Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe

Volume 4 Issue 6 Article 4

12-1984

Hypotheses on the Nationalities Factor in Soviet Religious Policy

Pedro Ramet Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington

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Recommended Citation Ramet, Pedro (1984) "Hypotheses on the Nationalities Factor in Soviet Religious Policy," Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol. 4 : Iss. 6 , Article 4. Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol4/iss6/4

This Article, Exploration, or Report is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ George Fox University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HYPOTHESES ON mE NATIONALITIES FACTOR IN SOVIET RELIGIOUS POLICY

by Pedro Ramet

Pedro Ramet, a native of London, England , has lived almost half of his life in Europe--chief ly in England , Austria, Germany , and Yugoslavia. He received his A.B. in philosophy from Stanford University , his M.A. in international relations from the University of Arkansas, and his Ph.D. in political science, in 1981 , from UCLA. He is currently an Assistant Professor in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington. He is the author of Sadat and the Kremlin (1980) and Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1963-1983 (1984) , and editor of Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics (in pr ess) . This essay wa s wr itten for a conference on religion in the USSR sponsored by Religion in Communist Dominated Areas (RCDA) and will be appearing in a forthcoming issue of that journal .

One of the differences between the Soviet outlook and the Western, whi ch confronts us the moment we undertake to examine Soviet political

behavior, is that whereas Westerners tend to view 'policy ' nebulously , viewing it usually as a continuing process of establishing fixed pr ocedures and expectations in a given realm , in Soviet terms 'policy' is more often seen as a program designed to eradicate a problem, to so lve it absolutely. As such , the eradication of the problem is expected also to end the need for a pol icy--.which reveals that the Soviet in terpretation of 'policy ' is distinctly ut opian. Policy has no other raise� d'etre than the solution of problems, for the Soviets, and both pr oblems and policies are assigned fixed values, i.e. they are defined ideologically. This concept of policy is underpinned by the now strictly honorific doctrine of the witheri ng away of the state, which ho lds that once certain problems have been solved , there would be no further need fo r policy and hence the state apparatus could disappear. In approaching "policy" matters, the Soviet approach is ito proceed from a definition of policy, wh ich embraces a definition of the pr oblem . These defini­ tions, in turn, yield a set of prerequisites for the solution of the pr oblem, and this set of prerequisites itself implies some concept of the instruments and targets of policy.

- 19 - Soviet religious policy is seen as a component in the broader project of eradicating attachment to pr e-communist culture (in Soviet parlance, "building the New Soviet Man") and of creating a unified, "Soviet" culture. Private views, as alternative ideologies, are obstacles to the success of this project. Within this framework, religion is seen as private prejudice �aving roots in pre-bourgeois and 1 bourgeois society . Viewed in this context, the oft-touted Soviet guarantee that religion is the private affair of the individual is seen to have a us eful corollary , viz. that, by virtue of being a "private" af fair , it is not public and hence, religious institutions enjoy no publ ic rights or pr erogatives, have no function in publ ic life , and are best restri cted to purely liturgical functions. 2 And , insofar as this private af fa ir is, in fa ct, a private affliction , it becomes the right and duty of communists to take concerted measures to eradicate "pre-sci�ntific consciousness." Or, as a communi st judge in Czechoslo­ vakia once put it , "In our socialist society all the cond{tions have been established so that all the citizens can get rid of their pr ejudices, including their rel igious bel iefs. "3 Moreover , once religion is defined as a "vestige" of pre-bourgeois and bourgois society , its el imi nation , in conditions of "the bu ilding of comrunism ," becomes a matter of definition, which is to say , beyond que stion. Accordingly , "under devel oped socialism the sphere of religion is increasingly narrowing , " 4 as increasing numbers of people are

"liberated " from rel igiosity . 5 The three chief components in the Soviet understanding of religion identify the prerequisite factors for the elimination of religion. As a private af fair, it is to be dislodged from the public sphere, regulated , registered, and controlled . The Soviets appreciate the organically political character of rel igion and the consequences of depoliticizing religion, as Zachary Irwin has pointed out: "Religion becomes politics wh en it seeks to externalize intrinsic obl iga tion through the fa ct of a regime , and politics becomes religion in the apotheosis of a popular et hos. Rel igion atrophies without re1evance to social fa cts, wh ether or not. they are independent of a regime. "6 As a prejudice, it is to be combatted by systematic atheist propaganda. As a vestige of pr�-

