CINEMA TRANSLATION IN POST-COMMUNIST UKRAINE: RECLAIMING THE UKRAINIAN IDENTITY

MOTRIA SPOLSKY

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MASTER'S OF ARTS

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN TRANSLATION

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I+I Canada Abstract

This thesis examines the circumstances which led to the enforcement of mandatory Ukrainian language translations of foreign movies in Ukraine beginning in January 2008. Secondly, it looks at the reactions of various translators, movie distributors, theatre owners, community activists and others to this language requirement. The goal of this thesis, besides providing an overview of the movie translation situation, was to understand the role that movie translation can play in providing a common language for the entire nation, thereby strengthening its self-perception of national identity. The data, consisting of articles from various print and internet media, was collected over a one year period from autumn 2008 to autumn 2009, while interviews were carried out in Ukraine during November and December 2008. The significance of this thesis resides in its overview and analysis of a newly created audiovisual translation situation, and as a starting point for future research.

Ce memoire a pour objectif d'analyser le contexte ukrainien et les circonstances qui ont rendu obligatoire la traduction des films etrangers vers I'ukrainien depuis janvier 2008. II fait tout d'abord I'etat des reactions que les traducteurs, les distributeurs, les proprietaires des cinemas, les militants et d'autres personnes impliquees ont exprimees vis-a-vis ce nouveau reglement linguistique. Mais au-dela de cette analyse, le memoire souleve egalement les questions concernant le double role que la traduction cinematographique peut jouer, d'un cote, en fournissant une langue commune pour la nation et de I'autre, en renforgant I'identite nationale.

Le corpus a ete constitue a partir des articles parus dans la presse et en ligne entre automne

2008 et automne 2009, ainsi qu'a partir des interviews effectuees en novembre et decembre

2008 en Ukraine. En mettant en lumiere une situation de traduction audiovisuelle tout a fait nouvelle, ce memoire se veut exploratoire et ne peut etre qu'un point de depart pour des recherches futures. Acknowledgments

Many people helped me through my thesis experience. Thank you to Prof. Aurelia Klimkiewicz

for being so much more than just a thesis advisor. Her encouragement, advice and belief in me

carried me through the most difficult days of writing and into progress. I am likewise grateful to

my thesis committee: Profs. Tereza Barta, Jerzy Kowal and Candace Seguinot. Their insight into

my thesis and the various directions it could lead made my defense a truly enriching experience

I would like to thank the late Prof. Daniel Simeoni, former director of the graduate program in

translation. He encouraged me to think outside the limits of French-English and helped me to

see that writing a thesis was an attainable goal. Thank you also to Prof. Marie-Christine Aubin,

current director of the graduate program in translation studies, for her encouragement, and to

Jacqueline Angoh for patiently answering all my questions from day one.

Thank you to everyone in Ukraine who willingly took time out of their busy schedules to speak

to me. My interviewees were eager to help me grasp the situation, to help me find more

interviewees. In particular, I am grateful to Bohdan Batruch and Andriy Andriyuk who both

continued to answer my emails months after our interviews; and Victor Morozov and Motria

Onyschuk, who welcomed me into their home and gave me many interesting documents.

I am very grateful to all my friends for their support and encouragement, and for knowing when to ask how my thesis was progressing and when to change the topic. In particular, thank you to

Lee-Anne and Ihor for proofreading, and to Eric Bury for his enviable formatting skills.

Finally, a special thank you to my family: my mother Marusia, my father Yuri, my sister Laryssa and my brother Danylo. Their support was invaluable, as was their proofreading, editing,

listening skills, patience and love.

AflKYKD! Table of Contents

Title Page i

Copyright Page ii

Certificate Page iii

Abstract iv

Acknowledgments v

Table of Contents vi

List of Tables viii

List of Figures ix

INTRODUCTION 1

1. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 4

Aspects of Audiovisual Translation 4

Choosing a Topic 7

Research Methods 9

Research Goals 11

2. HISTORY OF UKRAINE 14

The Era of Princes 15

The Cossacks 19

Occupation 23

Independence 34

3. HISTORY OF THE UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE 36

Early History of the Language 36

The Twentieth Century 40

The Specificity of the Soviet Era 42

Language Challenges in Contemporary Ukraine 44

Identity Through Translation 48 4. LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 52

Defining a Nation 53

Defining National Identity 54

Language and Identity 56

National Identity and Language in Ukraine 58

5. CINEMA IN UKRAINE 67

Cinema Before Independence 68

Independence and Reality 70

The Domestic Film Industry 73

6. PRESENT SITUATION AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 74

The Law on Cinematography 76

Understanding the Law on Cinematography 80

The Current State of Film Translation 84

The Major Players 88

7. ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS 95

Hopes and Fears 99

Recommendations 117

Movie Translation in Belgium, Catalonia and Quebec 120

Identity Through Translation, Part Two 122

CONCLUSION 126

Appendix A - Map of Present-Day Ukraine 130

Appendix B - Sample Interview Questions 131

Bibliography 133

VI1 List of Tables

Table 1 Population and percent of film market of the six 86 largest markets (urban centres) in Ukraine. List of Figures

Figure A.l Map of Present-Day Europe 130

Figure A.2 Map of Present-Day Ukraine 130 Introduction

In today's world, due to globalization and the evolution of the Internet, borders both geographic and political have become permeable and identities variable. The importance of language as an element of national identity is often considered debatable, as is the relevance of ethnicity. The

Soviet reality, a constant in Ukraine for a large part of the twentieth century, no longer exists.

Modernity, with its hallmark of individuality, is the new reality. It is within this context of a post-

Soviet modernity that Ukraine has taken on the challenge of defining its identity in the nearly twenty years since declaring independence.

Movies, along with all popular culture, make up an important part of this new and modern Ukrainian identity, and translated movies are an essential component of this cinema landscape. Over the past four years, the field of movie translation has had significant changes introduced and, more importantly, enforced. In December 2007, the article of the Ukrainian Law on Cinematography dealing with the language of foreign movies, an article which was previously disregarded, was brought into force. Movie distributors could no longer rely on Russian language translations carried out beyond the borders of Ukraine; they henceforth had to ensure the movies they distributed were being translated into Ukrainian. This change was played out against the background of linguistic tensions, both Russian and Ukrainian being historically significant languages in Ukraine.

In the presented research, I have addressed the questions of how people have reacted to the changes in linguistic requirements in movie translations; the reasons for the varied reactions; and the influence that these changes might have on feelings of national identity and on the language situation in Ukraine. I have likewise drawn a connection between translation and identity through Annie Brisset's functions of translation.

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. I begin in the first chapter with an introduction to relevant literature in the field of audiovisual translation and a presentation of my methodogy.

In the second chapter, in order to understand Ukraine's current situation and its hesitation between Russian and Western influences, I look at the complex history of Ukraine - its brief yet illustrious period of supremacy; the numerous and prolonged stretches of subjugation, punctuated by campaigns for sovereignty; and finally modern independence. Chapter three presents the history of the Ukrainian language, the changes it has undergone and the oppression it has endured, helping to explain why the language is not always perceived in a positive light and why Russian is so prevalent. A key component of the second chapter is the connection between identity and translation through the linguistic functions of unification, re-

I 2 territorialization and legitimacy. The fourth chapter further looks at language, contemplating the

link it has to national identity and its different conceptions, ethnic or civic.

Chapter five brings the focus to cinema, looking at its history in Ukraine throughout the twentieth century and after independence to the present day. This chapter includes a brief overview of the current state of affairs of the film industry in Ukraine, looking at both domestic and foreign products. The sixth chapter looks specifically at movie translations in Ukraine

presenting the current situation and the changes, legislative and otherwise, that have led to this scenario. In this chapter I introduce some of the people who have been involved in the process of change. In addition I look at the health of the dubbing industry in Ukraine. The seventh and final chapter presents an analysis of the dubbing situation, looking at the hopes and fears of

interviewees as they relate to the future of the movie industry.

I hope that this thesis will serve not only as a source of information on the translation of foreign movies in Ukraine, but also as a starting point for further research. In order to determine where this research can lead, it is important to first have a look at the research that has already

been carried out.

I 3 Chapter 1 - Literature Review and Methodology

ASPECTS OF AUDIOVISUAL TRANSLATION

Audiovisual translation, or AVT, is not one of the more extensively studied areas of translation.

Nevertheless, there is a growing body of research available for those interested in both the theoretical and applied aspects. Before I look at the situation in Ukraine, I will present a brief survey of some of the aspects of AVT currently being studied.

In Yves Gambier's introduction to the April 2004 special issue of Meta "Traduction

Audiovisuelle / Audiovisual Translation," he provides an overview of the field and some of its complexities. Gambier identifies twelve different modes of AVT, ranging from various forms of subtitling to dubbing, and from commentary to multilingual productions, and comments on the multiple categories that AV translators have been grouped into. He mentions the dubbing-

I 4 subtitling divide, the lack of common directives within the European Union, and the advent of the digital age as important factors in understanding the current state of AVT. Gambier

underlines with examples the role that habit plays in choosing between dubbing and subtitling

on a national scale, and finishes by touching on the ethics of AVT modes such as dubbing, which

show no trace of the Other.

While professional issues in the field of audiovisual translation, such as those mentioned

above, are important to understand the general context within which AV translators work,

language issues are fascinating in that the approaches used to deal with them differ from case

to case. Many of the following articles were published in Gambier and Gottlieb's collection

(MULTI) MEDIA TRANSLATION and Pilar Orero's compilation TOPICS IN AUDIOVISUAL TRANSLATION.

Anne Jackel, in her article "Shooting in English? Myth or Necessity?" contemplates the

dominance of English in the film industry and the certain success it is believed to bestow upon

products. Speaking of intralingual translation, she mentions the Scottish accent "asserting its

own cultural (linguistic) identity" by resisting dubbing into a standard accent understandable to

all. Reine Maylaerts also discusses the influence of the English language, this time in Flemish film

and TV. She brings to light the observation that subtitling, the method most often used, allows

the English language to dominate while dubbing would keep this domination to a minimum, at

least on the level of language. Henrik Gottlieb also looks at the influence of English, focusing on

the prevalence of Anglicisms in translations into Dutch.

The Spanish context is examined in the following three articles. Patrick Zabalbeascoa et

al explain the Spanish dubbing process. They discuss the use of dubbing as a means of

I 5 promoting regional languages, mentioning in particular the case of Catalan, which must adhere to standard language norms in order to satisfactorily promote and improve knowledge of the language. Ana-Cristina Garcia de Toro and Frederic Chaume Varela likewise focus on the Catalan context in Spain and the normalizing function of AVT. Rosa Agost looks more widely at the differences in dubbing translation norms for the different linguistic communities in Spain.

A number of authors have also broached the subject of quality. Eivor Gummerus and

Catrine Paro look at the quality of TV screen translations and how they relate to the organization of the translation process. In other words, they looked at the relationship between translation management and translation quality. Felicity Mueller looks at subtitling procedures and quality in Australia, while Heulwen James analyzes quality control of subtitles in Wales, and

Hazel R. Morgan discusses technical subtitling constraints in the UK. Finally, Jorge Diaz Cintas, in his article "Striving for Quality in Subtitling: the Role of a Good Dialogue List," writes about the importance of a thorough dialogue list, much more than a simple script, as an aspect of the working conditions of subtitlers.

The third identifiable category within the AVT literature is that of culture. The above topics on language touch on culture, often by presenting subtitling as a foreignizing process and dubbing as a domesticating process. Some authors, however, analyze this and similar issues without a specific language context. Martine Danan, in her article "Dubbing as an Expression of

Nationalism," looks at dubbing and subtitling not only as domesticating or foreignizing strategies, but through the lens of nationalism. According to her, dubbing was not only chosen for economic reasons, but also as a form of protectionism and nationalism. Teresa

I 6 Tomaszkiewicz discusses the translation of cultural specifics in subtitles, examining different strategies such as neutralizing information, omitting culture-specific terms, keeping the foreign elements (with or without explicitation), and finding substitutes.

Related to culture but emphasizing economics, Robert Paquin describes the relations between Quebec and France concerning dubbing policies. While the case has been made of the

English language infringing on the French language in Quebec, here it is the lack of cooperation

between French and Quebecois products that is at issue. While Quebec allows any film dubbed

into French to be shown on its screens, France specifies through legislation that the dub must be executed in France in order to be shown there. In Paquin's opinion, this harms the Quebec dubbing industry, whose costs are much higher than those in France since its products are

limited to Quebec screens.

While these examples are far from exhaustive, they give an idea of some of the aspects of audiovisual translation being studied. The three group categories I focused on were language, quality, and culture, all relevant to the current situation of language and national identity in

Ukraine. Although language is a focus of this thesis, elements such as quality need a separate study to be properly assessed.

CHOOSING A TOPIC In December 2007, following months of deliberation, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine announced that a previously disregarded Law on Cinematography was to be followed to the letter, particularly in dealing with the distribution and demonstration of foreign films. This meant that films which had up to this point been shown with a Russian translation were no longer going to be allowed; all films had to be translated into Ukrainian. This situation has only been a partial reality from 2006, and an all-encompassing legal requirement since January 2008.

A significant period of time has not elapsed, and the topic remains mostly untouched in academic study. In addition, while technical or cultural aspects, such as the translation of humour in movies, have been explored, the connection of movie translation to national identity has not. My choice of thesis topic was framed by this gap in current research and a desire to present an overview of the dubbing industry in Ukraine.

As we approach the end of the first decade of the twenty first century, Ukraine finds itself in an interesting position. For the first time in over three hundred years, the country has succeeded in remaining independent and united for almost two decades. The people and their government have been experiencing intense growing pains over this period, in terms of finances, politics, international affairs, national identity and much more. National identity has itself been analyzed from many different angles, be it linguistically, politically, ethnically or otherwise. It has likewise been looked at from a cultural point of view, though not in terms of movie translations where Ukrainian is the target language.

Film translation, being a topic which deals with national identity, contemporary culture, translation and the importance of language, is of great interest to me. It embodies the waves of

I 8 change that Ukraine has been riding since independence, ebbing and flowing, sometimes charging forward, sometimes receding back. It is this dynamism of transition which fascinates and inspires curiosity. Nevertheless, this study is but a starting point for those interested in the

Ukrainian situation.

RESEARCH METHODS

In order to provide a thorough analysis of the current status of Ukrainian language movie translations, I focused on two key methods. In the first place, I kept track of any newspaper, magazine or Internet article which pertained to developments in the law regulating movie translations, as well as any reactions to these changes. This provided me with facts, statistics and opinions. I began monitoring the media in November 2008, and have continued to the present day. Secondly, I traveled to Ukraine to interview 14 people who were involved in the movie industry or who had made a point of raising their voices to be heard in the lead up to and during the implementation of changes to the law.

My interviewees were chosen for their involvement in and attitude to the changes being made. They included:

• The head of the State Department of Cinematography at the Ministry of Culture;

• A dubbing actor;

• A lawyer who has set up a website to encourage subtitling all movies;

• The owner of a distribution company and chain of movie theatres, and supporter of

Ukrainian language movie translations;

I 9 • The owner of a major movie theatre chain and an outspoken critic of mandatory

Ukrainian language translations;

• The owner of a Kharkiv movie theatre chain who does not agree with legislation, but

understands its importance;

• Three translators, two of whom are well-known in Ukraine for their popular culture

translations;

• A journalist who does not support Ukrainian language movie translations;

• A well-known movie director who was involved in negotiations concerning the law

in question;

• A member of the organization Kino-Pereklad, which supports Ukrainian language

translations and was instrumental in getting citizens involved;

• A member of the organization Ne Bud' Bajduzhym, which carries out initiatives to

encourage the use of the Ukrainian language;

• A representative of a watch group for human rights in Ukraine.

In addition, I spoke informally to a number of people, such as journalists and students, who were in some way impacted by the changes in movie translation legislation.

Most of the people I spoke to were very eager to talk about the situation and their involvement, and explain events from their point of view. This meant that while I did ask a few questions, they were mostly to keep interviewees from veering off topic. Most of the time, they needed little prompting. The questions prepared, and sometimes asked, are provided in the appendix. There were a couple of interviewees with whom I kept in touch upon my return to

Canada, and who answered questions whenever some aspect of my research was unclear to me.

The methods of research that I chose, particularly speaking individually to those involved in the industry or in bringing about changes to the legislation, were beneficial because

I 10 they allowed me to gain an understanding from within. While reading articles was helpful

because it provided a mostly unbiased presentation of the situation, speaking to those involved

made it easier to understand the reasons why some supported while others opposed the

legislation. It put a human face on events, and kept me from equating opposition with an anti-

Ukraine attitude. And while the interviews I conducted gave me a valuable insight into the

situation in Ukraine, it also left me with many more questions as I put everything together. In

that sense, these interviews and the subsequent analysis are an excellent starting point for

further research, be it focus groups, questionnaires, or more detailed interviews. For the

purposes of this thesis, however, these interviews were sufficient.

RESEARCH GOALS

The interviews and articles selected for my research methods provided me with an abundant

but not overwhelming amount of information which allowed me to achieve my goals. In the first

place, I wanted to present an overview of the movie translation situation in Ukraine, focusing

specifically on the period from 2006 to the present and the changes brought on by newly

enforced legislation. Although similar publications had been undertaken, namely by the

organization Kino-Pereklad and by Juliane Besters-Dilger as part of the "Language Policy in

Ukraine: Anthropological, Linguistic and Further Perspectives" project, these efforts were not all-encompassing. In addition, the very thorough overview by Kino-Pereklad was released in

January 2007, almost a year before the most recent changes to the legislation were brought about. The goal of the Kino-Pereklad publication was to provide recommendations on how to

resolve the situation, something which was not amongst my intentions.

Secondly, the aim of my research was to understand the role that translation can play in

strengthening an uncertain identity. A medium such as the movies, an element of popular

culture, seemed to me to lend itself well to exposing the entire country to the same images and

sounds, thereby creating a link between Eastern and Western Ukraine which would be more

difficult to establish through radio or TV, media with much more individual choice. While cinema

made in Ukraine would have more leeway to strengthen national identity through both sound

and image, translated movies coming into Ukraine would at least provide a common language

for all. In other words, in a country whose domestic movie industry is not very visible even at

home, translations of foreign movies could be the precursor to the development of this industry,

providing sounds to define the uncertain Ukrainian identity.

Finally, through this thesis I wanted to highlight the complexities of establishing a

linguistic policy in Ukraine. Many members of the Ukrainian diaspora, particularly those whose families left Ukraine during World War II, see only one solution to Ukraine's language problems:

enforce the Ukrainian language while eliminating the Russian language. Although this attitude is also present in Ukraine, it is neither the only nor the dominant one. In order to understand the current situation Ukraine, it is important to be aware of the country's history, its centuries of subjugation and its struggles for independence. It is also important to keep in mind that the split in Ukraine is not always as simplistic as it is portrayed. The eastern parts of the country are not entirely pro-Russian, and the western parts are not all necessarily eager to join the European Union. Likewise, opposition to Ukrainization, the promotion and encouragement of the use of

Ukrainian, does not automatically imply a desire to see Russian as an official language in

Ukraine, and strong support of Ukrainization does not mean opposition to the Russian language.

As I spoke to people in Ukraine during my research visit, I constantly saw the situation from different and enlightening perspectives. It is my hope, therefore, that those who read this thesis will gain an appreciation for the complex situation in which Ukraine finds itself.

The three main goals of this thesis are therefore to present an overview of the changes that have been implemented over the last four years in the domain of movie translations in

Ukraine; to understand the connection between translation, specifically of movies, and national identity; and to outline the difficulties of choosing a linguistic path for Ukraine. Chapter 2 - History of Ukraine

Ukraine today is a land of diverse cultures and languages. Unlike Canada, a country built on

immigration, Ukraine's variety is a consequence of years of invasion and occupation by other

nations, and more recently, of forced or awarded resettlement from various areas of the Soviet

Union. Although Ukraine's dominant ethnic base remains composed of Ukrainians themselves,

its current situation and its particularities cannot be fully understood without first taking a look at how the Ukrainian nation came to be.

The name Ukraine is considered to have stemmed from the word npau, meaning edge, or border, as well as country. Indeed, Ukraine's role as border country has been staged

| 14 countless times over history, whether as a buffer between Russia and Europe, as is the current case, or farther back between Russia and Poland in the seventeenth century.

Ukraine as borderland invites the theme of transition. Its current state is an obvious example of this, as it teeters, looking to the West as a beacon of the future, yet eager to retain ties to Russia as a symbol of the past. Its transition from communism to democracy has been awkward at best, as it stumbles along from corruption to revolution to disappointment.

THE ERA OF PRINCES

The territory currently known as Ukraine has been populated since approximately 3500 BC by peoples such as the Trypillians and the Scythians, and by tribes such as the Polianians and

Derevlianians from the early 7th century (Subtelny 21). In the ninth century AD, Ukraine's widely accepted predecessor state, Kyivan Rus', was established. Kyivan Rus' was the first state created among the Eastern Slavs - defined as the group whose language developed into Ukrainian,

Russian and Belarusian - named for its founding city, Kyiv. Legend has it that Kyiv itself was named for the prince Kyi, who along with his brothers Shchek and Khoryv and their sister Lybed' founded the city in the 6th century. Kyi, however, was unable to extend his rule beyond the city, and so it was that Kyivan Rus' as a state was established in 830 AD (Subtelny 25) by Askold and

Dyr, two Varangians (elsewhere known as Normans or Vikings) who had come from the North.

Hearing of their success, Oleh came to Kyiv from the northern city of Novgorod and killed them, taking the reins of the budding empire in 882 (Subtelny 28; Zhdan).

I 15 Oleh, the first ruler of Kyivan Rus', went by the title of kniaz', which is often translated as prince though in reality he and subsequent princes were closer in status to kings. Oleh was followed by Ihor, Olha and Sviatoslav, whose ruling methods ranged from Ihor's trading and

pillaging to Olha's diplomacy to Sviatoslav's expansion (Subtelny 28-31). By the end of

Sviatoslav's reign in 971 (Zhdan and Zhukovsky, "Sviatioslav"), Kyivan Rus' extended from north

of Novgorod to south of Kyiv, east along the Volga river, and west to the Carpathian Mountains.

In other words, the state covered territory beyond present-day Ukraine, including portions of

Russia and Belarus.

