The social impact of the Silk Road Economic Belt in : can the legacy of a disruptive history be overcome?

Academic dissertation

Promoter: prof. dr. Bruno De Cordier

Words: 17746

Karl De Winne 00605461 Master Conflict & Development 2019-2020

Table of contents 1 The Silk Road Economic Belt: the peaceful rise of ? ...... 5 2 What is at stake in Central Asia? ...... 8 2.1 Drivers behind China’s growing presence in Central Asia ...... 8 2.1.1 Domestic economic challenges ...... 8 2.1.2 (Geo)political factors ...... 9 2.2 A Blessing or a Burden: the SREB in the Central Asian Republics ...... 10 2.2.1 Opportunities ...... 10 2.2.2 Risks associated with a growing Chinese presence in Central Asia ...... 14 3 The SREB as a reproduction of capitalist Globalization ...... 18 4 How the past is defining the future of Central Asia ...... 21 4.1 Economic Violence ...... 24 4.1.1 Endemic corruption : rent-seeking activities are flourishing ...... 25 4.1.2 The lack of conditionality ...... 28 4.2 Local responses to China: sinophobia ...... 29 4.2.1 ...... 31 4.2.2 Kyrgyzstan...... 32 4.2.3 Tajikistan ...... 33 4.2.4 Uzbekistan/Turkmenistan ...... 34 4.2.5 How real is sinophobia threatening the Central Asian societies ...... 34 4.3 Central Asia as a patchwork of visible and non-visible borders ...... 37 4.3.1 Borderlands ...... 38 4.3.2 Nation Building ...... 39 5 Concluding remarks ...... 41

ABSTRACT

In September 2013, lots of expectations were created as Chinese President Xi Jinping introduced the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) during a speech at Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev University. Since then, a debate started in academic circles as well as in wider society about whether or not the SREB can deliver on local expectations. Based on literature of both the drivers for China’s growing presence in Central Asia as the opportunities and risks associated with this large-scale project for the Central Asian republics, this dissertation argues that the SREB is in fact a reproduction of China’s vision on globalisation. Above all, China wants to establish economic partnerships that can address a number of domestic shortcomings.

Furthermore, it is stated that the way in which the SREB will influence local societies in Central Asia cannot be separated from the recent and less recent history of this region. It is concluded that the implementation of SREB is influenced by certain dynamics arising from both the Soviet period and the sudden (and forced) globalization which followed. Moreover, it is shown that without an adjusted policy, the SREB can reinforce certain negative dynamics that are specific to the region. Specifically, it is discussed how the SREB in

Central Asia has led to the exacerbation of corrupt practices, the increase of a historically grown sinophobia and the disruption of precarious stability in the border regions.

1 The Silk Road Economic Belt: the peaceful rise of China?

The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) was introduced as part of the in September 2013 in Central Asia by Chinese president Xi Jinping during a speech1 at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan. The president stressed that building cooperative relationships based on mutual benefit with the Central Asian countries is a priority of China's foreign policy. China aims to improve the common development and prosperity, and to contribute to the happiness and well-being of the people in the countries involved, said the president. The countries involved in the project should strengthen economic ties by better aligning policies, improving road connectivity, promoting trade, enhancing monetary circulation and by strengthening people-to-people exchanges. In addition to economic arguments, security concerns were also put forward. According to Xi, more intensive cooperation is necessary to cope together with the ‘three evil forces’ of terrorism, extremism and separatism, as well as drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. It is remarkable how much the president has emphasized that any form of cooperation will be conducted with the utmost respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each partner. During a similar speech a month later in Indonesia, Xi Jinping presented the Maritime Silk Road (MSR). Together with the SREB, this project forms the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In 2015, a vision text was published by the National Development and Reform Commission led by both the Ministry of Foreign Policy and the Ministry of Commerce. In this document a number of basic principles and policy priorities were explained in detail. The Belt and Road Initiative is praised as a win- win cooperation that promotes prosperity, development and peace by enhancing mutual understanding and trust, and strengthening all-round exchanges (the National Development and Reform Commission, 2015). It is noteworthy that the common character of the project is strongly emphasized. The term 'mutual' occurs no less than 27 times in the document.

The project assumes cooperation in various areas. Five major priorities are put forward. First, enhancing intergovernmental cooperation both on intergovernmental as bilateral level is claimed as a necessary condition for the implementation of the project. Improving facility connectivity is proposed a second critical area for project implementation. Taking into account everyone's sovereignty, the countries concerned should align their infrastructure building plans in order to work gradually towards a coherent infrastructure (or transportation) network. Efforts should be made to increase connectivity in the areas of transport, energy and communication. A third priority is to strengthen investment and trade cooperation. The countries along the Belt and Road must create an attractive investment climate

1 For the entire speech see: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn and promote trade between the participating countries. Free trade zones must be created by simplifying customs systems along the Belt and Road in order to facilitate foreign investment. Fourth, further efforts must be made on financial integration. China led investment banks and financial organizations will play a leading role in this. Last but not least China wants to strengthen people-to- people exchanges. By strengthening the friendly exchanges between people along the Belt and Road they want to promote mutual understanding and friendship. On land, the Initiative will focus on jointly building a new and developing six economic corridors by taking advantage of international transport routes, relying on core cities along the Belt and Road and using key economic industrial parks as cooperation platforms. The Central Asian states are involved in two of the six economic corridors: the New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor and the China Central Asia- Economic Corridor.

Source: Hong Kong Trade Development Council and Nomura Global Economics

As made clear in this vision document, China is trying to convince potential partners with a discourse linking improved connectivity with economic progress, security and stability (Lain, 2018), which of course strikes a chord with central Asian regimes. According to Xi Jinping (Speech at the Fourth Summit of The Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), 2014) Asian countries need to ‘improve people’s lives and narrow down the wealth gap so as to cement the foundation of security’.

Contrary to popular belief, China's investments in central Asia are not new. In order to improve ties with its immediate neighbours and to promote the country's peaceful rise, China introduced 'the good neighbourhood policy' already in the late 1980's (Laruellle & Peyrouse, 2012). The SREB represents, however, an amplification of China's existing economic policy in the region (Lain, 2018). Since the project was announced, all kinds of Chinese investments and loans, both existing and new, have been placed under the SREB umbrella (Lain, 2018).

According to Laruelle (2018) the SREB entails repacking and bringing together the many ongoing or completed China funded infrastructure projects in Central Asia under the umbrella of the new project. However, she adds, the SREB is not simply the sum of the infrastructure projects launched to connect China to other parts of the world. Rather it is a new meta-discourse on the Silk Road and it should be understood as a manifestation of China's peaceful and multilateral rise.

In the next chapter both the drivers for China’s growing presence in Central Asia as the opportunities and risks associated with this large-scale project for the Central Asian republics, are being discussed. This is essential for one to understand what is at stake in this region. It is shown that China's policy in Central Asia is mainly driven by domestic economic concerns. As for the Central Asian republics, the SREB definitely includes a number of opportunities to overcome their landlockedness and to create economic growth in order to provide perspective for the local population. However, this economic growth is (too) largely created by the export of natural raw materials. In addition, the massive investment in infrastructure works associated with the SREB resulted in the Central Asian countries accumulating significant debt to China. Finally, reference is made to the role of the geographic features of the region. In the third chapter it is argued that the SREB project in general is in fact a reproduction of China's view of globalization. Moreover, it is pointed out that knowledge of the heterogeneous social space in Central Asia a necessary condition to be able to assess the local implementation of the SREB. The fourth chapter provides a brief but important overview of the recent and less recent history of this region. Moreover, it is shown how three historically developed phenomena that characterize the social and political space in Central Asia interact with the SREB. First, it addresses how the SREB is affected by the widespread corruption in Central Asia. In this regard it is noted that the SREB has the potential to even exacerbate this corruption as the resources the project entails may foster rent-seeking practices. Subsequently, it is discussed how a historically grown fear or even aversion for the great neighbour has led to a very critical and sometimes little rational debate about the growing presence of China in the economic landscape. In addition, there is a risk that any failure of the SREB will reinforce this sentiment. Finally, Central Asia is described as a patchwork of visible and invisible borders. However, the political boundaries are quite new as no state ever existed independently before 1991. This implies that these countries are still in the midst of a nation-building process whose objectives are sometimes inconsistent with those of the SREB. It is concluded that large-scale infrastructure projects can separate as much as they connect, especially in the highly symbolic and conflict-prone border regions. 2 What is at stake in Central Asia?

2.1 Drivers behind China’s growing presence in Central Asia

Analyses of what China wants to achieve with the Silk Road Economic Belt can be roughly divided into two categories: some authors emphasize China's geopolitical agenda, others point to mainly economic and commercial drivers (Summers, 2016). The former group interprets the SREB as a way for China to gain power and influence in recipient countries through investment, constraining their policy choices. The latter group sees the project primarily as a counterweight to a spluttering internal economy. The SREB must create new markets for Chinese companies and provide a solution for industrial overcapacity and a surplus of financial reserves. In what follows, China’s economic and geopolitical interests are discussed in more detail.

2.1.1 Domestic economic challenges

As stipulated by several authors (Lain, 2018; Ghiasy & Zhou, 2017; Laruelle, 2018) domestic economic stabilization is one of the main drivers for China. Laruelle (2018) argues that the project must serve to bridge the period awaiting the much needed switch from a low-cost production model ("Made in China") to a value-added model ("Created by China"). It is clear that, given the rather low standard of living and the limited purchasing power of the local population, the central Asian markets are perfectly suited to absorb surpluses in production of finished goods (Peyrouse, 2016). Meanwhile, China’s capital reserves are used to invest along the SREB to stimulate demand for Chinese goods and services which should compensate for the declining internal demand (Lain, 2018).

Not unimportantly, the SREB also serves as a facilitator for foreign investments in China itself (Duarte, 2018). Chen and Zhang (2015) describe the SREB as a two-way route which facilitates the worldwide expansion of Chinese companies but at the same time also attracts foreign investors to take a chance on the Chinese market.