- 2 0 - bourgeois � bourgeois society , its links with national sentiment must be shattered , and national identity founded on a new basis--for the Soviets, differences in language. Th e disappearance of religion has traditionally been associated with the achievement of "full com­ munism"--an association which would postpone the disappearance of religion to the indefinite future. Yet a recent article in Komsomolskaya pravda called for "a mo re determined struggle" against religion, on the argument that "religion must disappear of itself in about twelve 7 years. " Soviet religious policy has been tactically inconsistent (with periods of relaxation and periods of intensified struggle) , but 8 st rategically consJ... stent. Differences across time (e.g. pre- and post-1928) and across denominations are tactical inconsistencies directed toward the same ends , but reflecting contextua l differences and differences in opportunity. The Russian Orthodox Church, for example, is fa r more sus ceptible to manipulation , infiltration , and subversion than is the catholic Church in Lithuania; hence , an entire range of policy in struments becomes available in th e former case, which are not available in the latter. As noted before, policy in a specific sphere is seen by the Soviets as but an aspect of their larger utopian proj ect. Hence, religious policy is not an autonomous realm. Its goals and values do not arise wi thin any autonomous framework but only within the broader context of "the bu ilding of communism. " The Soviets conceive of policy as a seamless �b, a united "front ," so that the relation of religious policy to nationalities policy can only be , in Leninist terms, a mutually 9 supportive one. Soviet nationalities policy , which defines nationality as the consciousness associated with a shared language, culture, . 10 terrJ.. tory , an d economJ... c l'f1 e, h as soug h t to er ode et nJ..ch . d'fJ.. f erences by promoting the spread of Russian language and culture, fostering et hnic intermarriage , assailing trad itional customs and ceremonies, and · 11 st imulating (even forcibly) interregional migration . Hence, while permi tting the Moscow patriarchate to continue to publish Russian- language materials, the Soviet state banned publication of the Ukrainian-language monthly , Pravoslavnyj visnyk in the 1960s, and except in we stern Ukraine, Rus sian is the language of the sermons in Orthodox - 21 - chur ches throughout Ukraine as well as the language of Ukrainian 12 ec clesiastical administration. Rel igious policy , in this way , is attuned to the needs of nationalities policy. Seen in thi s light, the disjunction of religion and nationalism assumes critical importance not only from the standpoi nt of the atheist desire to weaken collective attachment to the 'folk' rel igion, bu t also from the standpoint of the assimi latory drive to enerva te national identity and to reduce it to mere differences in crafts, costumes, and dances. soviet dissident Valentyn Moroz saw this quite clearly when he wrote that th e most convenient way of de stroying [the] founda­ tions of a nation is to employ the pretext of fighting aga inst the Church . The Church has grown into cultural life so deeply that it is impossible to touch it with­ out damaging the spiritual stru cture of the nation. It is impossible to imagine tradi tiona! values without th e Church ... [Hence, ] the struggle a��inst the Chur ch means a struggle aga inst the culture. Th e purpose of this paper is to set forth hypotheses on the nation­ alities fa ctor in Soviet religious pol icy and , in the proce ss, to relate religion and nationalism analytically, providing the conceptual ba sis for empirical linkages. Given the number of hypotheses being outlined , it wi ll not be possibl e to pr ovide conclusive arguments, only suggestive ones. 'Ihe hypotheses are aggregated into three broad groups . Hypotheses ·1.- 3 are concerned with the orientations of religious groups and

nationalists toward each other. Hypotheses · 4-5 are concer·ned with ·processes associated with modernization in the Soviet Union. Hypotheses 6-11 are concerned wi th Soviet religious policy per se .

Hypothesis 1: Nationally .!inked religions �!_ larger nationalities are

more threatening than thos� of smaller nationalities. Whi le addi tiona! factors have to be added into the calculation in' order to capture the complexity of the situa tion accurately , it appears th at, where the rel igion/nationalism symbiosis is concerned , the Soviets ha ve been most troubled by Ukrainian Catholicism and Central Asian Is lam. Neither the nationally intense catho licism of the Lithuanians nor the Islam of the ·smaller peoples of the USSR produces fulminations as feverish as those inspired by Ukrainian Uniates and underground Islam in 1 Centra 1 As�a.. 4 In the case o f t h e 1 atter , t h e Sov1e. ts h ave o ften soug h t

- 22 - to blame heightened Islamic consciousness on the influence and activities of foreign groups--as in the case of an article by A. Ortigov in the February 15 , 1983 issue of Soviet Uzbekistan and in the case of

an article by A. Doev in the February 1984 issue of the Kirghiz edition 15 of Kommunist . Moreover, while the Soviets banned the Ukrainian Uniates, the Lithuanian catholic Church has been allowed to continue legal operation.

Hypothesis 2: In the case of nationalities with more than one 'national religion,' th� regime will tend to view � 'national religion ' as � dangerous than the other . At least four nations in the communist world have mo re than one 'national religion, ' i.e. more than one religious organization claims to be the protector and traditional cultural organization of the group: Hungary (catholicism and Calvinism) , Romania (Orthodoxy and Greek-Rite Ca tholicism) , Ukraine (Greek-Rite [Uniate] Ca tho1ici sm and Orthodoxy ), and the Ossetians (Orthodoxy and Islam) . In two of these cases, one of th e compe t.ing religions has been banned outright (Greek-Rite ca tholicism in Romania and Ukraine) . In Hungary , the Calvinist Church accommodated it sel f to communism much sooner , just as Orthodoxy did wh ere the Ossetians are concerned. The religious group seen as "more threatening" is so identified, in each case, on the basis of its greater resistance to cooptation and, in the Ukrainian case, also on the basis of its li nkage with centri fugal ideology . In Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox have also been bl unted , by being united organizationally into the Rus sian Orthodox Church .

