Ill.1986, 63 B.R. 415. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

262. Dismissal of complaint--Generally

It was reasonable for district court to have believed that Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against bank's successor were only RICO claims in case, and thus, district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of dismissal order, which was entered following settlement agreement, even though plaintiff argued that it never agreed to dismissal of RICO claims against predecessor bank's employees; district court did not authorize plaintiff to amend complaint to add employees, complaint only alleged “control or influence” element of RICO claim against employees and remainder of pled RICO claim discussed only actions of predecessor bank, no employees had been named or served as defendants at time claims were reported settled, and plaintiff did not clarify post-dismissal that it intended to assert RICO claims against employees. Fabrica de Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Incorporado v. Inversiones Mendoza, Inc., C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 2012, 682 F.3d 26. Federal Civil Procedure 1715

Court improperly dismissed complaint alleging RICO claim and two state law claims on basis that claims were time barred by statute of limitations; face of complaint invoked state and federal equitable tolling doctrines by alleging pendency of two prior actions and that plaintiffs did not know of defendant's alleged misconduct until within one year of date of filing of pendent actions. Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1988, 846 F.2d 1190. Limitation Of Actions 180(7)

Dismissal on ground of international comity was not warranted in action by Colombian national and regional governmental agencies alleging that liquor manufacturers participated in enterprise for laundering proceeds of illegal narcotics sales, in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even though there were 27 pending and decided Colombian actions challenging validity of Colombian tax laws, and agencies could have raised similar tort claims in Columbia, where instant suit did not involve claims for lost taxes. Re- public of Colombia v. Diageo North America Inc., E.D.N.Y.2007, 531 F.Supp.2d 365, certificate of appealability 619 F.Supp.2d 7. Courts 512

Shareholders in company manufacturing space satellites would not be allowed, for reasons of social policy, to proceed with claim against company officers, President of United States and committees of his political party, alleging violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) arising out of alleged bribes in form of campaign contributions to secure waiver of rule prohibiting export of satellites to China; shareholders could obtain relief through properly pleaded derivative suit, and allowance of action could result in duplicative recoveries and superfluous deterrence. Meng v. Schwartz, D.D.C.2000, 116 F.Supp.2d 92, affirmed 48 Fed.Appx. 1, 2002 WL 31248491, rehearing denied , rehearing en banc denied. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 55

In absence of federal authority requiring dismissal of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims prior to accounting, RICO claim would not be dismissed. Stratavest Ltd. v. Rogers, S.D.N.Y.1995, 888 F.Supp. 35. Federal Civil Procedure 1781

Pro se plaintiff's conclusory allegations that defendants' conduct directly harmed his pecuniary interest were not sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss based on plaintiff's lack of standing to bring RICO suit in personal capacity, where comprehensive factual allegations within complaint omitted any reference to injury to plaintiff's

business or property. Pappas v. Passias, E.D.N.Y.1995, 887 F.Supp. 465. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 59

Possibility that plaintiff might be able to establish threat of continuing racketeering activity is sufficient for plaintiff to survive motion to dismiss on grounds on failure to establish “pattern of racketeering activity” in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action. O'Rourke v. Crosley, D.N.J.1994, 847 F.Supp. 1208. Federal Civil Procedure 1781

Plaintiff's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint would not be dismissed on ground that plaintiff failed to satisfy requirement that RICO enterprise had existence separate from pattern of racketeering activity in which it engaged. Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, D.Del.1992, 821 F.Supp. 232. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Although franchisees asserting Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against franchisor and its principal bore burden to prove at trial that members of alleged RICO enterprise participated in some conduct other than business of franchisor, that burden was not basis for dismissal of complaint for failure to state claim. Giuliano v. Everything Yogurt, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1993, 819 F.Supp. 240. Federal Civil Procedure 1811

Third-party appraisal of fair market value of corporation's stock and third-party analysis of corporation's operations relied on by buyers of corporation did not constitute independent intervening causes so as to render buyers unable to demonstrate that corporation's principal bank's alleged acts were proximate cause of buyer's injuries in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action and did not thereby warrant dismissal of RICO claim against bank; buyers alleged that misrepresentations of defendants, including bank, were passed on to third parties when third parties performed their analyses and that defendants were aware that buyers were relying on opinions of third parties in deciding whether to enter into transaction with corporation. Grove Hold- ing Corp. v. First Wisconsin Nat. Bank of Sheboygan, E.D.Wis.1992, 803 F.Supp. 1486. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