Lain (2018) argues that the SREB is a logical continuation of the previously started ‘go out’- project in which Chinese companies are encouraged to invest abroad. Even today, China is still confronted with a development gap between the eastern coastal provinces on the one hand and domestic, especially western, provinces on the other. It is clear that the investments bundled under the SREB framework have to serve as a catalyst for the development of the Western provinces (Jochec & Kyzy, 2018). In this sense, the SREB furthermore serves as a way to preserve national stability (Duarte, 2018) as the Investments in the Central Asian states are partly driven by the need to counterbalance the political and social unrest in Xinjiang (Lain, 2018; Duarte, 2018). According to Lain (2018) the Chinese regime tries to counter both economic and political discontent among the Muslim Uyghur population in Xinjiang by improving the connectivity of Xinjiang both with other Chinese provinces as with markets abroad. Creating more prosperity is the main lever for the Chinese government in combating social unrest and the violence that comes with it.

As China’s manufacturing capacity has exceeded the ability of domestic and traditional foreign markets to absorb it (Jochec & Kyzy, 2018), increased connectivity can also contribute to the export of this excess capacity, mainly in heavy industry and construction (Lain, 2018; Tolipov, 2018). Duarte (2018) agrees stating that infrastructure projects abroad can provide an external stimulus for Chinese companies which forms a counterweight to the construction slowdown in China. According to Lain (2018), these efforts must be interpreted as part of China's efforts to rebalance its economy away from investment and toward consumption.

As labour is no longer as cheap as it once was in China, Chinese investors are looking for manufacturing locations abroad where labour is cheaper which makes capacity relocation another motive (Jochec & Kyzy, 2018).

Securing the access to natural resources such as oil, gas uranium copper and gold is another important driver for China, especially in Central Asia (Tolipov, 2018; Duarte, 2018). The SREB is therefore being deployed to build transmission grids and pipelines in order to import oil, gas and electricity from resource-rich areas (Jochec & Kyzy, 2018). Bitabarova (2018) emphasizes that specifically the import of natural gas is crucial for China as a weapon in the fight against air pollution, one of the biggest social problems the regime is facing at the moment.

As concluded by Jochec and Kyzy (2018), China mainly wants to achieve what other major economies managed in earlier decades of globalization: establishing economic partnerships that can address a number of domestic shortcomings. However, it should be noted that, given China's dominant position, comparisons with imperial practices will never be far off.

2.1.2 (Geo)political factors

Duarte (2018) points out that SREB serves a number of military, political and cultural goals by increasing China's influence in the wider region, especially westwards. More specifically, he argues, the SREB can be considered as a Chinese response to multilateral cooperation initiatives such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). As China's foreign policy is increasingly focused on developing the western provinces as part of this counter-hedging geopolitical strategy in Asia (Li, 2016), both Xinjiang and the adjacent Central Asian countries are gaining strategic importance. Moreover, China may be able to fill a vacuum recently created by the rather isolationist attitude of the United States since President Trump took office (Jochec & Kyzy, 2018).

Central Asians strategic value can be explained by its geographic proximity to and its close historical and cultural ties with Xinjiang (Bitabarova, 2018). Just like the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)2, the SREB must primarily promote regional cooperation and stability, which, according to China, must serve to tackle to religious extremism, ethnic separatism and international terrorism (Bitabarova, 2018; Duarte, 2018). Indeed, The SREB includes a security dimension as China explicitly links both connectivity and economic development with security and stability (the National Development and Reform Commission, 2015).

Interestingly, Duarte (2018) points out that the SREB may as well serve as a means of legitimizing the rule of the by both improving the country's international image and increasing its international influence. In the same vein, Zheng (2014) affirmed that what he calls "the Chinese dream" is a new way of self-legitimization that must evoke memories of glorious times when China was considered the epicentre of civilization.

Last but not least, Jochec and Kyzy (2018) point out that China also wants to make diplomatic progress through the SREB. By investing in education, science and culture, but also by focusing on poverty reduction, China tries to gain international prestige and increase its political influence (Jochec & Kyzy, 2018).

2.2 A Blessing or a Burden: the SREB in the Central Asian Republics

2.2.1 Opportunities

The SREB clearly provides the Central Asian republics an opportunity to overcome their landlockedness. SREB projects could go hand in hand with economic growth as they deliver significant improvements in transport infrastructure and industrial capacity and moreover, they contribute to developments in terms of financial connectivity (Rana & Ji, 2020). The focus on transport infrastructure is not surprising. Since none of the Central Asian republics in their vicinity can rely on access to open

2 The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a multilateral alliance between China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, , Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan with the aim of facilitating cooperation in the political, economic and security field. sea, economic development has been retarded by deficient transport connectivity and high transport costs. Moreover, the SREB is providing solutions to domestic transport bottlenecks and internal missing links in every central Asian republic (Rana & Ji, 2020). How China's SREB policy will effectively change society in Central Asia will, however, depend mainly on the Central Asian states themselves and on the degree to which they will succeed in aligning future SREB projects with their own domestic policies. If the central Asian states succeed to investment in human and institutional capital and manage to implement the right economic policies, the SREB infrastructure projects can certainly serve as a catalyst for both employment and economic activity (Ghiasy & Zhou, 2017). More specifically, the investments of Chinese companies can contribute to the much needed diversification of the central Asian economies (Lain, 2018). As shown by Rana and Ji (2020) the improved transport connectivity in Central Asia resulted in both a significant improvement in intra-regional trade as well as in an increase of inward foreign direct investment.

This chapter provides a brief overview of the opportunities that the SREB offers to China's neighbouring countries in Central Asia.

2.2.1.1 Kazakhstan The cooperation between China and Kazakhstan considerably predates the start of the Silk Road Economic Belt. In fact, becoming the bridge between East and West has been the country’s official strategic development project since the early years of independence (Kassenova, 2017). The cooperation focused mainly on the areas of energy and transport as both countries pursue complementary objectives in this area (Kassenova, 2017).

In terms of transportation several projects were launched in the last three decades. The first railway link between the countries was put into use in 1992. A second link was launched in 2012 as part of the huge dry port and special economic zone in Khorgos (Kassenova, 2017). Furthermore, in 2008 Kazakhstan began construction of a road connection between the yellow sea in the East and the Baltic sea in the West (Kassenova, 2017). Serving as a link between East and West, the projected increase in Eurasian container transit can yield up to $5 billion annually for Kazakhstan, according to Aitzhanova (2019).

In 2014, China and Kazakhstan agreed on building the logistics terminal under the SREB to give landlocked Kazakhstan its 'window to the sea' (Kassenova, 2017) and to facilitate Kazakhstan’s trade with East and Southeast Asia (Rana & Ji, 2020). By 2017 this resulted in the first wheat exports to Vietnam and Malaysia by making use of the Khorgos-Lianyungang railway and the logistics facilities in Lianyungang (Rana & Ji, 2020). Besides the obvious partnerships with China and Russia, Kazakhstan is striving to strengthen trading relations with Iran, Turkey and the Caucasus. The SREB is creating the infrastructural facilities for such prospects to materialise (Rana & Ji, 2020). The China-supported construction and development of the Kuryk port in Kazakhstan is the perfect illustration of this as it is meant to increase Kazakhstan’s trade with neighbouring countries as well as to increase the all- weather transit potential of the (Rana & Ji, 2020).

In terms of energy, the first pipeline between Kazakhstan and China was launched in 2009 supplying China with half of its natural gas imports (Kassenova, 2017). As for Kazakhstan this decision was mainly driven by domestic needs as this pipeline made it possible to connect the energy-rich west with the densely populated south (Kassenova, 2017). Indeed, the Kazakh government understood from the outset that a strategic partnership with China can help the regime pursue domestic goals. As shown by Kassenova (2017), investments in transportation infrastructure connecting the two countries has contributed significantly to the development of the national transportation and communication infrastructure which is quite a challenge given the huge area that makes up Kazakhstan.

Nurly Zhol As a reaction on the 2013 launch of the SREB, in 2014 Kazakhstan announced the Nurly Zhol, a five- year development program to build domestic infrastructure focusing on transportation, industry and energy as well as the development of the social space and institutions. The program was reviewed in October 2019 and the objectives for the next five years were agreed, with the promise of the creation of no less than 550,000 jobs (Official Information Source of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2019 ).

Launching a transversal development project complementary to SREB was a good strategic decision. First and foremost, this makes it possible to evaluate the projects under SREB based on the extent to which they also contribute to achieving domestic objectives as formulated in Nurly Zhol. In addition, it strengthens Kazakhstan's position in negotiations with Chinese partners regarding the more concrete implementation of the various SREB subprojects, which as stated above, are often rather vague in nature.

However, according to Kassenova (2017), it is far from certain that the coming investments will really foster Kazakhstan’s development as the sustainability of some of the connectivity projects seem to be driven by discourse rather than by considerations of economic feasibility. Moreover, Kassenova (2017) concludes, without structural institutional reforms to tackle endemic corruption the country may end up with increased inequality and even worse governance.

On the cultural level China is more present in Kazakhstan than in any other Central Asian republic. Four Confucius institutes were launched in cooperation with local institutions and, not unimportant, China is becoming more and more an attractive destination for Kazakh exchange students (Vakalchuk & Overland, 2019).

