790820A
RAPPOPORT t ANN LITTMANN SOVIET POLICIES TDWARD ITS JNION REPUBLICS A COMPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS OF "NATIONAL INTEGRATION".
THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, PH.D., 1978
University, Microfilm s International .TOO N / I I U HOAD. ANN AHIJOH. Ml 4H1
© Copyright by Ann Littmann Rappoport 1978 SOVIET POLICIES TOWARD ITS UNION REPUBLICS: A
COMPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS OF
"NATIONAL INTEGRATION"
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University
By
Ann Littmann Rappoport
*****
The Ohio State University
1978
Reading Committee: Approved By
Philip D. Stewart, Ph.D.
R. William Liddle, Ph.D.
Loren K. Waldman, Ph.D. M) Adviser \ Department of Political Science Dedicated to the most special Family with all my love. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A lengthy appendix might be in order to adequately acknowledge those persons who provided valuable assistance to this dissertation. Many of their names do indeed appear throughout the footnotes and bibliography of this study. Certain others are acknowledged for the inspira tion they provided me through their dedicated teaching.
My sincere appreciation goes to my thesis and Major Adviser, Prof. Philip D. Stewart, who supported and somehow tactfully guided this undertaking. I also thank Prof. R. William Liddle and Prof. Loren K. Waldman, for their incisive comments, especially at the time of this study's "debut" presentation. Professor Waldman1s suggestion to investigate the Lieberson Diversity Measure as a means for approaching my compositional problem, made a great independent contribution toward this study while also serving to provide my Entropy Index with additional credibility.
In preparing and typing this manuscript, the work of Mrs. Diane Winestock must not go unmentioned.
Prof. Paul Rappoport earns my deepest respect and gratitude, not merely in his superlative husband capacity, but also for his not infrequent assistance in the technical application of the Entropy Measure. VITA
PERSONAL
Name . . , Ann Littmann Rappoport
Address 114 East Waverly Road Wyncote, Pennsylvania 19095
Telephone 215 884-4155
Date and 10-26-48 Place of Birth St. Louis, Missouri
Marital Status Married; 2 children
DEGREES
A.B. (Phi Beta Kappa) Oberlin College, 1970 Oberlin, Ohio
M. A. Department of Political Science The Ohio State University, 197 2 Columbus, Ohio
PROFESSIONAL PROGRAMS AND EXPERIENCE
1970-1974 ...... University Fellowship Program, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
1971-1972 ...... Research Associate, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University
1973 ...... Teaching Associate, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University
iv VITA (CONTINUED)
1975 ...... Lecturer, Department of History and Political Science, Montgomery County Community College, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
1975-1976 ...... Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Temple University, Ambler, Pennsylvania
1977-1979 ...... Consumer Representative from Montgomery County, Health Systems Agency of Southeastern Pennsylvania
FIELDS OF EXAMINATION
Major Field: Comparative Politics Adviser, Prof. Philip D. Stewart
Nation Focus: USSR and The Peoples' Republic of China
Cross National Topics: Political Parties and Political Elites;"Methodology"
Minor Field: American Politics— Legislative Politics, Urban Politics
PROFESSIONAL PAPERS
1970 "China and the Soviet Union: Problems of Modernization and Mass Mobilization," 1st Prize, Newton Essay Competition, Oberlin College.
1972 "Residuals Analysis as a Tool in Theory Building and Testing: Applied in Study of Soviet Political Elites," The Ohio State University, M.A. Thesis.
1972 "A Research Note: Residuals Analysis and the Model of Soviet Political Elite Mobility," (un published paper) Ann L. Rappoport and Philip D. Stewart, The Ohio State University.
v TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page DEDICATION...... ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iii
VITA ...... iv
LIST OF T A B L E S ...... ix
LIST OF F I G U R E S ...... xiii
Chapter
ONE. INTRODUCTION ...... 1
Notes--C.hapter O n e ...... 3
TWO. BACKGROUND ...... 4
I. Salience ...... 5 II. Context and Premisesof Soviet Policy Toward the R epu b l i c s...... 10 A. Period of "Consolida tion" ...... 10 B. Premises Meet Anti- Premises: Syn- Prem i s e s ? ...... 17 Notes— Chapter T w o ...... 22
THREE. SOVIET REPUBLICS UNDER WESTERN ANALYSIS: LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 29
I. Political Dimension...... 32 II. Social Dimension ...... 39 III. Economic Dimension...... 44 Notes— Chapter Three ...... 51
FOUR. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY ...... 58
I. The Common Denominator ...... 5 9 II. Measurement: Entropy ...... 64
vi Page III. Measurement: Lieberson's Diversity Index ...... 80 IV. Methodology Overview ...... 85 Notes — Chapter ^ o u r ...... 87
FIVE. IMPACT OF POLITICAL POLICIES ...... 89
I. Restating the Political Q u e s t i o n s ...... 89 II. The Evidence ...... 94 A. Party Membership ...... 94 B. Political Leadership .... 104 C. Russian Political Colonialism...... 112 D. Government Apparatus .... H 7 III. S u m m a r y ...... 121 Notes— Chapter Five ...... 123
SIX. IMPACT OF ECONOMIC POLICIES ...... 127
I. Restating the Economic Q u e s t i o n s ...... 127 A. Autarky vs. Trade .... 128 B. "Equality"?...... 135 II. The Evidence ...... 140 A. Concerning Autarky and T r a d e ...... 140 B. Concerning "Equality" .... 152 III. S u m m a r y ...... 165 Notes--Chapter S i x ...... 168
SEVEN. IMPACT OF SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC POLICIES ...... 172
I. Restating the Social Q u e s t i o n s ...... 172 II. The Evidence ...... 178 III. S u m m a r y ...... 205 Notes— Chapter Seven ...... 207
EIGHT. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ...... 211
I. Restating Some of the Ques tions and F i n d i n g s ...... 211 II. Tying Together the Policy D o m a i n s ...... 216 III. Significance of this Study . . . 225 Notes--Chapter Eight ...... 227
vii Page BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 228
APPENDIXES
A. Tables Relating to Chapter Five ...... 245
B. Tables Relating to Chapter Si x ...... 248
C. Tables Relating to Chapter Seven ...... 256
D. Tables Relating to Chapter Eight ...... 267
viii LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Entropy Dictionary ...... 75
2. Diversity Dictionary ...... 84
3. Komsomol Membership ...... 97
4. CPSU Central Committee Membership ...... 102
5. Elite Background ...... 106
6. Leadership Patterns ...... 107
7. Russian Migration to Non-Russian R e p u b l i c s ...... 114
8. Russian Proportions of Non-Russian Republics' Populations ...... 115
9. Expenditures on Republic Government A p p a r a t u s ...... 118
10. Inter-Republic Trade as Percentage of Total Trade Volume for each Union R e p u b l i c ...... 14 3
11. Correlations ...... 144
12. Net Exporter or Net Importer? ...... 145
13. Trade Activity Pursued by Republics ...... 148
14. Relative Proportions of Republic's Involvement in Import and Export A c t i v i t y ...... 149
15. National Income Distributions ...... 155
16. Total Budget by Republic ...... 158
ix Table Page
17. Education Budget by Republic ...... 159
18. Social-Cultural Budget by Republic ...... 159
19. Investments in the Republican National E c o n o m i e s ...... 160
20. Length of Railroad Track by Republic ...... 162
21. Rank Order of Republic RR T r a c k ...... 163
22. Physicians per Capita by R e p u b l i c ...... 164
23. Ethnic Group as Percentage of Titular SSR ...... 181
24. National Dispersion Ratios ...... 182
25. Rural Component in the R e p u b l i c s ...... 184
26. Pre-School Enrollments per Capita by R e p u b l i c ...... 190
27. University Enrollments per Capita by R e p u b l i c ...... 192
28. Dispatch of Air Passengers by Republic .... 193
29. Inter-Republic MigrationPatterns ...... 195
30. Migration Index, 1970 198
31. Immigration and Emigration, 1970, as Percentages of Republican Populations .... 199
32. Long Distance Phone C a l l s ...... 202
33. Outbound Letters ...... 203
34. Migration and its Relation to Economic Factors ’...... 218
35. Interkolkhoz Organizations ...... 221
36. Mixed Marriages, 1970 222
x Russian Population as a Percentage of Republic's Population (Appendix A) . . 246
Relative Frequencies of Republic Shares in Military Personnel (Appendix A) ...... 247
Inter-Republic Trade as a Percentage of each Republic's Total Trade Volume (Appendix B) ...... 249
Volume (millions of tons) of Freight Transported by Union Republic (Appendix B) ...... 251
Relative Proportions of National Income Held by Republics (Appendix B) . . . . 252
Republic's Shares in Total Budget (Appendix B) ...... 253
Relative Frequencies of Selected Budget Expenditures Across Union Republics (Appendix B) ...... 254
Relative Frequencies of Investments in Republic National Economies (Appendix B ) ...... 255
Strength of Ethnic Group in its own Union Republic (Appendix C) ...... 257
National Dispersion Ratios (Appendix C) ...... 258
The Rural Component by Union Republic (Appendix C) ...... 259
Slavs in Non-Slavic Republics (Appendix C) ...... 260
Percentage Speaking Russian in Non- Russian Republics (Appendix C) . . . . 261
Percentage of Republic Population which is Russian (Appendix C) ...... 261
xi Table Page
51. Dispatch of Air Passengers by Republic (Appendix C ) ...... 263
52. Immigration into the Ukraine, 1970 (Appendix C ) ...... 26 4
53. Immigration and Emigration, 197 0 (Appendix C ) ...... 26 5
54. Relative Frequencies of Communications by Republic (Appendix C) ...... 266
55. Measures of Intra-Republic Consolidation and Cooperation Among Peoples (Appendix D ) ...... 268
xii LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. Illustrative Distributions, Entropy = 0 . . . 70
2. Illustrative Distributions, Entropy = 51.8 percent of M a x i m u m ...... 70
3. Illustrative Distributions, Entropy = 32.6 percent of Maximum ...... 71
4. Illustrative Distributions, Entropy = 89.5 percent of Maximum ...... 71
5. Distributions from Dictionary, Entropy = 12.2 percent, Diversity = 10.42 percent . . . 76
6. Distributions from Dictionary, Entropy = 14.1 percent, Diversity = 16.19 percent . . . 76
7. Distributions from Dictionary, Entropy = 29.6 percent, Diversity = 29.53 percent . . . 77
8. Distributions from Dictionary, Entropy = 30.35 percent, Diversity = 37.21 p e r c e n t ...... 77
9. Distributions from Dictionary, Entropy = 99.5 percent, Diversity = 99.89 percent . . . 78
10. Distributions from Dictionary, Entropy = 99.81 percent, Diversity = 99.98 p e r c e n t ...... 78
11. Distributions from Dictionary, Entropy = 99.91 percent, Diversity = 99.96 p e r c e n t ...... 79
12. Distributions from Dictionary, Entropy = 100 percent, Diversity = 100 percent .... 79
xiii Figure Page
13. Strength of Communist Party Membership, 1960 ...... 96
14. Relative Frequency Distributions of 1966 Central Committee Membership, Treatment 1 101
15. Relative Frequency Distributions of 1966 Central Committee Membership, Treatment 2 101
16. Relative Frequency Distributions of 1966 Central Committee Membership, Treatment 3 ...... 101
xiv CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
A recent textbook on Soviet politics states:
the multinational character of the Soviet state is often practically ignored even by careful students of Soviet politics; yet it is probably the most important determinant of the peculiarity of the Russian revolution and the Soviet system.!
If such neglect is true by scholars of Soviet politics, it is perhaps not so surprising that comparative political scientists also share in this crucial oversight. Despite the relevance and similarity of the problems of the Soviet
Union with those of other nations, the USSR has remained outside studies of "nation-building", "national integration" and federalism; despite the CPSU's role in mobilizing the masses, this Party has not been examined in a context of comparative political parties nor political socialization or behavior. Nor have scholars interested in "Third World" nationalist aspirations included focus upon claims of
Soviet ethnic minorities.
Soviet policy toward its multinational federation of Republics touches all of these problems. This dis sertation asks what this policy is, and upon what premises it is built. It asks how the Soviet leaders have reconciled competing policy considerations and how these decisions are manifested empirically. It does not provide a clear "test" for any particular theoretical framework, because none exists. Instead, it addresses its primary empirical investigation to a more basic descriptive level, for it is still at this level that more definitive answers are required. Aggregate analysis is used to examine the distributions of political, ethnic, and economic variables across the Republics. It is anticipated that this study will further clarify: (a) the status and relations among the Soviet Union Republics and (b) the policy orientation and compositional character of the Soviet polity. Notes— Chapter One
Robert Wesson, The Soviet Russian State (New York John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972), p. 309. CHAPTER TWO
BACKGROUND
1. Salience
Unbreakable Union of freeborn Republics;/Great Russia has welded forever to stand;!
With these words the Soviet national anthem ex presses a major domestic policy paradox. A number of ideological principles and programmatic measures have combined to form a not altogether consistent Soviet socialist blueprint. Federalism or centralism, equality or privilege, assimilation or segmental communalism are some alternative patterns describing the many formulae which integration processes can take. How the USSR reconciles these competing principles comprises the primary thematic problem of this dissertation.
The population of the Soviet Union numbers a hetero geneous 250 million; it is divided into over one hundred ethnic varieties. The 1936 version of the Soviet Consti tution, revised from the original in 1924 and amended most recently in 1977, established a federation of fifteen Union
Republics, encompassing twenty republics with lesser "autono- 2 mous" status, eight autonomous oblasti and ten national okrugs. With two exceptions, the population of each Union Republic is dominated by what are regarded as indigenous peoples and each national unit receives representation in the all-Union legislative body, the Supreme Soviet. Additional constitutional formalities accorded to the Union
Republics include, in striking contrast to most fed erations, the rights to Republican-based military organizations and to secession. Restraint on the exercise of these rights, however, is also built into the
Soviet framework: the privileges granted to the
Republics can be removed by constitutional amendment 3 WITHOUT consent of the constituent Republics. Moreover, the "guiding role" of the Communist Party "vanguard" in reality obviates any independent functioning by these state organs; and federalism has been proscribed to the
Party structure since Lenin's quarrel with the Bund in 4 1903 and the Party's Resolution of Unity on 1921. The token nature of the fourteen non-Russian party sub divisions is manifested in the curious absence of a separate party division for the Russian Republic, whose apparatus coincides with that of the all-Union Party.
The all-too-common identification of "Soviet" with
"Russian" is suggestive of a non-symmetrical distribution of political assets. Thus, the principle of "democratic centralism" might be viewed as a camouflage for "the 6 5 mincing-machine of Russification."
The theoretical role of the Union Republics in the
federal system may be viewed as a pivotal issue, upon which ethnic, nationalities and economic policies are predicated.
But a condition of flux and ambiguity has characterized the priorities of Soviet decision-making in these domains. Not only have leaders differed in their interpretations of
Marxist theory, but a multiplicity of options always exist on the best methods for implementing and achieving par ticular ideological goals.
Grey Hodnett cites the debate conducted among
Soviet elites during the late 1960s as evidence that the meaning of federalism constitutes an unresolved issue. The extent to which the federal trappings outlined above are accepted as enduring, or are perceived as tactical ex pedients in the transition to a unitary political form, has v 4 become an "open question" in which Party gospel has been drawn upon in support of both competing viewpoints.^
Overlapping the arguments on federal structure, are the differing perspectives on the "nationalities 7 question." Analysts point to a "schism between assimi-
lationists and moderates" which "underlies the vagueness of g current official policy." Rywkin calls attention to "the heated discussion" in the Soviet Union surrounding three 9 general approaches to national integration. These positions might be described as: (1) fusion (sliyanie) of natives into a Slavic cultural tradition, subject to primacy of the great Russian elements; (2) flourishing
(rastsvet) and development of native national cultures, implying greater dispersion of political and economic initiatives; and (3) synthesis, "blending," or "coming together" (sblizhenie) of the best and "most progressive elements"^ of all minority peoples.
The expanded public participation into this prob lem, reflected in the official Soviet press and specialized journals, is an indication of the absence of a firm party position in the economic domain as well. The appearance in 1957 and retraction in 1965 of the Sovnarkhozy attest to such ambiguities in the functional sphere, more specifically in the role of the Union Republics in de ll termining economic policy. One Soviet demographer wrote: "the interests of economic and social development of Soviet society require accurate knowledge about the regularities and factors of migration because this is the only way of insuring effective control of these 12 processes." Accordingly, Soviet sociologists have con ducted survey research in order to determine the sorts of ethnic prejudices held among certain segments of the 13 socxety, and friendship patterns between groups are 14 examined. Churches are viewed as "custodians" of national prejudice, and these "survivals of the past"
supposedly perpetuate backward approaches to economic 15 problems. Population transfers and "social engineering" 16 are fundamental tools in socialist construction.
Soviet leaders are increasingly sensitive over the
precariousness of their authority over non-Russian
Republics. There are several contributing factors: higher
birth rates among the Asian nationalities has led to pre
dictions that by the year 2000 not only the Russians, but
the Slavic population in the USSR, will have become a 17 minority, despite strong policy measures to prevent this.
Propaganda attacks, from Peking as well as the West, con
demning Great Russian imperialism and oppression of colonial 18 peoples, have also served to put Moscow on the defensive.
Finally, letters to the editors of Soviet newspapers often
express frustrations regarding the "contradictory position"
of the national Republic, even though we may only learn of
the unpublished letters through the vehicle of the 19 Samizdat underground. Via the Samizdat, the West is pre
sented with a "picture of an indefatigable, pitiless and 20 absurd persecution of national cultural life." More
openly, academician and Nobel Prize winner Sakharov warns that "nationality problems will continue to be a reason for
unrest and dissatisfaction unless all departures from
Leninist principles are acknowledged and analyzed, and firm 21 steps are taken to correct mistakes." A limited, placatory response to these growing demands for a return to constitutional norms has alternated with waves of arrests.
In 1966, a Study Commission on Problems of Nationality Re- 22 latxons was established under the Academy of Sciences.
The Uzbek Republic Communist Party sponsored an all-Union
Conference on Theoretical Problems of Socialist Inter- 23 nationalism in Tashkent in 1968. And by 1969 a Scientific 24 Council on Nationality Problems had also been created.
Yet, during the ten years during which Brezhnev has held tenure as both Russian Republic and CPSU First Secretary, five non-Russian Republican level first secretaries have been 25 replaced. Similarly, under Khrushchev's regime six under- 2 6 lings were purged during the years 1959 to 1963. This higher degree of job instability among leaders of non-
Russian Republics is attributed by many writers to: (a) their lack of control over the centrifugal forces in their territories and (b) the tendency of these regional leaders to develop vested interests in expanding the autonomy of their bailiwicks contrary to and at the expense of the 27 center.
It is clear that the official status of
"nationalism" is complicated by the ironic conjunction of a world powerful superstate with an internationalist political philosophy proclaiming that the "workers have no country." 10
The multi-ethnic empire is challenged by the need to reckon with what Hans Kohn calls "one of the determining forces in 2 8 modern history." Even Lenin was forced to admit that without a satisfactory solution to the nationalities prob- 29 lem, the construction of socialism would not be feasible.
Considering the delphic cloak that Lenin's name evokes on these issues, it is appropriate now to review the
conditions under which the changing approaches to Soviet
integration have developed.
II. Context and Premises of Soviet Policy Toward the Republics
A . Period of "Consolidation"
Marxism is essentially a theory of economic-social
classes. As such, it tends to overstate the class aspects
and to discount the dynamics of other social and political 30 forces (like nationalism). If this distorted emphasis was not apparent to the Bolsheviks before the Civil War, it
had at least been crystallizing the thought of Lenin. In
his 'Theory of Imperialism', Lenin demonstrated an awareness
that subjugated colonial peoples comprise a weak (hence,
exploitable) link in the strength of the oppressor country.
By 1913, in a joint publication with Stalin, the impact 31 of nationalism was recognized as "epidemic." The voting
of war credits in countries where the working elements were
supposed to be more "advanced," again brought home to a 11 disappointed Lenin the importance of the national factor, in relation to the principle of "international solidarity of 32 the workers." By the time the Bolsheviks took power, they had begun to use this dynamic to serve their political ends: "The national question is part and parcel of the 33 general question of the proletarian revolution."
Ironically, riding to victory on promises of national self-determination and liberation from the Tsarist
"prison of nations", the early Bolshevik state found itself threatened by those emotions it had unleashed. Scholars agree that "consolidation" is the key to Soviet integration 34 policies during the regime's first decade. Toward this goal, a combination of military, social, political and economic measures was employed, culminating in the compromise of the federal state structure noted above.
Lenin had made a distinction between two particular types of nationalism: "Great-power chauvinism" is the bourgeois imperialist manifestation, whereas the other type can be identified as a defense reaction against the ag- 35 gressive kind. On this basis, Lenin concluded that "the principle of self-determination would destroy the basis for national hostility," while "the principle of proletarian unity would guarantee eventual solidarity of all workers 3 6 regardless of nationality." Accordingly, in the effort 37 to eliminate the "retaliatory" form of nationalism, the 12
1.918 Declaration of Rights of the Toiling and Exploited
People gave
to the workers and peasants of each nationality the right to make an independent decision . . . whether they desire, and, if so, on what basis, to participate in the federal government and in other Soviet in stitutions . 38
Issued in order to avert resistance and alienation, this
concession, together with the 1917 Declaration of Rights of
the Peoples of Russia, are said to have:
solemnly confirmed the sovereignty and equality of these peoples . . . abolished all national restrictions and privileges, guaranteed the all-around and free development of all nations and nationalities, however, small. . .39
The right to attend native language schools was one ex
pedient way of educating illiterate masses while simulta
neously attempting to befriend the ethnic minorities. It was believed that if the nationalities were permitted to
indulge freely in native cultural forms (expressing a
common socialist content, however) a major cause of ethnic
conflict and separatism could be extinguished.
A second premise specifically identified "Great
Russian Chauvinism" as a related factor impeding the con
solidation and integration of nations into the Union. It is
interesting that Lenin privately censured Stalin's less
tolerant approach (the latter is notorious for his "Great-
Russian "riff-raff"— below), declaring "war to the death on
Great Russian Chauvinism.The Twelfth Party Congress 13
(1923) resolved that this struggle furnished it a "top 41 proprity task." Lenin prophetically wrote: "There is bound to be on the pretext of unity in the railway service,
unity in the fiscal service and so on , a mass of truly
Russian abuses. Special ingenuity is necessary for the 42 struggle against these abuses." "Korenizatsiya" was a pro
gram instituted during the early 1920s to develop a crop of
local administrative personnel throughout the Republics.
Just as many Americans see improved education and employment opportunities as a way of mitigating racial confrontation in
the United States, one Soviet citizen wrote:
the more favorable the conditions for the mobility of non-Russian personnel, the more successfully possible tension in ethnic relations is eliminated.43
Cadres, composed of "local people who know the language, way 44 of life, manners and customs of the respective peoples," presumably would allay suspicions, symbolize the promise
for participation and mobility, and counter whatever 4 5 residual aspirations might persist for secession.
Evidence is available, however on the other hand, to sug gest that such improvements may serve only to wet the appetite of nationalist aspirations and hence intensify rather than mollify national and ethnic tensions.
Also considered dysfunctional to consolidating the
Union was "the actual inequality of nations that we have 4 6 inherited from the period of tsarism." A fundamental 14
premise is that "national character is a reflection of
societal [read 'material'] existence."4^ Stalin assumed
that "inequality remains the basis of all the discontent 48 and friction." Therefore, he explained:
the essence of the national question lies in abolishing the actual backwardness . . . to make it' possible' for the backward oeoples to catch up with central Russia. . ."49
Lenin took economic equality a step beyond Stalin's formu
lation in prescribing a responsibility of the "advanced"
peoples toward their former colonies. These duties might
result
even in an inequality of the oppressor nation . . . that must make up for the inequality which obtains in actual practice. Anybody who does not understand this has not grasped the real proletarian attitude to the national question, he is still essentially petty bourgeois in his point of view. . .50
So, along with the political concessions of
federalism and korenizatsiya, and the cultural slogan
"national in form, socialist in content," some specific
economic approaches were formulated to facilitate consoli
dation. Party programs have insisted upon "fraternal
assistance" to the underdeveloped constituent peoples.
National rivalries and resentments, it was assumed, would
disappear as the benefits of economic prosperity were dis
tributed among the ethnic minorities with greater parity.
This socio-economic theme has continued as the basso-
ostinato in official leadership pronouncements: 15
it is clear that, as the economy and culture develop . . . the source from which bourgeois nation alism draws its strength evaporates.51 * » Regarding the original conditions "that gave rise to the movement for the formation of a Union of Republics," Stalin 52 had insisted: "the motives are economic." This theory
assumes that economic factors would serve to bind together 53 the interests of the separate Republics:
Socialist division of labor, the growth of new and multifarious forms of economic and cultural ties, and of comradely cooperation, mutual assistance and friend ship, create a firm basis for an ever closer coming together of peoples of our c o u n t r y . ^4
Brezhnev himself, beyond recognizing the tenacity of material-motivational principles, suggested an instrumental
utility of these factors for integration:
correct distribution of productive forces is of great economic and political importance.55
Political manipulation, both of economic and of labor-man- power resources, is imperative in the effort to achieve this
"correct distribution." Contemporary sociologists in the
USSR underscore, for instance, the importance of knowledge about "economic foundations of the friendship among the peoples,since "migrational processes" are held to be
"one of the most important factors in bringing Soviet 57 peoples closer to each other." "Mutual assistance" and
"cadre exchange" were designed not only in the interests of
enriching the poorer, non-Russian nations and eliminating 16 gaps among living standards; the tremendous program of population migration (orgnabor) aims toward the forging of 5 8 "a new historic community of people— the Soviet people."
Resettlement is conducted with the expectation of breaking down the "isolation'1 of national groups, and encouraging
"inter-national" friendships and mixed marriages. Multi national construction works projects, for example the
Chilik State Tobacco Farm in Kazakhstan, reflect a conscious endeavor to catalyze "rapprochement," "approximation of 59 peoples" or sblizhenie.
Just as population shuffling overrides the boundaries between Republics, so also do the plans for socialist development. There exists the premise that economic and functional interdependence facilitates the £ n "drawing together of all the nations." The economy of the USSR is viewed "not as the arithmetic sum of national economies but as an integral national-economic c o m p l e x . " ^
The need to "subordinate the development of the smaller
Republics to the solution of broader regional-complex 6 2 problems" results in imbalances and distortions in the local economies. Such problems are often lamented by national dissidents:
Economic over-centralization . . . inhibits the de velopment or causes the one-sided development of a number of regions in the USSR . . . without any eco nomic justification. ^ 17
The tendency to "gerrymander" economic administrative regions*^ while "disregarding . . . the needs of the national Republics"^ is a common observation by Western c a scholars." A deliberate policy of specialization beyond strictly economic considerations in order to increase 6 7 interdependence" has according to another accusation,
"made the Union Republics less self-sufficient economically than before.
A number of policy premises and responses were thus derived during the early years of the Soviet regime. These approaches were formulated in dealing with national
Republics on political, ethnic and economic levels. What problems arose when these policy assumptions confronted changing realities? What additional factors have played a role in determining policy approaches since the years of consolidation?
B . Premises Meet Anti-Premises: Syn-Premises?
Stalin's decision to emphasize the building of
"Socialism in One Country," and later, his campaign during the "Patriotic War" to glorify the Russian Motherland, signaled a distinct detour from the principles of inter- 69 nationalism. Survival of the Socialist Revolution became identified with survival of the Soviet Russian State.^
Moreover, the earlier line admonishing about the dangers of "Great Russian Chauvinism" underwent a volte face. As early as the 1930s, a scapegoat had to be found for ex- 71 plaining away difficulties in the collectivization drive: non-Russian nations were viewed as unreliable, and the fear of bourgeois (enemy) contamination permeated policy as sumptions toward these border populations. Purges and de portations of "narrow national separatists" were justified 72 on these bases. Predominantly Russian troops were garrisoned in the border regions while native draftees were dispersed throughout the regular army so as to prevent 7 ^ "defection of entire units." History was reinterpreted to mobilize loyalty toward the State in its war effort, and it came to be characterized by the theme of "obligatory
* 7 A adulation" of all things Russian. Stalin's famous 1945
"Toast to the Russian People" as the "leading Soviet nationality" and the "elder brothers" is commonly cited as the emblem of this new perspective. Literature was exhorted to reflect this "most prominent," leading role of the
Russian people in socialist construction. As one poet, who had received Stalin's favor expressed:
An eagle rules the hatch of his eaglets--he supports first one then another of the eaglets.75
This chauvinist Russian line is apparent in the national anthem quoted at the head of this chapter, in the con stitutional revisions about this time, and in the proclamation in 19 38 rendering the Russian language a 19
subject throughout schools in the USSR. Vernon Asputurian
regards the era from 19 36 to 1953 as a period of 7 6 "Russianization." Similarly, Vardys refers to this
stage as a time of cultural assimilation into a Russian 77 framework and Osborn speaks of a "Great Russian
7 0 Revival."
The reader should not assume that the flavor of
Russian primacy is solely an abberation of the Stalinist
"cult." Sblizhenie was supplemented by a more aggressive
goal of merging, sliyanie, in the 1960s. The Twenty-
Second Party Congress' of the CPSU Program notes with
satisfaction that
the boundaries between the constituent republics are increasingly losing their former significance.79
Though the leadership has found it necessary to moderate
this extreme position, the earlier axiom presenting Russian chauvinism as the number one obstacle has nonetheless clearly been overridden. Today vigilance is instead directed against the dangers of "fetishism" and "national 8 0 separateness." Brezhnev summons the spirit of "im placability toward manifestations of . . . national narrow mindedness and conceit" while his report to the Twenty-
Fourth Party Congress carried a special paragraph devoted 81 to the guiding role of the Great Russian nation. The
rich and "developed" Russian language is promoted as the 8 2 "common medium for interaction;" its role "in bringing 20 8 3 socialist nations together" is stressed to date as well.
Attacks against "national fetishes" attempt to curtail and 84 trim the excessive "flowering" of the nationalities.
These excesses are sometimes maliciously camouflaged, however, Pravda readers are warned:
localism may look like an endeavor to strive for the flourishing of one's own republic.85
Concern is expressed over the "tendency toward pro vincialism . . . and in the striving to create an autarkic economy for the nation.Minorities are advised not to take advantage of the concessions they have received:
the small nationalities are not exotic exhibits to be kept on museum reservations . . . they are developing toward a single world nation.^7
But Dzyuba contends that the "national narrow mindedness" which is being attacked is nothing more than a
"defense of economic and other needs of the Republics 8 8 against the excessive appetites of the super-centralists."
He interprets the criticisms as covers for a "notorious 89 orgy of 'Russian priority'". He protests that
to speak about the threat of nationalism from a nation that is being Russified wholesale is tantamount to shouting at a funeral 'many happy returns of the day.1
Thus, not only are the earlier admonitions against and assumptions regarding Russian chauvinism inoperative, but also the status of those premises assuming the importance and persistence of national cultural forms is called into 21
question. If, as Engels is quoted, "nations are most
international precisely when they are genuinely national,"
why are the Soviet leaders and their press reacting so
negatively to national expressions?
An effort is made by some theoreticians to reconcile
the conflict between nationalism and internationalism.
"The Soviet people is simultaneously single and multi- 91 national" one apologist maintains. The "flourishing of
socialist nations and nationalities in no way contradicts
the development in the USSR of an international community 92 of peoples." One of the major tasks of this investigation was to explore the changing empirical conditions of the
Republics created by this paradox of fundamental
principles. 22
Notes— Chapter Two
1. From National Anthems of the World, ed. M. Shaw and H. Coleman (London: Blandford Press, 1960).
2. Area Handbook for the Soviet Union, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), Ch. 20.
3. Karel Hulicka and Irene Hulicka, Soviet Institutions, the Individual and Society (Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1967), chapter 4. Also, Robert Wesson, The Soviet Russian State (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972), chapter 7.
4. Frederick Barghoorn, "Our Party is not a federation of separate parties but a unified centralized Party . . . " in Soviet Russian Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 87. Also, Robert Osborn, The Evolution of Soviet Politics (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press, 1974), p. 418.
5. Ivan Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification?, ed. M. Davies (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), p . 33.
6. GreyHodnett, "The Debate Over Soviet Federalism," Soviet Studies 18, no. 4 (April 1967) : 458-81.
7. Stanley Vardys, "Communism and Nationalities: Soviet National Building," APSA Proceedings, Vol. 13, (Washington, D.C.: 1969). Also, Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP) 23, no. 26, p. 16, an article by M. P. Chernov from Voprosy Istorii, February, 1971.
8. Paula Rubel, "Ethnic Identity Among Soviet Nationali ties," in Soviet Nationality Problems, ed. Edward Allworth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).
