Hypotheses on the Nationalities Factor in Soviet Religious Policy
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Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe Volume 4 Issue 6 Article 4 12-1984 Hypotheses on the Nationalities Factor in Soviet Religious Policy Pedro Ramet Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree Part of the Christianity Commons, and the Eastern European Studies Commons Recommended Citation Ramet, Pedro (1984) "Hypotheses on the Nationalities Factor in Soviet Religious Policy," Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol. 4 : Iss. 6 , Article 4. Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol4/iss6/4 This Article, Exploration, or Report is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ George Fox University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HYPOTHESES ON mE NATIONALITIES FACTOR IN SOVIET RELIGIOUS POLICY by Pedro Ramet Pedro Ramet, a native of London, England , has lived almost half of his life in Europe--chief ly in England , Austria, Germany , and Yugoslavia. He received his A.B. in philosophy from Stanford University , his M.A. in international relations from the University of Arkansas, and his Ph.D. in political science, in 1981 , from UCLA. He is currently an Assistant Professor in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington. He is the author of Sadat and the Kremlin (1980) and Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1963-1983 (1984) , and editor of Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics (in pr ess) . This essay wa s wr itten for a conference on religion in the USSR sponsored by Religion in Communist Dominated Areas (RCDA) and will be appearing in a forthcoming issue of that journal . One of the differences between the Soviet outlook and the Western, whi ch confronts us the moment we undertake to examine Soviet political behavior, is that whereas Westerners tend to view 'policy ' nebulously , viewing it usually as a continuing process of establishing fixed pr ocedures and expectations in a given realm , in Soviet terms 'policy' is more often seen as a program designed to eradicate a problem, to so lve it absolutely. As such , the eradication of the problem is expected also to end the need for a pol icy--.which reveals that the Soviet in terpretation of 'policy ' is distinctly ut opian. Policy has no other raise� d'etre than the solution of problems, for the Soviets, and both pr oblems and policies are assigned fixed values, i.e. they are defined ideologically. This concept of policy is underpinned by the now strictly honorific doctrine of the witheri ng away of the state, which ho lds that once certain problems have been solved , there would be no further need fo r policy and hence the state apparatus could disappear. In approaching "policy" matters, the Soviet approach is ito proceed from a definition of policy, wh ich embraces a definition of the pr oblem . These defini tions, in turn, yield a set of prerequisites for the solution of the pr oblem, and this set of prerequisites itself implies some concept of the instruments and targets of policy. - 19 - Soviet religious policy is seen as a component in the broader project of eradicating attachment to pr e-communist culture (in Soviet parlance, "building the New Soviet Man") and of creating a unified, "Soviet" culture. Private views, as alternative ideologies, are obstacles to the success of this project. Within this framework, religion is seen as private prejudice �aving roots in pre-bourgeois and 1 bourgeois society . Viewed in this context, the oft-touted Soviet guarantee that religion is the private affair of the individual is seen to have a us eful corollary , viz. that, by virtue of being a "private" af fair , it is not public and hence, religious institutions enjoy no publ ic rights or pr erogatives, have no function in publ ic life , and are best restri cted to purely liturgical functions. 2 And , insofar as this private af fa ir is, in fa ct, a private affliction , it becomes the right and duty of communists to take concerted measures to eradicate "pre-sci�ntific consciousness." Or, as a communi st judge in Czechoslo vakia once put it , "In our socialist society all the cond{tions have been established so that all the citizens can get rid of their pr ejudices, including their rel igious bel iefs. "3 Moreover , once religion is defined as a "vestige" of pre-bourgeois and bourgois society , its el imi nation , in conditions of "the bu ilding of comrunism ," becomes a matter of definition, which is to say , beyond que stion. Accordingly , "under devel oped socialism the sphere of religion is increasingly narrowing , " 4 as increasing numbers of people are "liberated " from rel igiosity . 