2.2.1.2 Kyrgyzstan Since the early 1990's, Kyrgyzstan became a transit hub for trade between China, Kazakhstan and Russia in an attempt to recover from the loss of many of its economic ties to the former Soviet republics (Vakalchuk & Overland, 2019). Up to 2009, almost three-quarters of the goods imported in Kyrgyzstan were re-exported (Kaminski & Raballand, 2009) across porous state borders using the Dordoi bazaar in Bishkek and the Karasuu bazaar near Osh as redistribution hubs (Mogilevskii, 2012). However, after adopting stricter trade rules as part of their entry in the in 2015, their role as a transit country became less popular (Vakalchuk & Overland, 2019). As confirmed by Alff (2016), increases of costs related to import from China and stronger borders controls do have affected everyday activities in the Dordoi Bazaar. Alff (2016) argues that, while China’s presence in Kyrgyzstan is often considered by entrepreneurs as a threat, their presence has definitely contributed to flexible and innovative entrepreneurial development. For example, as a source of knowledge and expertise, China has played an important role in the development of Kyrgyzstan's fast-growing sewing industry, which grew out of entrepreneurial initiatives of those previously dealing with re-export (Alff, 2016).

As elsewhere in Central Asia, Chinese companies are involved in the construction of transport infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan. According to Vakalchuck and Overland (2019) the country's major opportunity lies in the construction of the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway connection as this could on the one hand stimulate both domestic and international connectivity and, on the other hand, generate significant annual transit fees. In addition, China is also involved in the construction of energy transmission lines, gas stations and above all in the extraction of natural resources (Vakalchuk & Overland, 2019).

In terms of road transportation, China's Exim Bank financed the construction of the north-south road between Balykchy and Jalal, significantly shortening north-south travel time which will ease traffic congestion and facilitate the transportation of (Chinese) goods and people along the route (Rana & Ji, 2020).

Furthermore, as mentioned by Rana and Ji (2020), the SREB allows Kyrgyzstan to resume trade with which had been mainly interrupted by the war in Afghanistan. Nowadays, both exports to and imports from Pakistan and other South Asian countries are transhipped through Xinjiang via the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan-China logistics routes and the Karakoram Highway (Rana & Ji, 2020). Although the rather small SREB projects in Kyrgyzstan aren't of much significance for China, they do are for Kyrgyzstan. The fact that China’s EXIM bank is Kyrgyzstan’s single largest creditor to the amount of more than 45 percent of government debt, illustrates this perfectly (Bhutia, 2019).

2.2.1.3 Tajikistan In Tajikistan, the Asian Infrastructure Investment bank (AIIB) plans to construct and expand the roads in the country, including the connection to Uzbekistan, in order to facilitate China's exports in the region (Vakalchuk & Overland, 2019). In terms of railway transportation, the China funded link between Vahdat and Yovon was completed in 2016 which has to facilitate domestic movement of people and goods between the more densely populated areas in northcentral Tajikistan and the resource-rich areas in the south (Rana & Ji, 2020).

In 2014, China and Tajikistan agreed to invest in Tajikistan’s lead-zinc industry. Ultimately, these plans resulted in the 2017 launch of the Tajikistan North Nonferrous Metal Industrial Park which is perceived as an essential development in function of the industrialisation of Tajikistan (Rana & Ji, 2020). Similar industrial parks have been developed in both the textile and agricultural sector.

Apart from transportation infrastructures, plans exist for one of the branches of the Turkmenistan- China pipeline to cross Tajikistan (Vakalchuk & Overland, 2019).

2.2.2 Risks associated with a growing Chinese presence in Central Asia

Following the opportunities that SREB offers to develop the Central Asian economic space, a number of questions are raised regarding the roll-out of the SREB and the increasingly intensive cooperation between the Central Asian states and China in general.

What follows is an overview of the most discussed risks associated with the project.

As summarized by Laruelle (2018), there are many uncertainties regarding the sustainability of the SREB and the alleged economic successes it would bring. Firstly, the corruption that characterizes this region stands in the way of an efficient allocation of resources, according to the author. In the same vein, she points to China's lack of coordination and cooperation with other multilateral financial institutions.

Laruelle (2018) also warns for what she describes as predatory aid. This is a process whereby recipient countries are forced into a subordinate role and need to grant rights to extract natural resources in exchange for the loans obtained. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that the export of natural raw materials is characterized by a total lack of transparency with regard to the agreed terms and conditions (Lain, 2018). Turkmenistan is a striking example as gas exports are diverted towards the repayment of the debt accumulated by Turkmenistan since 2009, which drastically reduces the net income resulting from gas extraction (Peyrouse & Anceschi, EU-Turkmenistan Relations, 2017). Moreover, as argued by Laruelle (2018) and Lain (2018) the generous Chinese loans are causing not only financial but also political problems as the Central Asian countries are increasingly at risk of being in a situation of debt dependence.

As argued by Lain (2018), there are already a number of signs that indicate that that the economic benefits experienced by the local population in Central Asia will not live up to the (high) expectations fuelled by the discourse accompanying this project. It is significant in that respect that only a very limited part of the investment actually ends up with local, central Asian, actors. As explained by Laruelle (2018), most of the loans granted by Chinese banks to Central Asian governments are directly reinvested in Chinese companies, who bring Chinese equipment and even more important a Chinese workforce to carry out the project, without creating a sustainable impact for the local population in the form of jobs or knowledge transfer. Moreover, if tangible benefits are not identified and communicated to local populations, it could raise suspicions that this is more of a geopolitical project whereof China is benefiting far more than the Central Asian populations thereby also gaining power over the political elites in the region (Lain, 2016).

According to the Chinese vision (the National Development and Reform Commission, 2015) infrastructure investments will ultimately lead to an improved investment climate and, above all, the emergence of a service economy that requires high-level human skills. However, Laruelle (2018) questions if this reasoning remains valid in a region that is still struggling with widespread corruption and a brain drain.

On soft power level, creating people-to-people ties is highlighted as one of the five spearheads of the SREB vision. Nevertheless, China's efforts on a cultural level are in no way comparable to the economic ones. Programs have been deployed, including cultural exchanges, student mobility and tourism promotion but their impact remains highly uncertain (Laruelle, 2018).

Lain (2018) states that the role of Central Asia in the SREB is too limited to that of a transit route. Jochec and Kyzy (2018) emphasize therefore that the recipient countries should be prepared for the fact that the expected Chinese economic prosperity and dominance in the Eurasian region will not be achieved for whatever reason. They point to the risk that the profitability of the new infrastructures depends too much on the extent to which China will use them as transit routes. Policy changes in China or a slowdown of the Chinese economy may have as consequence that investments made in infrastructure will not pay itself back. This risk is exacerbated by the geographic features of the region, ,consisting largely of desolate and barely inhabited mountainous terrain, which make infrastructures also extremely expensive and difficult to maintain (Jochec & Kyzy, 2018). Today, China is promoting land transport use by covering the losses of companies that use it (Kassenova, 2017). However, the question is how long China will continue to promote the SREB in this way.

Lain (2018) adds that other Central Asian products such as textiles and food are struggling to access Chinese markets. She points out that, as one of China's most important objectives is to develop the border province of Xinjiang, the Central Asian states could be confronted with another significant competitor in terms of exporting raw materials, food and textiles in the near future.

Tolipov (2018) adds a political factor by pointing out that there is a lack of unanimity among the Central Asian states regarding the future shape of the regional transport networks covered by the SREB. Moreover, it is the object of competition between the different states. This is an example of what the author describes as the 'geographical trap' in which states hinge between more regional cooperation motivated by historical commonality and indivisibility of one region on the one hand and self-isolation from each other, dictated by the attributes of sovereignty on the other.

In China, the advancements of the developments in Xinjiang could also have a significant influence on the developments in Central Asia and not merely because of cultural elements or some form of sympathy towards people of the same religion or ethnicity. As stressed by Alff (2016), the modernization of Xinjiang is accompanied by massive migration of Han-Chinese. In addition, he continues, the local Muslim Uyghurs have very limited access to both the urban labour market and cross-border trade activities. The limited extent to which the local - in this case Uyghur - population can benefit from the development and urbanization evokes a fear among local Central Asian populations and may reinforce pre-existing prejudices.

Another potential threat is related to Central Asia's crucial location on the drug route from Afghanistan to . According to Ramani (2015), especially in Kyrgyzstan, this has fostered the development of links between drug gang leaders and government officials. In this way, the focus on connectivity risks unintentionally to foster an increase in drug trafficking an urban crime (Ramani, 2015).

Finally, physical geography makes the execution of infrastructure works more complex, which can lead to unexpected social and political events (Barry, 2016). As the SREB aims to cross the Pamir and Tien Shan mountains and to traverse the deserts and steppe of the Central Asian heartland, much time and resources will be necessary to overcome geography, culture and sparse resources (Sternberg, Ahearn, & McConnell, 2017). Moreover, it is essential to take into account the environmental limitations within the SREB projects in order to avoid unrest in the conflict-prone region (Sternberg, Ahearn, & McConnell, 2017). As argued by Howard and Howard (2016), the success of the SREB hinges on the ability of the Central Asian republics to improve current transboundary water management, which has been problematic since independence. If not, projects may come with high environmental costs, disturbing local life.

3 The SREB as a reproduction of capitalist Globalization

In literature concerning the intentions of China behind the SREB policy in general, several division lines can be discerned. Summers (2016) distinguishes two broad categories: First, the authors who interpret the SREB primarily as a political strategy. Secondly, studies that consider economic and commercial drivers to be decisive. The first group sees the SREB as an attempt by China to expand its political power and influence through investments that will limit the policy choices of the recipient countries (Summers, 2016). According to the latter, China is mainly driven by domestic motives such as creating new markets for Chinese companies or addressing challenges facing the economy, such as industrial overcapacity or excessive capital reserves (Summers, 2016). Cooley (2016) agrees, presenting the debate as an interplay between "traders" who attach the most importance to development and economic interests and "gamers" who consider geopolitical incentives as primary. Akhter (2018) makes another nuance, distinguishing between theories that regard the SREB as a mutually beneficial cooperation between states on the one hand and studies that see the project mere as a way for China to strengthen its dominant (economic) position on the other.

