1 European/American Relations Over the S.D.I
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1 EUROPEAN/AMERICAN RELATIONS OVER THE S.D.I. CHARLES J. BALL Submitted for the Ph.D. Degree London School of Economics University of London July 1991 UMI Number: U042872 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Disscrrlation Publishing UMI U042872 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 I H F POLITICAL W o A o. tOMlC^ yâ.\\L\Z<S\-yi ABSTRACT This thesis examines the dispute that arose between the United States and key European members of NATO (Britain, West Germany and France) over the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The debate is traced from its inception on March 23, 1983, when Reagan announced his decision to accelerate ballistic missile defence research, to the eclipse of SDI as a major source of transatlantic and international controversy when Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty in December 1987. The transatlantic SDI debate is investigated to determine: (1) the underlying cause, or reasons, for the controversy, (2) how the Alliance managed the differences which arose, and (3) how East- West relations affected the manner in which the controversy was handled. This study includes analysis of past transatlantic controversies about military strategy; reasons why Reagan launched SDI as a unilateral programme; the nature and reasons for West European opposition to SDI; how compromises over SDI were sought and effected (or rejected) between the U.S. and Britain, West Germany and France; the role of the ATBM debate in the SDI controversy; and the significance of the Reykjavik summit and the INF treaty in the SDI debate. Three main and related conclusions emerge from this study. First, that differing conceptions of what constituted a credible nuclear strategy and a stable nuclear regime, rather than the issue of BMD deployment, was the primary cause of the SDI controversy. Second, that in managing the SDI dispute, the Alliance ignored the salience of differing conceptions of strategy and sought agreement on the terms of SDI research in order to maintain NATO unity. And third, that contrary to what the literature on alliances posits, the improvement in East-West relations toward the end of the SDI debate increased rather than decreased NATO unity. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT TABLE OF CONTENTS 3-4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ACRONYMS CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION, 7-36 The Context of European/American Relations Over SDI (8) Review of the Literature (12) Thesis Statement and Its Significance (21) Procedure (24) Organisation of the Study (35) CHAPTER II. HISTORY OF PAST TRANSATLANTIC DISPUTES ABOUT MILITARY DOCTRINE............... 37-123 Introduction (38) Massive Retaliation (39) The Flexible Response Debate (52) The First Transatlantic Debate About HMDs (1967-1972) (79) The INF Controversy (93) Conclusion (117) CHAPTER III. THE ORIGINS AND PURPOSE OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE...........................124-185 Introduction (125) Reagan's Early Views on Ballistic Missile Defences (128) Development of the Reagan Administration's Military Programme (132) Precipitating Factors Leading to the March 23, 1983 Speech (149) The 23 March 1983 Speech (162) The Objectives and Rationale of SDI (167) Conclusion (180) CHAPTER IV. THE BRITISH, WEST GERMAN AND FRENCH REACTION TO SDI AND THE U.S. EFFORT TO PERSUADE................................. 186-277 Introduction (187) The British Reaction to SDI (188) The West German Response to SDI (210) The French Reaction to SDI (228) The US Effort to Assuage West European Anxieties (243) The Significance of Intra-Alliance Differences About the Implications of BMD Deployment (261) The Role of NATO (270) Conclusion (272) CHAPTER V. THE DEBATE ABOUT WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN SDI RESEARCH____ 279-380 Introduction (280) The British Reaction to the US Participation Offer (288) The West German Reaction to the US Participation Offer (319) The French Reaction to the US Participation Offer (352) The Failure of the WEU to Forge a Consensus on SDI (361) The Role of NATO in the Participation Debate (367) Conclusion (373) CHAPTER VI. THE ATBM DEBATE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SDI........................................... 381-421 Introduction (382) The Reagan Administration and ATBMs (385) West German Support for ATBMs (389) The French Reaction to ATBMs (400) The British Response to ATBMS (409) Conclusion (416) CHAPTER VII. REYKJAVIK, DETENTE, THE INF TREATY AND THE DEMISE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC SDI DEBATE 422-503 Introduction (423) The British Reaction to Reykjavik and Its Aftermath (427) The West German Response to Reykjavik and Its Aftermath (442) The French Reaction to Reykjavik and Its Aftermath (464) The WEU and NATO (492) Conclusion (497) CHAPTER VIII. CONCLUSION................................... 504-522 • The Role of Strategic Differences (505) • Management of the Debate: The Papering Over of Differences (509) • The Role of East-West Differences in the SDI Debate (519) BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................... 523-549 5 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There are many people whom I would like to thank for their help in enabling me to complete this thesis. Dr. Christopher Coker has been a patient and wise supervisor who has steered me more than once in the right direction and dissuaded me from pursuing unproductive paths. Moreover, in dispensing much needed criticism, he was always careful to do so in a manner that was precise and unambiguous yet in a way that did not discourage or dishearten me. I also appreciated.the speed with which Dr. Coker read my drafts. I would like to thank Professor David Yost for his guidance and support. Dr. David Schwartz was likewise a source of encouragement. My special thanks go to Miss Henrietta Johnson for her help in the preparation of the manuscript. Mrs. Teri Hancock's help was absolutely indispensable in seeing the thesis through to its final form. Finally, I would like to thank my father. Dr. John C. Ball, for his steadfast encouragement. ACRONYMS ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile ASAT Anti-Satellite Weapon ATBM Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile BMD Ballistic Missile Defence CDU Christian Democratic Union, West Germany CSU Christian Social Union, West Germany FDP Free Democratic Party GLCM Ground Launched Cruise Missile ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile INF Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces LNO Limited Nuclear Option MAD Mutually Assured Destruction MIRV Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle NAA North Atlantic Assembly NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NPG Nuclear Planning Group SAC Strategic Air Command SALT I Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I SALT II Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II SDI Strategic Defence Initiative SDIO Strategic Defence Initiative Organization SEP Selective Employment Plans SLBM Sea Launched Ballistic Missile SLCM Sea Launched Cruise Missile START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks WEU West European Union CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 8 I. THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN/AMERICAN RELATIONS OVER SDI This study examines the controversy that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) engendered within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the manner in which this controversy was managed. The primary questions that this thesis seeks to answer are: Why did the Reagan Administration's decision to pursue SDI cause such controversy within the Alliance? And how, and to what extent, did the United States, Britain, West Germany and France reconcile their disagreements about SDI? The disagreement over SDI within the Alliance has been primarily attributed to the assumption that the United States and Europe had divergent security interests and that the deployment of HMDs would therefore affect European and American security differently. A central argument forwarded in this study is that the transatlantic controversy was not primarily due to the prospect of BMD deployment; rather SDI caused controversy because it highlighted and heightened long-standing disagreements within the Alliance about nuclear strategy, arms control, and the conduct of East-West relations. SDI thus became a vehicle through which these prior differences manifested themselves; it was not however their primary cause. The second argument forwarded in this thesis concerns that manner in which the SDI controversy was managed. I argue that rather than confront the doctrinal differences exacerbated by SDI, the Alliance deliberately ignored them in order to maintain transatlantic unity and instead focused on finding areas of 9 agreement that were peripheral to the main issues evoked by SDI. While this method of papering over important differences constituted the primary means by which the SDI controversy was managed, a seemingly contradictory element of decision-making within the Alliance dictated the manner in which SDI arose and was occasionally handled within the Alliance; unilateral American action. Explaining how these seemingly contradictory methods coexisted and why papering over differences was the method to which the Alliance consistently reverted, despite the Reagan Administration's occasional unilateral initiatives, can most appropriately