Final Conclusion

Home , Erhard Busek, Franz Vranitzky, Fritz Bock, Johannes Schober, Leopold Figl, Treaty of Lisbon (1668)

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X . FINAL CONCLUSION

1 . THE LONG ROAD TO BRUSSELS: ATTEMPTS, FAILURES AND SUCCESSES – EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL FACTORS

In the wake of World War I, four great European empires collapsed, and specifically, in chronological order, the Russian Tsarist Empire (1917), the German Empire of the Kaiser (1918), the Habsburg Monarchy (1918), and the Ottoman Empire (1922–23). The political, economic, and psychological consequences for those generations of people who were accustomed to living in those great empires over centuries proved to be catastrophics. That was true in particular for the empire on the Danube. It was not by chance that the “Paneurope” construct of ideas and the movement accompanied by it which had been initiated by Count Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi found very fertile ground in Vienna, where the collapse and end of the Habsburg empire was felt especially bitterly in its capital. Added to this was the forced Treaty of Saint-Germain (1919) as a foiled Austrian state treaty, which had to be painfully perceived as the outcome of the bankrupt assets of the empire on the Danube. The new republican order was a founding of a state against its will (see chapter I). It was not “Europe”, but rather the German Reich that was regarded as provid- ing room for hope and a future, as was expressed in the Anschluss movement of the 1920s. The victorious powers attempted to suppress this both with the Geneva Protocols (1922) and through the Lausanne Loans (1932) and to cover it with a prohibition against Anschluss of, in each case, twenty years (up to 1942 and 1952, respectively). As a result of these dictates, the idea of “Europe” was not much more popular in Vienna (see chapter II, subchapters 3 and 8). While Ignaz Seipel flirted with the idea of Central Europe (Mitteleuropa), Johannes Schober was more oriented towards the German Reich. “Paneurope” remained a pipe dream. In contrast to that, the Central Europe project already had something of a more realistic effect. It was, however, likewise doomed to failure as a result of differences of opinion between the neighbor countries in the Danube region that came into question with it in the area of conflict between a broad reaching dependency of Austria upon the League of Nations and only restricted sovereignty with a view towards Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in the 1930s. The loss of the Central Europe idea for Austria was also tied to Seipel’s departure from the political stage in 1931–32. Interestingly enough, this also corresponded 888 X. Final Conclusion with the German-Austrian customs union project that was advocated by Schober through the process of secret diplomacy (see chapter II, subchapter 7). The German Reich also continued to remain a fixed point for Austria’s foreign policy in the 1930s. While Berlin pushed for a bilateral customs union, Vienna vacillated and remained undecided until an indiscretion there in the matter which had been kept secret provoked international condemnation and caused the plan’s downfall. France and Czechoslovakia immediately lodged a protest against the customs union project. After the Briand Plan of 1930 was received by both Germany and Austria with comments ranging from reservations to rejection, the Tardieu Plan of 1932 for the formation of a confederation of all of the states neighboring the Danube came too late to still have any chance at realization. Aus- tria was already too closely tied to Rome, and it was then willing to move forward in a consistent manner with the “Rome Protocols”, an alliance with both Fascist Italy and revisionist Hungary. Italy’s Abyssinian War starting in 1935 put Austria completely on the defensive, and the July Agreement with Nazi Germany (1936) turned it into a satellite with only a limited lifespan (chapter II, subchapters 8, 9). The Austrian exile comprised both the period of the authoritarian corporative state (Ständestaat) (1934–1938) and Hitler’s totalitarian dictatorship (1938–45). It gathered in Brno, Brussels, Paris, London, New York, and Moscow and was correspondingly dispersed, disparate, ideologically heterogeneous, and politically disunited, such that during all these years, no unified government-in-exile was achieved. The debates revolved around greater German solutions and small Aus- trian constructs. For one group, and specifically the socialists, Austria should still belong to a (socialist) German nation that had been freed of fascism in order to realize the all-German revolution within a socialist Europe that had already been hoped for back in 1918–19. For the other group, christian socials and monarchists, a Danube federation, the Habsburg restoration, or a “Southern German league of states” were topics, while the communists were the first to speak out for a separate and independent Austria. But for all of the exile groups involved, Europe as a topic was on the whole only a subordinate theme and consequently a second-class one (chapter II, subchapters 11 and 12). During the period from 1945–47 through 1953, decisions were made that would set the course for the future. The first steps were taken in the direction of cooperation with Western European governments. With the formulation and propagation of the victim thesis in 1945–46, not only could the demand for the return of South Tyrol be justified, good legitimization could also be found for receiving foreign aid (funds by UNRRA, GARIOA, Interim and Extended Interim Aid, and the ERP). The integral South Tyrol matter could not, however, be pushed through. Rather, there was only a questionable autonomy solution in 1948 which was followed by decades of strife. The victim status of Austria that was successfully asserted also supported the special case thesis in terms of Western orientation policy. Its participation in the Marshall Plan had priority and in 1947–48, that 1. The Long Road to Brussels: Attempts, Failures and Successes 889 was more important than the concluding of the State Treaty. The preservation of a unified state in a divided Europe through the validity of the ERP for the entire country ranked in significance ahead of the conclusive resolution of Austria’s international status. A search for balance that was always a difficult one along with a tightrope act between East and West were necessary in order to maintain the Four Powers consensus in Austria or not to threaten it. That also led to that fact that membership in NATO had to in no way come into question and in the best case, only a ‟secret” (pseudo) partnership with the West could exist in terms of security policy (chapter III, subchapters 3, 4, 5, 6). Towards the end of the war, Coudenhove-Kalergi returned from exile in the US and settled at first in Gstaad in the Berner Oberland in Switzerland, where he advocated for the idea of a European Parliamentary Union. In a sort of pincer movement between American reconstruction aid and parliamentary involvement, he hoped for the creation of a movement for a European constitution, which was not to be fulfilled. In the meantime, the ERP mutated from a welfare and aid program into a reconstruction and modernization program for Austria. Its West- ern orientation took place through the process of trade liberalization within the framework of the OEEC starting from 1948 and of GATT from 1951. But the ERP was also effective through the counterpart funds. Through its membership in the European Payment’s Union (EPU), Austria had participated early on in a multilateral balance of payments in Western Europe. Within that context, a clear reorientation took place of Austrian foreign trade in the direction of the West and the more or less secret handling of the US embargo policy against the East. What was conspicuous and considered by France and the Soviet Union in an increasingly critical manner was also the interweaving of trade and economic policy with the Federal Republic of Germany that was becoming closer and closer, which was a result of the cessation of trade with Central and Eastern parts of Europe and which threatened to turn Austria into an appendage of West Germany (chapter III, subchapters 7, 8, 9). Against the background of the German question that had remained open (1952–55), Austria, with the maintaining of the Four Powers administration, appeared in contrast to be a good example for its solution. An initial cautious approach with the Council of Europe began early on: there was an Austrian observer status in the Consultative Assembly by the Nationalrat starting in 1949 and then by the Federal Government from 1953 with Eduard Ludwig (ÖVP) and Bruno Pittermann (SPÖ). Austria also occupied the same position with the High Author- ity of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) when with Carl Bobleter (ÖVP) and Fritz Kolb (SPÖ), coalition representation that was proportionally balanced was also established in Luxembourg (chapter III, subchapters 10, 11). During the period between 1953 and 1960, decisions were once again made by the Austrian side that would set the course for the future and which would carry significance up to the end of the 1980s. In contrast to later years, there 890 X. Final Conclusion was a party consensus on Europe policy that only diversified in the following period. After the end of the Marshall Plan program in 1953, when new options emerged for a concluding of the State Treaty, Austria stopped further steps towards integration with the ECSC in 1954. In the spring of 1955, Austria made use of the window of opportunity for the finalizing and signing of the State Treaty through a “ One-Plus-Four” solution with the four occupying powers. The Austria solution with the State Treaty and neutrality also triggered a multifaceted internal and international debate about the possibility of a model case for Germany with which, however, Vienna behaved in a restrained manner: new complica- tions were to be avoided, but before 1955 movement was in many cases in the shadow of the German question, which was more important to the victorious powers than Austria was. The calling into question and rejection of the Austrian pattern for Germany by the Western powers, who internally did not dispute its earnestness and possibility, obstructed an earlier reduction of tensions in Central Europe which was only to take place in the first half of the 1970s. In any case, in 1955 Austria realized its state unity and independence. In contrast, the division of Germany and the dependency upon the respective superpowers continued to exist (chapter III, subchapter 12; chapter IV, subchapters 3, 4). Even after 1955, Austria did not become a real secret ally of the West. Further- more, it was to turn out to be unrealistic, and even illusionary, that in the event of a hypothetical attack from the East, NATO would defend Austria. The intra- german border had priority for the Atlantic military alliance. The Austrian army was itself not NATO compatible, and thus there was no serious and substantial talk of a “secret ally” (chapter IV, subchapter 4). If Austria’s access to Strasbourg and the Council of Europe was still waiting and hesitant in 1953–54, then after the concluding of the State Treaty, it was all the more decisive, which already led to full accession as early as 1956. The upris- ing in Hungary that was suppressed in the autumn had immediate repercussions on Austria’s Europe and integration policy. The wish by Chancellor Julius Raab and Foreign Minister Leopold Figl that was briefly articulated for candidacy for membership in the ECSC – including from considerations of domestic policy towards the coalition partner, the SPÖ – was to be withdrawn right away. Protec- tionist intentions for the defense of the nationalized industries and resistance on the part of the socialists prevented early membership in the ECSC. In the shadow of the Hungary crisis, there was no Austrian membership in the ECSC. Human- itarian refugee aid and the political support that was also provided with it for the rebellious neighbor strengthened the Austrian feeling of self-worth, awakened national self-awareness, and contributed towards the growing existence of a first neutrality identity. Last but not least, what was concerned was also something along the lines of a Central European responsibility for Austria. This was, however, shown limits right away by the Soviet Union when during his visit to Austria in 1957, the Soviet Minister Anastas Mikoyan made a clear objection known to 1. The Long Road to Brussels: Attempts, Failures and Successes 891 the recommendation that had been made by Raab shortly before for an Austrian solution for a Central Europe free of atomic weapons. In the meantime, it had also been realized in the Kremlin that Austrian neutrality could signify a Trojan horse for the cohesion of the socialist camp in Central Europe. Attempts by Raab in 1958 for the solution of the German question were futile as he continued to have the Austrian model case in mind to overcome the division of Germany (chapter IV, subchapters 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10). The project that had been proposed by the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan for a large free trade area appealed to Vienna without it having been remarked upon there that this endeavor amounted to a shattering of the plans of the ECSC states to form a common, core-european market. When those negotiations got bogged down in 1957–58, the Austrian chancellor considered the “EEC Anschluss” which, however, was in turn rejected by the socialist coalition partner. Thus in 1959–60, only a small free trade zone remained as a last resort (chapter IV, subchapters 11 and 12). For want of a better alternative, Austria acted only with hesitation and restraint in the “Stockholm Group” which led to the formation of EFTA. Participation also took place under the condition of endeavoring to build a bridge to EFTA as soon as possible. But that was not to be realized so quickly. Alternative variations that in the end were not to get their chance were to be a bilateral customs union, an expansion of EFTA, and Greece as an example for an EEC association (chapter IV, subchapters 13, 14 and 15). Bruno Kreisky as foreign minister viewed EFTA, the State Treaty, and neutrality in a productive, identity-establishing triangular relationship as a contribution towards political self-determination and Austria finding itself. But the consensus at the domestic policy and party politics levels in integration issues began to crumble: in the last years of the Grand Coalition (1963–66), the extent of Austria’s rapprochement with the EEC became further disputed internally. The FPÖ in the opposition even demanded withdrawal from EFTA. After the British application for EEC accession in 1961, the worry in Vienna was great that EFTA could break apart. The neutrals (Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden) each sought, found, and made their own application for EFTA association. There were Soviet objections and American reservations, but also intra community resistance, above all from France and Italy. De Gaulle’s veto against British accession to the EEC on January 14, 1963 then had the effect of EFTA continuing to hold together. In contrast to Berne and Stockholm, though, which let their applications for association lie or withdrew them, respectively, Vienna stuck to its ambitions for an “EEC arrangement”, which led to a split among the neutrals (chapter V, subchapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7). “Going it alone to Brussels” continued once again and was intensified in its single-party government. For Chancellor Josef Klaus (ÖVP), the EEC had priority over EFTA. Eight rounds of negotiations with Brussels had already led to tangible 892 X. Final Conclusion results when relations with Italy became aggravated in 1967 because of the South Tyrol conflict to such an extent that Rome exercised a veto in both Brussels and Luxembourg against Austria concluding a treaty with the ECSC and the EEC. In the background, both France and the USSR also interacted against Austria having too close of a relationship to the European Communities, such that the “going it alone” had to fail. The suppression of the reform socialist movement of the Prague Spring in 1968 also left Austria’s EC ambitions overshadowed and on the sidelines. Only the South Tyrol compromise between Aldo Moro and Kurt Wald- heim that was achieved in 1969 with the “package” and the “operations calendar” smoothed the way for a solution with the EC (chapter V, subchapters 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14). In the meantime, Coudenhove-Kalergi had returned to Austria and emphati- cally recommended building bridges between the EC and EFTA in order to overcome the trade policy split in Western Europe (chapter V, subchapter 14). Against the background of the “Eurosclerosis” of the 1970s, which really should not be designated as such, Austria attempted to take up the integration policy of the 1960s. What was striven for here was no longer an association, but rather merely bilateral tariff and trade treaties – in any case with an evolutionary clause (chapter VI, subchapter 2). The average Austrian was sometimes only very incompletely informed. There were at times unrealistic presentations of EFTA and the EC. A broad public discourse was lacking. The Federal Government’s Europe policy and integration policy in the first half of the 1970s that were more or less oriented towards the status quo may have had their share in this diffuse and indifferent forming of opinions. Chancellor Kreisky stuck to his foreign policy priorities: the profiling of neutrality policy and the support of the policy of détente within the framework of the CSCE with continuing membership in the Council of Europe and EFTA. The Soviet Union therefore accepted the tariff and trade treaties which Austria had concluded with the EEC and the ECSC in 1972, but only under the condition of also receiving the same trade policy concessions, which was expressed in a subsequent Austrian-Soviet trade treaty (chapter VI, subchapters 3 and 4). Starting from the mid-1970s, a new accentuation of integration policy began under Kreisky that went hand in hand with the intensification of relations with EFTA and the participation in the European Monetary System (EMS) that suc- ceeded in coordination with German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. For Kreisky, though, there was a limit that could not be exceeded: for him, “permanent” neutrality was no longer compatible with “supranational” integration. Thus as far as Kreisky was concerned, there could also only be an “asymptotic rapprochement” of Austria to the European Communities, that is, the broadest reaching rapprochement without the congruence of the two lines (chapter VI, subchapter 4). 1. The Long Road to Brussels: Attempts, Failures and Successes 893