9. Michael Rywkin, "Moscow Versus the Minority Nationalities," in Bulletin,17, no. 10 (October 1970): 14-22
10. E. Bagramov, in CDSP, 24, no. 25:10-11, quoted from Pravda, June 22, 1972.
11. Oleg Zinam, "Dilemma of Specialization Versus Autarky in the USSR," in The Soviet Economy in Regional Perspective, ed. V. N. Bandera and Z. L. Melnyk (New York: Praeger, 1973). 23
12. V. I. Perevedentsev, "Contemporary Migration in the USSR," in Soviet Geography: Review and Translation 10, no. 4 (April 1969):192-208. Translated from Narodona Seleniye i ekonomika, Moskva 1967, pp. 99- 118.
13. Iu. V. Arutiunian, "A Concrete Sociological Study of Ethnic Relations," in The Soviet Review, IASP, 14, no. 4 (Summer 1973):3-23.
14. A. I. Kholmogorov, "International Traits of Soviet Nations," in Soviet Sociology, IASP, 12, nos. 1, 2 (Summer and Fall 1973, pts. 1, 2) : 3— 33, 27-68.
15. Ibid. Also see CDSP, 24, no. 2:8, and CDSP, 23, no. 46:13-17. The first translates a Pravda, January 14, 1972 article by A. Ikulov, pp. 3-4, and the second, a report by Azerbaidzhan First Secretary G. A. Aliyev from Bakinsky rabochy,November 2, 1971.
16. Among others, see:Hulicka and Hulicka, op. cit., chap. 4; Stephen Dunn and Ethel Dunn, "Soviet Regime and Native Culture in Central Asia and Kazakhstan: The Major Peoples," Current Anthropology 8, no. 3 (June 1967) :147-83. Perevdentsev, op. cit.; and "24th Congress Resolution on the Central Committee's Report," April 10, 1971. Trans, in CDSP 23, no. 17: 21-29.
17. Rywkin, op. cit.
18. Ibid. Also, a theme in Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (New York: Harper and Row Perennial Library, 1970) .
19. Dzyuba, op. cit., pp. 190-92.
20. Ibid.
21. Michael Browne, Ferment in the Ukraine (London: MacMillan Co., 19 70), p. 26.
22. Edward Allworth, "Restating the Soviet Nationality Question," in Soviet Nationality Problems, ed. Allworth, op. cit.
23. Rywkin, op. cit.
24. Allworth, in Soviet Nationality Problems, ed. 24
Allworth, op. cit.
25. A. Avtorkhanov, "Union Republic Congresses and the State of the Party," in Bulletin, May 1960, pp. 37-46. Also, S. A. Billion, "Centralization of Authority and Regional Management," in The Soviet Economy in Regional Perspective, ed. Bandera and Melnyk, op. cit. pp. 214-34.
25. S. Tekiner, "The Background to the Ouster of Three Union Republic Party Leaders," in Bulletin, April 1970, pp. 18-26. Also, Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Communist Party of the Ukraine After 1966," paper discussed at McMaster University Conference on the Ukraine, Hamilton, Ontario, 30 September 1974.
27. Rein Taagepera, "Nationalism in the Estonian Communist Party," Bulletin 17, no. 1 (January 1970):3-15. Also, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970). This is discussed by Osborn and Bilinsky in the words already cited as well as by others.
28. Hans Kohn, Nationalism (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1955), intro. Also a specific theme throughout Barghoorn, op. cit.
29. Robert Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the Ukraine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).
30. Friedrich Engels' letter to Joseph Bloch, "Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that the younger people sometimes lay more stress on the eco nomic side than is due to it," London, September 21-22, 1890, in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1972).
31. E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1950), 1:426.
32. Ibid.
33. Joseph Stalin, Foundations of Leninism (New York: International Publishers, 1932), 1:426.
34. Vardys, op. cit., p. 7. Also in Kohn and Carr in the places already cited.
35. Dzyuba, op. cit., pp. 40-60. And Vernon Aspaturian, 25
"The Non-Russian Nationalities," in Prospects for Soviet Society, ed. Allen Kassof (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 158-201.
36. Sullivant, op. cit., p. 21.
37. Joseph Stalin, "Report on National Factors in Party and State Affairs" to 12th Party Congress, April 23, 1923, in J. V. Stalin: Works, vol. 5 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953).
38. Carr, op. cit., p. 149.
39. B. G. Gufarov, "The Solution of the Nation Question," trans. in The Soviet Crucible, ed. Samuel Hendel (N. Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1973).
40. Sullivant, op. cit., pp. 90-91, and Dzyuba, op. cit., p . 60 .
41. Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 30; Dzyuba, op. cit., p. 61.
42. Dzyuba, op. cit., p. 151.
43. Arutiunian, op. cit.
44. Dzyuba, op. cit., p. 181,quoting a discussion at the 12th CPSU Congress.
45. Robert Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 52.
46. Joseph Stalin, "Report on the Immediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question," J. V. Stalin: Works, Vol. 5, March 10, 1921 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953).
47 . Kholmogorov, op. cit. , pt. 2. CD
• Stalin, 1923 Report, op. cit.
49. Stalin, 1921 Report, op. cit.
50. From Dzyuba, op. cit. , p . 61.
51. Statement attributed to Khrushchev by Robert Conquest, The Nation Killers (London: MacMillan Co., 1970), p. 195. 26
52. Joseph Stalin, "The Question of the Union of the Independent National Republics," J. V. Stalin: Works, 5 (1921):142.
53. A theme throughout the writings of Stalin and Bagramov (CDSP, op. cit.) and in CDSP, 23, no. 28:8.
54. V. K. Gardanov, B. 0. Dolgikh, and T. A. Zhdanko, "Major Trends in Ethnic Processes Among Peoples of the USSR," in Soviet Anthropology and Archaeology, Summer 1962. Translating from Sovetskaya Etnografiia, no. 4, 1961, pp. 3-18.
55. Rein Taagepera, "National Differences Within Soviet Demographic Trends," in Soviet Studies, April 1969, p. 478.
56. Gardanov, et al., op. cit.
57. V. I. Naulko, "Present Ethnic Composition of the Population of the Ukrainian SSR," in Sociology in the USSR, ed. Stephen Dunn (White Plains, N. Y. : IASP, 1969), pp. 184-97.
58. Resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress, 1971. Trans lated in CDSP, 23, no. 17:21-29.
59. E. V. Tadevosian, "The Further Convergence of the Socialist Nations of the USSR," in Sociology in the USSR, ed. Dunn, op. cit. Translating from Voprosy filosofii, 1963, pp. 60-69.
60. For example, ibid., or Stalin, "The Question of the Union of the Independent National Republics," op. cit. See also CDSP, 21 (March 1969) no. 21:5-7, and CDSP, 23, no. 17:21-29.
61. Bagramov, 1971, op. cit. CDSP.
62. V. Kistanov, "Leninist Nationalities Policy and Economic Regionalization in the USSR," in CDSP, 25, (March 28, 1973) no. 9:1-4. Translated from Voprosy ekonomiki.
63. Dzyuba, op. cit., p. 108.
64. This arbitrary basis is noted: J. P. Cole and F. C. German, "Kazakhstan is a meaningless monstrosity," A Geography of the USSR (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1971), p. 78. Same point is made by 27
Barghoorn, op. cit., pp. 71-83.
65. Vardys, op. cit., p. 16.
66. Zinam, op. cit., p. 206., states, "the Republics weren't allowed to develop well integrated economies . . . were forced to develop as branches of a national Soviet economy." Same theme in Osborn, op. cit., chap. 13, 14 and Conquest, 1967, op. cit., pp. 122, 126.
67. Robert Wesson, The Soviet State: An Aging Revolution (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), p. 39.
68. Hulicka and Hulicka, op. cit., p. 169.
69. Hans Kohn, "Soviet Communism and Nationalism: Three States of Historical Development," in Allworth, op. cit.
70. Barghoorn, op. cit., pp. 34-37.
71. Rakowska-Harmstone, 1970, op. cit., pp. 36-50.
72. Barghoorn, op. cit., pp. 14-19.
73. Rakowska-Harmstone, op. cit., p. 45.
74. Ibid., p. 81.
75. Poet is Tursun-Zade, Rakowska-Harmstone, op. cit., p . 45.
76. Aspaturian, in Kassof, op. cit.
77. Vardys, op. cit., p. 7.
78. Osborn, op. cit., chap. 13.
79. Naulko, in Dunn, op. cit.
80. Dzyuba cites Pravda, p. 181.
81. CDSP, vol. 23, no. 14.
82. From the 22nd CPSU Program, 1961. Translated in Hendel, The Soviet Crucible, op. cit.
83. Report by G. A. Aliyev, 1971, First Secretary of 28
Azerbaidzhan's CP. Translated in CDSP, 23, no. 46: 13-17.
84. Report by T. U. Usubaliyev, 1973, First Secretary of Kirgiz CP. Translated in CDSP, 25, no. 28:4.
85. G. Zimanas, CDSP, vol. 21, no. 4, from Pravda, January 1969.
86. Kholmogorov, op. cit., pt. 3, p. 51.
87. Pavel Puchkov. "Small Ethnic Groups and Nationalities," Soviet Life, February 1968.
88. Dzyuba, op. cit., p. 189.
89. Ibid. , p . 65.
90. Ibid., p . 203.
91. Bagramov, CDSP, op. cit., 1971.
92. Bagramov, CDSP, op. cit., 1972. CHAPTER THREE
SOVIET REPUBLICS UNDER WESTERN ANALYSIS:
LITERATURE REVIEW
Research on the Soviet federation of Republics has been conducted on three broad levels. These include those
investigations focusing on the impact of the federal
structure, those primarily devoted to ethnic relations, and those more recent analyses which are concerned with problems of economic equality. It was the perspective of this writer that there existed an essential inquiry under
lying this disparate collection of research: that is the problem of composition or integration. Given a multi ethnic, multinational state entity, what are the political, social and economic patterns whereby its constituent units are combined? How are political, social and economic variables distributed across the component parts of this political whole? This writer agrees with Stanley Vardys that the Soviet Republics, and the nationalities they represent, "are not isolated phenomena." Their study should not be conducted
as a mere adjunct of the Soviet civil rights problem, but as a part of political, economic and social
29 30
development, as a factor in decision-making by the rulers, as an inextricable influence in the building of Soviet society.
We shall return to this approach after a review of the literature already established.
The scope of the relevant research ranges from case studies of individual Republics, to a numerical few which apply aggregate analysis to the group of fifteen. Among the former category, the most prominent include works by 2 Rakowska-Harmstone, Armstrong and Sullivant. These in vestigations trace the recent historical relation between the minority group and their Russian "liberators." Fre quently, broad periodizations are offered to summarize the changing treatment meted out to these peoples. The con trast between official policy statements and actual policy performance is spotlighted by these scholars. Special attention is focused on the development of indigenous national resistance movements, such as the Basmachi in the 3 Central Asian areas, or the Borotbists and Bandensts in 4 the Ukraine. Contemporary dissidents like Dzyuba,
Chornovil, Amalrik and Litvinov receive extensive audience in the Western press as well.
It must not be overlooked here that such case studies were built upon an earlier, more general framework laid by Robert Conquest, Frederick Barghoorn and Richard
Pipes. It was primarily these scholars who identified (if 31 only semi-consciously) the fundamental policy paradox which is central to research and debates today. Sometimes this problem is abbreviated as the question of "inter nationalization or Russification?" touched upon above in the discussion of Soviet policy premises. But goals and expectations constitute only part of the larger issue.
Nor should empirical analyses be confined to merely evaluating the degree of success of Russification, though this is an important aspect. The problem turns on the longer range prospects and consequences of the 'composition1 policies vis a vis the Republics:
Are the national minorities persisting as identifiable groups, and are their demands increasing; or are they gradually merging into an inter-national "Soviet" community, in which their particularist characterics are losing visibility?
Disagreements arise in the first place out of this specific empirical question. And if a preliminary concensus is lacking on this basic empirical situation, the literature is even less fruitful when it comes to the larger theoretical question. This second, more encompassing source of professional contention involves the impact of particular factors, conditions or variables on the style or type of integration. On the political level, for in stance, the consequence of intermediate national loyalties for decentralization or competition, is un resolved.5 Similarly, it remains ambiguous what sort of 32
social climate is produced by say, an increase, in
functional interdependence or equality.
Thus, the research suffers from two deficiencies at the outset. First, there is no comprehensive empirical
"picture" of the state or pattern of the Soviet con
federation. Second, there is no theory linking specific policies or conditions to specific empirical patterns or outcomes. The next sections elaborate on the tentative
findings concerning Soviet Republics and 'integration1, and on the problems attending this research in general.
I. Political Dimension
Political scientists have not yet been successful in constructing theories capable of generating testable hypotheses (in the Popperian sense) for the problems of sub-state nationalism.
Walker Connor, for example, maintains that "lesser
'us-them' relationships can exist within a single nation, so long as in any test of allegiance the larger 'us' of the g nation proves more powerful than the divisive call. . ."
Myron Weiner believes in the feasibility of the "unity in diversity" formula, but only if the diversity is contained at a level "commensurate with what their political 7 leadership needs to carry out their goals." Neither of these tautologies offers much insight toward resolving the 33 problem: a state can tolerate whatever amount of undertow
it can endurel Wallerstein1s contribution is similarly ambiguous: he cites different situations in which ethnicity has played quite opposite roles in the inte- g gration processes. Liddle notes that for Indonesia,
"primordial" identifications may be used as a base for building higher loyalties, and sees the creation of inter mediary organizations as a necessary link between 9 individuals and the larger state. Such a perspective is coincident with the earlier assumptions of the Bolshevik leaders, and is incidentally the underlying premise for their federalist compromise. However, the Malaysian,
Indian, Belgian, Canadian, and Northern Irish governments could certainly testify, in contrast, to the erosive aspects of such ethnic loyalties. It must be noted, in fairness, moreover, that the Bolsheviks were not blind to the tactical opportunities which nationalist agitation could provide.
The questions to be raised below in the Pipes-
Barghoorn controversy thus reflect the unresolved state of the national integration issue in comparative political research. Barghoorn is of the persuasion that centrali zation, industrialization, control of demographic movement and suppression are forces which will lead to a sort of "compulsive homogeneity" and assimilation of 34 national, minorities into the more aggressive, Great Russian mold."^ His argument is supported by the Hulickas, among others. They feel that the Soviet press is justified in its claim that a singular, new "Soviet people" has
"supervened particularist identifications" of the former multiplicity of Soviet "peoples^. Pipes, on the other hand, emphasizes the ironies of implementing Soviet nationalities policies. He contends that formal con cessions, "devised to mollify nationalism . . . in effect intensif[y] it and provide it with institutional out- 12 lets." Instead of succumbing to pressures of
Russification, according to Pipes' predictions the nationalities are becoming increasingly conscious and solicitous over their uniqueness. Vardys agrees that the status of Union Republic provides a "shield of defense" to national groups. Pipes is also joined in his agrument by Yaroslav Bilinsky and Rein Taagepera. Bilinsky believes that the ethnic milieu serves to foster an inde pendent perspective among Republic level elites, who gradually tend to formulate demands on their 13 constituency's behalf. According to Taagepera, a sub national momentum is built up as local cultural and political leaders develop vested interests in their local establishments. The perpetuation of some degree of national autonomy is cultivated as a way of expanding 35 their roles, and thereby ensuring a need for their 14 positions. Then there are those researchers who, like
Brian Silver, prefer to hedge on this scholarly contest.
He concludes, inconclusively, that although "the main tenance of national identities . . . does provide a potential focus" for drawing "ethnic loyalties into open political conflict, ". . ." such consciousness need not 15 signify a lack of loyalty to the Soviet regime." Are forces of decentralization or centralization in ascendency today? Is the Soviet polity accepted as legitimate or are secessionist movements undermining the existence of the
"whole"? Just what the current status is, and what trends are anticipated for the Union Republics in their role vis a vis the "Russified" all-Union forces, are thus large
"undecided1s" among the scholars studying the Soviet Union.
And unfortunately, a search for other hints in the political science literature is not rewarded. One writer suggests that the behavior of the political elite provides a "pivotal role in determining the future course of 16 nationality events." Lijphart and Lorwin similarly emphasize the significance of the conscious decisions made by political leaders in structuring the patterns of political integration. 17 But as valid or obvious as such statements might seem, they lack the precision and "em pirical import" (Hempel) necessary for hypothesis-testing. 36
Application of models based upon coalition theory and cost- benefit analysis is urged by researchers like Jacob and
Haas, in order to determine the specific conditions 18 associated with alternative political patterns. However, just when, how, why and under what conditions political elites would decide to join together in "deliberate efforts to counteract" fragmentation, and which mix of factors would 19 render their "consociational" efforts 'successful1 or
'unsuccessful' has not been ascertained. So, in addition to the factor of substate national loyalties, a second variable has been identified, i.e., the role of political elites, whose impact on federative political structure remains ambiguous.
Political parties can be seen in a similar fashion.
Wallerstein, Rosberg and Coleman, and others note the socialization and recruitment activities of parties in the context of mobilization.^ What is not easily predictable are the political consequences of mobilization; thus the ambiguity extends to the central function performed by the political party in the mobilization process. Mobilization is generally associated with the breaking down of traditional relationships, and, through exposure to the media and to new values, with an elimination of social isolation and an expansion into a wider participatory com- 21 munity. It is the character of this new level of 37 participation which creates the uncertainties. Mickiewicz
is concerned with how mobilization affects cleavage and consensus, since mobilization can channel additional de- 22 mands into the political system. Again, however, the political science literature provides us with some sterile tautologies. All that the literature is able to contribute is that political integration requires a "favorable ratio 23 of loads to capabilities"; nothing is posited as to which conditions or political institutions and patterns provide this favorable ratio. At best, analyses imply a curvilinear sort of relation between mobilization and 24 maintenance of the polity. It is also 'predicted' that the pattern will depend upon whether the mobilization is occurring in a homogeneous society, or in one with a 25 heterogeneous political culture.
Mickiewicz senses "in the current dissent in the
Soviet Union evidence that the campaign for mass mobili zation has stimulated political awareness in a non- 2 6 consensual way." This raises a fourth nonspecific variable— that of conflict. But what sorts of conflict and strains can a political system endure? At what point does tension cease to be contained at a "favorable" level?
More critically, this writer must interject: other than retrospectively through persistence of the political system, how can we evaluate the extent or character of the 38 danger posed by conflict? Another fallacy is presented by those scholars who refuse to treat the Soviet Union in any context associated with integration because of its re- 27 liance on coercion. This myopic bias is unjustified, since it is SOP for authoritative governments to claim the ultimate prerogative of force, whether or not it is actually employed. It is being gradually conceded now that "conflict is not simply the opposite of integration" and that its avoidance is not necessarily indicative of 2 8 integration among distinct units. ("The absence of hostilities . . . does not confirm a single transgroup 29 identity,") but may instead "merely indicate a non participant political culture."^0 Joseph Nye suggests that increased interassociation may be correlated with 31 greater crisis potential. Louis McCall demonstrates contrasting situations in which greater amounts of joint efforts have produced higher crisis intensity and fre- 32 quency on the one hand, and less in another instance.
Thus, despite intuitive reactions to such variables as ethnic nationalism, mobilization or harmony, political science has been unable thus far to relate these factors systematically to patterns of political composition. II. Social Dimension
The nationalities emphasis of the Pipes-Barghoorn
conundrum has stimulated further research on the relation
ships among Soviet ethnic populations. Short of the micro
level data required for sociometric "mapping" of inter
action, Western scholars focus on the spectrum of
integration patterns which ethnic "mingling" can take.
Brzezinski and Rubel describe this spectrum as ranging from cultural and biological assimilation into the "host"
Russian solvent on the one hand, to a pluralist accommodation of distinct ethnic peoples (resembling
Lorwin's image of "segmented pluralism"on the other.
Of course this spectrum represents only an example of any number of possible classification systems which could be devised to categorize types of social patterns. Let us review here some of the social patterns described by research on the Soviet Union. Throughout this review, in addition, observations critical of studies will be offered.
One characteristic pattern commonly noted through out the research was "the marked contrast between town and 35 country." Demographers report an extreme polarization whereby the cities accommodate disproportionate numbers of
Great Russians, while the rural areas remain "the guardian"
O £ of the native groups. This cleavage is recognized and 37 lamented among the Soviets themselves. The gap is 40
rendered more serious by the cumulative aspect of 3 8 political and economic factors. For instance, a major
factor in the very presence of Russians in the non-Russian
Republics at all stems from a conscious policy of migration 39 40 and colonization. Fertility rates and occupation
are said to correspond to the urban-rural dichotomy. And
the economic differentials favoring urban populations
exacerbate the social and cultural segmentation and com- 41 pound the potential source of ethnic alienation.
Other studies on the pattern of Russian/non-
Russian interaction have focused on language. As we have
already seen, the Russian language has recently received
official status as the medium for inter-Republic
communications; minorities are expected to learn Russian
(though Russians residing in the other Republics seldom
learn the native languages), since the operation of in
stitutions of higher education and the operation of
government and bureaucracy presupposes facility in 42 Russian. A stigma accompanies some native speakers m 4 3 their interactions with Russians. Yet despite the
advantages associated with linguistic Russification, the research supplies only contradictory evidence. Silver offers one point of view. In his study, psychological
identification with the Russian ethnic group (as measured by native language) is correlated with urbanization, 41
youth, and other mobilization indices. Silver predicts
that although multiplicity persists, the general long-term 44 trend is one of Russification. In contrast, both Harry
Lipset and Taagepera emphasize the stability and
crystallization of republic minority languages in the past 45 decade or so. They do not believe the evidence warrants
a conclusion that local languages are in "retreat" or that
instruction in them has declined at a "significant pace"
since the 1958 education amendment. Vardys takes a neutral position, merely pointing out the existence of "an intense competition between the Russian and native languages,
a r especially in the field of book publications."^u Some im portant irony is introduced into this discussion by 47 Bilinsky and Pipes, however. Not only are there in sufficient data on this matter "to permit any firm opinion," but the linguistic criteria are not even accepted by them as valid indicators for ethnic resistance and assimilation!
Bilinsky cites numerous instances in which it is precisely the Russian-speaking and Russian-educated "natives" who are the most zealous national dissidents. Such facts tend to undermine inferences, like Silver's, that language identification and social and political commitment are equivalent.
How do political scientists explain the differing patterns of social integration? A number of relevant 42 variables have been identified, but, just as with the ethnic loyalty factor discussed above., their roles are ambiguous and their specific impacts have not been iso lated. Scholars are not even in agreement over what basic social patterns they observe in Soviet society. How do they explain the differing conclusions on social in tegration which they report? Several relevant variables are identified that supposedly contribute in the deter mination of patterns of social interaction.
The general atmosphere of Russianization for instance, is constantly referred to as affecting social/ ethnic relations. Included in the concept of
Russianization would be the linguistic pressures noted above, the educational system, and even military service.
With regard to the Red Army, Wesson contends that 4 8 "military training is a powerful blender." Barghoorn refers to the army as a "traditionalistic Russian 49 agency." Even Dzyuba complains about the army's role in Russifying and disorienting native youth from their homelands. He cites passages from an early Party Congress decrying the use of the army as "an instrument of 50 Russification." But Russianization clearly is a double-edged variable! At the same time that it is operating to foster sblizhenie and homogenization, it accidentally awakens a protest among the 'melting' 43 nationalities. The net impact of this variable on patterns of social integration is thus indefinite.
Migration policy is an additional factor pro viding mixed results. Aspaturian believes that the diffusion of Russians through the Union not only accelerates the process of ethnic convergence, but
"guarantees a minimum political and ethnic ballast in the „ 51 non-Russian regions to counter separatist sentiment.
Barghoorn predicts that when peasant populations are dis placed and resettled, they will be submerged into the new medium, for lack of the institutional foundations sup- 52 porting their traditional way of life. In contrast, according to Szporluk and others, migration has aroused 53 increased resentment and resistance among non-Russians.
Osborn notes a difference in response to the influx of
Great Russians, depending upon the Republics which are in volved. He speaks of the "dilution" of the Kazakh peoples on the one hand, whereas in the Baltic nations the 54 immigration is met with protests and friction. Like the mobilization factor discussed above, an increase in inter ethnic social contacts may result in either greater understanding and cooperation or in an intensification of 55 antagonisms; it could encourage and lead to either assimilative or segmentalist tendencies and demands.
Soviet migration efforts may indeed be aimed at the first 44 of each of these sets of alternatives, but,literature does not consistently confirm their success.
The ambiguities in the research on Soviet ethnic policy outcomes suggest therefore opportunities for further study in this area as well.
Ill. Economic Dimension
The research literature is also confounded when it comes to analyzing patterns of economic integration.
The most popular question investigated is the
Soviet boast that "the former inequality of peoples has 57 been eliminated." It is toward testing this claim that aggregate data analysis has been applied to Soviet
Republics. In general, the data seldom overlap, with the consequence that the studies are partial and occasionally seem contradictory. A couple of patterns are duplicated however. Holubnychy compares national income per capita 5 8 among the Republics. Latvia, Estonia and the RSFSR lead the other Republics on this variable. Schroeder supports 59 this finding. When the Republics are rank ordered,
Tadzhikistan falls at the bottom of the list. Essentially the same pattern is discovered by Koropeckyj using GNP per capita.^ Employing a number of modernization-mobili- zation type data, Mickiewicz reports a similar pattern from her rank ordering. The variation among Republics is 45 stable over time however, indicating that although a certain inequality persists, equality of treatment assures that economic changes are proportionate and in the same 61 direction. Her data are probably comparable to
Holubnychy's measures for per capita industrial production, 6 2 by Republic. But beyond finding the RSFSR more in dustrially advanced he also found that the disparity among
Republics was increasing until approximately 1958. He notes, moreover, that the Ukraine economy suffers a deficit in the all-Union treasury in terms of capital investment expenditures. (This might raise the question of "exploi tation.") Schroeder also examined distribution on economic benefits. However, she makes a distinction be tween community service and welfare benefits (social wages) and those more individualistic benefits which are reflected in allowance differentials from region to region
(incentives to encourage migration to labor-deficient or hardship areas). The range of variation of the former type of benefits has diminished, whereas the gap in the latter 6 3 has tended to become wider over the past ten years.
Silver also puts the equalization claims to the test. He, like Mickiewicz, uses mobilization type data rather than actual economic data. His results are also mixed: Silver concludes that there is less variation on modernization 64 indices among the Republics than there is within them. 46 Such a conclusion reconfirms the earlier observations emphasizing a severe urban-rural cleavage. Soviet economists are concerned about this pattern. Their ex planation of these lingering disparities is twofold. One team of researchers urges:
The problem of overcoming these differences is first and foremost a problem of more effective development of agriculture, of bringing the incomes of collective farmers up to the level of the earnings of workers and employees, and in more general form, of over coming the differences between the city and the village. 5
The lag of the agricultural sector, a chronic defect in
Soviet socialism, thus constitutes the first aspect.
This problem is supposedly acute for the 1956-1964 period— ironically the time of Khrushchev's agricultural reorganization and decentralization. Secondly, when the disparity does occur across Republics, it is explained as a result of the differing percentages or shares which agriculture comprises in the Republic economies (ranging from 18 to 50%).*^
The first limitation I would like to point out in these studies is their reliance on rank order and 6 7 statistical measures of central tendency. The reader himself can probably recite the many anecdotes demon strating how "average" is "a very uninformative con- 6 8 cept." Coefficients like standard deviation and variance are criticized in this context as being nothing more than
"sophisticated averages." It is also undesirable that rank 47
order introduces an a priori bias toward inequality, ir
respective of the magnitude of inequalities in the data.
This permits no standard interpretation or definition of
"disparity" or "inequality"; the size and significance attached to the "gaps" is intuitive and noncomparable.
Wiles and Markowski have been sensitive to these problems and attempted to place Soviet income distribution in comparative perspective with some capitalist nations.
They find income equalization "has been striking" in the 69 USSR, with the exception of the agricultural domain.
The "relativity" of comparison is what provides social science statistics with meaning and contributes perspective to our research.
Another limitation of the economic research on
Soviet Republics is the passive acceptance, and the in complete treatment of the Marxist premise which we seem to be calling "the equalization hypothesis." Actually several things are involved here. First there is the materialist determinism which ascribes to functional and economic conditions influence over political and social at titudes and values . The inference is that economic equality, by eliminating class-based exploitation will eliminate 70 tensions and conflict. But alternative responses and attitudes can also be documented. Such a proposition does not adequately incorporate evidence on the impact of 48
"rising expectations" for example. Nor is it an absolute
that economic disparities automatically produce political
strains. Haas for instance asserts that inequality can
serve as a basis for some patterns of economic integration, 71 provided "special pay-offs" are available. Indeed, the whole notion of economic specialization and division of
labor presumes certain fundamental inequalities, in re
sources, production, and even consumption patterns. A
symbiotic relationship can be efficient and satisfying without presuming equality of the participants. Moreover,
it is narrow to assume that equality is the only economic goal which concerns Soviet economists. As Schroeder,
Zinam, Galay and others maintain, strategic considerations and overall economic efficiency and production pose equally 72 important criteria and principles.
Implicit to the hypothesis furthermore, are "spill over effects." Functional interdependence (conducted in a socialist context of "fraternal assistance"), is expected 73 to intensify friendship ties among the peoples.
Feldman's study of small groups seems to support this ex pectation. He finds that social compatibility is indeed enhanced more by functional interdependence than by normative consensus. On the other hand, Russett dis- 75 credits too simple a leap from transactions to good will.
The success of the spillover would seem to depend upon a 49 complex of intervening factors, however, including an evaluation of costs and needs and benefits, and considera- tion of emotional responses to the quality of the admin istration of the economic transactions.
Another serious question is left unresolved in the literature. I refer here to the impact— functionally, politically and socially— of industrial modernization on relations among the Republics. Again the troops fall in line behind the Pipes-Barghoorn standard, with the latter 7 6 stressing the universalistic impetus of industrialism and the former arguing in contrast that "the needs of an industrial society are used to forward local autonomy" in 77 the interests of the awakening Republic elites. The ambivalence of this variable must be recognized. Lamser acknowledges that the Union Republics contain the potential for asserting more autonomous positions in the moderniza tion process. But he also notes that a cultural converg ence accompanying modernization could counteract these 7 8 forces toward greater independence.
It will be the task of subsequent chapters to build on to the research outlined here. The distribu tional patterns of the Republics for political, ethnic and functional variables will be clarified. And some new 50 evidence will be introduced into the debates and in quiries raised by this literature. 51
Notes--Chapter Three
1. Stanley Vardys, "Communism and Nationalities: Soviet Nation Building" Washington, D. C.: APSA Proceedings, 1969) 13:2.
2. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970); John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 196 3); Robert Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the Ukraine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962); Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Communist Party of the Ukraine After 1966" paper presented at the McMaster University Conference on the Contemporary Ukraine, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, 30 September 1974; S. Vakar, "Belorussian People," in Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, ed. Erich Goldhagen (New York: Praeger, 196 8); Michael Browne, Ferment in the Ukraine (London: MacMillan Co., 1970) .
3. Michael Rywkin, "Central Asia and the Price of Sovieti- zation," in Problems of Communism 13, no. 1 (1964): 7-15.
4. Armstrong, op. cit., and Sullivant, op. cit.
5. John Armstrong, "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union," in Goldhagen, op. cit. Also Immanuel Wallerstein, "Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa," in Comparative Politics, ed. Harry Eckstein and David Apter (New York: Free Press, 1963).
6. Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" World Politics 24, no. 3 (April 1972):319-55.
7. Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, March 1965, pp. 52-64.
8. Wallerstein, in Eckstein and Apter, op. cit.
9. R. William Liddle, Ethnicity, Party and National Integration: An Indonesian Case Study (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).
10. Frederick Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism 52
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 70 and other places throughout his work.
11. Karel Hulicka and Irene Hulicka, Soviet Institutions, The Individual and Society (Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1967), chap. 4.
12. Richard Pipes, "'Solving1 the Nationality Problem," in Man, State and Society in the Soviet Union, ed. Joseph Nogee (New York: Praeger, 1972).
13. Bilinsky, op. cit.
14. Rein Taagepera, "Nationalism in the Estonian Communist Party," in Bulletin, 17, no. 1 (January 1970):3-15.
15. Brian Silver, "Social Mobilization and the Russifi cation of Soviet Nationalities: A Statistical Analysis," Florida State University, Tallahassee, 1973), p. 39. (Manuscript)
16. Paula Rubel, "Ethnic Identity Among Soviet Nationali ties," in Soviet Nationality Problems, ed. Edward Allworth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).
17. Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in World Politics, January 1970. Also Val Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism," in Comparative Politics, January 1971, pp. 141-76.
18. See, for example, Philip Jacob and James Toscano, The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964); Ernst Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration," in International Organization 24, no. 4 (Autumn 1970):607-48.
19. From Lijphart, op. cit.
20. James Coleman and Carl Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966) . Also Wallerstein, in Eckstein and Apter, op. cit.
21. Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," APSR, 55, no. 3 (September 1960):493-514.
