DOCSLIB.ORG

1 European/American Relations Over the S.D.I

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
1 European/American Relations Over the S.D.I 1 EUROPEAN/AMERICAN RELATIONS OVER THE S.D.I. CHARLES J. BALL Submitted for the Ph.D. Degree London School of Economics University of London July 1991 UMI Number: U042872 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Disscrrlation Publishing UMI U042872 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 I H F POLITICAL W o A o. tOMlC^ yâ.\\L\Z<S\-yi ABSTRACT This thesis examines the dispute that arose between the United States and key European members of NATO (Britain, West Germany and France) over the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The debate is traced from its inception on March 23, 1983, when Reagan announced his decision to accelerate ballistic missile defence research, to the eclipse of SDI as a major source of transatlantic and international controversy when Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty in December 1987. The transatlantic SDI debate is investigated to determine: (1) the underlying cause, or reasons, for the controversy, (2) how the Alliance managed the differences which arose, and (3) how East- West relations affected the manner in which the controversy was handled. This study includes analysis of past transatlantic controversies about military strategy; reasons why Reagan launched SDI as a unilateral programme; the nature and reasons for West European opposition to SDI; how compromises over SDI were sought and effected (or rejected) between the U.S. and Britain, West Germany and France; the role of the ATBM debate in the SDI controversy; and the significance of the Reykjavik summit and the INF treaty in the SDI debate. Three main and related conclusions emerge from this study. First, that differing conceptions of what constituted a credible nuclear strategy and a stable nuclear regime, rather than the issue of BMD deployment, was the primary cause of the SDI controversy. Second, that in managing the SDI dispute, the Alliance ignored the salience of differing conceptions of strategy and sought agreement on the terms of SDI research in order to maintain NATO unity. And third, that contrary to what the literature on alliances posits, the improvement in East-West relations toward the end of the SDI debate increased rather than decreased NATO unity. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT TABLE OF CONTENTS 3-4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ACRONYMS CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION, 7-36 The Context of European/American Relations Over SDI (8) Review of the Literature (12) Thesis Statement and Its Significance (21) Procedure (24) Organisation of the Study (35) CHAPTER II. HISTORY OF PAST TRANSATLANTIC DISPUTES ABOUT MILITARY DOCTRINE............... 37-123 Introduction (38) Massive Retaliation (39) The Flexible Response Debate (52) The First Transatlantic Debate About HMDs (1967-1972) (79) The INF Controversy (93) Conclusion (117) CHAPTER III. THE ORIGINS AND PURPOSE OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE...........................124-185 Introduction (125) Reagan's Early Views on Ballistic Missile Defences (128) Development of the Reagan Administration's Military Programme (132) Precipitating Factors Leading to the March 23, 1983 Speech (149) The 23 March 1983 Speech (162) The Objectives and Rationale of SDI (167) Conclusion (180) CHAPTER IV. THE BRITISH, WEST GERMAN AND FRENCH REACTION TO SDI AND THE U.S. EFFORT TO PERSUADE................................. 186-277 Introduction (187) The British Reaction to SDI (188) The West German Response to SDI (210) The French Reaction to SDI (228) The US Effort to Assuage West European Anxieties (243) The Significance of Intra-Alliance Differences About the Implications of BMD Deployment (261) The Role of NATO (270) Conclusion (272) CHAPTER V. THE DEBATE ABOUT WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN SDI RESEARCH____ 279-380 Introduction (280) The British Reaction to the US Participation Offer (288) The West German Reaction to the US Participation Offer (319) The French Reaction to the US Participation Offer (352) The Failure of the WEU to Forge a Consensus on SDI (361) The Role of NATO in the Participation Debate (367) Conclusion (373) CHAPTER VI. THE ATBM DEBATE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SDI........................................... 381-421 Introduction (382) The Reagan Administration and ATBMs (385) West German Support for ATBMs (389) The French Reaction to ATBMs (400) The British Response to ATBMS (409) Conclusion (416) CHAPTER VII. REYKJAVIK, DETENTE, THE INF TREATY AND THE DEMISE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC SDI DEBATE 422-503 Introduction (423) The British Reaction to Reykjavik and Its Aftermath (427) The West German Response to Reykjavik and Its Aftermath (442) The French Reaction to Reykjavik and Its Aftermath (464) The WEU and NATO (492) Conclusion (497) CHAPTER VIII. CONCLUSION................................... 504-522 • The Role of Strategic Differences (505) • Management of the Debate: The Papering Over of Differences (509) • The Role of East-West Differences in the SDI Debate (519) BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................... 