While the debate about which socio-political paradigm dominates from a political science point of view is very interesting, it does not help us understand how a project such as the SREB will affect society in the host countries once the theory is put into practice. However, both Summers (2016) and Akhter (2018) have developed a structural framework by situating the SREB within the evolutions in contemporary capitalism, rather than merely focusing on supposed intentions.

As argued by Summers (2016), the development policy of China and the related growing presence in Central Asia has to be contextualised through a discussion of developments in global political economy, in particular by analysing the emergence of globalisation. In his research, he uses Manuel Castells’ (2007) metaphor of a ‘network society’ to discuss ‘to which extent this era of globalisation has challenged the centrality of the nation-state as a ‘power container’ and actor in international affairs’. According to Castells (2007), bounded surfaces (nation-states) have been replaced during the recent decades by a global networks of nodes (metropolitan regions) as dominant spatial configurations of political economy, with capital, information, technology and elites flowing globally through the nodes of these networks. Summers concludes that the proactive development of these networks of nodes, through the development of transport transportation networks in order to facilitate flows of capital and to bring products to market, has to be seen as a form of ‘spatial fix’3 in order to speed up the

3 For a more in debt analysis of this theory: Harvey, David (2001) – Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography process of globalisation and to reduce existing spatial barriers. Although this dissertation does not allow to analyse this theory in debt, the summary of Akhter (2018) grants the necessary understandings. According to his interpretation, this theory is concerned with interpreting how certain spatial strategies such as outsourcing or large scale infrastructure projects, are pursued by capitalists in response to the contradictions peculiar to the nature of capital accumulation such as over- accumulation of surplus capital or underconsumption of goods by consumers (Harvey D. , 2006).

In short, Summers (2016) thus concludes that the SREB is merely a state-led spatial fix to provide infrastructure to facilitate the development of networks of capital across the Eurasian continent. In this sense, the creation of megalomaniac industrial hubs, such as the one in Khorgos, can therefore be understood as adding 'nodes' with the aim of connecting already existing networks. Not only physical infrastructures can be understood in this way. Investments in communication technology and in the financial sector also reduce 'the distance' between the various needs in the network.

Although, Summers (2016) is suggesting that China was mainly driven by economic and commercial drivers in the elaboration of the SREB vision, he emphasizes it will also have geopolitical implications as a result of China’s growing economic influence.

Like Summers (2016), Majed Akhter (2018) draws on David Harvey’s theory of the ‘spatial fix’ to understand how the infrastructural and investment policies of nation-states are influenced by political economic constraints. He agrees with Summers (2016), stating that Chinese led infrastructure projects such as the SREB, therefore have to be seen as China’s spatial response to the nature of capitalist accumulation. However, he adds another crucial element to this debate. Namely, that this rather abstract theory does not help our understanding of what happens when capital ‘touches the ground’ and interacts with a range of political and cultural histories and values. Therefore, the geography of capitalism contained in the theory of the spatial fix needs to be supplemented with an analysis of political and social forces and relations (Akhter, 2018). The author additionally argues that most of contemporary literature views China as an internally homogeneous space that then acts on another state that also embraces a homogeneous social space. However, he argues, social space is heterogeneous. Despite states often make efforts to control and homogenize social space, he continues, this is an unfeasible goal as social space is characterized by historical and geographical particularity (Akhter, 2018).

The insights of both Summers (2016) and Akhter (2018) are essential for a thorough evaluation of the potential opportunities and risks associated with the implementation of the SREB in a local context. Since the SREB is seen as a spatial response to China's current economic situation, one can deduce which policy priorities have been included in the SREB vision merely to justify the initiative politically and diplomatically. The fact that China is stressing the project has to be both mutual beneficent and with respect for the sovereignty of each participating state is therefore little more than a political layer on an essentially economic story. It also helps to understand why soft power efforts are lagging so much behind the massive investments in physical infrastructure. Finally, this also partly explains why China is taking little initiative to guarantee the sustainable implementation of the projects. On the one hand this is certainly to avoid to scare off potential partners, but on the other hand it would also contribute little to China's primary objectives.

The next chapter takes a closer look at the recent and less recent history of Central Asia and gives an impression of how the political and social forces and relationships have evolved over time. Ultimately, three major observations are distinguished and it is examined how these interact with the SREB.

4 How the past is defining the future of Central Asia

As argued by Akhter (2018) as Gambino (2019), the analysis of the SREB project must always consider both the history and the geographies of the region where it is being implemented. This dissertation does not allow to study the entire history of central Asia in detail, however, it is important to indicate some recent and less recent developments that have profoundly influenced the social space in central Asia.

As argued by Catherine Poujol (2017) the Central Asian social space is characterized by a patchwork of both visible and invisible boundaries. Even more than anywhere else in the world, she adds, these boundaries have been embedded throughout history. Geographical and administrative boundaries are complemented by boundaries of a social, ethnic, religious, socio-economic and gender-related nature. They stand in addition to political boundaries, which undermines the apparent uniformity of the Central Asian republics (Poujol, 2017).

Central Asia is a gigantic landmass of over 4 million square kilometres and is delimited by a series of natural boundaries: the Caspian Basin in the West, the Eurasian Steppe in the North, the Taklamakan Desert in the East and the mountains of the Hindu Kush and the Dasht-e-Lut desert in the South (De Cordier, 2012). The area consists of several core areas each characterized by a number of hydraulic, climatic and geo-economic factors: the zone of irrigated oases, the steppe zone, the piedmont zone4, the high mountainous desert plateaus, the semi-deserts and the deserts (Poujol, 2017). The different landscapes and soil types that are found there are not only natural but definitely have a social significance as well. After all, the steppes have been dominated long time by nomadic cultures and economies, the oases by sedentary agricultural economies. Both complemented each other and the contacts and confrontation between the two was the engine of Central Asian history in the pre-modern period (De Cordier, 2012).

New political and economic configurations arising out different disruptive events such as the Tsarist colonization and both the creation and the disintegration of the have modified certain social demarcation lines without, however, changing them all (Poujol, 2017). The disconcerting speed with which Central Asian societies have been confronted with modernity since 1990 generates new socio-cultural boundaries in an already saturated social landscape. This may lead to a reductionist analysis of these societies by seeing them as either too traditional or too modernized (Poujol, 2017).

4 gradual increases in elevation at the base of a mountain range Poujol (2017) points out that the Central Asian region is particularly characterized by ethnic- professional and ethnic-religious dividing lines. According to her, they correspond to the requirements of pre-20th century economic development between the sedentary economy and that of nomadic pastoralism. The independence of the Central Asian republics, and their subsequent integration into the world economy, has created new borders. Thereby dividing the social legacy of the Soviet Union, on the one hand into a very narrow segment made up of the economic and political elites, and on the other, the rest of society (Poujol, 2017). However, one must emphasize, some of the elder dividing line are still relevant today.

During the 20th century, the Central Asian space was absorbed into the Soviet Union. The natural boundaries that characterize this region have been replaced, or rather supplemented, by formal boundaries of the newly created nation states. In addition, as argued by De Cordier (2012), society was characterized by a certain Sovietization in which new elites, institutions and (national) identities gradually became part of the social space. Moreover, unlike during earlier phases of history, much of the Central Asians were cut off from the rest of the region and from the wider Muslim world (De Cordier, 2012). The ethnic landscape of the region was also further fragmented during this period by the immigration and deportation of non-indigenous groups from other parts of the Soviet Union (De Cordier, 2012).

Along with the Soviet Union, a lot of certainties and social achievements also disappeared (De Cordier, 2012). During this post-disclosure period, Central Asian states and their societies also became directly reconnected to the global economy. As the economic, military and political infrastructure of the Central Asian republics had been connected to Moscow, the brand new nation-states had to create new institutions that could manage the tasks that had previously been supervised by Moscow (Engvall, 2016). In addition, elites had to find a way to legitimize their rule and to bond with their population in an psychologically and ideologically way (De Cordier, 2012). In this context it is important to point out that, unlike in the Baltic states, the independence of the Central Asian republics did not stem from years of separatist struggle that enjoyed widespread support in society but rather as a fait accompli (De Cordier, 2012). In an interview with Engvall (2016), Muratbek Imanaliev, former Minister of Foreign Affairs described these events as an ‘independence that no one wanted’. Moreover, the post- communist Central Asian republics are characterized by processes of state formation and state building. After all, prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, none of them had ever existed as an independent state (Engvall, 2016). In this vein, it is important to notice that the borders of present-day Central Asian republics are not generated from within, but are externally created by the Soviet’s policy of national delimitation in the 1920-30s (Engvall, 2016), without paying too much attention to their multi-ethnic compositions.

According to De Cordier (2012), this sudden (and forced) globalization has led, to some degree, to social upheaval, a major identity crisis and a certain loss of self-esteem. Together with economic decline, he points out, the first years of independence where thus characterized by an unravelling of the social fabric. The Soviet heritage and cultural , globalization and cultural , the imaginary ethnic identity of their own, whether imaginary or not, the historical presence of the Islamic religion and the confrontation with external powers and their conflicting interests, all do influence the complex social reality in central Asia today (De Cordier, 2012).

For all the reasons mentioned above, this dissertation moves beyond the sole focus on observable and often economic implications of the growing presence of China and therefore takes into account the complex social reality which characterizes post-communist Central Asia.

I argue that the viability of the SREB in this part of the world will depend largely on its ability to respond to this rather complex legacy is from a recent and less recent history. Therefore, three historically developed characteristics of the contemporary social space in Central Asia, which unmistakably influence the chances of success of the SREB, will be analysed in the next subchapters.

- A phenomenon of Economic violence, which is mainly expressed through an endemic corruption that is intertwined with the post-communist polity - A historically grown fear and hostility towards China: sinophobia - A complex social equilibrium in a space characterized by countless visible and invisible boundaries and within which a complex process of nation building takes place

4.1 Economic Violence

Bruno De Cordier (De Cordier, 2011) uses the term Economic Violence to describe a structural phenomenon which is peculiar to central Asian political society where regimes and other people in power exercise monopolistic control over economic resources such as raw materials, foreign investment and international aid. Thereby they use the state apparatus to prevent others from obtaining benefits from these resources. Various forms of economic injustice such as rent-seeking activities, corruption and clientelism can thus be classified as economic violence (De Cordier, 2011).