22. Ellen Mickiewicz, "Cleavages in Industrialized Society," in Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data, ed. Ellen Mickiewicz (New York: Free Press, 1973) . 53
23. Bruce Russett, International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); Deutsch, op. cit.
24. Mickiewicz, op. cit.
25. Lijphart, op. cit.
26. Mickiewicz, op. cit., p. 41.
27. Haas, op. cit. Amitai Etzioni is an exception in Political Unification (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965) .
28. Russett, op. cit., pp. 96, 192.
29. Connor, op. cit.
30. Aristide Zolberg, "Patterns of National Integration," in Journal of Modern African Studies 5, no. 4 (December 1967):449-68.
31. Joseph Nye, "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement," in International Organi zation 12 , no. 4 (Autumn 1968) : 855-80.
32. Louis McCall, "Dynamics of Regional Integration: Comparison of European and Central American Processes Within a Causally Determined Axiomatic Theory" The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, 1974. (Manuscript)
33. Lorwin, op. cit.
34. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Political Implication of Soviet Nationality Problems," in Allworth, op. cit.
35. Alex Inkeles, "Soviet Nationality Policy in Perspec tive," in The Soviet Crucible, ed. Samuel Hendel (N. Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1973); Robert Lewis, "Mixing of Russians and Soviet Nationalities and its Demographic Impact," in Allworth, op. cit.; Stephen Dunn and Ethel Dunn, "Soviet Regime and Native Culture in Central Asia and Kazakhstan: The Major Peoples," in Current Anthropology, June 1967; Vernon Aspaturian, "The Non-Russian Nationalities," in Prospects for Soviet Society, ed. Allen Kassof (New York: Praeger, 1968); Brian Silver, op. cit., pp. 27, 37; Mickiewicz, op. cit., pp. 15-16. 54
36. From J. V. Stalin: Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953) 5:49. This theme runs throughout authors cited in note 35 above.
37. For instance, see Supreme Soviet's Council of Nationalities discussion on education, Izvestiia, July 21, 1973. Translated in CDSP, 25, no. 29:16-17, or comments by Kazakh professor Buketov, CDSP, 25, no. 33:10. Also, V. I. Perevedentsev, esp. in "Urbanization Problems in Central Asia," CDSP, vol. 28, no. 4. Translated from Komsomolskaya Pravda, January 28, 1976.
38. Sullivant, op. cit., p. 24.
39. Warren Eason, "Population Changes," in Prospects for Soviet Society, ed. Allen Kassof (New York: Praeger, 1968). Also Karl-Eugen Wadekin, "Internal Migration and the Flight from the Land in the USSR, 1939-1959," Soviet Studies 18, no. 2 (October 1966):131-52.
40. Alec Nove, "History, Hierarchy and Nationalities: Some Observations on the Soviet Social Structure," Soviet Studies 21, no. 1 (July 1969):71-92.
41. V. Zlatin and V. Rutgaizer, "Comparison of the Levels of Economic Development of Union Republics and Large Regions," Problems of Economics, (IASP), June 1969. Also, Cole and German, op. cit., p. 243.
42. This tendency is frequently alluded to in the works already cited by Silver, Bilinsky, Aspaturian and Rakowska-Harmstone.
43. John Kolasky, Two Years in Soviet Ukraine (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1970).
44. Ibid.
45. Rein Taagepera, "1970 Census: Fusion or Crystalli zation of Nationalities," Soviet Studies 23, no. 2 (October 1971):216-21 and Harry Lipset, "The Status of National Minority Languages in Soviet Education," Soviet Studies 19, no. 2 (October 1967):181-89.
46. Vardys, op. cit., p. 19.
47. Pipes, in Nogee, op. cit.; also Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Education of the Non-Russian Peoples in the USSR, 55
1917-1967/' Slavic Review 27, no. 3 (September 1968): 411-37.
48. Robert Wesson, The Soviet Russian State (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972), p. 325.
49. Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 132.
50. Dzyuba, op. cit., p. 136.
51. Aspaturian, op. cit., p. 149.
52. Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 117.
53. Roman Szporluk, "The Nations and the USSR in 1970," Survey, Autumn 1970; L. Sultan, "Turkic Peoples," in Goldhagen, op. cit.; and Rakowska-Harmstone, op. cit.
54. Robert Osborn, The Evolution of Soviet Politics (Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey Press, 1974), p. 460.
55. Connor, op. cit.
56. Lijphart, op. cit.
57. E. Bagramov, CDSP, 24, no. 25:10. Translated from Pravda, June 22, 1972.
58. Vsevolod Holubnychy, "Some Economic Aspects of Relations Among Soviet Republics," in Goldhagen, op. cit., p . 50.
59. Gertrude Schroeder, "Regional Differences in Incomes and Levels of Living in the USSR," in The Soviet Economy in Regional Perspective, ed. V. N. Bandera and Z. L. Melnyk (New York: Praeger, 1973).
60. I. S. Koropeckyj, "National Income of the Soviet Union Republics in 1970," in Economic Development in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, vol. 1: Reforms, Technology and Income Distribution, ed. Zbigniew Fallenbuchl (New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1974) .
61. Mickiewicz, op. cit., p. 38.
62. Holubnychy, op. cit.
63. Schroeder, op. cit.
64. Brian Silver, "Levels of Sociocultural Development 56
Among Soviet Nationalities: A Partial Test of the Equalization Hypothesis," APSA Paper (Tallahassee: Fl-orida State University, 1973) .
65. Zlatin and Rutgaizer, op. cit.
66. Ibid.
67. P. J. D. Wiles and S. Markowski, "Income Distribution Under Communism and Capitalism," Soviet Studies, January and April 1971, pp. 344, 487.
68. Ibid. Take for instance, the fellow whose foot is in the fire and whose hand is in the freezer, who, on the average, is quite comfortable. Similarly, "It is in the nature of averages that some must be above and others below it," Alec Nove and J. A. Newth in The Soviet Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 50.
69. Wiles and Markowski, op. cit.
70. See especially, "Report on the Immediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question," March 10, 1921, J. V. Stalin: Works, vol. 5 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953) and "Report on National Factors in Party and State Affairs," April 23, 1923.
71. Haas, op. cit.
72. Gertrude Schroeder, "Soviet Wage and Income Policies in Regional Perspective," Association for Comparative Economic Studies Bulletin (ACES), Fall 1974; Oleg Zinam, "Dilemma of Specialization Versus Autarky in the USSR," in Bandera and Melnyk, op. cit.; and N. Galay, "Economic and Military Division of the USSR," Bulletin, December 1962.
73. V. K. Gardanov, B. 0. Dolgikh, and T. A. Zhdanko, "Major Trends in Ethnic Processes Among Peoples of the USSR," Soviet Anthropology and Archaeology 1, no. 1 (Summer 1962): 3-18; also E. V. Tadevosian, "The Further Convergence of the Socialist Nations, of the USSR," in Sociology in the USSR, ed. Stephen Dunn (White Plains, N.Y.: IASP, 1969), pp. 60-69.
74. Ronald Feldman, "Interrelationships Among Three Bases of Group Integration," Sociometry 31, no. 1 (March 1968):30-46. 57
75. Russett, op. cit., p. 199.
76. Barghoorn, op. cit.
77. Rein Taagepera, "Nationalism in the Estonian Communist Party," Bulletin 17, no. 1 (January 1970):3-15.
78. Vaclav Lamser, "A Sociological Approach to Soviet Nationality Problems," in Allworth, op. cit. CHAPTER FOUR
APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
The preceding chapters have introduced a web of problems ranging from basic empirical uncertainties over the status of the Soviet National Republics and spinning to larger theoretical questions involving ethnic national ism and the role of functional ties in social-political relationships. We have found a net of competing policy principles which leave the role and relations among the
Republics undetermined. It is in the larger interest of resolving particular policy ambiguities posed above that we resort to an investigation capable of yielding a descriptive, empirical profile. As suggested earlier, it is the view of this writer that a common analytical denomi nator is available which can unite these seemingly dispar ate inquiries into a single comparative framework. In addressing the numerous empirical and theoretical questions attending Soviet policies toward its multinational federa tion of Republics, this common denominator requires some discussion.
58 59
I . The Common Denominator
Whether we refer to it as the study of
"composition" or "distribution" or "integration," this inquiry concerns the relationships among the Union
Republics. The analysis involves the development of aggre gate summary indices describing the patterns by which certain political, economic and social values are appor tioned across the fifteen political-administrative units and describing the behavioral patterns among them. The appropriateness and significance of such a compositional approach are well accepted; differences in the distribution of political, economic and social resources have been acknowledged as criteria for distinguishing among political systems since Aristotle. And even today, Robert Dahl insists that the (compositional) patterning of resources not only serves in classifying polities, but helps to characterize and determine their power structures.'*' If we seek a deeper understanding of the role of the Union
Republics in the Soviet political system, it is upon these distributional patterns that we should focus. Dahl suggests that both quantitative (degree) and qualitative
(configuration) aspects of resource allocation be 2 considered. We might thus be concerned not only with the extent of political participation throughout the constit uent SSR's, but also with the aspect involving the 60 cumulative or noncumulative nature of this variable with other resources, such as economic benefits.
Moreover, in examining the compositional character of the federation, we are, by definition, examining the general problem of integration. The term "integral" describes a general condition "made up of parts which together constitute a whole;" the verb "integrate" means to
"bring together (parts) into a whole.The present analysis attempts to identify specifically the characteris tic patterns by which the Republic "parts" are incorporated into the Soviet "whole." Measures describing how the
Soviet Republic's "sort" with respect to certain political, economic and social resources define for particular policy domains the specific pattern of relationships and inte gration obtained.
An analogy might be useful here to further clarify how this approach is intended for use. The concept of integration or composition is somewhat like the notion of
"temperature," which refers both to a broad spectrum of a whole scaling system, as well as to individual, specific measures on the scale. The operationalization of each con cept embraces an enormous variety of empirical possibili ties, including, for instance, freezing and boiling temperatures, or ranging from unitary to decentralized patterns of political incorporation. The question of 61
"what integration looks like?" goes beyond theoretical definitional specification and asks for an empirically derived response. Operationally, "integration" is no more confined to the form of ethnic assimilation or economic equality than temperature refers a priori only to 98.6° F.
Each characterization represents merely one specific pattern or type (of integration/temperature) along the broad scale or continuum of patterns encompassed by the concept. Indeed, the usefulness and interest surrounding these concepts stems from the very fact of this variablity; and the development of appropriate scaling and classifi cation systems precedes multivariate analysis.
That the process of indexing and operationalizing our concepts must not be minimized in the research design is emphasized by methodology-conscious writers like Mayer 4 and Sartori. Implementing their pleas for sound "concep tual containers" comprises the major task set forth for this chapter. Given our concern of "composition" of the
USSR, we need to establish the spectrum of possible con figurations for the constituent republics.
Three domains will be considered— political, economic and social. The scales will be considered both nominally and mathematically.
Verbally, the range of political integration can be envisioned as extending from complete domination and control by a single unit, to a pattern of autonomous, cooperative federalism; authority can be totally centralized or decen tralized evenly among Republics. A distribution of partisan affiliation, ranging as a percentage of Republic popu lation, provides a comparative index measuring the degree of participant/nonparticipant culture. Typological extremities of economic integration range from a symbiotic master-slave formula on the one hand, to symmetry and equality on the other; distribution can be discriminatory with all the goods and services received by one component, or the distribution can be uniform. Production and labor can be organized on the basis of autarky and self- sufficiency of the Republics at one extreme or on the basis of specialization, division of labor and trade. Ethnic integration can take the image of a "segmented society" characterized by isolated zuilen and communalism, or it can range to complete assimilation at the opposite end of the spectrum. It can look like diversity or uniformity; there may be intense or multiple sub-"whole" loyalties, or there may be no subsystem attachments at all. In this informal presentation of our scaling system, we can observe close parallels to those patterns conceived by the alter native Soviet policy positions cited in chapter two and whose existence was claimed or debated by scholars in 63 chapter three.
I shall pause prior to the formalization of our measures in order to emphasize what this scaling procedure does not directly address. These continua do not attempt to rate the distributional patterns according to normative criteria; questions as to whether the state is "well integrated" or "poorly integrated" depend upon (a) the empirical consequences of the patterns observed, and (b) the goals and values with which one perceives these implications. But it is crucial to recognize that these consequences cannot even be scientifically determined without prior development of the measurement system, and the accumulation of preliminary data.
It follows that these continua are not to be confused or equated with the very separate concepts of
"coherence," "stability," and "effectiveness." Rather, the patterns measured by our scale comprise potential independent variables for eventual use in the study of these complex dependent variables. It is necessary to establish first the nature of the relationships among the constituent units, before it is possible to determine their impact on such other factors. An additional danger in using these concepts moreover is one of circularity; 5 "holding together" is generally measured only retrospec tively, with the resultant perversion that our scales would 64 be used synonomously with system maintenance and persistence. Similarly, the criteria employed by Russett and Deutsch equate integration with a "favorable balance" g of "loads to capacity" or response to demands. A prefer able approach might formulate the question: are particular patterns of distribution and integration associated with differences in system maintenance and efficiency?
The measurement indices presented in this chapter address the compositional uncertainties which are basic to understanding the role of the Union Republics in Soviet policies. It is time to elaborate formally the two compositional scales which are applied.
II. Measurement: Entropy
Entropy, as formulated by Henri Theil, provides the first of two tools by which the distributional and behav ioral patterns among the Soviet Republics can be indexed.
Theil's measure is derived from and utilizes properties of information theory and probability theory.
It resembles its namesake in the physical sciences in its concern over the disposition or ordering of the pertinent variable. In short, the thermodynamic counterpart refers to the "downhill" dispersion and deconcentration of energy and posits a continual increase in this dissipated quantity, 7 which then becomes unavailable for further use. It is the 65 differentials in molecular concentration or in temperature, etc. which permit the original conversion of energy into work. The social science version of entropy formulated by
Theil, in contrast, allows a broader application. It has been employed in studies of various economic phenomena, racial diversity, equality, and partisan voting.
According to Theil, entropy is an instrument for g answering "How large is the degree of 'dividedness1?" It is best understood against the backdrop of "a general partitioning theory in the sense that it presents measures 9 for the way in which some set is divided into subsets."
Its appropriateness to our problem is thus readily apparent; it can tackle the fundamental political questions of ordering and allocation among actors competing for resources and influence within a State. Entropy scores are used here to characterize "shares" or "parts" in the
"whole" by providing summary indices of concentration/ fragmentation or dominance/diffusion or inequality/equality.
An individual entropy score can be calculated to describe the aggregate system of relationships among constituent
Republic units along any given variable of interest.
Assets include its ability to use qualitative, nominal-level data, and the fact that it is invariant to the unit of measurement. Entropy has a well-defined range, with a minimum (0) and maximum (log N) for any N. Moreover 66 it is supplementary and probably superior to such measures as the mean, variance, rank order, etc., in several ways.
Similar to variance, the perspective of entropy is on the total distribution as a whole, not only on the parts; but unlike variance, where a single score can represent quite contrasting types of distributions, entropy is less ambiguous. And whereas none of the other statistics taken alone is complete to describe a distribution, entropy alone neatly summarizes the patterning of the variable or the relative shares constituting the whole.
Comparability is a primary benefit springing from all these features. Since we can easily convert entropy into a percentage of its maximum value, we can compare all entropy scores against the extreme model of perfect homogeneity or decentralization. Or our given distribution could be compared against other alternative models pre sented in the relevant literature (e.g., the "equalization hypothesis"). This entropy measure makes it possible to compare distributions at two points in time, and to compare distributions of totally different variables. Hence policy impact in two different policy arenas could be meaning fully contrasted, say between CPSU participation and eco nomic welfare. In addition, these scores facilitate a comparison of different "wholes" or state systems. 67
The general notion of a distribution or
"dividedness" encompasses several factors not always dis tinguished. These include the number of units across which the variable is distributed (N), the total amount being distributed (unity or 100 percent), and the relative proportion of the variable which each unit (n) receives
(p^). The entropy score is a single logarithmic-based measure which summarizes these factors and gives an aggregated "report" relating all the units along an equality/inequality or decentralization/concentration con tinuum.^^ Entropy thus defines the empirical distribution obtained by variables in policy classes of our interest.
Technically it works like this: entropy as used in information theory represents an expectation of information to be received about the actual disposition of a specified variable. More information is conveyed and greater sur prise is thus generated the greater the prior uncertainty which prevailed about the distribution. And this uncer tainty about a distribution or an event is maximized when we cannot distinguish among the "parts," as when they all have the same relative frequencies or probabilities.
Maximum prior uncertainty is equivalent to maximum posterior information content, which is equivalent to maximum entropy (log N). Entropy hits its minimum, 0, on the other hand, when uncertainty is minimized, as when the 68
variable is not dispersed at all, and it remains concen
trated, with a probability or relative frequency of one, in
one single component part (n^) . In such acase, no surprise,
information or entropy is experienced,because no uncer
tainty existed in the first place.
Let H represent the entropy of any distribution
that assigns probabilities (i=l, . . . , n) to the
elements of that distribution:
n l 11 H = £ p.h(p.) where h(p.) is equal to log — . (1) i=l 1 1 pi
Entropy is never negative, takes zero value when one of the
events has unit probability, and is maximized when all n
elements have the same probability.
The principal wherein entropy is based upon the
relative frequencies with which a specified variable is sub
divided over elements of a given set, provides an appropri
ate "bridge" to the problems addressed in this dissertation.
A characterization of the way a given total is subdivided
into parts corresponds neatly to the compositional-inte-
gration approach and to the resource allocation focus noted
by Dahl. Applying the entropy paradigm to variables belonging to any particular policy domain, we can compute
an index to the empirical patterns relating Soviet
Republics. 69
It is not a distortion to refer to the Entropy
Index as a panoramic means of describing the patterning
of policy toward the Republics.
As part of our introduction of the entropy
measure, it would be valuable to present some illustrative
scores along with the hypothetical distributions they
represent and a broad discussion. We shall refrain from
imposing actual empirical references in these preliminary
examples in order to leave them as general as possible,
and so that they may constitute a "dictionary" for future
reference.
We have noted above that entropy obtains its lowest
value (at 0) when one constituent member contains the
entire variable. This is illustrated in the first graph
below (fig. 1). Say now, for example, that the share of one
component is substantial (with relative frequency equal to
.7) but that it nonetheless leaves 30 percent of the value
of the variable to be distributed among the remaining
fourteen units. What is the entropy of such a situation?
The answer, in part, depends on the precise disposition of
this residual 30 percent. Surely the entropy will have moved away from the extreme minimum since there is no
longer a perfectly "monopolistic" condition. But is this
30 percent apportioned evenly among the components or does
one have 25 percent, leaving a mere 5 percent distributed 1.0
R 9 Fig. 1 Fig. 2 E L 8 Entropy = 0 A Entropy = 51.8 % of maximum T 7 I V E 6 F 5 R E Q 4 u E N 3 C I 2 E S 1 (pi>
123456789 11 13 15 123456789 11 13 15
Constituent Parts, Members
Figs. 1 and 2. Illustrative Distributions
• - j o R E Fig. 3 Fig. 4 L A Entropy = 32.6% of maximum T Entropy = 89.5% of maximum I V E
F R E Q U E N C I E S
(p±)
5 7 8 9 11 13 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 13 15
Constituent Parts, Members
Figs. 3 and 4 . Illustrative Distributions equally to the other thirteen? Entropy in this first case is 1.40 or 51.8 percent of its maximum; in the second case entropy is .882 or only 32.6 percent of the maximum. If the reader initially finds these scores somewhat counter to his expectations, he is reminded that entropy summarizes the total distribution of relative frequencies. Whereas one might overassume the amount of disperson of the vari able in the second case from the fact that a second compon ent shares a larger chunk in it, this ignores the fuller picture. Also crucial in the entropy calculation is what has happened to the shares of the other constituent units.
In the first instance, where .30 is distributed among four teen, each unit receives a relative frequency, or share of
.021. But in the second instance, only .05 remains for distribution, with the result that thirteen of the fifteen receive much smaller portions of the "pie," only .004. In both cases, a small percentage of the members "hog" a disproportionate share of the variable— wealth or power, etc. But whether 6.7 percent of the "population" claims
70 percent of the "values" or 13.3 percent claims 95 per cent, this is only one aspect of the problem. The extent of polarization also depends upon the distribution accorded to the 93.3 percent and 86.7 percent of the population.
Some graphs will help to clarify the comparisons here.
(See figs. 2 and 3). 73
Let us, in addition, take an example in which five, or one-third of the participant units claim equal shares in the 70 percent of the item being allocated. If we assume that the other 30 percent is distributed equally among the other ten, their relative shares come to .03 each. This is greater than the shares noted in either of the earlier instances. And since the overall distribution is becoming increasingly more homogeneous, it is anticipated that the entropy score will tend more toward its maximum. This is indeed the case; entropy for such a situation is 2.425 or
89.5 percent of a maximum 100 percent.
A property of the entropy scores which may require a bit of "getting used to" is its tendency to cluster about its higher values. But this is not as arbitrary as it may at first appear. Similar to the physical analogy wherein energy flows from high to lesser concentration and entropy
(energy lost in the process) is always increasing, in the case where there is a large set of participants over which a variable is to be allocated, so is the potential of a greater dispersion, or entropy, raised. (The maximum value of entropy correspondingly increases.) The more slices of the pie we cut, the more equivalent in size the pieces tend to become. Consequently, a much greater relative dis tortion or aberration from a uniform distribution is required to obtain the greater polarization associated with 74 lower entropy scores. It is not uncommon therefore to get what we might at first regard as fairly high entropies, even though one share might be twice as large as that of another. Instead of such a pairwise perspective, entropy is determined by the overall range of relative frequencies.
And considering the range of possible distributions out of a total of 1.00, the difference between a share of .033 and
.066 is not that dramatic, despite the fact that the latter is twice the size of the former. In interpreting this study then, it is important to understand that since high values are characteristic of entropy, incremental differ ences between scores at this end of the continuum are more significant than one might initially suppose. The entropy scores used in this study will be calculated to several decimal places.
For the reader who wishes to familiarize himself further with the behavior of this measure, and make his own determinations in labeling the patterns more or less strictly, a table of sample Entropy Scores, together with the "shares" or relative frequencies (p^'s) they represent, is presented (table 1). The patterns which these distri butions reflect are visually displayed in a series of graphs (figs. 5-12).
It is desirable to develop some statistical criteria on which decisions regarding the significance of 75
TABLE 1
ENTROPY DICTIONARY
Relative Frequencies Entropy Score % Maximum
Px P 2 P 3 P 4 P15
1.00 (0___ ) 0 0% .95 (.0036....) . 3305 12.2% .92 .05 (.002___ ) . 382 14.1% . 85 0 0 (.0125___ ) . 8015 29.60% . 80 .10 .05 (.004___ ) . 822 30.35% .51 .34 (.0115___ ) 1. 3795 50.94% .20 .20 .20 .20 (.018 ....) 2.083 76.93% .40 (.043___ ) 2.256 83.3% . 30 .15 .10 .05 (.036 ___ ) 2.345 86 .6% . 30 (.05 . . . . ) 2.458 90.77% . 26 .08 (.05....) 2 . 512 92.74% .21 .14 (.05___ ) 2.550 94.17% .20 (. 057____) 2.612 96.44% .15 (.061___ ) 2.666 98.44% .01 (.0707___ ) 2.669 98.55% .085 .015 (.069___ ) 2.676 98.81% .07 .03 (.069 ___ ) 2.695 99 .5% .05 .05 (.069 ___ ) 2.703 99.81% .05 (.0679____) 2.706 99.91% .0667 (.0667___ ) 2.708 100% R E Fig. 5 Fig. 6 L A Entropy 12.2 T Entropy 14.1% I Diversity 10.42% Diversity 16.19% V E
F R E Q u E N C I E S
123456789 11 13 15 123456789 11 13 15
Constituent Parts, Members
Figs. 5 and 6. Distributions from Dictionary R E L Fig. 7 A Fig. 8 T I Entropy = 29.6% Entropy = 30.35% V Diversity = 29.53% E Diversity = 37.21%
F R E Q u E N C I E S
123456789 11 13 15 123456789 11 13 15
Constituent Parts, Members
Figs. 7 and 8. Distributions from Dictionary R E L A T I V Fig E Fig. 10
F Entropy 99.5% Entropy 99.81% R Diversity 99.89% E Diversity 99.98 Q U E N C I E S
123456789 11 13 15 123456789 11 13 15
Constituent Parts, Members
Figs. 9 and 10. Distributions from Dictionary
CO R E L A T I V 1.0 Fig. 11 E Fig. 12
.9 F Entropy = 99.91% Entropy = 100% R . 7 Diversity = 99.96% E Diversity = 100% Q u E .5 N C .3 I E S
< P i >
123456789 11 13 15 123456789 11 13 15
Constituent Parts, Members
Figs. 11 and 12. Distributions from Dictionary
\D 80
these entropy scores can be based. We would like to be able to determine if two entropy scores are statistically different, or if an entropy score varies statistically
from a hypothesized score. We turn here to the Z Test from hypothesis testing of the normal distribution. To use the Z Test on our entropy scores, it is necessary to view entropy in the context of sampling theory. In this sense, entropy must be seen as a random variable distribu- 12 ted normally. Theil details this formulation.
Under the testing procedure, both a null hypothesis and an alternative must be set forth. The null hypothesis in this study is that of maximum entropy, that is, a uni form distribution of the given variable across the Union
Republics. The alternative hypothesis is that entropy is less than maximum, the variable being heterogeneously distributed. It follows that in assigning a critical region for acceptance or rejection of the null hypothesis, a one-tailed test is selected (and Z scores will be reported in their absolute values). A 95 percent confidence level is used throughout most of this study.
Ill. Measurement: Lieberson's Diversity Index
The second instrument which is employed to characterize overall policy impact on the Union Republics 13 is a "diversity measure" presented by Stanley Lieberson. 81
Lieberson states that "this method has a wide range of applications, including such phenomena as attitudinal consensus, political cleavage, residential isolation, linguistic communication, cohesion, as well as the general diversity of populations."14 Accordingly, diversity measures are sought here in order to ascertain the simi larity of treatment toward the fifteen members of the
Soviet federation; this approach is conducted for policies ranging from migration and Russian "colonial" settlements, to ethnic intermarriage, to economic productivity and trade.
A continuum is envisioned, the extremities of which span conditions of homogeneity and heterogeneity. The degree of diversity (for a given population, along a given variable) is an empirically determined position on this continuum.
Like the entropy measure, the continuum is bounded by a minimum and a maximum, in this case, 0 and 1-1/N, respectively. Unlike the entropy concept however, diver sity is not derived from information theory. It is based instead, on the principles of permutations. The reader will probably find this the more familiar and straight forward of the two measures. But the use of both will serve to check and strengthen the reliability of our find ings and broaden somewhat the interpretation assigned to them. The operationalization of this Diversity Index is not much more complicated than the task of determining one's chances of winning a lottery, assuming it is known how many competing numbers are in the drum with one's own.
Again, as with entropy, we are concerned with relative frequencies as components of a total distribution.
The Index describing this distribution is,in a sense, a reflection of the weights or shares contributed by the constituent elements. "Diversity" is calculated as "the probability that randomly paired members of a population 15 will be different on a specified characteristic." For our purposes the members being paired are defined by the
Republics' individual relative frequencies (p^'s) which sum to one, on any given variable.
Computationally, the Lieberson Index uses a quadratic function of a polynomial incorporating these p^'s. The expansion of the multiplication expresses all the possible random pairs which the given N can produce.
The expansion includes those pairs which are alike and those which differ, such that the overall similarity (S) of the distribution is represented by:
S = Pi + P2 + P3 ••• P15 (2) and the diversity, 1-S is equal to: 83
1 - Epi2 . (3)
'<* * This score can be standardized as a percentage of its maximum by the following modification:
When all the p ^ 's are equal, as in a uniform distribution,
D will obtain its maximum value. When any one of the p^1s is one or monopolizes the entire content of the variable,
D will be 0.
A table is offered which displays the diversity scores for illustrative sets of p^'s. For comparative convenience, these relative frequencies will be the same as those for which entropy scores and histograms were presented in the preceding section.
The close similarity of the Diversity Index and the Entropy Index renders them practically interchangeable.
The Lieberson measure also tends to cluster around its maximum values as we noted with the entropy scale. And it is typical for the diversity score for any given set of relative frequencies to be a slightly higher percent of its maximum than the corresponding entropy score (the table reveals only two exceptions). 84
TABLE 2
DIVERSITY DICTIONARY
Relative Frequencies Lieberson % Maximum Diversity Score
... p 15 Pi P2 P 3 P4 ......
1.00 (0___ ) 0 0% . 95 (.0036 ___ ) .0973 10.42% .92 .05 (.002___ ) .1511 16.19% .85 0 0 (.0125... .) .2756 29.53% .80 .10 .05 (.004 . .) .3473 37.21% .51 .34 (.0115___ ) .6226 66.71% .20 .20 .20 .20 (• 018___ ) .8364 89.61% .40 (. 043___ ) .8141 87.22% .30 .15 .10 .05 (. 036....) .8607 92.22% .30 (.05___ ) .875 93.75% . 26 .08 (.05....) .8931 95.69% .21 .14 (.05... .) .9038 96 .84% .20 (.057___ ) .9145 97.98% .15 (.061___ ) .9254 99.15% .01 (.0707___ ) .9300 99 .64% .085 .015 (.069... .) .9307 99.72% .07 .03 (.069 ___ ) .9323 99.89% .05 .05 (.069 ___ ) .9331 99 .98% .05 (.0679___ ) .933 99.96% .0667 (.0667___ ) .93333 100% 85
In only two instances in these dictionaries are the two scores inconsistent. This discrepancy reflects a difference in the way each scale is computed. The Diver sity Index shows more sensitivity to the size of a single component, giving greater relative weighting to a large deviation from the other scores in the distribution.
Entropy in contrast, is sensitive to the overall size of all the individual deviations from 1/N. This occasional peculiarity does no harm to our study, and perhaps enhances it, since both emphases are of interest in and incorporated into our interpretation.
IV. Methodology Overview
This chapter has introduced two scaling systems which are employed in examining Soviet policy toward its
Union Republics. It provides "dictionaries" and graphs for referencing sample scores and the distributions they represent. The utility of a broad comparative theoretical context is suggested. And it is demonstrated how a compo- sition-integration focus serves as "common denominator" linking these procedural tools back to address our substantive inquiry.
Subsequent chapters will rely heavily on the foundation laid in chapters two to four. From earlier discussions of the Soviet policy dilemmas will come the 86 problems analyzed below. Tentative judgments and speculations tendered in the literature section are refined by applying the techniques presented here.
The analysis is subdivided according to general policy domain: political, economic and social. Republic- level data were sought which could cast light on the impact and direction of federal policy. When possible, data were selected to span a time period, in order to assess poten tial change and the effect of major all-Union events.
Efforts were made to assure systematic and comprehensive data in preference over a limited case-study approach.
Yet, despite these efforts, not all criteria were met in all cases. Sources for data sets are properly noted at the end of each chapter. In addition to Soviet census data, statistical and budget handbooks, they include some secondary materials, gathered and presented by scholars in the field. 87
Notes--Chapter Four
1. Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963).
2. Ibid., p . 3 3.
3. The American College Dictionary (New York: Random House, 1964) .
4. G. Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," APSR, December 1970; and Lawrence Mayer, Comparative Political Inquiry (Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey Press, 1972) .
5. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Old Societies and New States, ed. C. Geertz (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); also Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" World Politics, April 1972.
6. Bruce Russett, International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," APSR, September 1961.
7. Isaac Asimov, "A Law We Can't Break," in Skeptic, Special Issue 5; and Henri Theil, Economics and Information Theory (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub lishing Company, 1967), pp. 19-20, 26.
8. Henri Theil, Statistical Decomposition Analysis (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1972), p . 1.
9. Theil, Information Theory, op. cit., p. 19.
10. The use of logarithms is justified because they provide a weighting system with properties of addi tivity, without concern over ordering and independence.
11. Theil, Decomposition, op. cit., p. 6.
12. Theil, ibid., pp. 10-11.
13. Stanley Lieberson, "Measuring Population Diversity," The American Sociological Review, December 1969, pp. 850-62. 88
14. Ibid., p. 850.
15. Ibid., p. 851. CHAPTER FIVE
IMPACT OF POLITICAL POLICIES
I. Restating the Political Questions
It is clear, from the background presented in
Chapters Two and Three, that the role of the Union
Republics in the Soviet political federation is ambiguous.