523-549 5 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There are many people whom I would like to thank for their help in enabling me to complete this thesis. Dr. Christopher Coker has been a patient and wise supervisor who has steered me more than once in the right direction and dissuaded me from pursuing unproductive paths. Moreover, in dispensing much needed criticism, he was always careful to do so in a manner that was precise and unambiguous yet in a way that did not discourage or dishearten me. I also appreciated.the speed with which Dr. Coker read my drafts. I would like to thank Professor David Yost for his guidance and support. Dr. David Schwartz was likewise a source of encouragement. My special thanks go to Miss Henrietta Johnson for her help in the preparation of the manuscript. Mrs. Teri Hancock's help was absolutely indispensable in seeing the thesis through to its final form. Finally, I would like to thank my father. Dr. John C. Ball, for his steadfast encouragement. ACRONYMS ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile ASAT Anti-Satellite Weapon ATBM Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile BMD Ballistic Missile Defence CDU Christian Democratic Union, West Germany CSU Christian Social Union, West Germany FDP Free Democratic Party GLCM Ground Launched Cruise Missile ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile INF Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces LNO Limited Nuclear Option MAD Mutually Assured Destruction MIRV Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle NAA North Atlantic Assembly NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NPG Nuclear Planning Group SAC Strategic Air Command SALT I Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I SALT II Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II SDI Strategic Defence Initiative SDIO Strategic Defence Initiative Organization SEP Selective Employment Plans SLBM Sea Launched Ballistic Missile SLCM Sea Launched Cruise Missile START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks WEU West European Union CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 8 I. THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN/AMERICAN RELATIONS OVER SDI This study examines the controversy that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) engendered within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the manner in which this controversy was managed. The primary questions that this thesis seeks to answer are: Why did the Reagan Administration's decision to pursue SDI cause such controversy within the Alliance? And how, and to what extent, did the United States, Britain, West Germany and France reconcile their disagreements about SDI? The disagreement over SDI within the Alliance has been primarily attributed to the assumption that the United States and Europe had divergent security interests and that the deployment of HMDs would therefore affect European and American security differently. A central argument forwarded in this study is that the transatlantic controversy was not primarily due to the prospect of BMD deployment; rather SDI caused controversy because it highlighted and heightened long-standing disagreements within the Alliance about nuclear strategy, arms control, and the conduct of East-West relations. SDI thus became a vehicle through which these prior differences manifested themselves; it was not however their primary cause. The second argument forwarded in this thesis concerns that manner in which the SDI controversy was managed. I argue that rather than confront the doctrinal differences exacerbated by SDI, the Alliance deliberately ignored them in order to maintain transatlantic unity and instead focused on finding areas of 9 agreement that were peripheral to the main issues evoked by SDI. While this method of papering over important differences constituted the primary means by which the SDI controversy was managed, a seemingly contradictory element of decision-making within the Alliance dictated the manner in which SDI arose and was occasionally handled within the Alliance; unilateral American action. Explaining how these seemingly contradictory methods coexisted and why papering over differences was the method to which the Alliance consistently reverted, despite the Reagan Administration's occasional unilateral initiatives, can most appropriately
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Fortress Europe: the Ym Th Martin Bangemann
    Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business Volume 9 Issue 3 Winter Winter 1989 Fortress Europe: The yM th Martin Bangemann Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb Part of the International Trade Commons Recommended Citation Martin Bangemann, Fortress Europe: The yM th, 9 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 480 (1988-1989) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. Fortress Europe: The Myth Martin Bangemann * The anticipation of the 1992 continental-wide market has already had an unexpected effect: one-third of the average 3.7% increase in eco- nomic growth of the European Community for 1988 is the result of in- vestors anticipating the big market.' This is the clearest signal the business community could make to show its confidence in Europe. This is the beginning of the most extensive exercise of deregulation the Euro- pean Community has experienced since its creation in the 1950s. Every- body agrees that it is an irreversible trend. Long gone is the "benign neglect" of those on Wall Street and Penn- sylvania Avenue that led the United States press to coin the sinister "Europessimism" concept of the early 1980s. Indeed, during last year, many East Coast analysts depicted Europe as a five trillion dollar econ- omy, thus granting the EC the economic powerhouse status it deserves.2 But awe often goes hand in hand with envy, which has resulted in the fashionable East Coast notion of "Fortress Europe." Before killing this myth, one crucial but often forgotten issue must be clarified: there is indeed nothing more legitimate for the Community than wanting to achieve one single market, abolishing national frontiers, and letting goods, persons, services and capital circulate freely.
