Preacher Fire
Fuels and Fire Behavior Resulting in an Entrapment July 24, 2017
Facilitated Learning Analysis (FLA)
Photo Courtesy of BLM
BLM Carson City District Office, Nevada
Table of Contents
Page Executive Summary ------2 Methods ------2 Report Structure ------3 Conditions Affecting the Preacher Fire ------3 Fuel Conditions ------3 Fire Suppression Tactics ------4 Weather Conditions ------4 Communication Challenges ------4 Previous Fire History and Map ------4 The Story ------5 Lessons Learned, Observations & Recommendations from Participants ---- 16 Fuel Conditions and Fire Behavior ------16 Communications ------17 Aviation ------17 Escape Routes and Safety Zones ------17 Fire Shelters ------18 Radios ------18 BIC Lighters ------18 Medical Evaluation/Burn Protocols ------18 Preseason Planning and Preparation ------18 Signaling Devices ------19 Human Factors ------19 Discussion and Analysis ------20 Summary and Conclusions ------25 Recommendations by the FLA Team ------27 Appendix ------29-35 Timeline of Events ------29 Maps ------31 o Fire History Map ------31 o Preacher Fire Area Map ------32 o Route to First Lookout Position ------33 o Route to Second Lookout Position ------34 o Location Where Lookout was Rescued ------35
Preacher Fire Facilitated Learning Analysis (FLA)
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uel loading in this part of the Great Basin is at historic highs. The resultant fuels- driven fires are moving much quicker and more intensely than many firefighters have experienced. Firefighters may not have seen this type of fire behavior in well over a Fdecade. Past effective traditional tactics are less effective this season.
The Preacher Fire was started by lightning at approximately 0330 0n July 24, 2017. Local fire department personnel arrived on scene soon after, with additional firefighting resources arriving throughout the day. By early afternoon, the crews and aviation assets had made significant progress and felt the fire was close to being buttoned up. However, at approximately 1700, a wind shift occurred and pushed the fire past containment lines at the heel of the fire. The fire rapidly grew from 400 acres to over 5,000 acres. As a result, the escape route for the Iron Mountain Type 2 IA hand crew lookout was compromised, forcing him to retreat from the fire through unburned fuels. During his escape, he dropped his line gear, inadvertently leaving behind his fire shelter. After retreating for approximately one mile, he started an escape fire to create a safety zone. This aided a Type I helicopter to quickly locate him. After a brief radio exchange between the lookout and the helicopter, the helicopter landed. The lookout boarded the aircraft and was flown to the helibase at the Minden-Tahoe Airport. He was then driven to the local hospital for evaluation and treatment, and sent to the nearest regional burn center. An interagency U.S. Forest Service and BLM Facilitated Learning Analysis (FLA) Team arrived on July 27. The team included diverse subject matter experts (SMEs) from four regions within the two agencies. The team was asked to focus on how the events and decision-making that led up to this incident, made sense to those involved.
Methods.
The FLA Team completed a 72-hour Report. The FLA Team conducted interviews, made site visits and gathered information to prepare a Rapid Lesson Shared (RLS) document that focused on fuels and fire behavior. The FLA Team completed this Facilitated Learning Analysis (FLA), which focused on the events and circumstances of July 24. The Team gathered and analyzed photos, videos, audio fragments, maps, dispatch logs, and incident documentation. They shared portions of the Narrative, Lessons Learned with key interviewees to clarify details and facilitated a group dialog session with the Iron Mountain Type 2 IA hand crew to generate deeper learning from this event.
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Report Structure. The FLA Team developed the report structure based on the details of the incident, the needs of the organization, and FLA principles. This report includes these sections: Conditions Affecting the Preacher Fire. Describes fuel conditions, fire suppression tactics, weather, communication challenges and the area’s fire history. The Story. Describes events surrounding the entrapment and emergency extraction, and what the fuels and fire behavior conditions were leading up to the day of the fire. Lessons Learned, Observations, and Recommendations from Participants. Offers forward-looking perspectives from the involved personnel. Their thoughts are offered with minimal processing to provide material for future discussion and action. Discussion and Analysis. Takes a deeper look at events and circumstances shaping this event and provides opportunities for group discussion. Summary and Conclusions. Provides insights into new issues and helps reinforce existing safety practices and protocols. Recommendations. Provides concrete action points for programmatic improvement, from the FLA Team. Maps. These five maps are included at the end of this document. Please click on the name of the map to view it. o Fire History Map o Preacher Fire Area Map o Route to First Lookout Position o Route to Second Lookout Position o Location Where Lookout was Rescued
Conditions Affecting the Preacher Fire
Fuel Conditions. This area of Nevada has experienced several years of drought, followed by record-breaking snow in 2017, which produced twice as much moisture than normal. The excessive winter moisture promoted vigorous growth of cheatgrass, a non-native invasive species, and considerably changed the fuel matrix in the cheatgrass/sagebrush/pinyon-juniper communities from recent years.
Normal fire return intervals in this area were 60-110 years; with cheatgrass, fire return intervals have decreased to five years or less. Cheatgrass is highly flammable, grows faster and displaces native plants such as sagebrush. The area where the Preacher Fire occurred has not burned since 2013, which resulted in a dense mat of cheatgrass underneath the new cheatgrass crop.
Cheatgrass
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The Great Basin Coordination Center issued a Fuels and Fire Behavior Advisory prior to the July 24 incident. It was updated on July 28, 2017 and most recently on August 11, 2017.
Fire Suppression Tactics. Due to the density of this season’s cheatgrass crop, water and retardant drops were less effective than in previous years. Retardant drop levels were increased to improve retardant effectiveness. In addition, use of dozers as a fire fighting tool in this area were restricted due to sensitive resources and the mix of federal and private lands.
Weather Conditions. On the morning of July 24, strong thunderstorms moved through the area, producing numerous lightning strikes but little moisture. A high pressure system then began to build over the area, bringing drier air and warmer temperatures. The topography of the Pine Nut Mountains, in conjunction with valley floor heating, regularly produces variable, gusty and erratic winds throughout the day. During the summer months along the Sierra Front Range, a meteorological condition known as Zephyr winds that blow from the west and southwest, commonly occur in the mid-afternoon until late evening. This condition is caused by a temperature differential between the Eastern Sierra Range Mountains and the valley bottom floor to the east. Strong westerly winds occur as a result, and can be further influenced by local terrain features.