With the Small Coalition of the SPÖ and FPÖ (1983–86), there was not any fundamental reorientation of integration policy. Rather, sensitive indications in the direction of a stronger connection with the EC were to be selectively understood from Vice Chancellor Norbert Steger and Defense Minister Friedhelm Frischenschlager (chapter VI, subchapter 5). The Single European Act (SEA) and the Single Market Program of Commis- sion President Jacques Delors then increased the pressure for a decision on integration policy and the need for action at the domestic policy level by the Austrian government. The Grand Coalition starting in January 1987 under that was formed under Franz Vranitzky and Alois Mock recognized the signs of the times and intensified the attempts at rapprochement with the Communities. The formula that was coined by Ambassador Manfred Scheich of the “global approach” – that is, of a “comprehensive rapprochement” with the European Communities – made the rounds (chapter VII, subchapter 4). Above all else, it was necessary to overcome the domestic policy hurdles, in particular with the leadership circles of the SPÖ, until it was possible to submit the “letter to Brussels” from July 14 on July, 17, 1989. That took place under the expressed and very serious reservation of neutrality. Not least for that reason, the application for accession was accepted in Brussels, but there were also reservations among member countries, while the EFTA states grumbled about Austria “going it alone”. The reserve of Delors was explained by the prime importance of his Single Market concept. The integration process was to first be deepened and then broadened (chapter VII, subchapters 5 and 6). The four former occupying powers accepted the application for accession in different ways. While traditional enlargement-oriented Great Britain advocated it and the USA was also positive about it, there were mixed reactions in Mos- cow and clear reservations and corresponding hesitancy in Paris (chapter VII, subchapter 6). After the “Fall of the Berlin Wall” on November 9, 1989, the matter of Austria fell completely under the shadow of the German question and landed on an integration policy sidetrack. Only the summit in Maastricht in 1991 brought a solution to the German question through stronger integration of the reunited Germany into the new construct of the “European Union”. Moreover, Austria still had to wait until 1993 before the negotiations for accession could then also begin with the EFTA partners Finland, Norway, and Sweden, which in the interim period had also submitted their applications for membership (chapter VII, subchapter 7). The question as to whether the “letter to Brussels” consisted of a break in or the continuation of prior Austrian integration policy was decided in this book more in the sense of continuity. Without the entire prior course of integration policy from the 1950s through the 1980s that was indeed changeable yet tending to be oriented positively, this application would not have been supported in terms 894 X. Final Conclusion of domestic policy and would not have been put forth consensually in terms of coalition politics (chapter VII, subchapter 10). The negotiations for accession took place together with the Scandinavians. For Austria, it was a stroke of luck that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was in fact already not concluded and had not yet entered into force at the beginning of its accession negotiations and at the end also had not yet been realized and practiced by the Community. Thus the core element of neutrality could continue to be safeguarded and the hurdle of the CFSP could be cleared. A large-scale and passionate battle over neutrality therefore remained outside of the public debate (chapter VII, subchapters 11, 12 and 14). In the case of Austria, the negotiations resulted in ups and downs: the most difficult material had to do with agricultural policy, followed by the transit issue, environmental standards, and finally the question of second residences. With the path of compromise, it was possible for the Austrian matters of concern to be solved (chapter VII, subchapter 13). The representatives of the Grand Coalition accepted the results of the negotiations positively, while the reaction of the FPÖ and the Green Party ranged from disapproving to rejecting (chapter VII, subchapter 16). With a vote of 66.6%, the Austrian people went into the EU fully convinced, while in Finland and Sweden, the results of the referendums came out more modest. But the Grand Coalition did not take advantage of the unique mood of euphoria in Austria with regard to union policy. Rather, it quarreled about questions of prestige, such as whether the treaty should be signed by representatives of the government or by the president, and when the head of state dropped out, then who on the part of the government should be the one to sign it. In the end, four people signed the treaty in order to keep the peace in the coalition. The unique success story was ruined out of partisan, domestic policy interests as a result of various intrigues and friction, squabbles about institutional competence, and personal vanity and envy (chapter VII, subchapters 18, 19). That was a not rare, but in fact nearly common pattern of the political culture of a small and lovely country, but one that was also characterized by malicious- ness, jealously, self-centeredness, and self-hatred.1 The first years of Austria’s membership in the EU moved completely along the line of continuity of the application for accession of 1989 and the Europe policy that had previously been followed. In terms of trade policy, economic policy, and monetary policy, there were efforts made at integration, but security policy remained reserved as a result of the neutrality policy. The European Monetary System was eagerly and formally joined and Austria became a full member. At the introduction of the non-cash currency (1999) and with the preparation of the real currency of the euro (2002), Austria participated fully and completely, while

1 Ernst HANISCH, Selbsthaß als Teil der österreichischen Identität, in: Zeitgeschichte 23 (Mai/ Juni 1996), 5/6, 136–145. 1. The Long Road to Brussels: Attempts, Failures and Successes 895 with the WEU, it held merely observer status, and with NATO, it stayed out or else only belonged to the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) cooperation program. Austrians were received into all of the bodies of the EU (the Commission, Parlia- ment, ECJ, and ECB). Austria withstood its “trial by fire” of Presidency of the EU in 1998. The country worked actively and committedly on the Convention for the Charter of Fundamental Rights with Heinrich Neisser and Johannes Voggenhuber (chapter VIII, subchapters 2, 3, 4 and 6). The year 2000 brought a Europe policy blow to Austria. No one had considered it to be possible that fourteen EU partner states would put a ban on the state after the ÖVP and FPÖ formed a government together. The government boycott measures that were imposed (in Austria, they were in many cases referred to er- roneously and exaggeratedly as “EU sanctions”, including by the Kronen Zeitung) immediately maneuvered the boycotting governments themselves into a predica- ment, since there were inherent difficulties in putting an embargo on a member of the Single Market. Thus the actions were limited to symbolic acts which at times had to have a ridiculous effect like the exclusion of Austrian representatives from the “family photos” or the abandoning of meetings (chapter VIII, subchapters 7, 8 and 9). International reactions were mixed and tepid, such that it soon turned out that there was no united front of the EU-14 against Austria, and in fact some of the smaller states had to be compelled or convinced to join in. The short-term effects consisted of the controversial ÖVP-FPÖ government bonding together in the sense of a national closing of ranks, with the majority of the population show- ing their solidarity with it. In the medium term, the EU-14 had to recognize that their action was excessive and counterproductive. The Three Wise Men (Martti Ahtisaari, Jochen A. Frowein, and Marcellino Oreja) led the EU-14 out of their dead end, and aside from a few trivial matters, they were able to confirm in their report that Austria’s government had not violated any European values and the lifting of the boycott was to be recommended. But many Austrians felt injured by the punitive action, and the country’s Europe policy was to suffer from this for a long time thereafter (chapter VIII, subchapters 9, 10, and 11). The year 2000 with the excessive, ineffective and though unnecessary EU-14 boycott measures and the Nice Summit that was characterized by many national differences of opinion rang in a phase of the EU coming under the clouds of renationalization and populism. The biggest enlargement in the history of the Com- munities by the Northern, Central and Eastern countries (CEEC) of the continent had already cast its shadow in advance. With the people of Austria, sympathy and enthusiasm were limited, while the Ballhausplatz diplomacy helped to wrap up the accession negotiations package with the CEEC. The prevailing mood in the Austrian public at large that was skeptical about enlargement did little to make the governments in Bratislava, Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw more Austria-friendly. The initiative of a “strategic partnership” 896 X. Final Conclusion from Vienna that was oriented in the direction of Central and Eastern Europe during the period of the EU-14 boycott was not accepted by them, and thus it had to be weakened, lessened in importance, and scaled back as a “regional partnership”. Up to the end, Austria also did not find any acceptance among the Visegrád Group with Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary (chapter IX, subchapter 2). In the convention for the drafting of a European constitution, Austria again worked actively with Reinhard Eugen Bösch, Caspar von Einem, Johannes Farnleitner and Johannes Voggenhuber. Both the Bundesrat and the Nationalrat also ratified the “Constitutional Treaty” in Vienna which, however, was of no help, since the people of France and the Netherlands rejected the constitutional work by way of referendums in 2005 (chapter IX, subchapters 3 and 5). It was not possible to renew the Transit Treaty with the EU which had a time limit on it. In Austria, an increasingly skeptical mood against the EU became rife. That was also tied to the substantial reservations against Turkey as a possible EU Member, with which negotiations were officially to begin in 2005. With Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik, Austria at first still exercised a veto against the beginning of negotiations with Turkey and only relented when the Austrian demand to also negotiate with Croatia about EU membership found acceptance (chapter IX, subchapters 4 and 7). The Austrian Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2006 had the effect of a productive pause for reflection after the failure of the “Constitution- al Treaty” in France and the Netherlands. The subsequent presidencies of Finland and Germany then achieved the result of the core of that treaty continuing to exist and finding its way into the history of the EU as the Treaty of Lisbon (chapter IX, subchapters 8 and 9). In spite of this breakthrough, an Austro-national populism that became stronger and stronger against the background of the crisis of the nation-states rose up throughout all of Europe, and this populism showed itself in Austria with the FPÖ as one of the strongest parties which, in the end, once again managed to procure responsibility in the national government (chapter IX, subchapters 6 and 11).

2 . THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND IN LIGHT OF SUPERVISION FROM OUTSIDE AND THE IMPACT OF “EUROPE” AND INTEGRATION UPON NATIONAL IDENTITY BUILDING INSIDE

Austria’s relationship to Europe and to integration can be better explained and understood against a greater historical background (chapters I and II).2 It was not and is not an underdeveloped country on the periphery, but rather a highly

2 See also Robert KNIGHT, Austrian Neutrality and European Integration. The Historical Back- ground, in: Karl KOCH (Ed.), Austria’s Contribution towards European Union Membership, 2. The Historical Background in Light of Supervision from Outside 897 industrialized state in the center of Europe. However, the question of its rising again and its further existence after the Second World War was open. The country became free of the occupying powers in 1955 because the victorious powers of World War II desired its detachment from Germany, because it had a Western orientation in both social and economic terms and finally because it promised the USSR to carry out a policy of “permanent” neutrality between West and East. For a long time, this foreign policy status was only compatible with free trade, but not with complete market integration. The permanent separation from Germany was an indispensable necessity. For that reason, the country had to and ought to be integrated into Europe and oriented towards its institutions as well as was in fact possible (chapters III and IV). In 1988, a study, edited by Günter Bischof and Josef Leidenfrost, was published with the title in the sense of “A Nation having its Decisions Made by others”, covering the relationsship between Austria and the Allies 1945–1949.3 Plausible objections to the term ‟Bevormundung” (having decisions made by others) were raised by the Viennese modern historian Thomas Angerer. According to him, the catchword was merely a good piece of political rhetoric and served the advantages of those who were under occupation at the time.4 But how sovereign had Austria really been in its history? It is necessary to look back further. The desire for the Anschluss with Germany in 1918–19 was widespread and could hardly be tamed,5 but the First Republic was obliged to maintain its existence by the Treaty of Saint-Germain. The loans arranged in Geneva in 1922 and Lausanne in 1932 kept Austria under the thumb of the League of Nations. A general commissar, the Dutchman Alfred Zimmermann, was responsible for overseeing Austria’s redevelopment, that is, its budget policy.6 A certain economic stabilization was indeed achieved, but political calm was not. With the agreement of July 11, 1936, Austria had already almost been made into a quasi-Nazi satellite. The “Anschluss” was only a matter of time,7 as well as merely an expression of Austria’s total dependence from outside and the inability of the Western powers to find effective means against Nazi suppression as well as

University of Surrey Printing Unit, Guildford 1995, 28–47. 3 Günter BISCHOF – Josef LEIDENFROST (Hrsg.), Die bevormundete Nation. Österreich und die Alliierten 1945–1949 (Innsbrucker Forschungen zur Zeitgeschichte 4), Innsbruck 1988. 4 Thomas ANGERER, Der “bevormundete Vormund”. Die französische Besatzungsmacht in Österreich, in: Alfred ABLEITINGER – Siegfried BEER – Eduard STAUDINGER (Hrsg.), Österreich unter alliierter Besatzung 1945–1955 (Studien zu Politik und Verwaltung 63), Wien – Köln –Graz 1998, 159–204, 165–166: 168–170. 5 Alfred D. LOW, Die Anschlußbewegung in Österreich und Deutschland 1918–1919, und die Pariser Friedenskonferenz, Wien 1975, 54–81, 82–101. 6 Friedrich WEISSENSTEINER, Der ungeliebte Staat. Österreich zwischen 1918 und 1938, Wien 1990, 117. 7 Gabriele VOLSANSKY, Pakt auf Zeit. Das Deutsch-österreichische Juli-Abkommen 1936 (Böhlaus Zeitgeschichtliche Bibliothek 37), Graz – Wien – Köln 2001. 898 X. Final Conclusion a lasting solution to the “Austria problem”. In the “Ostmark” and the “Alpen- und Donaugaue”, the Anti-Hitler coalition saw an important part of the war-waging Nazi Germany which had to be broken away from the Reichsverband. The thesis of Austria as the “first victim of Nazi aggression” was not an invention by Austrians, but an allied interpretation and offer which lucky Austrians had and could accept.8 After the end of the war, Austria was thus supposed to be “liberated” and “independent,” as the Allies had proclaimed close to the end of the Moscow Confer- ence in 1943. Their trust, however, was not especially deep. Memories of budget crises, the civil war, and the Anschluss movement in the period between the wars were still too fresh. Unity and liberty were thus still to be awaited after 1945. Austria only achieved its State Treaty in 19559 with limits to its sovereignty. On an international level, neutrality was more or less accepted only in a “like it or not” manner.10 The literature has correctly made it clear that the development of an Austrian identity profited from the fundamental German identity crisis after 1945. Austria was spared from a lasting occupation (even if that was also transformed by so- called “friendly troops”11), a divided country, and a wall through the former capital. The Austrian Second Republic demonstrated much more stability and prosper- ity than the First Republic. Economic stability and, in particular, political stability were essential preconditions for the finding of the national self. Identity-building cannot, however, be reduced solely to the socioeconomic success story. “Europe” and “European integration” had an assisting function. The economic inter-weav- ings between Germany and Austria were thicker than ever and today are closer than at any point in history, and thus they could be covered up by the European Monetary System and the European Union and could be glossed over in a positive manner. Nevertheless, identifications by Austrians developed, ranging from