    [Show full text]
  • Inhalt Vier Jahrzehnte Liberaler Politik
    Inhalt WOLFGANG MISCHNICK Zum Geleit 9 OTTO GRAF LAMBSDORFF Vorwort 13 Vier Jahrzehnte liberaler Politik HEINO KAACK Die FDP im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 19 Die Gründung der Freien Demokratischen Partei DIETER HEIN Der Weg nach Heppenheim 1945-1948 48 THEO RÜTTEN Von der Plattform-Partei zur Partei des _ liberalen Programms 1949-1957 66 Zeitzeugen: Liberale der ersten Stunde GÜNTHER SERFAS Gespräch mit Wolfgang Haußmann (März 1988) 81 HELGA LERCH Der Abgeordnete und Unternehmer Karl Atzenroth 93 http://d-nb.info/881467189 6 Inhalt Zwischen Opposition und Regierung ig$7-1967 UDO WENGST Mit und gegen Adenauer und Erhard 102 FRITZ FLISZAR Mit der FDPregieren Ein Gespräch mit Erich Mende (7. Juni 1988) 125 DANIEL KOERFER Schwierige Geburten: Die Regierungsbildungen 1961, 1962, 1963 und 1965 156 Die Liberalen von 1967 bis heute ULRICH WILDERMUTH Von der FDP zur F.D.P. 194 HARTMUT HAUSMANN Die Freiburger Thesen 21 j GERD RAUHAUS In der sozial-liberalen Koalition 229 JOHANNES MERCK Von der sozial-liberalen zur bürgerlich-liberalen Koalition 246 Themen und Perspektiven liberaler Politik MARTIN BANGEMANN Liberale Wirtschaftspolitik 285 IRMGARD ADAM-SCHWAETZER Die Kontinuität liberaler Außenpolitik 297 GERHART RUDOLF BAUM Liberaler Rechtsstaat 308 DIETER-JULIUS CRONENBERG Liberale Gesellschaftspolitik 323 Inhalt GUIDO WESTERWELLE Die Jungen Liberalen 342 HELMUT HAUSSMANN Perspektiven des Liberalismus 347 ACHIM RHODE Die FDP in Ländern und Kommunen 364 Die FDP und die liberale Tradition WOLFGANG J. MOMMSEN Zwei Jahrhunderte
    [Show full text]
  • Report on Europe and the Global Information Society
    Bulletin of the European Union Supplement 2/94 Growth, competitiveness and employment White Paper follow-up Report on Europe and the global information society Interim report on trans-European networks Progress report on employment Extracts of the conclusions of the Presidency of the Corfu European Council This document reproduces the infonnation society report on pages 5-39 and the Presidency conclusions on pages 126- 134. The other two reports are available as separate documents on AEI-EU. Blank page not reproduced: 8 European Commission Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1994 ISBN 92-826-8547- (Q ECSC-EC-EAEC, Brussels. Luxembourg, 1994 Reproduction is authorized, except for commercial purposes, provided the source is acknowledged Printed in Germany General contents Europe and the global information society Recommendations of the high-level group on the information society to the Corfu European Council (Bangemann group) Trans-European networks Interim report of the chairman of the group of personal representatives of the Heads of State or Government to the Corfu European Council (Christophersen group) Progress report on employment 103 Results of Mr Flynn s tour of capitals Extracts of the conclusions of the Presidency of the Corfu European Council (24 and 25 June 1994) 125 S. 2/94 Europe and the global information society Recommendations of the high-level group on the information society to the Corfu European Council (Bangemann group) In its Brussels meeting of December 1993, the European Council requested that a report be prepared for its meeting on 24 and 25 June 1994 in Corfu by a group of prominent persons on the specific measures to be taken into consideration by the Community and the Member States for the infrastructures in the sphere of information.