Communication Challenges. On the morning of the initial attack, there was only one tactical channel assigned to the fireline crews, so intra-crew communication occurred on non- tactical frequencies. As a result, communication that would have benefitted the entire fire occurred on frequencies that were not being monitored by all. In addition, line of sight radio communication was hampered by the hilly terrain and required the use of “human repeaters” to maintain effective communication.
Previous Fire History. The map to the right depicts the fire history for the last 45 years in the area of the Preacher Fire. Past wildfires have significantly altered fuel loading, by decreasing sagebrush and pinyon-juniper and increasing cheatgrass. A larger version of this map is located at the end of this document in the Maps Section.
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The Story
his story has a happy ending. A crew lookout survived being entrapped by a dangerous fuel-driven wildfire with a combination of luck, quick thinking, calm direction from his T supervisors and highly skilled pilots, who were able to land their Type I helicopter in the face of an oncoming fire to pluck the lookout from danger. Early morning severe thunderstorms on July 24 woke residents of Nevada’s Great Basin area. Multiple lightning strikes rained down on the area, and ignited several wildfires on the BLM Carson City, Nevada District. One lightning strike started the Preacher Fire, located in the Pine Nut Mountains, seven miles southeast of Gardnerville, Nevada. The terrain was demanding and dangerous, populated by sagebrush, rock outcroppings and acres of heavy, dense cheatgrass, an aggressive non-native invasive species that was known to burn hot.
The fire history in this area had The area of the fire was in mix land ownership of federal fostered a solid working and private lands. With the area’s long wildfire history, a relationship between the local, strong working relationship was developed between the state and federal cooperators. The local, state and federal cooperators. This relationship cooperators have several operating allowed for seamless resource ordering processes and a meetings that cover cost share unified command structure that the local area resources agreements, operating plans, were used to working under. ordering processes, rolls and responsibilities, and unified The fire was first reported to the local 911 dispatch center, command structure. who contacted the local fire department. They responded In addition, these cooperators and located the fire off Buffalo Canyon Road, but could not have conducted preseason medical find vehicle access to the fire. Due to firefighter safety and evacuation, search and rescue, and several open mine shafts in the area, they waited for evacuation drills that have daylight before engaging the fire. As they continued to continued to strengthen their working knowledge of each establish access points to the fire, the local fire chief agencies capabilities, making ordered additional resources to assist in managing the fire. incident response in the area Two members of a helitack crew were the first firefighters seamless. to arrive on the fire’s edge, just north of the fire. They hiked up-slope to the heel and established an anchor point around 0800 hours. At that time, the fire was on a northerly slope and had a north wind blowing across the area. The lead firefighter established radio communication with Operations, discussed tactics and immediately began working with aviation assets. The two firefighters were soon joined by an eight-person helitack crew. Over the next few hours, more crews arrived, including four type 2 initial attack (IA) crews; one interagency hot shot crew; an eight-person initial attack module; local fire department engines and numerous aviation assets.
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The fire was initially divided into Division Tango and Division Echo. However, as the fire continued to burn to the south, threating subdivisions and Highway 395, three structure protection groups were stood up. These groups were made up of mostly local fire department engines and personnel. Divisions Tango and Echo were assigned tactical frequency Vfire22, and the structure protection groups were assigned Vfire23. Division Tango: The lead firefighter from the first helitack crew was a fully-qualified DIVS and assumed the role of Division Tango. As the fire continued to move to the south, it began to threaten Highway 395 and a 250-home subdivision. Division Tango became the fire’s priority division and was assigned a type 1 interagency hotshot crew, two type 2 IA crews, three Single Engine Air Tankers (SEAT) and several helicopters. A structure protection group was assigned to a subdivision to the south of the fire; a second to a subdivision to the west of the fire and the third group was to help in staging (later to become Ruby Mine Structure Group). Division Echo. The Iron Mountain Type 2 IA hand crew (Iron Mountain) arrived at the ICP at 0900 and The Iron Mountain Crew is made up of three 10 person Fuels/IA modules received a briefing on their assignment. During the off the Eldorado National Forest. For briefing, captain 26 was assigned Division Echo consistency all three modules division supervisor (Echo DIVS) and captain 23 as his command structure are set up the trainee (Echo DIVS (t)). Assistant captain 26 was same with; one Captain, one Asst. assigned crew boss (Iron Mountain crew boss) and Captain, one senior firefighter and assistant captain 23 helped manage the crew. seven firefighter. The three modules are on a set Iron Mountain came from the Eldorado National rotation for off forest assignments. Forest’s Georgetown and Placerville Ranger Districts. This rotation also addresses rotation Nearly all the crew were seasoned firefighters, with a of “Chief of Party” duties between the wide range of training and experience. This tight-knit three Captains. When a resource crew’s leadership placed safety as their highest priority. order is filled with the Iron Mountain The crew also prided themselves on their physical crew, two of the modules fill the order conditioning, camaraderie, esprit de corps and their while one module stays on the forest as an IA resource. commitment to take care of each other. For the Preacher Fire, the Iron The day of the Preacher Fire was day 13 of a 14-day Mountain Crew consisted of Module assignment. Their first 10 days were on the 83,733-acre 23, form the Georgetown District, and Module 26 from the Placerville Long Valley Fire, near Doyle, California. It was a District. The Iron Mountain Lookout grueling fire assignment with hot temperatures, very was from Module 26. dry grass and sagebrush fuels (similar fuel type as the Preacher Fire), afternoon Zephyr winds and two days of red flag warnings. Iron Mountain relocated to the Carson City BLM District Office three days before the Preacher Fire to provide support to the district. When Iron Mountain arrived around 0900, the fire appeared to be between 40-60 acres. The crew was briefed about the weather, erratic winds and current fuel conditions. During the crew’s briefings, it was mentioned that the previous winter’s precipitation had washed out many of the two-track roads, making them impassable. The senior firefighter from Module 26 was assigned as Iron Mountain lookout. He immediately geared up and left on foot to find a strategic position. The rest of the crew arrived at the division break at the heel/north end of the fire. They met with Division Tango at 1030, discussed plans and tactics and again briefed on Lookouts, Communications, Escape Routes and Safety Zones (LCES) and firefighting tactics. Iron Mountain lookout was an experienced firefighter known for his excellent physical conditioning, quick speed, good communication skills and experience with fast-moving fires. Although he was offered the use of a truck, he chose to hike the half-mile from the parking area to his first lookout position, which was perched on a knob north of the fire in unburned fuels.