Following Sviatoslav, Prince Volodymyr the Great, son of Olha, began his rule in 980,

playing an important role in Ukraine's history for two reasons (Subtelny 35). First of all, he began to look westward for trade routes. In doing so, he expanded his princedom and established good

relations with the rulers of present-day Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.

Secondly, he converted Kyivan Rus' to Byzantine Christianity. Although Olha had previously

brought this religion into the state by way of her own conversion, it was Volodymyr who chose to introduce and promote Christianity as a political move. In 988, he organized a mass baptism

of many of Kyiv's residents, forever linking his name to the birth of Christianity in Ukraine.

Volodymyr's accomplishments were continued by his son Prince Yaroslavthe Wise, who

in the early 11th century wrote the Rus'ka Pravda (Rus' Truth), which took stock of all Kyivan Rus'

laws and organized them into a then-modern and coherent code of law (Subtelny 35) which was further expanded over the subsequent centuries (Padokh). Yaroslav was succeeded by Prince Volodymyr Monomakh, one of the last successful rulers of Kyivan Rus'. A variety of factors influenced the decline of the state. Throughout the reign of each of the rulers, disagreements between brothers, sons and nephews consistently weakened their power. Despite attempts by some, such as Yaroslav the Wise and Volodymyr

Monomakh, to establish a system of succession which could bring these disagreements to a minimum, the strife continued. It resulted in the division of Kyivan Rus' into strong settlements in Galicia-Volhynia in the south-west, Novgorod in the north, and the Russian north-east

(Subtelny 57). Besides internecine strife and regionalism, which saw Kyiv attacked by various princes (Zhukovsky, "Kyiv"), the decline of Kyivan Rus' was also brought on by the Mongol invasions of the 13th century, whose task was facilitated by the aforementioned bickering. In

December 1240, the city was destroyed by the Mongols, marking the end of the Kyivan Rus' era.

As Kyivan Rus' fell apart, the Galician-Volhynian principality took on more power. In a reversal of roles, King Danylo of Lviv sent troops to defend Kyiv from the Mongols in 1240

(Subtelny 61). Although he ultimately did not succeed in freeing Rus' from the rule of the

Mongols, the principality continued the culture and traditions of Kyiv (Subtelny 65). When the last native Galician-Volhynian prince died in 1340, however, the principality experienced its own decline.

The invasion of Kyivan Rus' by the Mongols was an unfortunate event, and it would not be the last time the territory of present-day Ukraine was invaded and occupied. In fact, this became the norm, with independence and self-rule a rare state of affairs for the Ruthenians, as the Ukrainian predecessors were known. Following the Mongols, Lithuanians took advantage of

| 17 the weakened state of the former Kyivan Rus', and by 1363 had taken over approximately half of the former Rus' empire (Reid 14-15). The invasion and rule of the Lithuanians were relatively peaceful (Subtelny 70), and rather than imposing their customs on the occupied lands, they adopted elements of Ukrainian culture for themselves (Wynar).

While the Lithuanians were annexing southern Rus' and northern Rus' continued under the control of the Mongols (Reid 14), the Polish began their move eastward. In 1340, when the last native prince of Galicia-Volhynia died, the Polish King Casimir III invaded the principality

(Subtelny 72; Zhdan, "Poland," 76), marking the start of Polish dominance in western Ukraine. In

1385, the Union of Krevo was signed between Poland and Lithuania, bringing those Ukrainian and Belarusian lands formerly part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania under Polish rule ("Krevo,"

670). Ukrainian nobles protested the union, since the Poles were much more controlling than the Lithuanians, and for a while, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was able to operate at arm's length from Poland (Subtelny 75). By the middle of the 16th century, however, the Lithuanian

Grand Duchy itself had begun to fall apart, allowing the Poles the opportunity to create a commonwealth, the Rzeczpospolita, in the 1569 Union of Lublin ("Lublin," 195). This union signified the end of independence for Lithuanians, and of all vestiges of independence for

Ukraine.

Lithuanian rule left a small, if significant, mark on Ukrainian society, with the introduction of the code of law known as the Lithuanian Statute. Polish rule, however, had more impact on Ukrainian lands and people. The Ukrainian elite was very quickly Polonized, as was the system of land division, and by the beginning of the 16th century, peasants had become

| 18 enslaved as serfs to their noble masters (Subtelny 90). Though Polish rule of Ukrainian territory would last, with breaks, well into the 20th century, it was not the final empire to control

Ukrainian territory, as this distinction would go to the Soviet Union.

THE COSSACKS

The period of Polish dominance also saw the rise of the Cossacks. The name comes from the

Turkic kazak, meaning "free man" (Subtelny and Vytanovych, 593), though by the 15th century it came to signify the Ukrainians, particularly males, who defied authority in a semi-organized

manner. They fought against Poles, Muscovites and Turks (Reid 32), for the most part refusing to commit to any one overlord. Even after the Cossacks as an organized fighting force disappeared in the 18th century, the name itself continued to inspire pride, representing a group of rebellious heroes who fought for the people, the peasants, of Ukraine (Reid 31).

The primary unit of Cossacks was based in Zaporizhian Sich, a fortress built on the

Dnipro River. Small groups of Cossacks remained in various towns and villages to protect them, and were under the control of local officials (Subtelny and Vytanovych, 593). Cossacks gained notoriety in Europe for their exploits against the Tatars (Reid 32), though they were equally intent on battling their local class of nobles, both Poles and Polonized Ukrainians. As peasants were placed under increasingly numerous restrictions, many fled to join the Cossacks, fuelling anti-Polish sentiment (Subtelny and Vytanovych, 594). The Poles attempted to harness the rebellious nature of the Cossacks by signing declarations limiting their numbers and appointing their leaders. Polish reliance on the protection and strength of the Cossacks at war, however, meant that they were reluctantly granted more freedom (Subtelny and Vytanovych, 594).

A number of Cossack leaders, called hetmans, have gone down in history for their specific endeavours. First on the list is Dmytro "Baida" Vyshnevetsky, who built the Zaporizhian

Sich in the middle of the 16th century (Zhukovsky, "Vyshnevetsky," 671). He was followed by such notable hetmans as Petro Sahaidachny, who early in the 17th century oriented the Cossacks against the Poles and towards self-government (Wynar and Zhukovsky, 495). The two most famous hetmans, who left their mark on European history, were Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Ivan

Mazepa.

As Anna Reid says in BORDERLAND:

Khmelnytsky is both the most influential and the most mysterious [of all the

endlessly mythologised figures of Ukrainian history]. For Ukrainians, he is the

leader of the first Ukrainian war of independence; for Poles he is the misguided

peasant rebel who split the Commonwealth, pushing Poland into her long pre-

paration decline. For Jews he is the prototype pogromshchik, author of the

infamous Khmelnytsky massacres; for Russians he is the founder of the Great Slav

Brotherhood, the Moses who led Ukraine out of Polish bondage into the

welcoming arms of Muscovy (Reid 33).

Khmelnytsky was elected hetman in 1648 (Subtelny 126; Ohlobyn, "Khmelnytsky," 470), and in the spring of that year, he mounted his rebellion as revenge against the Polish lord who had taken off with his future wife and killed his son. While many other Cossack attacks had been

| 20 fueled by revenge and ended in failure, Khmelnytsky's case was different (Subtelny 126).

Ukrainian peasants had grown tired of being ruled by Polish nobles, and supported Khmelnytsky as a means of overthrowing the system (Subtelny 128). Over the course of a few months in

1648, Khmelnytsky's rebellion inspired the peasants, his forces swelling at one point to between

80,000 and 100,000. This rebellion is seen as one of the most important events in Ukrainian

history, uniting the Ukrainian masses against a foreign occupier. Nevertheless, any gains which could have been achieved from this rebellion were negated in 1649 when the Tatar khan, a

Cossack ally, unexpectedly withdrew his support. When the khan's advance stalled, a treaty was signed returning much of the captured territory to the control of Polish nobles.

Khmelnytsky's other claim to fame was the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654. After being

betrayed a number of times by the Tatar khan, he realized the Cossacks needed a new ally. The

Muscovite tsar was chosen by Khmelnytsky and supported by the people, who were happy to

have an Orthodox partner (Subtelny 134). The treaty established a relationship in which Russia was Ukraine's ally and recognized the hetman's rule (Ohlobyn, "Pereiaslav," 837). The

Pereyaslav agreement lasted until Khmelnytsky's death. At that point, the Duchy of Muscovy

began to interfere on a regular basis in the country's internal affairs, limiting its autonomy

(Ohlobyn, "Pereiaslav," 838). This treaty set the stage for a complicated relationship between the two countries. While historians view this treaty variously, including as a temporary military alliance, a big brother protectorship, and a natural consolidation of two like peoples (Subtelny

135), it is clear that the outcome of the treaty was indicative of the future, with Ukraine in a constant state of subjugation to Russia. The other particularly noteworthy hetman, Ivan Mazepa, ruled from 1687 to 1709. His

"main goal was to unite all Ukrainian territories in a unitary state that would be modeled on existing European states but would retain the features of the traditional Cossack order"

(Ohlobyn, "Mazepa," 354). And while he did manage to control the starshyna - the upper echelon - of the Cossacks, he wasn't very popular with the peasants. Although he came close in

1703 when he united the left- and right-bank factions of the Cossacks, he never fully achieved this goal (Subtelny 161-163). He did, nevertheless, build churches and support educational and cultural establishments. For most of his reign, Mazepa was on friendly terms with the Muscovite

Tsar Peter I. This changed early in the 18th century, when Peter I began sending Cossack troops to fight his distant battles while Ukrainian lands were left unprotected (Subtelny 163). In retaliation, Mazepa allied himself with Sweden, an act which resulted in the destruction of

Mazepa's headquarters, Baturyn (Subtelny 164). When Peter I won the Battle of Poltava against

Sweden and the Cossacks in 1709, Russian military rule was introduced into Ukraine.

The Cossacks represented a period in Ukraine's history that involved fierce battles for autonomy, and a number of different allies - the Poles, the Turks, the Russians and the Swedes.

And while the results were not always to Ukraine's advantage, the Cossack movements involved were carried out, for the most part, with its people's best interests at heart. But Mazepa's loss introduced steady Russian rule to Ukraine, and by 1775 the Zaporizhian Sich was destroyed

(Subtelny 175), bringing to an end the era of the Cossacks in 1781. OCCUPATION

Meanwhile, Mazepa's vision of a united Ukraine was falling to pieces. In 1772, Austria annexed

Galicia, and two years later, Bukovyna, also in western Ukraine. What had formerly been the

eastern part of the Polish Commonwealth now belonged to Russia, while western Ukraine was

under Austrian rule (Reid 39).

For the first little while, the life of Ukrainians under Austrian rule improved. Empress

Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II instituted various reforms in the hopes of revitalizing the

economy of the Ukrainian provinces (Subtelny 216). Steps were taken to eliminate serfdom -

finally abolished in 1848 (Kubijovyc 7) - while a more thorough educational system was

introduced, and the first university on Ukrainian soil was established in 1784 (Subtelny 217).

These efforts did not, however, result in economic success, partly because the region was cut off

from its previous trade routes in Russian-occupied Ukraine (Kubijovyc 6), and therefore

subsequent emperors reversed many of these forward-looking policies (Subtelny 218).

Nevertheless, some reforms remained, setting the scene for the creation of an

intelligentsia conscious of its ethnic identity. One early example from the late 1830s was the

Ruthenian Triad, a group centred around three students in Lviv who wanted to show that vernacular Ukrainian could be used as a literary language by publishing books written in the

language (Subtelny 240; Struk 479). This was not to say that life in Galicia as part of the Austrian

Empire was all rosy with a focus on language and national consciousness. On the contrary, life for the peasants was difficult; even after serfdom was abolished, they often worked on large estates since their own plots of land were too small to support them (Kubijovyc 7). This resulted

| 23 in the emigration of a large number of Ukrainians from Galicia to Argentina, Brazil, Canada and the United States from the 1880s onward (Kubijovyc 7).

Under Austrian rule and later the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Ukrainian culture and national consciousness had a chance to develop, despite unfavourable conditions for the peasants, some of whom decided to leave for the New World. A Russophile movement emerged at this time, meaning that pro-Russian propaganda was present in the press. This only served to strengthen the feelings of Ukrainian identity in those not involved in the movement (Kubijovyc

7).

Meanwhile, the experiences of the Little Russians, as Ukrainians living on lands within the Russian Empire were called, explain a number of practices currently or until recently considered the norm in 21st century Ukraine. For example, corruption was introduced to Ukraine in the early 19th century, officials being allowed to take what they would from the people, as long as the treasury received its required amount (Subtelny 205). Another such practice was censorship, which existed within the church in Ukraine from the late 16th century, but was introduced secularly by Russian authorities at the end of the 18th century (Struminsky 388).

Most notably, the writings of Taras Shevchenko, a Ukrainian poet who is considered the face of

Ukrainian nationalism, were among those censored in the 1840s. The Valuev circular was introduced in the 1860s (Himka and Kubijovyc 453) and served as precursor to the Ems Ukaz, issued in 1867 by Tsar Alexander II. The Ems Ukaz was a strict anti-Ukrainian language law which drove the pro-Ukrainian movement underground. A ban was placed on the import and publication of books in Ukrainian, both original and translated; Ukrainian was prohibited on

| 24 stage in any form; Ukrainian lyrics were banned from being printed; and the Ukrainian language

was removed from the education system, with no instruction allowed in Ukrainian in elementary

schools, all books in Ukrainian or by Ukrainophiles removed from libraries, and Ukrainophile

teachers replaced by Russians or Russophiles (Subtelny 283, "Ems" 824). This debilitating law

was not in effect in Austrian-ruled Ukraine, allowing for the afore-mentioned greater

development of culture and national consciousness. While many Ukrainophiles were scared into

submission, there were those who continued to fight for the Ukrainian language and culture,

though it was often in exile.

Besides corruption and censorship, the period of Russian rule gave many Ukrainians

what is known as the Little Russian mentality, whose "essential components are admiration and

identification with Russian culture and imperial tradition and a denial of Ukrainian

distinctiveness, accomplishment, and political aspirations" (Kravtsiv 166, my emphasis).

Therefore while the Russians did impose many strict measures on Ukrainians, such as the Ems

Ukaz, some Ukrainians in their admiration for the Russians chose to devalue their own culture,

an attitude still evident today in parts of Ukraine, typified by the refrain: "But Ukrainian isn't at the level needed for business/arts/film/etc., whereas Russian is."

Throughout the Russian domination of Ukrainian lands, Ukrainian writers and

intelligentsia found ways to assert their identity. Examples include the first publication of a

novel in vernacular Ukrainian by Ivan Kotliarevsky in the late 18th to early 19th centuries

(Petrenko 633), and the establishment of the Saints Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood in 1845-

1846, whose aim was in part to bring equality to the people in terms of language, culture and rights (Koshelivets, "Cyril," 635). The Russian authorities did not make this assertion of identity easy. Starting in the 1830s, a policy of Russification was imposed: Russian became the language of instruction in schools; a new Russian-language university was opened in Kyiv; the Ukrainian

Greek Catholic Church, a link to the west and at odds with the Orthodox Church which dominated in Russia, was nearly eliminated; and Polish nobles, many of whom were in actual fact Polonized Ukrainians, were stripped of their titles and land and shipped to the far eastern reaches of Russia, only to be replaced by Russians in Ukraine (Subtelny 210-212).

The abolition of serfdom in 1861 came almost fifteen years later than in Galicia, in the midst of a period of relative freedom. In 1900, the first Ukrainian political party in the Russian

Empire was established - the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party - whose aim was to establish an independent Ukrainian State (Himka and Kubijovyc 453). After a time, its members began to disagree on this goal, and the party was renamed and reoriented.

The Ukrainian lands under Austrian and Russian rule existed separately for a while longer, though their paths were united briefly in World War I when twice Russia occupied Galicia and Bukovyna (Himka and Kubijovyc 454).

Despite the restrictions they endured, Ukrainians in both empires managed to take advantage of the instability in the region brought on by the Russian revolution of 1917 to proclaim independence, albeit for brief periods of time. In Russian-occupied territory, a

Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) was established in November 1917, though for the first couple of months, its goal was equality for all as it worked alongside the Russians (Subtelny

350). The following January, the UNR proclaimed full independence, and despite a brief lapse

| 26 and general internal chaos, the government continued to function ("Ukrainian National

Republic" 410). Meanwhile, Galicia, Bukovyna and Transcarpathia - Ukrainian lands under the

Austro-Hungarian Empire, established 1876 - proclaimed their independence by the Western

Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR) in October 1918 in Lviv (Markus and Stakhiv 694). In January

1919, the UNR and the ZUNR united into one Ukrainian National Republic, though each section retained separate administrations, armies and policies (Subtelny 362). Miscommunication, differences in ideology and a multitude of enemies led to the disintegration of the Ukrainian

National Republic in 1920 (Subtelny 374-375) and by 1923, Poland was once again in charge of

Galicia (Markus and Stakhiv 694), with most of the rest of Ukraine under Russian rule.

Between the two World Wars, Ukrainian lands were divided between four powers:

Soviet Russia, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia. Most of Ukraine fell to the Soviets, who continued ruling in the manner of the tsars, oppressing the Ukrainians and other minorities, with the occasional reprieve. When Lenin instituted the New Economic Plan (NEP) in 1921, he did so partly to pacify the peasants, who were dissatisfied with previous policies (Subtelny 381).

Just over a year later, in December 1922, the USSR was established with Ukraine as one of its republics (Subtelny and Zhukovsky 186). However, as not enough non-Russians supported the communists, a policy of indigenization or korenizatsiya was implemented, whereby the culture and language of each republic was encouraged and promoted to pacify the native populations

(Subtelny 386-387). In the Ukrainian SSR, this Ukrainization meant that many positions of authority were now occupied by Ukrainians, and many Ukrainian schools were allowed to function. This led to the growth of a national consciousness, a consequence the Soviets had not

I 27 intended. Having realized this, the expulsion of pro-Ukrainization party members began in 1926, culminating in the exile or execution of nationalists during the Stalinist purges of the 1930s

(Subtelny and Zhukovsky 186).

In 1928, Stalin established the first five-year plan, during which many peasants were deprived of their lands due to the development of heavy industry and to collectivization

(Subtelny 405). Not only were peasants stripped of their lands, but those deemed to be wealthy

-the kulaks-were deprived of their belongings and forced off collective farms, sent to forced labour camps in Siberia and the Arctic, or simply executed (Subtelny 410). As collectivization continued, Stalin implemented ever higher and less attainable quotas for grain, resulting in the man-made famine-genocide known as Holodomor, or death by famine, of 1932-1933. During this time, between three and six million people died - though estimates have varied between two and ten million - and entire villages and traditions died along with them (Subtelny and

Zhukovsky 186; Subtelny 415). One possible explanation for this famine, which scarcely touched

Russia, was that Stalin intended it as a weapon against Ukrainian nationalism (Subtelny 415).

Following the famine, Stalin continued his terror, purging the communist party and manufacturing show trials of "bourgeois nationalists" (Subtelny 417). In 1933, the policy of

Ukrainization was replaced with the glorification of all things Russian under the guise of a harmonious unification of all the Slavic peoples (Subtelny 422).

Meanwhile, Eastern Galicia, Volhynia, Polissia and Kholm came under Polish rule in the early 1920s - the first from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the latter three from Russia

(Subtelny 428). And although Galician autonomy, dating back to the 1860s (Subtelny and Zhukovsky 187), was taken away, those under Polish rule at least had the means to state their opposition when they did not agree, an option those under Soviet rule did not have (Subtelny

427). Nevertheless, Polonization did exist, albeit to varying degrees: the Ukrainian press was censored; in 1924 the use of Ukrainian in governmental institutions was banned; and Ukrainian schools became bilingual with an emphasis on Polish (Subtelny and Zhukovsky 187; Subtelny

429). The 1920s were also characterized by the colonization of Ukrainian lands by approximately

200,000 Polish military and civilians (Subtelny and Zhukovsky 187; Subtelny 429). Ukrainians did not accept this without protest, in 1929 creating the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

(OUN), which led revolutionary actions, including assassinations (Subtelny 445). In retaliation, the Polish government sent Ukrainians to the Bereza Kartuzka concentration camp and destroyed many Ukrainian centres (Subtelny 431; Subtelny and Zhukovsky 187). Animosity between the Poles and Ukrainians was therefore high in the period leading up to World War II.

Ukrainians in Bukovyna under Romanian rule also experienced discrimination. The

Romanian government refused to recognize them as a distinct nationality, closed all Ukrainian schools (Subtelny 447), and abolished Ukrainian organizations and the Ukrainian press (Subtelny and Zhukovsky 188). Life in Czechoslovakia was better for Ukrainians. The area known as

Transcarpathia voluntarily came under its rule in 1919 (Subtelny and Zhukovsky 188, Subtelny

448). Contrary to the actions of the Russians, Poles and Romanians, the Czechoslovak government encouraged the Ukrainian language, allowing schools to use it for instruction

(Subtelny 449). Nevertheless, tensions were not entirely absent, since Ukrainians wanted autonomy and the Czechoslovak government was not willing to grant it. In October 1938,

| 29 however, Transcarpathians took advantage of a weakened Czechoslovak government and proclaimed independence. It was very short-lived, however, ending a mere five months later when Hungarian forces invaded the region (Subtelny 451). On the eve of the Second World War, therefore, Ukraine and its people were divided between four states.

Soon Ukraine was once again shuffled; the implementation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop

Pact in 1939 resulted in the division of Ukraine between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

(Balan 448). Most of Ukraine, including western regions, found themselves under Soviet rule, while the Lemko and Kholm regions in the west were taken over by Germany (Subtelny 435-

437). This did not last particularly long, though, as Ukrainian lands were torn from one set of occupying hands only to be ripped away again. By the end of 1941, Germans had occupied the majority of Ukraine, with the Soviets destroying everything useful in their retreating path

(Subtelny and Zhukovsky 189; Subtelny 461). In between, Ukrainians attempted to take control of their destiny, fighting all their enemies.