Hypothesis 3: Nationalists tend to identify � single religion with their particular nationality grou_E and are therefore antagonistic toward proselytization E� splinter sects ; the splinter sects are often antagonistic or indifferent toward national feeling . Among Lithuanian nationa lists, for instance, the editors of Ausrele insist that all Lithuanians should be catholic and argue that "the [Lithuanian ] nation will remain alive only as long as the ca tholic . .. 16 Chur ch remaJ.ns alJ.. ve. Whatever erodes the strength of the catholic Church in Lithuania--whether atheization or proselytization by other

- 2 3 - groups--i s ipso fact� inimi cal to the nation as a collective entity. The identification of nationality with religion is so strong among the Muslims of Central Asia as to render the concept of religionle ss na tionality ananalous and incanprehensible,17 and Christian churches are rightly viewed as indifferent toward the national feel ing of Central Asians. Among Ukrainians, Protestant sects such as Jehovah's Witnesses .ha ve no interest in Ukrainian nationalism and therefore oft en function

1 . . . as d e f acto ag ents o f Rus sJ.. f J.c. atJ.o. n . 8 And f or Rus::aan na tJ.ona 1 J.sts, t h e Russian Orthodox Chu1 ch has often been viewed as the most authentically Rus sian insti tut ion. Inde ed , in a multi-national setting even non-believing Ru ssians will often call themselves Orthodox to cl earl y mark off their national identity from that of Soviet citizens of non-Russian origin. This same close J:-J() nd between Orthodox rel igion and Rus sian na t.i onali ty wa s also forged by the short-lived , political ly oppositional Berdyaev Circle wh ich wa nted to carry this connection to the extreme by founding a new politi cal order on the Chur ch . Bapti sm in the Orthodox Church ... is regarded by many as a national custom. Rather than symbolising a strictly reJ igious commi t­ ment , baptism is often appr��ched as an act of af firming a nationaJ tradition .

Corollary 3a : Assaults on the primary religious organization �!. ��­

Russian peoples � to E� viewed � attempts to de-nationalize them as a preparation for eventual Russification . Thi s follows directly from the foregoing evidence and indicates th at not only the regime but the people as wel l appreciate the extent to whi ch atheism is de signed to serve considerations of nationalities policy and , even more, fear the implications of atheism for .t he pr eservation of their national identities. Assaults on the Russian Orthodox Church are viewed , similarly, by Rus sian Slavophiles, as attempts to denationalize the Russian people and cut them off from their . 20 non-SovJ.et. past.

Hypothesis 4: Interregional migratory dispersion weakens ethnic con- . . sciousness and attenuates the reinforcement which religion provides to nationality . To take one example of this, Ukrainians and Belorussians who are

- 2 4 - moved to Central Asian cities find Russian-language schools, films, and pe riodicals readily available , but find little in their own languages. The Ukrainian and Belorussian Orthodox Church organizations have both be en suppressed, and hence Orthodox Slavs in Central Asia have only the 21 Rus sian Orthodox Church available. Moreover, Ukrainians and Bela­ russians are viewed by the Central Asians as simply "Russians," much in th e way that Aus trians are often viewed by Slavs as "Germans. " Similarly, a transplanted Li thuanian , cut off from his/her homeland , is under gr eat pr essure to assimi l.at.e, and likewise may find that the availa ble catholic churches are not Lithuanian in culture. The tr anspl antation of the Crimean Tatars seems to have had the opposite ef fec t, undoubtedly because :r·ather than being dispersed they were moved as an entire community and have continued to exist as a compact. commun ity. Interregional migration is most effective in dissolving ethnic consciousness wh en the community itsel f is termi nated through dispersion.

Hypothesis 6: Tactical. changes in religious policy and in nationalities policy tend to coincide , since they are parts of a seaml ess web of interrel ated polides. The 'NEP ' period wa s a period of relaxation in both the ethnic sfhere and the religious sphere. This wa s reversed between 1928 and 1929 with the passage of a new law on religion, the dispatch of new cadres to administer the non-Russian areas, a re-Russi fication of Ukraine and Bel orussia, and new pr essur e on religious organizations. The wa rtime rehabilitation of Russian nationalism coincided with a partial rehabili­ ta tion of the Russian Orthodox Church , just as Khrushchev 's subsequent anti-religious drive of 1959-1964 coincided with the launching of a campaign to intensify ling uistic Russification, with the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961 officially proclaiming a drive to merge the nations of th e US SR . Under Brezhnev, resolutions taken by the CPSU Central Committee in 1979 specifically signa lled a toughening in both atheist 25 and internationalist propaganda , and the drive to assail Musl im practices coincided wi th renewed pa rty concern about shifting demo­ graphics in Central Asia. It is not to be supposed,of course, that every change of policy in

- 2 5 - one of these spheres necessarily entails change in the other. But sin ce th e two policy realms ar e united by broad overlapping obj ectives (Sovietization, secularization, social homogeni zation) and by certain common instruments (ideology , intermarriage , urbanization, Russifica­ tion) , it is natural that change in one sphere of policy shou ld suggest ch ange also in Ute other, or--to put it another way --change in either sfhere is apt to ref lect change in the approach to certain objectives and instruments common to both policy spheres.