    [Show full text]
  • Herr Und Knecht Kohl Und Schäuble – Wie Sich Eine Politische Freundschaft Im Schatten Schwarzer Kassen Entwickelte
    Titel Herr und Knecht Kohl und Schäuble – wie sich eine politische Freundschaft im Schatten schwarzer Kassen entwickelte m Anfang stand Dankbarkeit. Der 41-jährige Ministerprä- dierte der Badener als Erster Parlamentarischer Geschäftsführer sident Helmut Kohl war im Oktober 1971 auf dem Partei- den Vorsitzenden Alfred Dregger zum Statisten. „Dregger macht Atag in Saarbrücken bei der Wahl des CDU-Chefs gegen die Reisen, Schäuble die Arbeit“, feixte Kohl. Beim Gang ins Rainer Barzel angetreten und hatte krachend verloren: 344 gegen Bundeshaus schaute der Kanzler häufig auf eine halbe Stunde 144 Stimmen. Der robuste Kohl, Leitfigur für die Jüngeren in der bei Schäuble vorbei. Helmut Kohl gefiel es, dass er über seinen Union, merkte sich jeden, der an diesem desaströsen Tag für ihn „leitenden Kompaniefeldwebel“ Schäuble auch die Fraktion im war. Wolfgang Schäuble zum Beispiel, den schmächtigen Be- Griff hatte. zirksvorsitzenden der Jungen Union von Südbaden, einen kecken Doch zugleich gab es schon damals die dunkle Stelle dieser Ver- jungen Mann von 29 Jahren. bindung, die schließlich beide in äußerste Bedrängnis brachte Als der zwei Jahre später in Singen auf einem Parteitag der und an der die Beziehung endgültig zerbrach: das System der Jungen Union seinen Vorsitz abgab, reiste Kohl, inzwischen schwarzen Kassen. Unter den Fraktionsgeldern, die Schäuble doch zum CDU-Bundesvorsitzenden gewählt, in die südlichste nach eigenen Worten von dem Kohl-Spezi Wilhelm Rawe über- Ecke Deutschlands, um Schäuble zu preisen. Loyalität hat Kohl nahm, fand er Beträge in Millionenhöhe vor. Deren Herkunft ist immer honoriert. Und Schäuble war mit solchen Gesten leicht bis heute nicht geklärt. zu gewinnen. Fortan war er, wie ein Wegbegleiter bemerkte, für lange Jahre „180-prozentig Kohl, und noch mal Kohl“.
    [Show full text]
  • From “Non-Immigration Country” to “Country of Integration”
    From “Non-Immigration Country” to “Country of Integration” Transformation of integration discourse in Germany Shigeki Sato (Hosei University/ University of Constance) [email protected] Paper presented at the 10th meeting of the German-Japanese Society for Social Sciences October 9, 2010 Hosei University (Tokyo, Japan) Abstract This paper aims to illuminate the transformation of integration discourse in Germany by comparing the different forms of discourse of the 1980s and the 2000s. In order to do so, the paper attempts to detect underlying cognitive schemes of boundary between immigrants and natives in the discourse of immigrant integration. In the 1980s, the integration discourse, whether it seeks to return immigrants to their homeland and to preserve homogeneous “national character” or it proposes a peaceful and democratic “multicultural” co-existence to enrich “our society”, commonly assumed the cultural difference between “Germans” and “foreigners” as essential and fixed. In the 2000s, the Integration discourse is mainly concerned with the common norms and values immigrants must share, whether these norms and values are called “Leitkultur” or “constitutional patriotism”. It is now generally agreed that immigrants, including Muslims, have to learn German and accept “our liberal-democratic values” of the constitution to be “a part of Germany”. Thus the boundary between immigrants and “us” is perceived to be more blurred and fluid. But Immigrants are strongly urged to have the “will” to integrate. More offensive calls for integration tend to marginalize or stigmatize immigrants “refusing” to integrate. *Do not cite without author’s permission 1 Deutschland schafft sich nicht ab, Deutschland verändert sich durch Immigration, und das ist gut so.