Continuing its campaign for independence, OUN experienced complications in 1940 when it split into two factions: those following Andrii Melnyk, more conservative; and supporters of Stepan Bandera, younger and more militant (Subtelny 458-459; Subtelny and

Zhukovsky 189). The Bandera faction later morphed into the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in

1942, which fought Germans, Soviets and Poles and eventually encompassed members from both factions (Subtelny 473-474). During the war, Ukrainians first welcomed the Germans as liberators from the Polish and Soviet forces, though they quickly understood that they were exchanging their previous occupiers for new ones.

| 30 Many Ukrainians were jailed or shot for pro-Ukrainian activities (Subtelny 465), and approximately 2.3 million were sent to Germany for slave labour from 1942 onwards (Subtelny

469). While many resisted, still others made the uneasy decision to obey or collaborate. For example, Galicia Division was a distinctly Ukrainian division of the German army, consisting of

13,000 volunteers who hoped they could help stabilize conditions for Ukrainians (Subtelny 472).

This was not the case, and many of these soldiers are now seen as Nazi collaborators. There were, however, glimmers of hope for Ukraine in the war. The Bandera faction of the OUN proclaimed a Ukrainian state in Lviv in 1941, though its administration was quickly arrested and jailed (Subtelny and Zhukovsky 189; Subtelny 463). And when Melnyk created a Ukrainian council in Kyiv later that year, the same happened to his administration (Subtelny 465).

Thus as the war came to an end, the Soviets were finally in control of most of the

Ukrainian territory. In eastern Ukraine, Stalin wanted to show his regime to be sympathetic to the Ukrainians, and he therefore put them in positions of authority in the Ukrainian SSR

(Subtelny 478). In western Ukraine, however, he felt the need to be more authoritative with

Ukrainian nationalists, and immediately implemented harsh policies of conscription and laid restrictions on the Greek Catholic Church (Subtelny 478). And so it was that at the end of World

War II, Ukraine was finally united, but still not independent.

One of the consequences of the war was less variety in the ethnic make-up of Ukraine.

Whereas previously there had been many Poles, Germans and Jews, there numbers were now significantly lower (Subtelny 483). Instead, Ukraine experienced an influx of Russians who came to fill the gap of industrial workers, government bureaucrats and party functionaries that the

I 31 war and the purges had eliminated. The implementation of strategies of Russification was made

much easier thanks to the hundreds of thousands of displaced Russians on Ukrainian territory.

While Ukraine was a republic of the USSR, in theory it had certain freedoms. Along with

Belarus, Ukraine was a founding state of the United Nations, separate from the USSR (Subtelny

487). Likewise, the Soviet constitution gave Ukraine the right to have direct relations with other

countries (Subtelny and Zhukovsky 190). In reality, however, Soviet Ukraine continued to

experience oppression. The Greek Catholic Church was liquidated from the public eye, though it

continued its illegal existence underground (Subtelny 488). Soviet soldiers paraded as members

of the UPA, raiding, raping and killing at random in order to discredit the organization (Subtelny

489). People continued to be sent to concentration camps (Subtelny and Zhukovsky 191), and

collectivization remained the modus operandi on farms (Subtelny 491). Russification continued

(Subtelny and Zhukovsky 191), with an emphasis on the glory that was Russian culture, while the

history of Ukraine was reworked to better suit this official pro-Russian attitude (Subtelny 493-

494).

With Stalin's death in 1953, policies and attitudes were eased under Nikita Khrushchev

during a period known as de-Stalinization (Subtelny 501). During this time, literary and cultural

endeavours were allowed more freedom, censorship was relaxed, and some Ukrainophile party

members were reinstated (Subtelny 501; Subtelny and Zhukovsky 192). In honour of the 300th

anniversary of the 1654 signing of the Pereyaslav Treaty by Khmelnytsky, an act considered by

Soviets to have brought the two countries to their 'natural' union, Khrushchev gave Ukraine the

Crimean peninsula as a gift (Subtelny 499). During the late fifties and early sixties, a group of

| 32 intellectuals emerged who went by the name the Sixtiers -Shestydesiatnyky. They took advantage of the detente to call for truth and more liberal creativity in literature through their own publications, protests and petitions (Koshelivets, "Shestydesiatnyky," 644; Subtelny and

Zhukovsky 192). However, as Khrushchev's rule came to an end, many of the Sixtiers were arrested and sent to Siberia or barred from writing (Koshelivets, "Shestydesiatnyky," 644). The

movement itself did not gain as much popularity as it could have because it did not appeal to farmers and workers, and therefore remained a movement for the intelligentsia (Subtelny 520).

Meanwhile, Khrushchev's loosening of rules was followed by Leonid Brezhnev's more conservative and authoritarian rule in the Soviet Union, and a return to more severe

Russification. He in turn was followed by Gorbachev, whose famous policies of perestroika -

restructuring - and glasnost - openness - led to the eventual collapse of the USSR. The Soviet

Union's instability was accentuated by its reaction to the 1986 explosion of the Chernobyl

nuclear reactor (Markus and Stebelsky). The government first attempted to hide the catastrophe from its people and the outside world, but when it became clear that something

had happened, the USSR unexpectedly sought outside help. The lack of trust coupled with the admission of mishandling signaled the end (Subtelny 534-535). By 1989, the first relatively free elections in the Soviet Union were being held, and the Ukrainian political party Rukh, or the

Popular Movement of Ukraine, the first large-scale non-communist political party in Ukraine in the late Soviet period, was formed (Kuzio and Senkus 147; Markus and Stebelsky). By July 1990, the Declaration on Ukraine's State Sovereignty was released, announcing the priority of

Ukrainian laws over the laws of the Soviet Union, and one year later, on August 24,1991, the

| 33 Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic proclaimed its independence (Markus and Stebelsky). After centuries of subjugation, Ukraine finally had its own independent and united state.

INDEPENDENCE

Independence, however, brought its own share of problems, some of them related to the country's newfound autonomy, while others echoed off the years of being dominated by other cultures and administrations. And while independence meant the introduction of a democratic system, it did not automatically mean a change in power. Both presidents Leonid Kravchuk

(1991-1994) and Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004) were what Taras Kuzio calls "former 'sovereign communists' turned centrists" (217). In other words, communists were in power before independence, and those same people remained in power after independence under a different name (Subtelny, THIRD ED., 592). Even Viktor Yushchenko, who came to power following the

Orange Revolution in 2004, was not entirely willing to part ways with Kuchma, to whom he was loyal for most of the tetter's regime (Kuzio 228).

In 1997, Ukraine and Poland signed a Declaration of Understanding and Unity through which they promised to set aside their differences and forgive past transgressions and work together to achieve future cooperation (Subtelny, THIRD ED., 602). On the other end of the spectrum were Ukraine's dealings with Russia. From the moment the USSR fell apart, Russia wanted to show its superiority and dominance in the Commonwealth of Independent States

(CIS), a situation which Ukraine was not willing to accept (Subtelny, THIRD ED., 599). This friction

| 34 has remained evident to the present day. Russia used its stores of gas and oil as political leverage with Ukraine in 1993-1994 (Subtelny, THIRD ED., 599) and most recently in 2007-2008; it has fueled separatist tendencies in eastern Ukraine and the Crimea on more than one occasion (Subtelny, THIRD ED., 587); and it has meddled in Ukraine's elections, most notably in

2004 with a reported US$300 million provided to Viktor Yanukovych, Yushchenko's opponent, and allegedly poisoning Yushchenko in the lead-up to the election (Kuzio 227).

Despite being a totalitarian state, the Soviet regime had given Ukrainians a certain amount of stability, something democracy and independence, being focused on freedom and responsibility, have not. Whereas Ukraine's relationship with Poland is no longer defined by its past, Ukraine's relations with Russia continue to base themselves on history, one which is often manipulated. Ukraine has had to develop ties with the West in order to legitimize its independence, an act that leaves Russia dissatisfied (Subtelny, THIRD ED., 600). On the other hand, Ukraine must maintain its ties with Russia as its biggest partner in trade and security, among other things (Subtelny, THIRD ED., 600).

For this reason, Ukraine's independence has not been a period of pure exaltation and new beginnings. It finds itself caught between past partners and new ones; between old regimes and new ones; between Russia and the West. And while corruption is still rampant and the law is often considered optional, Ukraine has taken steps into the future. After the 2004 peaceful

Orange Revolution, its media are free, as are its elections, and some politicians with links to organized crime have even been cleared from the Interior Ministry (Kuzio 233). Nevertheless,

Ukraine's past cannot be forgotten. Various myths of Slavic unity and brotherhood abound, and

| 35 Russia cannot be swept aside as a manipulating communist power. Ukraine's geographical

position means it can be of use to both Russia and the West, but its history dictates that it must

manoeuvre its path into the future with utmost care.

Chapter 3 - History of the Ukrainian Language

EARLY HISTORY OF THE LANGUAGE

Ukrainian formed on the territory of present-day Ukraine as part of what is known as the group of East Slavic languages, which also encompasses Russian and Belarusian. The development of the Ukrainian language, according to George Shevelov, can be divided into four general time

periods (Proto-Ukrainian, Old Ukrainian, Middle Ukrainian and Modern Ukrainian) and three fields of use (church, written and spoken) (Shevelov, "Literaturna"). Although many phonemic, syntactic, morphological and grammatical elements changed over the course of its

| 36 development, only some of the ones which distinguish it from the other East Slavic languages will be highlighted.

The history of the modern Ukrainian language began in the sixth century, with what is known as Common Slavic (Shevelov, "Ukrainian"). Between the sixth and eleventh centuries

A.D., Proto-Ukrainian, a grouping of dialects of the Common Slavic language, appeared on the territory of present-day Ukraine. During this time, variations first began to separate this category from the other Slavic dialects. Following this Proto-Ukrainian period, the history of the language can be divided into three sections: Old (10th to 13th centuries), Middle (14th to 18th centuries) and Modern (19th to 21st centuries) (Shevelov, "Standard"). Throughout the first two of these periods, Ukrainian moved steadily away from its common Slavic roots with Russian,

Belarusian and other languages. The Modern era, on the other hand, provided a number of obstacles to linguistic independence, bringing these languages closer together again.

What is known as the Old period of the Ukrainian language began in the middle of the eleventh century and ended in the late fourteenth century, with the beginning of Polish and

Lithuanian rule in Ukraine (Shevelov, "Ukrainian"). At the start of the Old period, Ukrainian still consisted of a number of dialects which can be grouped into three categories: northern, southwestern and southeastern. Certain common changes occurred in these dialects which served to distinguish them from the other Slavic dialects. During this period, changes included the introduction of the V (H) in addition to the f (G), and the merging of sounds to create the M

(Y) as opposed to I (long E). These are among the elements which serve to distinguish Ukrainian from Russian in current usage, since the t and the M letters do not exist in Russian. A second

| 37 important feature of Old Ukrainian is the addition of numerous loan words, introduced through the Byzantine Empire and through contact with Central Europe and the Turkic peoples of the steppes (Shevelov, "Ukrainian"). One example of this was the name Cossack, derived from the

Turkic kozak, as mentioned in the previous chapter. The majority of these loan words did not become permanent, although they influenced the flexibility of the language. Towards the end of the Old period, violent conflicts between the princes of Kyivan Rus', coupled with Mongol invasions, forced a mass westward migration, resulting in the formation of the western and northwestern dialect.

The beginning of the Middle period, generally considered to have taken place from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries, was marked by the continued westward migration of

Ukrainians in the face of threats from the Crimean Tatars (Shevelov, "Ukrainian"). Because the population was concentrated, the language developed more uniformly. The subsequent resettlement to the east and south spread this linguistic homogeneity throughout the territory of present-day Ukraine. Another outcome of the contact between the Cossacks and the Crimean

Tatars was the inclusion of Turkic military and commercial terms in the Ukrainian language. The continued influence of Polish and Latin, along with German and Czech, resulted in a Ukrainian vocabulary closer to West Slavic than Russian (Shevelov, "Ukrainian"). It was during the Middle

Ukrainian period that the southeastern dialect, which would be the foundation for Modern

Standard Ukrainian, was formed, and the phonemic and morphophonemic systems of modern

Ukrainian were already close to their final form. Throughout this Middle Ukrainian period, the language encountered opposition from occupying forces: Polish, most significantly after the 1569 Union of Lublin that Polonized

Ukrainian nobility, and Russian, from the 1709 Battle of Poltava in which the Cossacks, siding with the Swedes, lost to Peter I of Russia (Shevelov, "Standard"). This loss was followed by tsarist edicts published from the 1720s to the 1770s whose aim was to censor the Ukrainian

language being printed and to Russify education. These edicts led to the stalled development of the Ukrainian language.

When the Modern period began, literary publications were no longer being written in

Ukrainian, as they had been in the seventeenth century; they were now written in Russian

(Shevelov, "Standard Ukrainian"). Nevertheless, some Ukrainian-language literature was being

produced, though it mostly consisted of satire and humour. Ivan Kotliarevsky is seen as the first writer to set down Modern Ukrainian on paper, with his 1798 epic poem Eneida (Gerus-

Tarnawecka 247; Reid 76). The written language made its largest gains through the work of

Taras Shevchenko, who "expanded the flexibility, range and resources of Ukrainian by synthesizing several Ukrainian dialects, the colloquialisms of peasants and townsmen, and the forms and vocabulary of Church Slavonic" (Subtelny 234). Both Shevchenko and Panteleimon

Kulish, his contemporary, were invaluable to the establishment of a supra-dialectic Modern standard Ukrainian language.

During the early nineteenth century, both the first Ukrainian grammar and the first short Ukrainian dictionary were published (Reid 77). Towards the end of the century, just as literary Ukrainian was beginning to gain momentum, the 1863 Valuev Circular was published,

| 39 effectively banning Ukrainian-language printing and book publishing within the Russian Empire.

This Circular also denied the existence of Ukrainian as a language separate from Russian,

reducing it to a mere dialect influenced by Polish (Senkus). Coupled with the 1876 Ems Ukaz, which expanded the scope of the Circular (Reid 88), this hostility resulted in the relocation of the

Ukrainian literary centre from Russian-ruled lands to Austrian-ruled Galicia, where the language continued to develop (Shevelov, "Standard"; Reid 88).

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Despite these incursions on Ukraine's linguistic identity starting in the sixteenth century, the twentieth century brought with it even bigger challenges. Short-lived independence towards the end of the second decade of the twentieth century allowed for the introduction of Ukrainian into both literary and social spheres, necessitating the language's codification and standardization (Shevelov, "Standard").

In the mid-1920s, korenizatsiya or indigenization was introduced as a way of

popularizing communism (Reid 118; Subtelny 386-387). This involved encouraging the languages and cultures of each of the Soviet republics; in Ukraine it was known as Ukrainization. It promoted the use of Ukrainian within the government, the education system and media

(Subtelny 388-389). Since the communists placed great emphasis on education as a means of instilling Soviet values, even the peasants were given the opportunity to learn (Subtelny 388).

And being that they were learning during the period of Ukrainization, this resulted in a

Ukrainian-educated peasant class. While a series of efforts to normalize orthography rules in the

| 40 1870s and 1880s had resulted in chaotic usage, in 1927, in the midst of the period of

Ukrainization, a conference in Kharkiv was held where academics managed to establish a compromised set of rules, published for use in 1928 (Gerus-Tamawecka 263). This was the first time in history that Ukrainian was academically standardized, officially proving its worth as a literary language. By the mid-1930s, however, Stalin had switched to Russification, re- introducing Russian government employees into Ukraine as well as praising Russian language and society above other nationalities (Subtelny 422). A review of Ukrainian orthography in 1933 brought it closer to Russian rules (Gerus-Tarnawecka 263). Twice more, in 1946 and in 1961, changes were made to the rules to bring them closer in line with the Russian system. After independence, when the orthography rules were reviewed once more to re-Ukrainianize them, only one change was brought in - the reinstatement of the letter f1 (G).

In the decades before post-Soviet independence, linguistic Russification policies were strengthened or relaxed according to the men in charge. Stalin and Brezhnev were known for their strict policies, the former harsher than the latter, while Khrushchev with de-Stalinization and Gorbachev with glasnost were more relaxed in their approaches.

Shortly before Ukraine achieved independence, in October 1989, the Ukrainian language law came into effect, making Ukrainian the official state language (Besters-Dilger 237). Since independence, however, there have been a number of attempts by politicians to introduce

Russian as a second official language ("Yanukovych"; Masenko, UMOVNA, 31). In terms of the language itself, active Russification is no longer in effect. While there have been calls to eliminate the Russian elements the language absorbed during the Tsarist and Soviet eras, the majority of the population is in favour of moving forward with the current language as a base.

Policies of Ukrainization have been followed by politicians such as Viktor Yushchenko, the

current president, although they generally apply only to public spheres such as government,

education and the media. Ukrainization of the language itself has not been pursued.

THE SPECIFICITY OF THE SOVIET ERA

Although the Tsarist and Austro-Hungarian Empires, among others, tried to ban or limit the use

of Ukrainian, their efforts were mostly undermined by the persistence of the Ukrainian

intelligentsia. The Soviet Union, under the leadership of Stalin, succeeded more than others in

diminishing the scope and reach of the Ukrainian language by implementing a more

underhanded approach. Not only did they limit the spheres in which Ukrainian could be used,

they also implemented orthographic, morphological and grammatical policies whose aim was to

change the language itself to bring it closer to Russian (Bilaniuk 16). Certain elements of the

language were eliminated (such as the letter tor G), while others were introduced from the

Russian, or simply promoted as the only true synonym based on its proximity to the Russian

equivalent (Shevelov qtd. in Bilaniuk 86).

The uniqueness and success of this approach stemmed from its ability to not only

change what was being spoken and where, but also how it was spoken. Through previous

oppressive regimes, the Ukrainian language managed to survive by being used outside of the forbidden spheres or in secret. With the Soviet regime, even this underground use incorporated the vast, forced changes, since none of the language's speakers were free from Russian influence within the borders of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This policy of linguistic rapprochement lasted, in varying levels of intensity, until the break-up of the Soviet Union, creating generations of Ukrainians who knew no Ukrainian other than the one which closely resembled Russian. This, coupled with the use and reach of Russian in Ukraine, led to the current diglossic situation.

Another element that led to the current diglossia was the establishment of Russian as the language of social mobility in the twentieth century. Higher education as well as more important administrative positions were carried out in Russian (Bilaniuk 40-41). Ukrainian, on the other hand, was the language of the villages and the peasants (Bilaniuk 38). Overtime, this created a feeling of inferiority of Ukrainian, which in turn contributed to the perpetuation of

Russian as the language of success. When the Soviet Union fell apart and Ukrainian was heralded as the official state language, despite widespread support, there was no simultaneous mass linguistic exodus from Russian to Ukrainian (Bilaniuk 143). Russian continued to be used in public in many cities, a situation which continues to the present day. With more emphasis on

Ukrainian in education and government, the language is slowly gaining more widespread use. As media is Ukrainized, the language has better chances of shedding its peasant image and establishing its worthiness in Ukraine.

I « LANGUAGE CHALLENGES IN CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE

The linguistic situation in which Ukraine currently finds itself can be seen from varying angles.

On the one hand, a language titled Ukrainian exists, and therefore it has every right to be the

single official language taught and publicly used in Ukraine. On the other hand, the Russian

ethnic minority in Ukraine is a very large one, and the histories of the two nations have been so

closely intertwined over the past centuries that it would seem illogical to dismiss the importance

of the Russian language in Ukraine. The truth lies somewhere between these representations.

The Ukrainian Constitution was ratified in 1996, five years after independence. Whether

or not to include Russian as an official language produced heated debate, resulting in the delay

of the ratification (Bilaniuk 94). This Constitution replaced that of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist

Republic, adopted in 1978 (Markus and Yurchenko 570). The Soviet Ukrainian constitution

identified Ukrainian as the official language, though in a number of articles, namely in the education and legal fields, it was not made a requirement. In the current Constitution, the tenth article of the first chapter states that:

1. The state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language;

2. The State ensures the comprehensive development and functioning of the

Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory of

Ukraine;

3. In Ukraine, the free development, use and protection of Russian, and other

languages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed;

4. The State promotes the learning of languages of international communication;

5. The use of languages in Ukraine is guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine

and is determined by law.

| 44 The Constitution enforces the use of Ukrainian, while protecting the use of Russian and other minority languages, defined by the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages as those languages "traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that

State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State's population; and different from the official language(s) of that State" ("European Charter"). When combined with the Ukrainian interpretation of the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages, however, the case becomes more complex. This Charter was intended to protect languages other than official ones, and not to protect linguistic groups. In Ukraine, the Charter was used to support a call for Russian as an official regional language in certain oblasts and cities

(Kravchenko and Prykhod'ko), although the Charter specifically states that it is not meant to detract from the use of the official state language ("European Charter"). On the one hand, the government is upholding Ukrainian as the state language, while on the other hand, the Charter is being misinterpreted by some politicians to lend support to Russian. In trying to keep in line with the European tendency of supporting multilingualism, Ukraine has created more linguistic confusion for itself and uncertainty in its national identity.

Besides the constitutional proclamation of the official language of Ukraine, there are a few other laws which deal with aspects of language use and administration. For example, article

7 of the law concerning telecommunications and article 10 of the law concerning television and radio deal specifically with the questions of which language must be used and in which percentage ("Zakony"). Both place an emphasis on Ukrainian as the state language, while allowing the use of minority languages where a large population using it resides. This neutral approach to language is common in Ukraine.

| 45 Such a noncommittal approach finds its most common incarnation in a phenomenon

known as nonreciprocal bilingualism, which can be defined as involving "each interlocutor

speaking his or her preferred language and not accommodating to others, sometimes resulting

in conversations being carried on in two languages" (Bilaniuk 22). This approach is most evident

in Kyiv (Bilaniuk 176; Masenko, UMOVNA, 47), where citizens are more likely to be shocked by

someone insisting they speak the other's language, than by the language choice itself. According to Bilaniuk, this phenomenon has a number of positive outcomes. First of all, it allows for purity of individual languages within a bilingual conversation, which post-independence citizens often strive for (Bilaniuk 175). In addition, since knowledge of both Ukrainian and Russian is required of those involved, and either one can be the active one, the languages are brought to an almost equal level (Bilaniuk 175). This act of equalization, in addition to relaxing linguistic tensions, aids

in depoliticizing the language situation (Bilaniuk 22). This exists in addition to a standard

bilingual situation, in which language switching is not an issue for those who understand both

Ukrainian and Russian (Masenko, "Movna," 125). Nonreciprocal bilingualism, however, can be seen one of three ways: as strengthening the hold Russian language has in Ukraine; as creating a situation of permanent and noncommittal bilingualism; or as a stepping stone to

monolingualism.