Not only are discrepancies found between theory and prac tice, but also among different theories and within prac tice. The most palpable inconsistency is the contrast between federal form which characterizes governmental institutions, and the unitary and central structure that the Party organization takes. Inherent to this duality are the uncertain priorities and rights which go into defining the status of the Republics. The Chinese charge that some Soviet nations are no more than "straightforward colonies" of Moscow.^ The Soviets return the attack and claim, in contrast, that the alliance is "voluntary",
"fraternal" and "cooperative". Historic documents are cited to confirm the foundation of "sovereignty and equality" upon which the Union is based. Moreover the
Russian nation asserts that it has "unselfishly" 90 2 abdicated its pre-1917 privileged position as "ruler".
We pose this general question for investigation:
Do all the Union Republics carry equivalent political weight, or does the Russian SFSR dominate and discrim inate against some of the others in a position as "first" among nation?
In the process of addressing this inquiry a
number of subsidiary questions arise. Let us focus ini
tially upon the CPSU.
A number of authors point out the tendency of the
All-Union Party to become identified with the Russian 3 nation (and with the Russian ethnic group). And public
statements made by Party leaders indicate little aversion
to, or attempt to modify this impression. It is already
noted that only the Russian Republic has no separate Party
hierarchy distinct from the Center. That the "Great
Russian people played an outstanding role in the formation, 4 strengthening and development of the USSR", that "their
revolutionary energy" commanded the leadership position in
1917, during collectivization and during World War II, and
that the Russians should receive paragraphs of special
adulation as the "elder brother", "model" and "teacher"
are premises challenged ironically only at the risk of being labeled a local separatist or bourgeois nationalist.
However, Lenin's writings no more condone this Russian national chauvinism than they do that defensive 91
"narrowmindedness" associated with the victimized nations.
This brings us to formulate the following questions:
(A) What is the pattern of Party strength and recruit
ment? Does membership distribution reflect a concern
for parity in representation (as in government's
Soviet of Nationalities) or is it disproportionately
supportive of particular Republic interests?
There are several isolated studies which suggest that, numerically, Russians dominate the Party, and that the 5 Party finds its strongest support m Russian areas. We shall be examining CPSU and Komsomol membership data for clues.^
Similarly we shall pursue the nature of Soviet policy toward cadres. Like membership this aspect of politics has fluctuated: policy has varied from
"indigenization" (the effort to create a grass-roots, native elite) to extreme sanctions against any evidence of local ties or "family groups". An old Chinese approach to remedy the centrifugal impact of the latter, incidentally, was to rotate provincial governors every few years. Observers have indeed noted such a response 7 . . in some instances by Soviet leaders. The impression is that Russians are settled in insecure, non-Russian areas, while native specialists are dispersed from their Repub- g lies across the country. The Soviets refer 92
euphemistically to this policy as a friendly and fraternal
"cadre exchange". Some observers find indications that an
informal quota system is in operation for selecting 9 Republic personnel; others point to tokenism toward minority groups and emphasize that the Russians are placed
in any meaningful posts of authority. On the other hand,
the Soviet press contains not a few attacks against na
tive bureaucracies for discriminating in their Republics
against the immigrant Russians.^ In this chapter the backgrounds of high-level Republican cadres are examined in an attempt to ascertain;
(B) What sort of ethnic-national criteria apply in the
selection of Republic political personnel? Does the
present policy tend toward the principles of
1korenizatsiya1 or are the Republic elites composed
of Russian (Slavic) watchdogs? What patterns of
geographic mobility and tenure can be identified and
are there distinctions between European and Asian
(Christian and Moslem) areas?
In addition some migration data will be employed 12 to address more fully the problem of "colonialism".
(C) Do Russians tend to migrate randomly to the other
Union Republics or do immigrants concentrate their
settlements in certain of the Republics? Do
Russians comprise equivalent percentages of urban 93
populations in all Republics?
Participation in military and security forces presents another theme for this investigation. Scholars
such as Szporluk, Vardys and Barghoorn note that the troops 13 stationed along border areas are primarily Russians.
One assumption underlying a policy of this nature would appear to stem from the desire to intimidate or minimize
forces of irredentism arising from non-Soviet Eastern
European, Chinese, Moslem or Turkic quarters. And that the Russians regard the other Republics as "unreliable" is contended by several studies which have pointed to the disproportionate numbers of non-Russian political 14 prisoners. Unfortunately no data could be located to test these claims directly, though we will be able to draw inferences from the data which we do have. Then there are frequent assertions that the military constitutes a 15 "powerful blender" of nations, that the army is a 16 17 "Russian agency", a "Russifier", or that the draft 18 rates favor Slavic areas and Russian-speaking people.
In order to tap the degree of Soviet concern over certain Republics we might focus upon the bureaucratic and administrative attention directed toward them. Con scription data and governmental budget expenditures are used^ 4 - to answer: 19
(D) How are expenditures on governmental operations 94
distributed among the federal units; are more
resources channeled into some Republic establishments
than their size would warrant? What is the Republic
composition of the Armed Forces and do all Republics
contribute a proportionate number of draftees?
We shall now begin to review the evidence pertaining to these questions.
II. The Evidence
A. Party Membership
A decentralized and nondiscriminatory pattern of participation is found to characterize the general rank and file membership and candidate membership of the Party and Komsomol across the Union Republics for the decade spanning 1960-1970. This strong pattern does not hold however for those members constituting the higher
All-Union level Party bodies such as the Central Committee.
Data presenting Republic Party and Komsomol 20 membership were taken for three years during the decade.
Each figure was standardized by the Republic's population for that year. Entropy and diversity scores were then calculated for each set of fifteen, and these scores turned out to be extremely high. The significance test devised for our Entropy measure was applied to these data.
In all six cases, using the 1-tailed test and at a 95 percent confidence level, we accept the null hypothesis that membership in the CPSU and Komsomol is distributed uniformly across the fifteen Republics. (Z scores for
CPSU membership across Republics were 1.592 for 1960,
1.113 for 1965, and 1.777 for 1968.) In 1960 for Party membership (including candidates) the Entropy Index was
2.658, or 98.15 percent of maximum, and the Lieberson
Index was .9266 or 99.28 percent of its maximum. The reader still adjusting to these measures might be in terested that the mean of the members/capita in all the
Republics was .0664 and the variance was .00084.
If we look at the relative frequencies, a per fectly equal membership distribution (Entropy and
Lieberson scores obtaining 100 percent of their maximum) would have required that each Republic contribute .0667 of the total membership (1.0). As the graph of the p V indicates, this is very nearly the case. The range is small and all the relative frequencies lie within two standard deviations of .0667. All this supports the original interpretation given to our high Entropy and
Lieberson indices that the Party membership figures show very little diversity. In 1965, Entropy of Party member ship increased to 2.683 (or 99.09 percent of max.) and in 1968 it slid back just slightly, to 2.680 (or 98.96 percent max.). The corresponding diversity scores were RELATIVE FREQUENCIES (PiJ rank and file, as well as the Supreme Soviet is subject to constraints of democratic centralism. The minor "two steps forward, one step backward" irregularity in these data poses a curious, if not terribly significant puzzle to resolve. My tentative explanation would center around the transition in regime occurring in the mid 1960s, with Khrushchev's ouster and the shift to the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership. It is not uncommon during such periods, in order to ensure broad support for the new crew, to appeal to the wider audience and to expand con cessions. The overall trend stands as one of regional homogeneity and this is probably still valid, despite recent murmurs of toughening up membership standards (since new standards are of a general nature and do not distinguish among Republics). Does the federal composition of the membership ^lter as we investigate higher levels of Party organization Is the All-Union Party at its top levels a Russian Party? Are the Russians the "vanguard" of the Party, just as the Party is the "vanguard" of the Proletariat? 99 As of the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress in 1971, the Politburo consisted of fifteen members and six candidate members. Biographic data reveal that of the former, eight, and of the latter, three, were born and educated in the 21 Russian Republic or were ethnically Russian. An ad ditional five of the regular members and one candidate were from Slavic regions--either the Ukrainian or Belorussian SSR's. Thus, four out of the twenty-one indi viduals on the highest decision-making body in the USSR represented in a nominal or descriptive sense, non-Slavic regions. The Entropy of this distribution is low, .439 of a maximum .693, or 63.35 percent, reflecting the domi nant role of the Slavic republic "sons" in Soviet politics. (How many U.S. Presidents and VP's has New York produced relative to the other parts of the country?) For the sake of perspective however, in 1970 the three Slavic nations housed 76.99 percent of the Soviet population, and the Slavic ethnic element accounted for 74 percent of the total. The bias is therefore not as extreme as one might initially assume. And when these population figures are taken into account, Entropy increases to .668 or 96.39 percent of its maximum, indicating only a slight relative discrimination to the advantage of the Slavs in the Politburo. My findings support the contention by Robert Wesson that "since 1964 all secretaries of the Central Committee 100 22 have been Russian." What is the case for the Central Committee as a whole? Borys Levytsky has done an analysis on the 1966 Central Committee in which members were cataloged as to 23 their ethnic origin. He reports that although ethnic Russians comprised 57 percent of the population, they com prised 65 percent of the body's regular membership and 70 percent of the candidates. Here we shall refine his deter mination that "Russians are much more strongly represented among members and candidate members than can be justified by their proportion of the Soviet population" by extending his analysis with the procedures introduced for this 24 study. Both the members and candidates were summed for each ethnic group and these fifteen scores were treated in three different ways. In one instance, they were standard ized according to the total population for each particular ethnic group; in the second instance standardization proceeded according to Republic population; and in the third, no controls were added to the raw figures. Entropy and diversity Indices were then calculated on each set, with the following results. Figures 14, 15, and 16 depict the relative frequencies of the Republics on the CC variables. > 101 NOTE R 1.0 Figure 14 Treatment 1 E 1 a RSFSR L .9 2 a Ukraine A ENTROPY =• 94. 68% 3 a Belorussia T 4 a Uzbekistan .7 I DIVERSITY » 97.63% 5 = Kazakhstan V 6 = Georgia .5 E 7 a Azerbaidzhan 8 a Lithuania .3 F 9 a Moldavia R g 10 a Latvia 11 a Kirgizia a .1 Q 12 a Tadzhikistan u 13 a Armenia E 14 a Turkmenia .0667 N 15 a Estonia C I * # • a a under partial magnification E .0250 S 123456789 TI 13 TF Figure 15 Treatment 2 Figure 16 Treatment 3 L 1.0 ENTROPY = 87.22% A ENTROPY ■ 46.46% T .9 DIVERSITY = 92.66% I DIVERSITY = 56.61% V .7 v F .5 R E .3 Q U g 3 .1 N C .0750 I E .05 S • * * t .0250 i (Pi) 123456789 11 13 15 123456789 11 13 15 REPUBLICS Figures 14, 15, and 16. Relative Frequency Distribution of 1966 Central Committee Membership 102 TABLE 4 CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP ENTROPY DIVERSITY TREATMENT SCORE % MAX. SCORE % MAX. 1 2.564 94.69% .9112 97.63% 2 2.362 87.22% .8648 92.66% 3 1.258 46.46% .5284 56.61% In no case do we find the extreme degree of homo geneity on the Central Committee that was accorded the nations in their Party and Komsomol membership at large. In fact, when no controls are introduced to cushion the effects of size, the situation is even more polarized than in the Politburo. The relative frequencies in Case 3 reveal that Central Committee seats are 'reserved' for Ukrainians and Russians, with Armenians (rather surprisingly) and Belorussians claiming a deputy or apprentice-type position behind them. This writer is of the perspective however that the raw figures, without con sidering the factor of Republic size or ethnic population, as in the controlled cases, can be misleading. Our significance test for treatment number two where we controlled for Republic size dictates that we reject the hypothesis of a uniform distribution of CC 103 members across Republics. (Z score = 3.747) The weight taken by the Armenians on the Central Committee is demonstrated much more vividly in this second instance, where their standardized relative frequency is clearly the dominant share. An explanation of this favor itism will remain for later discussion, but given the con text claiming Slavic dominance, one might hypothesize that the Armenians could represent a highly reliable, if not Russified group. Their preeminence in the Central Committee is similarly noted in the first situation, des pite the higher overall degree of uniformity noted when the size of the total ethnic group is taken into account. To synthesize this portion of the evidence then, there are slight distinctions in the operation of Soviet federal principles depending upon the level of analysis. Participation rates per capita in the Communist Party and its Youth League are practically invariant across Repub lics. With respect to the more authoritative positions, a less uniform policy applies. This nonuniformity in some ways reflects the position of Slavs as an actual (even if declining in the late 70s) plurality in the USSR. In the opinion of this writer, the impression of extreme Russian chauvinism, or a version of Michels 'iron law1 are unwarranted on the basis of Republic Party activity. B. Political Leadership The three Republic political positions which have received the most scholarly attention are the First and Second Party Secretaries and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Background data was amassed on individuals holding these offices in 1960 and 1970, and efforts were made to categorize cadre recruitment policies on the basis 25 of differing career service patterns. One major observation which comes out of this analysis is that the dichotomy made so frequently in the literature between Russian and native cadres is oversimplified. It totally obscures the distinctions between these "pure" types and say, those nonparochial leaders who, though native communists to the local Repub lic have spent much of their early careers in the RSFSR and were socialized into a Slavic community, or for in stance those who, though ethnically Russian, have spent more than ten years of service solely in one other Republic. At least five general patterns of geographic mo bility can be identified among these Republic personnel. We shall regard "native Communists" as those either born in or ethnically affiliated with the Republics, who have been active in only that Republic's organizations. A single, brief period in the army during World War II, or the receipt of a degree from a Russian university will not, 105 for the purpose of this study, automatically "Russify" these cadres. (Attending the University of North Carolina does not make a Bostonian a Southerner; the precise impact of this experience on him is indeterminate without much further research.) On the other hand, repeated returns from the "home" Republic to the RSFSR, in which a single purpose, e.g., education, is compounded by army duty and/or Party service, is perceived as a distinct job pattern, for which we shall (arbitrarily) offer the title of "bi lateral shuttler". Such a pattern might be illustrated by the career of Estonian First Secretary, I. G. Kebin. Taagepera refers to him as a "Yestonian", indicating the 2 6 probability of a duality of official loyalties. Or perhaps the shuttle reflects a harnessing effort by the Center. Another group of leaders can be identified whose careers awkwardly fall between the "Russian" and "native" poles. These are the cadres who, though perhaps born and educated in Russia, have only served in one other Republic where they have been active in a number of functions for approximately ten years. "Decaders" are not part of an "indigenization" program, but such a pattern does appear to open the doors to the sort of local vested interests which have concerned the Soviet press. Though it is hard to ascertain the degree of Russian'nost associated with such leaders, one might deduce from the length of their 106 TABLE 5 ELITE BACKGROUND 1971 Politburo Composition, National Origina L. I. Brezhnev, Russian Candidates: V. V. Grishin, Russian A. P. Kirilenko, Russian Yu. V. Andropov, Russian A. N. Kosygin, Russian P. N. Demichev, Russian F. D. Kulakov, Russian P. M. Masherov, Belorussian D. A. Kunayev, Kazakh V. P. Mzhavadnadze, Georgian K. T. Mazurov, Belorussian Sh. R. Rashidov, Uzbek A. Ya. Pel'she, Latvian D. F. Ustinov, Russian N. V. Podgorny, Ukrainian D. S. Polyansky, Ukrainian V. V. Shcherbitsky, Ukrainian A. N. Shelepin, Russian P. Ye. Shelest, Ukrainian aderived from Levytsky, The M. A. Suslov, Russian Soviet Political Elite. G.I. Voronov, Russian Footnote 25 lists the re maining sources. Secretariat, 1971 I. V. Kapitonov, Russian K. F. Katushev, Russian F. D. Kulakov, Russian B. N. Ponomaryov, Russian M. S. Solomentsev, Russian a 1966 Central Committee Representation Russians 236 Georgians 3 Kirgizes 2 Ukrainians 60 Azerbaidzhanis 2 Tadzhiks 2 Belorussians 13 Lithuanians 3 Armenians 14 Uzbeks 5 Moldavians 2 Turkmenis 3 Kazakhs 5 Latvians 3 Estonians 3 (including candidate members) TABLE 6 LEADERSHIP PATTERNS Chairman of Republic Council of Ministers 1960 1970 RSFSR D. S. Polyansky, Ukrainian G. I. Voronov. "Native Communist" Ukraine N. T. Kalchenko, "Nat. Comm." V. V. Shcherbitsky, "Nat. Comm." Belorussia T. Ya. Kiselev, "Bi-lateral Shuttler " . . ... ____ Uzbekistan A. Alimov, "Native Comm." R. Kurbanov, "Native Communist" Kazakhstan D. A. Kunayev, "Native Comm." B. A. Ashimov, "Bi-lat. Shutt." Georgia G. D. Dzhavakhishvili, "Native Communist"------► Azerbaidzhan M. A. Iskenderov, "Nat. Comm." E. N. Alikhanov, "Nat. Comm." Lithuania M. Iu. Shumauskas, "Nat. Comm." I. A. Manyushis, "Nat. Comm." Moldavia A. F. Diorditsa, "Decader" P. A. Paskar, "Native Communist" Latvia la. V. Peyve, "Decader" V. P. Ruben, "Native Communist" Kirgizia K. D. Dikambaev, "Nat. Comm." A. S. Suyumbayev, "Nat. Comm." Tadzhikistan N. Dodkhudev, "Nat. Comm.” A. Kakharov, "Nat. Comm." Armenia Kochinyan, "Nat. Comm." B. A. Muradyan, "Nat. Comm." Turkmenia A. A. Annaliev, "Nat. Comm." 0. N. Orazmukhamedov, ? Estonia A. A. Myurisep, "Bi-lat. Shut." V. I. Klauson, "Bi-lat. Shutt." Republic First Secretary 1960 1970 Ukraine N. V. Podgorny, "Nat. Comm." P. Ye. Shelest, "Nat. Comm." Belorussia K. T. Mazurov, "Nat. Comm." P. M. Masherov, "Nat. Comm." Uzbekistan Sh. R. Rashidov, "Nat. Comm." ------Kazakhstan N. I. Belyaev, Russian D. A. Kunzvev, "Nat. Comm." Georgia V. P. Mzhavanadze, "Rover" E. A. Shevardnadze, "Nat. Comm." TABLE 6— Continued Chairman of Republic Council of Ministers 1960 1970 Azerbaidzhan V. Yu.. Akhundov, "Nat. Comm." G. A. Aliev, ? Lithuania A. Yu.. Snechkus, "Nat. Comm."--- -- ► Moldavia Z. T. Serdyuk, "Rover" I. I. Bodyul, "Bi-lat. Shutt." Latvia A. Y. Pelshe, "Bi-lat. Shutt." A. E. Voss, "Decader" Kirgizia I. R. Razzakov, "Bi-lat. Shutt." T. Usubaliev, "Bi-lat. Shutt." Tadzhikistan T. Uldzhabaev, "Nat. Comm." D. R. Rasulov, "Bi-lat. Shutt." Armenia S. A. Tovmasyan, "Nat. Comm." A. Ye. Kochinyan, "Nat. Comm." Turkmenia D. D. Karaev, "Decader" M. Gapurov, "Nat. Comm." Estonia I. G. Kebin, "Bi-lat. Shutt."--- — ► Republic Second Secretary 1960 1970 Ukraine L. I. Naidek, "Nat. Comm." I. K. Lutak, "Decader" Belorussia F. A. Surganov, "Nat. Comm."------► Uzbekistan F. Y. Titov, Russian V. G. Lomonosov, Russian Kazakhstan N. N. Rodionov, Russian V. N. Titov, Ukrainian Georgia P. V. Kovanov, Russian P. A. Rodionov, Russian Azerbaidzhan V. E. Semichastny, "Rover" has V. Kozlov, ? Lithuania B. S. Sharkov, ? V. I. Kharazov, ? Moldavia I. I. Bodyul, "Bi-lat. Shutt." Yu . D. Mel’kov, Russian Latvia V. K. Kruminsh, "Decader" N. A. Belukha, Ukrainian TABLE 6— Continued Republic Second Secretary 1960 1970 Kirgizia Si. A. Gavrilov, "Rover" A. P. Chubarov, Russian Tadzhikistan P. S. Obnosov, "Decader" I. G. Koval, Ukrainian Armenia Y. N. Zarobyan, "Rover" G. A. Ter-Gazaryants, "Bi-lat. Shutt." Turkmenia F. A. Grishaenkov, "Decader" V. N. Rvkov, Russian Estonia L. N. Lentsman, "Decader" A. P. Vader, "Decader" £ ^Prior to Kozlov the office was held by P. >1. Yelistratov, "Rover". Prior to Kharazov, the office was held by B. V. Popov, "Rover". Gavrilov came into office in 1961 actually; information on his predecessor, V. E. Stopkin, was incomplete. 110 tenure that they were able to forge a successful synthesis of Russian and minority features. This is presumed to be the case, among others for L. N. Lentsman, former Second Secretary in Estonia and A. F. Diorditsa, Chairman of 27 Moldavia's Council of Ministers in 1960. A fourth broad category will be referred to as "rovers", since their careers have taken them to a number of different regions. Performing in several capacities throughout the RSFSR is a regular part of the rover's service. Their superior geographical/regional mobility can be interpreted in two ways however: the Soviets might assert that these cadres represent a truly international spirit of selfless coopera- tion--the goal to which all the socialist peoples are striving. Other observers could counter that such career patterns belong to versatile 'trouble-shooters', whose talents are coopted by, and in order to further, a privi leged and controlling ruling elite. Finally we come to those cadres who are generally known as "Russians". Their backgrounds reveal no evidence of experience outside the RSFSR (usually confined, in fact, to the European oblasti) prior to that in the republic in which each is found at the time of this analysis. They have not worked their way up within the Republic hierarchy, as the "decaders" have done, but seem to be on temporary assignment as a cap placed on top of a half-used bottle. A couple of Ukrainians Ill similarly fit in this category as well. Some Western scholars maintain that Soviet policy pronouncements for cadre "exchange" are in fact justifica tions for Russian backup personnel behind a minority PR front. Rywkin emphasizes this tendency in Asian Republics, where the Second Secretary in charge of appointments is 2 8 typically Russian. And the large numbers of native minorities which are given the Council of Minister chair manships presumably are explained by the relative lack of 29 real authority contained in this post. One hypothesis is that the mobility of the Russians is lateral or horizontal, while that of the other groups is vertical within their 30 own Republics. Though the categories used here are more refined than in previous studies, these general tendencies are not significantly challenged. A large majority of Council Ministry Chairmen were, as expected, "native Communists": ten out of fifteen in 1960 and eleven out 31 of fourteen in 1970. Seven (of fourteen) Party First Secretaries in 1960, and eight (of thirteen) in 1970 were "native Communists" as compared to two in this category for either year as Second Secretary found in the Slavic Repub lics. In 1960 however the plurality of Second Secretaries were "decaders" whereas only by 1970 had this pattern changed to favor the Russians and Ukrainians described by Rywkin. The decline moreover in "decaders" and 112 corresponding persistence in the number of "bi-laterals" suggests a possible tightening or defensive reaction by the Brezhnev group. The disappearance of "rovers" from these levels in the later year might suggest a new priority of regional political specialization, a concession that the internationalization process is progressing slower than desired. And the generally shorter periods of tenure for Republic leaders relative to those of the All-Union Party (which, as noted, is also the Party of the Russian SSR) similarly reflects the concern by the Center over the reliability of regional cadres. Whole waves of replace ments occurred in 1971, 1969, and the mid-1960s, etc. On the other hand, beyond the context of the Russians' centripetal and leading role in cadre recruitment, no further discrimination is perceived: the Russians treat the other fourteen regions uniformly. This researcher cannot find evidence which makes clear distinction in the policy for high-level cadres among the different republics. Asian SSR's do not receive consistently different treatment on this variable, from for instance, the Baltic SSR's. C. Russian Political Colonialism? The policy of "exchanges" is encouraged at all levels. Accordingly, a prominent Soviet academician boasts: "there is an expanding participation of people 113 in all nationalities in the affairs, not only of their own, 32 but of other Republics." But the evidence in the litera ture suggests a one-way direction of participation in such exchanges. Deliberate Russian "colonialism" in non-Russian Republics has been deplored by foreign commentators and the 33 Soviet underground alike. Protests demonstrate fears by some minorities that Russian settlements are designed to dilute their populations and thereby eliminate the bases of their national existence. It is recalled that one criterion for Union Republic status is an ethnic majority in the population; it was supposedly upon this rationale that the Union Republic status of the Karelo- 34 Finnish Republic was demoted in the 1950s. Theoretically, the status of two other republics is currently threatened by similar revision. We are interested in questions of discrimination and political "reliability". Do the Russian 'colonialists' display "favoritism" in settling the different regions? Are the Ukrainians "picked on" because of historical resistance arising from some sections of that republic? Has the higher birth rate of Asian populations succeeded in weakening or camouflaging Russian efforts to outnumber them in their own Republics? Analytically there are two problems entwined here. The first is to determine to which Republics the Russians 114 are directed to migrate, out of the total number of Russians settling in non-Russian Republics. This requires examining the raw numbers of Russians in each Republic, and subjecting these values to our Entropy and diversity scales.^ TABLE 7 RUSSIAN MIGRATION TO NON-RUSSIAN REPUBLICS ENTROPY DIVERSITY YEAR SCORE % MAX. SCORE % MAX. 1959 1. 812 6 8 . 6 6 £ .7388 79.56% (N = 14) 1970 1. 787 67.71% .7373 79.40% These figures however only depict part of the policy situation. The second problem is to determine the impact of Russian influx on the population composition in the Republics. Due to differences in size of fertility rates of native populations, the raw numbers of Russian immi grants may be very misleading. The precise impact of "exchange" on the composition of the Republics depends on both the net number of Russians and the political/ demographic dynamics of the native minorities. The materials presented above are thus supplemented with the proportions of the Republic population obtained by the 3 6 Russian settlers. 115 TABLE 8 RUSSIAN PROPORTIONS OF NON-RUSSIAN REPUBLICS' POPULATIONS ENTROPY DIVERSITY YEAR SCORE % MAX. Z SCORE SCORE % MAX. 1959 2.4742 93.75% Z = 2.854 .9030 97.24% (N = 14) 1970 2.4745 93.12% Z = 3.026 .9009 97.02% These Entropy :scores are found in that five percent of the significance test curve which causes us to reject the null hypothesis of uniform settlement. It must be concluded that the Russians clearly have a nonuniform, discriminatory pattern of settlement across the Republics, and that this bias is increasing slightly over time. This statement should be qualified to the degree that the impact of their settlement results in considerably less diversity in Republic compositions than the initial disparities alone would predict. Yet it is still not possible to argue that the Russian presence is distributed evenly without any regard to Republic borders. Over the decade all the Republics except Georgia show a net growth in their Russian populations. However this growth did not result in an increase in the percentage of Russians in most of the Asian or Turkic Republics. 116 Armenia consistently demonstrates the lowest attraction for Russian 'colonialists' and the least weight they play in terms of a Republic's Russian composition. The largest number of the Russians found in "fraternal diaspora" is found in the Ukraine. Kazakhstan contains the next largest supply of Russian personnel and settlers. But when our focus changes from the raw numbers to the relative contribution of the Russian factor in the Republics, a milder, and different pattern is produced. A look at the p ^ 's representing the acutal impact indicates that the Republics fall short of being homogenously com posed. See Appendix A, Table 37. However, it is NOT the Ukrainians who are discriminated against in the sense that the impact of Russian immigration on their large population is any worse than that of fellow Republics. Instead, it is primarily the Kazakh SSR which suffers (enjoys?) the greatest disparity. Following behind it, Kirgizia, Latvia and by 19 70, also Estonia contain slightly over proportionate percentages of Russians. The "Virgin Lands" campaign in Kazakhstan helps to explain the large Russian presence in that republic. A second possible explanation for variation in the extent of Russian presence in the republics concerns the differing threat perceived by the regime along the borders exposed to non-Soviet countries. I agree with Vardys and others who regard the Russian 117 settlement as a strategic move to strengthen and reinforce 37 the Russian/Soviet character of less secure regions. Although over time the relative Russian position in the Asian and Turkic Republics has slipped slightly, there is as yet no evidence of a massive effort to counter these tendencies. Neither the numbers of settlers, nor their relative proportions in the republics indicate discrimination along an East-West or Asiatic-European fault-line. "Colonialism" does not distinguish be tween republics on the basis of a Moslem-Christian dimension. It will be added parenthetically before proceeding that a similar general pattern as those discussed here is found when examining the percentage of the Republics' urban 3 8 populations which is Russian. Entropy is 96.15 percent of its maximum and the diversity index reaches 9 8.56 percent, a bit higher on the scale toward uniformity than the previ ous scores, though still not in the "acceptance" zone with respect to the null hypothesis (z = 2.463). These results should not be surprising as they confirm the tendency of Russians to favor the urban areas wherever they are. D. Government Apparatus What is the disposition of the governmental admini strative and security apparatus across the republics? We 118 might initially expect it to parallel the pattern by which the Russian 'colonialists' are distributed. On the other hand, it might be contended that outlays for governmental operations should depend on the size of the unit being administered. The latter case appears to be the actual policy. Budget data, listing expenditures on governmental management and judicial operations were examined at three 39 points in time. Expenditures were normalized on a per capita basis for each republic's population. Both the Entropy and Lieberson Indices were very high and showed small, but positive increments over the period being re viewed and our significance tests indicate that we accept the null hypothesis of uniformity for each case. TABLE 9 EXPENDITURES ON REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT APPARATUS ENTROPY DIVERSITY YEAR SCORE % MAX. Z SCORES SCORE % MAX. 1950 2 .678 98.90% 1.214 .9293 99.57% 1960 2.686 99.17% 1.052 .9303 99.67% 1965 2 .689 99.31% .962 .9308 99.73% 119 The interpretation is fairly straightforward: per capita administrative budgets are evenly allocated across Repub lics . There may be readers however who question such an interpretation for its naivete: the Soviets construct the data, or for that matter erect the budgets themselves as propaganda devices to 'prove' equality of treatment. It may be claimed that the 'interesting' apparatus, the real administrative organs, cannot be inferred from published budget data on formalistic government institutions (referring instead, e.g., to the Party or KGB etc.). We would acknowledge this argument insofar as it urges an awareness of the actual limits on administrative 'trans mission belts' in major policy decisions. But these pat terns ought not to be ignored since they nonetheless re veal trends basic to mobilization/participation, recruit ment and welfare policies. This same discussion applies to our analysis of draftees into the Soviet Armed Forces. Expected patterns of induction are confounded by predictions, on the one hand, that non-Russian nations will be called upon in a massive Russification drive, or by the view, in contrast, that primarily Slavic Republics will provide the forces, since only these areas are perceived as reliable. The only data available are from the 1959 Census, and these 120 40 figures were standardized by Republic populations. Our test statistic of z = 1.413 shows that the Entropy score in this distribution falls well within the curve we would expect in order to accept the hypothesis of a uniform treatment. Entropy was 2.668 or 98.51 percent of maximum; the Lieberson measure was .9278 or 99.41 percent of its maximum, indicating again a very uniform distribution of the burden of providing military personnel over all fifteen Republics. These findings are somewhat disturbing in light of those made by Stephen Rapawy who has investigated this aspect in depth, and concluded, in contrast, that Slavs are favored in military recruitment, presumably because of 41 their facility with the Russian language. A few comments are in order to clarify the discrepancy here. The rela tive frequencies (Appendix A, Table 38) provide a look at the relative shares contributed by each Republic's personnel to the Union military force. The larger shares are indeed those provided by the RSFSR, Ukraine and Belo- russia. However, according to the entropy and diversity scales, the differences among the shares do not represent significant deviations along either a homogeneity or concentration continuum. This issue is thus one of emphasis and perspective shaping the selection of measurement technique. On the other hand, there is no 121 contention at all with Rapawy1s findings of ethnic (as opposed to Republic-level) based bias in conscription. It is acknowledged that uniform treatment across republics 42 may indeed conceal discriminatory policies within them. There is no reason to doubt the determination made in Rapawy1s study that it is the Slavic elements within the republics which are favored. III. Summary The findings presented in this chapter suggest that the degree of Republic-based political discrimination in the Soviet federal system has been slightly exaggerated. This may stem in part from a logical, though erroneous identi fication and extension of ethnic group bias to the Republic level. And it may also stem from a tendency among some observers to minimize the importance of those instances where Republic treatment is ostensibly uniform, due to a fear that these are merely "show-case" tokens or PR concessions. Nonetheless our findings fail to discover a dis tinction in behavior or treatment accorded to Asian Republics, a recurrent theme in the existing literature. In political realms where the Russian Republic does stand apart from the others, it is frequently not gravely in disproportion to its relative size in the USSR. And 122 the remaining fourteen republics are generally treated uniformly, with no consistent patterns of favoritism. 