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This gave him a view of all of Divisions Echo and Tango’s operation and allowed him to watch the air show. Iron Mountain lookout checked in via radio with Iron Lookouts or scouts (roving lookouts) Mountain crew boss and identified his position north of need to be in a position where both the fire. Iron Mountain crew boss asked him to give a the objective hazard and the mirror flash so the whole crew could confirm his location. firefighters can be seen. Lookouts Due to cloud cover and the position of the sun, the must be trained to observe the lookout was unable to establish a mirror flash. wildland fire environment and to recognize and anticipate wildland Throughout the day, the lookout provided visual weather fire behavior changes. updates and maintained radio contact every 15-20 Each situation determines the minutes. As the crew progressed up the ridge to the south number of lookouts that are needed. away from the lookout, they became spread out and radio Because of terrain, cover and fire communications became problematic, so the lookout was size, one lookout is normally not sufficient. The whole idea is when enlisted to also work as a “human repeater.” the objective hazard becomes a At approximently 1230, Eagle Valley, an eight person IA danger, the lookout relays the module, arrived at the parking area and was assigened to information to the firefighter so they can reposition to the safety zone. Division Echo. They were briefed by Echo DIVS (t) and Each firefighter has the authority hiked to the fire. When they arrived on the fire’s edge, to warn others when they notice an Eagle Valley and Iron Mountain crew boss discussed objective hazard which becomes a tactics and LCES over the tatical frequency. Eagle Valley threat to safety. took a short bump ahead of Iron Mountain to start cold trailing and hotspoting the fire. It did not take long for Iron Mountain to tie into Eagle Valley’s starting point, so Iron Mountain took a short bump in front of Eagle Valley and continued moving to the south towards the southern division break. Around 1300, the fire crested over the ridgeline and Iron Mountain lookout radioed that he was going to reposition himself to maintain eyes on the crew and improve communication. He crossed the road and picked out a second lookout position on a ridgeline about three-quarters of a mile from his first position. He noticed that the hills were grassy with some shale. As Iron Mountain lookout was repositioning, the Slide Mountain Type 2 IA crew arrived at the parking area and was briefed by Echo DIVS (t). After arriving on the fire’s edge, Slide Mountain tied in with Iron Mountain crew boss and discussed the best tactical approach with multiple crews on the division. It was decided that Slide Mountain would take a bump out in front of Iron Mountain to start cold trailing and hotspotting the fire’s edge. By early afternoon, everything was looking good. The fire was about 400 acres, but the crews and aviation assets had made significant progress. Around 1600, Iron Mountain tied into Slide Mountain’s starting point. Iron Mountain crew boss radioed Slide Mountain to see if Iron Mountain needed to take a bump and pick up the fire’s edge in front of them. Slide Mountain relayed that they were about to tie into resources from Division Tango. “There is no need to bump us…hold what you got. We are running out of real estate. Keep all other incoming resources to hold the back door.” Iron Mountain crew boss then relayed the message to Eagle Valley and asked them to spread out to hold and improve their section of line and to keep an eye on the back door.
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This map shows the lookout's tracks and progression of the Preacher Fire. The red arrows show the slop over’s direction of spread. As this radio communication was going on, a third Type 2 IA crew arrived at the parking area and Echo DIVS (t) briefed them. This crew was assigned to “hold the back door” on Division Echo from the division break to the backside of Eagle Valley. Iron Mountain spread out between Slide Mountain and Eagle Valley and moved into mop-up operations. Containment lines had been tested earlier by scattered thunderstorms that produced brief periods of high winds, hail and rain. Throughout the day, the winds were shifting and pushed the fire around, but was never a problem for the crews. However, around 1700, conditions changed when a slop over occurred and the winds pushed the fire past containment lines at the heel of the fire to the northeast towards Buffalo Canyon. Iron Mountain lookout picked up the smoke from the slop over and radioed Echo DIVS about the slop over.
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Echo DIVS (t) saw that the slop over was just west of the division break inside Tango. He tried calling Tango on both the tactical and command frequencies but was not able to make contact. Echo DIVS called air attack at 1655 and requested buckets to hit the slop over, and additional helicopter support was requested as the slop over become more established in the bottom of Buffalo Canyon. Air attack also ordered heavy air tankers, including a Very Large Air Tanker (VLAT). The VLAT was overhead at 1705 and all other aerial resources were placed into holding patterns. The lead plane was having difficulty getting a “clean line of air” for the VLAT due to the turbulence from the shifting up-canyon winds. As the slop over rapidly grew to the north and east, crews on Division Echo stepped into their safety zone, the black of the main fire. At the same time, Division Tango called all resources on Tango advising them to get into their safety zones and to confirm a full head count for division personnel. Iron Mountain lookout’s planned escape route was to the west, down the ridge to Buffalo Canyon Road and out to the parking area – his safety zone. He could see a stringer of fire moving towards the road below his position, and knew he needed to move. At 1715, he started down his planned escape route and tried to radio Iron Mountain crew boss, who was on the other side of a ridge and out of line of sight communication. However, assistant captain 23 heard and Up to this point, the overhead on answered Iron Mountain lookout. Iron Mountain lookout Iron Mountain thought the told assistant captain 23 he was heading to his safety zone. lookout had a truck close to his Assistant captain 23 replied, “Let me know when you get position. It is common practice back to the truck.” When Iron Mountain lookout replied that for lookouts working in light he did not have the truck, assistant captain 23 realized the flashy fuels to have a truck, ATV true urgency of the situation and he began to closely monitor or UTV to use as part of their the situation. escape route plan. Having a vehicle would allow a lookout to Iron Mountain lookout started down his planned escape move faster down the planned route. He said running down the ridge was like “running on escape route to a safety zone. marbles.” He entered a shallow saddle that obscured his view Although the lookout was of the oncoming fire. By the time he got to the other side of offered the use of a truck, he did the saddle, he realized he needed to get off the ridge and not use it. The lookout had asked the onsite local fire department turned north, half running, half sliding down a steep slope, personnel about the road system straight to the road. There wasn’t a lot of smoke and he before leaving the parking area. thought everything was OK. As he hit the road, the ridge He was told, “The roads are all completely blocked his view of the fire and he continued to washed out and there are no move towards the parking area. When he rounded a bend in good turn around points up the road, he was hit with a slurry of orange and black smoke there.” and got “sucker-punched” with a blast of hot air. “Damn It!! With this information and I’m cut off and in a bad spot.” looking at the terrain, the lookout decided to leave the Iron Mountain lookout immediately turned around and truck and hike to his first lookout started running up Buffalo Canyon Road to the east and position a half-mile away. radioed Echo DIVS, “I’m cut off; fire is 400 feet behind me and I am headed east on the road.” Echo DIVS contacted air attack on the air-to-ground frequency. “Priority bucket support for a firefighter in need. Iron Mountain lookout is in front of the fire!” Overhearing this radio traffic, assistant captain 23 began to fear for Iron Mountain lookout’s life. He said he was hit by a heavy feeling of panic and
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fear for Iron Mountain lookout. Assistant captain 23 said his heart was pounding so hard it felt like it was about to jump out of his chest because he was concerned that Iron Mountain lookout may not make it back to the parking area. Iron Mountain lookout was trained to drop line gear to lighten his load. He knew he needed to take his radio, fire shelter and hand tool. He threw his line gear on the upper cut bank of the road to remove his equipment. The cord to his external speaker mic was woven into the webbing of his line gear, which is something that many firefighters do to keep the cord out of the way. The KNG radio is difficult to separate from the external speaker mic under normal conditions, because it has a significantly smaller attachment screw than the familiar DPH radios. In addition, Iron Mountain lookout was the only person on the crew who had a KNG radio. The urgency of the situation made it even more difficult to disconnect his radio mic. He felt it took an extraordinary amount of time and was extremely frustrated when he finally removed the radio from his line gear. As Iron Mountain lookout was struggling to unscrew the speaker mic from the radio, he kept yelling at himself over and over, “NOT The pen points to the location of TODAY! This is not happening today! DON’T RUN! Not yet! the button on the KNG radio that Get your stuff!” was difficult to release.