Another important angle of the language debate in Ukraine involves the mixing of the

languages themselves, resulting in a range of sociolects known as surzhyk. As with nonreciprocal

bilingualism, there is debate as to its role in Ukrainian society. Some see it as a symbol of impurity, while others see it as an improvement for previously monolingual Russian speakers

| 46 incorporating progressively more Ukrainian into their daily language. Although the prevalent view of surzhyk is one of a second-rate language, it is precisely this low-class characteristic which makes it more readily accessible to a larger number of people and therefore a popular sociolect.

Likewise, popular culture is a non-elitist form of entertainment which allows for wide dissemination. Mandatory education expands the reach of a language, but pop culture is more likely to bring that language into voluntary daily use, subsequently allowing for its natural development. Until recently, Ukrainian-language pop culture - music, novels, movies - was rare and more often than not lagging far behind in the popularity of Russian-language pop culture, both from Russia and Ukraine. As Ukrainian pop culture develops, it allows the language to be seen as belonging to the people and not simply to the elite or intelligentsia (Masenko, UMOVNA,

83).

A number of diverse solutions have been proffered to rectify Ukraine's linguistic situation, often based around the East-West axis. There are those who would have the language step back in time to undo the forced Russification of the Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union.

Others insist on using current Ukrainian with all its foreign influences as the basis for all future linguistic development. Some point to Ukraine and Russia's common ethnic and linguistic roots when searching for future directions, while others see the West as the path to modernity and prosperity. Whether Ukraine's future will determine it as a monolingual Ukrainian nation state or a multicultural European country will depend on the policies its government follows in a number of spheres (Besters-Dilger 274-275).

I 47 IDENTITY THROUGH TRANSLATION

One such modern sphere of influence, as mentioned above, is popular culture, within which movies play an important role. Following independence, Ukraine's markets were opened up to the West and to the phenomenon of globalization, producing an influx of foreign movies. These movies conveyed ideas and attitudes from their countries of origin, sowing them wherever the movies were shown. What made these films and their ideas accessible, however, was translation.

Language is a key element in the act of translation, but translation is also crucial to language, and in turn, to identity. International languages reach new audiences through translation, while less widespread languages are given more use and more weight as they become the result of translation. Annie Brisset, in her article "The Search for a Native Language:

Translation and Cultural Identity," outlines a number of functions of translation which impact a nation's identity. Although she bases her theory on the linguistic situation in Quebec, it is similarly applicable in Ukraine. Quebec, a province in officially bilingual Canada, speaks French, a language which must always be on guard against the onslaught of English. Ukraine, a functionally bilingual country, is trying to protect Ukrainian against the onslaught of Russian. The following three of Brisset's major functions of translation are aids in the fight against the encroaching languages: linguistic unification, re-territorialization and legitimacy.

Linguistic unification can also be called standardization or normalization. It is the creation, establishment or promotion of one single linguistic variant for the entire territory of a nation, creating a sense of common identity. Translation is one of the vehicles of linguistic

| 48 unification because it is the prism through which a nation sees the external world (Ukrainian as target language), and in turn, through which the world sees the nation (Ukrainian as source

language). Movie translation is a particularly good example of this, since foreign films are usually translated and distributed individually for each country. This creates a situation whereby all citizens have access to the same translation and the same language.

The second function Brisset mentions is linguistic re-territorialization, or the reclamation of linguistic territory. She refers to Henri Gobard's four types of language: vernacular, spoken at the local and familiar level; vehicular, spoken at the national or regional level and learned out of

necessity; referential, used in works of culture and tradition; and mythical, used for sacred works (Brisset 339).

Applying this analysis to the present situation in Ukraine, the role of vernacular

language is carried out by village Ukrainian, surzhyk and Russian. Any variation or combination of these is used in family homes and amongst friends. The vehicular language for a large part of

Ukraine remains Russian. Although civil servants are required to perform their functions in

Ukrainian, the majority of other businesses have no such restrictions. Russian and its variations

remain the language of choice in most city centres. The referential capacity is fulfilled mainly by

Ukrainian. Although many Russian plays are staged in Ukraine, those associated with the

Ukrainian tradition and culture are mostly written in Ukrainian. The mythical language can be

identified as Old Church Slavonic, still used in many church services and the source of both

Ukrainian and Russian.

| 49 The goal of linguistic re-territorialization would be to replace Russian with Ukrainian as the main vernacular, vehicular and referential languages in order to reclaim and re-centre

national identity. This does not, however, mean expelling Russian from Ukrainian lands; it is a

matter of re-prioritizing the languages in a way that focuses on a future as an independent

country. By reclaiming the Ukrainian language and ensuring that some form or dialect of it is the

main carrier of the three oft-used categories, the people would claim the territory and therefore the language as truly their own. The translation of movies is one method in which Ukrainian can

be expanded to take on a larger vernacular and vehicular role.

The third and perhaps most important function mentioned is linguistic legitimacy. As

mentioned earlier, Soviet linguistic policy had as its aim to emphasize the common roots of

Ukrainian and Russian and to bring the former closer in line with the latter through the internal

manipulation of grammar, syntax, morphology and phonetics. Not only was the development of the Ukrainian language artificial through this period, its use was also limited to very specific situations, further stunting its development. Over time, this resulted in a certain portion of the

Soviet population doubting the legitimacy of Ukrainian, seeing it as merely an offshoot of

Russian, not worthy of the title of language. This in turn led to a general linguistic inferiority complex in Ukraine, whereby any comparison was bound to favour Russian (Kravtsiv). In recent years, this complex has gradually become less evident as a superiority complex has come into

play, with Ukrainian being a sign of culture and enlightenment (Shumlians'kyi 47), and it is

important that this process continue.

| 50 In order for Ukrainian to come as close to ridding itself of the inferiority complex as possible, it must prove that the language is indeed "living," used outside of formal and literary situations. Proof of an active and organically developing language can be established by creating original pop culture in Ukrainian, but also through pop culture translation (Masenko, UMOVNA,

27). This legitimization works not only because it makes use of Ukrainian for popular culture such as romance novels, action movies and rap music, but also because it shows that the outside world does not have to be viewed through the prism of Russian translation and attitudes, but can be seen through a uniquely Ukrainian lens.

Movie translation can achieve linguistic unification through the expansion of a standard language variant throughout the entire country, at the same time showcasing regional variations on the national level. This brings exposure to the language, the first step necessary to increasing its use, in turn increasing its significance as both a vernacular and a vehicular language.

Simultaneous to this linguistic re-territorialization and unification, movie translations legitimize the language by the very fact of being a target language. Thus movie translations have the potential to play an important role in Ukraine, re-centering Ukrainian as the main language, thereby readjusting its national identity to once again include a more prominent linguistic element.

I 51 Chapter 4 - Language and National Identity

In order to better understand the role that language plays within a country such as Ukraine, I will briefly look at the concepts of nation, nationalism and national identity, as well as the significance of a common language in the creation of a national identity. Understanding the relevance of language within the context of the nation will in turn highlight the important role that movie translations can play in creating a strong national identity and in strengthening the national language.

I " DEFINING A NATION

According to Anthony Smith, a nation is a "named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members" (Smith 14). The elements he presents can be grouped into two categories, those dealing with the past and common group origins (historic territory, common myths and historical memories), and those dealing with ensuring a peaceful and prosperous present (a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties).

Smith goes on to describe two different types of nation - the civic and the ethnic (Smith

9-12). The civic nation gives priority to those elements dealing with the present and focusing on the economy and laws, while the ethnic nation emphasizes its members' common roots. The term nation-state describes the situation in which the two types overlap, and the ethnic and

political boundaries match (Joseph 92). Just as such a perfect overlap rarely happens, neither

are nations exclusively civic nor ethnic. The two types are always combined to varying degrees

(Oakes and Warren 14). Although many factors influence a nation's position on the ethnic-civic continuum, one important element is its stability and trust vis-a-vis outside forces. A nation which feels threatened, whether by a large influx of immigrants such as in France, or by an

imperial or colonial power, is more likely to emphasize an ethnic conceptualization of the nation

(Joseph 92), excluding those outsiders who are causing internal uncertainty and creating a tighter inner circle. Periods of tolerance and stability, on the other hand, result in a nation which gives priority to civic ties. DEFINING NATIONAL IDENTITY

Having defined a nation in terms of both a common past and a desire for a common future, it is logical to next look at national identity. What are the most important elements to consider when defining a national identity - in other words, the group identity of a nation? A national identity exists as a consequence of the nation's existence, all the while helping to forge an even stronger nation. It is the sense of belonging that citizens feel in regards to their nation; it is partly intangible, and partly composed of concrete elements.

Although a nation and national identity are both largely defined by objective characteristics, the importance of subjective elements within this definition should not be underestimated. Oakes and Warren list language, religion, customs, territory and institutions as examples of objective characteristics, and attitudes, sentiments and perceptions as examples of subjective characteristics (13). To this, Joseph adds that a national identity "is focused on political borders and autonomy, often justified by arguments centred on shared cultural heritage, but where the ethnic element is inevitably multiple" (163). In other words, unlike ethnic identity which emphasizes common origins over political autonomy, national identity uses a cultural heritage, often composed of numerous ethnicities, to support its claim for political autonomy. A modern national identity, therefore, necessarily combines both the civic and ethnic aspects of the nation to produce an identity unique to that nation. Nevertheless, where Joseph emphasizes multiple ethnic elements, Oakes establishes that a national identity is usually based on the identity of the dominant ethnic core of a country (79).

I 54 Focusing on ethnicity within national identity, it is easy to confuse the latter with ethnic identity. In order to clarify the possible associations of the two identities, Hettne, Sorlin and

0stergard present the following categories (qtd. in Oakes 11), wherein:

a. ethnic identity is a subcategory of national identity;

b. ethnic identity is a historical predecessor, the raw material used to forge national

identity of modern times;

c. ethnic identity is a competing identity to national (or rather state) identity;

d. ethnic identity is a supercategory of national identity, so that national identity is a

specific type of ethnic identity.

Of these four possibilities, the prevalent view of the government in Ukraine is in line with the second category (b) (Hrycak 78).

To summarize, a national identity can be broadly defined as a sense of belonging to one's nation combined with certain tangible characteristics which unite the population. An important feature identified by Joseph is memory, crucial in creating and maintaining the traditions which themselves are of utmost importance to national identity (35). Ernest Gellner takes the idea of memory one step further, stating that national identity is not only based on shared memories, but also on a shared forgetting of the differences which exist between members of the nation (qtd. in Joseph 114).

Another important aspect which falls in between the tangible and the intangible in terms of creating a national identity is the concept of the Other (Oakes 33). In order to create a group identity - in this case a national identity - there must be a group from which to distinguish. As established in an earlier part of this chapter, the Other often presents a threat to the nation,

| 55 either internally, such as immigrants, or externally, such as colonial or imperial powers or ideological opposites (Oakes 34).

Therefore, national identity is a product of features including, but not limited to, common language, religion, customs, territory and institutions layered with prevalent attitudes, sentiments and perceptions. These features are a product of a common memory in the face of a common Other. It is important, however, not to neglect the significance of language.

LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY

Language is one of the key elements of nation and national identity creation. As Joseph states, it doesn't matter which or how many ethnicities constitute the nation, the nation is defined by the language it speaks as a unit (98). Both nations such as France or Germany, whose national identity is based on its autochthonous population, and those such as Canada or Australia, whose national identity is based on early immigrant ethnicities, use language to unite its citizens.

Besides this communicative role, necessary for the citizens of a nation to successfully interact and therefore to function, language also has a strong symbolic role.

The first major role of language is communication. The citizens of a nation need a common language in order to communicate and therefore to function (Edwards 17). Any language can in theory fulfill this role, as long as it is understood and used by the vast majority of the population. Therefore, English serves as the lingua franca in most of Canada, not because it is the mother tongue of any significant portion of its citizens, although historically speaking

| 56 this was true, but because it is the language to which so many of them revert in public.

Language, therefore, provides a nation with the power to communicate.

Language has another important function, that of symbolism (Edwards 17). If language was limited to its communicative role, countries would have no issue with language shifts. As it is, when a different language is proposed for a nation, some resistance is expected, precisely because that language has a symbolic power tied to the ethnic roots of the population.

Language represents a nation outwardly and is therefore seen as a key element in its identity.

Likewise, it represents the culture and tradition of a nation. Therefore, when the choice to use a symbolically strong language is taken away, it often seems that part of the nation's identity is being erased. Logically then, a strong nation is rooted in a strong national identity, in itself rooted in a language charged with both the symbolic and communicative functions.

Having already established that language is a unifying force for both ethnic and civic nations, the next step is to see how exactly it can be used to achieve this unification. As mentioned, the strongest national identity is one based on both the communicative and the symbolic functions of language. A language which unifies based only on its communicative role is one of convenience and risks being switched for another language precisely because it has no symbolic function. On the other hand, a strictly symbolic language will never reach its full potential because it is only by being used as a means of communication that it can be in touch with a maximum number of speakers. The questions then are, how does one choose a language, and how does one go about ensuring that both these functions are fulfilled by the chosen language?

I 57 The answer to these questions is a process called language planning. Although language

planning has a bad reputation thanks to Stalin and his New Economic Policy, among others, it is a practice that is not uncommon (Edwards 89). According to Einar Haugen, language planning consists of four stages: norm selection, norm codification, functional implementation, and functional elaboration (qtd. in Edwards 88). Whereas codification or standardization, and elaboration or keeping the language up to date, are linguistic processes known as corpus

planning, the selection of a norm and its implementation or diffusion are social processes known as status planning (Edwards 88; Oakes 51). Language planning is often used in reviving languages close to death, establishing a lingua franca, or to introduce linguistic diversity (Edwards 89).

Although governments tend to want to please all of their citizens, Haugen insists that

language planning is one aspect of its rule that cannot be politically neutral (qtd. in Edwards 89).

On the other hand, language planning should not be thought up on the government's whim, instead focusing on representing the needs of the nation's citizens (Edwards 90). This comes into play both in the choice of a norm - choosing the language which applies to the majority of the population - and its implementation - ensuring that human rights and minority rights are respected.

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND LANGUAGE IN UKRAINE

How then do these elements - nation, national identity, language and language planning - play out in Ukraine? Has Ukraine after independence followed an ethnic or civic nation model? What

| 58 are some of the key elements of national identity in Ukraine? How do the Ukrainian and Russian languages interact, and are the communicative and symbolic functions carried by both languages? Finally, how is a renewed and increased use of the Ukrainian language being promoted by the state's government?

Alexandra Hrycak explains that "Ukrainian state builders have adopted a model of nationhood that grounds national identity in an ancestral language and homeland" (78); in other words, an ethnic model of the nation is being implemented. Although this model has detractors in Ukraine, among them the Communists and their allies, those positioned on the political right see the ethnic Ukrainian element as the key to a united nation (Shevel 221). Those who support the ethnic conception of Ukraine are also those who view Russia as an outsider and a threat

(Joseph 92), while Communists and their allies tend to see Russia as a big brother and therefore not an external threat against which ethnic unity is necessary. The added complication in the

Ukrainian situation is that the past 300 years of history have seen Ukraine dominated by foreign countries, most often Russia. This occupation, combined with the displacement of various nationalities throughout the Soviet Union, has resulted in a population composed of 77.8% ethnic Ukrainians and 22.2% other nationalities, most of whom are Russian. The worry is that in an ethnic model nation, non-titular ethnic groups will be subject to discrimination. Ukraine has taken steps to ensure this does not happen, as seen in article 10 of its Constitution: "In Ukraine, the free development, use and protection of Russian, and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed." In most cases, various state laws adhere to this principle, although the increased promotion of Ukrainian and decreased reliance on Russian leads some to worry

I 59 that Russian and other languages will in fact be banned. This is not, however, the goal of an

ethnic model nation, and there is no concrete indication of this in the laws of Ukraine. Instead,

leaders are striving for a country united around a common language and culture, but accepting

of all ethnicities (see Ukraine's refugee policy, Shevel 223).

How, then, do the citizens see their adherence to this ethnic nation? What are the elements which create a sense of belonging amongst Ukraine's population? We recall that

language has both a communicative and a symbolic function, and that both are essential for a strong language. According to Larysa Masenko, the Ukrainian language is fully functional in

Western Ukraine since Russification only began with its inclusion into the USSR in 1939

("Movna," 97). Eastern Ukraine, on the other hand, is much more reliant on Russian and surzhyk, a mix of the two languages, though Ukrainian is still present. To see to what extent

Ukrainian is being used not only in its symbolic but also its communicative functions, I will refer to a couple of sources. These are the Ukrainian government's 2001 census, as well as a survey conducted by the Centre for Sociological Research "Hromadska Dumka" in 2006 within the framework of the "Language Policy in Ukraine: Anthropological, Linguistic and Further

Perspectives" project as part of the International Association for the promotion of co-operation with scientists from the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union program.

According to the 2001 census, Ukraine has a population of 48,457,000 (STATE STAT.

COMM.). Of that number, 77.8% consider their nationality (as distinguishable from citizenship) to be Ukrainian, 17.3% Russian, with the remaining population composed of various nationalities.

As part of the census, a number of questions were posed to the different nationalities

| 60 concerning their mother tongue. Of the 37,541,700 Ukrainians, 85.2% stated Ukrainian to be their mother tongue, and 14.8% Russian. Out of 8,334,100 Russians, 95.9% specified Russian as their mother tongue, 3.9% Ukrainian, and 0.2% another language. There are two important conclusions that can be drawn from these numbers. First of all, the overwhelming majority of each of these two nationalities consider the language of their nationality to be their mother tongue. Second, out of the nearly 46 million Ukrainians and Russians living in Ukraine, over 32 million consider Ukrainian to be their mother tongue, and only 13.5 million see Russian as their mother tongue. Taking into account the over 300 years of Russian dominance, we can say that this is a relatively small number.

The Hromadska Dumka survey delves deeper into the issue of language use in Ukraine, once again focusing on Ukrainian as the state language and Russian as the largest minority language. When asked whether Ukrainian should be used to a larger or smaller extent than it is currently, 25.3% of respondents thought that its use should be expanded, 27.3% thought its use should be decreased, and 42.2% thought its current use perfectly adequate (Besters-Dilger 345).

When asked the same question about the Russian language, 39.7% agreed that its use should increase, 16.2% thought its use should decrease, and 38.9% felt its current use perfectly adequate. In both cases, a sufficiently large proportion of respondents were satisfied with the extent to which these languages are used.

A number of survey questions looked at issues pertaining to appropriate or necessary uses of Ukrainian and Russian. Both languages are considered prestigious or somewhat prestigious by over fifty percent of respondents in categories including government use,

I 61 education, business, services and interactions with strangers (Besters-Dilger 345-346). Ukrainian was considered prestigious or somewhat prestigious by more respondents than Russian in the government and education, while Russian edged out Ukrainian in the services industry, interactions with strangers, and business. Whereas education and government are spheres in which language use is more easily dictated, the other three categories allow for more freedom of choice or simply the maintenance of the status quo. From these questions, it would seem that although Ukrainian is not by any means shut out (over fifty percent considered Ukrainian to be prestigious in all categories), Russian does have a more prominent communicative function.

The survey asked whether certain spheres in Ukraine were predisposed to being

Ukrainophone or Russophone. Slightly more than fifty percent saw the media sector as being equally bilingual, with a further 18.3% seeing language use tipping in favour of Russian, while

26.5% said it tipped in favour of Ukrainian. When the same question was asked in terms of local media, percentages were more evenly distributed, with those considering their local media bilingual at 36%, those considering it more Ukrainophone at 35.3%, and those considering it more Russophone at 25.8%. The media therefore is seen as slightly more Ukrainian language oriented.

Finally, respondents were asked what language they used in various circumstances they may encounter on a daily basis (Besters-Dilger 355-356). In the majority of categories, including those such as conversations with strangers and salespeople, academic literature, festivities, reading fiction, counting, and swearing, Russian dominated as the language of choice. In a number of categories, including higher education, conversations with friends and family, and

| 62 interactions with government officials and the elderly, use of Ukrainian and Russian were equal or nearly equal. In categories such as television shows and the language of (future) children and their education, those who used both languages equally were more numerous than those who chose either Ukrainian or Russian. Finally, in categories such as grandparents' conversations

between themselves and conversations with Ukrainophones, Ukrainian was slightly more dominant than Russian. From these survey questions, we see that although Ukrainian is in no way absent from the majority of spheres, it is often dominated by Russian. Both languages are communicatively functional.

Supporting these findings were comments made by community activists and movie industry insiders as part of interviews I conducted. Each interviewee was asked how they perceived the Ukrainian identity. Out of twelve interviews where the question was asked, seven made statements indicating their belief that the Ukrainian national identity is based around ethnicity, while three supported the civic model of national identity for Ukraine, with the desire to live together being stronger than any specific ethnicity. Again, of those twelve interviews, six said that language was a key element in determining national identity; two said language was a political and not national issue; two stated that language was an issue in national identity, though not key; and two did not mention language at all. The Hromadska Dumka survey mentioned above found that 70.1% of respondents wholly or partially supported the view that the Ukrainian language is a symbol of Ukrainian nationalism (Besters-Dilger 346).

Besides the importance of language, ethnicity and culture, interviewees spoke of the necessity of respect towards all languages - Ukrainian, Russian and other - regardless of

| 63 whether they speak it or not. One interviewee identified the Other as a reason for internal unity, stating "We're not Russians." Although numerous other elements were mentioned, self- awareness, along with language, ethnicity and culture, was considered to be crucial parts of national identity.

Having established that Ukrainian is still dominated by Russian in certain spheres of use, it is important to note that since independence, the various governments have followed mostly re-Ukrainizing linguistic policies. This means that the Ukrainian language is being reintroduced into Ukrainian society. When considering the sphere of use of both Russian and Ukrainian and the competition between the two, it is important to remember that in this post-communist context where Russian continues to assert its place in a society it once dominated, it is impossible for Ukrainian to expand its functionality on the entire territory without encroaching on parts of Ukraine that tend to be predominantly Russian-speaking (Masenko, "Movna," 117).

A Ukrainizing policy is one that takes a stand and pledges to lessen the influence of Russian products while supporting and protecting domestic products and services (Besters-Dilger 250).

One of the most important ways this is happening is through the educational system, though other areas of change include the government, the railway system, advertisements, television and radio media.