    [Show full text]
  • Security Communities and the Habitus of Restraint: Germany and the United States on Iraq
    Review of International Studies (2007), 33, 285–305 Copyright British International Studies Association doi:10.1017/S0260210507007516 Security communities and the habitus of restraint: Germany and the United States on Iraq CORNELIU BJOLA AND MARKUS KORNPROBST* Abstract. Borrowing from Norbert Elias, we introduce the habitus of restraint to the study of security communities. This habitus constitutes a key dimension of the glue that holds security communities together. The perceived compatibility of practices emanating from the habitus that members hold fosters the collective identity upon which a security community is built. The violation of a member’s habitus by the practices of another member, however, disrupts the reproduction of collective identity and triggers a crisis of the security community. Our analysis of Germany’s reaction to Washington’s case for war against Iraq provides empirical evidence for the salience of the habitus for the internal dynamics of security communities. Introduction At first glance, it is surprising that Saddam Hussein triggered the deepest post-World War II rift in the usually amicable relationship between the United States and Germany. The two countries share many values that should have prevented action taken against a vicious dictator from becoming a contentious issue. Saddam Hussein’s longstanding record of gross human rights abuses and aggression against other states should have been yet another reason to draw the two allies even closer together. This scenario, however, failed to materialise. Not only did the United States and Germany fail to find a common ground on Iraq. They even started to fundamentally question the nature of their relationship.
    [Show full text]
  • Germany and Japan As Regional Actors in the Post-Cold War Era: a Role Theoretical Comparison
    Alexandra Sakaki Germany and Japan as Regional Actors in the Post-Cold War Era: A Role Theoretical Comparison Trier 2011 GERMANY AND JAPAN AS REGIONAL ACTORS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: A ROLE THEORETICAL COMPARISON A dissertation submitted by Alexandra Sakaki to the Political Science Deparment of the University of Trier in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Submission of dissertation: August 6, 2010 First examiner: Prof. Dr. Hanns W. Maull (Universität Trier) Second examiner: Prof. Dr. Christopher W. Hughes (University of Warwick) Date of viva: April 11, 2011 ABSTRACT Germany and Japan as Regional Actors in the Post-Cold War Era: A Role Theoretical Comparison Recent non-comparative studies diverge in their assessments of the extent to which German and Japanese post-Cold War foreign policies are characterized by continuity or change. While the majority of analyses on Germany find overall continuity in policies and guiding principles, prominent works on Japan see the country undergoing drastic and fundamental change. Using an explicitly comparative framework for analysis based on a role theoretical approach, this study reevaluates the question of change and continuity in the two countries‘ regional foreign policies, focusing on the time period from 1990 to 2010. Through a qualitative content analysis of key foreign policy speeches, this dissertation traces and compares German and Japanese national role conceptions (NRCs) by identifying policymakers‘ perceived duties and responsibilities of their country in international politics. Furthermore, it investigates actual foreign policy behavior in two case studies about German and Japanese policies on missile defense and on textbook disputes.
    [Show full text]
  • 5 Vergangenheitsbewältigung: Historikerstreit and the Notion Of
    Vergangenheitsbewältigung: Historikerstreit and the Notion of Continued Responsibility Paul Rutschmann The chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Angela Merkel, an- nounced in April of 2006 during a parliamentary session that she and her fellow party members represent a younger generation which no longer has direct ties to the Third Reich. Her statement revealed a certain confidence that the National Socialist past can finally belong to the past without further continuation into the present, as well as the hope that Germans would finally be able to devote their full attention, unencumbered by the shadow of Hitler, to the future. This renewed desire to put the burdened past behind appears twenty years after the highly publicized Historians’ Dispute (Historikerstreit) in which a more vigorous attempt had been made to free German national consciousness from the lingering influences of a negative-laden Nazi past. Despite her optimism, one still has to ask whether enough time has elapsed to absolve later generations of Germans of continued responsibility for the atrocities of Nazi Germany. The Historikerstreit of 1986/7 revolved mainly around the uniqueness or non-uniqueness of Nazi history in public memory and the historian’s role in rees- tablishing a healthy sense of national identity. While adding nothing new in the way of historical research, the dispute did reveal what is at stake for Germans in their interpretations of the past. Ostensibly, the dispute was conducted in the man- ner of political Vergangenheitsbewältigung. But by politicizing the memory of Nazi war crimes, many of the conservative historians were clouding the deeper issues inherent in the notion of Vergangenheitsbewältigung.1 Vergangenheitsbewältigung as such expresses the manner in which Germans come to grips with or interpret their past and to what degree their interpretations of history reflect feelings of continued responsibility towards the survivors of the former victims.