Thoughts of his loved ones flooded his mind as he finally separated his radio from the speaker mic. He thought he had already placed his shelter in his Nomex shirt, so he grabbed his hand tool and continued his escape. Air attack contacted Iron Mountain lookout to establish his location and asked him if he had a signal mirror to help locate his position. Iron Mountain lookout said his signal mirror was in his line gear which he had dropped. While he was running from the fire, Iron Mountain lookout continued to maintain radio communication with Echo DIVS and assistant captain 23 on the crew channel, and with air attack on air-to-ground. He sounded out of breath, but after dropping his line gear, he was able to move faster and was easily out-pacing the fire. This opened up his options and he became more comfortable with his very bad situation. Iron Mountain lookout had gotten a pretty good lay of the land from both lookout positions and the only thing going through his mind was, “What is your next move?” Iron Mountain lookout could see an air tanker dropping retardant around some structures at Ruby Mine to his Lookout's burned line gear. His east. He called air attack and told them he was moving shelter is the black box in the middle “towards that last tanker drop,” who responded, “That’s of the photo. a good call.” Air attack then realized Iron Mountain lookout was on the opposite side of the smoke column and radioed the lead plane to start looking for Iron Mountain lookout. During these radio
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conversations, a Type I helicopter was heading towards the dip site and overheard the traffic. The two pilots discussed if they should help look for Iron Mountain lookout or continue to the dip site, fill the bucket, and then go look for him. As they watched the fire behavior, they knew Iron Mountain lookout did not have time for them to get another bucket. That’s when air attack asked air operations, “Can we get a helicopter up to help look for this guy?” The Type I helicopter immediately responded, “We got this.” The first pilot on the Type I helicopter was known to be “one of the best pilots for the company and could really fly with precision and finesse.” The second pilot had experience flying a Type I during several operational missions in Afghanistan and trained other pilots how to fly this aircraft while serving in US military. The pilots briefed the third crew member about the mission change. The third crewmember’s primary responsibility was to monitor the helicopter’s hydraulic systems, serve as inflight mechanic and serve as a third set of eyes during flight operations. The third crew member also had experience flying in the same type of helicopter during combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan as a military crew chief. He partially lowered the helicopter’s rear ramp and started looking for Iron Mountain lookout. Burned area. Iron Mountain lookout's hand tool is laying in At this point, Division Tango had a confirmed head count for the middle of the two-track. all their assigned resources and that they were all in the black. “Nothing left All Tango could do at that point was, “Watch and listen in horror. I for me to do but said a long prayer for him.” watch and Iron Mountain lookout continued to sprint up the road going east. listen in As he was scrambling to escape, a calm voice came over the radio horror.” and asked him if he had his cell phone and if he had a lighter. That voice was assistant captain 23, who told him they could get a GPS point from his cell phone for air attack to locate him. Iron Mountain lookout replied that he didn’t have time to turn it on, but he did have his lighter. Assistant captain 23 told him to start some escape fires to create a safety zone.
“As I was lighting Iron Mountain lookout sprinted up the road looking for an open- flat area to light the fires. He found a grassy area and lit the my escape fires, I escape fires. The wind suddenly went calm, so he lit more escape realized I didn’t fires. At this point, Iron Mountain lookout realized he did not have my shelter.” have his fire shelter and it reminded him of past fatality fires. Then the winds picked up and his fires took off. Since Iron Mountain lookout was between his escape fires and the wall of fire coming towards him, he stepped into the black of his fires for safety. He called assistant captain 23 and told him, “I have burned about 2 acres of grass and I feel more comfortable. I have a safety zone.” Hearing this, Echo DIVS, assistant captain 23 and other Iron Mountain crew members felt slightly relieved, but knew the situation was still very serious. Fortunately, along came the cavalry in the form of the Type I helicopter. The helicopter did not see Iron Mountain lookout at first and flew right over the top of him, but the smoke and active fire from his escape fires helped the helicopter crew locate him. The third crew member spotted
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him and told the pilots, “He’s at our six.” They pulled the helicopter into a hard 180 degree right-hand turn and told air attack, “We got him in sight!” The helicopter was hovering over him; the rotors fanning the flames of the escape fires, making a bigger safety zone. The main fire was rapidly getting closer. The helicopter pilots asked Iron Mountain lookout if he saw a spot for them to land and he said no, but he would “take a ride in that bucket!” Click here to watch a video of events on the Preacher Fire. The three members of the helicopter crew discussed the options of loading Iron Mountain lookout into the helicopter or into the bucket. They decided to load him into the helicopter because they felt there was less risk to have a fourth person in the helicopter than dangling in the bucket. They also decided that if they could not find a place to land, they would load him into the bucket as the last option. The pilots saw a flat area on top of a small hill just above Iron Mountain lookout to land the helicopter. The pilots radioed the lookout to tell him they were “landing on top of the hill,” and to come up to them. Iron Mountain lookout responded, “No…. the fire is running up that slope.” The pilots pulled the helicopter back into a hover looking for another place to set the ship down. They saw a location to land between two skeleton pinyon-juniper snags. They knew it was going to be a tight spot to land, but with three sets of eyes to watch the spacing between the rotor blades and snags, they felt comfortable landing. The three-person crew was in constant communication as they lowered the ship between the snags and between the main fire and the lookout’s escape fires. The back end of a Chinook Helicopter. The lookout climbed in to the back of Around 1812, the bucket hit the ground, and the lookout the helicopter and not the bucket. started toward the bucket to get in, but realized the helicopter was landing. Not fully sure of what was going on, he ran back into the black of his escape fires, thinking, “I just survived outrunning this fire, now the helicopter is coming down? We’re going to have an incident within an incident, within an incident, within an incident!” “The helo was coming down super slow, then the back of the helo “It was amazing touched the ground.” The back end opened up and the third crew piloting. Kept the member waved the lookout to get in. He was slightly up slope nose up; back from the back of the helicopter, so he had to “duck walk” beneath down.” the rotors to get into the helicopter. Inside helicopter, the noise of the engines was deafening, so the third crew member had to point to the jump seats near the front of the helicopter where the Iron Mountain lookout was to sit. The third crew member strapped him into the jump seat, told the pilots, “Got him strapped in; appears uninjured and breathing fine. He is all smiles right now.” The pilot in command (PIC) started easing the helicopter up from the ground. He knew he had to negotiate the 200 foot long line and get the bucket off the ground. The second in command (SIC) pilot transmitted over air-to-ground, “We got the guy!” As the PIC was working on finessing the helicopter, long line and bucket off the ground, the SIC saw the main fire quickly moving in on their position. The SIC told the PIC, “This is no time to be cute, get us off the ground now!” The PIC looked up and saw the wall of fire and smoke in