The linguistic policy for education is based on the 1989 language law, which stated that the education of a child should be in his or her native language, although it also gave parents the right to choose the language of instruction (Hrycak 64). This was gradually reinterpreted to focus on children being taught in the language of their ancestry, resulting in many Russophone

| 64 Ukrainians receiving their education in Ukrainian (Hrycak 64). One reason Hrycak cites for the lack of protest from parents is that although they speak Russian, they still consider Ukrainian to be their native language, and believe, as shown in the aforementioned survey, that their children should speak both languages (78).

In terms of the government, the president is required to have "command of the state language" (Constitution, article 103) while government officials are encouraged to use Ukrainian in all correspondence, though making concessions to those whose native language is Russian or another minority language. The above-mentioned survey indicates that over fifty percent of respondents agreed that government officials should have to pass a test to ensure their

Ukrainian is adequate (Besters-Dilger 353). In 2003, the wording of article 6 of the Advertising

Act was changed to require all advertisements in Ukraine to be produced in Ukrainian ("Law

'Regarding advertisements'"). Likewise, the law on TV and radio programming states in article

10 that programs are to be conducted in Ukrainian, except in regions where a compact minority population resides, in which case the language of that minority group can be used ("Law

'Regarding television'"). As regards national television and radio programs, 75% must be in the state language. The other sphere mentioned was that of the national railway system. In

February 2008, Ukrzaliznytsia, the Ukrainian railway system, announced they would be ensuring that Ukrainian was being used in all areas, including information announcements, meetings and training seminars, in addition to Ukrainian language courses specifically tailored to the railway environment ("Ukrzaliznytsia"). One of the most recent examples of Ukrainization pertains to

| 65 the obligatory translation into Ukrainian of all foreign movies, as will be discussed in a later chapter.

Out of two possible paths, therefore, the Ukrainian government has followed the one based on a common ethnicity and a common language to create its linguistic policy, in turn influencing its national identity. Although during Viktor Yushchenko's presidency, the official position has varied with each of the three prime ministers who have accompanied him (Besters-

Dolger 236), the overall approach has been one of Ukrainization, with less emphasis on multilingualism. Whether such overt implementation strategies will be successful remains to be seen, though some argue that incentives rather than laws would produce better results

(Besters-Dilger 276). A further analysis of the Ukrainization policy will be conducted on the Law on Cinematography and its implementation in chapters six and seven. Chapter 5 - Cinema in Ukraine

"Cinema exists in Ukraine!" proclaims the Ukrainian Panorama 2008-2009 description on the

Molodist Kyiv International Film Festival website (Ukrainian version, my translation). And the very fact that this has to be announced for Ukrainians themselves to read is indicative of the lack of presence that Ukrainian films have on their domestic market. While the movie industry has existed in Ukraine since the end of the nineteenth century, it has not always been vibrant. It has had periods of dynamic development and periods of stagnation. It has been a platform for both the people and for the ideology of the state. And although it will likely never reach the proportions of Hollywood, the movie industry is still significant in the story of Ukraine, its people, its culture and its language. CINEMA BEFORE INDEPENDENCE

Movies became a part of the Ukrainian cultural landscape in September 1896, when the first film was shot on Ukrainian territory in Kharkiv, and screened a couple of months later

(Trymbach). The industry continued to develop, first with movies shown in "portable" movie theatres, and then in regular movie theatres starting in the early 1900s. During this period, a number of films were made by Russians based on Ukrainian literature and history. In the years following the 1917 Russian Revolution, political instability led to the destruction of many of these films and a dramatic drop in audience numbers (Hosejko 15). During Ukraine's brief independence in 1918-1919, Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky decreed the Ukrainization of the national cinema, an endeavour all too swiftly stopped with the arrival in power of the Bolsheviks

(Hosejko 15-16). Nevertheless, Ukrainian film production began in earnest in the 1920s with the creation of the All-Ukrainian Photo and Cinema Administration, or VUFKU (Trymbach).

The first round of art house films, starting in the 1920s, centred on the theme of the individual who was called upon to bring about changes to the national landscape (Trymbach).

This adhered to Bolshevik ideology, and was therefore encouraged in film, as well as in other forms of art. One of the greatest film directors from Ukraine, Alexander Dovzhenko, began his work during this period. His films, in particular the trilogy ZVENYHORA, ARSENAL and EARTH, were considered to be the starting point of a nationally conscious Ukrainian cinema (Koshelivets,

"Dovzhenko," 751). His 1930 film EARTH looked at collectivization in Ukraine, and was therefore seen as being against the Bolshevik ideology. Consequently, he was criticized by the regime, and forced to move to Moscow to continue his work under Joseph Stalin's supervision (Trymbach).

During the late 1920s and early 1930s, as indigenization or korenizatsiya was taking

place throughout the Soviet Union, filmmakers in Ukraine were able to return to Ukrainian

literature as a source for films. At this time, the work of Taras Shevchenko and Nikolai Gogol (a

Ukrainian known for his Russian-language but Ukrainian-themed literature), along with

Ukrainian operas, found their way onto the big screen in Ukraine. But as the thirties drew to a close and korenizatsiya was replaced with Russification, films were put to use supporting the ideology of the Soviet Union; after all, Lenin considered film the most important art for the communists (Slater, "Introduction," xi). Movies made specifically for propaganda were known as og/'t-films and were shown in mobile movie theatres known as og/'t-trains which traveled to the various cities and villages to spread their message to as much of the population as possible

(Hosejko 18; Slater, "Soviet Union," 3). This was a time when even non-documentary filmmakers were forced to work within the ideological framework set out for them.

As the Soviet era wore on, themes in Ukrainian film production mirrored the attitudes of the contemporary regime, with the production and demonstration of films constantly controlled and financially supported by the government (Bryukhovetska 28). Russian directors were encouraged to film their Russian-themed movies in Ukraine, while Ukrainian-themed movies were not given any official support (Bryukhovetska 28). After Stalin's death in 1953,

Khrushchev's thaw was felt in the film industry, with a return to the national themes of the thirties (Trymbach). This relaxation of policies also cleared the way for a younger generation of filmmakers such as the Armenian Sergei Parajanov, who in 1964 released the Ukrainian classic,

SHADOWS OF FORGOTTEN ANCESTORS (Trymbach). A policy of Russification once more intensified in the early seventies and continued into the last years of the Soviet Union (Bryukhovetska 28).

During Gorbachev's reign of glasnost and perestroika, documentary films which did not necessarily adhere to the regime's thinking finally appeared on the scene, tackling important subjects such as the Chernobyl nuclear explosion.

While Ukraine's Russified film industry did not always have freedom in the themes and ideas it presented, it was not lacking in numbers. According to Bryukhovetska, 18 big screen features were produced yearly in the Ukrainian SSR, along with 45 television movies, over 500 documentary and educational videos, and 12 animated films (Bryukhovetska 34). Ukraine's film industry was active, and the public was interested in seeing the products. The cinematic industry developed to such an extent that according to the State Statistics Committee, in 1990 there were 552 million movie theatre visits in Ukraine. This all changed with the arrival of independence.

INDEPENDENCE AND REALITY

When Ukraine achieved independence in 1991, its people were exposed to globalization and economic freedom. While both are positive notions for a country, the sudden realization that the state would no longer control and provide everything was difficult for people to come to terms with. On a backdrop of freedom and globalization, two important changes occurred in the

| 70 film industry. First of all, the state no longer controlled the industry, leaving more room for

Ukrainian themes. This loss of state control meant that the industry also lost valuable state funding. Both of these elements had serious consequences for the Ukrainian post-independence film trade.

Although independence brought with it increased tolerance and support of the

Ukrainian language, this did not mean that the entire industry immediately switched to their titular language to the thunderous applause of audiences nationwide. On the contrary, many filmmakers resisted, citing comfort and the possibility of Russian becoming a second official language (Bryukhovetska 29). As time went on and the government did not provide incentive for producing movies in Ukrainian, filmmakers continued to produce their movies, often with

Ukrainian themes, but in Russian. Likewise, Russian dominated the soundtracks of foreign films, since these translations were cheaper to buy than the original American, French or other movies, and no additional money needed to be spent on further translation because everyone understood the language. In January of 2008, therefore, when a law originally drawn up in 1998 requiring foreign movies to be shown in Ukrainian was finally enforced, distributors protested, seeing it as an imposition of unnecessary additional costs which would cut into their profit margin. But regardless of the language in which movies were produced after independence, the topics they tackled were very important to the Ukrainian identity. These included events such as

Chernobyl and the man-made famine, or Holodomor, of 1932-1933.

The second issue was the loss of government funding. The state's decision to allow the film industry to develop freely meant that there was almost no financial support coming from

| 71 the government. When government funding ceased, some private investments took over. Most

businessmen, however, did not see a profitable industry and left it to fend for itself

(Bryukhovetska 20). This domestic drought was coupled with a lack of foreign films being shown

in Ukraine. On the one hand, the Russian industry was itself in a state of limbo after the collapse

of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Ukrainian copyright laws were not up to par, resulting in

the reluctance of Hollywood majors to show their films in Ukraine. It was not until 1995 that the

Hollywood embargo was lifted, and American films began to flood movie screens (Horbyk). In

addition, television and home video gained popularity at this time. Consequently, audiences

stayed home, and movie theatres began to shut down (Trymbach; Bryukhovetska 16). Whereas

in 1990, there were 552 million movie theatre visits in Ukraine, by 1996 this number was down

to a mere 14 million visits, and by 1998 it had dropped to a low of 5 million visits. In the

following decade, visits climbed to 18 million in 2007, only to drop again to 11 million in 2008,

according to the State Statistics Committee.

These factors - lack of state funding, expensive domestic films, and television popularity

- meant that the Ukrainian film industry at the beginning of the twenty-first century was

dominated by foreign product, particularly Russian and American. Nevertheless, it would be

wrong to say that in 2009 the Ukrainian domestic film industry is dead. While Ukrainian films for the masses are almost nonexistent, a number of movies are made each year, mostly art house films.

| 72 THE DOMESTIC FILM INDUSTRY

There are presently two main film studios-the National Dovzhenko Feature Film Studio in Kyiv,

and the Odessa Film Studio in Odessa - as well as a number of smaller studios (Trymbach).

Numerous film festivals have emerged over the last few years or made their mark on the circuit,

among them: the Molodist Kyiv International Film Festival, in its 39th year, and truly

international since 1993; the Krok Kyiv International Animated Film Festival; and the Kontakt

Kyiv International Documentary Film Festival. Ukraine has approximately 300 movie screens,

with apparent plans to increase to 1500 screens (Koziuba).

The Ukrainian Association of Cinematography lists that the Government of Ukraine

earmarked 5 million hryvni, or 500,000 Euros, for film production in 2009. In comparison,

France's film budget for the year stands at 535 million Euros, Russia's is 283 million Euros, and

Poland's is 45 million Euros ("Byudzhety"). The 2009 budget is itself ten times less than

Ukraine's 2008 budget, which was barely enough to produce forty films, only ten of which were feature length and found their way onto the big screen (Koziuba). The Ukrainian government

has, however, promised the film industry an additional 50 million hryvni for 2009, though it is doubtful this money will ever appear (Koziuba).

Ukraine therefore finds itself at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century with a weakened domestic film industry. The absence of state funds, coupled with movie theatre closures and the popularity of television and home video, provide Ukraine's film industry with a bleak outlook. There are, however, things that can be done to improve this. The first is soliciting private investments to supplement government funding. In addition, the 1998

| 73 Law on Cinematography, whose article on movie translations is the focus of this thesis, also has as its goal to aid in the development of the national consciousness and patriotic feelings ("Law

'Regarding cinematography'"). With this in mind, suggestions have been made to set up a fund which collects a certain percentage of box office intake and is used to supplement domestic film budgets (Koziuba). As the domestic film industry grows stronger, it will create a more significant local Ukrainian film tradition. A healthy domestic industry coupled with movies translated into

Ukrainian are elements that are sure to bolster Ukrainian pop culture.

Chapter 6 - Present Situation and Recent Developments

Although Ukraine's domestic film industry is slowly developing with some support from the government, the reality of world cinema means that the majority of films being shown are imported. Ukraine, like many countries, shows a large number of Hollywood movies, though there are almost equally large numbers of Russian films in theatres. This reliance on foreign film has led to a film industry largely dependent on translations. As a state in post-communist

transition, Ukraine has started to shift from Russian to Ukrainian as the lingua franca of the

movie industry, visibly supporting a language policy of Ukrainization. As with any policy,

Ukrainization has its supporters and its detractors, as does the government's method for

implementing this policy within the film industry. In order to fully grasp the situation and to

understand its possible implications within Ukrainian society at large, I will begin by presenting

relevant legislation introduced after independence. I will then explain the choice of dubbing and

subtitling. Finally, I will look at the reality of the present situation, including the state of affairs, the reach of translations and the presentation of key players. I will leave reactions to the most

recent legislation for the next chapter.

While translation into Russian, namely in the form of voice-overs, was present in the

Soviet Union, towards the end of the 1980s there was a late-Soviet attempt at producing

Ukrainian-language movie translations in Ukraine. This endeavour was, however, short-lived due to lack of funding, with only ten movies dubbed by 1992 (Bryukhovetska 31; Abakumova 3). As

Ukraine moved into a new era of independence, its Law on Cinematography spoke of the creation of a Ukrainian film industry, but remained silent on the issue of language. As such, distribution companies, in charge of acquiring the rights to films and distributing the products to various movie theatres, took the path of greatest profit. Trying to maximize their low profit margin, they began buying American movies dubbed into Russian on the secondary market

(Bryukhovetska 16). Their costs were reduced thanks to Soviet legacy, whereby the vast majority of Ukrainian citizens understood and most likely spoke Russian. This meant that further

I 75 translation was not needed and movies could be shown as bought without further expense.

From the point of view of distribution companies, this made perfect sense. Citizens, however, were not so unanimously accepting. Although everyone understood Russian and many accepted the status quo, others lamented the fact that they could not watch movies in their own mother tongue, the titular language of Ukraine (personal communication).

THE LAW ON CINEMATOGRAPHY

In 1998, the movie situation was on the verge of change. A new Law on Cinematography was drafted and on January 13,1998, it was signed by President Leonid Kuchma. This new law laid out various elements of the industry, including its goals, archiving, the production of films, state support and quotas of airtime. Most importantly for this paper, article 14, entitled "The order of diffusion and demonstration of films," stated that "[...] Before diffusion in Ukraine, foreign films must be dubbed, voiced over or subtitled, in that order, in the state language; films can also be dubbed, voiced over or subtitled in national minority languages.!...]" ("Law 'Regarding cinematography,'" my translation). This law, like many others, was disregarded by those to whom it was meant to apply, and no one in the government enforced it. In other words, the law had no impact on the actual practices of the Ukrainian film industry.

The next positive step took place on January 16, 2006, when the government, under the direction of Prime Minister Yuri Yekhanurov, accepted a resolution regarding the implementation of quotas for Ukrainian-language translations of foreign films (Besters-Dilger

261). The resolution instituted a transitional period, from September 1st 2006 to July 1st 2007, by

I 76 the end of which no less than 70% of foreign movies had to be dubbed, voiced over or subtitled into Ukrainian before being shown in theatres or sold on video/DVD. It also stated that the translation must be carried out on the language of the original. With Viktor Yanukovych as Prime

Minister and Dmytro Tabachnyk as vice premier for humanitarian issues, this resolution was overturned by the Kyiv Court of Appeal in October 2006 following protests by movie distributors who feared the language switch would diminish audience numbers and therefore their box office gross (Besters-Dilger 261). What appeared to be a failure for those supporting Ukrainian- language dubbing turned out to be a positive step. In overturning the resolution, the Court of

Appeal in fact bound movie distributors to releasing all films in their Ukrainian translation by bringing attention to the 1998 law.

Besides replacing quotas with a full commitment to Ukrainian translation, this resolution also got people talking. Articles appeared on the Internet, on sites such as Dzerkalo Tyzhnia

(http://www.dt.ua), and in print publications such as the Kyiv Post. The public voiced their opinion in the chatrooms of movie theatre websites (http://www.kinopalace.lviv.ua), community activist organizations (http://nbb.com.ua) and fan sites

(http://www.harrypotter.com.ua). In short, this became a topic of concern for many people, both those who lamented not being able to watch a movie in their mother tongue - Ukrainian - and those who feared they would no longer be able to watch movies in theirs - Russian.

In January 2007, thirteen Kyiv distributors signed a memorandum with the Ministry of

Culture and Tourism, agreeing to voluntarily increase the number of film copies produced in

Ukrainian translation: 50% of all films, and 100% of children's and animated films, by the end of

| 77 2007 (Besters-Dilger 261). This memorandum allowed for Russian movies to be shown in the original, while other foreign movies were to be translated. Certain segments of the public were not happy with the changes this implemented, leading to the boycott of theatres showing films in Ukrainian (Besters-Dilger 262).

While all this was happening, in 2006, sixty deputies had written formally to the

Constitutional Court of Ukraine, asking for an explanation of the second paragraph of article 14 of the Law on Cinematography ("Dystrybyutors'kym"). More specifically, they were interested in the first part of the sentence: "Before diffusion in Ukraine, foreign films must be dubbed, voiced over or subtitled, in that order, in the state language; films can also be dubbed, voiced over or subtitled in national minority languages [...]" ("Law 'Regarding cinematography,'" my translation, my emphasis). It took the Constitutional Court over a year to address the wording, finally producing an explanation on December 20, 2007. The Court confirmed that a foreign movie could not be shown publicly in Ukraine unless it had been dubbed, voiced over or subtitled into Ukrainian. It further specified that once a film had been translated into Ukrainian, it could also be translated into the languages of national minority groups. In other words, a

Russian film could be shown in the original language, as long as it had Ukrainian subtitles.

Likewise, a British movie, dubbed into Ukrainian, could be further subtitled into Crimean Tatar.

The mandatory element in article 14 was the translation of movies into Ukrainian, with a further optional translation into the national minority languages of Ukraine. Any film which was not dubbed, voiced over or subtitled on the language of the original would not be given government certification.

| 78 This December 2007 Constitutional Court decision was one which could not be

overturned or appealed. It took into consideration the position of the Ukrainian language as the

sole official state language in Ukraine. It explained that cinematography was one of the areas in

which the state could lawfully dictate the language to be used. Likewise, the decision addressed the issue of minority languages, explaining that by making Ukrainian translations mandatory, the government was not taking away the right to translate into other languages; it was simply

prioritizing the languages to be used.

Before the Constitutional Court made its decision public, a formal attempt was made in

November 2007 to introduce changes to the Law on Cinematography, spearheaded by Deputy

Vadym Kolesnichenko. Its main goal was to change the above quoted section to read: "Before

diffusion in Ukraine, foreign films may be dubbed, voiced over or subtitled in the state, regional

or minority language, as chosen by the distributor" (my translation, my emphasis). This request,

based on the assumption that the Law on Cinematography was creating an obstacle in the free development of minority languages in Ukraine as guaranteed by the Constitution and the

European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages, was turned down. The explanation given for the refusal was that the Charter also stated that the protection and development of minority

languages should not impede on the full functioning of official languages. According to the committee charged with examining the request, the introduction of the above mentioned changes would create a situation in which the functioning of the official language would be limited by the emphasis placed on minority languages, namely Russian.

| 79 Thus, both the committee examining the request for changes and the Constitutional

Court came to the conclusion that mandatory Ukrainian-language translation of foreign movies

did not impede the development of minority languages, but rather encouraged the

development and wider functioning of Ukrainian. As of January 2008, all distributors and movie

theatres were therefore expected to function in accordance with the Law on Cinematography.

UNDERSTANDING THE LAW ON CINEMATOGRAPHY

The Ukrainian Law on Cinematography has five terms which are crucial to its understanding:

state language, national minority languages, dubbing, voice over, and subtitling. A state

language is the one officially chosen by the state to represent it and be used by its members; in

the case of Ukraine, the Constitution defines this language as Ukrainian. A national minority is

defined in Ukraine as a "group of citizens of Ukraine who are not Ukrainian by ethnicity, and

who demonstrate a sense of national consciousness and community amongst themselves" ("Law

'Regarding national minorities,'" my translation). In more specific terms, the European Charter

of Regional and Minority Languages defines regional or minority languages as those

"traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who form a group

numerically smaller than the rest of the State's population; and different from the official

language(s) of that State" ("European Charter"). Ukraine considers its minority languages, for the purposes of the Charter, to be those of the Belarusian, Bulgarian, Crimean Tatar, Gagauz,

German, Greek, Hungarian, Jewish, Moldavian, Polish, Romanian, Russian and Slovak

communities ("List of Declarations"). In terms of cinema itself, dubbing, voicing over and subtitling are three methods of translating movies, each of which has arguments both for and against. Dubbing consists of replacing the original soundtrack of a film by another track which has the dialogue in a different language (Passek 229). It is the most expensive of the three methods and is therefore used mostly by large countries such as France and Germany (Danan 606). This approach requires not only translating the text itself, but also synchronizing the mouth movements of the original actors with the words in the new language. Each dubbing actor records his lines separately, which saves time and expenses if any section has to be re-recorded, but makes for a lengthy process in the first place. Dubbing allows for maximum exposure to the chosen language, its goal being to recreate the film's soundtrack as though it was truly being voiced by the cast of the movie in the target language. In addition, dubbing allows the viewer to consume the film in the medium in which it was originally intended, without any additional skills required.

Subtitling is cheaper than dubbing and is often used by countries with multiple languages such as Belgium and Switzerland (Danan 606). It consists of translating the text itself in compliance with time code and spacing norms, and often involves summarizing the text and possibly leaving out so-called unimportant elements. The text appears most often along the bottom of the screen, adding an extra visual feature. While it is cheaper and much less time- consuming, it requires a more active viewing on the part of the audience. Whereas those watching a dubbed movie can focus on the images while listening to the soundtrack, viewers of subtitled films must watch the images, read the subtitles, and listen to cues from the soundtrack indicating emotions which are not conveyed by the subtitles. For viewers in the habit of

I 81 watching subtitled movies, the combination of "actions" is quite natural; for those used to

dubbed movies, it can be exhausting. A strong argument for subtitles, however, is the exposure

it lends to foreign languages. Reading the subtitles in one's mother tongue or fluent language,

the viewer simultaneously hears the foreign language, making it possible to acquire that second

language more readily (Gottlieb 87).