Corollary 6a: Anti-religious campaigns can be expected to coincide with increased vigilance against divisive nationalism , and vice vers�.

Corollary 6b : Foreign _EOlicy pressures and perturbations which excite clampdowns or relaxations �� either th� religious � the nationalities sphere are �pt to �xcite complementary activity in the other sphere as well . Ev idence for both corollaries may be found in the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 and the Polish euphoria of 1980-1 981 . The liberalizati on of Czechoslovak politics in 1968 excited a wave of expression of nationalist discontent. in the Ukraine and also stimulated the revival of open activity on the part of the banned Uniate Ch urch . In response, the regime orga nized a number of elaborate anti-religious seminars in 1968 and 196 9, especially in the Transcarpathian oblast. In the wake of Polish disturbances 1980-1 981, there we re anti-Russian demonstrations in several Bal tic cities and Latvian Party Secretary A. E. Voss openly fret ted, in January 1981, over the spread of "bourgeois nationalism" in th e Soviet West. Once ag ain, anti-Russian nationalism was linked with the churches, and once again, anti-religious seminars and meetings were . ed 26 organ1z 1n. the Sov1e. t West.

Hypothesis 7: Regional variations in nationalities policy have impact on regional expressions of religious polici · Th e targeting of Ukrainians and Bel orussians for fa ster rates of 27 as simi lation is reflected in the disappearance of their autonomous religious organizations. The greater resistance of Lithuania to Rus sification- -both demographically and linguistically--when compared

- 26 - with the other Baltic republics has its parallel in the greater strength of the catholic Church in Lithuania. The Georgians have in many spheres been comparatively better able than most other Soviet nationalities to resist Russian encroachment; the nationalist currents pr esent in the Georgian Orthodox Church are the result of grass roots pressure. Laxity in one sphere may also be accompanied by laxity in the other. In Central Asia, for example, the quiet reassertion of 'nationalist' attitudes is paralleled in a pronouncedly lax attitude toward religion--lax, at least, by Soviet standards. Complaints continue to surface, therefore, of "permi ssive" attitudes on the part of local officials toward religion and a certain raikom secretary was specifi- 28 cally upbraided for having urged that "religion does not do any harm." Compa ring Lithuania and Kazakhstan , one might note that the more aggr essive posture of Soviet cultural policy in the latter is also repl icated in the religious sphere , for although both republics gi ve promi nent play to atheist ideas in the schools, atheist. ag itators are 29 act1. ve out s1 . de the sch ools only 1n. the latter, not 1n. the f ormer.

Hypothesis 8: There is a difference in regime orientation toward nation- alists who are believers and toward those who are not. Atheist nat ionalists are, in a sense, more pr imevally threatening because they cha llenge the concept of the seamless web and discriminate be tween those parts of the package which they accept and those wh ich they do not. From the Soviet viewpoint, the erosion of religion is supposed to promote the erosion of "bourgeois nationalism ." To the extent that it does not, "bourgeois nationalism" will have shown itself to have additional {or perhaps, alternative) ideological resources.

Hypothesis 9: The creation or suppression of ethnic identities is

impeded El ethnically linked religious affiliation , and hence the manipulation of ethnic identity requires the cooptation or manipulation of th� religious elite� . Th e policy of dividing larger groups into a number of smaller groups, known as razmezhevanie, 30 divided Chech en from Ingush, North Ossetian from South Ossetian, Moldavian from Romanian , and spl intered th e Mus lim nation of Turkestan into a ho st of smaller groups, including

- 27 - Kazakhs, Kirg hiz, and Karakalpaks. In all the se cases, new identities we re manufa ctured and pr esented as the "authentic" expression of self-determination . In Oentral Asia, this policy targeted the tradition­ al Mus lim identity . Two recent Soviet authors conceded as mu ch , wh en they noted that Islam continues to unite believe rs and nonbelievers within on e nation and to create a feel ing of community between practicing Muslims and those who had professed Islam (or who se forebears had do ne so) in the past. But , they quickly added , religious-based consciousness has nothing in common with thc1 community among Soviet 31 peoples as a who le. All the same , Central Asians often observe Islamic religious .r.·ites as assertions of their ethnicity--which tends to undermi ne the new republic-based national identities they have been assigned by the CPSU and to set them apart from the rest of the population. Th rough manipulation of the coopted �lema ("official Isl am" ) the Soviets have endeavored to erode traditional Islamic customs either by attribut ing them to paga n derivation or by simply ignori ng them as "b ackwa rd ," and to replace them wi th new "interna tional ," "Soviet" cu stans. Underground cleri cs ("unofficial Islam" ) are th reatening in pa rt because they continue to use the traditional customs and rites and . . 32 d e f y t h e eff orts at Sov�et�zat�o. n o f r�. tua 1 s.