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front of him, pulled max power, and got the helicopter into the air. The PIC noted, “The wall of flames and smoke was intimidating from inside the helicopter, I can only imagine what it was like from the ground.” While the Iron Mountain lookout was running from the fire, back at the Incident Command Post (ICP) the local fire chief, incident commander (IC), called the 911 center to order an ambulance to a large road intersection where the helicopter could land and transfer the lookout to the ambulance. Air operations informed the helicopter of the ambulance’s location, but the helicopter pilots were unfamiliar with the area and said that Iron Mountain lookout was in good condition and they were going to the helibase. The ambulance was directed to the helibase, a 15- minute drive away. At approximately 1818, the helicopter landed at the Minden-Tahoe Helibase. The Type I helicopter manager trainee loaded Iron Mountain lookout into his truck and drove him to the other side of the helibase to meet the ambulance. The ambulance arrived at the helibase at 1825, and met the lookout. The ambulance crew were expecting to transport someone with a serious injury and were surprised when Iron Mountain lookout limped up to them. He said his only injury was his ankle, but did not require treatment or ambulance transport, so the ambulance departed. Shortly after 1840, Echo DIVS arrived at the helibase. He located the Iron Mountain lookout and observed that he was coughing heavily, had trouble taking deep breaths, and his breathing was raspy. Echo DIVS had experienced a burn injury earlier in his career and recognized the symptoms that the As the Iron Mountain lookout was presenting. Echo DIVS initiated the Burn Injury lookout was being Criteria Protocol in the 2017 Red Book. He took Iron Mountain transferred to the lookout to a local medical center, arriving at 1950. They were met regional burn center, by a Carson City BLM District hospital liaison who assisted in Echo DIVS tied in with getting the appropriate injury and medical care paperwork the Iron Mountain crew to update them on the started. Iron Mountain lookout received chest and ankle x-rays lookout. The crew then and breathing treatments for his trachea. The local ER doctor conducted an After referred him to a regional burn unit for additional treatment. Action Review. At 2100, Iron Mountain lookout was air transported to the regional burn center, where he was met by his girlfriend and the Eldorado NF hospital liaison. At the regional burn center, he was evaluated and treated for minor burn injuries to his trachea, and was discharged early in the morning of July 25 with no work-related restrictions.
Wait!!!! This story is not over…To finish this story, we must go back a few hours…. As the fire progressed into late morning, a resident from the Ruby Mine area stopped at the ICP and voiced his concerns about the fire. A type 6 engine, with a two person crew, from a neighboring fire department was sent to Ruby Mine to assess the situation. When the engine arrived, they found a cluster of five homes, several outbuildings, eight residents with six vehicles. The Ruby Mine homes sat on top of a predominant hilltop at the base of the Pine Nut Mountains. The one-lane unimproved road leading into Ruby Mine had suffered washout during last winter’s storms. This road transverse off the hill side to the northeast down the steep slope. It had four heavy corners and two sharp switchback curves before reaching Pinenut Road in the bottom of a drainage. On the northeast slope, a two-track road
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transversed fuels that changed from the heavy cheatgrass and skeleton snags, to a thick stand of live pinyon-juniper trees with a heavy cheatgrass understory. The engine boss radioed to ICP about what they found at Ruby Mine and that the fire was still a long distance away. The engine crew was asked to stage at Ruby Mine, to be a point of contact for the residents and act as an additional lookout. More fire department overhead arrived to assist the local fire chief with span of control and resource management. One local fire department battalion chief (battalion) was assigned to Ruby Mine. The battalion drove to Ruby Mine, tied in with the on-site engine and discussed what the engine had found during their assessment. They determined there was only one home site that could act as a safety zone. They also had concerns about the condition of the road. Due to the number of residents on-site, they decided if they needed to retreat from the Ruby Mine, they would convoy the group down the road out to Pinenut Road then to the ICP. The battalion and the engine would work with the residents to prepare for an evacuation. When the fire slopped over and became established in Buffalo Canyon, the IC called the 911 center and ordered mandatory evacuations of the Pinenut Road area, which included Ruby Mine. The 911 center activated the reverse 911 system with the evacuation order. At the same time, local sheriff deputies and the county search and rescue personnel went house-to-house informing residents of the evacuation. The battalion at Ruby Mine saw that the fire was going to reach their location and called for retardant to be dropped around the structures. He gathered all the residents into their vehicles to drive out their planned escape route. However, at that time, they learned that the Iron Mountain lookout was on the run and all radio traffic was held to priority traffic only. After the Iron Mountain lookout was rescued, the battalion called air attack notifying him he was leading the residents and the engine off Ruby Mine to the northeast down the two-track road towards Pinenut Road. The lead plane saw that the fire crossed Pinenut Road and was running towards the switchback corner below the Ruby Mine group. The fire had 10-15 foot flames torching out the live pinyon-juniper on both sides of the road. The lead plane advised the battalion to turn around and go back to the structures because their escape route was compromised. The lead plane directed the heavy air tankers, scoopers and VLAT to drop additional retardant and water around the Ruby Mine structures to help reinforce their safety zone. Hearing this traffic, the battalion got all eight vehicles turned around and headed back to the structures. He had everyone go to the one structure that had defensible space mitigation work done around it, to use as a safety zone. The battalion called the ICP around 1820and updated them about their situation, but he was feeling comfortable with their safety zone and even more comfortable with all the retardant and water drops. The fire hit the retardant lines around the Ruby Mine structure group and split into two fronts, burning around the cluster of homes. The residents, battalion and engine crew held in place as the fire burned around them. The battalion called ICP to report they had no injuries and no lost structures. They stayed in place waiting for the area to cool down.