Especially in Central Asia, corruption is not an easy phenomenon to analyse. As noted by Werner (2000), relations between gifs and bribes are blurred and are contextually determined. Moreover, as argued by Polese (2008), this is linked with the retreat of the state from the provision of realistic levels of pay and social services, which makes bribing is often characterized as a necessary strategy for survival. In a study about corruption in Mongolia, Sneath (2006) argues that materialisations of social relations are positively evaluated when they express ties of obligation and expectation within networks of kinship and friendship, but illegitimate when associated with instrumental, impersonal, market exchanges. What the above theories make clear is that corruption is a relative fact. Certain phenomena that, viewed from a Western perspective would be categorized as corruption, are not necessarily experienced as such in Central Asian society. Apart from that there is, undeniably and very visible, a trend of urban elites corruptly enriching themselves to both bolster their power and fund their decadent jet-set lifestyle.

The rapid collapse of the Soviet Union and the sudden integration into the capitalist world economy, as discussed above, formed the ideal breeding ground for this type of impersonal enrichment as it has allowed central Asian elites to integrate into the global political economy via contemporary financial vehicles and informal and offshore enterprises (Toktomushev, 2018).

In this regard, it is important to notice that, as argued by Cooley and Sharman (2015), corruption in the contemporary global economy requires a multiple set of connected transactions, processes and relationships that take place within informal transnational networks. According to their research, these networks include multinational companies, elites in host countries, offshore financial vehicles and conduits, middlemen and brokers, and destination financial institutions. Central Asian elites, they emphasize, are also part of these complex networks which has enabled them to make huge fortunes at the expense of the countries they govern.

The extent to which this will affect the individual infrastructure works falling under the SREB umbrella is different since the social space is heterogeneous and the degrees and forms of economic violence differ from country to country, and between provinces and districts. However, for the SREB to succeed, central Asian states have to overcome this structural marginalization of central Asian populations. It will depend, to a large extent, on this whether this project will be able to create sustainable progress together with the local populations rather than it will further confirm and deepen existing forms of inequality and economic violence.

4.1.1 Endemic corruption : rent-seeking activities are flourishing

Toktomushev (2018) defines rent-seeking as an activity whereby powerful individuals and groups tend to capture the state by using corrupt and nefarious practices, in order to gain incomes that are higher than the minimum that an economic actor can gain in a competitive market. He adds, that privileged elites take advantage of weak and underdeveloped states as they offer an undeniable potential to extract those rents and enrich themselves. However, he notes, rent-seeking is not a mere illegal practice as it is complemented by a set of legal and semi-legal activities such as political lobbying and monopoly rents.

Examples of such practices seem endless in Central Asia. As disclosed by WikiLeaks in 2010, Texas oil services company Baker Hughes made corrupt payments to Kazakh state oil chiefs in return for a lucrative $219m contract. Leaked diplomatic documents made clear huge amounts of cash were moved through an offshore shell company registered in the Isle of Man, where true ownerships are easier to conceal (Leigh, 2010). More recently, a journalistic investigation by RFE/RL, made clear how hundreds of millions of dollars linked to a cargo-and-real-estate empire were funnelled out of the country with the help of influential officials over the course of several years (Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 2020). Also in Kyrgyzstan, a $386 million contract awarded to a Chinese company in 2013 to rebuild Bishkek’s Power Plant has prompted a corruption scandal that eventually led to the arrest of two former prime ministers (Alkanova, 2018).

The foregoing examples confirm Cooley and Sharman’s thesis (2015) by making it definitely clear that the Central Asian elites are well integrated into the global political economy through a set of contemporary financial vehicles and informal offshore companies (Toktomushev, 2018).

2019 figures from Transparency International confirm the presence of widespread corruption. The Central Asian countries rank 117 (Kazakhstan), 131 (Kyrgyzstan), 159 (Tajikistan), 160 (Uzbekistan) and 170th (Turkmenistan) on the Corruption Perception Index 5 in which 183 countries are compared.

5 The CPI scores and ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt a country’s public sector is perceived to be by experts and business executives. Source: https://www.transparency.org/

Allegations of corruption, moreover, are also a common tactic to eliminate political opponents. In 2014, Tajik authorities confiscated a bazaar in the western city of Tursunzade on corruption grounds. The bazaar belonged to Muhiddin Kabiri, the leader of the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), which was subsequently declared an extremist party (Pannier, 2017). A trial against Omurbek Tekebaev, number one of the Ata-Meken party in Kyrgyzstan, also seemed to be aimed at neutralizing an outspoken critic of the government. Tekebayev was discredited after investigating President Atambaev's alleged business ventures and properties abroad. Moreover, Tekebaev had also announced plans to run for president in elections in October 2017. He was finally convicted in August, 2 months before the elections, of corruption and fraud for alleged offenses dating back to 2010 (Pannier, 2017).

Since the Central Asian republics have each undergone a specific state-building process in the post- communist era, two examples from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are cited to support the above claims.

Kyrgyzstan

The Kyrgyz state is described by Engvall (2016) as an investment market where licenses to seek rents are sold. He points out that, next to the economic assets of the state, political and administrative offices, resources and services as well have been turned into market commodities. Public officials use their power over decision making and enforcement for making private profits. Public offices thus are considered as investment objects that offer lucrative prospects for generating (often informal) income (Engvall, 2016).

Satybaldieva (2015) agrees and emphasizes that former Soviet Elites use their political position to exploit the system and to enrich themselves, behaving in an instrumental and self-interested manner (Satybaldieva, 2015). Rather than reproducing the previous Soviet Ideology of egalitarianism and focusing on wider social goals, they focus on short-term personal interests and try to accumulate as much as possible (Satybaldieva, 2015). Doing that, they are facing more and more competition from what Satybaldieva (2015) describes as 'the new Kyrgyz': business groups with criminal links.

In summary, one can conclude that the Kyrgyz state functions as a resource for the elite to plunder, both in terms of its ownership of rights over natural resources as regarding the distribution of posts in state agencies (Doolot & Heathershaw, 2015). In addition, in their research on the local and global politics of gold mining in Kyrgyzstan, Doolot and Heathershaw (2015) found out that Kyrgyzstan’s state is thereafter structurally unable and unprepared to regulate contentions between local and foreign business actors and, by consequence, with the networks of international transactions in which it got involved. Furthermore, Kyrgyz's state's mediation efforts become more frequently contested by local elites, activists or even criminal bosses who act on behalf of their own 'local' interests which exists independently of central politics (Doolot & Heathershaw, 2015). Although corruption is of course a problem in itself, this is exacerbated in Kyrgyzstan as the state apparatus appears to be anything but performant. The state does lack the ability to comply with agreements it has made, which does not make the country attractive to foreign investors. Foreign companies have to find their way in web of state officials, both from the national and local level, who's behaviour is highly unpredictable and who's support is not even a guarantee for protection. The problem for foreign companies is not the corrupt state itself, but the inadequate ability of that state to perform its tasks in a predictable and enforceable manner (Doolot & Heathershaw, 2015).

In Uzbekistan, as argued by Rasanayagam (2011), the formal state has actually ceased to exist since independence. According to his research, important functions of the state such as guaranteeing social and material provision, are no longer fulfilled. What remains, is an informal state which is characterized by ubiquitous, daily corruption in which bribes and extractions for mere personal gain are part of almost every meeting with an official in Uzbekistan (Rasanayagam, 2011).

As mentioned before, Central Asian elites managed to connect with a global network of intermediaries, company service providers, offshore jurisdictions and tax havens, which offer them legal protection and hide their transgressions from ordinary citizens (Cooley & Heathershaw, 2017; Toktomushev, 2018).

As the SREB will lead to an unprecedented influx of resources in the Central Asian Republics, the debate on rent-seeking activities is very relevant. The funding related to SREB has, after all, the potential to become a new source of rent for Central Asia's kleptocratic elite's (Toktomushev, 2018), which can lead to increasing political instability and can contribute to the advancement of corrupt practices in the region.

Moreover, the link between corruption scandals and the SREB has the ability to further strengthen anti-Chinese sentiments (which is discussed below) among central Asian local populations (Toktomushev, 2018) as these scandals do have an impact on people's daily lives. A corruption scandal linked to the opening of a new highway between Dushanbe and Khujand illustrates this perfectly. Despite the fact that Tajik law banned the construction of toll roads, until recently in cases where there are no viable alternative routes, the Tajik parliament voted in favour of an amendment to the transport law, clearing the way for tolls to be levied (Mathesius, 2010). The toll is collected by Innovative Road Solutions (IRS), a company registered in the British Virgin Islands whose ownership has been categorized by the Tajik government as a trade secret (Mathesius, 2010). Today, ‘drivers have to pay more to pass through the tolls, we have to pay more for our goods and customers have to pay more for our products’ as testified a local resident who runs a business along the highway (Mathesius, 2010).

One can conclude that the SREB is not only threatened by corrupt practices but is inadvertently contributing to the advancement of these practices in the wider region (Toktomushev, 2018), as the local elites become increasingly intertwined in a global network that can help them to cover up this type of illegal practices. This problem is only exacerbated by the fact that many of the Chinese partners are not exemplary in terms of the normative expectations associated with sustainable development (Toktomushev, 2018).