8 Robert Graham KNIGHT, Besiegt oder befreit? Eine völkerrechtliche Frage historisch betrachtet, in: BISCHOF – LEIDENFROST (Hrsg.), Die bevormundete Nation, 75–91; Robert H. KEYSERLINGK, Austria in World War II. An Anglo-American Dilemma, Kingston – Montreal 1988, 123–156; Günter BISCHOF, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945–55. The Leverage of the Weak (Cold War History Series, General Editor: Saki DOCKRILL), Basing- stoke – New York 1999, 7–29. 9 See the master work by Gerald STOURZH, Um Einheit und Freiheit. Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost-West-Besetzung Österreichs 1945–55 (Studien zu Politik und Verwal- tung, ed. by Christian BRÜNNER, Wolfgang MANTL, and Manfried WELAN 62), fourth completely revised and expanded edition, Wien – Köln – Graz 1998 and at least IDEM – Wolfgang MUELLER, A Cold War over Austria. The Struggle for the State Treaty, Neutra- lity, and the End of East-West Occupation, 1945–1955 (The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series), London 2018. 10 See Heinrich PAYR, Die schwierige Kunst der Neutralität, Wien – Köln 1990, 43–55. 11 Hermann-Josef RUPIEPER, Der besetzte Verbündete. Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1949 – 1955 (Studien zur Sozialwissenschaft 95), Opladen 1991. 2. The Historical Background in Light of Supervision from Outside 899

divergent to very different – in part as a conscious dissociation from Germans and Germany. Economic integration therefore went hand in hand with mental and psychological division. The different political cultures contributed also to that kind of separation.12 The foundation of Austrian identity often took place from above – it was ani- mated, carried forward, and lived out through politics. The rejection of a German identity was a conditio sine qua non. What necessarily followed from this was the logic that Austria also had to try hard to avoid a wide-ranging policy of repara- tions like that of Germany, which otherwise would be equivalent to an admission of guilt. With the complete support of the Great Powers, Austria freed itself from the German question in 195513 that for a long time appeared unsolvable, while economic relations with Germany strengthened year after year. In that regard, “Europe” served as a helpful and effective substitute identity and as a new area of the future, yet at the same time it also served as a mask for the close economic ties with Germany. In the end, EU accession prevented Austria from taking on the status of a client state or a satellite of Germany. Our topic also covered aspects of the background, motives, and advantageous factors in order to build an Austrian identity after the Second World War. Special attention had been paid to the thematic areas of Europe and integration policy. In-depth studies on Austrian identity and identities have been evident since the 1980s and documented and analyzed by Ernst Bruckmüller.14 There are various reasons for this: as an indication of the revaluation of the writing of social history, the rediscovery of the history of ideas, and the resumption of a policy of Europe- an integration as well as in light of the growing consciousness of new forms of globalization, interest also grew in questions of identity. After 1945, as an Austrian it was actually difficult, if not impossible, to present oneself simultaneously as a victim and also a German. One of the two had to necessarily be omitted if it were desired to adhere to the other. Instead of someone saying that he or she was German, had belonged to Germany, or was included in the German cultural circle, Austria’s search for an identity quickly found refuge in “Europe”. “German” was replaced with “European”. In fact, leading Austrian politicians had repeatedly maintained that Austria was at least as “European” or even “more European” than other countries. The

12 Frank TROMMLER, Berlin and Vienna. Reassessing their Relationsship in German Culture, in: German Politics & Society 23 (Spring 2005), 1, Issue 74, 8–23. 13 Michael GEHLER, Modellfall für Deutschland? Die Österreichlösung mit Staatsvertrag und Neutralität 1945–1955, Innsbruck – Wien – Bozen 2015. 14 For the first time on a social and society history background: Ernst BRUCKMÜLLER, Nation Österreich. Sozialhistorische Aspekte ihrer Entwicklung, Wien 1984 and then afterwards IDEM, Österreichbewußtsein im Wandel. Identität und Selbstverständnis in den 90er Jahren, Wien 1994, IDEM, Österreichische Geschichte. Von der Urgeschichte bis zur Gegenwart, Wien – Köln – Weimar 2019. 900 X. Final Conclusion first Chancellor of the Second Republic, Leopold Figl, created the catch-phrase, “Austria is Europe, and Europe cannot exist without Austria.”15 This ideology was closely connected to the German question and the syn- drome of the “Anschluss” of 1938. In order to counteract the suspicion of still being “German” or Anschluss-oriented, Austrian foreign policy used “Europe” as a means of identification which in turn allowed for a more intensive economic link to Germany again. The political switch and the avoidance of selecting the Germany complex as a central theme had their deep roots in the close economic and financial intertwining that was becoming more and more intense with the German sphere. The Marshall Plan came into existence during this time and was inserted without problem into the building of the new political identity, being ideally supple- mented with the victim theory: the country had been occupied; it had just been liberated from Nazism, and was now being threatened by communism. The Soviet Army was still in the Eastern part of the country. But it also had to be protected against new fast action from Germany, and above all else, it was to be rebuilt again. Participation in the Marshall Plan was therefore compelling. Although this was understood as a contribution to European reconstruction, it first and foremost served the gaining of political and economic independence. Within this context, “Europe” was just a means to an end. The posters read: “ERP contribution in the Marshall Plan – and your production for an independent Austria.” The thesis by the British economic historian Alan S. Milward, according to which early Euro- pean integration served the salvation and renovation of nation-states, can hardly be proven more clearly with a contemporary document. It was the “European Rescue of the Nation State”16 within the “Reconstruction of Western Europe”.17 The erosion of the victim status in the wake of the Waldheim debate 1986–88 and the drawing to a close of the Cold War in Europe in connection with German unity, the application for EC accession 1989, the calling into question of neutrality, and EU membership 1995 were all big challenges that were posed to Austria’s political identity. The interest in that topic can be read from different publications at these times.18 As Peter Thaler has shown, the building of Austrian identity after 1945 was a project of elites. It included not only decision-makers, executives, and politicians, but

15 Thomas ANGERER, „Österreich ist Europa.“ Identifikationen Österreichs mit Europa seit dem 18. Jahrhundert, in: Wiener Zeitschrift zur Geschichte der Neuzeit 1 (2001), 1, 55–72: 68. 16 Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State, London 1992. 17 Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–1951, London 1984, Berkeley – Los Angeles 1986. 18 Max HALLER, Identität und Nationalstolz der Österreicher, Graz – Wien – Köln 1996; Peter THALER, The Ambivalence of Identity. The Austrian Experience of Nation-Building in a Modern Society (Central European Studies), Purdue University Press, 2001. 2. The Historical Background in Light of Supervision from Outside 901 also intellectuals, creative artists, and the literati.19 Historians also participated in the nation-building process. They had considerable involvement as the archi- tects of finding the national self; although their possibilities for the transformation of the public consciousness remained limited, politicians received them. Figures who could be named include Hugo Hantsch,20 Felix Kreissler,21 Friedrich Heer,22 Georg Wagner,23 Ernst Bruckmüller,24 or Gerald Stourzh.25 In addition to their patriotism for Austria, they were also at the same time dyed-in-the-wool Europe- ans. These proponents of Austrian nation-building were convinced by their cause and believed in it. The conservative and “anti-teutonic” journalist Alfred Missong with the Österreichische Monatshefte is a prime example of someone who, starting from such approaches in the “corporative state,” began after 1945 to shape the construct of the character of the Austrian people. Public institutions, parties, media, and educational institutions employed means of the delegitimation of opposing concepts of identity as an instrument of Austrian nation-building. This was necessary above all to provide immunity from post-Nazi, greater German, or even communist interpretations. The reduction of the “Habsburg complex” from the official version of history that was successfully practiced in postwar Austrian policy and the politics of history that were conveyed at the state level played a role in this which up until now has been little noted. What was favorable for the building of an Austrian identity was the socioeconomic development that was connected with the economic reconstruction after 1945, the Marshall Plan, the establishment of the social partnership in the domestic policy, and the foundation of neutrality in foreign policy. The influence of “Europe” and “European integration” has up until now received little attention in research on the Austrian identity development. With the policy towards Europe, the most political of decisions and target measures likewise had an effect as catalysts for the finding of an Austrian sense. The membership in EFTA starting in 1960 and the EC free trade agreement beginning in 1972 marked a clear difference from West Germany with its membership in NATO, the ECSC, and the EEC. Thus, there were possibilities for dissociation of the ideal

19 Peter THALER, The Nation, the Provinces, and the Republic. Recent Writings on Postwar Austrian Identities, in: Austrian History Yearbook 32 (January 2001), 235–262. 20 Hugo HANTSCH, Die Geschichte Österreichs, 2 Bde, Wien 1937–50, Neuausgabe 1994. 21 Felix KREISSLER, Der Österreicher und seine Nation. Ein Lernprozess mit Hindernissen, Wien – Köln – Graz 1984. 22 Friedrich HEER, Der Kampf um die österreichische Identität, Wien – Köln – Graz 1981. 23 Georg WAGNER, Österreich. Von der Staatsidee zum Nationalbewußtsein. Studien und Ansprachen, Wien 1982. 24 BRUCKMÜLLER, Österreichbewußtsein im Wandel. 25 Gerald STOURZH, Erschütterung und Konsolidierung des Österreichbewusstseins – Vom Zusammenbruch der Monarchie zur Zweiten Republik, in: Richard G. PLASCHKA – Gerald STOURZH – Jan Paul NIEDERKORN (Hrsg.), Was heißt Österreich? Inhalt und Umfang des Österreichbegriffs vom 10. Jahrhundert bis heute (Österreichische Akademie der Wissen- schaften/Philosophisch-Historische Klasse/Historische Kommission), Wien 2005, 289–311. 902 X. Final Conclusion type as well as possibilities for a different self-presentation on the international stage, as well as in self-perception. Paths for the Europe policy and integration policy that were followed differently or consciously selected as divergent were and are to be perceived as a part of the finding of the national self and of the building of a national identity. Along its long road to (EU) Europe, Austria made use of this conscious dissociation of integration policy from Germany. Bruno Kreisky, who is not mentioned by name one single time in Thaler’s study, can be listed as the model represent- ative of Austria’s political elite. In contrast to Germany, he exploited the other direction of Austria’s integration policy in a conscious distancing from its larger neighbor. Within that context, matters of Austrian sovereignty and independence always played a major role. In 1960, the year of Austria’s membership in EFTA, Kreisky argued bluntly against the christian democrat German Foreign Minis- ter Heinrich von Brentano as to why Austria could not and would not enter the Common Market, specifically not because of the USSR, but rather because of Germany! According to Kreisky the Soviet Union would not consider Austria’s accession to the EEC to be a cause for war (“not a casus belli”), but such an accession would be tantamount to an “Anschluss”. It was necessary to prevent that. Austrian Neutrality was also a guarantee factor against (NATO) Germany and “Anschluss” thoughts. Up to 1989 and then beyond, Austria’s integration policy was constantly accompanied by the official emphasis of the desire for compatibility with neutrality. With a view towards earlier phases (1947–56, 1961–72), continuities also predom- inated in this regard. After 1989–90, with the removal of the East-West conflict and after Mikhail Gorbachev had not complained about Austria’s ambitions for rapprochement with the EC, the chance for full accession offered itself without it being necessary to take the Soviet Union into consideration as before. From 1989 to 1995, the path to Brussels led not only through Moscow – which would be an overestimate of the USSR’s veto position – but above all through Paris and Rome. Since the bogeyman of “Anschluss” no longer turned out to be an insurmountable obstacle, and since the so-called “Declaration of Settlement of Dispute” in the tiresome South Tyrol issue had been submitted to the United Nations in 1992, the door to the Single Market could be completely pushed open for Austria. At the same time Jacques Delors’ Single Market Project was ready to be achieved (1993) which put pressure on Austria’s economy and policy attempting to enter the new community with the “four freedoms” and developing towards a European Union. External factors were therefore more motivating and more important for the increase in Austria’s behavior towards integration as domestic policy needs. In the case of Austria, what were concerned were predominantly government decisions that were led by external challenges and stimuli. Added to this was certainly also the insight into the growing necessity for domestic policy reform, tasks 2. The Historical Background in Light of Supervision from Outside 903 which, however, were only to be tackled long after EU accession in a dragging and hesitant way. Austria’s path to EU Europe was very long. Following along it was therefore also strenuous, time-consuming, and energy-sapping. With the conception of the application to be accepted into the EC, Austria predominantly concentrated upon Western Europe. CEE fell out of the picture. The process of Austrian accession tied many forces together and took nearly six years (1989–95) (chapter VII). Once it had arrived in the European community of states, the country was too preoccupied with its internal problems – preoccupied, on one hand, with the dangerous political waste of the Grand Coalition and overdue bigger reforms and, on the other hand, preoccupied with the processing of the results of the accession to the European Union – to be able to look towards the outside securely and with self-confidence and correspondingly to be able to move forward with ambition. Austria was always and is in the center of Europe. It was a founding member of the OEEC (1948–60) and an active member in the Council of Europe (since 1956). During its EFTA membership (1960–95), it was an important and reliable partner (except the period from 1963 to 1967 and until 1989), even if in political terms, above all from the ÖVP, the euphoria about the small free trade zone was limited. Beginning from the 1950s up to 1995, Austria was abstinent starting out from new and supranational political integration and therefore at the margin, so to speak, of “core Europe”, but economically it maintained a connection to the Euro- pean Communities from which it did not want and was not able to be completely excluded. The decision that it made early on, in contrast to the other neutrals of Europe, for full membership in the EC speaks to this. The controversy as to whether the famous “letter to Brussels” dated on July 14 and presented on July 17, 1989 with Austria’s application for membership in the European Communities (the EEC, ECSC, and EURATOM), was a break in or the expression of continuity with the integration policy thus far of the Alpine Republic – and reference is made here to the controversial debate with Thomas Angerer26 – fundamentally touches the core of the relationship of tension between