Hypothesis 10 : As certain �roups assimilate E� "socialist" traditions and ceremonies and lose acquaintance with their traditional ceremonies and customs , they become �ess threatening !� � regime , or, to put it another way , secularization converts "bourgeois nationalism" into "socialist pa triotism, " by weakening tokens of particularity . In Armenia, as in other parts, the performance of hallowed reli­ gious traditions, including in thi s case pilgrimages to the cahtedral of Etchmiadzin, the sanctuary of Tcharchaban at Armash, and other historic religious sites, has the ch aracter not merely of pious observance .but also of ethnic loyalty . Thi s 'extra-religious ' dimension to ritual is perhaps as troubl ing to th e authorities as the ethical-doctrinal 33 dimension. '' Internationalization " finds in religion a clear obstacle , and thus secularizaU on serv es the interests of both religious pol icy and nat.ionali ties policy . Sovi et writer I.M. Dzha bbarov explici tly linked secularization and

- 2 8 - in ternationalization : A further developnent of the Soviet way of life and the reorganization of the everyday life of the Soviet pe ople on a communist basis serves as an active factor in promoting an intensification of the secularization of the entire mode of life and of family and domestic relations. Even such stable elements of everyday life as housing , clothing , food , fami ly and marriage relations and rites and rituals, when they become subjected to the influence of the process of inter­ nationalizat.ion and of the Soviet way of life, gradually become free of rel igious su rvivals. As a result of the interna tionalization of social life and of culture and everyday life there occur s a substan­ tial weakening of the connections and then a complete break ��twe en the relig ious and the national moments. Th e resu lt_ is the reinforcement of tendencies towa rd Sovietization in the sense of the di lution of specific ethn ic culture. At the pr esent time , thanks to the final formation of an Uzbek socialist nation, with the Uzbeks, as with other nations, local characteri stics in the ma terial forms of everyday life have not only greatly disap­ peared or been leveled out , bu t have been replaced predominantly by national [sic ] elements. This is witnessed by the appearance in the vocabulary of the Uzbek language of many new everyday terms which have be en borrowed from the Russian jlfld from other languages of the peoples of the USSR . Similarly, the creation of new socialist ritua ls goes hand in hand with the suppression of traditional Islamic customs in providing Soviet

citizens with a new sense of "national" identity . 36

Hypothesis 11: By targeting traditional religio-national E� for expurgation and suppression, Soviet nationalities policy converts atheism �nto � weapon of denationalization and tightens the connection between religious consciousness and national consciousness. Soviet hi storiography celebrates Czarism's expansion of the empire's frontiers and thus is at odds with the folk hi story of the borderlands, many of whose political heroes acquired that renown through their resistance to Russia. 37 Where religious leaders are involved , as is the case especially in Central Asia, but also in Lithuania and el sewhere, the suppression reinforces awa reness of the national role of religious figures. In the North Caucasus , for instance, Sheik Shamil , a

- 2 9 - Muridic imam , led guerril la forces in a 25-year war of resistance ag ainst the Russian army , 1834-1859. A major revolt in the Andizhan Va lley in Ka zakhstan in 1898 , against Russian rule, was led by Dukchi Ishan, Y.ho sought t.o create a regime organized on Sufi principles. There we re also religious overtones--embodied in the catalyt ic role of the ulema--to the widespread Central Asian revolt of 1916 , and to an ti-Rus sian resistance throughout that area in the 1800s. In Ukraine, th e Russian army was sent against the insurgents in the anti-Polish Kol ii rebel lion in 1768 ; the leader of the rebels was Maxim Zalizniak , a pr od uct of Ukrainian monastic life. In Armenia, nationalist sel f-defense groups began to organize themselves in Erzerum in the 1880s, with the knowledge and tacit approval of Khrimi an, the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople , and religious models from medieval Armenian Christianity

and also from ![.;lam later pr ovided inspiration for the Armenian Dashnak guerrillas. And though nineteenth-century Lithuanian Bishop Motiejus Valencius did not bel ieve an independent Lithuania was politically possible, he is cred ited wi th having done more than any oth er individual 38 to nurture L1th. ua n1 . an nat1o. na 1 consc1o. usness 1n. th at century .

Soviet pol icy tended to be counterproductive in the short run , by in flami ng anti-Russian and anti-regime sentiments; wh ether the combina­ tion of demographic mi xing , secularization , and Sovietization can effect the degree of social homogenizat ion generally that has already been achi eved to a large degree in Belorussia and eas tern Ukraine is the ch allenge upon whi ch the su ccess or fa ilur e of Soviet policy in the long run wi ll be measured.