    [Show full text]
  • 01-707 Carl Otto Lenz
    01-707 Carl Otto Lenz ARCHIV FÜR CHRISTLICH-DEMOKRATISCHE POLITIK DER KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG E.V. 01 – 707 CARL OTTO LENZ SANKT AUGUSTIN 2014 I Inhaltsverzeichnis 1 Persönliches 1 1.1 Glückwünsche/Kondolenzen 1 1.2 Termine 1 1.3 Pressemeldungen zur Person 2 2 Veröffentlichungen: Beiträge, Reden, Interviews 3 3 CDU Kreisverband Bergstraße 6 4 BACDJ 9 5 Wahlen 10 5.1 Bundestagswahlen 10 5.2 Landtagswahlen Hessen 10 5.3 Kommunalwahlen Hessen 11 5.4 Allgemein 11 6 Deutscher Bundestag 13 6.1 Sachgebiete 13 6.1.1 Verfassungsreform 25 6.1.2 Ehe- und Familienrecht 27 6.2 Ausschüsse 29 6.3 Politische Korrespondenz 31 7 Europa 64 7.1 Materialsammlung Artikel, Aufsätze und Vorträge A-Z 64 7.2 Europäischer Gerichtshof / Materialsammlung A-Z 64 7.2.1 Sachgebiete 64 7.3 Seminare, Konferenzen und Vorträge 64 8 Universitäten 65 9 Sonstiges 66 Sachbegriff-Register 67 Ortsregister 75 Personenregister 76 Biographische Angaben: 5. Juni 1930 Geboren in Berlin 1948 Abitur in München 1949-1956 Studium der Rechts- und Staatswissenschaften an den Universitäten München, Freiburg/Br., Fribourg/Schweiz und Bonn 1954 Referendarexamen 1955-56 Cornell University/USA 1958 Hochschule für Verwaltungswissenschaften in Speyer 1959 Assessorexamen 1961 Promotion zum Dr. jur. in Bonn ("Die Beratungsinstitutionen des amerikanischen Präsidenten in Fragen der allgemeinen Politik") 1957 Eintritt in die CDU 1959-1966 Generalsekretär der CD-Fraktion des Europäischen Parlaments in Straßburg und Luxemburg und 1963-1966 der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der WEU in Paris 1965-1984
    [Show full text]
  • INHALT Vorwort 9 Konrad Lübbert Neutronenbombe. Eine Saubere
    INHALT Vorwort 9 Konrad Lübbert Neutronenbombe. Eine saubere Waffe, die nur Leben zerstört 11 Wie ist es zur Neutronenbombe gekommen? ' 19 Die totale Gleichgültigkeit oder „Humanismus" eines Sam T. Cohen 24 Die Lehren von Hiroshima 31 Die Wirkungsweise der Neutronenwaffe 36 Aktive Vorbereitung eines Kriegsverbrechens und Verstoß gegen das elementarste Menschenrecht 43 Der Wahnsinn zum Prinzip erhoben 47 Welche Interessen stehen dahinter? 49 Jede Entspannungspolitik wird zunichte gemacht 53 Mit europäischem Interesse unvereinbar 59 Was sich jetzt als wirklicher Doppelbeschluß herausstellt 62 Militärstrategie und Neutronenbombe 65 Neutronenwaffen sind Angriffswaffen und erhöhen die Gefahr eines Atomkrieges 70 Weinberger drängte und der Präsident entschied 75 Woran man sich gerade heute erinnern sollte 78 Und wie verhält man sich in Bonn? 80 Die Friedensbewegung wird breiter und intensiver 89 Die Friedensbewegung in den Kirchen 92 Zusammenarbeit — Erfordernis der Friedensbewegung 94 http://d-nb.info/810998416 DOKUMENTATION Funktion und Wirkungsweise der Neutronenbombe 97 Prof. Dr. Eric Burhop, Physiker, Präsident der Weltförderation der Wissenschaftler 98 Prof. Dr. Dr. Max Steenbeck, Physiker, Mitglied der Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR 99 General a.D. Senator Nino Pasti 103 Admiral a.D. Antoine Sanguinetti 106 Peter Thomsen, Stern 108 Zeitung der Industriegewerkschaft Metall 110 Perversion des Denkens 113 Die Welt 114 Herbert Kremp, Die Welt 114 Interview mit dem Erfinder der Neutronenbombe Samuel Cohen 116 Caspar W. Weinberger, Verteidigungsminister der USA 124 Deutsche National-Zeitung 126 Bundesregierung und „Opposition" zur Neutronenbombe 129 Jürgen Möllemann, sicherheitspolitischer Sprecher der FDP-Bundestagsfraktion 130 Dr. Alfred Dregger, Stellvertretender Fraktions- und Bundes vor sitzender der CDU 130 Dr. Lothar Rühl, Stellvertretender Regierungssprecher 131 Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • The Importance of Osthandel: West German-Soviet Trade and the End of the Cold War, 1969-1991