26 Thomas ANGERER, „Alte“ und „neue“ Integration. Antwort auf Kritik an der These vom Bruch in der österreichischen Integrationspolitik 1989, in: Rosita RINDLER SCHJERVE (Hrsg.), Europäische Integration und Erweiterung. Eine Herausforderung für die Wissen- schaften (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, Biblioteca Europea 17), Napoli 2001, 67–89; Michael GEHLER, Der österreichische EG-Beitrittsantrag vom 17. Juli 1989: Mehr Kontinui- tät als Diskontinuität!, in: Ernst BRUCKMÜLLER (Hrsg.), Europäische Dimensionen öster- reichischer Geschichte (Schriften des Institutes für Österreichkunde 65), Wien 2002, 143–210; IDEM, Kontinuität und Wandel: Österreichs Europa- und Integrationspolitik vor und nach dem Epochenjahr 1989, in: Thomas FISCHER – Michael GEHLER (Hrsg.), Tür an Tür. Verglei- chende Aspekte zu Schweiz, Liechtenstein, Österreich und Deutschland. Next Door. Aspects of Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Austria and Germany in Comparison (Institut für Geschichte der Universität Hildesheim, Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration, Historische Forschungen, Veröffentlichungen 9), Wien – Köln – Weimar 2014, 259–292. 904 X. Final Conclusion self-exclusion from and integration with the members that later came to the EC/ EU. The political dimension of the supranational small-Europe integration was quickly perceived and its significance recognized early on by business people, diplomats, and international law experts at the Ballhausplatz. The consequences that resulted from this with a view towards the political “finality” of integration, however, were not always seen, and if they were, then they were not emphasized as long as the acceptance of Austria into the nascent Community or Union was not yet achieved. It was also not the task of Austria’s accession-oriented policy in 1989 to give prominence to the ideas of the supranationality of the EC in order to make the existing rift in integration policy appear even bigger than it already was towards the outside for the EC states and in the Austrian public. Austria could reckon on far better chances if it were emphasized how much it had “for ages” been connected with the “Common Market” and along those lines had started out from government collaboration and “international economic cooperation”. Austria looked at the integration process predominantly from its economic sides. Idealistic motives about Europe were in fact brought to the forefront from time to time, but they did not decisively drive towards the EC or EU membership in 1995. It was above all else economic, pragmatic, and rational considerations that were principally shaped by factors of foreign trade, investment, business, and regulatory policy and were also in part supported by ideological Western-oriented and cultural aspects. External factors such as the diverse challenges of Europe- an economic integration were more decisive for the change than internal forces were. Those were additional. It was the Single Market and the new community form that transformed the EC into the EU which exercised the decisive expression of attractiveness. Austria’s political elite were not completely convinced by the “Common Market”, and temporarily staying on the sidelines did not appear to be extremely disadvantageous. Above all else, the security policy implications were for a long time a deterrent, and they in part still continue to be so today. The ambivalent behavior towards the military dimension of integration, under the motto “NATO is good, but not for us”, extended like a leitmotif as an element of continuity of Austrian policy from the Cold War through the twenty-first century (chapters VIII and IX). The prominent, profiled neutrality policy of Chancellor Bruno Kreisky was an important precondition for Austria’s relatively constant integration policy of the 1970s. In the 1980s, a policy of EC rapprochement then began with an expressed reservation of neutrality (1987–91), which was supplanted by an intensified accession policy with the growing willingness to put neutrality up for consideration (1992–94). But in the published and public debates before the EU referendum of June 12, 1994, the security policy elements of Europe policy and integration policy did not play a prominent role. That was no accident. When Austria made its application for accession on July 17, 1989, there was neither a Maastricht Union Treaty nor a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 2. The Historical Background in Light of Supervision from Outside 905

During the negotiations for accession (1993–94), there was not yet any profiled security policy acquis communautaire that was established by treaty. That would in fact be suggested with the Maastricht Treaty (entered into force in 1993), but it would really only change with the Amsterdam Treaty (entered into force in 1999) (chapters VI, VII and VIII). With the “friend of Austria” Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (FDP), the Federal Republic of Germany, a traditional supporter of Austrian integration interests, brought its entire community policy weight to bear in 1993 and 1994 – this time, in contrast to the 1950s and 1960s, with complete success. In actuality, Austria in the 1990s was in no way a young and opportunistic interested prospect – that is, one that was only late in acting – but rather an old one that was experienced and consistent, and thus in light of the historical developments, the application for EC accession was not at all surpris- ing: during the political crisis in the neighboring country of Hungary in 1956, the heads of the government around Julius Raab and Leopold Figl at times actively contemplated candidacy for full membership in the ECSC, but then set it aside. The application for EC membership was and is viewed by the author not fundamentally, but rather qualitatively as having been somewhat new: that which was fundamental consisted of the rapprochement to the EC, the interest in the “Single Market”, and the desire for an intensification of the relationship with the Community; it was still predominantly based upon “old” ideas of integration or even “obsolete” views of economic integration (further expansion of trade and inclusion in sectors which thus far had not been considered, above all the agricultural sector, up to a customs union on the basis of cooperation between governments). That which was qualitatively new lay in the willingness for full participation in the “Single Market” and involvement in the Community that was becoming supranational. The reservation of neutrality that was expressly mentioned twice in the “letter to Brussels” was in any case a weighty element of the argumentation of continuity, that is, an expression of lasting ideas of self-exclusion, a tradition which lasted up to the very end. In the years between 1987 and 1995, the politically determining and economically essential forces spoke out in favor of Austrian membership in the EC/EU. The decisive motive forces were the Federation of Austrian Industrialists (VÖI) and the leading foreign policy and Europe policy figures of the ÖVP. The social democrats which had been called that since 1991 (previously, they were still named “socialists”) did not come out so vehemently in favor of accession, and between 1987 and 1993, they acted more hesitantly in accession policy. In the government campaign for EU accession in 1994, a broad reaching unified appearance by the parties of the Grand Coalition (SPÖ-ÖVP) and a broadly oriented pro-EU vote of all special interest groups and indeed all groups that were relevant in society was recognizable. Practically the entire media landscape came out in favor of the country’s EU membership in 1994. With the assistance of the print 906 X. Final Conclusion mass medium with the largest circulation, the Kronen Zeitung, it was possible for Austrian public opinion to be won over to a large extent for joining the Union. The background of this swirl of agreement was a simple, at times one-sided and superficial pro-EU mood that was generated, not to mention a relatively primi- tive government propaganda campaign which, in a superficial manner, convinced many Austrians, and in fact talked them into voting “Yes”. In a similarly simplistic way, public opinion was stirred up and agitated against the EU by the same tabloid media. The main point was to be able to raise circulation. The mood of euphoria of 1989 is really not at all comparable with the situation within the context of the worldwide economic crisis of 2008–09 and the crisis decade up to 2017, that is, it is far too different. The cutting through of the Iron Curtain by Foreign Minister Mock along with his Hungarian counterpart Gyula Horn on June 27, 1989 and with Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Jiři Dienstbier on December 17, 1989 had a signaling function. This changed climate was one of the essential political preconditions for the implementation capability of Austria’s request for EC accession and the success of the accession negotiations in 1993– 94. There is no doubt today that the end of the East-West confrontation in Europe in 1989–90 substantially improved Austria’s chances of joining the European Communities because between 1989 and 1991, it was to be decisively successful in softening the initially hard Soviet veto position. One has also to know that at this time the Soviet Empire was still facing a process of erosion and implosion.27 In the end, the fading Gorbachev regime consented to the Austrian desire, which previously had still been ruled out. The “permission” that was granted by the great Soviet reformer to join the EC had not yet been conceivable in 1988–89, as it was also not yet clear or decided if he would consent to German ‟reunification”.28 Neutrality was already being interpreted differently before the application for accession and, as Thomas Angerer correctly puts it, it was used as a “mul- tipurpose instrument” (“Mehrzweckinstrument”),29 that is, it was subjected to a process of change. In that respect, there was only a seeming break with its official desacralization in the 1990s which, in the partial misjudgment or over- estimation of its function as a continued indispensable condition, broad portions of the people viewed as unchangingly positive. In the official emphasis of the

27 Helmut ALTRICHTER, Russland 1989. Der Untergang des Sowjetischen Imperiums, München 2009, 307–388; Ignaz LOZO, Der Putsch gegen Gorbatschow und das Ende der Sowjetunion, Köln – Weimar – Wien 2014. 28 Andreas HILGER, Die getriebene Großmacht – Moskau und die deutsche Einheit 1989– 1990, in: Michael GEHLER – Maximilian GRAF (Hrsg.), Europa und die deutsche Einheit. Beobachtungen, Entscheidungen und Folgen, Göttingen 2017, 117–139. 29 Thomas ANGERER, Für eine Geschichte der österreichischen Neutralität. Ein Kommentar, in: Michael GEHLER – Rolf STEININGER (Hrsg.), Die Neutralen und die europäische Inte- gration 1945 bis 1995. The Neutrals and the European Integration 1945 to 1995 (Institut für Zeitgeschichte der Universität Innsbruck, Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration, Historische Forschungen, Veröffentlichungen 3) Wien – Köln – Weimar 1999, 702–708. 2. The Historical Background in Light of Supervision from Outside 907 compatibility of the maintaining of neutrality with EC/EU membership (1989–92 and then to 1995), the refusal to break this taboo (Manfred Scheich30) continued beyond July 17, 1989. This refusal had gone hand in hand with continuity in thought and expressions. Remarkably enough, what was concerned with Austrian advocates of EC/EU accession was gaining sovereignty, whereby for the majority of them, this consisted here of their contemporary perception of a new, still visionary understanding of sovereignty (even though European federalism is actually a well-known concept, but it hardly had any roots in Austria and therefore also no tradition): a “supranational sovereignty” that was to be exercised together. If this argumentation is taken as the basis for the motivation for an EC/EU accession, then it revolves around matters of sovereignty that are understood nationally which, so it seemed, was better practiced and more easily implemented within the union than outside of it. From Austria’s point of view, accession to the EU should fulfil a dual function: on the one hand, it should help to shape the European integration process to an ever greater extent and, on the other hand, it should bring about a corresponding national benefit for Austria. A trend reversal consisted in the reinterpretation of interests specific to sovereignty. The argument now was that Austria could gain more sovereignty within and not outside the EC/EU. With the application for membership of July 14, 1989, a first cautious and slow approach to a change in the political culture and mentality of diplomats and political elites was thus indi- cated. In my opinion, however, this only began gradually against the background of the increasingly realized challenges and problems with the EEA (1989–1994), which also accelerated the erosion of the “special case” argument. The Austrian diplomat Franz Ceska formulated this in 1993:

“What we need, then, are not special favors, but integration as soon as possible as equal partners, so that we can participate in decisions as soon as possible and help shape our future. Austria’s current de facto satellite situation is intolerable in the long run.”31

National interest policy seemed much more effective within the EC and national identity much better preserved than outside:

“This Austrian nation will be able to assert its national identity as an EC member more clearly and with more weight than in the semi-satellite situation in which our country currently finds

30 Manfred SCHEICH, Der Tabubruch. Österreichs Entscheidung für die EU, Wien – Köln – Weimar 2005. 31 Original quotation: „Was wir also brauchen, sind nicht Extrawürste, sondern die möglichst rasche Integration als gleichberechtigter Partner, damit wir möglichst bald mitentscheiden und unsere Zukunft mitgestalten können. Der derzeitige, de facto satellitäre Zustand Österreichs ist auf die Dauer unerträglich.“ Franz CESKA, Österreichs nationale Politik als EG-Mitglied, in: Europäische Rundschau 21 (1993), 4, 89–93: 89–90. 908 X. Final Conclusion

itself. It is membership that gives us the opportunity to assert our national interests in the EC institutions under the common rules of the game.”32

Remarkably, the Austrian EC/EU proponents of accession were also very much concerned in their argumentation with the gain of national sovereignty,33 whereby the contemporary perception was already of a new, still visionary understanding of sovereignty: a “supranational sovereignty” to be exercised jointly.34 Mock also anticipated this understanding and formulated it in good Austrian way:

“Inside we are stronger! Outside the Union, the law of power continues to determine political reality. In the interplay of interests, the strength of a country remains by far the most important factor. Within the framework of integration, on the other hand, the law of power is opposed by the community of law and partnership in the institutions. Of course, strength relations also play a role here, but to a much lesser extent than outside integration. As a non-member of the Union, Austria would have far fewer opportunities to assert its interests in the international power play. This is not least true in relation to the European Union, which is an overpowering partner even for the smaller European non-member states. As a member of the Union, Austria, on the other hand, would be able to play an active part in shaping common policy – above all through alliances with like-minded Member States – and would have the strong backing of the European Union against the influence of powerful external states. When deciding on EU membership, it is therefore first and foremost a question of enabling the Austrians – and above all future generations – to play an active and effective part in shaping the European future. Only in this way can our country take on a position in Europe that it deserves.”35

32 Original Quotation: ‟Diese österreichische Nation wird ihre nationale Identität als EG- Mitglied klarer und mit mehr Gewicht zur Geltung bringen können als in der halbsatellitären Lage, in der sich unser Land derzeit befindet. Denn erst die Mitgliedschaft gibt uns die Möglichkeit, unsere nationalen Interessen in den EG-Institutionen unter den gemeinsamen Spielregeln zur Geltung zu bringen.” Ibid, 92–93. 33 Thomas ANGERER, L’Autriche précurseur ou «Geisterfahrer» de l’Europe integrée? Réflexions dans la perspective des années 1950, in: Revue d’Allemagne et des pays de langue allemande XXIV (Octobre-Decembre 1992), 553–561: 559–560. 34 Michael KREILE, Politische Dimensionen des europäischen Binnenmarktes, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 24–25/89, 25–35: 32–34; Tilman MAYER, Die nationalstaatliche Herausforderung in Europa, in: ibid., B 14/93, 2. 4. 1993, 11–20; Karlheinz WEISSMANN, Wiederkehr eines Totgesagten: Der Nationalstaat am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts, in: ibid., 3–10; Norbert BERTHOLD, Europa nach Maastricht – Die Skepsis bleibt, in: ibd., B 28/93, 9. 7. 1993, 29–38. 35 Original quotation: “Drinnen sind wir stärker! Außerhalb der Union bestimmt nach wie vor das Gesetz der Macht die politische Wirklichkeit. Im Wechselspiel der Interessen bleibt die Stärke eines Landes der mit Abstand wichtigste Faktor. Im Rahmen der Integration dagegen steht dem Gesetz der Macht die Gemeinschaft des Rechts und die Partnerschaft in den Institu- tionen entgegen. Natürlich spielen Stärkeverhältnisse auch hier eine Rolle, aber in weit gerin- gerem Maße als außerhalb der Integration. Als Nichtmitglied der Union hätte Österreich deut- lich geringere Möglichkeiten, seine Interessen im internationalen Kräftespiel durchzusetzen. Dies nicht zuletzt auch im Verhältnis zur Europäischen Union, die ja selbst für die kleineren europäischen Nichtmitgliedstaaten einen übermächtigen Partner darstellt. Als Mitglied der 2. The Historical Background in Light of Supervision from Outside 909

If one takes this argumentation as the basis for the motivation for joining the EC/ EU, then it again turned to sovereignty issues, which could also be better practised and enforced as nationally understood within the Union than outside. In the reference to concepts of sovereignty as such – disregarding their different nature and quality – there was continuity again. It is obviously not and was not primarily a question of the Community or the future Union, but of Austria, as Chancellor Vranitzky expressed in his motion to the Council of Ministers on March 16, 1994 (with some reservations about the constitutional changes and legal obligations which were to be made in his country):

‟Membership of the European Union would provide Austria with a considerable increase in opportunities for participation at European level. In particular, Austria can influence the future development of European law within the framework of EU membership.”36

In 1996, the Salzburg political scientist Herbert Dachs made a note of the iron Austrian political message:

“We continue to make our own rules. We guarantee that things will go well – probably even better. This message of preserving, guaranteeing and also licensing, which belittles the problems, remained dominant until very recently. It is only slowly that we are beginning to suspect whether every political course is associated with incalculable risks and whether there might