Conclusion . If there is a thematic current underlying these distinct hypotheses, it is that the Soviets do not view ei ther religious policy or nationalities policy in isolation , but view both as dimensions of a broader program of communization ("the bu ilding of communism" ). Soviet · so ciology of religion is viewed instrumentally , as a means to develop 39 th e most e ff ect1ve. po 1"1c y o f at h e1. zat10n. . As I.D. Pantskh av a put J.t . , in a 1969 essay, "religious prejudices can be overcome only if we know the concr·ete forms in wh ich religion exists today , the [present] state 40 o f re] .1 . g1 . ous consc1ous. ness, and t h e te ndencJ.es towar. c d ange h 1n. J.t . . " Similiarly , Soviet "ethnosociologists" are entrusted with promoting the

- 30 - 41 rapproch ement of nations and the evolut ion of the New Soviet Man. The 42 Soviet regime sees itself as fa shioning a new "Soviet culture, " which is atheist, bilingual (with Russian as the lingua franc�) , and ethnically convergent, giving ri se to a new hi storical category , the "Soviet people ." Inter-ethnic problems af flict countries of all political and religious persuasions--as the examples of Quebecoise separatism in Ca nada , Si kh violence in Indi a, South Tyrolean discontent in Italy , Albanian ir redentism in Yugoslavia, and north-south problems in Chad and Sudan make clear. But while the Soviet system cannot. be sa id to have· created its difficulties in this realm, nor has it made much headway towa rd solving them, wh ether in th e sense in wh ich the Soviets themselves speak of solutions or in the sense in which Westerners might do so. Moreove1: , the combined effect of Leninist ho stility to both national diversity and religio-nationalist symbiotic bonds and to en courage both bel ieve1: s and non-bel ievers to view assaults on their traditional religions as assaults on their respective national heri­ �ages.

FOOTNOTES

1 Pravda (March 30 , 1979) ; and Pravda (OCtober 21, 1981) . A Soviet handbook for atheism defines religion as "bel ief in a nonexistent, supernatural world , supposedly inhabited by gods, spirits, angel s, saints, the souls of the dead or other supernatural beings . "--Sputnik ateista , 2nd · ed . (Mos cow , 1961) , p. 13, as quoted in David E. Powell, Antireligious Propaganda in the Soviet Union (Cambridge, Mass .: MIT Press, 197 5) , pp . 9-10.

2 I have el aborated on this in "The Interplay of Religious Policy and Nationalities Policy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ," in Pedro Ramet (ed.) , Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics (forthcoming from Duke University Press) .

3 Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia, in a June 10, 1976, statement, quoted in Otto Ulc, •i social Deviance in Czechoslovakia," in Ivan Volgyes (ed.) , Social Deviance in Eastern Europe (Boulder , Colo. : Westview Press, 1978) , p. 28.

4 Slovo lektora , no. 5 (May 1982) , p. 39.

- 31 - 5 Pravda (March 30 , 1979) . On the other hand , see the accounts in Gerhard Simon , "Die Lage der Kirchen in der Sowj etunion und das neue Rel igionsgesetz," in Kirche in Not , Vol . 24 (1976) , pp . 92-93; and "Sko l' ko veruyushchih v SSSR," in Pose� , No. 11 (November 1981) , pp . 7- 8.

6 zachary T. Irwin, "Legitimacy and Rel igion's Revival : Steps in a Systemic Conv ergence ," paper presented at the 21st Conference of the Western Sl avi c Association, Standard University , March 29-31, 1984 .

7 Komsomolskaya pravda (March 15, 1982) , translated into Croatian in Aktualnosti Krscanske Sadasnjosti Informativni bilten (AKSA) 1 March 26 , 1982.

8 See Gerhard Simon, "Das neue sowjetisch e Religionsgesetz ," in Osteuropa, Vol . 27, No. 1 (January 1977) , pp . 4-8 ; and Otto Luchter­ ha ndt, "Geknebelt, und dennoch lebensfahig : Die Russisch-Orthodoxe Kirche in der �ra Breschnew," in Herder Korrespondenz 1 Vol . 36 , No. 5 (May 1982) , pp. 233-234.

9 Malik Sabirovi ch Fazyl ov, Religiya i natsional 'nyye otnosheniya (Alma At a: Kazakhstan Publishing House , 1969) .

10 rn a 1966 article for Voprosy istorii , two Soviet writers offered the following definition (a variation on Stalin 's definition of 1913): "The nation is a hi stori cally arisen community of people, which is cha racterized by a stable , shared economic life (with the existence of a work ing class) , a common territory , common language (especially a common literary language) , a consciousness of ethnic identity as well as particul arities of psyche and of traditions of life style , of culture as wel l as a [common ) liberation struggle. "--D .M. Rogachev and M.A. Sverdlin1 "0 ponj at ii 'nacija' ", in Voprosy istorii , No . 1 (1966) , as quoted in Boris Meissner, "Nationalit1=itenfrage und Sowj etideologie ," in Europai sche Rundschau , Vol . 7, No. 4 (Fall 1979) , p. 81.

11 Borys Lewytzkyj , "'Sovetsk ij Narod'- -was heisst eigentlich 'Sowjetvolk '?", in Osterreichische Osthefte, Vol . 15, No . 2 (May 1973), pp . 106, 110; and Gerhard Simon, "Sowjetische NationaliU:itenpolitik, " in Politische Studien, Vol . 25 , No. 214 (March-April 1974) , pp . 168-169.

12 "La persecuzione rel igiosa in Ucraina (A cura della Commi ssione per i diritti dell 'uorro del congresso mondiale dei liberi ucraini , " in Russia Cristiana , Vol . 3, No. 2 (March-April 1978) 1 pp . 40-41.