4.1.2 The lack of conditionality

The literature agrees that intensive cooperation with China is particularly attractive because of the general belief among central Asian regimes that Chinese aid is not accompanied by the kind of political conditions demanded by Western partners, including human rights conditions, economic liberalization and good governance (Tian, 2018 ; Bossuyt, 2016; Kassenova, 2009). The lack of such conditions in China's foreign policy stems from its strong commitment to the principles of non-interference in domestic affairs and the treatment of other countries as equals (Bossuyt, 2016). This rhetoric can also be found in several SREB policy documents such as the vision text on the Silk Road Economic Belt of the National Development and Reform Commission (2015). Moreover, by linking infrastructure projects and development to regional security in its discourse, China subtly indicates its commitment to a political status quo (Roland, 2017). This strategy is interesting to China for two reasons. First of all, quite a number of political discussions with potential partners are avoided. Secondly, in this way the responsibility with regard to sustainable governance also falls entirely to the participating states. However, although the conditions imposed by China are significantly different from those of other donors, China's development aid is not free from conditionality. Laruelle (2018) points out that recipient countries must loyally support the 'One China' policy. According to her, this means more specifically conforming to Chinese minority policies in Xinjiang and Tibet, counter-terrorism cooperation and to acquiesce in China's geopolitical policy. Tian (2018 ) points out that China does include conditions such as granting access to Chinese state-owned companies. However, according to Tian (2018 ), this is often consciously overlooked as this form of aid plays a positive role in stabilizing local regimes and helps them to create a sense of progress towards the population. However, none of the conditions discussed above contain expectations with regard to the internal organization of the state, which makes cooperation very attractive for the Central Asian kleptocratic elites. As mentioned above, considering SREB as a reproduction of China's vision of globalization, it is doubtful whether China will do anything in the years to come to address this much-discussed problem.

4.2 Local responses to China: sinophobia

Despite close government relations between China and the Central Asian republics, sinophobia is widespread among the regional public (Owen, 2017). This phenomenon can be considered one of the major stumbling blocks to the success of the SREB in this region (Kassenova, 2017; Toktomushev, 2018). Chinese citizens living in Central Asia have been victims of violence and racism. Protests against perceived Chinese incursions into the region are not uncommon (Owen, 2017).

One could expect that a partner that presents itself as a source of economic opportunities has a rather positive image. However, the reality in Central Asia is much more complex. Sinophobia is a complex phenomenon that has its roots in the history of the region and its intensity can vary greatly depending on the region, the subject addressed and the social position that someone has.

Negative clichés of China, created and cultivated by Soviet propaganda, have reinforced Central Asian societies’ already long-standing apprehensions of their large neighbour (Peyrouse, 2016; Laruelle, 2015; Owen, 2017). According to Peyrouse (2016), discourses based on ancient oral tradition wherein China is presented as a distant but recurring enemy of nomads and Turkic peoples and as a historical opponent of Islam, have become frequented in Central Asian media. Owen (2017) delves deeper into history and argues that the history of relations between the Central Asian region and China in the 19th and 20th centuries can provide important insights in the roots of contemporary sinophobia. She shows that many of the fears present among central Asians have evolved and escalated because of events, rumours and stories relating to these periods and are nowadays propagated in a number of conspiracy theories. These conspiracy theories must be seen in relation to the political and social upheavals of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent territorial claims by China (Laruelle, 2012). By examining Chinese-Central Asian relations during the late imperial period and during the Sino-Soviet split, Owen (2017) shows that these territorial claims were part of an attempt of China to resolve colonial disputes dating back to the late 19th century. Therefore, she argues, fears of contemporary Chinese territorial expansion are greatly exaggerated, adding that China has already significantly reduced its territorial claims. Although, it clearly remains one of the possible motives for China's engagement in the region in the minds of Central Asian citizens. Peyrouse (2016) agrees, claiming that the idea that China is still pursuing an imperial agenda is widely accepted. A presumption which is only reinforced by a lack of knowledge about the Chinese culture in general and China's intentions in Central Asia in particular (Owen, 2017). Peyrouse (2016) adds that China's growing presence and influence in Central Asia, influences the domestic orders and catalyses social changes. Furthermore, he argues, it fosters a reorganization of the social fabric by giving rise to new professional niches that present themselves as “go-betweens” between China and Central Asia.

According to Peyrouse (2016), China's emphatic presence has profoundly changed the economic space in the region. He emphasizes that both the Central Asian states as China have every interest in developing their mutual relations as their economies are more complementary than in direct competition with one another. However, he adds that many Central Asian specialists are persuaded that China is trying to transform the economies of Central Asia to suit its own interests Chinese investments are not aimed at the development of local production but at the creation of conditions to aid the export of Chinese products and the import of primary resources according to them.

Several authors agree that there is a significant difference in the perception of China by the ruling elites and by the broader public. Elites tend to be pro-China, while the public is sceptical of Chinese economic and cultural expansion (Toktomushev, 2018; Burkhanov & Chen, 2016; Laruellle & Peyrouse, 2012; Peyrouse, 2016; Kassenova, 2017; Burkhanov, 2018). However, even the local elites share the perception that it is risky to become too dependent on China as a source of foreign investment (Lain, 2018). According to Peyrouse (2016) circles are situated in the uppermost echelons of society consisting of the presidential families, political elites and private sector oligarchs and directors of large public companies. They are linked through political, personal, regional, corporatist and clan allegiances and have foremost pragmatic and economic reasons to be in favour of good relations with China (Peyrouse, 2016). Sinophobe circles consists mainly out of members of political opposition, worker's unions, entrepreneurs and Uyghur associations (Peyrouse, 2016). In contrast to their Sinophile opponents, they have diverse motivations and social affiliations, and have difficult time formulation common viewpoints for the purpose of building cooperation (Peyrouse, 2016).

However, the prevailing dynamics are much more complex than this dual representation of sinophiles and sinophobes suggests (Exnerova, 2018). As noted by Peyrouse (2016) sinophilia and sinophobia go hand-in-hand in Central Asia, both can be present in the same person, depending on the subject being addressed. However, he adds, sinophobia is increasingly prominent, both economically and culturally, which can have significant social consequences.

It is clear that the Chinese presence is increasingly provoking political debate in Central Asia. Especially in academic circles China is condemned for their unwillingness to adopt a transparent attitude towards their activities in Central Asia, which they believe can lead to increasing social tensions (Peyrouse, 2016). On the other hand, the author notes that the attitude of experts is not always markedly negative. Regarding geopolitical aspects and security, China is often seen as a rather positive factor in contrast to domains related to identity and culture.

All over Central Asia, the influx of Chinese immigrants is raising many concerns with the local population (Jochec & Kyzy, 2018; Garibov, 2018), both economically and culturally. Chinese migrants are seen as a potential threat to their job opportunities and as the cause of rising crime in urban areas (Peyrouse, 2016). In general, public and political discourses stating that China' intends to turn the central Asian republics into clientelist states remain predominant (Toktomushev, 2018).

4.2.1 Kazakhstan

In Kazakhstan the overall attitude towards China in society can be viewed as the least positive in the region (Vakalchuk & Overland, 2019). As argued by several authors (Dave, 2018; Kassenova, 2017) the lack of transparency about Chinese activities in Kazakhstan and specifically about SREB feeds the idea that China is a threat.

One of the most sensitive and discussed topics in the light of increased Chinese activity in Kazakhstan is undoubtedly agriculture. Farmers eagerly await Chinese investment. In addition, hope is placed in access for their local products to the enormous Chinese market which is considered to be 'a pot of gold' that is bottomless and insatiable (Kassenova, 2017). However, ordinary citizens seem to be growing more worried, which has in particular been sparked by a new land legislation that extended the maximum lease on farming land for foreigners from 10 to 25 years (Kassenova, 2017). Protests have spread across different cities in the country and brought together between 1000 and 2000 people in each city (Abdurasulov, 2016), particularly remarkable in the case of Kazakhstan, a country characterized by very low levels of public dissent (Owen, 2017). Protesters feared the law would allow Chinese companies and nationals to poison the soil or capture and colonize their land (Kassenova, 2017). In addition, there is a fear that, due to ubiquitous corruption, only the rich and powerful will benefit from the changes, leaving the rest of the population without land (Abdurasulov, 2016). The concern is further fuelled by a public discourse on security and the future of the country, in which China is invariably dismissed as a threat (Burkhanov & Chen, 2016). In an effort to counter social unrest, President Nursultan Nazabayev has (finally) decided to institute a moratorium on land reform and set up a special committee to address this issue (Toktomushev, 2018). This makes it clear that Sinophobia, regardless of whether it is based on rational grounds or not, does influence policymakers and can therefore also be a significant obstacle in the near future for the roll-out of projects that fall under the SREB. This risk is compounded because, as demonstrated by Laruelle and Peyrouse (2009), opposition forces often instrumentalize popular fear of China to discredit the ruling elites.

Furthermore, there are regular disputes between Chinese and Kazakh workers as the former are generally perceived as better paid (Vakalchuk & Overland, 2019) or because they are accused of taking away job opportunities for local people. Some authors agree and warn that the sinophobic attitudes of the locals is rooted in the bad treatment of the locals employed by Chinese companies (Burkhanov, 2018; Sadovskaya, 2007; Syroezhkin, 2009). Although this is a too simplistic representation of reality, such practices do contribute to sharpening existing prejudices.

Both examples show that sinophobic feelings are mainly fuelled by economic fears. It is indeed no coincidence that these events come together with an economic slowdown marked by falling real incomes and a steep increase in the inflation rate which has eroded the real wages and purchasing power of the population (World Bank Group, 2016). This is remarkable since one can argue that the investments made by Chinese entrepreneurs and companies can be part of the solution of these economic problems. Soviet clichés who linger on and distrust due to a lack of transparency are the decisive factors in this. Therefore, the region’s society, which is still recovering from the economic shock after the fall of the Soviet Union, does not yet has the capacity to adapt to the (potential) disruptive evolutions associated with the increasing Chinese presence in the region.

4.2.2 Kyrgyzstan

As mentioned above, in the early years of independence, Kyrgyzstan served as re-export hub for onward transportation to more developed countries as Kazakhstan and Russia. However, also given Kyrgyzstan’s overall weak economic performance, these re-export schemes have fostered views that perceive Kyrgyzstan as China’s vassal state (Alff, 2016). This perception, according to Alff (2016), does not entirely correspond to reality, but it nevertheless contributed to the spread of sinophobia.