Union könnte Österreich dagegen - vor allem durch Allianzen mit gleichgesinnten Mitglied- staaten - die gemeinsame Politik aktiv mitgestalten und hätte gegen den Einfluß mächtiger außenstehender Staaten den starken Rückhalt der Europäischen Union. Bei der Entscheidung über die EU-Mitgliedschaft geht es daher in allererster Linie darum, den Österreichern – und vor allem auch künftigen Generationen – eine aktive und wirkungsvolle Mitgestaltung der europäischen Zukunft zu ermöglichen. Nur so kann unser Land eine Stellung in Europa ein- nehmen, die es verdient.” Document 29 “Die aktive Mitwirkungsmöglichkeit Österreichs in der EU”, Konzept einer Rede von Bundesminister Dr. Alois Mock, 16.5.1994”, in: Michael GEHLER, Der lange Weg nach Europa. Österreich von Paneuropa bis zum EU-Beitritt, Bd. 2: Dokumente, Innsbruck – Wien – München – Bozen 2002, 695–697: 696–697. 36 Original quotation: “Die Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Union würde Österreich einen beträchtlichen Zugewinn an Mitwirkungsmöglichkeiten auf europäischer Ebene sichern. Ins- besondere kann Österreich im Rahmen einer EU-Mitgliedschaft gestaltenden Einfluß auf die künftige Entwicklung des Europarechts nehmen.” Document 13 Antrag durch Bundeskanz- ler VRANITZKY, “Vortrag an den Ministerrat GZ. 671.800/19-V/8/94 betrifft Entwurf eines Bundesverfassungsgesetzes über den Beitritt Österreichs zur Euripäischen Union, 16.3.1994 [...] die Bundesregierung wolle den beiliegenden Entwurf eines Bundesverfassungsgesetzes über den Beitritt Österreichs zur Europäischen Union samt Vorblatt und Erläuterungen geneh- migen und dem Nationalrat zur verfassungsmäßigen Behandlung zuleiten”, in: GEHLER, Der lange Weg nach Europa, Bd. 2: Dokumente, 654–663: 656, see also Hanspeter NEUHOLD, Strukturelle Veränderungen im internationalen System und das Völker- und Europarecht: der rechtliche Niederschlag des Endes des Ost-West-Konflikts, in: Waldemar HUMMER (Hrsg.), Paradigmenwechsel im Völkerrecht zur Jahrtausendwende. Ansichten österreichischer Völkerrechtler zu aktuellen Problemlagen, Wien 2002, 5–41. 910 X. Final Conclusion

not be serious disadvantages for the future (such as high budget deficits, to be paid off by our children and grandchildren) in addition to major advantages for the present.”37

Continuity in the history of mentality can be seen in the national sense of grand- fathering and the only hesitant willingness to make far-reaching structural changes within, while the possibilities for shaping the European Communities were beginning to be realised. In this respect, the reinterpretation of Austrian sovereignty interests could at first only be a cover for the traditional national and state policy goals, which are more difficult to maintain. Despite the fact that further detailed research is necessary, the following thesis can be formulated: The break in European integration and foreign policy only took place at the earliest in the course of EU accession in 1995 or in the following decades with the other Un- ion Treaties (Amsterdam 1999, Nice 2003, Lisbon 2009) and their effects on the Austrian social and constitutional system. A change in mentality thus only began gradually and very hesitantly in the course of development, i.e. much, much later than immediately after the application for membership in 1989. With reference to the ideas of sovereignty as such – if their different natures and qualities are set aside for the moment – continuity therefore existed for a long time. What was concerned was not primarily the Communities or the Union, but rather Austria. This represented a projection of nation-state interests and expectations upon Europe with a correspondingly high risk of disappointment, as was also the case with other states. It didn’t even take Austria ten years to go from the greatest EU euphoria to nearly total EU frustration. As had previously been the case in 1989 and the following years, there was a feeling of the menace of being excluded and the feared danger of loss. Both had a mobilizing effect and spurred on Austria’s integration policy. Its policy of comprehension and involvement did not, however, occur immediately and directly, but rather with a time delay. It took place in a transition, whereby the project of the European Economic Area (EEA) from 1992 to 1994–95 served as a springboard for the increase in quality of integration. As has already been mentioned, Austria’s path to EU Europe was very long. It therefore also formulated itself as correspondingly energy-consuming. Since the accession treaty, its foreign policy has predominantly been concentrated on Western Europe, while Central and Eastern Europe were off the radar, which explains why it was only rather late, although with great publicity effect, that the

37 Original quotation: “Wir machen uns auch weiterhin unsere Regeln selber. Wir garantieren, daß es gut – wahrscheinlich noch besser – weitergeht. Diese die Probleme verharmlosende Botschaft des Bewahrens, Garantierens und auch Lizitierens blieb bis in die jüngste Zeit dominant. Erst langsam macht sich heute die Vermutung breit, ob denn nicht doch jeder politische Kurs auch mit unwägbaren Risiken verbunden sei und ob nicht neben großen Vorteilen für die Gegenwart auch gravierende Nachteile für die Zukunft stehen könnten (wie etwa hohe Budget- defizite, abzuzahlen von unseren Kindern und Kindeskindern).” Herbert DACHS, Österreich kann nur Mit-Spieler sein, in: Salzburger Nachrichten, November 4, 1996. 2. The Historical Background in Light of Supervision from Outside 911 country began to be occupied with the Beneš decrees or with the controversial Temelín nuclear power plant in the Czech Republic (chapter IX). The case of Austria demonstrates, though, that neither economic effects nor the setting up of political borders have to be critical for a process of nation-building. Through the diversification of the mass media as a result of privatization and internationalization as well as new forms of intellectual exchange, the public institutions of Austria have in any case lost the central position that they held over the decades with regard to identity-building. Austria’s national identity reflects a multiple reality. It discovered the ideal conditions for its realization after 1945. Elite self-interest and public self-perception intermeshed with each other and led to an instrumental politicization and a cultural reinterpretation. But with regard to the position of the country in Europe and its relations, they also led to the integration process. Christian democrats and social democrats saw their country anchored culturally and economically in the West. Politically, however, they preferred to be neutral for a long time.38 When neutrality lost its logic with the receding Cold War, though, they took the first real chance for a relatively uncomplicated entry.39 The changed international context, including the “fall of the Berlin Wall” and the collapse of the Soviet Union, had a great impact on Austrian Europe and integration policy. The symbolic severing of the Iron Curtain by Foreign Minister Alois Mock and his Hungarian counterpart Gyula Horn in June 1989 and with the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiři Dienstbier in December 1989 pointed the way to the future and paved the way for the Austrian application for EU entry and the accession negotiations in 1993–94. The Austrian perception of “core Europe” also improved a great deal as the threat of the Cold War receded. The elites increasingly recognized the need for domestic structural reforms and began to regard the EC/EU “core Europe” as an external modernizer for the Austrian economy which was increasingly characterized by growing budget deficits, high public deficits, and corruption scandals. The debates about the Federal President Kurt Waldheim (1986–92) also facilitated

38 Michael GEHLER, “Politisch unabhängig”, aber “ideologisch eindeutig europäisch”. Die ÖVP, die Vereinigung christlicher Volksparteien (NEI) und die Anfänge der europäischen Integration 1947–1960, in: IDEM – STEININGER (Hrsg.), Österreich und die europäische Integration, 291–326; Martin HEHEMANN, “Daß einzelne Genossen darüber erschreckt sind, daß wir kategorisch jedwede Teilnahme an der EWG ablehnten.” Die SPÖ und die Anfänge der europäischen Integration 1945–1959, in ibid., 327–345. 39 On the EFTA states in a comparative perspective, see Wolfram KAISER, Culturally Embed- ded and Path-Dependent: Peripheral Alternatives to ECSC/EEC “core Europe” since 1945, in: Journal of European Integration History 7 (2001), 2, 11–36, here 14–33, 17, 19, 24, 25; specifically about Austria: Thomas ANGERER, De “l’Autriche Germanique” à “l’Autriche européenne”? Identités nationales et internationales de l’Autriche depuis 1918, in Gilbert TRAUSCH (Ed.), La place et le rôle des petits pays en Europe au XXème siècle, Brussels 2003, 1–58. 912 X. Final Conclusion identity change. Due to his alleged war crimes in the Balkans during the Second World War, which have still not been proven one way or the other to this day, he received invitations only from Jordan, Pakistan, and the Pope.40 Underlying the Austrian EC application was also the old yearning to belong to a powerful large economic bloc, a kind of substitute for the Habsburg empire.41 Added to this was chiefly the fear of being excluded from an economically dynamic “core Europe”. At the same time, the CEEC, which were no longer part of the Soviet sphere of influence, were already queuing up in Brussels. Many Austrians feared that if they continued to be passive, they could possibly end up behind the new CEE applicant states, and this cleared away any remaining inhibitions about joining “core Europe”.42 It is worth mentioning the circumstance that it was during this of all time periods that a certain politician in Austria achieved a noteworthy ascent: Jörg Haider, the controversial FPÖ politician with a German national biographical and also Nazi family background, a political product of the Waldheim debate, first of all expressed himself very disapprovingly and contemptuously about the “Austrian nation”, which he disqualified as a “ideological deformed child” (“ideologische Mißgeburt”),43 only to then, remarkably enough, distance himself from other remarks of that sort. His case study is noteworthy with a view towards the building of an Austrian identity that has grown and solidified. Haider had no further opportunity to effectively call into question the idea of the Austrian nation – he had to follow completely different paths in order to be successful in Austria as a right-wing populist, namely, to play the Austro-nationalist card. With the mot- to “Austria first” and Austrian-nationalist catchwords, he was able to maximize far more votes than with the “hyper-Germanness” that was so often quoted by his critics. Haider was compelled to distance himself from this publicly. Within that context, he also increasingly distanced himself from the EU (1993–1994). In the end, however, his anti-EU position did not pay off in maximizing even more votes, and that is the truly remarkable thing.

40 Michael GEHLER, Die Affäre Waldheim. Eine Fallstudie zur Instrumentalisierung der NS-Vergangenheit zur politischen Vorteilsverschaffung 1986–1988, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 69 (2018), 1/2, 67–85. 41 Dieter A. BINDER, Pietas Austria? The Imperial Legacy in Interwar and Postwar Austria, in: religions 8 (2017), 1–10; Pieter JUDSON, The Habsburg Empire. A New History, Cambridge/ Massachusetts – London 2016. 42 See also Michael GEHLER, Paving Austria’s Way to Brussels: Chancellor Franz Vranitzky (1986–1997) – A Banker, Social Democrat and Pragmatic European Leader, in: Journal of European Integration History 18 (2012), 2, 159–182: 169–170. 43 Brigitte BAILER-GALANDA, Ein teutsches Land. Die „rechte“ Orientierung des Jörg Haider. Eine Dokumentation, Wien 1987; IDEM, Haider wörtlich. Führer in die Dritte Republik, Wien 1995. 2. The Historical Background in Light of Supervision from Outside 913

Since accession, Austrian attitudes towards EU integration have remained somewhat ambivalent.44 The government had used the simplistic catch-phrase “We are Europe”45 to campaign for entry to the EU. A “European” identity appeared in the future to be an ideal replacement for the ideology of Austria as the first “ victim” of Nazi Germany, which had been greatly strained in the Waldheim debate. The government raised expectations in the country which, however, were unrealistic. They created the impression that everything would improve once Austria was in the EU, without Austrians having to face any harsh domestic reforms. The political elite thus attempted to distract from the “silent revolution”46 which Austria had been undergoing since 1995 as a result of EU accession. Austria’s assumption of the EU Council Presidency in the second half of 1998 demonstrated its capability of taking on this new role and, with it, the responsibility for community policy.47 Austria needed “Europe” – within a short time, two identity-forming core elements of the Second Republic were removed: the victim thesis was rendered questionable in the wake of the Waldheim debate,48 and “permanent” neutrality seems to become obsolete through the security policy in Europe, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, in a new manner, NATO.49 The “return to the European stage” seemed to offer a sensible replacement for them. Was this hope becoming deceptive? The outstanding European event for Austria was its EU Presidency in the second half of 1998. It took the role in stride as if it had been a long-standing member state. The German general election in 1998 with the victory of the social democrat Gerhard Schröder over Helmut Kohl and the resulting transition problems limited the scope of what the Austrian Council Presidency could achieve, however.

44 On a first assessment, Günter BISCHOF – Anton PELINKA – Michael GEHLER (Eds.), Austria in the European Union, New Brunswick – London 2001. 45 See on this ANGERER, „Österreich ist Europa“, 55–56: 71 and Karin LIEBHART – Andreas PRIBERSKY, “Wir sind Europa!” Österreich und seine Nachbarn am “Goldenen Vorhang”, in: Ferdinand KARLHOFER – Josef MELCHIOR – Hubert SICKINGER (Hrsg.), Anlassfall Österreich. Die Europäische Union auf dem Weg zu einer Wertegemeinschaft, Baden Baden 2001, 115–27. 46 Wolfram KAISER, The Silent Revolution: Austria’s Accession to the European Union, in: Günter BISCHOF – Anton PELINKA (Eds.), Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity, New Brunswick – London 1997, 135–62. 47 Kurt Richard LUTHER – Iain OGILVIE (Eds.), Austria and the European Union Presidency: Background and Perspectives, Keele 1998. 48 Michael GEHLER, Die Affäre Kurt Waldheim. Eine Fallstudie zum Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit in den späten achtziger Jahren, in: Michael GEHLER – Rolf STEININGER (Hrsg.), Österreich im 20. Jahrhundert. Vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zur Gegenwart (Böhlau Studienbücher, Grundlagen des Studiums Vol. 2), Wien – Köln – Weimar 1997, 355–414. 49 Heinrich SCHNEIDER, Die österreichische Neutralität und die europäische Integration, in: Michael GEHLER – Rolf STEININGER (Hrsg.), Die Neutralen und die europäische Inte- gration 1945–1995. The Neutrals and the European Integration (Institut für Zeitgeschichte an der Universität Innsbruck, Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration, Historische Forschungen, Veröffentlichungen 3), Wien – Köln – Weimar 2000, 465–496, 488–496. 914 X. Final Conclusion

That is also why the Vienna Summit of December 1998 was not very successful regarding the so-called “Agenda 2000” for the urgently needed reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).50 At the same time, the long shadow of neutrality continued to leave its mark long after Austria had joined the EU.51 The government could only agree on obtaining observer status in the Western European Union (WEU) and participation in the NATO cooperation program, Partnership for Peace (PfP).52 The SPÖ-ÖVP coalition failed to develop a consensus about a new security concept. While the ÖVP, which had traditionally supported “Europe”, recommended NATO accession, the SPÖ, which was initially more skeptical about Western integration and also has a neutralist and pacifist wing, wanted Austria to remain neutral. Thus, Austria is to this day not a complete and full military partner in common European or transatlantic defense and security policy. As a result of this, the EU’s ability to act on the security front has been somewhat impeded.53 The sanctions by the governments of the fourteen EU partners which were threatened on January 31, 2000 and imposed on February 4 after the formation of a ÖVP-FPÖ Government came as a shock for the government.54 Austria has appeared to be a politically unreliable partner in Europe, especially in relation to the EU’s Eastern Enlargement which Jörg Haider abused for his populist political agenda. The fears regarding the FPÖ, which came to a head in the sanctions policy, were historically and politically motivated, but the imposition of sanctions was counterproductive.55 Despite the lifting of the isolation measures in Septem- ber 2000, Austria’s perspective was far more introspective again than before. Its