What is known variously as voice-over or lectoring constitutes the middle ground of the

three methods, though it is not always considered a satisfactory compromise. While cheaper

than dubbing for a number of reasons-fewer actors voice the roles and synchronization of the

new language to the source mouth movements is not necessary - it does allow for exposure to

both languages. The method involves a translation of the text being read more or less in time

with a slightly muted original dialogue that can be heard in the background. In some cases, one

actor takes on the role of narrator, explaining dialogue rather than speaking in the first person

for each of the characters. Another approach consists of two actors, one male and one female,

voicing the dialogue in the first person, with each one taking on all the characters of their

gender. Either way, it can be highly disconcerting to hear two languages at once - the source

language in the background and the target language overtop of it - not to mention the lack of

emotion in the target language voices. Nevertheless, it is a practice to which people have

become accustomed, and therefore continues to be used to varying degrees in cinema and

television in a number of countries (Gottlieb 83).

Ukraine's imported cinematic landscape is dominated by dubbing, a practice it inherited from an overly nationalistic and protective Soviet Union ("Doslidzhennia"; Danan 611). Although

| 82 both subtitling and voicing over continue to exist as methods of film translation in Ukraine,

neither has become widespread on the big screen in the years since independence. Subtitling is

used primarily for Russian-language movies and television broadcasts. Its television use is seen

by many viewers as a low-quality inexpensive way of appeasing the language requirements. In

regards to Russian movies, many consider it pure nonsense to dub them into Ukrainian since the

majority of the population speaks or understands Russian. As with television, subtitling is viewed

in this case as a cost-effective way of staying within the boundaries of the law. Subtitling is also

seen on the big screen for low-budget or independent films, which are known in Ukraine as art-

house films. These movies most often do not earn enough at the box office to warrant dubbing.

Although there exist movements to make subtitling the primary method of film translation in

Ukraine as a way of having access to the original language (http://www.kino7.com), dubbing

continues to exert its pull on a large part of the population. Movies which are voiced over can

still be found on television, though they are now relatively rare.

Although dubbing continues to maintain its hold on Ukrainian moviegoers, this is not, as

Danan says, a case of "suppressing [...] the foreign nature of imported films" (Danan 613), but is

in fact representative of the importance the current administration has placed on Ukraine's

language and the country's relationship with Russia. In addition, the decision to dub movies was

made when Ukraine was not independent, but was following the laws and guidelines set out by the Soviet Union. Its people grew accustomed to the practice, making it difficult to change tactics without protest. Comparisons can be drawn with the language itself: the people of

| 83 Ukraine grew accustomed to movies dubbed into Russian, and thus a transition to Ukrainian-

language dubbing could not be painless.

Ukraine's practice of primarily dubbing movies is therefore a remnant of its Soviet past

which does not necessarily represent its opposition to other cultures. Its decision to translate

movies into Ukrainian is, however, a good indicator of its uneasiness and instability in relation to

Russian dominance. Movie translation is one domain where Ukraine can have control and shed

its inferiority complex, and is currently attempting to do so.

THE CURRENT STATE OF FILM TRANSLATION

The current film translation situation in Ukraine is in theory aligned with the requirements of the law. All films released in the country are either dubbed, voiced over or subtitled into

Ukrainian on the original language. Those which are not appropriately translated do not receive

a license from the State Department of Cinematography, which has led to the delay of the

Ukrainian premiere of a couple of high-profile films. One example is that of ASTERIX AT THE

OLYMPIC GAMES, scheduled for release on January 30, 2008 and finally premiered in Ukraine on

February 21, 2008 ("Kinoprem'yery"). The delay occurred because the distributor in Ukraine,

Synerhiya, presented the film dubbed into Russian and subsequently subtitled into Ukrainian, whereas the law requires the subtitling into Ukrainian to occur on the original language.

Although this was not the only film whose release date was delayed - another was I AM LEGEND

-the majority of films have premiered as scheduled, translated as required by law. Out of the

| 84 ten top grossing films in Ukraine in the period from December 1, 2008 to May 24, 2009, three were released in Ukraine simultaneously with their world premiere; one was released alongside

Kazakhstan and Russia before the rest of the world; and six were released after the world premiere, but within a relatively short time frame and in line with release dates in other countries ("Zbory"; IMDB; MULTIKINO).

The assumption is that all movie theatres in Ukraine are now screening films which have been translated as required by law and which have therefore been licensed by the State

Department of Cinematography. High profile opponents of mandatory dubbing such as Anton

Pugach, owner of the Multiplex-Holding movie theatre chain, have set aside their personal opinions and acted in accordance with the law, screening only licensed films (Hlon' and

Verhelis). Nevertheless, it is very difficult to verify that each and every movie screen in every theatre is screening licensed copies. When quotas on Ukrainian film copies were first introduced, there were movie theatres which announced one film screening per day, and always in Ukrainian. Besides this, however, those theatres also screened films in Russian translation unannounced, with news traveling by word of mouth. The government was able to diminish this practice through its own initiatives, but also with the help of citizens. As one young community activist explained in an interview, he and his friends would report theatres which screened movies without the proper translation to the government, who would then take matters into its own hands. It would be idealistic to assume that all such illegal screenings have been eliminated, but the current situation is nevertheless a huge improvement over that of previous years.

| 85 Although numbers concerning non-compliance with the law are unavailable, there are

other statistics which can be presented to give a more precise view of the current condition of

movies in Ukraine. As mentioned earlier in this paper, the total population of Ukraine is

48,457,000 according to the 2001 census (STATESTAT. COMM.). The six main movie audiences

reside in Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk and Lviv. The table below shows the

population of each city, the percent of the total population of Ukraine, and the percent of the

film market each city occupies.

Table 1. Population and percent of film market of the six largest markets (urban centres) in Ukraine.

City Population Percent of total Percent of film

population market1

Kyiv 2,611,300 5.39% 50-65%

(44-55%)2

Odesa 1,029,000 2.12% 15-25%

Dnipropetrovsk 1,080,800 2.23% 7-10%

Kharkiv 1,470,900 3.04% 5-7%

Donetsk 1,033,400 2.13% 3-5%

Lviv 758,500 1.57% 3-5%

Source: 2001 All-Ukrainian Census and http://kino-pereklad.org.ua

1 Percent of film market as of January 2007 according to http://kino-pereklad.org.ua/?p=lll and http://kino-pereklad.org.ua/?p=115.

2 Percent of film market as of May 2009 according to http://www.telekritika.ua/daidzhest/2009-05- 27/45834.

| 86 The most important conclusion to be drawn from these numbers is that Kyiv dominates the Ukrainian film market, its audience comprising around 50% of the total Ukrainian movie- viewing public. Other than Kyiv, therefore, no single city is significant enough to sway the

Ukrainian market one way or the other. Even when the predominantly Russophone cities -

Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Donetsk-are grouped together, their maximum take of the

market stands at 47%, barely exceeding Kyiv's minimum percentage of May 2009.

The film market, having been near death in the years following the collapse of the Soviet

Union, has in recent years been resuscitated. During the period from May 5 to December 24,

2006, only one weekend grossed over US$1,000,000 for the top ten movies: July 14-16 (Box

OFFICE MOJO, "Ukraine, 2006"). In comparison, during the period from May 8 to December 28,

2008, the top ten movies grossed over US$1,000,000 during twelve weekends, and over

US$2,000,000 during the weekend of October 30 to November 2 (Box OFFICE MOJO, "Ukraine,

2008").

During the period from December 1 2008 to May 24 2009, 62% of the box office gross was earned from foreign (American, French, etc) films, 37.5% from Russian films (including

Russian-Ukrainian projects), and 0.5% from Ukrainian films ("Zbory"). In 2008, the top ten

highest grossing films included six from the US, three from Russia, and one joint US-Russia project. The first half of 2009 (December 1, 2008 - May 24, 2009) paints a slightly different picture, with five Russian films and five American films at the top ("Zbory"). While foreign films

(North American, European, etc.) are still a large presence on Ukrainian screens, the move to obligatory Ukrainian-language translation has resulted in more Russian movies being shown

since they are most often simply subtitled, an inexpensive process as compared to dubbing.

One of the new costs incurred with the enforcement of the 1998 legislation, along with

Ukrainian-language advertising, is the cost of dubbing. Dubbing in Ukraine can cost anywhere from US$20,000 to US$60,000 per film (personal interview with Batruch), while the average is

around US$35,000 (Borisow). Subtitling, on the other hand, costs approximately US$1,000 per film copy (Borisow). A film such as HARRY POTTER AND THE HALF BLOOD PRINCE earned over

US$1,790,000, and the Russian LYUBOV V BOLSHOM GORODE earned over US$2,000,000. On the

other hand, less popular movies such as DRAGONBALL: EVOLUTION made under US$50,000 while

GRAN TORINO made under US$10,000. Nevertheless, movies listed on the Box Office Mojo website for Ukraine in 2009 made on average upwards of US$100,000 each (Box OFFICE MOJO,

"Ukraine, 2009"). Therefore, while box office intake varies greatly depending on the movie,

most earn enough to be able to sustain a US$20,000 dubbing price tag.

THE MAJOR PLAYERS

Throughout the transition from Russian- to Ukrainian-language dubbing and subtitling, a

number of people and organizations have played important roles, both supporting and opposing this change. They include individual community activists and organizations, translators, editors, journalists, distributors, movie theatre owners, film producers and lawyers. All those who became involved have influenced the situation, or at the very least, have the possibility of doing so in the future. Some of the most passionate people were the community activists.

Alongside the changes going on within the legal system, a desire for difference was also becoming evident in sections of the population. Two organized movements which initiated discussions on the topic of mandatory Ukrainian-language movie translations were Kino-

Pereklad - the Ukrainian for 'movie translation' - and Ne Bud' Baiduzhym (henceforth NBB) - meaning 'don't be indifferent'.

The Kino-Pereklad movement was initiated in the fall of 2006, around the time the resolution implementing quotas was overturned by the Kyiv Court of Appeal. It started out as an initiative entitled "I promise not to go to movies translated into Russian," which consisted of an online petition. The immediate goal was to gather 1000 signatures. More long-term goals of the organization included seeing the exhibition of foreign films in Ukrainian translation at any time of day and at any movie theatre become reality, and the possibility of choice between Russian and Ukrainian for movie-goers. As time went on and the translation of movies into Ukrainian was enforced, the organization, through its website, continued to be a place to find information on Ukrainian movie translations, from statistics to opinions and everything in between. Kino-

Pereklad dealt exclusively with the issue of translating films into Ukrainian, and succeeded in informing the internet-savvy section of the public - those who were also most likely to go to the movies - on the issues at hand (KINO-PEREKLAD).

NBB, on the other hand, was a movement which was created in 2005 with the goal of popularizing the Ukrainian language and the modern Ukrainian spirit in all their forms, and

| 89 widening the sphere of use of the Ukrainian language in the entire country, bringing it closer to being fully functional beyond the western regions. The movement includes a number of

Ukrainian stars, mostly musicians, who have lent their support in bringing the issue to the forefront. Events that NBB has staged have included: a protest against the Russophone press, focusing on the lack of Ukrainophone magazines; an action encouraging Ukrainians to speak

Ukrainian; a rebranding of Ivan Mazepa, who is seen by some Ukrainians as a traitor for aligning the Cossacks with Sweden instead of Russia; and an action encouraging Ukrainian businesses to greet their customers in Ukrainian, not Russian. In March 2008, NBB held an event at Zhovten', the oldest movie theatre in Kyiv. It consisted of two parts, the first a briefing of the movie situation for representatives of the mass media with the participation of Ukrainian stars, and the second a viewing of a foreign film (THE OTHER BOLEYN GIRL), translated into Ukrainian. As with their other actions, the goal was to bring attention to the gap between Ukrainian's current and possible roles as the state language within the sphere of cinema and to encourage the further intertwined development of the two. Both NBB and Kino-Pereklad have stressed that they are apolitical and therefore do not support any one political party.

There have likewise been campaigns against the mandatory Ukrainian-language translations in movie theatres. One such example was an action led by the youth group Proryv - meaning 'break or breakthrough' - in Simferopol, on the Crimean Peninsula. The now- prohibited organization's goal was to protect the interests of Russians in Crimea, as well as to fight against the separation of Ukraine and Russia. In February 2008, Proryv organized a demonstration which included its participants tearing up Ukrainian-language posters, and going

| 90 to see 1814, a Russian-language movie about Pushkin ("Ukrayins'kyj dubliazh"). These actions were carried out in conjunction with the collection of signatures for a campaign against

Ukrainian-language movie translations, organized by local theatre owners. The organizers of the

Crimea-focused action believed that the Russian language had no right being replaced by

Ukrainian since the majority of Crimeans are Russophones.

Besides community activists and politicians involved in bringing the law into effect, a third force during this transition period was that of film industry insiders, both distributors and theatre owners. Ukraine has 43 licensed distributors, including five principal distribution companies and a number of smaller ones (STATE DEPARTMENT OF CINEMATOGRAPHY). There are seven major movie theatre chains which own a total of 123 screens. By the end of 2008, there were 306 screens in Ukraine, an increase of almost 25% over the previous year ("Zbory").

Ukraine's film market is still developing, and at the end of 2008 demand still exceeded supply.

Over the last few years, as the approach to the translation of foreign films was debated, distributors played a particularly important role. In 2006, following the implementation of quotas, many distributors protested, arguing that Ukrainian translations would leave theatres empty. Meanwhile, in early 2007, Kyiv-area distributors signed a memorandum with the

Ministry of Culture and Tourism, pledging to increase the number of film copies produced in

Ukrainian translation. Many distributors supported the idea of movies in Ukrainian, but were loathe to follow through in practice, seeing it as a poor economic choice. Although the majority of distributors agreed to comply with the law starting in January 2008, one distributor in particular took on the challenge of translating movies into Ukrainian and showing them in his

theatres before this enforcement became reality.

B&H Film Distribution is one of the larger distribution companies in Ukraine, working as

the official distributor of a number of major Hollywood companies, including Walt Disney,

Dreamworks, Paramount and Sony (through United International Pictures). For the first half of

2009, B&H took 35.44% of the market, coming in second after Gemini Films, which took 40.12%

("Zbory"). Four of the top ten movies of 2008 were distributed by B&H. The CEO and owner of

the company is Bohdan Batruch, a Polish national of Ukrainian heritage. As of 1998, he is also

the director of Kinopalats, the largest chain of movie theatres in Ukraine, with theatres in Kyiv,

Kharkiv, Donetsk, Lviv, Cherkasy, Mykolaiv, Rivne, Sumy, Chernivtsi and Kremenchuh.

Batruch first became involved in the Ukrainian film industry in the early nineties. A Swiss

foundation he was working with wanted to show TARAS BULBA in Ukraine, the 1962 Hollywood

film based on a novel by Nikolai Gogol, but was unable to because of an embargo on American

movies brought in to combat rampant piracy. It was at this point that he began to work with the

American Motion Picture Association (AMPA) to create a Ukrainian copyright law, implemented

in 1995, which brought piracy down to acceptable levels. Satisfied with this law, the AMPA lifted

its embargo, allowing American movies to be shown. Batruch likewise played an important role

in consultations and discussions between the government and distribution companies during the uncertain years surrounding Ukrainian-language dubbing. When Ukrainian translation

quotas were introduced in 2006, B&H immediately set to work on dubbing the Disney Pixar

animated feature CARS into Ukrainian. It took over a year to dub the film, and a large marketing

| 92 campaign was led prior to its release, all of which resulted in a high quality translation and large audiences. It was the first film in Ukraine that was released simultaneously in Russian and

Ukrainian, and statistics showed that the Ukrainian version grossed more at the box office, not only in Western and Central Ukraine, but also in traditionally more Russophone areas. Having given the Ukrainian film industry and audiences an example of a successful Ukrainian-dubbed

movie, Batruch has continued releasing high-grossing movies dubbed into Ukrainian. In January

2009, Batruch also opened the first fully operational dubbing studio in Ukraine. Previous to this, the last steps of the dubbing process were carried out beyond the borders of Ukraine - often in

Poland or Russia. Batruch was instrumental in reviving a moribund film industry in the late nineties, and has since been a key player in a return to Ukrainian-language cinema.

Another major player in the events surrounding Ukrainian dubbing has been Anton

Pugach. A former director of Kinopalats, he established the movie theatre chain Multiplex-

Holding in 2003. In June of 2009, it had 31 screens in six movie theatres across the country (Kyiv,

Kryvyj Rih, Mykolaiv, Donetsk), the largest number of screens owned by any one chain in

Ukraine.

Whereas Batruch is a big proponent of mandatory Ukrainian dubbing, Pugach has been the voice of opposition from the start. His belief is that the economy should be of the highest priority; since Ukrainian distributors were earning a certain amount of money without paying the expense of dubbing, it would not make sense to have them incur these additional losses that are being covered elsewhere. In addition, he believes that a sudden change to Ukrainian- language cinema would push viewers out of their comfort zone, turning them away from movie

| 93 theatres, resulting in even greater losses for distributors and movie theatre owners. Although

Pugach is not against Ukrainian-language cinema and has been carrying out the law as required

since its implementation, he nevertheless sees the forced Ukrainization, particularly the

requirement of subtitling on the original language, as anti-constitutional, and believes that

bilingualism should exist in cinema for another five years (personal interview). He has been a

driving force in protests against this latest iteration of the Law on Cinematography, organizing

demonstrations and petitions (Nicholas). Although often portrayed variously as pro-Russian and

anti-Ukrainian, Pugach can more aptly be described as a supporter of the status quo.

Other important players include translators, editors, film producers, lawyers and journalists. Some, such as Ukrainian film producer Oles Sanin, were involved in official

discussions with government and distribution company representatives in order to find a

solution to the dubbing problem before December 2007. Others have chosen more personal

avenues to bring awareness to the issue, discussing the issues amongst friends or on blogs.

Representatives of each of these areas were interviewed for this thesis, and their thoughts on

mandatory film dubbing, in addition to those of the above-discussed figures, will be presented in

the next chapter.

The Law on Cinematography evolved from its original state as an easily ignored law to

one that currently evokes heated discussion by those involved in the industry. As the Law

becomes generally accepted as a permanent measure, and not an intermediary step, it would be

interesting to study the legal and financial benefits of those who have adapted to the new

requirements.

| 94 Chapter 7 - Analysis of Research and Recent Developments

As mentioned earlier, I conducted a series of interviews to gauge the reaction of industry

insiders, community activists and others to the new movie translation requirements. These

interviews were carried out during November and December 2008 in Kyiv and Kharkiv, Ukraine.

Sample questions are found in appendix B. My goal was to see the events as those who were

involved in various capacities saw them, and to understand the reasons behind their support of, or opposition to, the newly enforced legislation. To begin, I would like to place the movie translation situation in an official context.

According to Hanna Chmil, the head of the State Department of Cinematography at the

Ministry of Culture, this latest emphasis on enforcing Ukrainian language use within cinema has five goals (personal interview). They are:

I 95 1. To ensure that movies in Ukrainian are available everywhere in Ukraine;

2. To aid in nation-building;

3. To strengthen Ukrainian culture;

4. To develop the modern Ukrainian language; and

5. To reinvigorate the Ukrainian language.

The Ukrainian government was not restricted to only one option - making Ukrainian-

language translation mandatory - in realizing these goals. Other options included tax credits and

other financial incentives. Nevertheless, the government decided to use legal force, an act which

risks inciting strong negative repercussions. A significant part of this chapter is dedicated to

reactions, both positive and negative, to the ultimate unstated goal-a Ukrainian-language film

industry - and to the method in which it is being achieved.

Towards the end of the chapter, I will briefly examine options used in other countries.

Likewise, I will look at how the above-stated goals coincide with Annie Brisset's functions of translation.

To reiterate, the law requires that all foreign movies be shown in their Ukrainian

language translation. A movie can subsequently be translated into one of the languages of

Ukraine's minority groups, but the original translation must be present. This means that a movie can be shown dubbed into Ukrainian, then subtitled into Russian or Crimean Tatar or any of the other minority languages. In theory, this also means that a movie can be subtitled into

Ukrainian, and then dubbed into another language. However, since emphasis in the wording of the law is placed on dubbing first and foremost, it is subtitling which takes on the role of

| 96 translation for the minority languages. Either way, this double translation method has not been taken advantage of thus far.

Although statistics indicate that neither viewership nor box office intake have suffered, this does not mean that everyone is satisfied with the current situation. While the majority of movie theatres, to the extent that can be verified, have been showing movies in Ukrainian, there are still some that try to circumvent the law or slip under the radar with Russian showings.

According to a couple of interviewees, some theatres have been caught showing regular DVDs with the Russian soundtrack as opposed to the version officially licensed for public viewing.

Others have employed in-house translators, showing licensed copies and interpreting live into

Russian. Most recently, a theatre in Odesa found a way of showing movies in Russian without infringing on the law. The Batkivshchyna/Rodyna movie theatre was showing Pedro Almodovar's

BROKEN EMBRACES in Russian on the basis of its status as a festival film, which does not require it to be shown in Ukrainian translation. The movie, having been shown at the Cannes Film Festival, falls into this category. Although this is a sore point with activists hoping to minimize the presence of the Russian language on Ukrainian screens, it is itself an example of the flexibility of the law.

As mentioned, the law requires all foreign movies being shown publicly in Ukraine to be shown in their Ukrainian translation. This applies not only in more heavily Ukrainian- or Russian- speaking regions, but also in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea which was originally inhabited by Crimean Tatars, and subsequently became a Russian territory, before being transferred to

Ukraine in 1954. To enforce the law, the State Department of Cinematography requires all films slated for public screening to pass through its hands. Those movies whose translations satisfy the demands of the law are granted a license allowing them to be shown throughout Ukraine.

Those which either lack a Ukrainian translation, have a translation (subtitles or voice-over) which is not on the language of the original, or whose translation is only partial, do not receive a

license. Such was the very public case of ASTERIX AT THE OLYMPIC GAMES, which was subtitled in

Ukrainian over a Russian dub (see previous chapter). Movie theatres which are caught showing

unlicensed movies are heavily fined. As a side note, the State Department of Cinematography also reserves the right to deny a license to films it deems to be of an immoral character, and lists seventeen cases in which movies will not be licensed. This was precisely what happened in the summer of 2009 with the movie BRUNO, which depicted a homosexual Austrian TV show host.