“Nexus” element of RICO claim is entirely a factual matter which, for the most part, must await presentation of proof either at trial or on appropriate motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff's allegations as to “nexus” must be radically deficient in order to merit dismissal at pleading stage. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

A Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against the major lender on a hotel- condominium development project would be dismissed with leave to amend complaint or supplement pleadings, where the complaint failed to allege with sufficient particularity the specific acts by the lender, beyond its participation in alleged securities fraud scheme, which constituted predicate RICO acts. Powell v. H.E.F. Partnership, D.Vt.1992, 793 F.Supp. 91. Federal Civil Procedure 1838

Plaintiffs would not be allowed to dismiss counts for violating Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against individual defendants, even though plaintiffs had requested voluntary dismissal “with prejudice,” where plaintiffs had expressed wish to bring remaining state claims in state court, litigation had been pending in federal court for more than four years, plaintiffs waited more than one year after dismissal of claims against corporate defendants before bringing instant motion, and discovery had been proceeding. Philan Ins. Ltd. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1992, 786 F.Supp. 345. Federal Civil Procedure 1713.1

Government, having cited explicitly to bylaws of labor organization and quoted from them in its brief, could not subsequently assert that bylaws should not be considered on motion to dismiss Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint and, thus, court would consider bylaws without converting motion into one for summary judgment. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 738. Federal Civil Procedure 1832

Condominium offering plan, which noted that plumbing system required repairs, that certain portions of roofs had leaks, and that electrical wiring would not sustain installation of additional loads, did not refute allegations of unit owner's racketeering complaint that defendants fraudulently failed to disclose need to replace plumbing system, roofs, and wiring; defendants' contention that there was nothing more than disagreement as to appropriate means of maintaining building did not require dismissal of complaint. Beauford v. Helmsley, S.D.N.Y.1990, 740 F.Supp. 201. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Failure to allege that corporate defendant was a “person” within meaning of RICO provision prohibiting person associated with enterprise from conducting enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity required dismissal of civil RICO claim against corporation. Zimmer v. Gruntal & Co., Inc., W.D.Pa.1989, 732 F.Supp. 1330. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Civil RICO complaint from which defendant could not possibly know precise nature of statutory claim was subject to dismissal for failure to state claim in plain and simple terms. Hartman v. Blinder, D.N.J.1987, 687 F.Supp. 938. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Civil RICO count that alleged only one predicate offense did not allege necessary pattern of racketeering activity and would be dismissed in its entirety. P.M.F. Services, Inc. v. Grady, N.D.Ill.1988, 687 F.Supp. 398. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Attorney's claim that persons involved in underlying criminal investigation and prosecution of attorney for witness tampering violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act required dismissal with leave to amend, where attorney failed to allege role of any person in alleged RICO violation and also failed to allege violation of predicate offenses listed in his complaint. Syre v. Com., E.D.Pa.1987, 662 F.Supp. 550, affirmed 845 F.2d 1015, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 139, 488 U.S. 853, 102 L.Ed.2d 112, rehearing denied 109 S.Ct. 521, 488 U.S. 976, 102 L.Ed.2d 554. Federal Civil Procedure 1811; Federal Civil Procedure 1838

To extent that complaint in civil action alleging violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Act named corporation as both a person and the enterprise involved in violation of the Act, the complaint had to be dismissed. Richter v. Sudman, S.D.N.Y.1986, 634 F.Supp. 234. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 38

Investors' section 1962(c) RICO claim against stockbroker was not subject to dismissal for failure to specifically identify the broker; reference to “defendants” sufficiently identified the broker. Onesti v. Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc., N.D.Ill.1985, 619 F.Supp. 1262. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

District court would not consider on motion to dismiss rather than by motion for summary judgment whether mail and wire communications alleged as predicate acts could be used to make out RICO claim. Electronic Re- lays (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Pascente, N.D.Ill.1985, 610 F.Supp. 648, on reconsideration. Federal Civil Procedure 1832