13 valentyn Moroz, Khronika oporu , quoted in Vasyl Markus , "Religion " and Nati onality : the Uniates of the Ukraine 1 in Bohdan R. Bociurkiw and Joh n W. Strong ( eds.) , Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe (London : Macmillan Press, 1975) , p. 118 .

- 3 2 - 14 For examples of Soviet attacks on the Ukrainian Uniates, see: Kultura i Zhyttya (January 3, 1969) , Lyudina i Svit (Kiev, October 1970) , Lyudina i Svit (August 1971) , Robytnycha Hazeta (Kiev, March 15 , 1973)--translated , respectively , in Religion in Communist Dominated Areas , May-June 1969 (pp. 103-105) , April 1971 (pp. 68-69) , Apri l-June 1972 (p. 80) , and July-September 1973 (pp. 129-1 30) ; Radyanska Ukrayina {March 24-26 , 1981) , Radyanska Ukrayina (June 28 , 198 1) , and Sil's'ki visti (November 11 , 1982) --translated, respectively , in Joint Publica­ tions Research Service (JPRS), USSR Report , August 19, 1981 , September 25, 1981, and February 17, 1983 . Regarding Soviet posture vis-a-vis un official Islam, see Baymirza Hayit, "Der Islam und die Anti-Islami sche Bewegung in der Sowj etunion," in Osteuropa , Vol . 22 , No . 2 (February 197 2) , p. 116 ; John Soper , "Unofficial Islam: a Muslim Minority in the USSR ," in Religion in Communist Lands, Vol. 7, No . 4 (Winter 1979) , pp . 226-231; Allen Hetmanek , "Spillover Effects of Religious Broadcasts in Iran on Soviet Muslims," Radio Liberty Research (April 14, 1980) , p. 3; Trud (July 19, 1983) , translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol . 35, No. 34 (September 21, 1983) , pp . 10-ll ; and Timur Kocaoglu , "Recent Reports on Activities of Living Muslim 1 Saints 1 in USSR," Radio Liberty Research (September 15, 1983) , pp . 1-2 , 4.

15 Arabia (London, Ju ly 1984) , p. 37.

16 Ausrele (February 1978) , quoted in Kestutis K. Girnius, "Nation­ alism and the Catholic Church in Lithuania," in Ramet (ed.), Religion and Nationalism.

17 See James Critchlow , "Islam and Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia," in Ramet ( ed.) , Religion and Nationalism .

18 Bohdan R. Bociurkiw , "Rel igion and Nationality in the Contem- porary Ukraine ," in George W. Simmonds ( ed.), Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe (Detroit : University of Detroit Press, 1977) , pp. 87- 89.

19 eri stel Lane, Christian Religion in the Soviet Union (London : George Al len and Unwin, 1978) , p. 77.

20 See V. Gorskii, "Russian Messianism and the New National Con- sciousness" (originally in Metanoiia), in Michael Meerson-Aksenov and Boris Shragin (eds. ) , The Political , Social and Religious Thought of Russian Samizdat--an Anthology (Belmont, Mass .: Nordland Publishing Co ., 1977) , pp. 356, 367-368.

21 In theory the situation is no different in Ukraine and Belorussia, but in practice, many so-called Russian Orthodox churches in th e we stern Ukraine have sermons in Ukrainian, and preserve certain Un iate trad itions .

- 33 - 22 see Cynthia H. Enloe, "Rel igion and Ethnicity," in Pete:r F. Sugar (ed.) , Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe (Santa Barba ra , ca lif.: ABC-Clio, 1980) , pp. 359-366 .

23 'l'he Pokutnyky are a breakaway sect from the ca tholic Ch urch in Ukraine, dat ing from 1954. See Bociurkiw, "Religion and Na tionality ," pp . 86-87 .

24 Bohdan R. Bociurkiw , "The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Chur ch , 1920-1930: A ca se Study in Religious Modernization ," in Denn is J. Du nn (ed.) , Religion and Modernization in the Soviet Union (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1977) , pp . 338-339.

25 Yaacov Ro' i1 "The Task of Cr eating the New Soviet Man : 'Atheistic Propaganda ' in the Soviet Muslim Areas," in Soviet Studies 1 Vol . 36 , No. 1 (Janua :ry 1984) , p. 35.

26 See Gray Hodnett and Pete:r J. Pot ichnyj , The Ukraine and the czechoslovak Crisis (Canberra: Australian National University Occasional Paper No. 61 1970) ; Pedro Ramet, "Domestic Determinants of Soviet Intervention Policy : the Repercussions of the Czech and Polish Crises in th e Soviet West, " in Osteuropa (forthcoming ); and V. Mahin, "Rel igiya v ideinom arsenale antikomirnlnizma ," in Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie, No. 12 (December 1982) , pp. 115-122.

27 For arguments to this effect, see Pedro Ramet, "Linguistic As s imilation in Ukraine ," in Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol . 35 , No . 3 (Autumn 1979) ; also Stephan M. Horak, "Belorussia: Modernization, Human Rights, Nationalism ," in Ihor Kamenetsky (ed.), Nationalism and Human Rights in the USSR (Littleton, Colo. : Librari es Unlimi ted , 1977) .