Although it is nearly impossible to ensure that every screening of every movie in every theatre abides by the rules, the enforcement of the law in combination with imposed fines has managed to diminish the number of transgressors. Ukrainian politics being unstable, however, and the

public dissatisfied with the post-Orange Revolution government, no one is sure if there will be any continuity with this law with the next change in government, scheduled for January 2010.

Since enforcing Ukrainian dubbing in the first place was a tug of war between those who placed more emphasis either on the Russian or the Ukrainian language, the head of the State

Department of Cinematography, Hanna Chmil, stated in a personal interview that she was sure the law would not outlast a change of the ruling party. Other interviewees, however, believed the legislation would remain in force beyond January 2010. HOPES AND FEARS

In order to better understand the commotion surrounding the enforcement of this law, I will take a look at a number of hopes and fears expressed by interviewees in Ukraine just before the first anniversary of the law's implementation. Some of these hopes and fears are related to the specific law and its application, while others take on the general concept of translating movies into Ukrainian. To reiterate, the interviewees included journalists, community activists, movie theatre owners, distribution company owners, translators, a government agency head, a film producer, a lawyer, a dubbing actor, and the director of a human rights organization.

The hopes that were mentioned by interviewees can be divided into three thematic groups: movie industry, language politics and nation building. Even those who were not in favour of this particular legislation saw certain merits to the general idea of Ukrainian-language translations. Their fears, to be reviewed later in this chapter, often focused on the mandatory aspect of the law. The first category outlines those hopes which deal with the movie industry itself.

A very important goal, cited by the head of the State Department of Cinematography and quoted by the former vice Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kyrylenko in an article ("Sud"), is for movies to be available in the national language throughout Ukraine. The hope is that a citizen of

Ukraine can walk into any cinema at any time of day and be able to watch a movie in Ukrainian.

The situation leading up to the implementation of quotas in 2006 was such that there were no

Ukrainian-language alternatives to Russian-translated movies, even in Western Ukraine. This would be the equivalent of only showing English-language movies in the province of Quebec. Although the language is understood by many, it is not theirs. Once quotas were implemented,

Ukrainian-translated movies were often shown at inconvenient times such as morning, when

many people didn't go to the cinemas. Unrestricted access to Ukrainian-language movies is

therefore the first hope of the interviewees.

The next hope, mentioned by the head of the State Department of Cinematography, a

film producer and a distribution company and movie theatre director, is that translating foreign

movies into Ukrainian will lead to the creation of a strong domestic film industry. The argument

is that in the years since independence, Ukrainians have become accustomed to the Russian

language on screen, as well as Russian movies. As movies are translated into Ukrainian, viewers

will get into the habit of watching movies in Ukrainian, and Ukrainian-made movies will have a

better chance of surviving the box office competition. In addition, the more chances Ukrainian

filmmakers are given to exercise their craft, the better they and their products will become. At

the same time, hope was expressed that this newly strengthened domestic film industry would

not be limited to the Ukrainian language, but would encompass all the minority languages of

Ukraine.

Somewhat more logical but often less explicitly stated is the hope that mandatory

Ukrainian-language translation will lead to a stronger dubbing industry in Ukraine, as mentioned

by a judge of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court in an article (Verhelis). Until 2006, all foreign

movies were brought into Ukraine through Russian intermediaries or distributors. This meant that they were all being translated into Russian, for the most part in Russia. When the Law on

Cinematography was brought into force, requiring movies to be shown in their Ukrainian-

| 100 language translation, more of the dubbing process was brought into Ukraine. By the end of

2008, all but the last stage of the dubbing process was able to take place in Ukraine, and in

January 2009, the first fully functioning Dolby studio was opened in Kyiv, allowing for the last

stage, mixing, to take place in Ukraine as well.

A natural consequence of a stronger domestic industry is job creation, another hope

expressed. With more distributors dubbing in Ukrainian, and more facilities with dubbing

capabilities, the need for dubbing professionals increases, as stated by translator Oleksa

Nehrebetsky (Konstantinova, "Shrek"). The dubbing process requires the services of a variety of

professionals, from sound engineers to managers, translators, editors and actors. In addition,

each of these roles requires professional training. Therefore, not only is the economy stimulated

through the creation of dubbing-specific jobs at a professional level, but it is also stimulated

through the education sector with the creation of more teaching positions.

In other words, with mandatory Ukrainian-language dubbing, movies in Ukrainian will be

available to all citizens, both the dubbing and domestic film industries will be stronger, and the

economy will grow.

The second, slightly broader category of hopes is that of language politics. The very

general expectation, as one translator put it, is that the current legislation will get the ball rolling

on the Ukrainian language and its popularity and usage in Ukraine. Russian is the standard

language of pop culture, and therefore the language that many youths feel more comfortable

using amongst themselves. It is also an urban language, popular among adults who have made the transition from village to city.

| 101 Stemming from this hope is the expectation by Nehrebetsky that more popular usage

will strengthen the language (Konstantinova, "Shrek"). As the Ukrainian language is seen on

screen more often, it will have a chance to develop more slang and technical terms, which, for the moment, it mostly borrows from Russian and recently from English. Instead of being seen variously as a peasant language or as the language of the western-leaning elite, it will be viewed

as a language that can adequately address both the formal and informal aspects of daily life,

making it accessible to all levels of society. Exposing the language through an area of pop culture such as movies will help reinvigorate the language by bringing it into the daily reality of the

movie-going public.

Community activists belonging to the organization NBB expressed the hope that youth would not have a particularly strong allegiance to either language, making their transition back to Ukrainian relatively painless and struggle-free. The expectation is that, for the most part, their connection to Russian is one of habit, and therefore they will soon enough become accustomed to movies in Ukrainian. Likewise, the hope is that youth will be eager to see the latest James Bond movie, or the newest Pixar animation, and having grown up speaking both

Ukrainian and Russian, will have no qualms about watching the movie in whichever language it happens to be screened.

Finally, the director of a human rights organization expressed hope that the dubbing situation would, to a certain extent, be indicative of reality. In other words, considering the deeply entrenched position that the Russian language occupies in Ukraine, the language cannot

| 102 be ignored. While Ukrainian, as the national language, is encouraged and promoted, Russian, as the mother tongue of 29.6% of the Ukrainian population, should not be eliminated.

Thus, there is a profound desire to see the Ukrainian language strengthened as a result of the introduction of Ukrainian-language dubbing, though the hope is also expressed that this does not lead to the demise of Russian in Ukraine.

The final category of hopes, centred on the theme of nation-building, is the one that is farthest removed from the movie industry itself. According to the Oxford English Dictionary,

nation-building refers to the encouragement of social or cultural cohesion within a nation.

Therefore, the government's initiative for mandatory Ukrainian language dubbing is one manner of trying to unite the nation around a common cultural point: language.

The first nation-building hope is that the mass introduction of Ukrainian into the cinematic landscape will encourage people to make use of the Ukrainian learned in school, thus

unifying them around a common language. Whereas currently Russian is the language that the

majority feels comfortable speaking, as Ukrainian is introduced into movies, TV and print media, etc, it can return to its rightful place as the titular language of Ukraine, the language used by the people and the culture.

The second nation-building hope, mentioned by community activists from the organization NBB, is that introducing Ukrainian onto the screen will render the language accessible to everyone. Currently, it is seen as both a peasant language, spoken in the villages and forgotten in the cities, and an elite language, spoken by the majority in Western Ukraine

| 103 and only the educated elsewhere. As stated in the language politics group of hopes, using

Ukrainian on screen will take the language out of the pages of textbooks and reinvigorate it. By

encouraging it within a medium which touches most levels of society, and by using the

appropriate registers of language, Ukrainian will no longer be for the peasants and the elite, but for everyone.

Once Ukrainian has become a fully living and popular language, the hope is that Ukraine will become truly Ukrainian. Although it is difficult to determine what truly is Ukrainian, since the many years of foreign dominance have created a heterogeneous cultural environment,

language is still seen as a marker of ethnic and national identity. Therefore, a Ukraine which speaks Ukrainian may truly be considered Ukrainian, as opposed to a Ukraine whose language of communication is Russian or English. This comes into play particularly in areas of the country which are largely Russophone. There is hope that areas near the border of Russia, or the

Autonomous Republic of Crimea, will accept Ukrainian as a language of internal communication to be used in addition to their native Russian.

Finally, hope was expressed by a Kyiv-based journalist that focus on the Ukrainian language would not translate into a desire to "correct" history. This "correction" includes de-

Russifying both the language and the textbooks. Many Ukrainians, though not all, are eager to look to the future without squabbling over the past. Similarly, a director of a theatre chain in

Kharkiv as well as a producer interviewed expressed hope that with this affirmation of the

Ukrainian language through cinema, the relationship between Ukraine and Russia will be more

| 104 balanced and genuinely harmonious. The hope is that Russia will recognize Ukraine as a smaller yet worthy trading partner, and not simply as a former underling.

As expressed through the conducted interviews and print media articles, Ukrainians

hope that Ukrainian-language dubbing of foreign movies will: strengthen both the dubbing and domestic film industries; create jobs; bring the Ukrainian language alive and make it accessible to everyone; strengthen and unify the national identity; and bring balance to Ukraine's relations with Russia. Although some of these hopes rely on a number of factors and not simply the use of

Ukrainian in movie theatres, the December 2007 legislation is in a position to positively influence many of these desires. There were also a number of fears which were expressed in these same interviews and articles. Like any change in status quo, this law was met with reservations alongside the hopes.

Once again, the fears and reservations expressed can be divided into three categories: movie industry, economy, and language politics. Even those interviewees who support the idea of Ukrainian-language cinema often had reservations about certain aspects of the legislation or its implementation, while others found reason to oppose the initiative entirely. For the most part, those who did not support the legislation denied being against the Ukrainian language, but professed discontent with the manner in which the situation was tackled.

First on the list of movie industry criticism is the low quality of translations, which is linked to a lack of preparation and an inappropriate approach. Without the many years of experience of the Russian dubbing system, distributors and movie theatre owners feared that

Ukrainian translations would be of poor quality and not correspond in context or in quality to

| 105 the original, thereby keeping audiences away. This has so far proven to be an unrealized fear, with animated features such as CARS and THE SIMPSONS MOVIE being praised for their translations, while action and drama movies have had adequate translations, no worse than their Russian equivalents. This fear of poor quality stemmed from the practice of translating foreign movies through the intermediary of Russian (English to Russian to Ukrainian), a method

now mostly avoided in Ukraine.

Second on the list of fears is the unpreparedness of the Ukrainian film and dubbing industries. Distributors argued that they were not given enough transition time in the switch to

100% Ukrainian-language translations, meaning that they were unable to adequately deal with the demand once the law was brought into effect. The legislation, however, took effect in

January 2008, two years after the initial implementation of quotas, and ten years after the law was originally written. The problem, therefore, lies with the system which has created citizens that doubt the ability of the government to follow through on its promises to enforce laws.

Nevertheless, not all distributors disregarded the initial steps; Mr. Bohdan Batruch of B&H

Consulting, for example, was prepared to meet the demand in January 2008 by beginning work in 2006.

The other aspect of unpreparedness is the underdevelopment of the dubbing industry itself. Since there was really no dubbing precedent in Ukraine, there was minimal experience to work with. A handful of translators had worked on TV programs such as ALF. which was dubbed and shown in Ukrainian from 1997, but the demand was suddenly very high, and those with experience were not able to fill all the necessary positions. Many feared that this lack of

| 106 professional experienced workers would lead to low quality productions. Likewise, existing studios were not equipped to complete the entire dubbing process in Ukraine, meaning that projects were sent to other countries for the final stages. This fear has proven to be valid, though demand has attracted workers who are gaining experience on the job. In addition, a

Dolby studio was opened in Kyiv in January 2009, and all stages of the dubbing process can be completed there. For some, this unpreparedness constitutes a genuine fear, while for others, it is a chance to build the system from the ground up and to establish an independent Ukrainian industry.

A couple of translators interviewed separately complained that actors did not, for the most part, have proper Ukrainian intonation. Because of the small scale of the Ukrainian domestic film industry, many Ukrainian actors work in Russian film. Working hard to eliminate their Ukrainian accent in Russian, they retain a Russian accent or intonation when speaking

Ukrainian. This issue, as with the development of various dubbing-related professions, can be addressed through the training process.

The third industry fear deals with the language itself. Stereotypes encouraged during the Soviet era have led to the belief, expressed by the director of a Kharkiv movie theatre chain, that the Ukrainian language, and in particular its vocabulary, is not advanced enough for the needs of movie dialogue. Partly, as mentioned, this comes from the Soviet stereotype of

Ukrainian as a peasant language and the Little Russian mentality, though it is also a more recent phenomenon. In the years since independence, the Ukrainian language has continued to take a backseat to Russian in areas such as commerce and popular culture, leaving the corresponding

I 107 Ukrainian vocabulary either lacking or relying on the Russian equivalent to fill the void.

Nevertheless, as Ukrainian is introduced and encouraged in these and other domains, its vocabulary will develop, either through loan words or neologisms, to ensure the language grows and changes along with reality.

A very real fear evoked by Anna Yashchenko in her article is that of the possibility of the proliferation of piracy. As people are forced to do something they are not used to doing - watching movies in Ukrainian as opposed to Russian - the demand for home copies with a

Russian dub released simultaneously with or soon after the theatre release of movies will increase. Although Hanna Chmil, head of the State Department of Cinematography, insists that those who want to watch movies in Russian or other minority languages will be able to do so in the comfort and privacy of their own home, this does not address the desire to watch movies at the time of their theatre release. The only way to satisfy this demand is through the production of pirated copies. Therefore, in order to avoid becoming an even bigger haven for piracy than it already is, Ukraine must also figure out a way to minimize the production and sale of illegal film copies.

Finally, those representing Russian distributors in Ukraine are afraid they will no longer be necessary, as brought to light in an article by Roman Horbyk. As business shifts from Russian distributors buying movie rights for the entire CIS and distributing them through their own intermediaries, to Ukrainian distributors buying rights directly for Ukraine, the industry will become less dependent on Russia, minimizing the need for its intermediaries. Although this is good news for Ukrainian distributors, it does not bode well for the Ukrainian representatives of

| 108 Russian distributors, some of whom have already disappeared from the Ukrainian market. This fear, although real, should not be viewed as negative for the development of the Ukrainian dubbing and film industries, since it can result in stronger domestic industries with Ukrainian intermediaries in Russia, and a more symbiotic relationship.

Fears and reservations dealing with the dubbing and film industries, therefore, for the most part are addressed relatively easily. The main concern remains piracy, an issue the government needs to address, and not only for dubbing and language reasons.

A very practical and real aspect of any legislation is how it relates to the economy; this is the second category of fears and reservations. The biggest complaint in this category, evoked in a number of articles and by four interviewees, is indeed that the transition to Ukrainian-dubbed movies will make the business financially unstable. Whereas before the Law on Cinematography was brought into force, distributors bought movies already dubbed by their Russian counterparts, this new legislation meant that Ukrainian distributors all of a sudden had to pay out of their own pocket for the translation. Likewise, before January 2008, distributors bought rights to these already dubbed movies on the second-hand market at a cheaper price, whereas this law has forced them pay full price on the standard market. This leaves larger distributors that represent Hollywood majors at an advantage as compared to smaller distributors, since large Hollywood companies often cover dubbing expenses.

Coupling this with the fear that audiences will reject Ukrainian-language screenings results in a very dire prognosis for the Ukrainian movie industry. Reality, however, takes the

| 109 middle ground. The issue of Ukrainian language will be addressed within the next category, but financing dubbing projects is indeed a costly undertaking.

Ukraine is a large country and therefore has the manpower, both in terms of workforce and audience, to support a movie industry independently of another country. Although distributors are certainly taking a hit in the short-term, there is no reason not to rethink finances

in order to make the business more financially viable for smaller distributors. Proposed solutions

include subtitling instead of dubbing, and tax breaks. Solutions such as these will be discussed in

more detail later in this chapter.

Lastly, fears and reservations dealing with language politics are the most difficult to assess. Members of a Ukrainian human rights organization argue that it is a violation of human

rights to dictate language use to the extent that the Ukrainian government is doing. According to this same organization, what we in Canada know as CanCon also violates human rights due to the high percentage of Canadian content required. Nevertheless, the argument remains that

Ukraine, as a purportedly liberal country, should not have a law that dictates the use of

language in a public domain such as cinema. The choice of language should be left up to the consumer as happens in other liberal countries. Opponents of the law allege that the interests and rights of the individual citizen are being relegated to the background while the interests of the ethnic majority, Ukrainian, are forced onto everyone.

While this argument holds some weight in that a public domain such as cinema should be consumer driven, other aspects of the assertion are less applicable. It is a stretch to say that human rights are being violated, since no one is being denied the right to watch movies in their

| 110 language of choice in theatres or at home. Nor do festival screenings fall under the same rules of

Ukrainian-language dubbing. Likewise, although other liberal countries may not have laws

defining the language in which movies may be publicly screened, they most often do screen in

the country's titular language. Thus in France, despite a large Arab population, most films screen

in French. Later in this chapter, we will look at examples of countries with more than one

dominant language to see how they deal with the issue.

The next fear is that there simply is not enough demand for the Ukrainian language in

movie theatres, a point brought up by a lawyer working for a distribution company, as well as in

a couple of articles (Konstantynova, "Shrek"; Hlon' and Verhelis). Some viewers - or parents of

young viewers - may have no desire to watch movies in Ukrainian themselves or to raise their

children watching movies in Ukrainian. Having grown up in a Russian environment, this is the

language with which they feel most at ease, and they do not have any desire for a leisure-time

activity to be a source of yet more stress as they try to switch to Ukrainian. Russian as the

language of communication is for some an ethnic connection, while for others it is a habit. Some

people may refuse to watch movies in Ukrainian out of principle, since there is no alternative

Russian-language dubbing, or simply because they can't be bothered to step out of their comfort zone and adapt to another language.

This argument has, however, proven less influential than expected. In the first place, almost all Ukrainians understand Ukrainian, even if they're not comfortable speaking it - and this includes Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea. Second, numbers have shown that since the Law on Cinematography came into force, cinema visits have been steady. A poll conducted by First

| ill Movies International in early 2008 showed that approximately 6% of respondents in Lviv had

decreased their movie theatre visits while 22% had gone more often since the change in

legislation. In Kyiv, 15% had gone less often, while 19% had visited more often ("Only 11%").

Some maintain that any tension based on language preferences is simply the effect of the two

main political forces trying to earn the vote of the electorate, which is itself much less caught up

in arguments over language and would sooner accept a state of nonreciprocal bilingualism

(Hlon'and Verhelis).

Next, interviewees on both sides of the debate fear that forcing people to use Ukrainian

will foster a feeling of resentment, instead of encouraging understanding. Because of the

resettlement of many ethnic Russians into Ukraine during the time of the Soviet Union, Russian

is not only their mother tongue, but also a link to their ethnic homeland. Having grown up in an

environment where use of Russian was encouraged and imposed, a forceful switch to Ukrainian

seems just as unlikely to promote feelings of kindness. Some interviewees argued that the

current policy of forced Ukrainization is no better than the Russification that Ukrainians

experienced from the 1930s through to the fall of the Soviet Union. This fear is very real in the

same way that Russification bred resentment among Ukrainians. A better approach, as will be

discussed, may be to encourage the use of Ukrainian through various incentives instead of

imposing it. Nevertheless, this Ukrainization is different from the previous Russification in that

its goal is to ensure the survival of a globally smaller language native to the country, and most certainly not to eliminate other languages. Others, such as the owners of two theatre chains in Kyiv and Kharkiv interpret this

Ukrainizing law as equivalent to anti-minority legislation. Although the law does allow for

movies to be subtitled into other minority languages on top of the Ukrainian translation, films

cannot be publicly shown for profit if the copy used is not also translated into Ukrainian. This, in

addition to the focus in the media and the Ukrainian courts on the first part of the law (foreign films must be translated into Ukrainian), means that many people assume that movies can only

be shown in their Ukrainian version. Thus proponents of documents such as the European

Charter for Regional or Minority Languages have argued that the Law on Cinematography does

not comply with the Charter's guidelines.

Similarly, a number of articles (Bahryanyj, "Prystrasti"; Bahryanyj, "Ukrayinskij";

Verhelis) as well as the director of a human rights organization and the director of a Kharkiv

movie theatre addressed the fear that this language law is a step towards the elimination of

Russian in Ukraine. When coupled with laws such as the law pertaining to advertising in Ukraine, which requires all ads to be in Ukrainian, the environment can appear anti-Russian. When contemplating this point, however, it is important to remember that with two major languages in play, for one to gain ground, the other has to lose ground. Therefore, if Ukrainian is to take a more dominant place in Ukraine, the sphere of use of Russian must be diminished, but not extinguished. In other words, if the status quo is maintained, neither language will be infringed upon, although one can say that Ukrainian is not being used to its full potential. To further develop the use of the Ukrainian language, Russian use will be diminished, while to bow to the pressure of minority rights groups may result in the diminished use of Ukrainian. Thus, ensuring

| 113 Ukrainian translations are present in theatres will inevitably encroach upon the expected use of

Russian, but this should not be seen as an attempt to eliminate it.

One of the reasons people feared this law would lead to the elimination of the Russian

language in Ukraine stems from the misconception that all Soviet and Russian films would also

be dubbed into Ukrainian, a practice many found to be ludicrous and redundant. In fact, the law

allows for movies to be dubbed, voiced over or subtitled, although priority is given to dubbing.

Since Ukraine inherited a legacy of dubbing from the Soviet Union, people would have difficulty

adjusting to subtitles. With Russian, however, the vast majority of Ukrainians understand the

language, and the popular view is that the need to provide Ukrainian dubbing is absent. Instead

of dubbing, therefore, Russians films are simply subtitled.

As a matter of fact, the Russian language has remained a strong force in Ukrainian

cinema for a couple of reasons. First of all, whereas before the implementation of the law in

2007 American movies made up the majority of offerings, including both blockbusters and low

budget films, the period following the implementation of the law has been characterized by an

increase in low budget Russian movies replacing the American ones. This works out to be less

expensive for the distributors whose costs involve subtitling over the Russian track, and not

dubbing the English. The reasoning behind this move is that it is worth dubbing American

blockbusters, sure to bring in money, but not secondary films which may fail at the box office.