Causes of action alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act by reason of use of insurance company funds through a pattern of securities frauds to operate other businesses were due to be dismissed for failure to state claim upon which relief could be granted, in that there was no allegation that insurance company suffered any proprietary injury by reason of a pattern of racketeering activity, which injury was different from the alleged injuries caused by predicate acts and no allegation of prior criminal conviction on underlying predicate offenses. Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, La., N.D.Ala.1985, 606 F.Supp. 1348, affirmed 783 F.2d 1011. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Dismissal of complaint alleging violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act for failure to state claim on which relief could be granted would operate as adjudication on merits, rather than dismissal with leave to amend, where plaintiff was given opportunity to plead with particularity the frauds alleged as examples of racketeering activity in amended complaint but did nothing more than allege facts that would amount to civil fraud. Sheftelman v. Jones, N.D.Ga.1984, 605 F.Supp. 549, reconsideration denied 636 F.Supp. 263. Federal Civil Procedure 1838

While count of federal complaint alleging violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act was facially within district court's subject matter jurisdiction, it could not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in its present form. Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration Ltd. - 1981A, E.D.Wash.1985, 604 F.Supp. 1365. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Allegations that employer's capping program secretly and fraudulently deprived employees of economic benefits to which they were entitled and that employer fraudulently negotiated rule of 65, under which employee became eligible for benefits if, on last day of work, he had 20 years of service with employer and if, at any time within two years of his last day of work, employee's age and years of service totals at least 65 years, and that employer never intended to pay benefits sufficiently stated violations of mail and wire fraud statutes to withstand motion to dismiss Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act civil action. McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., D.C.N.J.1985, 602 F.Supp. 1492. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 12

In light of Court of Appeals' direction that courts adopt a liberal approach to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act pleadings at motion to dismiss stage, account executive was not entitled to dismissal of securities customer's RICO claim because he had not been convicted of the predicate criminal acts. Witt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., W.D.Pa.1985, 602 F.Supp. 867. Federal Civil Procedure 1781

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act counts against public water supply district which issued municipal bonds, bond counsel, water district attorney, and outside auditor and accountant to water district were subject to dismissal, in that none of the named defendants had been criminally convicted of any of the predicate acts listed in RICO and, as to bond counsel and outside auditor, complaint did not sufficiently allege requisite degree of participation in or conduct of affairs of an enterprise. Southgate Bank v. Public Water Supply Dist. No. 7 of Jefferson County, Mo., E.D.Mo.1984, 601 F.Supp. 262. Federal Civil Procedure 1729

Since injury suffered by insurer in alleged massive conspiracy to extract money from insurer by means of fraudulent automobile insurance claims totaled no more than sum total of injuries which insurer would have suffered from each individual act of mail fraud, the alleged “predicate act” establishing “racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, had such act occurred in isolation, insurer's civil claim under RICO would be dismissed. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Plaza Oldsmobile Ltd., E.D.N.Y.1985, 600 F.Supp. 1452. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Where investor's claim against investment banker and others for alleged wrongful refusal to liquidate securities account had been dismissed for failure to state claim, his claim under this chapter premised on such wrongful refusal as requisite “second enterprise” was also properly dismissed. Kravetz v. Brukenfeld, S.D.N.Y.1984, 591 F.Supp. 1383. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Plaintiff's complaint alleging that president of finance company violated this chapter by allegedly fraudulent scheme connected with sale of retail installment contracts was properly dismissed for failure to allege that president engaged in type of fraud which this chapter was designed to prevent, i.e., “racketeering activity.” Wil- lamette Sav. & Loan, a Div. of American Sav. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Finance Co., D.C.Or.1984, 577 F.Supp. 1415. Commerce 80

In securities fraud action brought by buyers of limited partnership interests in insolvent coal mining partnership, certain defendants' motion to dismiss was found to be frivolous and was denied, except insofar as it could be construed to seek dismissal of counts under this chapter, which court dismissed on its own motion. Noonan v. Granville-Smith, S.D.N.Y.1981, 537 F.Supp. 23. Federal Civil Procedure 1741; Federal Civil Procedure 1824