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The battalion checked the conditions along the two-track road several times over the next few hours, but the heat was too intense to safely drive out. They held in place into the night. Around 0230, the local fire chief (IC) drove up Pinenut Road with a type 6 engine to reach the Ruby Mine structure group. As they approached the bottom of the Ruby Mine two-track road, the fire chief found the fire activity was a backing fire with an occasional pinyon-juniper tree torching out. He called the battalion to gather everyone up, because it was safe to drive out. At 0330, the residents from the Ruby Mine structures were at the Red Cross evacuation center and the battalion and engine were at the ICP.
So how does this story have a happy ending? Well… No one was seriously injured or killed. There were no structures lost. There was an opportunity to learn something. And the happiest news of all — Iron Mountain lookout proposed to his girlfriend two weeks after this event and she said, “Yes!”
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Lessons Learned, Observations and
Recommendations from Participants
Fuel Conditions and Fire Behavior As described in the 2017 Great Basin Fuels and Fire Behavior Advisory, the vertical growth and density of cheatgrass this year was much more pronounced and overtopped an already dense mat of vegetation from the previous growing season. These conditions have not been experienced in this area since 2005. “There is a lot of fuel loading. Most of the firefighters on the ground haven’t seen conditions like this.” (District FMO) Firefighters need to give as much credence to new information in advisories and briefings as they do to their past experience. “You can’t rely on previous experience this year in this fuel type.” (Line officer) The use of water and retardant is much less effective than previous fire seasons since fires are able to burn under the retardant and continue to spread. Water and retardant lines must be followed up by ground resources, otherwise the fire continues to progress through aerial applied water and retardant. Fire intensity and higher rates of spread are greater than previous fire seasons due to the density and vertical structure of cheatgrass. Wind from local influences and/or thunderstorms can and often result in extreme fire behavior, especially with these fuel conditions. Greater and prolonged burning periods have occurred during the night. This has decreased the This photo shows patches of unburned operational effectiveness of nighttime firefighting. fuel in the middle of a retardant line. Greater rates of spread and larger fire perimeters cause hand “You don’t know crews to be more spread out, and requires a more frequent what you don’t reassessment of LCES. know. But you Continuously evaluate changing variables within your fire can know what environment to determine the most appropriate strategies and you haven’t tactics. experienced.”
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Past experiences reinforced the mindset that cheatgrass fires could often “We had be contained with cold trailing/hot-spotting techniques. The current fuels conditions necessitate reassessment of tactics. the fire in the bag.” Even when everything looks good on a fire and you think it is contained, employ solid tactics to ensure that “your back door isn’t open.”
Communications Line of sight radio communication in this terrain is typically problematic and requires the use of “human repeaters” to maintain communications. Radio communication is often challenging during initial attack. However, as crews become spread out, it can become even more problematic. As a lookout, it is critical to establish and maintain communication with other lookouts. When a lookout relocates, inform all adjacent resources of the specific location. As an incoming resource, ensure a proper briefing is received and understood. It should cover current conditions, any exceptional or unusual circumstances, and any other local fire management concerns. “Crews use intra-crew frequencies. They are not always on the tactical channels where conversations can be heard by all. The DIVS must be in the loop for plans that are being made before they are implemented.” (DIVS) As the DPH radio is being slowly phased out of wildland fire operations and newer style of radios are being introduced, hands-on training and familiaraziation of the newer radios needs to be emphasized.
Aviation “In certain life-threatening emergencies, it may be necessary for personnel to deviate from policy. This may include seating configuration, PPE and riding in unapproved aircraft and/or with unapproved Pilots. A SAFECOM outlining the deviation from policy should be submitted as soon as practical.” 2016 Interagency Helicopter Operations Guide (IHOG). Question: Are firefighters and helicopter pilots aware of this? As soon as it is known that a ground resource is missing or in trouble, appropriate aviation assets should be immediately reassigned to look for the missing resource.
Escape Routes and Safety Zones Higher than normal fire intensity necessitates the need for firefighters to be very close to the black and to maintain effective escape routes and safety zones. As single resources separate from crews, the need for communicating their intended escape plan, escape routes and safety zones is essential for resource accountability. Exceptional current fuel conditions in the Great Basin, requires resources to evaluate escape plans and safety zones differently than in previous years. “In this fuel type, I don’t want people in the green without a rig [vehicle].” (DIVS) Leaders need to be more specific on leaders’ intent on being one foot in the black.
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Firefighters generally have great physical conditioning programs. However, excellent physical fitness alone cannot be relied on to outrun fires. You will not always be able to outrun a fire. Consider ATV/UTVs for lookouts to use as part of their escape plan if they can’t access their position with a truck due to washed out roads or terrain.
Fire Shelters This incident and the often unpredictable nature of wildfire, reinforces the need to always have your fire shelter on hand.
Radios With multiple incidents in the area, tactical aviation frequencies were experiencing bleed- over from other aviation assets in the area. The bandwidth difference for the rotor wing Victor and assigned fixed wing frequencies are too narrow. There is significant bleed-over between the two that has serious safety implications. The connection between the KNG and other new radios and the remote mic can be difficult to quickly disconnect. Under pressure, it can be extremely difficult. It is common practice to weave the remote mic wire through the webbing of the fire line gear to keep it out of the way, and routed in the most advantageous way. Fire shelter training should also include separating your radio from your gear.
BIC Lighters “Burn injuries are often These compact lighters can be used to burn out a safety zone difficult to evaluate and may in emergency situations. Carry a lighter in your pocket so take 72 hours to manifest you will always have one if you drop your line gear. themselves. When there is any doubt as to the severity of, or if Medical Evaluation/Burn Protocols criteria are met for a burn injury, the recommended The lookout was fortunate that an experienced firefighter action is to work closely with recognized the symptoms of inhalation injury and initiated the treating physician to the Burn Protocol outlined in the 2017 Red Book, page 171. facilitate either a digital picture or telemedicine consult If firefighters receive external burns, or are suspected of with a burn center or the having an inhalation injury, they should immediately receive referral and transport of the proper medical examination and treatment. burned employee to the nearest burn center.” 2017 Red Preseason Planning and Preparation Book, page 171. This incident highlights the importance and benefits of maintaining employee emergency contact information and that the local emergency response plan is up-to-date and accurate. Practicing unplanned event exercises with other federal, state and local fire resources has allowed all agencies to become familiar with protocol and to respond more efficiently during a fire.