50 Kurt Richard LUTHER – Iain OGILVIE (Eds.), Austria and the European Union Presidency: Background and Perspectives, Keele 1998; Michael G. HUELSHOFF, The European Council and EU Summitry: A Comparative Analysis of the Austrian and German Presidencies, in: BISCHOF – PELINKA – GEHLER (Eds.), Austria in the European Union, 92–117. 51 Oliver RATHKOLB, Österreich zwischen Neutralität und Allianzfreiheit 1953–2000. Ein Überblick, in: Journal of European Integration History 7 (2001), 2, 103–25. 52 Markus CORNARO, Die Westeuropäische Union – ein erster Nachruf, in: Erich P. HOCHLEITNER (Hrsg.), Das Europäische Sicherheitssystem zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhun- derts, Wien – Köln – Weimar 2002, 233–265: 259–265; Michael GEHLER, Finis Neutralität? Historische und politische Aspekte im europäischen Vergleich: Irland, Finnland, Schweden, Schweiz und Österreich (Center for European Integration Studies), Bonn 2001, 73–82. 53 Michael GEHLER, Der lange Weg nach Europa. Österreich vom Ende der Monarchie bis zur EU, Bd. 1: Darstellung, Innsbruck – Wien – München – Bozen 2002, 428–437. 54 Michael GEHLER, “Preventive Hammer Blow” or Boomerang? The EU “Sanction” Measures against Austria 2000, in: BISCHOF – GEHLER – PELINKA (Eds.), Austria in the Euro- pean Union, 180–222. See also Waldemar HUMMER – Anton PELINKA, Österreich unter „EU-Quarantäne“. Die „Maßnahmen der 14“ gegen die österreichische Bundesregierung aus politikwissenschaftlicher und juristischer Sicht. Chronologie, Kommentar, Dokumentation, Wien 2002. 55 For this, see Thomas ANGERER, Welches Österreich für welches Europa? Die Krise von 2000 im Lichte europäischer Österreichprobleme und österreichischer Europaprobleme seit dem 19. Jahrhundert; Michael GEHLER, Kontraproduktive Intervention. Die „EU 14“ und der 2. The Historical Background in Light of Supervision from Outside 915 search for strategic partners among the CEEC, a product of the period of isolation in 2000, was hardly a success. The “strategic partnership” had been renamed “regional partnership”.56 In Austria’s years of membership (1995–2009), its governments made efforts to fit into the EU structures. Austria participated fully in economic and monetary union and in the introduction of the euro between 1999 and 2002. The country fulfilled the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, and also joined the Schengen Agreement. Once a member, from the very start the Austrian Govern- ment wanted to belong to the inner core of the EU. Austria’s economy became more competitive, the gross domestic product grew more rapidly than before 1995, and prices more or less dropped. Productivity increased and progress was made in reforming the state budget. The country became not only more important as a market for foreign products, but also as a site for foreign direct investment. As a result of the increased competition, there were, however, economic losers as well as winners. On the whole, however, the Austrian economy was rapidly integrated into the EU.57 Initially, the foundations of the Austrian welfare state remained unaltered after Austria had become a member of the EU. When the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition was formed in 2000, however, it carried through the first structural reforms,58 and a major pension reform followed in 2003 – a belated recognition of structural problems that EU integration has made more urgent to solve. Austria’s political path towards eventual EU integration was very time-consuming and exhausting after its application for membership of the EC. It concentrated mainly on relations with Western Europe. CEE became marginal, which explains why Austria only began at a late point to concern itself with controversial issues of the so-called Beneš decrees on the expulsion of German speaking population from Czechoslovakia after 1945 or the Czech nuclear power plant at Temelín. Austria has become integrated into the EU as a country with internal problems. It has largely been preoccupied with the political burden of the long-standing Grand Coalition and the resulting lack of more radical structural reforms, and it has been too busy adapting to membership to turn its gaze outwards with

Fall Österreich oder vom Triumph des “Primats der Innenpolitik 2000–2003”’, in: BISCHOF – GEHLER – PELINKA, Österreich in der EU, 85–120, 121–81. 56 See the critical analysis by Annelies ROHRER, Eine „Partnerschaft“, widersprüchliche Signale Österreichs – und retour, in: Die Presse, December 1, 2001; Labile Partnerschaft, in: Die Presse, February 28, 2002. 57 Michael PFAFFERMAYR, Austria’s Performance within an Integrating European Econo- my, in Michael GEHLER – Anton PELINKA – Günter BISCHOF (Hrsg.), Österreich in der EU. Bilanz seiner Mitgliedschaft/Austria in the European Union. A First Assessment of her Membership 1995–2000, Wien – Köln – Weimar 2003, 201–218. 58 Gerda FALKNER, Austria in the European Union: Direct and Indirect Effects on Social Policy, in: GEHLER – PELINKA – BISCHOF (Hrsg.), Österreich in der EU, 185–199. 916 X. Final Conclusion self-confidence and play a more pro-active role in the EU. Nevertheless, Austria was and still is at the center of Europe and economically integrated with “core Europe”. From 2004, it was able to take on an important bridging function and a mediating role for the integration of the new member states from CEE and for their continuing “Europeanization”, something of central importance to the EU.59 The Haiders of this world come and go, (and the Straches also), but Austria’s central position in Europe and its European consciousness remained. In the end, the FPÖ of Haider collapsed as a governing party as a result of the practical constraints of a policy that was increasingly oriented towards EU Europe (the introduction of the euro or the “Eastern Enlargement” were intensely combatted by him, but they had to be accepted in a manner similar to the Maas- tricht criteria which led to a neo-liberal economic policy and left no room for a policy for the “little people”). It was not the sanctions of 2000, but rather the inevitable requirements of Europeanizations that contributed to the destruction of the Haider FPÖ. A comparison of the two Council Presidencies (1998, 2006) shows that a number of not inconsiderable successes have been achieved in areas such as the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement on the legal bases of budget lines after 15 years (1998), the initial spark for the “creation” of the ESDP within the framework of the first meeting of EU defence ministers (1998), the almost com- pleted “Agenda 2000” (1998), the Road Map for the German and Finnish EU presidencies in 1999 through the “Vienna Strategy for Europe” (1998) and the Transit Agreement with Switzerland (1998), which finalised the overall EU package with Switzerland under Transport Minister Caspar Einem, combined with Switzerland’s commitment to gradually open its borders to 40-tonne trucks and to allow full transit in 2005. The route over the Brenner Pass was thus relieved. The second series of bilateral agreements with Switzerland was unblocked (2006), agreement was reached on the “Services Directive” (2006), the “Flexicurity In- itiative” (2006) and the introduction of the “European Energy Policy” (2006) as well as on the prospects for the continuation of the EU enlargement process with the ‟Western Balkan” states (2006) despite enormous resistance within the EU.60 The second Austrian Council Presidency of the EU in 2006 occurred with completely different circumstances than that of 1998. The EU Constitutional

59 See also Michael GEHLER, „Europe“, Europeanizations and their Meaning for European Integration Historiography, in: Journal of European Integration History 22 (2016), 1, 141–174. 60 Gunther HAUSER, Die österreichischen Ratspräsidentschaften 1998–2006 im Vergleich, in: Maddalena GUIOTTO – Michael GEHLER (Hrsg. unter Mitarbeit von Imke SCHARLEMANN), Italien, Österreich und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Europa/Italy, Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany. Ein Dreiecksverhältnis in seinen wechselseiti- gen Beziehungen und Wahrnehmungen von 1945–49 bis zur Gegenwart/A Triangle Relation- ship: Mutual Relations and Perceptions from 1945–49 to the Present (Institut für Geschichte der Universität Hildesheim, Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration, Historische Forschungen, Veröffentlichungen 8), Wien – Köln – Weimar 2012, 509–544: 543–544. 3. Associations, Concepts, Ideas, Imaginations, Identifications and Future Perspectives 917

Treaty had previously been rejected during the year before in France and the Netherlands. The matter of the EU budget was unresolved and the mood on the whole was one of crisis. With the motto “Europe is listening” and closeness to the citizens that was both demonstrated and practiced, the Austrian EU Presidency that was both europe-conscious and self-conscious was successful in creating a constructive working climate and thus keeping the topic of a new EU treaty alive. The major future problems in the EU were not mastered by the Austrian presidencies, but new impulses were given for overcoming them.

3 . ASSOCIATIONS, CONCEPTS, IDEAS, IMAGINATIONS, IDENTIFICATIONS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPE

The long path to institutionalized Europe ended for Austria in 1995. From 1918 to that date, there was a changeful development of Europe associations, ideas, images, identifications, and options61 that were neither promising nor realizable for the country: a) “Paneurope”, as personified by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi with the Paneuropean Union, was founded in Vienna in 1922. “Paneurope” was the name of a greater European idea from Portugal to Poland. Even though Coudenhove was regarded as a “republican by reason”, “Paneurope” sym- bolized a revitalized or reapplied Habsburg area concept for which there was the desire to declare support after 1918–19 and which one could profess – one which, however, remained an illusion. It did not happen by chance that after the Second World War, the Paneuropean Union was occupied more and more by monarchists and was presided over by Otto von Habsburg; b) “Central Europe” (“Mitteleuropa”) as personified by Ignaz Seipel, was a reduced concept of Europe starting out from the “Paneurope” idea, a reduced Habsburg-Danube area concept of the 1920s to which one could feel attracted as a convinced Austrian, but which in political terms was likewise unrealistic; c) The Nazi idea of Europe as an economic community as the basis for the Greater German Reich in connection with a Großraum policy (1938–45), as personified by the Austrian economic expert Richard Riedl, may have offered a certain substitute for the unachievable Paneurope and Central Europe, but just like every violent hegemonic formation by force, worked repulsively from above in Europe and was doomed to failure.

61 For different projects and keywords like “Paneurope”, “United (socialist) States of Europe”, “European Union”, “European Federation” see also Senta G. STEINER, Österreich und die europäische Integration zwischen Moskauer Deklaration und Europakongreß in den Haag (1943–1948), phil. Diss. Universität Salzburg 1971, 194–202. 918 X. Final Conclusion

d) After the Second World War, concepts of a “Small Europe” or a “Core Eu- rope” that were fixated purely on Western Europe were in fact not rejected by the Austrian side for rational reasons, since they could be profited from indirectly. But as a result of the status of a separate country, they could not and would not be participated in. The “Small Europe” or “Core Europe” of the ECSC and the EEC which in fact was purely superficially approved of, to which as a result of Austria’s past, could not be completely felt as shared wholeheartedly – and neutrality was one more reason for not taking part. Owing to Austria’s tradition as a Great Power that continued to have a long-lasting effect, the Austrian political culture did not feel emotionally attracted to these small Europe EEC concepts and certainly did not wholeheartedly adhere to them. e) Ideas of a “Greater Europe”, which for the Council of Europe in Strasbourg appeared as good as a done deal, created far more Austrian identification with a Europe that was also to range far beyond the Iron Curtain. It is no wonder that Austrian politicians such as Karl Czernetz, Lujo Tončić-Sorinj, Franz Karasek, or most recently Walter Schwimmer made careers as presi- dents of the Parliamentary Assembly or as Secretary-Generals. Against the background of the Cold War, however, Greater Europe was not realizable as a result of the double division of Europe: first of all, Europe was politically divided between West and East, and secondly, Western Europe was also divided in terms of trade policy between EFTA and the EEC (1960–72). f) Thus in the 1970s and 1980s, in the wake of the depressing experience with the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968, but also against the background of the CSCE process, a new “Central Europe” discourse began which in Austria was represented above all by the vice mayor of Vienna, Erhard Busek, a colorful character of the ÖVP who, in contrast to that party’s politicians who primarily had their eye on the EC, took up the tradition of Vienna’s christian social vice mayor during the period between the wars, Ernst Karl Winter. With a view towards his contacts with and travels to Central and Eastern Europe, Busek became active primarily at the level of the activation of cultural and education policy and the support of the civil society. He represented an anti-Naumann, a Central Europe with Vienna, Prague, and Budapest – and without Berlin, that is, also on the basis of a divided Germany, which not without reason gave rise to the suspicion and resentment of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. g) In addition to “Central Europe”, there was the EC-Europe and later the EU-Europe which, in the 1980s, appeared more and more to be without an alternative, particularly since the project offered the small free trade zone of EFTA only a little material for identity, although even the EC of the 1980s or the EU of the 1990s was still received by the Austrian view 3. Associations, Concepts, Ideas, Imaginations, Identifications and Future Perspectives 919

as incomplete and in need of expansion. The “EU Europe” of 1995, to which it was felt to belong, also appeared to be incomplete and in need of enlargement. At the start of the integration process, most Austrian political leaders did not support the EEC, or indeed Austrian membership. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, an interesting paradigm shift occurred. The EFTA supporters of the 1960s and 1970s lost influence, increasingly changed their stance, and eventually supported EC/EU entry. In spite of all of the positive professing, Austria’s relationship to the EU remained ambivalent. With the simplistic but catchy formula “We are Europe”, the Federal Government advertised for EU accession, which was easily transparent as propaganda. This rash assertion hinted at a substitute identity for the neutrality that was appearing to lose significance (1992–94) and the “victim ideology” that eroded in the Waldheim debate (1986–88) as state doctrine. The solution that was effective for advertising with the referendum was, however, opposed by the pop- ulistically catchier formula “Austria First” from the Haider FPÖ. Before accession, the government awakened expectations in the country which could hardly be implemented at the EU level and which did not withstand the harsh realities in Brussels. Ideas of national vested rights continued to domi- nate the political policy and its rhetoric. It attempted to mislead about the “silent revolution”62 which was in full swing in Austria since the EU accession in 1995. As a result of EU accession, an intensified pro-supranational integration policy was announced (the policy itself was and remained national) with an erosion of neutrality that was consciously accepted, and indeed a destruction of it that was attempted (starting from 1995), above all on the part of the ÖVP, which resolved to join NATO in 1997 and thus was subjected to an historic mistake. The softening of neutrality did in fact take place gradually, but the intended membership in the transatlantic alliance was not to be successful – the political opposition and public opinion were too strong for it to be maintained. In the years following 1999, the ÖVP leadership increasingly backed off of the goal of joining NATO. At the latest by the Iraq War of the Bush II Administration in 2003, the subject was no longer a topic. The out-of-area military intervention policy of the NATO leadership and the unilateral action by the USA were off-putting and salutary. In purely monetary and economic terms, Austria was an absolutely reliable partner from the beginning of its membership in the EU starting from January 1, 1995. In that respect, it had to be assumed that with the major enlargement of the EU beginning on May 1, 2004, it could continue to provide bridgehead functions and mediation services in the center of the EU in terms of economic