28 Quoted in T.S. Saidbaev, Islam i obshchestvo ; opyt istoriko­ sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia (Moscow: Nauka, 1978) , as given in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone , "Rel igion and Nationalj sm in Soviet Central As ia," in Raymond G. Gastil (ed. ), Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties (Westport, Conn. : Greenwood , 1981) , p. 205.

29 II • • And reJ M1cha' ]'1 ov 1c:• I g1o• van1• , 1 a propagand a ate1 sta e 1 a religiosita," in Russia Christiana, Vol . 7, No. 5 (September-October 1982) 1 P • 76 •

30 · Re. razmezhevanie , see Teresa Rakowska�Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) , pp . 26 -2 7.

31 F.K. Kodiarl i and R.O. Kurbanov, "O reaktsionnoi sushnosti konseptsii musal'manskogo natsional'nogo kommunizma ,". in Voprosy filosofii (1982) , No. 12, p. 111.

- 34 - 32 s. Dorzhenov, "Shto eto--musul'man?", in Nauka i religiya (1967) , No. 4, excerpted in Religion in Communist Lands, Vol . 2, Nos. 4-5 (July-October 197 4) , pp. 44-45 ; N. Ashirov, "Islam i natsional' nye otnosheniya ," in Nauka i religiya (1974) , No. 2, translated into German under the title , "Islami sche Probleme in Sowjetasien," in Osteuropa , Vol. 25, No. 4 (April 1975) , p. A206 ; "Official Attitudes toward Islamic CU stans, " Radio Liberty Research (March 22, 1977) , pp. 3, 5; Turkmenskaya iskra (May 30, 1976) , translated in CDSP, Vol . 28 , No. 23 (July 7, 1976) , p. 1; and Soper , "Unofficial Islam, " esp. pp. 226-227. Alexandre Bennigsen calls the underground Sufi brotherhoods "the most in tractable and dangerous adversari es of the Soviet reg ime ," describing them as "the only authentic anti-Soviet ma ss organizations in the USSR . "--Ale xandre Bennigsen, "Muslim Conservative Opposition to the Soviet Regime: the Sufi Brotherhoods in the North Caucasus ," in Jeremy R. Az rael (ed.) , Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1978) , p. 344.

3 3 Vaha k n N. Da d rl.an,' IINa tJ.o' na 1'J sm in Soviet Armenia--A Case Study of Ethnocentrism ," in Simmo nds (ed.) , Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe , pp . 222, 239-2 40.

3 4 Problemy nauchnogo atiezma (1973) , No. 14, p. 25.

35 rbid .

36 See B.S. Tukhliyev, "The Significance of New Rituals and Tradi- tions in the Development of the Rural Workers ' Life Style ," in Obshchestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane (Tashkent, 1979) , No . 11, trans­ lated in JPRS , USSR Report (April 25, 1980) ; Sovetskaya kirgiziya (Fru nze, September 12, 1980) ; and Helene Ca rrere D'Encausse, "Islam in the Soviet Union : Attempts at Modernization ," in Religion in Communist Lands, Vol . 2, Nos. 4-5 (Ju ly-October 1974) .

37 E.g. a Central Asian daily wrote , in September 1982 : "Despite the COI!'!Plete (ly] reactionary nature of czarism 's colonization pol icy , union with Russia played a progressive role under the hi storical conditions whi ch had taken shape where the danger of complete enslavement and systematic destruction and plundering by the feudal despots, who surrounded Turkmenia and behind whose backs stood imperialist England , threatened the Turkmen people. "--Turkmenskaya iskra (September 1, 1982) , translated in JPRS , USSR Report (October 27, 1982) .

38 Lowell Tillett, The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities (Chapel Hill : University of North Ca rolina Press, 1969) , pp . 130-133, 172-177, 232-233, 240-245; Micvhael Hrushevsky , A History of Ukraine (N ew Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1941) , pp. 443-445; Manuel Sarkisyanz, A Modern History of Transcaucasian Armenia (N agpur , · India: Udyama Commercial Press, 1975 ) , pp . 117, 135; and V. Stanley Vardys , The Catholic Church , Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lituania (New York : East European Monographs, Co lumbia University Press, 1978) , p. 9.

- 35 - 39 Jer ry G. Pankhurst, "Soviet Sociology of Rel igion," in Religion in Communist Lands, Vol . 10, No. 3 (Winter 1982) , pp . 292-293 .

40 Quoted in Powel l, Antireligious Propaganda , p. 17.

41 "The Social and the National : A Study in Ethnosociology ," in Soviet Life (Moscow) , No. 12 (December 1976) , pp . 32-35 ; and Sergei Voronitsyn , "Controversy about Demographic Policy in the USSR," Radio Liberty Research (September 22, 1978) , pp . 2-3 .

42 P. Fedoseev, "Teoreticheskie problE-my razvi tiya i sblizheniya natsii, " in Kommunist, No. 1173 (January 1980) , p. 66 .

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