123 Notes-'-Chapter Five 1. Michael Rywkin, "Moscow Versus the Minority Nationalities: Trends for the New Decade," Bulletin 17, no. 10 (October 1970):14-22. 2. B. G. Gafurov, "The Solution of the National Question," in The Soviet Crucible, ed. Samuel Hendel (N. Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1973). 3. Including Robert Wesson, The Soviet State: An Aging Revolution (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972); Frederick Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 27 and throughout; Ivan Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russifi cation? (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968); Alec Nove and J. A. Newth, The Soviet Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1967); and Robert Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the Ukraine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). 4. G. A. Aliyev, First Secretary of Azerbaidzhan in October 1971. Translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, CDSP, 23, no. 46:17. 5. See Alex Inkeles, "Soviet National Policy in Perspec tive," in The Soviet Crucible, ed. Hendel, op. cit.; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Political Implications of Soviet Nationality Problems," in Soviet Nationality Problems, ed. Edward Allworth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); and J. P. Cole and F. C. German, A Geography of the USSR (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1971). 6. Available from Ellen Mickiewicz, Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data, chap. 7, (New York: Free Press, 1973), and from the Soviet Census volumes for 1959 and 1970, Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1959 (1970) goda, SSSR (Moskva: Statistika, 1962 [1973]). 7. Dzyuba, op. cit., pp. 110-11, 123, etc. 8. John Kolasky, Two Years in Soviet Ukraine (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates Ltd., 1970), pp. 17-20. 9. Robert Osborn, The Evolution of Soviet Politics, chap. 13 (Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey Press, 1974) . 124 10. Michael Rywkin, "Central Asia and the Price of Sovietization," Problems of Communism, no. 1, 1964, pp. 7-15. 11. For instance, see Pravda article in January 1969 by G. Zimanas, CDSP, 21, no. 4:27-28. 12. Data from Soviet Census, Itogi, op. cit., 1959 and vol. 4, 1970, and from Brian Silver, "Social Mobilization and the Russification of Soviet Nation alities: A Statistical Analysis" Florida State University, Tallahassee, 1973, table 6. (Paper) 13. Barghoorn, op. cit., pp. 83, 132; also Roman Szporluk, "The Nations of the USSR in 1970," Survey, Autumn 1971; and V. Stanley Vardys, "Communism and Nationali ties: Soviet Nation Building," Proceedings of the APSA Annual Convention, 1969 (Washington, D.C., APSA, 1969), 13:13-15. 14. Barghoorn, op. cit., and Michael Browne, Ferment in the Ukraine (London: MacMillan Co., 1970), p. 19. 15. Robert Wesson, The Soviet Russian State (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), p. 320. 16. Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 132. 17. Dzyuba, op. cit., p. 136. 18. Stephen Rapawy, "An Analysis of Data on the Soviet Armed Forces in the 1959 Census" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, May 1975) . 19. Rapawy, op. cit., p. 3 uses Soviet census data, 1959. The budget figures were from Gosudarstvenni Biudjet SSSR i. Biudjeti Soiuznikh Respublik, Statisticheski Sbornik (Moskva: Finansi, 1966), p. 68. 20. Mickiewicz, op. cit., and Itogi, op. cit., 1959 and 1970. 21. Borys Levytsky, The Soviet Political Elite (Stanford University: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1970). The membership list came out of CDSP, 23, no. 17:18, appendix. 22. Wesson, The Soviet Russian State, op. cit., p. 347. 125 23. Levytsky, op. cit. 24. Levytsky, op. cit. 25. A number of sources were consulted beyond those already cited such as Levytsky and CDSP;Compiled by the Institute for the Study of theUSSR in Munich, and printed by Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, N.J. in - 1968 were: Portraits of Prominent USSR Personalities; Prominent Personalities in the USSR; and Party and Government Officials of the Soviet Union, 1917-1967; Also, Grey Hodnett and Val Ogareff, Leaders of the Soviet Republics, 1955-1972 (Australian National University: Department of Political Science, 1973); and A. Avtorkhanov, "Union Republic Congresses and the State of the Party," Bulletin, May 1960, pp. 37-46. 26. Rein Taagepera, "Nationalism in the Estonian Communist Party," Bulletin 17, no. 1 (January 1970):3-15. 27. See tables 5 and 6 for classification used in this study compiled from sources listed in note 25 above. 28. Rywkin, op. cit., 1964 and 1970. 29. Robert Conquest suggests this observation in Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 131. 30. Stephen Dunn and Ethel Dunn, "Soviet Regime and Native Culture in Central Asia and Kazakhstan: The Major Peoples," Current Anthropology 8 , no.3 (June 19 6 7): 147- 83. 31. See table 6. 32. E. V. Tadevosian, "The Further Convergence of the Socialist Nations of the USSR," in Sociology in the USSR, ed. Stephen Dunn (White Plains, N.Y.: IASP, 1969), pp. 60-69. Taken from Voprosy Filosofii, 1963. 33. Kolasky, op. cit.; Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970); Dzyuba, op. cit.; also, Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (New York: Harper & Row, Perennial Library, 1970); and Vernon Aspaturian, "The Non-Russian Nationalities" in Prospects for Soviet Society, ed. Allen Kassof (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 158-201. 126 34. Conquest, op. cit., p. 140. 35. Derived from Soviet census, Itogi, op.cit., 1959 and 1970. 36. Ibid. See appendix A, table 37. 37. Vardys, op. cit. 38. From Silver, op. cit. 39. See note 19 above. 40. From Rapawy, op. cit. 41. Ibid. 42. A theme raised by Brian Silver in "Levels of Socio cultural Development Among Soviet Nationalities: A Partial Test of the Equalization Hypothesis," (paper presented at the APSA Annual Convention, 1973) Florida State University, Tallahassee. CHAPTER SIX IMPACT OF ECONOMIC POLICIES I. Restating the Economic Questions In his address to the Twenty-Fifth Party Congress in 1976, Brezhnev affirmed that economic policy is "one of the decisive sectors of the struggle for Communism."^ Perhaps we can best illuminate the impact of Soviet econo mic policies on the Union Republics by dissecting the broad economic dimension into three major problem areas. The background presented earlier in Chapters Two and Three enables us to distinguish three separate sets of economic issues: (A) That reflecting the regimes' policy commitments on an autarky vs. trade continuum. (B) That bearing on the "equal distribution of benefits" evidence. (C) That addressing the Marxist-Leninst-Stalinist premise relating economic equalization to greater, more posi tive social ties among nations. This chapter will analyze the problems raised in sets A and B, but will defer the analysis of set C until 127 128 Chapter Eight, after the preliminary economic and social evidence have been discussed independently. A. Autarky vs. Trade One reason, of course, for our interest in the autarky-trade problem is because of our hope that it can shed light on the (changing?) status of the Union Republics in the All-Union economic picture. The general inquiry runs: On what basis are the Union Republics incorporated into the Soviet economic system? Can we define a particular economic role corresponding to the Republic units which goes beyond their political/ administrative capacity? Now admittedly, there are several ways in which we might approach these queries. National economies can be ordered according to any of a variety of patterns and our study must be aware of the possibilities. Perhaps most Western readers of politics are accustomed to analyzing economic systems by comparing the degree of centralization or dis aggregation of decision-making. BUT, probably because the Soviet economy relies more heavily than capitalist nations upon the framework of central planning, the question of economic autonomy for the Union Republics often becomes a relative non-question in our literature. The formula "democratic centralism" seems to suffice when the "re organizations", which occur frequently in Soviet economic 129 management, blur the chain of command through the state, ministerial and branch divisions. Besides, when such studies of centralization or disaggregation are undertaken, they are attended by other serious difficulties. For in stance, beyond the requirement of identifying the decision makers, the data-gathering and follow-up on the consequences of the "input" from these Republic economic actors present no simple research rask. Such efforts are further com plicated by the dangerous procedure wherein an inflated amount of decision-making influence might be inferred to these actors simply because their jobs are subject to reprimand or recall for "shortcomings" in economic per formance; it is not altogether certain that being held responsible in a retroactive sense indicates much potential in the initiative and policy-formation stages. Finally, the locating and even the determining of "power" of the decision-maker does not necessarily inform us about the character of the impact of the decisions being made. Consequently, we take here another approach to examine the relationship between the Republican and central economies and among the Republics themselves. Instead of focusing on the locus of economic decision-making, we focus directly on patterns of exchange and economic inter dependence among them. This latter context permits us to ask of Soviet economic policy specifically: 130 (A.l) Is the trend toward one economic system or perhaps fifteen? Are the economic activities of the Repub lics increasingly intertwined or isolated? We use here what we have loosely referred to as an autarky vs. trade continuum. The extreme autarkic condition would envision fifteen self-contained and self-sufficient, broad- based, fairly diversified economic subsystems within the Soviet plan. In contrast, the spectrum's "trade" extremity would represent a complete interlocking and mutual depen dence among the fifteen Republics, corresponding to an overall program of specialization and division of labor. Thus, the "trade" model of the All-Union economic afghan would reject the 'granny-square1 sectionalism of the autarkic pattern, and would require the subordination of any well-rounded, Republican-centered economies. It might add perspective to this discussion if we note a similar policy problem in the American context. Urban planners in this country today are caught up in dis cussions of "balanced growth vs. concentrated growth". "Sprawl", economies of transport, environmental concerns and population density are all among the general factors 2 complicating this policy choice. It is an important question for comparative politics even beyond our considera tion of the Soviet Union. 131 For the present, our findings will be of primary interest however in so far as they can be juxtaposed to Soviet policy debates. Party documents, even as recently as the 1976 Congress, do not resolve this policy question. On the one hand, strong statements are increasingly abundant proclaiming the line: The single economic organism that covers the entire country is a solid material foundation for the friend ship and cooperation of p e o p l e s . 3 Emphasis seems here to be on a "uniform, nationwide approach 4 to the development of the entire agro-industrial complex." And the method by which this course is to be pursued calls for improved production efficiency through specialization 5 and concentration of production. This approach would correspond to the "trade" perspective. In contrast, it is "fragmentation" of production efforts which is being blamed for "unwarranted costs and losses, and slow(s) the accomplishment of major tasks. A great push is underway to open new regions to the North and East which will require tremendous (lopsided?) in vestments to lay the initial base and infrastructure. The "chaos" noted at the regional level and criticized by economists, is attributed by them to the lack of guidelines for comprehensive regional planning. Research at this level is urged as a "top-priority task". So, whereas the first breath gave impetus to an All-Union program, this second 132 breath enlivens those favoring the regional focus. Brezhnev's ambiguous position can stand empirical clarification; he asserts the need to establish a "correct balance between the interests of each nation . . . and the common interests of the Soviet people as a w h o l e . "7 Just how is this "correct balance" operationalized? Where exactly does economic rastsvet ("flowering") end and sblizhenie ("drawing together") take over? One aim of this chapter is to help quantify an answer. National dis senters and Republican sympathizers attack the Soviet "balance" for being tilted against legitimate Republic interests. Dzyuba emphasizes that the excessive pressures for assimilation have resulted in a distorted "one-sided g development", detrimental to regional economies. Regime defenders emphasize in rebuttal the urgent need to combat localist narrow-mindedness, exclusiveness, and parochialism. Admonitions appear in the Soviet press warning Republics against assuming a bourgeois "ours-theirs" possessiveness 9 toward their economies. "Industrial isolation" and other manifestations of a "closed economy"^ within the Republics are condemned as attempts to "weaken the unity and internationalist convictions of Soviet people."'*''*' It has even been argued that "the national territory is, above all, a component part of the territory of the USSR utilized in the common interests of all its nations and 133 12 nationalities." In this context, it is conceded that territorial-based division of labor, connecting the 13 Republics, is one conscious "lever" by which the state can try to "ensure the correct combination" of the All- 14 Union and Republic claims. Thus, it would seem that a tendency toward specialization and its concomitant of inter-Republic trade in the USSR would have political implications beyond economic considerations of "comparative advantage" in production. Indeed, an inescapable implication of an intricately specialized, interwoven economic system would include the diminished capacity for Republic units to strike off and pursue independent policy lines, much less seriously contemplate secession. Survival of the Republic territory itself could thereby become "locked into" and de pendent upon the fortunes of the All-Union economy, and in so doing, presumably contribute to a more cohesive, singu lar political unit. The premise thus emerges to the effect that, if the development of well-balanced economic subsystems cor responding to Republic borders is inhibited by excessive specialization, then the viability of the Republic units is somewhat undermined. We might thus read into a policy of extreme economic specialization the political ex pectation of "merging" and increased Republic docility. 134 The logic behind this premise must not be allowed to go totally unchallenged, however. A policy of extreme specialization, if it were to correspond neatly with the Republic units, might, on the other hand, also serve to enhance Republic leverage within the economic and political system. The irony would be that whereas the threat of independent, viable Republics might, be eliminated, the dangers of sabotage are simultaneously intensified. The possibility of an embittered Republic organization en gaging in a blackmail effort to hold a unified economy hostage to its demands would become much less absurd- sounding under the model of extreme economic specialization, wherein the rest of the country is dependent for certain crucial items upon the delinquent territory. It is therefore a delicate matter of great politi cal interest how far along a continuum of economic specialization the Soviet policy-makers are committing the Union Republics. Our focus on inter-Republic trade relations ex tends however beyond these general initial questions pitting the All-Union unitary design against Republic- based economies. We are further interested in the patterns of the trade responsibilities which do arise across the Republics. (A.2) Do the Republics engage in economic exchange on a 135 proportionate basis? Are some Republics considerably more isolated than others? Such inquiries themselves suggest further investigation into the claims that the Russian Republic engages in economic colonialism by exploiting fraternal Soviet peoples.^ So we also ask about the character of economic activity conducted by the Republics: (A.3) Are there differences among the Republics in their roles as importer or exporter? Are there clues leading the researcher to hypothesize a cleavage between "supplier Republics" and "consumption Republics"? If so, do such cleavages correspond to broader cultural/geographic divisions already salient in Soviet politics? D. "Equality"? Our understanding of the Union Republics' status in the Soviet economy can be augmented by addressing our second set of issues: involving the distribtution of economic "benefits". No longer are social scientists content to evaluate the economic state of a country merely by its GNP or by its rate of heavy industrial growth. Increasingly, the concept referred to as "quality of life" has been making claims on political systems and the Soviet Union is no exception. The Ninth five-year plan is 136 claimed to have used funds totalling the sum of both preceding five-year plans in order to meet the goal of "raising the people's living standard". Perhaps skeptics of this particular Soviet priority will appreciate its seriousness when they remember that the Soviets draw a link between material/economic conditions and "social (read political) consciousness", or political security. Living standard is "a matter of enormous political and economic importance."^ It is no surprise then, that the author of a recent study on American urban life emphasizes that "everywhere social statistics and the measures of quality 17 of life have increased priority." Liu uses the study of social indicators as fundamental for policy-making processes, 18 including feedback and change. There is a great variety of variables to tap when approaching the question of economic benefits. "Standard of living" is still a culture-bound and relative concept, so it means many different things. "Level of development", welfare payments, consumption habits, leisure time and dental coverage are but a few of the diverse notions which might be contained in a discussion of comparative economic health. This study selects to treat a wide range of such variables rather than to concentrate on any particular 137 variables in depth. The sense is that the broader per spective will enable us to evaluate the broader patterns of Republic economic policy, while avoiding any over emphasis on any single aspect. This concern is not one invented toward a straw man. Were a study to focus pri marily on industrial investment across Republics, and find evidence of great inequality, the inference would naturally rank the favored Republics in accordance with the in vestment priorities. But if those investments were ac tually being geared to compensate certain Republics for previous neglec-1-, or to bolster their sub-adequate physical resources, the validity of the inference would stand in doubt. And the data and conclusions would likely collide with those from other studies. Something like this indeed seems to be happening in research on policy toward the Union Republics. On the one hand, we read studies like those of Mickiewicz, claiming that a "clear difference in the level of economic . . . development" exists between the Asiatic and European sec tors of the country with a "continued disadvantage for 19 Central Asia." She provides a caveat excluding 20 Kazakhstan from this pattern. Hans-Juergen Wagener similarly tapped development by examining Republic output levels, as measured by national income per capita. He too concluded that the North Western European areas rank higher 138 21 than the Republics to the South and East. Furthermore, he believes that over time the gap is increasing. The caveat he offers distinguishes the service sector from the net product figures, admitting that services are distributed more equitably across Republics. Contrast these findings with, for example, those of Rakowska-Harmstone, who speaks of "economic emancipation" for areas like Tadzhikistan, despite the 22 tight political controls. Or compare them against the assessment made by Alec Nove and J. A. Newth that across the Soviet Middle East, "living standards compare 23 favorably" with the rest of the country. In fact, this latter study yields evidence pointing "far from there being any economic exploitation," that indicates a flow of capi tal and benefits to these areas which is significantly greater than mere economic return considerations would warrant. These scholars also present the percentage of turnover taxes allowed to be retained for the Republic budgets. Proportions granted to the Asian and Mid-Eastern SSR's turned out to be relatively generous. Armed with our broad "compositional" perspective and distribution measures, we hope to shed some light upon, if not reconcile, the confusion arising from ap parently competing findings like these just noted. We shall be asking: 139 (B.l) Does the Soviet claim that "the economic and cul tural conditions of life of the peoples have basically 24 been equalized" stand up to empirical test? Are economic benefits distributed evenly across the Soviet Union Republics? What changes are documented over time? It is clear from the Soviet press that Party leaders are indeed worried by accusations like those alleging 25 "Soviet colonialism in Central Asia" or that "Russian will 2 6 always be 'an alien country' for the Baltic Republics". They go to great lengths to dismiss such attacks as 27 . . . "malicious, slanderous fabrications" or "nationalistic fairytales", and depict them as the work of either Maoist 2 8 schismatics or perhaps "Latvian emigre rabble". Our inquiries therefore will aim beyond the question of economic equality and probe: (B.2) Is there validity to the complaints characterizing Soviet economic decisions as colonialist and discriminatory? Our analysis of this question will require us to syn thesize the trade findings with findings on investment and living standard. An unsatisfactory income per capita in itself does not automatically constitute economic ex ploitation. Were, however, large investment benefits to an Asian Republic primarily consumed by railroad track 140 construction, and that Republic scored quite high along the trade dimension as an "exporter", we would have a sounder foundation upon which to base an inference of "exploitation". The primary sources of the economic data used for this investigation included Narodnoe Khoziaistvo, a series of statistical handbooks for both Union and Republic levels published under the Soviet Central Statistical Administration; the volume Transcport i. Sviajh; and the statistical collection put out by the Soviet Finance . . . . . 29 Ministry Division for the Budget. Let us now begin to reply to the problems we have been raising in this section. II. The Evidence A. Concerning Autarky and Trade Our autarky-trade question calls initially for an aggregate level response, which will subsequently be broken down. Very simply, we first want to compare intra- Republic trade with inter-Republic trade: How much of Soviet trade activity is conducted within the individual Republics, indicating the autarkic dimension, and how much is conducted among Republics, signifying interdependence and specialization? Data available were for volume of freight transported.*^ The reader's possible dissatis faction with such data is duly noted and respected. 141 However, he may be reassured that weight is not such an in appropriate measure. It is afterall, the measure which the Soviet planners themselves employ. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that, whereas for instance, cotton weighs less than heavy machinery, the differential in amounts of each product traded might help to compensate the seeming incomparability. So, with these justifications made, let us now examine the physical economic picture. One approach toward charting a rough economic interaction "map" would be to sum the freight tonnage transported by Republics both internally and externally, and present the ratios. Readers still un comfortable with the distributional approach used in much of this study will probably relate very easily to this concept. In 1960, the ratio of intra-Republic trade to inter-Republic trade in the USSR was 2.28; in 1970, the figure decreased very slightly to 2.23. In other words, there is more than twice the volume of goods transferred within Republics in the Soviet Union than there is being transferred across Republics, though this tendency shows a small decline over time. Can we therefore assert that indeed, the economic pattern in the Soviet Union is one of fifteen sub-Union autarkic actors which do not function as an "organic unity"? Not exactly! We must remember that these ratios were 142 comprised of trade volumes aggregated across the fifteen Republics. So whereas intra-Republic trade activity takes the larger percentage of the total trade volume, and is the prominent mode relative to total trade volume, we cannot necessarily infer this pattern down to the economic activ ity of the individual Republics. In fact, it is only in the two largest Republics, the RSFSR and the Ukraine, that internal trading volumes surpass the volumes of freight traded on an inter-Republic basis. A mixed conclusion thus results, with thirteen Republics behaving according to economic specialization, and the others presumably possess ing economies diversified enough to be more self-sufficient. With this pattern in mind, we wanted to determine just how severely the Republics differed from each other as far as inter-Republic trade figured as a percentage of their total trade volumes (including intra-Republic volume). Of what order is the magnitude distinguishing the Republics on their activities in this trade domain? How do we deter mine how much weight to place on the ratios of intra- to inter-Republic freight traded? . . . on the dichotomy between the "autarkic" and "specialized" Republics? Individual ratios taking inter-Republic trade volume as a percentage of total trade volume were calculated for each Republic for 1960 and 1970. (Appendix B, Table 39). The distributional test results are presented below. For both 143 years, the rejection of uniformity is a marginal decision, occurring at the 95 percent but not at the 99 percent con fidence level. The RSFSR and Ukraine, of course, rank lowest on their relative frequency shares in the distribu tions, and Tadzhikistan and Kirgizia are revealed to demon strate the highest levels of specialization. But the degree of discrepancy we perceive in the trade patterns between the RSFSR and Ukraine on the one hand, and those of the other thirteen Republics on the other, can be scaled down in light of our diversity measures. That is, the aggregated ratios presented earlier would intuitively suggest a larger divergence among the Republics than our evidence actually warrants. TABLE 10 INTER-REPUBLIC TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE VOLUME FOR EACH UNION REPUBLIC 1960 1970 Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieberson Index .9281 99.43% .9282 99.45% Entropy 2.6625 98 . 32% 2.6628 98.33% Z Score 1 .664 1. 668 144 This discussion helps put into perspective, but . does not allow us to dismiss those other questions from the previous section above concerning the character of that trade going on among the Republics. Let us now look at the break-down of the trade data into import and export activities by Republic. Raw tonnage figures for 31 both exports and imports are available for 1960 and 1970. First of all, it does appear that volume of freight in volved is largely proportionate with population, with the more populous Republics doing the greater volume of trading and the smaller ones doing less. Correlations of Republic populations in 1960 and 1970 with their respective volumes of trade exported and imported and totalled are very high and are considered statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. TABLE 11 CORRELATIONS 1960 1970 Population Population Exports .9314 .9470 Imports .9489 .9636 Total .9437 . 9610 145 Thus, it would not be fair to speak of economic isolation of any Republics. But what about the balance of trade held by the various Republic units? Does the Russian Republic in fact "milk" the others? Are the Asian Republics seen empirically as the "suppliers"? Note the list summarizing the tonnage data by describing the Republics as either net importers or net exporters. TABLE 12 NET EXPORTER OR NET IMPORTER? 1960 1970 RSFSR Exporter Exporter Ukraine Exporter Exporter Belorussia Importer Importer Uzbekistan Importer Importer Kazakhstan Exporter Exporter Georgia Importer Importer Azerbaidzhan Exporter Exporter Lithuania Importer Importer Moldavia Importer Importer Latvia Importer Importer Kirgizia Importer Importer Tadzhikistan Importer Importer Armenia Importer Importer Turkmenia Exporter Exporter Estonia Importer Importer Only five of the Republics export more freight than they bring in and the USSR is one of these. This is true for both points in time. In addition, data were compiled for one year, 1966, providing ruble values for the physical trade figures,, and although they are admittedly incomplete, they can serve as a partial check on the patterns revealed 32 by our freight data. From the twelve Republics reporting on value of trade, a very similar pattern emerges. Again, there were fewer net exporters than importers, and suppos edly "favored" European Republics, specifically the RSFSR, turned out to be among the former. The two non-European Republics which are net exporters, are probably so because they are important Soviet sources of oil and natural gas, and energy-related equipment. The heavy export volume of Turkmenia might be for this same reason, while that of Azerbaidzhan might even be explained more simply, as its 33 exports include a great proportion of cement! The inconsistencies in the weight vis a vis ruble data are of interest, and are not considered disturbing. That Latvia and Lithuania are net importers in terms of weight, but net exporters in terms of value might merely reflect their particular position along the Baltic as hosts of port cities. Kazakhstan appears, moreover, as a net exporter in weight, but as a net importer when it comes to value of goods received. On the one hand, this probably does reflect what is regarded as a "traditional colonialist' economic pattern, since it is raw materials and agricul tural produce which comprise Kazakhstan's exports and the 147 more expensive finished goods which constitute her 34 imports. On the other hand, such a negative, discrimina tory interpretation is not altogether necessary, if one instead were to accept the view that the Virgin Lands . campaign approach was "fraternally" devised to improve and develop the area, otherwise underappreciated. Subse quent sections may help us select the more appropriate view. So far, we have been looking at the net balance of trade going on across republics. We have spoken of directional flows and have identified and discussed these patterns. Obviously however, if there are net importers, there would have to be net exporters. We have not found as yet, clear evidence supporting the attacks claiming favoritism, discrimination, or isolation of Republics along ethnic or cultural-geographic lines. But we have yet to consider the distribution of Republics within each separate trade activity— both within importing and within exporting. Is the range of participation by all the Repub lics in each trade sector of the same magnitude, or is there great divergence? Our diversity measures are again called upon to provide perspective. We ask independently of the import and export data: Are the differences among Republics in the volume of freight transported significant, or are they reflective of a uniform behavior? To what extent are the Republics distinguishable according to their 148 involvement in each dimension of trade? If the divergence is significant, how can the outstanding Republics be ex plained? Import and export data were standardized on a per capita basis in order to account for the Republics' size as a factor in trade volume, and both the years 19 60 and 1970 were considered in an effort to discern any changes over time or across political regime. Note the following scores. TABLE 13 TRADE ACTIVITY PURSUED BY REPUBLICS Imports Exports 1960 1970 1960 1970 Score % Max. Score % Max. Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieber- son Index .9250 99.11% .9184 98.40% .9036 96.82% .8989 96.31% Entropy 2.6436 97.62% 2.6029 96.12% 2.0540 92.47% 2.4805 91.60% Z Score 1.845 2.265 3.143 3.268 When computed "Z" values are compared with the critical values at the 95% confidence level on the Entropy measures, they in dicate that for each category here we must reject a hypo thesis of uniform or equal trade activity across Republics. There are significant differences among Republics according to both import and export involvement. See Table 14 below. 149 TABLE 14 RELATIVE PROPORTIONS OF REPUBLIC'S INVOLVEMENT IN IMPORT AND EXPORT ACTIVITYa REPUBLICS Pi IMPORTS EXPORTS 1960 1970 1960 1970 RSFSR .0246 .0236 .0371 .0406 Ukraine .0468 .0406 .0753 .0684 Belorussia .0766 .0858 .0241 .0489 Uzbekistan .0452 .0372 .0261 .0240 Kazakhstan .0932 .0571 . 1556 .1505 Georgia .1009 .0780 .0714 .0348 Azerbaidzhan .0444 .0528 .1517 .1005 Lithuania .0861 .1114 .0224 .0357 Moldavia .0537 .0652 .0271 .0307 Latvia .1065 .1422 .0465 .0785 Kirgizia .0555 .0520 .0533 .0255 Tadzhikstan .0515 .0366 .0404 .0251 Armenia .0503 .0514 .0452 .0379 Turkmenia .0832 .0592 .1318 .1814 Estonia .0813 .1069 .0920 .1175 a Volume of freight (in each category) was standardized by Republic population to a per capita figure; then the fifteen statistics were summed and the p.'s represent each Republic's share of those totals. 150 As we examine these results over time, we observe a defi nite trend for both import and export behaviors toward differentiation and nonequality. So far then, we are able to infer that no uniform quota policy is operative on these lines. Freight transactions among Republics are not rooted in principles of equality or proportionality. But, if we look more closely, we also see that neither are they based on consistent Slavic vs. Moslem criteria, or criteria of obvious exploitation. Those Republics drawing the greatest imports per capita were Latvia, Georgia and Kazakhstan respectively for 1960, and Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia for 1970. Surprisingly, it was the Russian Republic which imported the least freight per capita for both years. Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaidzhan clustered very closely together with the Ukraine toward the lower end of the distribution, but considerably above the RSFSR. Much more complex factors must be at work in determining freight interactions than the literature has thus far led students to believe. The breakdown of export data also confirms this view, and casts suspicion on the simpler East-West, Christian-Moslem, or Russian primacy hypotheses. Republics clustering at the bottom of the export distribution were Lithuania, Belorussia, Uzbekistan and Moldavia, for 1960, and Uzbekistan, Kirgizia and 151 and Tadzhikistan for 1970.- Highest per capita exporters included Kazakhstan, Azerbaidzhan and Turkmenia for 1960, and added significantly, Estonia to these in 1970. The Republics' positions within the distributions are clearly not immutably frozen over time. Changes occur, and what ever policy perspectives treat this area apparently contain some flexibility. We still need to consider one more aspect of these data. Our entropy scores permit us to compare the two distributions of importing Republics against the two dis tributions of exporting Republics. We find that for both years, there is much greater homogeneity among Republics on the import dimension than on that for exports, where the distribution is more deeply contoured. This pattern might well indicate, and we might well offer as a hypothesis, a policy effort toward redistribution of Republic resources in a more satisfactory (not necessarily more equitable) manner across the Union. This would seem consistent with the posi tion of the RSFSR as a net exporter and as the lowest for importing. And, depending upon the mix of political and economic pressures on the regime, it would explain the more flexible, otherwise unexplained assortment of "receiving" Republics. We should keep this possible hypothesis in mind as we sift through supporting or contradictory evidence in later chapters. 