62 Wolfram KAISER, The Silent Revolution: Austria’s Accession to the European Union, in: Günter Bischof – Anton Pelinka (Eds.), Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity (Contemporary Austrian Studies Vol. 5), New Brunswick – London 1997, 135–162. 920 X. Final Conclusion and investment policy for the countries that were to be newly integrated and for their continued westernization. From Austria’s geographically central location in Europe, broad reaching consequences resulted for its policy and economy, whereby the latter was among the big winners from membership in the EU and from the “Eastern Enlargement” (chapter IX). The end of the First World War had more than just the political collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a consequence. It was also tied to the loss of a large european single market at the center of the continent. In the period between the wars, a phase of protectionism and stagnation followed. After the Second World War, Austria only experienced its (small) “economic miracle” after 1955, but it remained excluded from the European market of the EEC. Added to this was the trade policy division of Western Europe into EFTA and the EEC, which basically continued into the 1970s and 1980s. Only in 1995 did Austria’s incorporation into the EU Single Market of Western Europe follow. After EU accession and the EU “Eastern Enlargement” of 2004, the Austrian economy was then oriented more and more towards the CEE parts of the continent. The period from 2004 to 2007 was basically the golden years for Austria’s foreign trade and investment policy, with very substantial growth rates. The country’s small economy opened up even more and expanded enormously. It opened up more strongly not just in the direction of Germany, but above all else also towards the CEEC. At the latest in 2004, Austria’s economy in the Single Market had returned to the period before the First World War. The year 1918 with devastating consequences in foreign trade and customs policy was overcome by Austria with its EU accession and the EU’s “Eastern Enlargement”. Its economy, which was oriented towards Central and Eastern Europe, had thus completely hastened away from the policy that was still greatly oriented towards Western Europe. With this, a larger trench has also come into existence between economics and politics. The setback for Austria’s economy then recognizably took place in the transition to 2009, which threatened to become the annus horribilis in economic terms for the country. The young EU Member provided the European Union not only with joy, but also with headaches and worries. In the years starting from 2000, the impression was reinforced that Austria could be a stubborn and difficult EU partner that was unpleasant and annoying (above all with a view towards the matter of transit and the EU Eastern enlargement). In both thematic areas that were highly stylized in the media as “veto issues”, however, Austria in the end had to give in. The successes in neighborhood policy also had to remain modest. The key term here was “strategic partnership”, which was then transformed to the more realistic “regional partnership” and in the end also proved to have more efficiency. Both inside and outside of the EU, Austria has demonstrated both willingness and capability for cooperation with small states and tendencies towards going it alone with questions of integration and neutrality policy, that is, unilateralism. In 3. Associations, Concepts, Ideas, Imaginations, Identifications and Future Perspectives 921 that regard, it must be noted that the conceptions of cooperation were as a rule associated with greater prospects for success than were those of “going it alone”. What can Austria’s contribution to foreign policy and Europe policy consist of in the future within the framework of EU Europe? Within the context of the Eu- ropeanization of Austrian foreign policy, Austria’s former ambassador in Moscow and Brussels, Franz Cede, named seven points of orientation which, within this context, it is worthwhile to list: a) Foreign policy and domestic policy flowed into one another; b) The status of Austrian neutrality receded (even though between 1999 and 2003, a sort of Renaissance took hold); c) Austria’s role in Central Europe; d) Southeastern Europe – a priority for Austrian foreign policy; e) Human rights and humanitarian commitment; f) Europe as a model for a way of life; g) Pushing environmental protection and climate policy as a European task. These points of orientation can essentially be shared. A comprehensible and con- vincing answer to the question that was previously posed can of course hardly be provided today without a final balance sheet of Austrian foreign policy for the years from 1945. This turns out to be ambivalent and contradictory, including because its objectives have changed and the successes are no longer so easily recognizable, let alone so simply measurable. Nevertheless, the balance sheet shows a lot that is positive if that can be assessed as positive from the Austrian point of view. Austria’s foreign policy and policy towards Europe have contributed to the preservation of the Austrian state and its international acceptance, and it has repeatedly achieved the goals that it has set for itself (unity, freedom, independence, self-reliance, neutrality, UN membership, and EU accession), such that with self-assurance and confidence, it can tackle tasks for the future, namely: a) Being the contact and mediator, if not even the spokesperson, for the small and medium-sized EU members; b) Further Europeanizing Central and Eastern Europe; c) Viewing Southeastern Europe not only as an area of Austrian economic interest, but also as an area of European responsibility (a politically mentioned and historically restricted horizon of the so-called “Western Bal- kans” is not sufficient for a comprehensive solution of the problems there); d) Making a contribution for a differentiated and more finely coordinated EU neighbourhood policy that is adapted and balanced to the corresponding specific situations of the affected regions; and e) Further developing the EU as a security union that is structurally not capable of attack but is also ready for external conflict resolution and international crisis prevention and at least for defense, and making EU Europe into not just a cultural dialogue partner but also additionally into a factor 922 X. Final Conclusion

of cultural integration (which the USA is capable of doing only to a very limited degree), that is, finally: f) Creating a distinctive image for the European Union in the sense of a Pax Europa as a globally effective factor of stability for peacekeeping and security policy. In that way, Austria’s neutrality could and can continue to play a useful role.

4 . EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: PROPOSAL FOR DIVISION INTO PERIODS WITH DIFFERENT APPROACHES IN CONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF AUSTRIA

If the attempt is made to formulate an ordering and structuring of the history of European unification, then different approaches result.

a) Seven Classical Approaches and Three Special Approaches

• First, the idea, concept, and space history approach (Paneurope, core Eu- rope or Western Europe, whole Europe or Greater Europe, Zwischen europa or Middle Europe, the Europe of concentric circles, the Europe of the var- iable geometry, of different speeds, etc.): In the course of the twentieth century, Austria changed step and tacked between these different concepts. • Second, the integration theory approach (idealism, constitutionalism, functionalism, neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, constructiv- ism): As an outsider, Austria fluctuated here between functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. • Third, the protagonist approach, above all against the background of the “German-French engine” (Schuman-Adenauer, Brandt-Pompidou, Giscard d’Estaing-Schmidt, Mitterrand-Kohl, Merkel-Macron): Austria’s most active integration policymakers came above all else from the ÖVP. These were Karl Gruber, Josef Klaus, Fritz Bock, and Alois Mock as the most convinced advocates of Europe, but Bruno Kreisky and Franz Vranitzky are also worthy of mention as a result of their pragmatic-realistic approach, which were able to reduce advancing integration and permanent neutrality to a common denominator. • Fourth, the treaty history approach by signing and ratification (the Treaties of Rome 1957–58, the Single European Act 1986–87, the Union Treaty of Maastricht 1991–93, Amsterdam 1997–99, Nice 2000–03, Constitution- al Treaty 2003/failed 2005, and Lisbon 2007–09): Since its membership, Austria has supported all of the treaty intentions. It made an exception only 4. European Integration: Proposal for Division into Periods with Different Approaches 923

with matters of atomic energy and with the obligatory mutual assistance provisions with security and defense. • Fifth, the enlargement history approach (Northern enlargement with Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Ireland in 1973; Southern enlargement with Greece 1981, Portugal and Spain 1986; the Eastern German enlargement with the GDR 1990; the EFTA states of Finland, Austria, and Sweden 1995; the Central Eastern European Countries [CEEC] and the Baltic states with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus 2004; and the southeastern European countries with Bulgaria and Romania 2007 and Croatia 2013): As a latecomer, Austria itself was part of an enlargement in 1995. Otherwise, Austria’s integration policy was fundamentally enlargement-friendly with the exception of Turkey. • Sixth, the interdependency history approach: the dialectic between Europeanizations and renationalizations (the Treaties of Rome and Gaulism 1958–68; Maastricht and nationalistic or [right-wing] populist counter- reactions 1991–99; the EU treaties, the introduction of the euro, the Consti- tutional Treaty, and the corresponding rejections by national referendums in Denmark in 1992 and 2000, Sweden in 2001, Ireland in 2002, France and the Netherlands in 2005, and Ireland again in 2008): Among the various waves of renationalization since the middle or end of the 1980s, Austria was also affected, the expression of which was the Austria-patriotic, right-wing national, EU-critical FPÖ under Jörg Haider and Heinz-Christian Strache. • Seventh, the crisis history approach or the “challenge and response” principle (the failure of the EDC in the French National Assembly 1954 and the departure towards or the new beginning with the Treaties of Rome as a Relance Européenne in 1955–57; the boycott of the EEC Coun- cil of Ministers with the policy of the empty chair by de Gaulle and the Luxembourg Compromise of 1965–66; the debate on the UK Rebate with Margaret Thatcher in the 1970s; German unity as a crisis of the EC and the Union Treaty of Maastricht as a response 1990–93; the ratification crisis of the EU treaties 1991–92, 2001–02, 2005–06, 2008–09): In Austria, crisis both within and outside of the Community were in many cases projected upon the EU. But here, things did not boil down to a ratification crisis with the EU treaties. • Eighth, the perception, reception, and intervention history approach: external perceptions and attempts at influence with regard to the EEC, EC, and EU, for example by the USSR or Russia gauged at various phases of development (1952–57, 1958–73, 1974–91, 1992–2004, 2005–2019). • Ninth, the transatlantic approach. • Tenth, the hegemonic and imperial history approach. 924 X. Final Conclusion

While the first seven approaches can be deduced from integration history and its development as well as from the research to date, the latter three approaches have still been studied very little. These may still be gone into in the end in the sense of a division into periods with an Austrian-specific approach.

b) The Perception History, Reception History, and Intervention History Approach of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation

This approach will take place with regard to the Communities or the Union with more intense consideration of the main political protagonists and can be realized in five phases: • First, the USSR under Stalin was in a negative action mode of total confrontation with the rejecting, combating, and undermining of the formation of Western European integration (the ERP, OEEC, and ECSC) with the mobilization of the communist parties in Western Europe within the context of Cominform as well as with the promotion of proposals for a freedom from coalitions or a neutralization of Germany for the prevention of the formation of a Western Bloc (1947–53). During this phase, Austria’s posture towards Western European integration projects in conformity with regard to Soviet expectations and demands was characterized by clear restraint in terms of integration policy. • Second, the USSR under Khrushchev pursued constructive and more positive matters of concern with regard to a whole European security confer- ence under the promotion of the superiority of the Soviet Union in system competition with the West (as well as with the European Communities) in order to not only catch up in the economic race but also to overtake (1954/55–1964). In this phase, Austria was emancipated from its self-imposed restraint and was more courageous and took the offense more with respect to integration policy. • Third, the USSR under Brezhnev acted with pragmatic approaches in order to change the direction of the non-recognition of the EEC/EC and to view it as a political reality (1972–73). In addition, within the context of a political reduction of tensions in phases and a resumption of arming and military confrontations, it improved its position in repeated endeavors, in particular with bilateral trade relations while making its own energy sector available for Western countries (above all West Germany). It did all of this, among other reasons, for the purpose of the consolidation of COMECON, the modernization of its own system, the avoidance of further trade discrimination, and the intensification of the competition between the EC and the USA while preserving its status as a superpower within the global East-West conflict (1964/65–1982/85). During this phase, Austria 4. European Integration: Proposal for Division into Periods with Different Approaches 925

attempted to preserve its integration policy interests with the support of all initiatives in Europe that bore a policy of tension reduction. • Fourth, the USSR under Gorbachev signaled its willingness for intensified economic cooperation (between the EC and COMECON) on a level playing field and for the concluding of an agreement (1989) with the preservation of the Soviet Union’s appearance as the second superpower, which was tied to the indirect admission of the inferiority of its system all the way up to the recognition of the symptoms of its own collapse (1985–1989/91). During this phase, Austria made use of this opportunity of the unique weakness of the Soviet Union to realize full accession to the EC, against which the USSR under Gorbachev could no longer raise any opposition. • Fifth, this was followed by East-West efforts for the creation of a whole European framework for peace – with unclear assurances by the West that were not covered by treaty to not carry out any expansion of NATO to the East – under Gorbachev and their failure following the EU-Russia-Partner- ship Agreement (1990/91–2008) that had little economic substance, as well as by the onset of symptoms of crisis with the political destabilization of border areas and military interventions in neighboring regions under Putin (2008–19), whereby this phase which is divided into two subphases is to be researched more precisely in order to subdivide it in a more differentiated fashion. In the first subphase, Austria was completely integrated into the Single Market in terms of trade, economic, and monetary policy, but with regard to security and defense policy, it kept to the line of freedom from alliances and a weakened neutrality that was maintained only in formal terms.63

c) The Transatlantic Approach

This can likewise be divided into five phases, and within that context, it turns out to be less actor-centered than that Russian one: • First, with the ERP, the USA acted as an economic midwife and political initiator for Western European integration and, with NATO, as the security policy guarantor and military power that was present in Western Europe (1948/49–1957/58). Austria profited enormously from the Marshall Plan funds, and it was also able to believe itself to be safe under the NATO protective umbrella. The USA consequently became the decisive and most important midwife for the Austria of the Second Republic in terms of foreign and integration policy. Without Austria’s participation in the Marshall Plan, the continued economic orientation towards the West would hardly 63 Gerhard JANDL, Die Neutralität (erneut) als Identitätsmerkmal?, in: Wiener Blätter zur Friedensforschung (2017), 170, 17–22. 926 X. Final Conclusion

have been possible. The status of non-alignment had no restrictive or lim- iting effects. The multilateralism practised by the USA as the basis of the international policy of the West also favored small and medium-sized states such as Austria, sometimes even becoming actors in the economic integration process, which anticipated its political integration. The Marshall Plan stood in stark contrast to the Soviet Union’s bilateral approach to torpedo- ing Europe’s Western integration. • Second, the USA went on to act as the keeper of continuity and the stabiliz- er of the Communities with the beginnings of competition at the economic and competition policy level (1958–72). In this phase, Austria was not especially pressed by the USA to optimize its integration policy position or to intensify its relationship with the Communities. • Third, against the background of increasing American disinterest in the development of the EC, European efforts followed at a political reduction of tensions in the East-West conflict as well as the maintaining of the security policy status quo and finding its own monetary policy aside from the dollar (1973–89). During this phase, Austria profiled itself along with the Finns, Swedes, and Swiss as supporters and sentinels of the policy of détente in Europe, which under Kreisky ranked clearly as coming before European integration policy. • Fourth, this was followed by the security policy establishment of the Western integration of the reunified Germany and EU Europe through the NATO Eastern Enlargement (1991–2004), such that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP: 1993–99) as well as the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP: 1999 et seq.) were to be understood only as modest attempts at the emancipation of security policy from the USA. During this period, Austria enjoyed broad reaching backing on the part of the USA in order to strive for and realize full accession in the Com- munities. After tendencies towards rapprochement towards NATO (1996– 1997/98), there has been since 1999 (the ‟Kosovo War”) and at the latest since 2003 (the Iraq War) great restraint on the part of Austria with regard to the transatlantic alliance, which led to the establishment of Austria’s alliance-free status. • Fifth, a drifting apart began between the EU and the USA with regard to their interests as a result of tendencies towards alienation, irritations, and efforts at emancipation against the background of the policies of George W. Bush and the Trump administration (2001/02–2019 and continuing). Within that context, Austria maneuvered in many cases, above all else as a result of its foreign trade policy interests, between the East (Russia) and the West (the USA). 5. Fifteen Concluding Aspects and One Final Result 927

d) The Hegemonic and Imperial History Approach

This may likewise result from five phases: • First, the ECSC can be understood as a core-Europe/late-Carolingian/regional-policy integration nucleus (1952–58). Austria formally excluded itself from these projects as a non-member, in order to create connections in weakened and informal ways. • Second, the EEC can already be interpreted as a trade policy and customs union-specific regional power with hegemonic traits (1958–72). The trade area of the Communities which had in the meantime grown larger exert- ed a greater force of attraction upon its surroundings, whereupon Austria along with the remaining EFTA neutrals concluded tariff and trade treaties in order to avoid greater economic disadvantages by remaining on the sidelines. • Third, the EC was a regional power that was expanded by the United Kingdom and Northern and Southern Europe with global ambitions and maritime dimensions (1972–92). During this phase, Austria could then no longer avoid making its application for accession (1989) as the first of the EFTA neutrals in order to safeguard its connection with the existing Single Market as well as, in the end, to become a complete part of it. • Fourth, the EU became a hegemonic power that was expanded by the center, North, East, and Southeast of Europe with neoimperial and postimperial traits (1993–2007). Austria’s economy profited enormously from the EU “Eastern Enlargement” with which an opening resulted for it for new investments and companies, as did a sort of return to traditional trade, investment, and economic areas of the Habsburg Monarchy. • Fifth, in the end, the EU presented itself as a multipresidential, pluricentric, and postmodern empire against the background of crises in legitimation and growth with smoldering problems at the peripheries of the Grexit and Brexit debates (2008–19 and continuing). Austria experienced its membership in this phase with the highs and lows of assent, including in any case within a greater trade, economic, and monetary area that went beyond the borders of the former Habsburg Monarchy.