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Signaling Devices In areas with open terrain, flashy fuels, high rates of spread, and radio communication challenges, firefighters should have easily accessible signaling devices that can be used under a wide range of conditions (overcast skies; smoke etc.). Some firefighters have found that lightweight strobe lights (like a small flashlight) work very well for signaling because it can be seen from a long distance under all lighting conditions.
Human Factors We must anticipate what could happen with changes in fuels and fire behavior. Many who lived through a 1999 or a 2005 fire season, are now office-based. We need to share our experiences with other firefighters who did not live through those fire seasons so they’re better able to anticipate conditions they have not yet experienced. Discussions and briefings involving LCES need to be very deliberate and intentional. Has LCES been briefed so much that it has lost its meaning? Conveying LCES in an interesting, engaging and meaningful manner is critical because it must be understood and taken to heart. This incident is a reminder that even when the fire looks like it’s done, it should be a red flag to not let your guard down. “As a DIVS, I don’t want folks out in the green without a rig. I will be more specific on my leader’s intent on being one foot in the black in this fuel type.” (DIVS) “Have solid accountability of resources. Know where every individual on your division is at all times.” (DIVS) “Get people to think and watch out for changing conditions and stay alert. Things on the ground could be different. Trust the hairs on the back of your neck.” (Line Officer)
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This section takes a specific look at the day of July 24, 2017 on the Preacher Fire. It also takes a broader look at a multitude of similar entrapments and incidents that have occurred over the last few years.
What Can We Learn From the Day of the Fire? uly 24 was a hot, dry and sometimes windy day in the area of the Great Basin where the Preacher Fire was located. There was nothing unusual about the fire size and location, or J the kinds of fuels that the fire was burning in. What was exceptional though, was the time of day that this fire started and the high to extreme cheatgrass fuel loading in the area. In addition, excessive moisture from the previous winter had washed out many of the two-track roads, making them difficult or impossible to drive a truck on. Despite all that, this fire was looking good through the early afternoon. As the day progressed, this fire appeared to be “caught,” due to all the good work from the ground forces and the abundance of aviation resources. The lookout stayed at his first position for three hours. While there, the fire continued to receive additional ground and aviation resources and they appeared to be outpacing the fire’s ability to grow. By the time the lookout moved from his position at 1300, the Preacher Fire had withstood several wind shifts and hadn’t really moved. The heel of the fire had received many water drops from helicopters and fixed wing, but no retardant. From the lookout’s vantage point, he was thinking, “This fire is looking good. I’m going to move to another location and see if I can get a better vantage.” This turned out to be a critical decision point, but it probably didn’t seem so at the time. From the lookout’s perspective, the fire appears to be “done.” Winds had tested it and nothing happened. Lots of firefighters were on the line, and the retardant ships, scoopers and helicopters were hammering away at the remaining areas that needed work. All things considered, moving to another lookout position doesn’t seem like a risky decision. When the lookout was chosen from the Iron Mountain crew, he was given a vehicle to get to a good vantage point. During the crew’s briefings, it was mentioned that the previous winter’s precipitation had washed out many of the two-track roads, making them impassable. That information led to the lookout’s decision to hike to a good vantage point, rather than drive. From the lay of the land, the lookout could tell that it wouldn’t take long to get to a good point where he would have a view of the entire fire. However, the rest of the Iron Mountain crew didn’t realize that the lookout hadn’t taken the truck. This would have an impact with some of the Iron Mountain crew leadership as future events started to unfold. From the first lookout position, the escape route was a short trip down the hill to the Buffalo Canyon Road and then west out to the parking area. It was easy. It was fast. It would be a quick trip out of harm’s way if the fire blew out. And he had a good view of the entire fire area and could see any potential threats as soon as they developed. This, of course, seemed entirely unlikely, given the lack of fire activity over the past several hours.
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As the Iron Mountain crew progressed along Division Echo flank, direct communication became more difficult. This led to his decision to move to his second lookout position. The other part that is important to recognize is that you don’t know what the view will be from another lookout point until you arrive there. As the Iron Mountain lookout moved from his first position to his second lookout position, he temporarily dropped out of viewing a good portion of the fire. As soon as he climbed up to the second position, he again had a commanding view of the fire area and reestablished positive communication with his crew. Of little concern, was the now partially obstructed view of the heel of the fire – just a very small area was now out of sight. He could see all that he wanted to, and took up residence at this second lookout position for the remainder of the afternoon. The escape route was essentially the same – down to the Buffalo Canyon Road and then west out to the parking area. A short trip out. The Iron Mountain crew leadership communicating with the lookout, were aware of his recent movement, but weren’t sure of his exact location. They were confident of the lookout’s ability to escape to safety, since they thought he still had a vehicle with him. Atop the second lookout position, the view was great. The entire Iron Mountain crew work area was visible, and the lookout had an even better view of a nearby structure and the retardant lines along Divisions Echo and Tango. The only thing missing from his view was a portion of the heel, just west of the division break – inside Division Tango. Considering the lack of fire activity over the last several hours, this didn’t cause much concern. It got hotter as the afternoon progressed, but there had been sporadic cloud cover from passing convective clouds that provided some shading and relief. The winds had shifted back and forth – both in direction and strength. There seemed to be a struggle between light outflow winds from the passing clouds, and the terrain- driven winds caused by the valley floor heating. At that time, the winds were not strong and did not cause problems on the fire. In the summer months, Zephyr winds are a common occurrence in this part of Nevada. Several firefighters we interviewed, identified the winds that eventually pushed the fire past its containment lines as Zephyr winds. Many others stated that the winds were nothing more than terrain winds caused by the afternoon solar heating of the valley floor. In any event, winds played a role in the fire’s escape, and both kinds of winds – terrain-driven and Zephyr – could and should be expected on fires in this area.