Plaintiff was not entitled to reconsideration of order dismissing complaint brought under the Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for failure to state a claim, where arguments presented in his motion to reconsider were largely a rehash of arguments he previously asserted or were arguments that he could have asserted in opposition to defendants' motions to dismiss his claim. Ferluga v. Eickhoff, D.Kan.2006, 236 F.R.D. 546. Federal Civil Procedure 1840

263. ---- Conspiracy, dismissal of complaint

Dismissal of anesthesiologist's substantive Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim on ground that anesthesiologist failed to establish pattern of racketeering activity mandated dismissal of anesthesiologist's conspiracy to commit RICO claim. Purgess v. Sharrock, S.D.N.Y.1992, 806 F.Supp. 1102, supplemented. Conspiracy 8

Dismissal of underlying fraud counts against defendants required dismissal of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy claims against same defendants. Farberware, Inc. v. Groben, S.D.N.Y.1991, 764 F.Supp. 296. Conspiracy 9

264. ---- Equitable remedies, dismissal of complaint

Union and individuals associated with it were not entitled to dismissal of Government's RICO complaint on ground that allegations of complaint could not support requested equitable relief, which included, inter alia, ouster of members of union's general executive board, and orders permanently enjoining board members from participating in affairs of any labor organization; if Government prevailed at trial, it would be court's responsibility to fashion equitable remedy to restrain future violations of RICO. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, S.D.N.Y.1989, 708 F.Supp. 1388. Federal Civil Procedure 1811

265. ---- Inconvenient forum, dismissal of complaint

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) fraud claim brought in connection with control of bank would be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds; court-appointed liquidators for plaintiffs had begun proceedings in England on same day as case was filed in United States, English court would most likely have authority to resolve all claims brought by liquidators, large majority of documents and witnesses were in Eng- land, and interests of England in disposition were more substantial than those of United States. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), Societe Anonyme v. Mahfouz, D.D.C.1993, 828 F.Supp. 92. Federal Courts 45

266. ---- Necessary parties, dismissal of complaint

In the absence of explanation by defendants as to why individual had to be joined as a party in action alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, dismissal was not warranted for failure to include individuals as a necessary party. Millonzi v. Bank of Hillside, N.D.Ill.1985, 605 F.Supp. 140. Federal Civil Procedure 1748

267. ---- Other claims, dismissal of complaint

Court would exercise its discretion under pendent jurisdiction doctrine and decline to hear common-law fraud claims of shareholders in labor organization where other civil RICO claims were dismissed as preempted by Na- tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA); parties would not be prejudiced by having common-law fraud claims adjudicated in one proceeding before National Labor Relations Board. Brennan v. Chestnut, D.Minn.1991, 777 F.Supp. 1469, affirmed 973 F.2d 644. Federal Courts 18

Where underlying securities fraud violations are dismissed for failure to state a claim, attendant Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968] claims must be similarly dismissed. Batcheld- er v. Northern Fire Lites, Inc., D.N.H.1986, 630 F.Supp. 1115. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

268. ---- Prejudice, dismissal of complaint

Organizations dedicated to promoting Southern culture were not entitled to dismissal of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim without prejudice; organizations failed to amend complaint as of right pri- or to decision on dismissal motions and organizations did not move for leave of court coupled with motion to alter or amend judgment; and organizations that demonstrated inability to allege valid claim for relief despite several opportunities to amend pleadings. Confederate Memorial Ass'n, Inc. v. Hines, C.A.D.C.1993, 995 F.2d 295, 301 U.S.App.D.C. 395, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied. Federal Civil Procedure 1838

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) plaintiffs who initiated no discovery, did not request district court to stay ruling on motion to dismiss pending opportunity for discovery, and did not seek leave to amend complaint or suggest that by amending infirmities infecting RICO claim could be cured were not entitled to additional period of discovery or right to amend before dismissal. Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp., C.A.1 (Mass.) 1991, 942 F.2d 34. Federal Civil Procedure 1789