5 . FIFTEEN CONCLUDING ASPECTS AND ONE FINAL RESULT

As a summarizing conclusion whilst referring to the foreword fifteen aspects may be named: First, Austria’s foreign policy, Europe policy, and integration policy are only to be understood within a larger European and international context. Along those lines, there was a high degree of dependence upon the big powers (the German 928 X. Final Conclusion

Reich and the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Soviet Union and the United States) and other neighbouring countries (like Italy) and thus determination from abroad. That began with the control by the League of Nations in the early 1920s up to the 1930s and continued with efforts at satellization through Nazism which led to Finis Austriae in 1938. Second, after 1945, the occupation of the capital and the country by the Four Powers followed, and they continued to have an observing and intervening effect. In fact, between 1945 and 1955, Austria did not succeed in making the Cold War rise and escalate more strongly in its own country, which was the real political achievement of the political elites of the Second Republic. What was helpful: Only after the Second World War did Austria define itself as to a large extent convinced about the idea of “Europe” and its possibilities for a unifying formation, whereby starting in 1955, the State Treaty and neutrality weakened, hindered, and restricted this acknowledgment up to the end of the Cold War (1987–1990) on the continent. Third, unlike previous research, the years 1955 and 1956 were seen in this book in a stronger context, on the one hand in terms of sovereignty and integration policy, but also with regard to their implications for the question of Germany and Hungary. 1955 was not only an act of emancipation from the occupying powers, but also an expression of Austria’s independence from the German question. 1956 was the first independent foreign and neighbourhood policy action with the self- less help for the rebellious Hungarians. The years 1955–56 also marked the clear boundaries between neutrality and sovereignty on the one hand and integration and supranationality on the other. Fourth, the State Treaty was first and foremost a means to an end for attaining and ensuring state and national independence. The choice of “perpetual neutrality” in 1955 was a suitable means for the desired end of liberation from the Soviet occupying power. It was anchored as a Federal Constitutional Law for external acceptance and reinsurance in Moscow, and was subsequently so pronounced that Austrian membership of the EEC had to be ruled out. While the ÖVP leadership had to live with it, the SPÖ leadership was satisfied with it. Fifth, while Austria’s policy of neutrality was still untested in the wake of the Hungarian uprisings in the autumn of 1956, it was handled more consciously and with greater familiarity during the “Czech crisis” of 1968, although many things remained inconsistent and questionable. Neutrality was increasingly perceived by the ÖVP as an annoying obstacle, especially since it was subsequently so pronounced that only an Austrian EEC association seemed conceivable. Sixth, in 1967–68 Austria experienced the limits of its ambitious EC integration policy and active neighbourhood policy with the escalation of the South Ty- rolean question and the “Czech crisis”. Due to pretended bombing attacks in “Alto Adige” Italy’s veto in Brussels and Luxembourg put an end to Austria’s already practically agreed quasi association with the EEC and the ECSC. The project of EC association failed in 1967 because also of foreign and community resistance. 5. Fifteen Concluding Aspects and One Final Result 929

But with the beginning of the 1960s and especially in the 1970s, Austria’s latch- ing on to or merely participating in European integration projects also served the achieving and maintaining of a new Austrian nation-state ideology. Seventh, in the Kreisky era (1970–1983), supported by three absolute majori- ties for an SPÖ sole government (1971, 1975, 1979), Austria’s policy of neutrality experienced an exaggeration that pushed the idea of European integration more into the background. Only customs and trade agreements (1972–73) with the two partial European Communities, together with the other EFTA states, were to be the pragmatic answers that determined Austria’s integration policy up to the application for EC membership and the EEA Treaty (1989–1994). The greatly upgraded neutrality policy was only reduced to a pragmatic and realistic measure in the course of the 1990s (amendment of the law on the transit of war materials 1991, “material derogation” 1999). Eighth, in the wake of the intensification of the Cold War in the course of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan (1979), the (more or less strong) Western boycott of the Olympic Summer Games in Moscow (1980) and the Polish crisis (1980–1983), Austria maintained its policy of neutrality not always in an unproblematic manner. Ninth, until Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the country’s EC membership was unrealistic. It was only with his reform policy in the Soviet Union that Austria’s accession to the EC became more conceivable and ultimately the application for membership in 1989 became possible. Austria successfully tested this question during visits of Vranitzky and Mock in Moscow in 1988. Tenth, in the years 1987–1990 Austria combined its policy on Central Europe and Germany with an increasingly accelerated EC accession option. It welcomed and promoted the liberalization and opening efforts in Poland and Hungary to the best of its ability, while judging the revolutionary developments in the GDR 1989 more cautiously but ultimately also supporting German unification in 1990. At that time Austria was the first EFTA neutral to recognise the new opportunities and major challenges of the planned EC Internal Market as well as the expanded scope for action with the end of the Cold War between the USSR and the USA in 1987–1990. As much as these years increased Austria’s chances of integrating and self-confidently depositing its accession intentions in Brussels, the German “reunification” and the Maastricht Union Treaty as a response to the German question delayed Austria’s opportunities to enter into negotiations with the Com- munities earlier. Eleventh, the key years 1991–92 marked Austria’s commitment to overcoming the Yugoslav crisis by activating the CSCE mechanisms and advocating the independence aspirations of Slovenia and Croatia. The main motivation for Austria’s foreign and European policy was originally a completely different one, namely to advance the accession process to the European Communities, which, however, was associated with a three-and-a-half year delay after the “fall of the 930 X. Final Conclusion

Berlin Wall” and the finalization of the Maastricht Union Treaty (1989–1993). During this period of waiting for Austria’s accession to the EC, the commitment in the Balkans was used by Austria to demonstrate that this was a first-rate area of responsibility for Europe which needed to be stabilised. In agreement with Germany and its support, Austria exposed itself as a pioneer for the independence of the Yugoslav republics, without being able to assess the consequences of this political decision. With this partisanship, Austria has already made a half- way farewell to neutrality. In addition, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, it had already agreed to the transit of US war material when it came to carrying out the “police action” against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq after his occupation of Kuwait. Twelfth, since 1989, Austria has remained politically more Western than Central Eastern Europe-oriented. The time from 1993 to 1994 were marked by the almost total concentration of Austrian foreign policy on EU accession, which was ultimately to succeed in 1995, but was not intended to strengthen or even improve relations with its Central and Eastern European neighbours, who had to wait until 2004 to join the EU. Relations with them remained ambivalent. Membership in the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) of the Viségrad states Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary (“V4”) was not an option either for these states or for Austria, although for geographical and economic reasons such a membership was very obvious, especially for Vienna. In contrast to all “V4” that joined NATO, Austria remained formally “neutral” in military terms. As an EU member, Austria thus remained a case study of ambivalence. The EU and Aus- tria’s membership could not force the government to touch the core elements of the Federal Constitutional Law on neutrality: Austria still does not belong to any military alliance, does not participate in any war and does not allow foreign military bases or foreign troops to be stationed on its territory. These three findings remained incontrovertible, however much there was talk of critics of maintaining neutrality, of ‘denial of reality’ and of an apparent ‘myth’. The so called myth remained reality. Thirteen, it was not until the application for EC membership in July 1989 that a debate on Austria’s foreign policy status seemed to begin. But the debate did not take place, especially since the nascent EU itself had not yet developed a legally binding Common Foreign and Security Policy, which was to be decided by majority vote. Therefore starting from Austria’s membership in the EU there upon served a safeguarded and strengthened Austrian nation-state for the ensuring of its interests against the background of a forced effective internationalization of its policy and an intensified globalization of its trade and economy. Fourteen, leading representatives of the ÖVP (Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schüssel and Defence Minister Werner Fasslabend) and even Federal President Thomas Klestil tried in the years following Austria’s accession to the EU to put Austria’s policy of neutrality to sleep and gradually kill it off by forcing Austria 5. Fifteen Concluding Aspects and One Final Result 931 into NATO. They did not succeed. The SPÖ leadership around Franz Vranitzky and Heinz Fischer successfully fended off this attack. Their position was covered by the majority will of the population and the two-thirds majority in the Austrian Parliament, a majority which did not exist for the ÖVP and which would have been necessary for the revision of the Federal Constitutional Law. The dissent in the Grand Coalition (SPÖ-ÖVP) was expressed in the failure of a common security policy option report in 1998. The NATO option was therefore ruled out and has remained so to this day. Within the framework of the Western European Union (WEU), Austria had only an observer post until the end of this organiza- tion (2011). The NATO “Partnership for Peace” was joined in 1995, but Austria remained far from the integrated alliance. Fifteen, the years 1998–2000 were the highs and lows of Austrian integration policy. The first Presidency of the Council in 1998 was very well organised, although the vote out of office of the great pro-European Helmut Kohl in Germany limited Austria’s scope for action during his Presidency. One had to wait and see what the new red-green government of the new Berlin Republic would bring to the EU. On the other hand, the national boycott measures of the 14 EU “partners” in 2000 against the formation of a black and blue government in Austria were a severe psychological setback for all sides – a loose-loose situation They reinforced the reservations of individual founding members against Austria and against the difficult late comer. Austria’s European policy did not recover from this shock experience for a long time. Criticism and skepticism therefore also remained a not inconsiderable element in Austria’s domestic assessment of the action, which was wrongly perceived as “EU sanctions”, from which a specific Austro-national populism also profited. On January 1, 1995 the new world of the still young and developable EU opened up for Austria with far-reaching perspectives, above all for transnational enterprises and the export-oriented economy. For Austrian citizens, new travel opportunities to the new EU Member States in the north-east, the centre and the east as well as the south-east of Europe were offered, also through more unre- stricted payment transactions. There were new opportunities for exchange and encounters, not least through cooperation in the field of research and science. But the consequences of Austria‘s EU entry were not all the way “positive”: For many Austrians, EU directives and regulations also created a feeling of external control. The assessment of the so-called “EU sanctions” in 2000 revealed the widespread ignorance and lack of familiarity with the structure, history, limits and possibilities of the EU. Through disappointments experienced in real life, EU membership also manifested an increased trend towards renationalization, pro- vincialisation and seclusion of average citizens, which found expression in gains by the EU-critical FPÖ under Haider and Strache. In many cases the EU was not the cause of grievances, but the nation state itself. EU criticism and scepticism can be explained less rationally, but more in psychological terms. In a paradoxical 932 X. Final Conclusion but understandable way a new and specific Austro-nationalism and an increased traditional Austrian patriotism were also consequences of EU accession. It remains to point out one final result: Official Austria was primarily interested in the economic integration of Europe. It therefore joined the euro zone without any problems, having been pegged to the European Monetary System since the 1970s. Military options were left out. In terms of Europe policy and integration policy, Austria repeatedly reacted more than it acted. Acting occurred when that was primarily in the country’s own national concern, which carried with it the consequence that it wasn’t seldom that a lack was seen in any impetus or initiatives for Europe which went beyond Austria’s own self-interest. On the whole, official Austria was basically pro-European, in a broader and much more comprehensive sense than the ECSC and the EU. This was also expressed in its active membership in the Council of Europe and the EFTA, as well as in its approval of all decisions on integration history, from the Treaties of Rome to Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon. Despite all its objections, obstacles, resistances and vetoes, Austria has continuously endeav- oured not to exclude itself from the common decisions, but to participate in them as far as possible and to profit from them accordingly. The balancing act between safeguarding one’s own life and increasing participation in further development from the Communities to the EU has always been relatively successful. In the end Austria’s long journey from Saint-Germain-en-Laye to Lisbon can be seen as a success story. Let’s conclude with a British historian: Alan S. Milward has probably formulated the most powerful thesis to date on the history of European integration with the ‟European Rescue of the Nation State.”64 This hammer thesis, which is he- retical for Europe’s supporters of integration, is still valid especially for the 1950s and the following period, but deserves to be expanded and modified further, especially after 1989. In the meantime, the EU Member States are concerned with more europeanized nation states that are trying to survive in a globalized world. In my opinion, it is now a question of the European Preservation of the Nation State in a consolidated EU in times of globalization. It is possible that Milward, the pioneer of integration history who died in 2010, would have agreed with my words: “The European Preservation of the Nation State within a solidified EU in times of globalization.”65 In our case study, this means: “Europe” and its integration had three functions for Austria and its politics: firstly, it served to liberate itself from the complex of

64 Alan S. MILWARD, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–51, London 1984, Berkeley – Los Angeles 2nd edition 1986; IDEM, The European Rescue of the Nation State, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London 1992; see also Stanley HOFFMANN, Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe, in: Daedalus 95 (1966), S. 862–915. 65 Michael GEHLER, Europa. Ideen – Institutionen – Vereinigung – Zusammenhalt, 3rd revisited largely extended new edition Reinbek/Hamburg 2018, 651, 890. 5. Fifteen Concluding Aspects and One Final Result 933 the German question and to emancipate itself in the 1950s; secondly, it helped to reconstitute the Austrian nation-state from the 1960s and 1970s onwards; and thirdly, the integrated Europe of the 1990s and today functions as a means of safeguarding Austria’s interests in an increasingly globalized world.