152 D. Concerning "Equality" Another large set of data were examined in addressing the questions on "distribution of economic benefits," and it is to these results we now turn. One. indicator, used commonly by students of the Soviet Republic economies is "national income". Since it has no precise Western equivalent, it can stand some clarification. Zlatin and Rutgaizer refer to national income as the income from material production and equate 35 it with prices. Hans-Juergen Wagener equates national 3 6 income roughly to level of development. It excludes most activites in the service sector of the national economy and focuses more on economic, mainly industrial, output. The Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities refers to national income as a measure of the performance of the 37 economy. It is used by others to reflect the value of production. It would seem then that national income can be interpreted to reflect the dimensions social scientists refer to as economic modernization and industrialization. One surmise from a high national income might be that the economic benefits accruing to the Republics include technologically advanced and mechanized work settings; another might be that the area is both well-endowed and well-cultivated. We use the indicator here specifically 153 to determine whether or not the Republics are at a uniform stage in their economic development, and as a partial test of the Soviet administration's claim that The Communist Party succeeded in overcoming the age-old backwardness of the outlying republics . . . and in eliminating the qaps in the development of various parts of our country.3° Not all our national income data were available from a single source. We used estimates by Wagener for 1960, 1965 and 1968. A Latvian economic handbook supplied figures for 39 1970. In addition, separate, but presumably fairly equivalent value-of-output data were found and examined for both 1960 and 1970. Of these, the figures for 1960 were from a study by Murray Feshbach and only took into account industrial output; those for 1970 were estimates of GNP by economist Ivan Koropeckyj (this is equal to national in- 40 come plus depreciation, a gross, rather than net figure). The evidence turns out slightly ambiguous con clusions. For most data points in the decade from 1960- 1970, the hypothesis of a uniform distribution of develop ment across the Republics would be accepted. The two exceptions were Wagener's 1968 data, and Feshbach's 1960 data, both of which might be considered only marginal "rejections" since both would have been accepted within a wider 99 percent confidence interval. Unfortunately, no obvious explanation for these aberrations stands out. 154 The shares of each Union Republic in the overall distribu tion remain fairly consistent among all these data sets, so that it seems unlikely that any particular demographic or agricultural/industrial disruption in a particular Republic could account for the discrepancy. More probable is the judgment that the modality of the distribution simply be came more severe than our test would tolerate. It is thus considered more a matter of degree over the contour of the total distribution, rather than a specific case outlyer which would explain the two exceptions. Presented below are the summary statistics for the national income dis tributions analyzed. Appendix B, Table 41 contains the Republic p^'s associated with these National Income indi cators . We must not fail to point out however that even within the bounds of statistical uniformity in development, a tendency can be seen which supports, if only slightly, the fears and claims of some regime critics. Indeed, it is the European, especially the Baltic Republics, which account for the larger portions of national income or development, rather than any of the others. We emphasize again that this tendency has been typically confined within a range to make it statistically insignificant, but we must admit that this does not necessarily eliminate grounds for attaching emotional significance in a context 155 TABLE 15 NATIONAL INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS 1960 (a) 1960 (b) 1965 (a) (Wagener) (Feshbach) (Wagener) Score % Max. Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieberson Index . 9289 99.52% .9242 99.02% .9251 99.30% Entropy 2.6765 98.84% 2.644 97.64% 2.6619 98.30% Z Score 1 . 227 1.744 1 .481 1968 1970 (a) 1970 (b) (Wagener) (Latvian) (Koropeckyj] Score % Max. Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieberson Index .9251 99.11% .9284 99.47% .9279 99.41% Entropy 2.6492 97.83% 2.672 98.67% 2.667 98.49% Z Score 1.685 1 .322 1.431 frequently charged with emotional and nationalistic attitudes. Regarding levels of economic development, we can see, in conclusion why the literature has little 156 consistency. There is room in the data analysis for arguments from both sides. We can say, in conclusion, that the overall statistical uniformity prevailing across most of the 1960-1970 decade does camouflage the only slightly but consistently superior position of the Baltic Republics over the Asian regions. Nevertheless, given the initial gaps in development between the Baltic and Asian Republics when the former were incorporated into the USSR, together with the statistical insignificance of these differences throughout most of the decade, one is led to discredit claims of intentional discrimination in this domain. Let us move on and attempt to put the national income and development question in greater perspective. These findings are probably better interpreted in con junction with results from other measures. There are numerous other indicators which go into the question of equal economic benefits, so that we are not left dependent solely upon interpretations based on national income. For instance, budget expenditures among Republics can be viewed as a direct measure of regime priorites, going beyond the problems of production and development levels discussed above. For in many areas it is this budgetary outlay which establishes the economic and social infrastructure upon which those other variables of 157 lifestyle depend. Although quality of life may not always necessarily be enhanced by monetary expenditures, expendi tures still remain a concrete measure of policy intent and effort! In the preceding chapter was presented the analysis of budget allocations for governmental and administrative functions. There, we recall, we reported a uniform distri bution across the Union Republics. Again we rely for our data primarily on the Budget Department of the Soviet Finance Ministry's Statistical Handbook for 1966. We have the overall budget figures for the Republics as well as the breakdown of more specific items of socioeconomic interest. Among these latter, the "economic benefits" provided by separate education, welfare and culture budgets are examined. Our data span the fifteen year interval from 1950-1965. The reader is cautioned to infer from these reports less about the net differences which might exist among the Republics than about present and future regime policy toward them. Test statistics falling well within the critical value at the 95 percent confidence level persuade us to accept the hypothesis of a uniform distribution among Republics of the overall budget expenditures. The Entropy and Lieberson values appear below. 158 TABLE 16 TOTAL BUDGET BY REPUBLIC 1950 1960 1965 Score % Max. Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieberson Index .9297 99.61% . 9285 99.49% .9300 99.64% Entropy 2.6818 99.03% 2.6739 98.74% 2.6840 99.11% Z Score 1 . 132 1 . 286 1 . 084 So as to dispel the fear that such statistical uniformity always covers up a Russian, European or Christian bias, we also present the rank orderings of the Republics according to the proportion of the budget they received (normalized by population) for these three points in time. (Appendix B, Table 42). Keep in mind though that rank orderings by their nature are intended to emphasize differences among elements, and that the differences within these rank orderings are statistically insignificant. It is of interest to note that each of the years presented represents a different administration in power in the Soviet Union. Thus it would seem reasonable to assume that a policy of uniform Republic budgets does not vary dramatically depending upon the particular leadership in Moscow. 159 But what about budget expenditures from a less aggregated perspective? Does the aggregated budget data conceal, if inadvertently, important budget differences on any specific economic benefits? The answer, for most of the cases we studied, is no; uniformity of budgeting per capita across Republics has been the prevailing policy. As the subsequent tables indicate, this applies in the realm of education, and to the allocations of social- cultural budgets. (Also Appendix B, Table 43). TABLE 17 EDUCATION BUDGET BY REPUBLIC 1950 1960 1965 Score % Max. Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieberson Index .9306 99.71% .9317 99.83% .9321 99.86% Entropy 2.6887 99.28% 2.6963 99.57% 2.6989 99.66% Z Score .9662 . 7609 . 6645 TABLE 18 SOCIAL-CULTURAL BUDGET BY REPUBLIC 1950 1960 1965 Score % Max. Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieberson Index .9308 99.73% .9313 99.78% .9316 99.82% Entropy 2.6893 99.31% 2.6933 99.46% 2.6959 99.55% Z Score .9635 . 8447 .7641 160 It is, interestingly, the investments in Republic "national economy" which depart, though only slightly, from this pattern. From 1950 through 1964, cur test criteria indicate a rejection of the uniformity hypothesis. Looking at the evidence, we find that this is really a marginal situation since (a) it occurs only at the 95 per cent confidence level and indicates acceptance at the 99 percent level, and (b) by 1965, the last data series available, the test calls for acceptance of the uniformity hypothesis at both alpha levels. Appendix B, Table 44 details the relevant raw data and relative frequencies. TABLE 19 INVESTMENTS IN THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL ECONOMIES 1950 1955 1960 1961 Score % Max. Score % Max. Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieberson Index .9233 98.92% .9099 97.49% .9221 98.8% .9164 98.19% Entropy 2.6376 97.4% 2.5727 95.00% 2.6346 97.29% 2.6058 96.22% Z Score 1.840 2. 374 1.832 2.100 1962 1963 1964 1965 Lieberson Index .9192 98.48% .9198 98.55% .9229 98.88% .9263 99.24% Entropy 2.6202 96.75% 2.6242 96.90% 2.6405 97.51% 2.6595 98.21% Z Score 1 .963 1.915 1.738 1.506 161 What factors might account for the lack of uniformity in national economy expenditures until 1965, while some of the other indicators of economic benefits were measuring equivalence? 41 According to U.S. Department of Commerce analyses , the budgetary classification of "national economy" is com prised of expenditures on industry, agriculture and con struction. In the absence of any obvious pattern in the rank standings of the Republic relative frequencies on this indicator, we can eliminate speculations of Great Russian chauvinism or European exploitation of Asiatic areas, etc. Nor can we use this data to reconfirm or bolster the minor bias noted earlier in the national income measure. Kazakhstan's leading position on this indicator recalls regime efforts to develop this territory in the great Virgin Lands campaign and suggests the possibility that investments and expenditures have been awarded on an un equal basis in order to redress previous grievances, rather than to perpetuate them. Moreover, the period between 1956 and 1964 corresponds to a weak time in the agricultural production sector of most Republican economies, according 42 to Zlatin and Rutgaizer. Because of the wide disparity among Republics in the proportion of their economies devoted to agriculture (the range stems from 18 percent to 50 percent), any disruption to this sector would be likely 162 to intensify the differences resulting among them. Thus the picture of nonuniformity in the national economy indicator could result. Another variable used in our compositional analysis was length of railroad track per square mile in 4 3 each Republic. It was the assumption here, as above, that such a measure would tap "economic benefits" in so far as it represents commitment to the economic infra structure of the region. For rail still constitutes a main artery for freight and travel in the Soviet Union, and in 44 its absence, isolation can be great. The results of the analysis are presented below. TABLE 20 LENGTH OF RAILROAD TRACK BY REPUBLIC 1959 1969 Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieberson Index .8938 95.76% .8996 96.38% Entropy 2.3815 87.94% 2.4178 89.28% Z Score 4.553 4. 374 Our test statistics fell greatly beyond the range in cluded within a 95 percent confidence level, and so we are forced to reject the hypothesis of uniformity for both years, despite the slight improvement in parity over time. 163 Let us examine the rank orderings of the Republics along this dimension. TABLE 21 RANK ORDER OF REPUBLIC RR TRACK 1959 1969 1. Latvia Latvia 2.Ukraine Ukraine 3. Lithuania Lithuania 4. Estonia Moldavia 5. Moldavia Estonia 6. Belorussia Belorussia 7. Azerbaidzhan Azerbaidzhan 8. Georgia Georgia 9. Armenia Armenia 10. Uzbekistan Uzbekistan 11. Turkmenia Kazakhstan 12. RSFSR RSFSR 13. Kazakhstan Turkmenia 14. Kirgizia Kirgizia 15. Tadzhikstan Tadzhikstan With the possible exception of the RSFSR, which spans the continent, the patterning of the rail network indicates an undeniable bias favoring the European-Christian West. The strongest ties cover the Baltic and Slavic regions, and become notably weaker as one migrates East toward the Caucasus and Central Asiatic-Turkic areas. It is not altogether certain that geographic criteria alone can account for this degree of asymmetry. Nor can we deter mine here how well alternative transportation systems such as waterways, function to offset the disadvantages in areas relatively underserviced by rail. The relative shares of 164 the Republics within the distributions do not change much over time. And as altering demographic patterns result in south-eastward shifts in the centers of population, it becomes increasingly likely that these disparities could become sources of friction in Soviet politics. Two other sets of indicators measuring economic benefits remain for this discussion. They include numbers of students per capita enrolled in higher education and numbers of physicians per capita by Republic. Both seem appropriate to consider in a context of living standards and quality of life. And both can be regarded as re flecting a socioeconomic commitment or investment in the future of the Republic. (The education indicator is also discussed in Chapter Seven, and its test scores are pre sented on pages 192 and 193. TABLE 22 PHYSICIANS PER CAPITA BY REPUBLIC 1960 1968 Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieberson Index .9284 99.47% .9295 99.59% Entropy 2.6724 98.68% 2.6797 98.95% Z Score 1. 313 1.191 The degree of uniformity over both of these indicators across the Union Republics has increased during the periods for which we have data. Only the test value for 165 numbers of students enrolled in higher education for the base year 1950-51 called for a rejection of the uniformity hypothesis, and it was a marginal decision at that. By the 1959-60 school year, this imbalance had already been eliminated. Consistent improvement in the degree of homogeneity across Republics represented by these indi cators of economic benefits suggests an effort extending beyond regime and over time toward proportional treatment of Republics. It is not denied here that ethnic differen tiation or favoritism based on an internal rural/urban cleavage might nonetheless be operative on these indicators within the Republican level. Yet the respect accorded to the Republic unit in the sense of the parity achieved at that level is the prevailing conclusion. III. Summary What are we now able to conclude about the econom ic status of the fifteen Union Republics? In the first place, volume of trade is highly correlated with the size of the Republic. So we conclude that the burden of trade is distributed proportionately among the Republics, without a policy of isolation or exploitation, at least at this level. The picture on the Trade vs. Autarky question is a mixed one, with the answer depending upon the individual 166 Republic involved. The majority of Republics conduct a greater proportion of inter-Republic trade, than .intra- Republic activity. So in this sense, specialization is the "rule". However, the two Republics which are ex ceptions and conduct a greater proportion of their trade on an intra-Republic basis, are so large and have such a larger volume involved, that on a purely numerical level, the bulk of Soviet trade (aggregated) is concentrated on the intra-Republic, autarkic "side". The significance thus depends upon whether one is more interested in focusing on, say autarky, as a characteristic of the Soviet economy as a whole, or as a characteristic of the trade pattern conducted by particular Union Republics. As for the trade which does take place among Republics, our findings do not evidence the suspected imperialist-chauvinist bias. There is no simple match depicting the "supplier" Republics as the Eastern, Moslem or Asiatic regions, or the "receiving" Republics as European, Slavic or Christian. If anything, the dis crepancy between the patterns of the exporting and im porting distributions suggests the greater likelihood of a progressive policy of redistribution around and favoring the existing Republic structure. This study does not entirely eliminate the ambiguity in the field centering around the "equal 167 benefits" question. On the other hand, it does avoid answering on the basis of too narrow a set of indicators. The confusion and contradictions over economic equality among the Republics can be seen partly as a result of reliance by researchers on different and frequently single measures. In the view of this writer, a more valid repre sentation takes into account the many divergent aspects of economic equality and is not undermined merely because they do not all report the same degree of equality. We are able to add something more of substance to this discussion as well. The only economic domains re flecting any European-Asiatic disparities are limited to those tapping developmental/technological infrastructure: railroads and some of the national income sector. All other indicators studied, ranging from budgets to health manpower, to opportunities for advanced education demonstrate a uniformity of achievement across Republics. The overall picture does seem to suggest policy efforts over time toward diminishing technological gaps among Republics and redistribution of benefits along a more proportionate basis. 168 Notes--Chapter Six 1. Translation of Brezhnev to be found in CDSP, vol. 28, no. 8, 19 76. 2. Ben-Chieh Liu, Quality of Life Indicators in U.S. Metropolitan Areas (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976). (This is merely one source among many for such references.) 3. Brezhnev, op. cit. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid., among others. 6. Ibid. 7. Roman Szporluk, "The Ukraine and the Ukrainians" in Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities, ed. Zev Katz, Rosemarie Rogers and Frederic Harned (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 21-48. 8. Ivan Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification? (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), p. 108. 9. S. Tekiner, "The Background to the Ouster of Three Union Republic Party Leaders," Bulletin, April 1970, pp. 18-26. 10. See, for instance, Moldavian Communist Party First Secretary's statement in CDSP, 23, no. 16:25-26, April 1971. 11. Robert Osborn, The Evolution of Soviet Politics (Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey Press, 1974), p. 451. 12. E. V. Tadevosian, "The Further Convergence of the Socialist Nations of the USSR," from Voprosy filosofii, 1963. Translated in Sociology in the USSR, ed. Stephen Dunn, IASP, 1969, pp. 42-50. 13. Dzyuba, op. cit. states: "... economic machinery is one of the most important and effective levers of Russification," p. 135. 14. V. Kistanov, "Leninist Nationalities Policy and Economic Regionalization in the USSR," from Voprosy 169 ekonomiki, December 1972. Translated in CDSP, 25, no. 9 (March 28, 1973):1-4. 15. See, for instance, report in CDSP, 23, no. 17 (April 4, 1971):32. And T. Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia; The Case of Tadzhikistan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970). 16. Brezhnev, CDSP, op. cit. 17. Liu, op. cit. 18. Ibid. 19. Ellen Mickiewicz, Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data (New York: Free Press, 1973), p. 37. 20. Ibid. 21. Hans-Juergen Wagener, "Regional Output Levels in the Soviet Union," Radio Liberty Research Paper, New York, no. 41, 1971. 22. Rakowska-Harmstone, op. cit. 23. Alec Nove and J. A. Newth, The Soviet Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 120. 24. See article by E. Bagramov, translated from Pravda, July 16, 1971 in CDSP, 23, no. 28:8. Also, Bagramov, Pravda, June 22, 1972, translated in CDSP, 24, no. 25:11-12 and Iu. V. Arutiunian, "A Concrete Sociological Study of Ethnic Relations," The Soviet Review, IASP, Summer 1973, pp. 3-23. 25. M. Gapurov discussing the 24th CPSU Congress Report, CDSP, 23, no. 17:32. Also see Michael Browne, Ferment in the Ukraine (London: MacMillan Co., 1970), p . 27. 26. A. E. Voss in discussion of 24th CPSU Congress Report, CDSP, 23, no. 15:26. 27. Gapurov, op. cit. 28. Voss, op. cit. 29. Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v. 1960 (1965, 1970) godu (Moskva: Statistika, 1961 [1966, 1971]). Transcport 170 i. Sviazh SSSR (Moskva: Statistika, 1972). Gosudarstvenni buidjet SSSR i. buidjeti Soiuznik Respublik (Moskva: Finansi, 1966). 30. See Transcport i. Sviazh. op. cit. 31. Appendix B, table 40. 32. Daniel Bond, "Input-Output Structure of a Soviet Republic: The Latvian SSR" (North Carolina: Duke University/University of North Carolina, September 1975). 33. Zev Katz, Rosemarie Rogers and Frederic Harned, Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities (New York: Free Press, 1975), in chapter "Azerbaidzhan." 34. Ibid., chap. "Kazakhstan." 35. V. Zlatin and V. Rutgaizer, "Comparison of the Levels of Economic Development of Union Republics and Large Regions," in Problems of Economics, June 1969, an IASP translation from Nauchnye doklady vysshei shkoly-ekonomisheskie nauki, no. 8, 1968. 36. Hans-Juergen Wagener, "Regional Output Levels in the Soviet Union," Radio Liberty Research paper, New York, no. 41, 1971. 37. Katz, Rogers, and Harned, op. cit. Appendix, p. 452. 38. E. Bagramov in Pravda, July 16, 1971. Translated in CDSP, 23, no. 28:8. 39. Narodnoe khoziaistvo Latviskoi SSR v. 1971 godu (Riga: Statistika, 1972) . 40. Murray Feshbach, et al., "Employment in the USSR," Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, U.S. Joint Economic Committee, 1962, pp. 591-668; Ivan S. Koropeckyj, "National Income of the Soviet Union Republics in 1970," in Economic Development in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Special Studies Edition, edited by Zbigniew Fallenbuchl (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 287-331. 41. Daniel Gallik, Cestmir Jesina and Stephen Rapawy, The Soviet Financial System: Structure, Operation and Statistics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 171 Commerce, Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, no. 23, 1968) . 42. Ibid. 43. Transcport i. Sviazh, op. cit. 44. Area Handbook for the Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Area Studies of the American University, 1971), p. 31. CHAPTER SEVEN IMPACT OF SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC POLICIES I. Restating the Social Questions In the domain of social policy toward the Union Republics, we again meet the question, as posed by Rein Taagepera, as to the "fusion or crystallization" of the nationalities and national units.^ To what extent do concessions to the national Republics accelerate "the process of the voluntary coming together and merging of nations"'1' and to what extent do such concessions only 3 reinforce the separateness of national existence? Speeches and articles by Soviet leaders and scholars have not resolved the question of how far along the path of "flourishing" or "approximation" the Republics have come. And, as indicated in Chapter Three, this problem is likely to remain outstanding until better agreement is reached on how to measure sliyanie and sblizhenie. Nevertheless, despite the uncertainties plaguing this policy sphere, social processes are not left by the Soviets to chance. According to the Soviets, "What is dangerous is to let these processes occur spontaneously, 172 173 4 to leave them without conscious regulation ..." The Soviets perceive an "integral -relationship" between national-ethnic-demographic behavior and the social 5 system as a whole. Thus, great efforts are being made to design and implement "a scientifically based demo graphic policy."^ In order to ensure the proper "management of 7 social and national processes" a host of important tasks 8 and studies await Soviet academicians and policy-makers. For instance, migration policy is viewed as "one of the most important factors in bringing the Soviet peoples 9 closer to each other." Education, of course, plays a critical role in social policy: "The ideological tempering of young people occupies a special place among the various [policy] measures . . . " Frequent changes in language policy reflect the belief that this too, can be a powerful, if indeterminate, mechanism of social control. It has been the Russian language which has been selected "as the language of international contact" within the USSR and serves as the "channel for the internationalization of 11 culture." Nor is the sphere of religion and national customs exempt from political intervention. Exhortations appear constantly in the Soviet press warning against "distortions of folk traditions" and claiming that a "good many instances in which actions alien to the Soviet 174 way of life . . . have been and are being committed under 12 the cover of national traditions." One article frankly states "the problem of free time . . . is acquiring increasing political urgency and importance." . 1 3 And even resort sanatoria are of policy interest in that "a resort not only improves health but socializes" (emphasis/ v, • mine). * . 1 4 The inquiries set forth to pursue in this chapter span a wide range of social concerns. At first we are primarily concerned with ascertaining the status of various descriptive demographic indicators within the Soviet Republics. Only then can we get into the more sophisticated problems of inferring the style and level of "integration". We ask initially: (A) What are the basic compositional patterns of the ethnic populations comprising the Union Republics? This approach will provide us with a quantitative handle on the population distributions and facilitate comparisons among Republics of their titular nationality groups. Specifically, we shall be documenting: (1) The degree of dispersion of Republic nationalities across the Union. This writer has developed an indicator called "national dispersion ratios" in order to study the character of dispersion of Republic nationalities across the Union. 175 These ratios juxtapose the Republic's nationality popula tion in the whole country against the Republic's nationality population within the borders of its titular home. Such ratios enable us to compare the peoples along a continuum ranging from diasporic to cohesive habitation patterns. They thereby supplement the picture being created in sub sequent sections with more dynamic measures of population flows. Comparative demographic isolation would be an example of one possible policy consequence measured by these dispersion ratios. (2) The extent of the rural component of the Republics, including comparative examination of ruralization across Republics. This is necessary in order to assess the cross-Union validity of the urban/rural cleavage. Although Soviet 15 literature abounds with references to this gap, we do not know whether all Republics are equally plagued by it. And the policy significance and socio-political ramifications arising from regions which may have ameliorated the gap could be expected to be instructive. (One would then perhaps want to study correlations between this factor and variables like intermarriage, crime rates, dissent, etc.) (3) The proportion of Slavic elements in the non-Slavic Republics. For unless we have comparative evidence on this question, 176 we cannot properly test claims of "colonialism" or determine the extent of the "leading role" played by some "fraternal" nations over others. Moreover, this evidence should be viewed in conjunction with findings presented on Russian settlement from Chapter Five. (4) The percentage of Republic population fluent in the Russian language. Our interest in the linguistic question goes beyond even Soviet affirmations of its importance. Its provocative utility as an independent variable predicting socio political behaviors of "rapprochement" must be further considered. Another aspect of demographic policy involves what we might refer to as the potential for increased social interaction. (B) Are the Republics equivalent in their utilization of activities and institutions designed to promote greater "friendship among the peoples"? Of course we must be cautious here, since sponsorship of inter-ethnic intercourse does not necessarily ensure its "success". "Mix potential" must therefore remain subjectively neutral until its theoretical implications can be empirically established. Meanwhile, we use a number of different indicators to measure "mix potential". Per capita enrollments of 177 children in nurseries and kindergartens by Republic, and the dispatch of air passengers from Republics, are but two. (It is assumed that the latter represents travels of social and resort nature as well as official business.) So far, our inquiries in this chapter have been concerned with merely locating and quantitatively defining the demographic "givens" in which the Soviet Republics find themselves. The patterns sought thus far have been more of a circumstantial, rather than a dynamic character. Our questions now shift their focus toward problems of this more dynamic sort. In this context, we explore situations of inter action. We pose the general problem: (C) Who is demographically mobile? Statistics on the entrance and egress of peoples from each Republic are used to establish a rough sociometric "map" of cross-Republic association. These data, together with the "migration index", defined as the ratio of Republic immigration to Republic emigration, enable us to deal with the following sub-questions: (1) Are some Republics significantly more isolated or aggressive in a demographic sense than others? (2) Do Republics with similar cultural/religious tra ditions maintain similar "exchange" networks as contrasted with Republics of more diverse backgrounds? 178 (3) Are some Republics "targets" for settlement, while others are dispersed as "agents" of colonialism? And do such population shifts leave some Republics depleted of their "native sons" while infusing them with "elder brothers"? Finally, we follow up this sequence of questions by asking (D) Are population shifts accompanied by proportionate transactions in the communications sphere? We use statistics on long distance phone calls and out bound letters to trace the continuity or overlap con necting otherwise possibly displaced segments of the Soviet population. Do such communications reinforce or mirror population transfers or do these transfers signify a break from the home Republic? Perhaps communications serve to substitute for physical mobility. Furthermore, do the Soviet Republics all make equivalent use of the communications system? II. The Evidence As suggested above, social policy toward the Union Republics cannot be understood without first quanti fying and comparing some of the basic demographic "givens". Scholars interested in Soviet policy toward the Republics find it imperative to focus on the demographic 179 fate of the nationality groups titularly associated with these political subdivisions. It is necessary to test the realities of their whereabouts and tenacity against the seemingly competing theoretical positions (a) establishing cultural homelands for them within the Socialist framework and (b) rendering the borders of these units obsolete in light of Socialist Internationalism, friendship and sblizhenie. One basic aspect in defining the demographic status of the Republican national groups would involve their relative demographic strength in their own Republics. What sorts of majorities do these groups maintain in their "homelands" and are any becoming particularly diluted relative to the remainder of the Republics? Raw percentages, familiar figures available from Census sources, indicate that the Armenian SSR has the highest concentration of its titular ethnic group, with that group constituting 88 percent of the Republic's popu- 1 f s lation in 1959, and 88.6 percent in 1970. The RSFSR, Belorussian and Lithuanian Republics follow Armenia with high percentages of their own peoples. In two Republics, Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, the native peoples constitute less than half of the ethnic mix. A comparative look across the decade reveals that in over one third of the Republics, the proportion held by the titular group 180 declined. These six Republics are Estonia and Latvia, with the greatest declines, the Ukraine, Moldavia, the RSFSR and Belorussia. It is of interest that the Baltic peoples are among those losing their concentration, whereas no Turkic, Asian or Moslem peoples are in this category. However, before we attach unwarranted significance to any of these observations, let us report that our diversity tests find no significant divergence among the Republics on this issue for either year. In fact, the uniformity among Republics on the concentration of their native groups is seen to increase from 1950 to 1970. Ironically, we can say that the Union Republics are becoming more alike in the sense that most of them are experiencing gains in the proportions of their populations represented by their titular nationalities. Could it then be that they are becoming more alike by consolidating their distinctiveness? Table 23 and Appendix C, Table 4 5 present this situation more tangibly. But this represents only part of the picture of ethnic and national demographics. "National dispersion ratios", defined as the ratio of the total population of a particular ethnic nationality residing in the USSR to that ethnic population residing WITHIN its titular Republic, are developed and used here to tap the diffusion 181 TABLE 2 3 ETHNIC GROUP AS PERCENTAGE OF TITULAR SSR 1959 1970 Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieberson Index .9297 99.61% .9302 99.66% Entropy 2.6782 98.90% 2.6825 99.06% Z Score 1. 295 1.189 17 of the fifteen Union nationalities. A high ratio would indicate demographic mobility relative to the Republic's size, but could describe either a colonizing people or a group forced into diaspora. Theory and subsequent evidence would have to help us select the appropriate interpretation. Low ratios, and certainly ratios approaching the number one, would suggest a cohesive, anchored and immobile population. And we would then be particularly interested in the immigration patterns impinging on such Republics. Our tests reveal that for both years, 1959 and 1970, all Republics were equivalent on their nationality dispersion patterns, and that this uniformity increased slightly over the period studied. Thus, we deduce that Soviet demographic policy did not, during this time frame at least, discriminate discernibly among Union national ities on the basis of broad settlement patterns. This is 182 not to deny that numerically speaking, there might be more, say, Russians, dispersed across the Union than Armenians, but refers rather to the relative proportions of peoples involved. TABLE 2 4 NATIONAL DISPERSION RATIOS 1959 1970 Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieberson Index .9321 99.87% .9234 99.90% Entropy 2.6996 99.69% 2. 702 99.75% Z Score .6204 . 