Dismissal of RICO complaint for failure to state claim upon which relief could be granted was to be without prejudice; complaint did not unambiguously disclose that no RICO claim existed and further, at time action was filed, there was not significant established body of civil law regarding RICO pleadings available. Old Time En- terprises, Inc. v. International Coffee Corp., C.A.5 (La.) 1989, 862 F.2d 1213. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 69

Amended complaint alleging civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation would be dismissed with prejudice, after plaintiff appeared before court for hearing, and received four extensions of time to file motions with court. Ageloff v. Kiley, S.D.Fla.2004, 318 F.Supp.2d 1157. Federal Civil Procedure 1837.1

Allegation in amended complaint of blanket pattern of racketeering activity against all defendants, in violation of different judge's previous ruling that there was, in fact, no global conspiracy did not warrant dismissal of entire complaint with prejudice; instead, given plaintiff's prior opportunities to amend complaint, court would dismiss offending counts, with prejudice, as barred by prior order of court. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Pharmaceut- ical Basics, Inc., D.Md.1992, 808 F.Supp. 446, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 2002, reversed 7 F.3d 1130, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1533, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1307, 510 U.S. 1197, 127 L.Ed.2d 658. Federal Civil Procedure 1837.1

Plaintiff's motion to reconsider order dismissing complaint brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for failure to state a claim would be granted to extent of changing dismissal with prejudice to one without prejudice, where it could not be said beyond a doubt that he could prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief if he were allowed to amend complaint. Ferluga v. Eickhoff, D.Kan.2006, 236

F.R.D. 546. Federal Civil Procedure 1838

Plaintiffs would be permitted to dismiss claims brought against certain defendants under the Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) without prejudice, rather than with prejudice, where decision to drop claims came relatively early in the litigation; moreover, plaintiffs' explanation that the defendants should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction was more than adequate to justify dismissal without prejudice. Team Obsolete Ltd. v. A.H.R.M.A. Ltd., E.D.N.Y.2003, 216 F.R.D. 29. Federal Civil Procedure 1700; Federal Civil Procedure 1713.1

Dismissal without prejudice of former Chapter 7 debtors' False Claims Act, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and civil rights claims against bankruptcy trustee and his attorney was proper, where debtors commenced action against trustee in district court during pendency of bankruptcy case without first obtaining leave from bankruptcy court, and bankruptcy court granted trustee's motion to reopen case and ordered debtors to file motion to dismiss trustee and attorney from district court case. U.S. ex rel. Krikava v. Community Nat. Bank of Seneca, Kansas, D.Kan.1998, 220 B.R. 699. Bankruptcy 2155; Bankruptcy 2162

269. ---- Res judicata, dismissal of complaint

Plaintiff could have pled its Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) claims in state action, so that dismissal with prejudice of its state action barred, under doctrine of res judicata, litigation of those claims in parallel federal action, even though it had not alleged RICO violations in its state action; plaintiff had sufficient knowledge to plead RICO claims in state court as it did so in federal action before state action was filed, and state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims. Official Publications, Inc. v. Kable News Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1993, 811 F.Supp. 143. Judgment 828.16(3)

270. ---- State law claims, dismissal of complaint

Physician's damages claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and his state law defamation claims, against hospital, its staff members, and affiliated physicians, relating to summary suspension and eventual termination of his hospital privileges under New York law, raised issues that New York State Public Health Council (PHC) would be more adept at reviewing in first instance, and thus, under doctrine of primary jurisdiction, federal district court would dismiss those claims; physician was apparently challenging whether summary suspension was warranted, whether full investigation by hospital was properly conducted, and whether investigation related to patient care, and inquiry into those issues would require consideration of information obtained during investigation, review of patient charts, and evaluation of other medical data. Bauman v. Mount Sinai Hosp., S.D.N.Y.2006, 452 F.Supp.2d 490. Libel And Slander 70; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55

District court could dismiss civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, in addition to state law claims over which it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, given that state law issues clearly predominated as 28 of the 29 counts in complaint were state law claims and state courts had concurrent jurisdiction to hear RICO claims. Bodenner v. Graves, W.D.Mich.1993, 828 F.Supp. 516. Federal Civil Proced- ure 1781