In Kyrgyzstan, the potential influx of Chinese immigrants and the related expansion of Chine's culture is viewed as one of the most significant risk related to Chinese investments (Jochec & Kyzy, 2018). Alff (2016) points out that Kyrgyzstan’s mass media regularly fosters the exaggerated image of Chinese migrants overrunning the county. This clearly isn’t harmless because it has a far-reaching influence on the everyday exchanges between Chinese and Kyrgyz people on the ground. In an interview conducted by Alff (2016), the head of Dordoi's labour union Damira Dolootalieva, called for work limitations and specific taxes to be imposed upon foreign traders working at Kyrgyzstan’s bazaars. According to Alff (2016), the (perception of) insecurity resulting from these latent hostilities has led many Chinese entrepreneurs to move to neighbouring countries such as Tajikistan. It is remarkable, Alff (2016) nuances, that negative and positive sentiments toward China often coexist in the narratives of one and the same person, balancing between the available resources and opportunities arising from cooperation with Chinese partners and the potential risk of being outcompeted.

In addition, the risk of loss of sovereignty associated with a fast increasing debt dependency, are stirring up heated debate among the Kyrgyz population (Jochec & Kyzy, 2018). Related to SREB, revealed misuse of funds for modernization and infrastructure projects have increased public dissatisfaction as well (Aliyev, 2019).

On the cultural level, some groups justify polygamy in order to counter the loss of identity which supposedly results from the growing presence of Chinese immigrants and their intermarriage with Central Asian women (Peyrouse, Discussing China: Sinophilia and sinophobia in Central Asia, 2016). As Owen's (2017) interviews show, there is a certain belief among the population that Chinese men immigrate to Central Asia with the aim of marrying local women in order to undermine the country from within and to advance Chinese interests. Furthermore conspiracy theories of Chinese intentions in Central Asia remain widespread in Kyrgyzstan. In an interview conducted by Catherine Owen (2017) for example, an OSCE employee testified about how people believed that the 2010 April revolution, which has diverse but domestic roots, was fuelled by the Chinese closing their borders.

4.2.3 Tajikistan

Although Chinese businessmen have been able to invest in the market without provoking feelings of competition because of the high rates of emigration to Russia, there is some indication of growing animosity among local entrepreneurs about the growing Chinese economic presence (Peyrouse, Discussing China: Sinophilia and sinophobia in Central Asia, 2016). Furthermore, there has been some turmoil about Chinese companies bringing their own workforce. A sensitive issue in Tajikistan given the fact that hundreds of thousands of migrant workers are driven to work in Russia due to Tajikistan’s unemployment situation (Pannier, Tajikistan Agrees To Allow Chinese Farmers To Till Land, 2011). However, compared to the other republics in Central Asia, the majority of Tajikistan's population appears to be rather positive about China (Vakalchuk & Overland, 2019). This is surprising as Owen (2017) emphasizes that sinophobia is the most common in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Even more surprisingly, sociological surveys of 2008 and 2016 carried out by the Institute of Oriental Studies und the Academy of Sciences of the Republic Tajikistan indicate that China is gradually replacing Iran as second most attractive partner (after Russia) on both the political and cultural level (Vakalchuk & Overland, 2019). As argued by Vakalchuk and Overland (2019) one cannot conclude that SREB is the cause of this change in perception as there has been no public debate about the Chinese-Tajik cooperation and the population remains rather poorly informed about SREB. Nevertheless, as in Kyrgyzstan, conspiracy theories of Chinese intentions in the region do exists, for example blaming China for the 2012 unrest in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan region.

4.2.4 Uzbekistan/Turkmenistan

Because the reclusive and isolationist nature of the regimes in both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, there has never been a genuine public pluralist debate about China (Peyrouse, 2016). It is therefore very difficult to draw conclusions about the views of the local population concerning the intensified cooperation with China. Although direct contact between Chinese businessmen and Uzbeks has been rather limited, tension appears to exist between Chinese and Uzbek merchants in the bazaar in the Kyrgyz border town of Karasuu (Peyrouse, 2016). Vakalchuck and Overland (2019) argue that Uzbek society has a vague understanding of China. As elsewhere in central-Asia, this perception vary depending on the issue but no evidence has been found that it have been affected by the launch of the SREB (Chen & Günther, 2016).

4.2.5 How real is sinophobia threatening the Central Asian societies

Although the breeding ground for anti-Chinese attitudes has historical roots, its rise is mainly determined by the country’s social-economic shortcomings. Public dissatisfaction about corruption and institutional mismanagement play an amplifying role (Aliyev, 2019). It is important to note that these economic and institutional factors, too, are not static properties of a particular state or region, but are indeed the result of certain disruptive events that have characterized this region in the past.

The lack of mutual knowledge clearly affects China-Central Asian relations, both on professional level as for the matter of people-to-people ties (Peyrouse 2016). Although China has opened several Confucius institutes throughout Central Asia with the aim of promoting both the Chinese language and culture, their efforts do not seem to produce the desired results. There is a clear imbalance between China’s economic and soft power presence in the region (Vakalchuk & Overland, 2019). One can conclude that China has underestimated the persistence of the cultural heritage of the recent and not so recent history of the region.

Every Central Asian republic is to some degree sympathetic to the increasing economic opportunities created by China. However, this is overshadowed by increasing anti-Chinese sentiments related to an potential Chinese demographic and cultural expansion and an increased financial dependence, both associated with this increased economic activity (Vakalchuk & Overland, 2019).

Although China stressed that cooperation in the region should lead to mutual benefits (the National Development and Reform Commission, 2015), much distrust remains among the local population. Whereas the broader public expects more economic opportunities from SREB and there has been more discussion of China’s role in Central Asia after 2013, local communities remain uninformed and weakly connected to the high-level interaction between the Chinese and Central Asian governments (Vakalchuk & Overland, 2019). However, it is important to emphasize that a recent study of Dirk van der Kley (2020) shows that Chinese companies are successfully localizing their labour in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. According to van der Kley (2020), this localization is fostered by pressures of both local societies and governments on the one hand as by increasing Chinese labour costs on the other hand. However, he adds, problems still arise with regard to a lack of skills of the local workforce as well as with regard to language and cultural barriers.

Unfortunately, the work of Owen (2017) shows that this suspicion translates itself occasionally into violence against Chinese in Central Asia. Several people interviewed by her reported clashes between Chinese entrepreneurs and local groups. Others stated that Chinese projects are targets for local criminal gangs and outlined incidents wherein Chinese businesses were victims of arson.

Given the intense (future) cooperation between China and the Central Asian Republics in the context of the SREB, they have to tackle the problem of Sinophobia. Indeed, if policy remains unchanged, a further increase in China's economic involvement in the region through SREB will inevitably lead to greater resistance among the wider public (Dave, 2018; Sternberg, Ahearn, & McConnell, 2017; Vakalchuk & Overland, 2019). Chen and Tovar (2017) argue that China should focus more on soft power diplomacy in order to increase its visibility beyond political elites. Although this may be useful, it is even more important for China to consider how their actions affect the socio-economic living conditions of the local population. After all, it is especially this socio-economic climate that sustains sinophobia today. More intensive cooperation at the local micro level seems essential. As people living in border areas seems to have more favourable views of China, one can suppose that everyday interactions at grassroots level contribute positively to decrease long-existing phobias (Laruelle , 2018). However, it is questionable whether the Central Asian regimes are enthusiastic about this as well. However, the central Asian republics cannot ignore this either, as they will have to respond to this rising turmoil as well to ensure the stability and legitimacy of their regimes.

Nonetheless, efforts to lead to a more inclusive society are often in contrast to the often nationalistic and symbolic discourses used in their respective state building policies. After all, it is important to understand that local perceptions of China are related to how the Central Asian states perceive themselves. In addition, it is a legitimate question whether it is in their best interest to communicate more transparently about cooperation with China given the elites' rent-seeking practices.

A stumbling block for which no solution is yet in sight is China's minority and development policy in Xinjiang. After all, religion also plays a role in Central Asia's attitude to China, as the Muslim population in Central Asia is concerned about Chinese government policy in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Vakalchuk & Overland, 2019). In the long run, this can definitely have an appeal for Islamic groups (political or not) that question the political status quo and are not inclined to intensify cooperation with China.

4.3 Central Asia as a patchwork of visible and non-visible borders

As argued in chapter 4, the Central Asian social space is characterized by a patchwork of both visible and invisible boundaries (Poujol, 2017). Geographical and administrative boundaries are complemented by boundaries of a social, ethnic, religious, socio-economic and gender-related nature. They stand in addition to political boundaries, which undermine the apparent uniformity of the Central Asian republics (Poujol, 2017). As social space is also produced and reconfigured through large infrastructures (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2015) this chapter focuses on how social space and especially the boundaries that characterizes it, interact with major infrastructure projects when the SREB discourse hits the ground.

For thousands of years, the Silk Road Spirit – "peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit" – has been passed from generation to generation, promoted the progress of human civilization, and contributed greatly to the prosperity and development of the countries along the Silk Road.

(the National Development and Reform Commission, 2015)

As the citation above makes clear, China's discourse on the SREB is accompanied by frequent references to the glorious past of the Silk Road. However, this historical reference is rather symbolic. After all, the political space in the region is difficult to compare with that of the old trade routes. As argued by Diener (2015), historical networks of city-states who shared a political space have been replaced by a patchwork of nation-states pursuing modernist ideals of territorial sovereignty, each having their own political and economic goals. In addition, each of these states is characterized by often divergent state ideologies (Diener, 2015). As a result, the boundaries between these nation- states are rather places of tension and mechanisms of political leverage than bridgeheads of connection and development (Diener, 2015);

The Chinese discourse states that connectivity leads to (political) stability, security and development (the National Development and Reform Commission, 2015). That in itself is not remarkable, as it is commonplace to belief that infrastructures will solve problems of economic and social integration (Harvey & Knox, 2008). Roads offer a promise of connectivity and seem to accelerate the circulation of people and goods, allowing even the most isolated areas to be connected to economic growth (Pedersen & Bunkenborg, 2012). However, although Infrastructures can certainly facilitate interaction between peoples, they can just as easily be used to avoid contact, as a smooth passage through geographical space is made possible (Pedersen & Bunkenborg, 2012).