5503 Moreover, if we wish to jump ahead and place these results in the context of "mix potential", we are able to conclude that, again, speaking proportionately of the size of the ethnic group to its Republic, no peoples with Union Republic status appear to have an "edge" or disadvantage. Among other demographic "givens" to explore, an appreciation, of the urban/rural situation is essential, since this factor is linked in the literature to dif- 18 ferentials in education and career advancement, socio- 19 economic benefits, and "national narrowmindedness" as 20 well. Data pertaining to the urban/rural breakdown of each Republic were available from Soviet census volumes 183 21 for the years 1959 and 1970. The range of ruralness spanned from 42 percent (in Estonia and Latvia) to 76 percent (in Moldavia) in 1960, and from 35 percent (in Estonia) to 68 percent (in Moldavia) in 1970. It appears from the extremes that the rural portion of the population is gradually giving way (though without altering the relative positioning of Republics) to urbanization. Nevertheless, the size of the range remains fairly steady. We need some guidelines on how to assess a range of 34 percentage points. (Intuitively perhaps, it seems like a very wide differential, but there are operational examples, such as the standard grading curve, in which all the graduations within this wide range are considered equiva lent for the purposes of "passing".) This is when tools like our distributional measures play a significant inter pretive role. Entropy and Lieberson scores were calculated on the percentages of Republic population considered rural in an attempt to test an hypothesis of uniformity on this important dimension. The results are as follows. For both years, the test statistic falls within the critical level for accepting the null hypothesis. We thus conclude that, despite the size of the range in ruralness among Republics, these Republics all must be considered statistically as members of a single, homogeneous 184 TABLE 25 THE RURAL COMPONENT IN THE REPUBLICS 1960 1970 Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieberson Index .9314 99.79% .9308 99.73% Entropy 2.6935 99.46% 2.6887 99.29% Z Score •8552 •9904 distribution. In short, the Republics do not vary significantly on the basis of their rural component. Appendix C, Table 47 shows the relative frequencies of the Republics for these distributions. Certain implications of this finding merit special emphasis. Since ruralness is so frequently associated in 22 23 the literature with inferior schools, income levels, and a range of other indices of quality of life, the fact that ruralness is spread uniformly over the fifteen Republics suggests that these problems of ruralness might be similarly uniform. Another interesting observation is revealed by this test just reported, though its magnitude is small enough to discount it as anything more than a methodologi cal "aside". Whereas the range of ruralization decreased by one percentage point over the decade, with the possible 185 implication of increasing similarity among Republics on this dimension, the overall configuration of the distri bution, as measured by the Entropy and Lieberson scores, became less uniform. This is mentioned not out of any desire to try to undermine traditional approaches to such problems, but to underscore the advantage of supplementing them with the distributional approach offered in this paper. The next demographic "given" for which we wish to provide systematic, empirical documentation addresses the problem of the Slavic presense in the non-Slavic Union Republics. This highly contentious question was partially answered in Chapter Five, when we analyzed the pattern on Russian colonization. There, we recall, we observed a nonuniform outcome of Russian settlement, but, perhaps contrary to expectations, the bias was not along a Christian-Moslem or European-Asiatic axis. A broader look at the Slavic/non-Slavic relation would shed further light on this important socio-political issue. Our rather limited data consist of percentages of Slavic urban males in the twelve non-Slavic Republics for 1959, as provided 24 by Stephen Rapawy. An Entropy coefficient of 2.3656, or 95.2 percent of its maximum, and a Lieberson score of .8991, or 98.08 percent of its maximum, were obtained on this distribution of data. And according to our hypothesis test, the test statistic Z obtained at 2.7527 exceeds the range permitted by a 95 percent confidence interval for accepting a null hypothesis of uniformity. Thus, as for the Russian settlers alone, we discover a nonrandom pattern of settlement by the Slavic population. Again, Kazakhstan is the leading "host" to the Slavs, while Armenia, again, "merits" significantly and dramati cally few. Based on the whole distribution, we are forced to abandon simplistic arguments of racism or religious- ethnic prejudice as the factors behind such findings. According to the relative frequencies of the distribution, great proportions of Slavs gravitate also to Kirgizia, Moldavia, and Latvia as well. See Appendix C, Table 48. Neither Moslem nor Christian Republics form distinguishable clusters within the distribution. To what reasons then, can we attribute the non uniformity of Slavic presence across the non-Slavic Union Republics? Perhaps once more we can fall back on Kazakhstan's "frontier" character, activated by the unique Virgin Lands program, to explain the disproportion ate abundance of Slavic brethren settling there. And perhaps Armenia's paucity of Slavs can be related to the same factors that grant this Republic its disproportion ately large representation on the Central Committee (whatever those might be!— presumably "political 187 reliability", or a cultural sophistication, etc.). But nevertheless, these explanations do not address the realm of broader demographic policy in operation. This writer suggests that further explanations for nonrandom Slavic settlement patterns should also include larger, strategic and economic considerations. Great emphasis is placed in Soviet and Western literatures on the currency of the Russian language 25 throughout the Union. in a previous chapter, its official role as the transmitter of science and culture was noted. Resentful non-Russians object to its virtually 2 6 prerequisite status for political access. Data are available for the percentage of Republican population 27 knowing the Russian language in 1970. It is to be ex pected that these data would correlate closely with the percentages of Russians living in the various Republics (see Chapter Five). And indeed, a coefficient of .7513, significant at the 95 percent confidence level, was ob tained. The rank orderings of Republics on both of these variables also indicate a parallel between these indi cators of cultural homogenization, particularly at the 2 8 extremes. Nor is it unexpected that the correlation might be even higher were it to account for the affinity of the other two Slavic Republics for the Russian language, and thus adjust for their altered positions in the rank ordering series. The range of 52.5 percentage points suggests a wide variation in the prevalence of Russian. And such an intuitive interpretation is indeed borne out by the scores obtained on our distributional tests. Entropy measured 2.5794 and the Lieberson Index registered .9199. The computed Z statistic was 1.7 34, beyond the limit required to accept an hypothesis of uniformity. In short, the Russian language has not been universally accepted by the non-Russian Republics, and there remains significant divergence across the country in its ubiety. The implications of this picture are not straightforward. The success of establishing Russian as a medium or tool of communication has been only partial; the success of the message content which such a transmission belt was hoped to service, remains undeterminable at this point. Social policy as it impacts education in the Union Republics is similarly important but equally tricky to evaluate (because of the dichotomy between process/ structures and content). The previous chapter reported on the relative uniformity in budgetary outlays for education across the Republics. That addressed in part the question of equality of treatment from above. Our questions here focus on education as a process of socialization and catalyzing cultural awareness from below. Whether the education experience results in 189 positive or negative attitudes across Republics or ethnic groups or toward the governmental regime is not now at issue (this complex multivariate problem probably goes beyond even the curvilinear relationship posited by some writers). At issue instead, is how uniformly mobilized or involved in the educational network the Republican populations are. (Even then we must not necessarily assume identical programs of instruction or classrooms composed with equal ethnic diversity. Nor will this writer "leap" to extrapolate the coming of sblizhenie from evidence of educational mobility; too many divisive political move ments have been led by just this stratum of "activists". One set of data consists of numbers of children per capita by Republic enrolled in pre-school institutions 29 for years covering 1950-1968. We are asking if all the Republics respond similarly to avail themselves of such social organizations. Is third party pre-school care, with whatever its implications, uniformly practiced across all cultures in the USSR? Given the higher fertility rates reported in Asiatic republics, we might expect to see much higher per capita enrollments in these areas. On the other hand, there are reasons to assume that cultural factors are operating to inhibit these very peoples from taking full advantage of such institutions. Soviet journals are full 190 of cultural references to the "feudal remnants" of 30 family customs, especially in these Asiatic regions. 31 An "incorrect attitude toward women" in these areas might contribute to a lower proportion of women in the labor force, which, together with the tenacity of customs like an extended family, probably further operate to keep youngsters at home rather than in a pre-school. The hypothesis of uniformity was tested for four points in time across the eighteen-year period. Each successive time block brought an increase in uniformity, such that, whereas in 19 50, the Republics showed signi ficant differences in their utilization of pre-schools, by 1965, the Republics could not be statistically dis tinguished on this issue. The scores are presented below. TABLE 26 PRE-SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS PER CAPITA BY REPUBLIC 1950 1960 1965 1968 Score % Max. Score % Max. Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieber- son Index .9147 98.01% .9252 99.13% .9294 99.58% .9302 99.66% Entropy 2.5808 95.30% 2.6498 97.85% 2.6791 98.93% 2.6847 99.14% Z Score 2. 4684 1.6919 1.1975 1.0718 In the earlier years, Turkmenia's relative frequency was the largest of the fifteen shares in the distribution, with the RSFSR coming in next. Armenia and Azerbaidzhan also had relatively high per capita enrollments in nurseries and kindergartens, whereas Moldavia, Lithuania and Belorussia ranked lowest on this variable. No simple explanations relying on cultural or religious customs can account for the heterogeneity of these earlier distri butions. Moreover, the consistent and increasing approxi mation of elements within the distribution over time would suggest that whatever the factors responsible for those previous disparities, they were (a) probably not systematic and (b) no longer operative in policy considerations, if they ever were, by the mid 1960s. Another set of education data was employed to help study the various Republics's responses to this as sumed channel of social mobility and intermingling. While university enrollments themselves cannot be used to pre dict successful cooptation into the Soviet system, nor to predict positive, liberal attitudes across ethnically diverse segments of society (as is sometimes the case), they are considered interesting indicators of potential access and efficacy toward the system, and broader ex posure to the social diversity within the USSR. 192 We examine per capita enrollments in higher education by Republic over a nineteen-year period, at 32 three different points in time. Again we find, as with pre-school activity, a growing uniformity in Republic behavior over time. Whereas our hypothesis test indicates a marginal rejection of a homogeneous distribution for the academic year 1950-51 (the decision for rejection only occurred for the 95 percent confidence level, not at 99 percent), by 1959-60 the distribution had become statisti cally undiverse; and the degree of uniformity continued to increase through 1969, the last year for which we had data. For the year in which the distribution was non- random, Armenia was the Republic outstanding for its high per capita level of students enrolled in universities. Moldavia took the smallest portion of the distribution and thus ranked in last place for our purposes. All the scores are presented below. TABLE 27 UNIVERSITY ENROLLMENTS PER CAPITA BY REPUBLIC 1950- 51 1959- 60 1968- 69 Score % Max. Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieberson Index .9252 99.13% .9311 99.76% .9318 99.84% Entropy 2.6497 97.85% 2.6909 99.37% 2.6965 99,57% Z Score 1.689 .9356 .7642 193 Again, we are unable to support claims of cultural bias on the educational dimension, at least at the Republic level. Per capita enrollments in institutions of higher education have increased across all Republics during the period under investigation and comparative opportunities for higher education enjoyed by the Republics have been equalized. (Please note that this is not to be construed as concluding that there is no ethnic discrimina tion WITHIN the Republics, since our data is not broken down into the detail necessary for such evaluation.) Among our other indicators of Republic isolation/ fraternization we examine the dispatch of air passengers 33 per capita by Republic. Air travel is probably still considered a sophisticated or prestigious mode of trans portation in contrast with the more commonly used rail alternatives. It is however certainly nonetheless of interest to us in our effort to compare social mobility patterns among the Republics. TABLE 2 8 DISPATCH OF AIR PASSENGERS BY REPUBLIC 1960 1970 Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieberson Index .9064 97.12% .9257 99.19% Entropy 2.5404 93.81% 2.6541 98.01% Z Score 2. 7612 1.6144 194 Our tests reveal great diversity across the Repub lics on this issue for 1960, giving way to uniformity by 1970. See Appendix C, Table 51. One might posit that since uniformity on this activity has been achieved, this merely reflects part of the broader policy effort to elimi nate technological disparities across the Republics, dis cussed in Chapter Six . . . that air facilities were not evenly distributed in "backward" Republics in 1960 and that this has been overcome by 1970. However, such an hypothesis seems belied by the fact that it is the Turkmen SSR which accounts for the hugely disproportionate relative frequency of the variable in 1960 (and ranks highest on per capita air passengers in 1970 as well). Tadzhikistan holds the second highest relative frequency on the distribution, whereas Lithuania, Belorussia and the Ukraine represent the smallest shares in the configuration. Tourism would not provide a satisfactory explanation. Nor would the diverse availability of railroads as an alternative to air travel in the Union Republics. We would discount the pos sibility of forced exile, since air travel would be an unlikely mode! Geographic-strategic factors might offer partial explanation. Another hypothesis offered to this writer would link the disproportionate activity in Turkmenia in 19 60 to the heavy oil and petroleum extraction 34 going on there at that time. A heavy rate of manpower 195 turnover, including "fraternal" consultants, engineers and drilling crews could certainly help account for Turkmenia's peculiar showing on this measure. In the broader effort to study population dynamics among the Union Republics, diversity measures were cal culated on the Republican composition of persons migrating 35 into and out of each of the fifteen units. All thirty tests indicated a rejection of uniformity on this aspect of demographic policy. TABLE 29 INTER-REPUBLIC MIGRATION PATTERNS 1970 IMMIGRATION INTO REPUBLIC EMIGRATION FROM REPUBLIC Lieb. Entropy Z Lieb. Entropy Z RSFSR .9131 2.5461 2.053 .9006 2.4545 3.059 Ukraine .9026 2.4793 2.723 .8884 2.3634 3.819 Belorussia .8826 2.3644 3.582 .8178 2.0605 5.112 Uzbekistan .8065 1.9098 6.050 .8362 2.0354 5.703 Kazakhstan .8516 2.2222 4.290 .8502 2.2434 4.150 Georgia .8523 2.2427 4.098 .6963 1.7844 5.503 Azerbaidzhan .6890 1.7030 5.877 .6929 1.7828 5.506 Lithuania .7476 1.8170 5.847 .6040 1.4686 6.591 Moldavia .8822 2.3683 3.504 .8751 2.2736 4.332 Latvia .8287 2.0800 5.055 .7595 1.7987 6.041 Kirgizia .7591 1.7888 6.221 .7963 1.9350 5.830 Tadzhikistan .7989 1.9586 5.548 .8440 2.0797 5.601 Armenia .6304 1.3328 7.340 .7479 1.9288 5.093 Turkmenia .8662 2.2332 4.701 .8522 2.2182 4.353 Estonia .8685 2.2662 4. 325 .7729 1.9569 5.224 196 That is to say, that no Republic attracts or repels intercourse from the other fourteen Republics randomly; there is typically a differentiated distribution. But do these distributions bear out the "popular" expectations and the hypotheses of writers like John Kolasky, who claim that the Slavs, and especially the Russians, are the disproportionate immigrants? Not consistently. It is true that, in raw numbers, the Russian Republic contributes more settlers to the frater nal SSR's than any of the other Republics. However, this fact alone tends to bemask the necessary relative per spective, that the RSFSR has more population to send than any of the others. And indeed, the nonuniform distribu tions which are reported above occurred after we had al ready normalized the data to take into account Republic population size. Moreover, the p^'s (or relative frequencies) of the normalized data are at variance with the hypotheses of Russian/Slavic infiltration; that is, the Russian proportionate share in the distribution is seldom outstanding. If, in fact, any consistent pattern at all can be discerned, it appears to favor a hypothesis of geographic/cultural proximity as the main single factor determining who comes to any given Republic. The pattern is similar with the emigration situation. And increasingly, it is typically the case 197 that the same Republic which contributes the highest relative share of immigrants also has the highest relative share of emigrants. We conclude then, based on this section, that demographic transactions among Republics are (a) not uniform across the Soviet Union; (b) do not evidence disproportionate colonization by- Slavic or Russian SSR's; (c) are more apt to cluster among culturally and 3 6 geographically neighboring Republics. There is additional information on the migration patterns of the Union Republics for discussion. We have just finished addressing the question of how uniform other Republics are in their demographic transactions with any one given Republic. Now we wish to compare the Republics on the net results of these as well as their own migration activities. A "migration index", defined as the ratio of the number of persons entering the Republic to the number of persons leaving the Republic, was calculated for all fifteen SSR's and this distribu tion was subjected to our diversity tests. A ratio well above unity would indicate a disproportionate magnetism of the Republic (either arising out of positive or nega tive stimuli); a ratio below unity would suggest a de pleting demographic situation. Our Entropy test permits 198 us to compare the Republics on their similarity along this dimension. The results are recorded below. TABLE 30 MIGRATION INDEX, 19 70 RSFSR _ 1. 020 Ukraine = 1. 017 Belorussia = 1. 005 Uzbekistan = .778 Lieberson Score = .932 Kazakhstan = .979 Georgia = . 708 % Max. = 99.85% Azerbaidzhan = . 751 Lithuania = 1. 014 Entropy Score = 2.6976 Moldavia = .940 Latvia = 1.114 % Max. = 99.62% Kirgizia = .910 Tadzhikistan = . 850 Z Score = . 7282 Armenia — 1.112 Turkmenia = . 852 Estonia = 1.192 As we can see, the ratios hovered closely around the number one. This would seem to imply that a fairly even balance was maintained in each Republic's population flow. The test statistic was within the critical area required for us to accept the hypothesis of a uniform distribution. Thus we can also say that the Republics behaved similarly on their net migration patterns. On the other hand, this Migration Index does not provide perspective on the magnitude of demographic activity engaged in by the Republics. Theoretically, at least, a ratio of one could represent either an extremely 199 isolated Republic or a socially hustling one. For this reason, we augment the migration indices with tests run on immigration and emigration calculated as percentages of each Republic's total population. And in these cases, the diversity among the Republics is just enough to reject the hypothesis of uniformity at the 95 percent confidence level. TABLE 31 IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION, 1970 As PERCENTAGES OF REPUBLICAN POPULATIONS Immigration Emigration RSFSR 6 . 8% 6.6% Ukraine 4.7% 4.6% Belorussia 5 .1% 5.1% Uzbekistan 2.5% 3.2% Kazakhstan 7.9% 8.1% Georgia 1.9% 2.7% Azerbaidzhan 1.7% 2.2% Lithuania 5.8% 5 . 7% Moldavia 4.2% 4 . 4% Latvia 5.9% 5 . 3% Kirgizia 5.1% 5.6% Tadzhikistan 3.6% 4.2% Armenia 2.2% 2.0% Turkmenia 2.9% 3.4% Estonia 7.1% 6.0% Lieberson Score .9211 .9248 % Max. = 98.69% 99.08% Entropy 2.6125 2.6420 % Max. = 96.47% 97.56% Z Score 2.273 1. 870 200 We find that immigration constitutes a bare 1.7% with respect to Azerbaidzhan's population and 1.9% of Georgia's total. Armenia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenia also have small proportions of immigrants. In contrast, Kazakhstan, Estonia and the RSFSR in decreasing order, have the highest relative frequencies and the greatest proportion of immigrants. As for the proportion of population leaving each Republic, the Republics show only slightly more uniformity than they did for immigration. Emigration is least significant (as was immigration) with respect to the populations in Armenia, Azerbaidzhan and Georgia, in that order. It appears then, that these three Republics tend to be relatively isolated in a demographic sense. Emigration figures most outstanding out of the Kazakh SSR, followed by the RSFSR and Estonia. Since it is contended so often in the literature, that the Russians are coloniz ers infiltrating the other Republics, the Russian exodus quantified here might be construed as supportive evidence. And it might be further supposed that since that Republic disproportionately attracts a large share of immigrants, that the RSFSR serves as a training/indoctrination site as well. This is a definite possibility. It would not, however, be the evaluation favored by this writer. Because such a theory takes into account neither (a) the context or significance of the rest of the data of which this is a part, nor (b) the size and charac ter of the territory encompassed by these Republics. I believe that the coincidence of Republics scoring at the extremes for both the immigration and emigration distri butions must be considered significant. The alternative theory would have to assume that the number of external settlers involved in colonizing of a given Republic would be in the same proportion and simultaneous to those (presumably) natives being exiled from it. This writer believes a simpler theory can explain why the magnitudes of migrants entering and leaving the Republics are so equivalent. And it assumes that these migrants are either: (1) the same people or, (2) people experiencing similar conditions. We have seen that the disproportionate bulk of "action" is into and out of Kazakhstan and Russia. Both incorporate large expanses of territory which are underdeveloped and which, according the Soviet policy 37 documents and the press, are slated for and undergoing intensive development efforts. Living conditions in these areas are admittedly rough and primitive, labor turnover is high, and new incentives are constantly being proposed to 3 8 attract and keep population in these regions. Much of the material written by Soviet social scientist 39 Perevedentsev is corroborated here. 202 In addition, this writer would call attention to the international borders of the Kazakh and Russian SSR's. Problems along the China border, inspiring a significant military and political presence, might well account for a large population flow into and out of these Republics. Important activities associated with social intercourse among peoples would include their communica tions transactions. Data are available for both 1960 and 40 1970 on long distance phone calls and letters outbound 41 from each Republic. Our tests suggest that the signifi cant variations observed among the Republics on these measures in the earlier period are gradually narrowing and that the Republics are indeed becoming more uniform in their use of the communications networks. TABLE 32 LONG DISTANCE PHONE CALLS 1960 1970 Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieberson Index .9026 96.71% .9163 98.18% Entropy 2.5288 93.38% 2.5935 95.77% Z Score 2.736 2.307 203 TABLE 3 3 OUTBOUND LETTERS 1960 1970 Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieberson Index .9240 99.00% .9264 99 .26% Entropy 2.6392 97 . 46% 2.6569 99.11% Z Score 1. 874 1.605 It is interesting to note that the variation in the utili zation of phone calls remains greater over the period than the variation in the dispatch of outbound letters. This can perhaps be traced to a greater variation in tele communications technology across the USSR in contrast with a presumably more uniform network of postal services. Greatest per capita relative frequency in the dis tributions of both long distance phone calls and letters dispatched is held for both years by Estonia. (See Appendix C, Table 54.) Given Estonia's relatively high standing in proportion of population flows, its high activity level in communications does not come as a sur prise. Similarly, we are not surprised that Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kirgizia score among the lowest on these indicators, because of our prior evidence on their relative demographic isolation. 204 Yet some other interesting findings are worth pointing out. Consistently ranking next highest on the communications measures is Latvia, with Lithuania ranking next on both years for phone calls. We observe a slight dichotomy then, with the Baltic Republics tending to engage more than the Asiatic Republics in the communica tions network. Oddly enough, Armenia and Georgia, which figured very low on migration activity, were not at all in this category on these dimensions of interaction. And the Turkmenians, from whose Republic such disproportionate numbers of persons were dispatched via air travel in 1960, were not found to be outstanding in these distributions at all. Nor was the Russian Republic a special case on the communications variables. Thus we conclude that our measures of interpersonal communication are only partially associated with Republic demographic shifts. The Baltic Republics tend toward greater than typical participation in these activities. This parallels, to some extent, the pattern noted in Chapter Six on the distribution of railroad systems. But the overall distribution of Republics on communications is indeed moving toward increasing uniformity over time. 205 III. Summary What policy inferences can be drawn from this chapter's study comparing Republican social and demo graphic indicators? Again evidence persuades us that the cleavage in treatment allegedly favoring Russians, Slavs or Europeans over Asian and Moslem Republics appears exaggerated. The picture created by the absolute or raw data does not always coincide with the one created when we normalize the data by taking relative population size into account or when we approach all fifteen Republics on a comparative basis. An interpretation of "Russianization" or "colonialism" falls very short in providing an adequate description of the demographic policy as it impacts on the Republics. Additional factors operating on demographic and social conditions in the USSR are suggested by the findings in this chapter. Geographic proximity and cultural similarity are seen to play a large (if logical or mundane) role in migration patterns. Campaigns aimed at economic development, and the availability of trans portation and communications networks also partly deter mine population flows. Moreover, political/strategic considerations cannot be discounted from the domain of social policy decisions. 206 It appears furthermore, that certain Republics are unique enough to fairly consistently stand out from the regular distribution of Republics. We have frequently attributed Kazakhstan's diversity to the policy of development of those lands. Armenia is also conspicuous, in its nonconformity with the other Republics, but in this case, the situation appears to stem more from indegenous cultural phenomena than imposed policy decisions. Another finding made in this chapter is the rela tive LACK of diversity among Republics on the extent of their rural/urban disjunctions. We are not concluding here that the dichotomy itself is insignificant (on the contrary); we are saying that, at least in a statistical sense, the problem is not that of only one or two Republics, but that all Republics can be considered to experience the urban/rural cleavage in a similar statistical magnitude. Future research on this question might focus on (a) whether or not within this uniform distribution there are any cumulative, qualitative differences and (b) how the slight (and statistically insignificant) tendency toward increased diversity among the Republics on this dimension noted from 1959 to 1970 is changing. 207 Notes--Chapter Seven 1. Rein Taagepera, "1970 Census: Fusion or Crystalli zation of Nationalities," Soviet Studies, October 1971, pp. 216-222. 2. M. S. Djunusov, "Soviet Autonomy and the Vestiges of Nationalism," trans. in Sociology in the USSR, Stephen Dunn, ed. (IASP, White Plains, N.Y.), 1969, originally in Istoriia SSR, 1963. 3. Djunusov, op. cit. writes, "If a nation exists, that nation will have its specific needs." Similar views are found in J. P. Cole and F. C. German, A Geography of the USSR (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1971), p. 62. Richard Pipes, "Soviet Impact on Central Asia," Problems of Communism, no. 2, 1957, pp. 27-32, and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dilemma of Nation alism in the Soviet Union," in The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev and Kosygin, ed. John W. Strong (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1971), pp. 121, 125, 126. 4. A. A. Susokolov, "The Influence on Interethnic Rela tions of Differences in the Educational Levels of Ethnic Groups in Contact," trans. in The Soviet Review, Spring 1977, pp. 24-42, originally in Sovetskaia etnografia, 1976. 5. Stated explicitly in E. A. Pavlodskii, "A Systems Approach to the Concept of Demographic Legislation," trans. in Soviet Law and Government, (IASP 15, no. 4 [Spring 1977]:87-96, originally in Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i. pravo, no. 6, 1976, this perception is implied ubiquitously throughout Soviet literature. 6. V. S. Tadevosian, "Demographic Policy and Law," trans. in Soviet Law and Government (IASP, no. 2, Fall 1976), pp. 42-50, originally in Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i . pravo, 1975, no. 8. 7. See review of Juhan Kaht's Affinities: Sociological Essays, 1974, trans. in CDSP, vol. 28, no. 3, February 18, 1976 from Istoria SSSR, 1975. 8. See for example L. P. Potapov. "Ethnographic Study of the Sovialist Culture and Mode of Life of the Peoples of the USSR," 1962, in Sociology in the USSR, ed. Stephen Dunn, IASP, White Plains, N.Y., 1969, and numerour works by demographer V. I. Perevedentsev: "Population Movement and Labor Supply in Siberia," 208 trans. in Soviet Sociology, Winter 1970-71, pp. 424-74, "Urbanization Problems in Central Asia," trans. in CDSP, February 25, 1976, vol. 28, no. 4. 9. V. I. Naulko, "Present Ethnic Composition of the Population of the Ukrainian SSR," 1963, trans. in Sociology in the USSR, ed. Stephen Dunn, op. cit., pp. 184-97. 10. From a critical discussion of "shortcomings" in Azerbaidzhan, trans. in CDSP, vol. 29, no. 17, May 25, 1977. 11. Iu. V. Arutiunian, "A Concrete Sociological Study of Ethnic Relations," trans. in The Soviet Review 14, no. 2 (Summer 1973):3-23. 12. From address to Georgian Party Congress by E. A. Shevardnadze, January 22, 1976, trans. in CDSP, vol. 28, n o . 4 . 13. Ibid. 14. O. Rudnev, "Resort Customs and the 'Caprices' of Their Clientele," Literaturnaia gazeta, August 27-September 3, 1975. 15. Among Soviet authors discussing this cleavage are V. I. Naulko, op. cit., V. Zlatin and V. Rutgaizer, "Comparison of the Levels of Economic Development of Union Republics and Large Regions," Nauchnye doklady vysshei shkoly-ekonomisheskie nauki, 1968, no. 8, trans. in Problems of Economics, IASP, June 1969; Y. Buketov, Uchitelskaya gazeta, July 17, 1973, trans. in CDSP 25, no. 33:10; USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities discussion trans. in CDSP 25, no. 29:16-17. Among Western scholars, see Ellen Mickiewicz, Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data (New York: Free Press, 1973); Brian Silver, "Social Mobilization and the Russification of Soviet Nationalities," Florida State University, Tallahassee, 1972; Robert Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the Ukraine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962) among others. 16. Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1959 (1970) goda, (Moskva: Statistika, 1962 [1973]). 17. The source for these data , Ibid. Appendix C, table 46 209 contains the derived ratios. 18. For example, see CDSP 25, no. 29:16-17 and 25, no. 33: 10 and CDSP, vol. 29, no. 16, book review by L. Sbytov of Labor Resources: A Socioeconomic Analysis, ed. V. G. Kostakov. 19. V. Zlatin and V. Rutgaizer, op. cit. 20. CDSP, vol. 28, no. 3, op. cit. and also A. I. Kholmogorov, "International Traits of Soviet Nations," trans. in Soviet Sociology 12, nos. 1, 2 (Fall 1973): 3-33, 27-68. 21. Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia, op. cit. 22. See, for example CDSP, vol. 29, no. 20, quoted from Selskaya zhizn, April 28, 1977. 23. V. I. Perevedentsev, "Contemporary Migration in the USSR," trans. in Soviet Geography 10, no. 4 (April 1969) :192-208 . 24. Stephen Rapawy, "An Analysis of Data on the Soviet Armed Forces in the 1959 Census," U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, Bureau of Economic Analysis, May 1975, p. 3. 25. CDSP 25, no. 31:6, First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party remarks that "not to study the Russian language is to rob oneself," E. A. Shevardnadze from Zarya Vostoka, July 31, 1973. Also see CDSP 23, no. 46:13-17, quoting report by Azerbaidzhan Communist Party Secretary G. A. Aliyev, November 2, 1971. 26. Ivan Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification? (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), pp. 62, 65, 100, 122, 125, etc. 27. I used Stephen Rapawy's data here (see note 24), p. 6, which he derived from 1970 Soviet census data, Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniye 1970 goda (Moskva: Statistika, 1973), vol. 4. Similar but not precisely equivalent data is available for earlier years as well. 28. See appendix C, tables 49 and 50. 29. Zev Katz, Rose Marie Rogers, and Frederick Harned, 210 Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities (New York: Free Press, 1975), p. 451. 30. CDSP, vol. 23, no. 46, p. 17, for example translates a pertinent speech by Azerbaidzhani CP First Secre tary Aliyev. 31. Gapurov's comments translated in CDSP, vol. 28, no. 23, July 7, 1976. 32. Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v. 1970 (Moskva: Statistika, 1971). 33. Transcport i. Sviajh SSSR (Moskva: Statistika, 1972), p. 209. 34. Thanks to Daniel Bond for helping me explore such possibilities. 35. The migration statistics upon which these diversity scores are based come from Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi Naseleniia 1970 goda (Moskva: Statistika, 1973), vol. 7. 36. This possibility is also suggested by Soviet demog rapher Perevedentsev in "Contemporary Migration in the USSR" trans. in Soviet Geography, April 1969, pp. 192-208. 37. See for example the 24th CPSU Congress Resolution, April 10, 1971, recorded in CDSP vol. 23, no. 17, pp. 21-29. 38. Perevedentsev, op. cit. Also his "Population Movement and Labor Supply in Siberia" in Soviet Sociology 9, no. 3 (Winter 1970-71):424-74. 39. Ibid. 40. Transcport i. Sviajh SSSR (Moskva: Statistika, 1972), p. 277. 