271. Counterclaims, complaint--Generally

Circus owner's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against non-profit animal rights organizations did not constitute compulsory counterclaims in organizations' prior suit against circus owner in relation to treatment of elephants under Endangered Species Act (ESA), where issues raised in underlying ESA suit, and evidence required to sustain it, concerned entirely distinct issues of fact and law than those raised in RICO suit, there was no suggestion that underlying suit had res judicata effect on RICO claims, and there was no logical relationship between the underlying ESA claims and present RICO claims. Feld Entertainment Inc. v. American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, D.D.C.2012, 873 F.Supp.2d 288. Federal Civil Pro- cedure 777

Health spa manager, who brought Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) counterclaim to employee's Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) action, failed to plead fraud with particularity, as required under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; although manager identified employee and her attorney as the individuals who engaged in alleged pattern of racketeering activity by attempting to solicit others to join FLSA action and in making settlement offer, manager did not specify any statements made by employee or her attorney that she contended were fraudulent, did not state exactly where and when the statements were made, and she did not explain why the statements were fraudulent. Flores v. Osaka Health Spa, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2007, 474 F.Supp.2d 523. Feder- al Civil Procedure 636

Counterclaim asserted by clothing importer and wholesaler against clothing manufacturers which alleged violation of RICO failed to state claim upon which relief could be granted; importer and wholesaler did not specifically contend that alleged violations of mail and wire fraud statutes constituted pattern of racketeering activity. Raffaele v. Designers Break, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1990, 750 F.Supp. 611. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 72

Counterclaims for abusive litigation, interference with business and contractual relations, libel and slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, all arising from filing of the RICO claim, were permissive rather than compulsory counterclaims. Majik Market, a Div. of Munford, Inc. v. Best, N.D.Ga.1987, 684 F.Supp. 1089.

Counterclaim which alleged only that management had engaged in development and implementation of judgment scheme in response to hostile takeover did not adequately allege mail fraud or wire fraud as predicate offenses to support claim under this chapter. Warner Communications, Inc. v. Murdoch, D.C.Del.1984, 581 F.Supp. 1482. Commerce 80

If counterclaim under this section stated claim under section 1963 of this title, it was not scandalous or immaterial to accuse plaintiffs of violating section 1963 of this title, and allegation of violation of section 1963 of this title, in pleading civil cause of action, did not necessarily imply that alleged violators could be convicted as criminals, and motion to strike allegations as scandalous, impertinent and indecent was improper unless counterclaim had no substantive merit. Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, N.D.Ill.1979, 513 F.Supp. 311. Federal Civil Procedure 1127

272. ---- Dismissal of counterclaims

In civil RICO action in which defendants and nondefendant corporate officers exercised their privilege against self-incrimination at deposition, plaintiff could file motion requesting dismissal of defendant corporation's counterclaim, although no order had been entered to compel defendants and corporate officers to answer the questions. Stop and Shop Companies, Inc. v. Interstate Cigar Co., Inc., D.Mass.1986, 110 F.R.D. 105. Federal Civil Procedure 1451

273. Cross claims, complaint

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act cross claim asserted by trustee before bankruptcy court, which cross claim was virtually identical to trustee's claim in district court, did not warrant withdrawal of reference, although withdrawal of reference would be mandatory if cross claim were allowed to stand, because plaintiffs in adversary proceeding had moved to strike cross claim. In re Candy Braz, Inc., N.D.Ill.1986, 62 B.R. 3. Bankruptcy 2103

274. Amendment of cross claims, complaint

In action for fraud and breach of contract, fact that defendant against whom other defendants sought leave to file amended cross claim adding complaint under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act had settled with plaintiff based on what it felt was the “frozen in concrete” state of pleadings did not, in and of itself, justify denying the motion to amend, especially in view of insufficient showing of bad faith and dilatory motive. Steven Operating, Inc. v. Home State Sav., S.D.Ohio 1984, 105 F.R.D. 7. Federal Civil Procedure 847.5

18 U.S.C.A. § 1964, 18 USCA § 1964

Current through P.L. 113-55 (excluding P.L. 113-54) approved 11-27-13

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