Ukrainian cinema itself, although it does not yet have a large arsenal of post-independence films, is also largely Russophone. For example, Ukraine had one entry in the 2009 Toronto

International Film Festival, MELODY FOR A STREET ORGAN by Kira Muratova, a film mostly in

| 114 Russian. Although Russian has been dethroned as the language of dubbing in Ukraine, it has maintained its hold on movie theatres and audiences through small- and big-budget movies from Russia, along with a few domestic products.

Finally, a fear evoked by one of Ukraine's foremost TV and film translators is that the failure of any movie will be blamed on an inadequate translation, even if it is the movie itself which is the source of the failure. This reservation can only be overcome with time, as people see more and more movies with good translations, and as they become accustomed to

Ukrainian as the language of the movies.

Left unchecked, the law on mandatory translation can have negative consequences, both on the industry itself and on people's attitudes towards the language. With some tweaking and the right presentation, this legislation can show that the Ukrainian language is an important part of the country's cultural make-up without discrediting the other languages that have taken their place in Ukraine's history. It can likewise show that Ukraine's film industry can indeed stand on its own two feet.

To summarize, the possible consequences, intended or unintended, of mandatory

Ukrainian-language translations are as follows. In the worst-case scenario, the law requiring mandatory dubbing, voice over or subtitling on the original language can result in theatre closures and a failed film industry due to lack of interest in Ukrainian-language movies. It can instill in current generations an aversion to the Ukrainian language because of lack of choice. It can bankrupt distributors through a steep rise in expenses that were earlier non-existent. And it can fuel the pirated movie industry, leading to scorn from the international community. In the best case scenario, distributors would adjust their business model to fit the new

permanent reality. Audiences would continue visiting theatres in larger numbers, and having

grown accustomed to hearing Ukrainian on screen, would begin to watch an increasing number

of domestic films. Through this increase in viewership, money would be more readily available for the industry, resulting in job creation at the level of dubbing, film production and training.

Finally, as audiences continue to hear cinematic and cultural heroes speak Ukrainian, they would

be more likely to imitate them off-screen, creating a Ukrainian-language pop culture following,

resulting in renewed respect for the Ukrainian language.

The most likely scenario is an average of the two. The domestic film industry will not

become a huge success simply because people have grown accustomed to hearing Ukrainian on the big screen, though it will get a slight boost. Distributors will likely need to tap into government tax cuts to help them adjust to their new expenses. Piracy is inevitable, and it is already a force to be reckoned with in Ukrainian markets. As for the Ukrainian language, some will avoid theatres on principle, while others will purposely go more often than they had before.

For the most part, however, audiences are likely to accept Ukrainian on-screen as the new

reality, and continue as they had before. Some will incorporate more Ukrainian into their daily speech, while others will not see much of a change. Younger generations, however, are likely to be most influenced by the effects of this and other language laws. Speaking Ukrainian in school, combined with increased exposure to Ukrainian in popular culture is likely to shift their reality closer to Ukrainian-than Russian-based. Although respect for the Ukrainian language will not increase overnight, within a couple of generations, it should be more common to hear Ukrainian

| 116 than Russian at recess and on the streets. Though it will be difficult to pinpoint the specific catalyst which will have resulted in this change, the Law on Cinematography will have certainly played its part.

ALTERNATIVES

The most realistic scenario depicted above achieves the goals of Ukrainian-language movie availability for all, a stronger Ukrainian culture and a Ukrainian language which has been revived and allowed to develop. It is not, however, necessarily the only or best way to go about it. The alternatives listed below are gathered from the various interviews I conducted, and from a sampling of magazine articles. Following this, I will present examples of other countries where more than one language is spoken by a significant number of people, and how they have dealt with language on the big screen.

Alternatives include the following:

1. The implementation of dubbing should be done in stages, with quotas, suggests the

director of a theatre chain in Kharkiv. Some movie distributors, as stated in one

article (Bahryanyj, "Prystrasti") recommend a transition period of three years, with

100% of movies dubbed into Ukrainian at the end of this period. This approach was

attempted in 2006, only to be annulled by the Kyiv Court of Appeal. While it was a

logical solution when first proposed, nearly two years after 100% mandatory

translation was implemented, to introduce quotas would only stifle the progress of

Ukrainization in the cinema.

| 117 2. The next alternative would allow for a certain number of film copies to be shown

dubbed into Russian with Ukrainian subtitles, a practice currently not permitted.

The community organization Kino-Pereklad, in its report on the state of the dubbing

industry released in early 2007, recommended that a maximum of five copies per

film be released without Ukrainian dubbing. Distributors mentioned in the Kino-

Pereklad report wanted an allowance of no less than twenty un-dubbed copies. In

an article from February 2008 (Hlon' and Verhelis), the head of a smaller distribution

company proposed dubbing 70% of copies into Ukrainian, and allowing 30% of

copies to be dubbed into Russian with Ukrainian subtitles. Likewise, a lawyer

interviewed proposed that any foreign film with less than 20 copies released in

Ukraine would not be required to be dubbed into Ukrainian. These propositions, like

the idea of quotas, accept the reality of the Ukrainian population, where 29.6% of

people consider Russian to be their mother tongue. These are alternatives that

could have been taken into account when the government was discussing the

details of the legislation. To implement these alternatives two years after Ukrainian-

language dubbing was made mandatory would invoke criticisms of failure, though it

would give viewers an alternative while continuing to heavily favour Ukrainian. With

such a solution, monitoring licensed and unlicensed copies becomes even more

important.

3. A lawyer working for a distribution company suggested all movies be subtitled

instead of dubbed. This would be a more financially viable solution, and would give

access to any number of foreign languages, while still satisfying the requirement of a

mandatory Ukrainian translation. This solution, while sounding ideal, would likely

have minimal support in Ukraine, a country whose population grew up with dubbed

movies thanks to the Soviet Union. And while studies show that different countries

prefer different translation methods, this is mostly a result of habit, just as on-

screen language is. To simultaneously change both the language and the manner in

which movies are translated would likely create an even more difficult transition

period than language alone.

| 118 4. The other alternative proposed by a number of sources suggests that the onus

should be on the government to stimulate, not force, a transition to Ukrainian on

screens. Juliane Besters-Dilger, in her article "Language Politics in the Mass Media,"

suggests freeing any movie theatres showing films in Ukrainian of all taxes. This

alternative was echoed by Kino-Pereklad's 2007 report on the state of the dubbing

industry. The same report recommended that any foreign films brought in through

Russia be subject to an import tax. A representative of a human rights organization

suggested that the government implement tax cuts and help finance Ukrainian-

language products in order to make it attractive for distributors to dub into

Ukrainian, and for movie theatres to show these translations. In a variation on this

suggestion, the same representative proposed that a fund be created into which

each distribution company allocates 1% of its movie profits. This fund would then

provide money for Ukrainian-language movies and translations.

The important aspect to note in this fourth series of alternatives is that they are not forceful. No one is dictating how much should be translated, nor how. It is up to the distributor to decide whether or not to translate into Ukrainian. It is the theatre owner's choice which version to show, if there is more than one version, and it is up to audiences to decide in which language to be entertained. Whether or not this sort of stimulus would work, however, is best left for further study. These are all worthwhile alternatives, and with elections looming in

January 2010 and current President Yushchenko not entirely in favour with the electorate, it is possible that another political party will deem it necessary to change this legislation. MOVIE TRANSLATION IN BELGIUM, CATALONIA AND QUEBEC

In the meantime, how have other countries with similarly split language landscapes dealt with the issue of movie translations? I will take a brief look at three different solutions currently in effect in Belgium, in the Spanish region of Catalonia, and in the Canadian province of Quebec.

Belgium, the first example, is a tri-lingual country with significant French and Dutch

(Flemish) regions, and a smaller German region. In the Flemish region, movies are shown in the original language with bilingual Dutch and French subtitles (Danan 607). While this allows for the two main Belgian languages to be used in translation equally, it creates an environment dominated by English (Maylaerts 92). The second example is the Catalonia region of Spain, whose regional and predominant language is Catalan, though its people also speak Spanish.

Since the 1930s, movies were all made and dubbed into Spanish in accordance with Franco's laws on regional languages. Since 1994, however, the law requires a maximum of 50% of movie productions, either domestic or foreign, to be dubbed or subtitled into Catalan (Garcia de Toro and Varela). In this case, Catalan can be equated to Ukrainian in that both were repressed languages which are being supported through language policy. Although Spanish is the majority language in Spain, while Russian is a minority language in Ukraine, both were the oppressive languages throughout a good part of the twentieth century. According to Garcia de Toro and

Varela, less and less movies are being translated into Catalan because of "aesthetic reasons - such as considering a film as a work of art that should not be manipulated-, and economic motives-there is no need to translate from a language everyone can understand ...." Imposing a maximum, as opposed to minimum, percentage is therefore not an ideal stimulant for a renewed domestic film industry.

In Quebec the rules are also laid out precisely. Just as in Ukraine, films must first obtain a certificate or license from the Regie du cinema (the governmental film authority). In accordance with chapter 3, section 1, paragraph 83 of the Law on Cinema, in order to obtain a certificate, movies must be in their French-dubbed version, except in the following four circumstances:

1. if the number of certificates for non-French copies does not exceed the number

of certificates for French-dubbed copies; the French-dubbed version must be

made available to movie theatre operators showing non-French versions at the

same time;

2. if the movie is subtitled into French;

3. if the person applying for the certificate for a non-French movie agrees to

provide for the dubbing of the movie into French within an agreed upon period

of time;

4. if no French-dubbed version exists, a temporary certificate may be issued for a

period of 45 days.

These regulations ensure that nearly all movies are screened in French, whose situation is comparable to that of the Ukrainian language. At the same time, it allows for movies to be screened simultaneously in their original language. Similarly to Ukrainian law, it places emphasis on the protection of the French language, though the two differ in that the Quebec law gives much more opportunity for the "oppressing" language and other languages to appear on screen.

Although the Quebec legislation is not ideal for the Ukrainian situation because it does not,

| 121 perhaps, do enough to encourage the French language, a similar situation would likely appease

many of those protesting the current law, while ensuring that Ukrainian is given its rightful place

in cinema.

The current Ukrainian solution, though not a liberal one which leaves the choice up to the consumer, is a satisfactory one. It allows for movies to be shown in the country's minority

languages, though this has not yet been put into practice. It does not eliminate the Russian

language from the screen, nor does it require Russian movies to be dubbed. More flexibility in the percent of copies dubbed would likely alleviate some of the discord from distributors, and tax credits or other financial incentives would ease economic worry. Nevertheless, the Law on

Cinematography, if it remains in force for another few years, will reacquaint people with

Ukrainian as the language of the cinema and enlarge the section of the population that would choose to watch movies in Ukrainian over Russian. With time, more flexibility can be added to the legislation since the playing field of language demand will be more level. Therefore, despite certain inadequacies, the current legislation is a good method of bringing greater balance to the

relationship between the status of the Ukrainian and Russian languages in Ukraine.

IDENTITY THROUGH TRANSLATION, PART TWO

I now return to a concept introduced in chapter three: that of addressing identity through translation. As was mentioned, Annie Brisset presents a number of functions of translation based on the linguistic situation in Quebec which can be applied to the situation in Ukraine.

| 122 These functions, as identified for this thesis, are linguistic unification, re-territorialization and legitimacy. I will look somewhat more in-depth at how these three functions have fared in the translation of movies into Ukrainian, though each one merits far more attention that I have been able to devote.

First off is linguistic unification, whereby translation helps to standardize the target language. The question is whether or not the translation of movies into Ukrainian since January

2008 has created any further linguistic unity in Ukraine. A significant precedent was set by the television series ALF. Oleksa Nehrebetsky, the translator who gained recognition for his excellent translation on the series, spoke of the unifying element of the Ukrainian-translated series, saying that even so-called Ukraine-haters watched it. He tells the story of a friend's wife, an ethnic Russian, who would rush home after work to watch the show, with dinner for her husband being relegated to a lesser priority. Thus, if a significant section of the population is watching movies dubbed into Ukrainian, the terminology being used will seep into daily language across the country, disregarding regional boundaries. This already happens with

Russian slang and terminology, therefore promoting Ukrainian language through film could also permeate the country's linguistic landscape. Local differences are likely to persist, as are borrowings from Russian, Polish, English and other languages. Using Ukrainian as the language of dubbing can therefore serve to enrich the language and unite the vast country in using its own language.

The second function is linguistic re-territorialization. This involves replacing Russian with

Ukrainian as the main vernacular (local and familiar), vehicular (national or regional and learned

| 123 out of necessity) and referential (works of culture and tradition) languages. As was noted earlier,

it is important to understand that this does not mean excluding Russian from Ukraine's linguistic

landscape; it means that Ukrainian becomes the primary language, and Russian a secondary

one, specifically on the national scale. There exist organizations which are working towards this goal. NBB, for example, recently organized an initiative to encourage store and business

employees to make initial contact in Ukrainian. Once the language the customer feels more

comfortable with is established, the employee can then decide whether to continue in Ukrainian or Russian. It is this initial contact which is important in establishing Ukrainian as the language of

Ukraine. Similarly, movies dubbed into Ukrainian create another arena where this language is

used as the primary language. The reach of the Russian language within Ukraine continues to be acknowledged, with Russian movies subtitled, not dubbed, but it is clearly Ukrainian which is

identified as the language of the nation. As a target language of translation, it encompasses its

role as a vernacular language - the language of popular culture; a vehicular language - the language needed to watch movies; and a referential language-the language of established culture. The longer it remains in these roles, the more the general population will come to accept and assume Ukrainian as the primary language of Ukraine.

Brisset's final function of translation identified for this paper is that of linguistic legitimacy. This entails affirming Ukrainian as a full-fledged language in the minds of Ukrainian citizens and the rest of the world. Instead of being considered a spin-off dialect of Russian,

Ukrainian must be viewed as its own language, worthy of being used in all contexts and in all regions of Ukraine. Besides being used in standard areas such as government, schools, and

| 124 literature, Ukrainian has fallen by the wayside in many parts of Ukraine. By giving it a starring

role on the silver screen, the 2007 Law on Cinematography has provided the Ukrainian language

with an opportunity to show its versatility - in action, drama and comedy movies. Just as Michel

Garneau translates Shakespeare into Quebecois as a way of legitimizing that language (Brisset

340), so translating all genre of movie into Ukrainian will help in its own legitimization. With

some movies being lauded for their Ukrainian translation, the law has already done much to

legitimize the language. I would like to refer to a personal anecdote to show the progress that

has been made. On a personal trip to Ukraine in the summer of 2004, my Ukrainian-speaking

cousin in Lviv (western Ukraine) laughed at the absurdity of watching movies in Ukrainian. Yet four years later, on my most recent visit in fall 2008, she found the notion quite normal, despite

not going to the movies often. Thus, even the segment of the population which only rarely, if

ever, goes to the movies can become accustomed to Ukrainian as the language of the cinema

simply through the knowledge that it is now the standard. Linguistic legitimization through the

movies works, therefore, not only because it makes use of Ukrainian as a target language, but

also because it makes the presence of Ukrainian in movie theatres the status quo.

Movie translation is therefore a good vehicle through which to reclaim the Ukrainian

identity. It can unify the Ukrainian language, thereby creating unity among the Ukrainian people

by showcasing new Ukrainian terminology, whether slang or other. It can help to establish

Ukrainian as the primary, though not only, language of communication in Ukraine by using it across all registers, while creating a need for the language (in order to watch movies on the big screen). Finally, it can legitimize Ukrainian through its role as a target language, worthy of being the end product of a translation, These three functions of translation show that movie dubbing

can play a very important role in re-establishing language as a key component of the Ukrainian

identity.

Conclusion

Over the past twenty years, Ukraine has experienced drastic changes, most poignantly in its transition from Soviet republic to independent state. After centuries of subjugation by many of its neighbours - Lithuanians, Poles, Russians, Austrians, Hungarians, Romanians, Czechs and

Slovaks, Germans, and by Mongolian marauders - Ukraine is finally a sovereign state. The era of transition, however, is not yet completed. Ukraine continues to experience changes while asserting its place on the world stage, but also as it negotiates domestic politics.

| 126 Transition and instability are the norm when describing Ukrainian culture, politics, and

history, and those adjectives apply particularly well to its internal politics. In fact, as I wrote the

last few sentences of this thesis, I received an email from the Kino-Pereklad list-serve,

announcing that Hanna Chmil, the head of the State Department of Cinematography at the

Ministry of Culture and an ardent supporter of Ukrainian language translations, was fired from

her post for allowing a supposedly immoral film to be legally distributed in Ukraine. Chmil had

wisely sensed this instability in her interview with me one year ago when she said that there was

"no hope" that the Law on Cinematography in its current state would outlive a change in government. While the reality of her prediction will become clear in the new year, her own

abrupt dismissal highlights the uncertainty of politics in Ukraine.

Despite this uncertainty, nearly two relatively stable years have passed since the fateful

December 20, 2007 decree that altered the course of movie translations in Ukraine. As gathered from interviews and articles, reactions to mandatory Ukrainian-language movie translations can

be grouped into hopes-for a stronger movie industry, a more popular titular language, and a

unified nation-and fears-of an unprepared and inadequate movie industry, financial non- viability, and the possibility of breeding resentment by not taking into account real linguistic demand. While the hopes give reason for an optimistic future, the fears are legitimate and need to be taken into account if and when further amendments are made to the current legislation.

Some alternatives-quotas, subtitling, financial incentives-were provided by interviewees in chapter seven.

I turn finally to the title of my thesis - CINEMA TRANSLATION IN POST-COMMUNIST UKRAINE:

RECLAIMING THE UKRAINIAN IDENTITY. In the post-communist context, Ukraine has had to deal with

| 127 the legacies of a non-viable economy, corruption, censorship and an ambiguous Soviet identity.

Through movie dubbing, another feature inherited from the USSR, Ukraine is now purposefully

taking steps to reclaim its identity and to redefine it. The decision to make Ukrainian movie translations mandatory is part of this process. By showing films dubbed into Ukrainian, the

population is given access to a common language. By dubbing films into Ukrainian, the

population recognizes a popular language that is not only the language of the peasants and the

elite, but of all layers of society. By showing different genres of films dubbed into Ukrainian, the

population perceives the versatility of the language. Dubbing therefore unifies the language, re- territorializes it, and most importantly legitimizes it. Although it is too soon to gauge the

influence of Ukrainian-language movie translations on these goals, the process has been set in

motion.

As proposed, this thesis has presented an overview of the changes that have been

implemented over the last four years in the domain of movie translations in Ukraine. The

connection between identity and translation has been established through Annie Brisset's functions of translation. And the complexities of defining a clear linguistic policy have accompanied the analysis of research.

Nevertheless, this has been no more than an introductory report and further research is

necessary. It would be interesting to gauge audience reactions to Ukrainian-language movies through surveys or focus groups. Some of the fears warrant individual study, such as the quality of translations and of the dubbed final product. A more in-depth analysis of the possible outcomes of financial incentives on the dubbing industry would likewise be worthwhile. Since

| 128 this is merely a survey and introduction to the situation, any of the elements in the last two chapters - the present situation and research analysis - merit further study.

Throughout its history, Ukraine has been a borderland, handed back and forth between occupying forces. While some such as Poland have pursued balanced relations in the post- communist world, Russia has continued to insist on its supremacy in the region. Despite the bitter taste this has left for some, Ukraine cannot move into the future without taking account of and dealing with its past. Whether it decides to pursue a future as a monolingual nation state, a multicultural country, or somewhere in between, its decision will have repercussions not only on external relations with Russia and the West, but also on language policy. As this thesis has shown, language and therefore translation are key elements in defining, strengthening and supporting a nation's identity. Appendix A

Fig. A.l Map of present-day Europe. Laryssa Spolsky

Fig. A.2 Map of present-day Ukraine. Laryssa Spolsky

| 130 Appendix B

Sample Interview Questions (translated into English):

1. Can you please tell me what your name is and your profession?

2. How are you or have you been involved with translation, movie translation or the movie

industry in Ukraine?

3. Starting in January 2008, Ukrainian movie theatres are bound by law to show foreign films

dubbed, subtitled or voiced-over into Ukrainian.

a. In your opinion, is this a positive step? For the film industry? For the country? For

the Ukrainian language?

b. How does the government's decision influence your job?

4. Have you switched the language you use at your job because of the recent changes in the

cinematography law, or for other reasons?

5. What obstacles do you foresee on the path to general acceptance of Ukrainian-language

translations of foreign movies?

6. Personally, would you rather watch movies in the cinema in Ukrainian or in Russian?

7. What are the advantages of translating movies into Ukrainian versus Russian?

Disadvantages?

8. Is there a demand for subtitling in Ukraine, where people are used to dubbing and voice

overs?

9. Would you support subtitling in Ukraine, in light of its economic advantages?

10. (for distributors and movie theatre owners) Has movie theatre attendance fallen since the

law on movie translations came into force?

11. In your opinion, will Ukrainian translations of foreign films help to strengthen and legitimize

the Ukrainian language?

| 131 a. Is this necessary, or are language problems inexistent?

b. Does this depend on the age of the viewer?

12. Does cinema in Ukraine reach as many people as in North America or Western Europe?

13. In your opinion, would TV be a more appropriate medium to show state support for the

Ukrainian language?

14. Why do you support, or why do you oppose, the law which makes Ukrainian language

translations mandatory?

15. (for translators) What are the conditions of your job and how do they affect the quality of

translations?

16. Explain the difference in translation quality before and after the law came into effect.

17. Based on your knowledge, how do foreigners see the language situation in Ukraine?

18. In your opinion, is government control of the linguistic development of a country a bad

thing?

a. Why or why not?

19. How do cinema and TV translations differ?

a. What different methods are used to translate?

b. Is quality more important in one medium than the other?

20. Why does it seem that quality, an important element in the success of a translation, is not a

priority for companies which translate, if they even mention it at all?

21. (pro-Ukrainian language community activists) What inspired you to take part in

actions/events supporting the Ukrainian language?

22. (for those who oppose the law governing movie translations) Why do you support the status

quo, which is favourable to Russian, in the cinema?

23. Are you aware of any groups that, of their own initiative, support or are trying to stop

Ukrainian-language movie translations?

24. How would you define a nation's identity? Which are the most important aspects? Bibliography

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