41. Ibid, p. 274. CHAPTER EIGHT SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS I . Restating Some of the Questions and Findings This study represents an attempt to assess the policy status of the Soviet Union Republics. Rather than focusing our inquiries around the conventional Western measures of the ambiguous concept "integration," and trying to quantify the Republics' positions on an integration-disintegration continuum, we offer a broader view of the problem. The underlying approach here is that there are different qualitative types of "integra tion"— different modes and characteristics by which a nation can be "integrated." Assuming this approach, it becomes the task of the researcher to identify, and whenever possible, to quantify for comparative purposes, the particular compositional patterns unique to that nation's integration situation. In setting about this task, this writer has found it important to keep close interface with the theoretical and policy documents underpinning the Soviet decision-making process. For "integration" should in the 211 212 first place be related to contextual objectives. Besides, the Soviet system has its share of policy conflicts, contradictions and dilemmas, and it is necessary to juxtapose the empirical evidence against these various considerations as they are raised in domestic policy debates. Thus, the sorts of integration problems which this investigation has addressed concern issues of Russianization, sblizhenie, equality of economic benefits, economic autarky, and ethnic viability, to name a few. The empirical discussion has been organized around three broad domains of policy: political issues, economic issues, and demographic/social issues. Behind the dimensions of political "integration" which we studied were questions of unitary vs. federal emphasis, equality of participation, and Russian domina tion. Out of a battery of some twenty tests and categori zations comes a mixed conclusion. Equivalence is the key to treatment of all fifteen Republics on (1) administra tive budgets for all three years in question, (2) con scripts into the armed forces, and (3) Communist Party and Komsomol memberships for the three years in question. But nonuniformity of Republics prevails on participation in high level Party and Republic political positions, where Slavic and Russian elements control the 213 Politburo and Central Committee Secretaryships, and surprisingly enough, Armenians take a disproportionate share of Central Committee memberships. Finally, the extent of the Russian presence in the other fourteen Republics turned out to be quite differentiated, with Russians constituting a disproportionately high percentage of the population of Kazakhstan, and barely figuring at all in the population of Armenia. Behind the dimensions of economic "integration" which we studied were questions of economic specializa tion and trade, versus diversification and autarky, "exploitation," and equalization of the material conditions of life. Over a dozen tests on trade inter actions among the Republics revealed that the fifteen units behave distinctly, rather than uniformly in this sphere. The majority of Republics are specialized enough to engage in a greater proportion of inter- Republic trade than intra-Republic trade. Thus, trade ties linking possibly reluctant Union Republics together are the favored system over autarkic economic units. But, the two largest Republics, in contrast, are diversi fied enough to have the reverse pattern, and the magni tude of their intra-Republic based exchange is great enough to swing the total All-Union trade volume on the side favoring intra-Republic trade. The Republics also 214 vary significantly among themselves on their importing and exporting involvement. The large majority of Republics are net importers. Furthermore, the distribu tions comprised of imports by Republics are consistently more uniform than those depicting the exports. So, if to these facts we add the findings (a) of high positive correlations between Republic size and volumes of exports, imports and total trade, and (b) that no consistent pro- RSFSR/Slavic or anti-Asian bias in trade patterns could be identified, THEN we are likely to arrive at the following conclusions. First, the literature gives greater weight to the emotional claims of "exploitation" than a statistical analysis at the Republic level would warrant. Second, a case can be made to hypothesize a real policy effort at economic redistribution among Republics. The bulk of the evidence on equalization of economic benefits works to support this hypothesis. Uniformity of benefits across Republics is found on indicators ranging from the health service sector to education to most areas of budget allocations. Economic gaps remain among Republics only on those indicators of residual technological disparity. It appears then that the Soviet Union Republics are gradually being bound closer together in the sense of economic proximity, 215 through mechanisms of trade, specialization and equaliza tion of living conditions. Behind the dimensions of social "integration" which we studied were questions of "fusion or crystalliza tion"^ of Republic national homelands, sblizhenie, and demographic dynamics. The majority of social indicators investigated revealed a fairly uniform demographic situation among the Republics, or at least showed increases in uniformity over time. This is the picture for ethnic concentration in and ethnic dispersion from the national ity homeland, net migration flow, communications, education, and perhaps most important, ruralness. Non uniformity in demographic activity was observed on patterns of Slavic settlement across non-Slavic regions and currency of Russian language in the non-Russian regions. Yet this nonuniformity does not take the "expected" form of a particular anti-Asian or anti-Baltic bias. Nor does the nonuniformity of immigration and emigration into, out of and as a percentage of each Republic's population. These latter patterns suggest that inter-Republic migration is propelled more by other considerations than by ethnic imperialism. Geographic, economic and strategic factors are believed to play the more important roles. 216 II. Tying Together the Policy Domains Based on our findings, how do we assess the Soviet claim that migration processes are causing Soviet Republics to become increasingly multinational.2 Our answer must point out the two guestions really contained within this problem. If the statement is con strued to indicate merely a numerical growth over time in the size of the ethnic populations residing outside their titular homelands, our dispersion ratios would bear this out. However, if the statement is intended to imply (as it appears to this writer) that the impact of migration flows has been to significantly diversify the ethnic composition in each Union Republic and diminish thereby the proportion or concentration of the ethnic group for which it is named, our conclusions would disagree. There may indeed be increasing numbers of "ethnics" residing across the land, but for the majority of Republics there are even greater numbers concentrating and reproducing at "home." Furthermore, the small group of Republics showing a decline in their percentage of titular ethnic population contain several Republics which started out with much higher than average ethnic concentrations in the first place. How do our findings coincide with the hypothesis of Soviet social scientist Perevedentsev, that 217 the simple fact of an out-migration from certain areas can serve as an indicator of a lagging regional living standard. Similarly, an inflow of labor suggests certain advantages in living conditions in a particular place.3 In short, what links can be found between social forces and economic/material conditions? We have already indicated that the gaps in living standards are less severe, looking from the Republic vantage level, than generally assumed. And we have pointed out other factors operating in the dynamics of migration. Still it would be of interest in evaluating this hypothesis, to look again at the figures for migra tion as percentages of each Republic's population and pit these against the worst cases of economic disparities. Table 34 should be noted here. Using our most recent (1970) data, the four Republics with the highest propor tions of population emigrating are Kazakhstan, the RSFSR, Estonia and Kirgizia, in that order. The two with the lowest emigration are Armenia and Azerbaidzhan. Juxtaposed to our national income measures of 196 8 which showed statistical disparities among Republics, there seems to be little relationship with a correlation coefficient of .486. Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia and Azerbaidzhan ranked lowest and Latvia and Estonia had the greatest shares. Lowest shares in the budgetary TABLE 34 MIGRATION AND ITS RELATION TO ECONOMIC FACTORS 1 % of Republic Population National Budgetary Expenditures in 7o of Republic Population Emigrating, 1970 Income , 1968 Rep. Nat'l. Econ . , 1964 Immigrating, 1970 Rank Rank Order ^i Order Rank Order £i Rank Order V_± 1. Kazakhstan .1172 8 .0559 1 .1481 1. Kazakhstan .1172 2. RSFSR .0955 4 .0900 5 .0700 2. Estonia .1053 3. Estonia .0868 2 .1101 3 .0846 3. RSFSR .1009 4. Lithuania .0825 3 .0914 2 .0903 4. Latvia .0875 5. Kirgizia .0810 11 .0495 13 .0503 5. Lithuania .0861 6. Latvia .0767 1 .1131 7 .0609 6. Kirgizia .0757 7. Belorussia .0738 7 .0648 9 .0548 7. Belorussia .0757 8. Ukraine .0666 5 .0783 8 .0560 8. Ukraine .0697 9. Moldavia .0637 6 .0649 15 .0355 9. Moldavia .0623 10. Tadzhikstan .0608 15 .0384 11 .0526 10. Tadzhikstan .0534 11. Turkmenia .0492 13 .0437 6 .0679 11. Turkmenia .0430 12. Uzbekistan .0463 14 .0435 14 ' .0429 12. Uzebekistan .0371 13. Georgia .0391 10 .0526 12 .0507 13. Armenia .0326 14. Azerbaidzhan .0318 12 .0482 10 .0540 14. Georgia .0282 15. Armenia .0289 9 .0556 4 .0815 15. Azerbaidzhan .0252 Correlation = .486 Correlation = .577 Correlation = .651 Correlation = .574 SOURCE: Migration data is from Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1970 goda (Moskva: Statistika, 1973). National income is based on data in Hans-Juergen Wagener, "Regional Output Levels in the Soviet Union," no. 41 (N.Y.: Radio Liberty Research Paper, 1971). Budget is from Gosudarstvenni Biydjet SSSR i.Biydjeti Soyunik Respublik (Moskva: Finansi, 1966). 219 investments in Republic national economies for 1964 were held by Moldavia and Lithuania. This correlation was .577, demonstrating again lack of support for the hypothesized inverse relationship between relative economic hardship and emigration, at least from the aggregated Republic-based level. This is not to dismiss the merit with Perevedentsev's argument, since the processes he refers to may well be operative on a sub- Republic level, e.g., from rural to urban areas within a given Republic. Correlations between immigration to the Republics and economic conditions are slightly higher, but still provide only fragile support, at best, for the hypothesis. (Again see table 34.) In an effort to draw conclusions and pull together the findings from different sections of this dissertation, it is not inappropriate (though perhaps it is unusual) to introduce at this time some additional data. Statistics on interkolkhoz organizations and inter-ethnic marriages 4 are available on the Union Republic level. It is the view of this writer that these data are qualitatively different from the majority of indicators studied in the previous chapters. For more so than many of the other measures, these measures cut across all the policy domains, and from a theoretical perspective, they seem to be more on the order of dependent variables in relation 220 to them. Interkolkhoz organizations apparently originated in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the collective farming system. They represent "func tional" economic cooperation in terms of shared resources and greater unity among materials, labor, and instruments of mechanization. They also have tremendous political and social implications. Official policy acknowledges the "social significance of intercollective farm cooperation" and views the expansion and proliferation of interkolkhoz organizations as the correct path for further improvement of social relations.5 Such associations are believed to both represent and foster a wholesome break from the localism and private g orientations of the past. They also represent a more aggregated unit for political purposes. In order to avoid the possibility of accidentally measuring ruralness with these interkolkhoz association variables we per formed two procedures. First, we standardized both measures by the number of kolkhozes in each Republic in order to take disparities among Republics on farm units into account. Second, a correlation was run between the percentage of each Republic which is considered rural and each interkolkhoz association measure. The relation ships were statistically quite weak with correlations of 221 .425 (on numbers of interkolkhoz associations) and .577 (on numbers of personnel employed in them). Our study reveals that these institutions were not uniformly accepted throughout the Union Republics (at least in the period for which data were published). See appendix D, table 55. TABLE 35 INTERKOLKHOZ ORGANIZATIONS Number of Personnel Working Interkolkhoz in Interkolkhoz Organizations Organizations 1959 1961 (Standardized by number of kolkhozes in Republic Score % Max. Score % Max. Lieberson index . 9079 97. 27% . 9005 96. 48% Entropy 2.5228 93. 16% 2. 4626 90. 94% Z Score 3. 122 3.686 Turkmenia and Uzbekistan were quite outstanding in the size of their relative shares of interkolkhoz associa tions, with Tadzhikistan and the Ukraine following. In contrast, Armenia,had a mere handful of cooperative arrangements and ranked disproportionately low on the relative frequencies. A similar pattern characterized the distribution of numbers of personnel employed in interkolkhoz organizations. This time Turkmenia and 222 Moldavia had the outstandingly high p^'s, followed again by Tadzhikistan and the Ukraine (Uzbekistan came in fifth). Armenia, once more, was conspicuous by its decisively low share (Azerbaidzhan was in next to last place for both distributions). Diversity scores v:ere also figured for mixed marriages, computed from the number of families in each Republic whose members represented different ethnic nationalities (and normalized by numbers of families in each Republic). Such data are very interesting because they provide information on several levels. Not only do we get insight on the relationship among and status of the ethnic/social processes going on within the Republics (and in so doing get a partial test of the "drawing together" and consolidation of peoples at the intra- Republic level). But we also get a comparative look at how "successfully" the fifteen Union Republics are deal ing with these processes. TABLE 36 MIXED MARRIAGES, 197 0 Score % Max. Lieberson index .9214 98.72% Entropy 2.6067 96.26% Z Score 2.486 223 Nonuniformity of intermarriages prevails across the Republics according to our Z score. Considerably greater percentages of the distribution of mixed marriages belong to Latvia, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine than any other Republics. Republics least involved in such "inter mingling" are, again, Armenia, and also, interestingly, the RSFSR. We hesitate in drawing any conclusion here that Armenians and Russians remain the most "ethnically pure," since as we shall see below, at least in the case of Russians, the "minglers" are apparently already having their impact in other Republics! What sorts of inferences can be drawn from this latest evidence as we take it into the context of the rest of this study? A correlation was computed on mixed marriages with the percentage of Republic population knowing the Russian language (excluding the RSFSR) to determine to what extent the Russian "presence" and/or the medium of this "international" language was instrumental in such processes of ethnic synthesis. The coefficient of .8706 is quite high and significant at the 95 percent confi dence level. Thus, the process of international marriage seems to be fostered by or at least coincident with, as the Soviet theorists suggest, "fraternal" visits by the "elder brothers" and by the spread of a 224 common linguistic channel. Another inference worth pondering is whether the low intermarriage rates in the Russian and Armenian Republics could somehow be associated with the dispropor tionate representation accorded to both nations on high level Party bodies such as the Central Committee, noted earlier in this dissertation. For to the extent that such cohesive inbreeding and ethnic stand-offishness serve as sources of strength in maintaining political access, the fears of ethnic dilution by other national Republic groups become increasingly serious. Moreover, the conspicuous "outlyer" role demon strated by the Armenian SSR on so many of the composi tional distributions is, in itself, an interesting finding, and a seldom-mentioned phenomenon in the literature. Finally, somewhat surprising is the apparent lack of association found between the distributions of inter kolkhoz organizations and mixed marriages, since both were expected to measure national/Republic consolidation and diversity. We surmise from our results that on some dimensions the Republics are simply at different stages in the extent of their internal political/economic syntheses, and building of their ties of Socialist friendship. This conclusion is more significant than at 225 first glance it may appear. For there seems to be some reluctance in the literature to accept such diversity without automatically imposing negative normative judg ments. The related question of whether the Republics as units are becoming more or less viable, must be answered cautiously. Answers are partly dependent upon policy sphere. They are partly dependent upon that Republic's relationships with all the other Republics. Moreover, the answers must show awareness that "viability" itself is not as much a place or level on a continuum, as it appears to be a dynamic response to political, economic or social stimuli. Ill. Significance of this Study The broad compositional approach of this disser tation has provided a distinctive perspective on Soviet policy toward, and the relationships among the fifteen Union Republics. The parameters of alleged Russian dominance have been more fully documented and measured here, and the limits are found which define their actual scope and extent. This study helps highlight important interactions occurring among the other fourteen Republics as well, drawing attention away from a mere bilateral relationship between the RSFSR and each of the others. This is very important, since the trend in the literature has been to focus either on isolated case-Republics or 226 has been set up around the presumed problem of Moscow- Republic mistreatment. This study suggests numerous factors other than the standard theories of Russianiza- tion and national prejudice to explain variations in policy impact and diverse behaviors across the Republics. In bringing together a broad empirical base with Soviet theoretical and policy documents, this dissertation has hopefully helped to clarify the status of many debated and possibly irreconcilable views within the Soviet Union. In bringing together several different policy domains, this study has hopefully synthesized a disparate litera ture of findings, and if not reconciled, then at least explained several sources of confusion and contradiction. In bringing together the Soviet problems of multi-national federation with the context of comparative political theory, this dissertation has presumably helped to enrich and link more closely both bodies of literature. And finally, in bringing together statistical tools of a compositional approach with problems of national politics, this dissertation has hopefully contributed, if in a minor way, to the potential of further political science analysis. 227 Notes— Chapter Eight 1. Rein Taagepera, "1970 Census: Fusion of Crystalliza tion of Nationalities," Soviet Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, October 1971, pp. 216-22. 2. From V. I. Naulko, "Present Ethnic Composition of the Population of the Ukrainian SSR," in Sociology in the USSR, ed. Stephen Dunn, White Plains, N.Y., IASP, 1969, pp. 184-97. A similar claim is made by V. Kistanov, in Voprosy ekonomiki, December 1972 and trans. in CDSP 25, no. 9, March 28, 1973: "the Republics themselves are becoming more and more multinational from year to year, thanks to the mobility of the population and as a result of changes in the siting of productive forces." 3. V. I. Perevedentsev, "Contemporary Migration in the USSR," trans. in Soviet Geography: Review and Translation, vol. 10, no. 4, April 1969, pp. 192- 208. 4. A comprehensive discussion, in addition to data on interkolkhoz organizations is provided by Ritchie H. Reed in "Interkolkhoz Organizations in the USSR," U.S. Department of Commerce Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, Bureau of the Census, June 1966. Intermarriage data are from the Soviet Census, Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1970 Goda, vol. 7 (Moskva: Statistika, 1973), table 30. 5. I. I. 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APPENDIX A TABLES RELATING TO CHAPTER FIVE 245 246 APPENDIX A TABLE 37 RUSSIAN POPULATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF REPUBLIC'S POPULATION The Relative Frequencies 1959 1970 Pi Ukraine .0721 .0821 Belorussia .0350 .0440 Uzbekistan .0576 .0529 Kazakhstan . 1822 .1795 Georgia .0431 .0360 Azerbaidzhan .0580 .0423 Lithuania .0363 .0364 Moldavia .0435 .0491 Latvia .1135 .1262 Kirgizia .1288 .1236 Tadzhikstan .0567 .0504 Armenia .0137 .0114 Turkmenia .0738 .0614 Estonia .0858 .1046 These relative frequencies are based on the census report in Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1959 (1970) goda (Moskva: Statistika, 1962 (1973). 247 APPENDIX A TABLE 38 RELATIVE FREQUENCIES OF REPUBLIC SHARES IN MILITARY PERSONNEL 1959 Aa Bb RSFSR .0965 . .1014 Ukraine .0926 .1001 Belorussia .0724 . 0963 Uzbekistan .0468 . 1456 Kazakhstan .1064 .0697 Georgia .0677 .0690 Azerbaidzhan .0637 .0609 Lithuania .0419 .0531 Moldavia .0709 . 0736 Latvia .0579 . 0647 Kirgizia .0664 .0598 Tadzhikistan .0450 .0402 Armenia .0735 .0614 Turkmenia .0424 .0418 Estonia . 0560 .0625 A Entropy = 98.51% B Entropy = 9 8.56% A Diversity = 99.41% B Diversity = 99.43% Aadata is standardized by the individual republic popu lation for that year Id B data is directly from S. Rapawyop. cit., and represented "military personnel per 1000 males aged 15 to 24" APPENDIX B TABLES RELATING TO CHAPTER SIX 248 APPENDIX B TABLE 39 INTER-REPUBLIC TRADE AS A PERCENTAGE OF EACH REPUBLIC'S TOTAL TRADE VOLUME3 (MILLIONS OF TONS) RATIOS P. l 1960 RSFSR 286.53 / 1483.60 .0206 Ukraine 200.92 / 621.27 .0345 Belorussia 35.17 / 54.18 .0692 Uzbekistan 24. 72 / 37.85 ,0696 Kazakhstan 89. 33 / 134.81 .0707 Georgia 28.91 / 40.82 .0755 Azerbaidzhan 27. 30 / 44.06 .0661 Lithuania 12.85 / 19.03 .0720 Moldavia 9. 86 / 14.63 .0719 Latvia 13.66 / 24.28 .0600 Kirgizia 9.14 / 10.27 .0949 Tadzhikstan 7.50 / 8.12 .0985 Armenia 6.88 / 10.45 .0702 Turkmenia 12.83 / 19.89 .0688 Estonia 8.26 / 15. 30 .0576 1970 RSFSR 451.32 / 2190.40 ,0222 Ukraine 278.00 / 968.62 .0309 Belorussia 71.77 / 110.96 .0697 Uzbekistan 42. 32 / 74. 75 .0610 Kazakhstan 141.00 / 245.39 .0619 Georgia 31.83 / 51. 87 .0661 Azerbaidzhan 42.00 / 68.16 .0664 Lithuania 28.28 / 39.71 .0767 Moldavia 20.54 / 28.51 .0776 Latvia 30.95 / 42.69 .0781 Kirgizia 13.59 / 16.75 .0874 Tadzhikstan 10.43 / 11.83 .0950 250 APPENDIX B, TABLE 39— Continued Armenia 12.91 / 19.09 .0729 Turkmenia 26.84 / 37.35 .0774 Estonia 17.07 / 32.59 .0564 "Inter-Republic trade" is the sum of export and import freight volume found on p. 44 in Transcport i. Sviajh SSR (Moskva: Statistika, 1972) for each Republic. "Total trade volume" is derived from the sum of this inter-Republic trade and "intra- Republic trade" (that volume of freight transported within the Republic unit), found ibid. 251 APPENDIX B TABLE 40 VOLUME (MILLIONS OF TONS) OF FREIGHT TRANSPORTED BY UNION REPUBLIC3 1960 1970 IMPORTS RSFSR 132.88 203.25 Ukraine 89.89 126.60 Belorussia 28. 32 51.11 Uzbekistan 17.12 29.01 Kazakhstan 39.14 49.09 Georgia 18.73 24.18 Azerbaidzhan 7.54 17.86 Lithuania 10. 71 23.04 Moldavia 7.11 15. 39 Latvia 10. 23 22.24 Kirgizia 5. 26 10.08 Tadzhikstan 4.68 7.01 Armenia 4.07 8.47 Turkmenia 5.79 8.45 Estonia 4.42 9.59 EXPORTS RSFSR 153.65 248.07 Ukraine 111.03 151.40 Belorussia 6.85 20.66 Uzbekistan 7.60 13. 31 Kazakhstan 50.19 91.91 Georgia 10.18 7.65 Azerbaidzhan 19.76 24.14 Lithuania 2.14 5.24 Moldavia 2.75 5.15 Latvia 3.43 8.71 Kirgizia 3.88 3.51 Tadzhikstan 2.82 3.42 Armenia 2.81 4.44 Turkmenia 7.04 18. 39 Estonia 3.84 7.48 a from Transcport i. Sviajh, SSSR. (Moskva: Statistika, 1972) . 44. APPENDIX B TABLE 41 RELATIVE PROPORTIONS OF NATIONAL INCOME HELD BY REPUBLICS3 1960 (a) 1960 (b) 1965 1968 1970 (a) 1970 (1 Wagener Feshbach Wagener Latvian Korope( RSFSR .0849 .0980 .0850 .0900 .0847 .0850 Ukraine .0750 .0929 .0783 .0782 .0737 .0784 Belorussia .0570 .0538 .0610 .0648 .0698 .0749 Uzbekistan .0517 .0435 .0491 .0435 .0468 .0438 Kazakhstan .0613 .0520 .0498 .0559 .0624 .0754 Georgia .0541 .0628 .0537 .0526 .0555 .0516 Azerbaidzhan .0643 .0572 .0529 .0482 .0471 .0426 Lithuania .0757 .0624 .0849 .0914 .0852 .0846 Moldavia .0585 .0476 .0665 .0649 .0622 .0626 Latvia .1039 .1111 .1099 .1131 .0993 .0921 Kirgizia .0516 .0461 .0483 .0494 .0438 .0415 Tadzhikstan .0434 .0427 .0434 .0384 .0438 .0415 Armenia .0599 .0720 .0588 .0556 .0586 .0579 Turkmenia .0585 .0419 .0501 .0437 .0559 .0535 Estonia .1003 .1160 .1072 .1101 .1030 .1044 a , The raw data from which these relative frequencies were derived came from the lowing sources: Hans-Juergen Wagener, "Regional Output Levels in the Soviet Union," (N.Y. Radio Liberty Research Paper, 1971), no. 41, p. 13. Murray Feshbach et alia, "Employment in the USSR" in Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, 1962, p. 704. Narodnoe khoziaistvo Latviskoi SSR v. 1971 godu. (Riga: Statistika, 1972), p. 56. Ivan S. Koropeckyj, "National and Eastern Europe, (New York: Praeger, 1976). Special 252 Studies ed., edited by Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl, p. 29. APPENDIX 3 TABLE 42 REPUBLICS' SHARES IN TOTAL BUDGET9 (Normalized by Population) ^ ^ 1950 Rank Order ---- P. Rank Order P Rank Order 1955 P. l l l 1. Estonia . 1008 1. Kazakhstan .1127 1. Kazakhstan .0973 2. Armenia .0877 2. Estonia .0928 2. Estonia .0926 3. Turkmenia .0865 3. Latvia .0783 3. Armenia .0814 4. Latvia .0767 4. Turkmenia .0748 4. Lithuania .0792 5. Georgia .0749 5. RSFSR .0738 5. Latvia .0738 6. Tadzhikstan .0718 6. Armenia .0675 6. RSFSR .0690 7. Azerbaidzhan .0667 7. Lithuania .0658 7. Turkmenia .0678 8. Kirgizia .0625 8. Kirgizia .0635 8. Georgia .0593 9. Kazakhstan .0622 9. Ukraine .0608 9. Ukraine .0578 10. RSFSR .0547 10. Azerbaidzhan .0587 10. Belorussia .0575 11. Lithuania .0546 11. Georgia .0575 11. Azerbaidzhan .0571 r—1 CM Uzbekistan .0531 12. Tadzhikstan .0557 12. Kirgizia .0568 13. Belorussia .0500 13. Belorussia .0543 13. Tadzhikstan .0549 14. Ukraine .0494 14. Uzbekistan .0452 14. Uzbekistan .0499 15. Moldavia .0484 15. Moldavia .0385 15. Moldavia .0456 a Derived from statistics in Gosudarstvenni bydjet SSSR i. bydjeti Soyuznik Respublik 9 (Moskva: Finansi, 1966), p. 28. to in u> 254 APPENDIX B TABLE 43 RELATIVE FREQUENCIES OF SELECTED BUDGET EXPENDITURES ACROSS UNION REPUBLICS3 EDUCATION 1950 1965 Millions/Rubles P. Millions/Rubles P. l 1 RSFSR 2102.0 .0568 7152.9 .0631 Ukraine 672. 7 .0505 2221.4 .0546 Belorussia 160.4 .0569 486.6 .0633 Uzbekistan 137.8 .0604 512.3 .0561 Kazakhstan 146. 5 .0618 701.6 .0657 Georgia 104.0 .0816 270.9 .0671 Azerbaidzhan 76.2 .0729 256. 7 .0631 Lithuania 45.5 .0490 188.6 .0711 Moldavia 45.9 .0551 169.7 .0571 Latvia 44.0 .0621 150.6 .0748 Kirgizia 41.4 .0655 147.1 .0613 Tadzhikstan 40.6 .0745 144. 5 .0648 Armenia 49.7 .1018 166. 7 .0868 Turkmenia 31.5 .0733 109.6 .0655 Estonia 31.4 .0775 97. 7 .0854 3The budget figures come from Gosudarstvenni biudjet SSSR i. bindget Soyuznik Respublik. (Moskva: Finansi, 1966), p. 31. The P.'s are derived from the proportion each Republic captured out ot the sum of the education budget after Republic population size was controlled. It should be kept in mind that p.'s approaching .0667 indicate a uniform distribution. APPENDIX B TABLE 44 RELATIVE FREQUENCIES OF INVESTMENTS IN REPUBLIC NATIONAL ECONOMIES3 1950 1955 1965 Millions/Rubles P. Millions/Rubles P. Millions/Rubles P. l l l RSFSR 1120.0 .0384 2375.0 .0466 16,291.1 .0642 Ukraine 436.5 .0415 1322.4 .0719 5,105.3 .0561 Belorussia 93.2 .0421 171.5 .0443 931.6 .0541 Uzbekistan 82.9 .0461 106.7 .0339 936.5 .0458 Kazakhstan 128.1 .0684 654.1 .1996 2,992.5 .1251 Georgia 69.6 .0694 72.0 .0410 477.7 .0528 Azerbaidzhan 43.9 .0535 123.2 .0858 477.4 .0524 Lithuania 45.5 .0616 60.1 .0465 539.4 .0906 Moldavia 24.0 .0365 36.9 .0321 266.9 .0400 Latvia 43.5 .0779 69.1 .0707 302. 3 .0668 Kirgizia 30.6 .0621 38.7 .0449 293.0 .0546 Tadzhikstan 34. 3 .0791 48.7 .0642 262.7 .0524 Armenia 32.6 .0843 36.9 .0545 364. 3 .0846 Turkmenia 37.3 .1085 46.5 .0773 260.4 .0693 Estonia 41.2 .1308 47.7 .0866 234.0 .0911 P.'s represent the proportions received by each Republic in expenditures after population size is taken into account. Investment figures are from Gosudarstvenni bydjet SSSR 1. biudjet Soyuznik Respublik. (Moskva: Finansi, 1966), p. 29. APPENDIX C TABLES RELATING TO CHAPTER SEVEN 256 257 APPENDIX C TABLE 4 5 STRENGTH OF ETHNIC GROUP IN ITS OWN UNION REPUBLIC 1959 1970 Relative Relative g g frequency RSFSR 83.3 . 0842 82.8 . 0827 Ukraine 76.8 . 0776 74.9 . 0748 Belorussia 81.1 . 0820 81.0 . 0809 Uzbekistan 62.2 . 0629 65. 5 . 0654 Kazakhstan 30.0 .0303 32.6 . 0326 Georgia 64 . 3 . 0650 66.8 . 0667 Azerbaidzhan 67.5 . 0683 73.8 . 0737 Lithuania 79 . 3 . 0802 80.1 . 0800 Moldavia 65.4 . 0661 64. 6 . 0645 Latvia 62.0 . 0627 56. 8 . 0567 Kirgizia 40.5 .0410 43.8 . 0437 Tadzhikistan 53.1 . 0537 56. 2 .0561 Armenia 88.0 . 0890 88.6 . 0885 Turkmenia 60.9 . 0616 65.6 . 0655 Estonia 74 . 6 . 0754 68.2 . 0681 Data based on Soviet Census volumes Itogi Vsesoiuzm perepisi naseleniia 1959 (1970 ) goda (Moskva : Statis 1962 (1973), vol . 4 (p. 12, p. 15) . 258 APPENDIX C TABLE 46 NATIONAL DISPERSION RATIOS 1959 1970 ND Ratios ND Ratios Computed Pi Pi RSFSR 114.11 / 100.42 .0663 1.197 .0674 Ukraine 37.25 / 33.09 .0657 1.155 .0650 Belorussia 7.91 / 6.67 .0692 1.242 .0699 Uzbekistan 6.02 / 5. 39 .0651 1.189 .0669 Kazakhstan 3.62 / 3.12 .0678 1.273 .0716 Georgia 2.69 / 2.70 .0582 1.036 .0583 Azerbaidzhan 2.94 / 2.68 .0640 1.160 .0653 Lithuania 2. 33 / 2.22 .0611 1.063 .0598 Moldavia 2.21 / 1.99 .0650 1.171 .0659 Latvia 1.40 / 1.33 .0615 1.066 .0600 Kirgizia .91 / .90 .0628 1.130 . 0636 Tadzhikistan 1.40 / 1.12 .0731 1. 310 .0737 Armenia 2.79 / 1.67 .0977 1.612 .0907 Turkmenia 1.00 / .99 .0591 1.076 .0606 Estonia .99 / .91 .0634 1.089 .0613 Numerator = Total population of ethnic group in USSR Denominator = Population of that ip residing in Titular Republic Based on data from Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1959 (1970) goda (Moskva: Statistika, 1962 (1973), p. 203 (vol. 4, pp. 12, 144). 259 APPENDIX C TABLE 47 THE RURAL COMPONENT BY UNION REPUBLIC 1959 1970 r o o Pi Pi RSFSR 4 5% . 0533 38% . 0497 Ukraine 52 . 0615 45 . 0588 Belorussia 66 .0781 57 .0745 Uzbekistan 65 .0769 63 .0824 Kazakhstan 56 .0663 50 .0654 Georgia 57 .0675 52 .0680 Azerbaidzhan 51 .0604 50 .0654 Lithuania 60 .0710 50 .0654 Moldavia 76 .0899 68 .0889 Latvia 42 .0497 38 .0497 Kirgizia 65 .0769 6 3 . 0824 Tadzhikistan 66 .0781 63 . 0824 Armenia 49 .0580 41 .0536 Turkmenia 53 .0627 52 .0680 Estonia 42 . 0497 35 . 0458 Data from Itogi Vsesoiu znoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1959 I goda (Moskva: Statistika, 1962 (1973), vol. 1, pp. 7, 9 The p.'s represent the portion of each Republic's share in the total distribution of ruralness. Variation from an equal distribution (represented by a p. of .0667) is small according to our measures. 260 APPENDIX C TABLE 48 SLAVS IN NON-SLAVIC REPUBLICS 1959 O. o Pi Uzbekistan 32. 7% .0769 Kazakhstan 65.1 .1531 Georgia 18.3 .0430 Azerbaidzhan 22.5 .0529 Lithuania 26.7 .0628 Moldavia 51.2 . 1204 Latvia 42.9 .1009 Kirgizia 57. 2 .1346 Tadzhikistan 35. 3 .0830 Armenia 4.2 .0099 Turkmenia 34.1 .0802 Estonia 34. 9 .0821 Percentages are from Stephen Rapawy "An Analysis of Data on the Soviet Armed Forces in-the 1959 Census," U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, Bureau of Economic Analysis. May, 1975, p. 3. 261 APPENDIX C TABLE 49 PERCENTAGE SPEAKING RUSSIAN IN NON-RUSSIAN REPUBLICS 1970 Rank Order Percenta 1. Kazakhstan 77.1% . 1194 2. Latvia 67.1 . 1040 3. Belorussia 66.6 . 1032 4. Ukraine 56. 7 .0878 5. Kirgizia 52.5 .0813 6. Moldavia 50. 6 .0784 7. Estonia 50.0 . 0775 8. Lithuania 44.0 .0682 9. Turkmenia 33.3 .0516 10. Georgia 32.6 .0505 11. Tadzhikistan 30.9 . 0479 12. Uzbc kistan 30. 3 . 0469 13. Azerbaidzhan 29.2 .0452 14. Armenia 24.6 . 0381 Compare this above with TABLE 50 PERCENTAGE OF REPUBLIC POPULATION WHICH IS RUSSIAN 1970 Rank Order Percentage 1. Kazakhstan 42.4% . 1795 2. Latvia 29.8 . 1262 3. Kirgizia 29.2 .1236 4. Estonia 24.7 . 1046 5. Ukraine ly.4 .0821 262 APPENDIX C, TABLE 50— Continued Rank Order Percentage Zi 6. Turkmenia 14. 5% . 0614 7. Uzbekistan 12. 5 . 0529 8. Tadzhikistan 11.9 .0504 9. Moldavia 11.6 . 0491 10. Belorussia 10. 4 .0440 11. Azerbaidzhan 10. 0 .0423 12. Lithuania 8.6 . 0364 13. Georgia 8.5 . 0360 14. Armenia 2.7 .0114 SOURCES: Stephen Rapawy "An Analysis of Data on the Soviet Armed Forces in the 19 59 Data," U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, Bureau of Economic Analysis, May, 1975, p. 6 and Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1970 goda, (Moskva: Statistika, 1973), vol. 4, p. 12. 263 APPENDIX C TABLE 51 DISPATCH OF AIR PASSENGERS BY REPUBLIC (IN THOUSANDS) 1960 1970 # Ei # RSFSR 9612 .0557 42478 .0812 Ukraine 1697 .0276 8987 .0474 Belorussia 255 .0215 1320 .0365 Uzbekistan 917 .0756 2562 . 0540 Kazakhstan 1260 .0937 4290 .0820 Georgia 321 .0540 1571 . 0833 Azerbaidzhan 271 . 0499 943 .0458 Lithuania 79 .0198 623 .0495 Moldavia 22 7 .0536 649 .0452 Latvia 168 .0546 737 . 0775 Kirgizia 241 .0794 767 .0650 Tadzhikistan 287 .0987 1082 .0928 Armenia 147 . 0568 619 . 0618 Turkmenia 448 .2012 1075 .1238 Estonia 101 . 0580 296 . 0543 SOURCE: Transcport i. Sviajh SSSR (Moskva: Statistika, 1973), p. 209. Note that the p.'s here are based not DIRECTLY on the raw data shown heri, but rather on the Republics' shares of a per capita-ized distribution's total. 264 APPENDIX C TABLE 52 IMMIGRATION INTO THE UKRAINE, 1970 This table is provided as an example of the data in the thirty tests performed for the discussion on pp. Population Coming From i P . l RSFSR 419,660 . 1055 Belorussia 22,260 . 0808 Uzbekistan 18,419 .0510 Kazakhstan 65,711 .1652 Georgia 8,356 . 0583 Azerbaidzhan 6, 656 . 0425 Lithuania 2,261 .0236 Moldavia 18,090 .1657 Latvia 3,474 . 0480 Kirgizia 5,194 .0579 Tadzhikistan 4,706 . 0531 Armenia 2,022 .0265 Turkmenia 3,632 .0550 Estonia 2, 766 .0667 SOURCE: Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1970 goda (Moskva: Statistika, 1973), vol. 7. Note that the p.'s were derived from a distribution of these data in whiih Republic population size was controlled. 265 APPENDIX C TABLE 5 3 IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION, 19 70 Relative Frequencies of the Distributions of These Population Movements as Percentages of the Republic's Population Immigration Emigrat RSFSR . 1009 . 0955 Ukraine . 0697 .0666 Belorussia . 0757 .0738 Uzbekistan . 0371 .0463 Kazakhstan .1172 . 1172 Georgia .0282 .0391 Azerbaidzhan . 0252 .0318 Lithuania .0861 .0825 Moldavia . 0623 .0637 Latvia .0875 .0767 Kirgizia .0757 .0810 Tadzhikistan .0534 .0608 Armenia .0326 . 0289 Turkmenia .0430 .0492 Estonia . 1053 .0868 NOTE: The data from which these relative frequencies were derived are found in the text, p. APPENDIX C TABLE 5 4 RELATIVE FREQUENCIES OF COMMUNICATIONS BY REPUBLIC Long Distance Outbound Phone Calls Letters 1960 1970 1960 1970 Pi Pi RSFSR .0529 .0638 . 0755 . 0865 Ukraine .0431 . 0583 .0661 . 0769 Belorussia . 0474 . 0668 . 0751 . 0749 Uzbekistan .0350 . 0365 . 0345 . 0472 Kazakhstan . 0373 . 0457 .0576 . 0664 Georgia .0515 . 0554 .0800 . 0561 Azerbaidzhan . 0438 . 0454 .0637 .0551 Lithuania . 0875 .1168 . 0623 .0698 Moldavia .0501 .0488 . 0549 .0612 Latvia .1548 . 1300 .1092 .1073 Kirgizia . 0392 .0396 . 0375 . 0449 '•Lidzhikistan . 0321 . 0330 .0266 . 0292 Armenia . 0689 . 0836 .0718 . 0603 Turkmenia .0611 .0380 . 0603 .0533 Estonia .1953 .1385 . 1247 . 1109 Source of Data on which these p.'s were calculated: Transcport i. Sviajh SSSR (Moskva:- Statistika, 1973) pp. 27 7 and 2 74. APPENDIX D TABLES RELATING TO CHAPTER EIGHT 267 APPENDIX D TABLE 55 MEASURES OF INTRA-REPUBLIC CONSOLIDATION AND COOPERATION AMONG PEOPLES Number of Interkolkhoz Number of Interkolkhoz Organizations (per kolkhoz) Personnel/kolkhoz Mixed Marriage: 1959 1961 1970 Rank Order Rank Rank £i El 1. Turkmenia .1537 1 .1664 9 . 0624 2. Uzebekistan .1500 5 .0951 10 . 0562 3. Tadzhikstan .1007 3 .1106 8 .0677 4. Ukraine . 0919 4 . 0977 3 . 1014 5. Georgia . 0731 9 . 0452 11 . 0513 6. Kazakhstan . 0697 6 . 0722 2 .1061 7. Kirgizia . 0655 8 . 0503 6 . 0765 8. RSFSR . 0546 10 . 0345 15 .0144 9. Moldavia . 0540 2 .1504 4 . 0920 10. Belorussia . 0521 7 .0648 5 . 0853 11. Estonia . 0442 12 .0337 7 . 0700 12. Latvia . 0341 11 .0342 1 .1081 13. Lithuania .0252 13 .0270 12 .0492 14. Azerbaidzhan . 0204 14 .0117 13 . 0403 15. Armenia . 0108 15 .0064 14 . 0192 SOURCE: National Economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1960: Statistical Hand book (Washington , D.C.: U .S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1960), P- 531; Ritchie Reed, "Interkolkhoz Organizations in the U .S.S.R." (Washing- ton , D .C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Foreign Demo- graphic Analysis Division, June 1966); and Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1970 goda, vol. 3 (Moskva: Statistika , 1973), table 30.