5 The three chief components in the Soviet understanding of religion identify the prerequisite factors for the elimination of religion. As a private af fair, it is to be dislodged from the public sphere, regulated , registered, and controlled . The Soviets appreciate the organically political character of rel igion and the consequences of depoliticizing religion, as Zachary Irwin has pointed out: "Religion becomes politics wh en it seeks to externalize intrinsic obl iga tion through the fa ct of a regime , and politics becomes religion in the apotheosis of a popular et hos. Rel igion atrophies without re1evance to social fa cts, wh ether or not. they are independent of a regime. "6 As a prejudice, it is to be combatted by systematic atheist propaganda. As a vestige of pr�- - 2 0 - bourgeois � bourgeois society , its links with national sentiment must be shattered , and national identity founded on a new basis--for the Soviets, differences in language. Th e disappearance of religion has traditionally been associated with the achievement of "full com munism"--an association which would postpone the disappearance of religion to the indefinite future. Yet a recent article in Komsomolskaya pravda called for "a mo re determined struggle" against religion, on the argument that "religion must disappear of itself in about twelve 7 years. " Soviet religious policy has been tactically inconsistent (with periods of relaxation and periods of intensified struggle) , but 8 st rategically consJ... stent. Differences across time (e.g. pre- and post-1928) and across denominations are tactical inconsistencies directed toward the same ends , but reflecting contextua l differences and differences in opportunity. The Russian Orthodox Church, for example, is fa r more sus ceptible to manipulation , infiltration , and subversion than is the catholic Church in Lithuania; hence , an entire range of policy in struments becomes available in th e former case, which are not available in the latter. As noted before, policy in a specific sphere is seen by the Soviets as but an aspect of their larger utopian proj ect. Hence, religious policy is not an autonomous realm. Its goals and values do not arise wi thin any autonomous framework but only within the broader context of "the bu ilding of communism. " The Soviets conceive of policy as a seamless �b, a united "front ," so that the relation of religious policy to nationalities policy can only be , in Leninist terms, a mutually 9 supportive one. Soviet nationalities policy , which defines nationality as the consciousness associated with a shared language, culture, . 10 terrJ.. tory , an d economJ... c l'f1 e, h as sough t to er ode et hnJ..c . d'fJ.. f erences by promoting the spread of Russian language and culture, fostering et hnic intermarriage , assailing trad itional customs and ceremonies, and · 11 st imulating (even forcibly) interregional migration . Hence, while permi tting the Moscow patriarchate to continue to publish Russian- language materials, the Soviet state banned publication of the Ukrainian-language monthly , Pravoslavnyj visnyk in the 1960s, and except in we stern Ukraine, Rus sian is the language of the sermons in Orthodox - 21 - chur ches throughout Ukraine as well as the language of Ukrainian 12 ec clesiastical administration. Rel igious policy , in this way , is attuned to the needs of nationalities policy. Seen in thi s light, the disjunction of religion and nationalism assumes critical importance not only from the standpoi nt of the atheist desire to weaken collective attachment to the 'folk' rel igion, bu t also from the standpoint of the assimi latory drive to enerva te national identity and to reduce it to mere differences in crafts, costumes, and dances. soviet dissident Valentyn Moroz saw this quite clearly when he wrote that th e most convenient way of de stroying [the] founda tions of a nation is to employ the pretext of fighting aga inst the Church . The Church has grown into cultural life so deeply that it is impossible to touch it with out damaging the spiritual stru cture of the nation. It is impossible to imagine tradi tiona! values without th e Church ... [Hence, ] the struggle a��inst the Chur ch means a struggle aga inst the culture. Th e purpose of this paper is to set forth hypotheses on the nation alities fa ctor in Soviet religious pol icy and , in the proce ss, to relate religion and nationalism analytically, providing the conceptual ba sis for empirical linkages. Given the number of hypotheses being outlined , it wi ll not be possibl e to pr ovide conclusive arguments, only suggestive ones. 'Ihe hypotheses are aggregated into three broad groups . Hypotheses ·1.- 3 are concerned with the orientations of religious groups and nationalists toward each other. Hypotheses · 4-5 are concer·ned with ·processes associated with modernization in the Soviet Union.