    The Importance of Osthandel: West German-Soviet Trade and the End of the Cold War, 1969-1991 Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Charles William Carter, M.A. Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2012 Dissertation Committee: Professor Carole Fink, Advisor Professor Mansel Blackford Professor Peter Hahn Copyright by Charles William Carter 2012 Abstract Although the 1970s was the era of U.S.-Soviet détente, the decade also saw West Germany implement its own form of détente: Ostpolitik. Trade with the Soviet Union (Osthandel) was a major feature of Ostpolitik. Osthandel, whose main feature was the development of the Soviet energy-export infrastructure, was part of a broader West German effort aimed at promoting intimate interaction with the Soviets in order to reduce tension and resolve outstanding Cold War issues. Thanks to Osthandel, West Germany became the USSR’s most important capitalist trading partner, and several oil and natural gas pipelines came into existence because of the work of such firms as Mannesmann and Thyssen. At the same time, Moscow’s growing emphasis on developing energy for exports was not a prudent move. A lack of economic diversification resulted, a development that helped devastate the USSR’s economy after the oil price collapse of 1986 and, in the process, destabilize the communist bloc. Against this backdrop, the goals of some West German Ostpolitik advocates—especially German reunification and a peaceful resolution to the Cold War—occurred. ii Dedication Dedicated to my father, Charles William Carter iii Acknowledgements This project has been several years in the making, and many individuals have contributed to its completion.
    [Show full text]
  • CDU) SOZIALORDNUNG: Dr
    g Z 8398 C 'nformationsdienst der Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands Union in Deutschland Bonn, den 7. Oktober 1982 Für die Wir packen Auftakt-Aktion Bundeskanzler es an Helmut Kohl liegen jetzt sämtliche Materia- Als Helmut Kohl vor zehn Tagen zum Bundes- lien vor. Ausführliche Vorstel- lung mit Abbildungen und Be- kanzler gewählt wurde, sagte er: „Packen wir es stellformular im rosa Teil. gemeinsam an." Dieses Wort gilt. Die Re- Von dem am 1. Oktober 1982 gierung unter seiner Führung hat angepackt. aktuell herausgegebenen „Zur D'e Bürger im Land spüren dies, sie atmen Sache"-Flugblatt zur Wahl Hel- *uf, daß die Zeit der Führungslosigkeit, des mut Kohls wurden am Wo- Tr chenende bereits über 3 Mil- eibenlassens und der Resignation zu Ende lionen Exemplare verteilt. 9eht. Auch die Beziehungen zu unseren Freun- • den im Ausland hat Helmut Kohl mit seinen er- sten Reisen nach Paris und Brüssel gefestigt Das traurige Erbe und gestärkt. Dokumentation über die Hin- terlassenschaft der Regierung Der Bundeskanzler und alle, die ihm helfen, haben in Schmidt im grünen Teil den letzten Tagen mit einem gewaltigen Arbeitspen- sum ein Beispiel für uns alle dafür gegeben, was jetzt yon uns verlangt wird, um Schritt für Schritt das trau- • HELMUT KOHL r,9e Erbe, das die Schmidt-Regierung hinterlassen Wir müssen den Leistungswillen nat, zu überwinden. Die häßliche Hetzkampagne zahl- in unserem Volke wieder beleben Seite 3 reicher Sozialdemokraten gegen diesen Neuanfang 2ßigt ihre Ohnmacht und ihr schlechtes Gewissen; s'e sind schlechte Verlierer und schlechte Demokra- • BUNDESTAGS- ten, und sie werden dafür am 6. März die Quittung er- FRAKTION halten.
    [Show full text]