In this sense, it is important to consider what Diener (2015) describes as the relativity of Mobility: “mobilities deemed “good” to an international organization might be considered “bad” to a given state; mobilities deemed “bad” by a given government might be “good” for segments of its population or regions of its territory”. In a complex geopolitical environment with so many visible and invisible borders, it is therefore very unpredictable how the infrastructure projects covered by SREB will be welcomed by the different actors involved.

4.3.1 Borderlands

In a study about the force of infrastructural intervention in the borderlands between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Madeleine Reeves (2017) has examined how new infrastructures bring both hope as questions concerning territorial integrity. More specifically, she investigated the impact of the construction of a new road that allows residents of the border villages to travel between the different villages in South Kyrgyzstan without having to cross an international border. Reeves (2017) clearly showed how new roads have fostered both new desires and anxieties. Even more important, her research shows how political intensions of fostering intra-state connectivity and mitigating trans- boundary tensions, have disturbed habitual routines of trans-boundary life. Previously normal habits such as taking a Tajik minibus have now come to be spoken of and policed as acts of transgression.

Similar conclusions were drawn by Grant (2020) in his research on mobilities in the Sino-Kazakh border region. In this study, Grant describes how China is hardening borders between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan as a reaction to anxieties about separatism. It is shown that China’s soft power rhetoric about being mutual beneficial proves to be less more than a discourse as it is complemented with territorial security practices in a way that is counterproductive. Grant (2020) stresses that these security forces have the potential to reactivate borders as ‘difference condensers’ by sowing suspicion and fear. Focusing on the Kazakh-Xinjiang border in Khorgos, Grant (2020) shows how initiatives to securitize the borders actually threaten the trans-local development that the border region has provided to Kazakhs over the past thirty years. These observations are shared by Alessandro Rippa (2020) in his study on the impact of the Economic Corridors in the Chinese provinces Xinjiang (CPEC)6 and Yunnan (BCIM)7 on local trade. He argues that due to security concerns in Xinjiang the informal trans-border economic activities between Uyghur and Pakistani traders have been disrupted, paradoxically in the name of fostering economic development and connectivity under the SREB umbrella.

Sternberg, Ahearn and McConnell (2017) frame these dynamics by stating that major infrastructure projects are ‘political’ not just because they materialise certain political ideologies, but also because they have the capacity to (re)shape the social space in unexpected ways. This can occur both by favouring particular publics based on certain (often non-visible) demarcation lines as by constituting a (temporary) political community through desire for, or rejection of, a particular infrastructural experiment.

The above examples show that SREB infrastructure projects with the aim to strengthen people-to- people ties can sometimes have very surprising and opposite results. Moreover, it appears that the way in which these projects affect the lives of the local population is not at the top of the priority list of China nor the Central Asian regimes. This confirms Summers' (2016) thesis that the SREB's discourse as mutually beneficial is no more than a political justification for what is essentially a capitalist endeavour. Nevertheless, the way in which such projects influence local realities should receive more attention within the policies of the actors involved. After all, irrespective of the true objectives of the project, it becomes clear that not fulfilling the created expectations or disrupting local relations can serve as a catalyst for local unrest and, as such, it can strengthen oppositional forces.

4.3.2 Nation Building

Since independence, Central Asian elites have proven to be creative in seeking ways to legitimize their rule and to create some kind of national identity in their countries characterized by ethnic diversity.

In a study about the Rogun dam in Tajikistan, Menga (2014) shows how large-scale infrastructure projects can be the subject of a state-led nation building8 project. Rogun is a gigantic dam on the Tajik Vakhsh river that, if ever completed, would be the highest in the world. While achieving energy independence is part of Tajikistan's official domestic policy, Menga (2014) argues that the project

6 CPEC: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 7 BCIM: Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor 8 Menga defines nation-building as 'a set of policies aimed at creating a common national identity and a sense of patriotism and loyalty towards the state'. should primarily be seen as a way for the government to gain legitimacy and strengthen a sense of national identity and patriotism, while diverting attention from more pressing matters. The symbolic value of this megalomaniac project allows the Tajik elites to create an image of progress and development, which should ultimately strengthen a nationalist discourse.

The pursuit of a national identity is a perfectly legitimate objective given Tajikistan's limited history as a nation-state and the increasing influence of globalization the country is experiencing. The large scale of the infrastructure projects and the symbolic discourse of the SREB that goes with them lend themselves perfectly to being used by elites in a process of nation building. However, the question is whether such an objective can be reconciled at all with sustainable development of the economy and the creation of jobs for the local population.

5 Concluding remarks

This dissertation has discussed China’s major drivers to increase its presence in Central Asia which can be roughly divided into two categories: some authors emphasize China's geopolitical agenda, others point to mainly economic and commercial drivers. In accordance with Jochec and Kyzy (2018), Summers (2016) and Akhter (2018) it is concluded that China mainly wants to achieve what other major economies managed in earlier decades of globalization: establishing economic partnerships that can address a number of domestic shortcomings.

As economic development in the region has been retarded by deficient transport connectivity due to the specific geography, the SREB does undoubtedly bring opportunities for the Central Asian republics. However, it is far from certain that the coming investments will effectively foster Central Asia’s development as the sustainability of some of the connectivity projects hardly seem to be based on considerations related to economic feasibility. A more intensive cooperation with China as it is observable today also entails significant risks such as, for example, an excessive financial dependence on China and a lack of diversification in the domestic economies.

As argued by Akhter (2018) an analysis of political and social forces and relationships is crucial to understand what happens when a project such as the SREB hits the ground. Therefore, certain dynamics arising from both the Soviet period and the sudden (and forced) globalization which followed are discussed in more detail.

The mutual interaction between the SREB and widespread corruption is set out. It is argued that the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union and the sudden integration into the capitalist world economy have formed the ideal breeding ground for corrupt practices. Central Asian elites were able to integrate into the global political economy which helped them via contemporary financial vehicles and informal and offshore enterprises to hide their pernicious practices. Not only does corruption impact the implementation of projects related to the SREB in a negative way, the SREB itself moreover has the potential to further aggravate widespread corruption and rent-seeking practices.

Next, it is argued that the limited transparency regarding the cooperation with China and the fact that the (high) expectations related to the SREB are not always fulfilled have led to a historically grown sinophobia being increasingly present in society. The increase in sinophobia, moreover, entails the risk that even very valuable and sustainable projects linked to China can count on little or no credit from the local population. While economic opportunism can be expected to be mitigating, such projects remain very useful for opposition forces to incite the local population against the current regime, which can be depicted as the ultimate ally of the Chinese enemy. Even more important, the link between corruption scandals and the SREB has the ability to further strengthen anti-Chinese sentiments among central Asian local populations as these scandals do have an impact on people's daily lives. In this way, one threatens to end up in a vicious circle.

Last but not least there is no unanimity among the Central Asian states on the future shape of the regional transport networks covered by the SREB (Tolipov, 2018). This illustrates how a project that focuses on connectivity is difficult to reconcile with a policy that focuses on self-isolation and sovereignty. Consequences are far-reaching, especially for the local communities in the border regions whose historically developed habits are being disrupted.

This dissertation argues that when projects such as SREB hit the ground, they both influence and are influenced by domestic circumstances in recipient nations. As discussed above, in Central Asia this includes (among other consequences) the exacerbation of corrupt practices, the increase of a historically grown sinophobia and the disruption of precarious stability in the border regions. The way in which this project interacts with legacies of history has been underestimated by both China and the recipient countries. The current SREB vision therefore does not contain a framework to provide an answer to this.

At the moment, the Central Asian republics clearly lack the institutional capacity to manage projects such as the SREB. The respective governments seem unable to invest in human and institutional capital, which is nevertheless essential to develop an economic policy that is adapted to the new reality that the SREB brings.

Moreover, the heterogeneity of society and in particular the fact that not everyone feels represented by the current regimes plays a crucial role. After all, even very local sources of power see this project as an opportunity to enrich their community, or just themselves, which might contribute to a further unravelling of the political system. It can be hoped that the benefits of this project will not be distributed according to one of the many invisible (often ethnic) boundaries in society, as this will have a further disruptive effect. Investigating which population groups, besides the elites, benefit from the SREB would certainly be an interesting research focus.

In summary, this dissertation argues that the way the Central Asian nation states act and react upon the legacy of their history will determine if the SREB paves a golden future or crumbles into a dusty dream. Therefore, ethnographic research that studies what happens on the ground when grand strategies meet the complex social space of a region that has experienced several disruptive moments in the past decades or even centuries is encouraged. After all, the complex dynamics inherent the Central Asian social and political space, that have been formed over the years, have the capacity to transform the original intensions of the SREB in an often unrecognizable way. More specifically, it is necessary to study how (perceived) corruption, whether or not related to the SREB, influences sinophobia. Moreover, it is desirable to investigate how nation-building projects and more general issues related to sovereignty, often accompanied by a rather nationalist discourse, play a role in the rise of anti-Chinese sentiments. Linked to this, one can research how such a discourse can be reconciled with projects whose ultimate goal is to promote connectivity. The way in which intra- regional cooperation (either multilateral or bilateral) is evolving in the context of the SREB is thus also an interesting field research. Finally, it is important to consider whether and how the Central Asian republics will adapt their internal policies on corruption, sinophobia and security (borders) in the near future.

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