A Word on Alignment The winds affecting the fire changed direction again, as they had often done, but this time some other factors came into play. As the afternoon wore on and it was nearing 1700, the passing convective clouds moved off to the north and allowed direct sunlight back onto the valley floor and surrounding hillsides. The relative humidity likely dropped, and the fine fuels would have rapidly responded. Once the fire jumped the containment line and got established on the opposite side of the draw, several factors came into alignment. The heavy fine fuel/cheatgrass loading, the orientation of Buffalo Canyon, the winds pushing directly up drainage, the dropping relative humidity and the increase in fuel temperature all came together to create an environment where the fire was free to move quickly. And move quickly it did. Once the lookout realized that the fire was moving, he started down his escape route from the second lookout position. The time to reach safety (escape route time) had increased from his first lookout position, but he didn’t think it was enough to matter. When he reached Buffalo Canyon Road, he started west toward his safety zone at the parking area. The fire was really starting to pick up, but his original escape route still seemed like his best option.
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As the lookout rounded a blind corner on the road, he was unexpectedly hit by a blast of hot air and smoke. This was his first indication that ‘Plan A’ wasn’t going to work. As he retreated east up the road, he realized he needed to lighten his load, so he could move more quickly. He dropped his line gear and struggled for what seemed like an inordinate amount of time to remove his external speaker mic from his radio. In the ensuing frustration over how long this was taking, he didn’t realize that he didn’t grab his fire shelter as he ran back up the road. During all his previous pre-season fire shelter training scenarios with the Iron Mountain crew, the lookout would drop his line gear, grab his fire shelter, tuck it inside of his shirt and run. This was a standard training practice. However, they hadn’t practiced disconnecting the radio from the mic. The focus was on removing the fire shelter, making sure you had your gloves and hand tool. And running. Somewhere during the high intensity combination of trying to remove the mic wire and making sure that the fire didn’t overtake him, the “muscle memory” of grabbing his fire shelter and tucking it inside his shirt blew a fuse. The lookout thought he had his shelter with him, as he moved about a mile up Buffalo Canyon. It wasn’t until he started to light his escape fires that he realized the “muscle memory” had failed him and he had left his fire shelter with his line gear. During the interview, the lookout clearly recalled that moment of realization. It was a horrifying moment. He didn’t have long to ponder how it could have happened. He just knew that his escape fires were his best chance now. For a brief moment where a minute seemed like an hour, his escape fires just sputtered along as the wind suddenly died. Finally, the wind picked back up and the escape fires “took off.” Once he saw how fast they were moving, his comfort level increased and he figured that riding it out in the burned area of the escape fires would be survivable. It might be uncomfortable, but survivable. The reason that the escape fires even occurred are two-fold. First, one of the Iron Mountain squad leaders was listening on the radio as the events unfolded, and asked the lookout if he had a lighter with him. Second, the lookout did indeed have a lighter in his pocket. Since the lookout dropped his line gear, he no longer had his fusees to start an escape fire. One of the simple things firefighters can do is to tuck a lighter in their pocket, for just such a need. He also no longer had his signal mirror, water, or anything else from his line gear. While these items didn’t have a great impact on the outcome of this event, it should be noted that keeping a signal mirror in a shirt or pants pocket might be better than keeping it in line gear that may get dropped. Aerial resources can often spot a mirror flash much more easily than a firefighter just standing somewhere out on the landscape. As it turned out, the escape fires also acted as signal fires for the helicopter crew searching for the lookout. The initial potential landing zone (LZ) was quickly compromised by the escape fires, so an adjacent LZ was chosen. The Chinook pilots did a fantastic job easing the helicopter down onto a two track road close to the lookout’s position. The initial discussions for an extraction method included the possibility of having the lookout climb into the helicopter’s bucket, but once the pilots identified the second potential LZ, landing the helicopter became the preferred option. Once on the ground, the helicopter crew chief (third crew member) waived the lookout over to the open tail ramp. The lookout then duck-walked over and climbed in to the helicopter. At this point, the entrapment event for the lookout is nearly over. After a short six minute helicopter ride, the lookout arrived on the ground at the helibase, safe and sound.
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Learning From the Past Are we learning from the past? It’s a fair question. To many of the people we interviewed, this entrapment seemed completely avoidable. And in hindsight, it is. We were briefed on the heavy fuel loading conditions that have been contributing to the extreme fire behavior. We read the Fire Behavior and Fuels Advisory that was recently issued for the Great Basin. We fought fires in this part of the Nevada and in this fuel type before; in fact, just a few days ago. We were briefed on, and are familiar with the local wind conditions and how they exacerbate an already extreme fuels condition. We trained hard — both physically, and in the field and in classroom with a strong emphasis on safety. We have the crew on the line with one foot in the black, so our escape route and safety zone concerns are mitigated. We established reasonably good communications. And we posted an experienced lookout.
But what about foresight? Shouldn’t we have been able to see this coming? Possibly. For those who have seen this type of fire behavior, or fight fire regularly in this part of the Great Basin, this entrapment doesn’t come as a surprise knowing that the lookout was posted in “the green.” But “the green” on this incident appeared to be deceptively safe. (See the fire history map of the area.) Fires have peppered this part of the Pine Nut Mountains several times over the last few years. It was the fourth fire in this exact location for one of the Iron Mountain assistant captains. The “green” was pretty black. The only pinyon-juniper that were left, were skeletons. And the sagebrush was gone. The cheatgrass in both locations where the lookout was posted was fairly sparse due to the rocky terrain. One foot in the black doesn’t allow for a good vantage point if I am looking for a place where I can see the whole fire – or at least a place where I can see the entire work area of my crew as they spread out, up and down the line throughout the day. I need to see incoming weather conditions. I need to be on the opposite hillside so I can see the crew’s work area. While at my lookout position, I am confident of my escape route, my ability to quickly get to my safety zone and seeing the entire fire, I feel like I have a solid handle on being in a safe position. Discussions and briefings involving LCES need to be very deliberate and intentional. Has LCES been briefed so much that it has lost its meaning? Conveying LCES in an interesting, engaging and meaningful manner is critical. LCES must be understood and taken to heart. “The hairs on the back of my neck start to tingle a little. Something seems out of place.” I reviewed the basics: L: I am the lookout. C: I have good communication with my crew. E: My escape route is “down and out.” It’s easy and fast. S. My safety zone is a short distance down and out. “I’ve got LCES covered.”
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“The hairs are still not behaving. What am I missing?” Let me go back through it again. L: I am still the lookout…….. wait a minute!!! I am the lookout, but who is MY lookout? C: I have good communication with my crew, but wait, what about establishing commo with other resources and adjacent divisions? E: My escape route is “down and out,” but now that I can’t quite see all of the fire, I may need more time if the fire escapes containment. Plus my escape route is now a bit lengthier, so I need to allow more time to get out. S: My safety zone is good, but only if I can reach it. Now that my escape route is longer, I may not get as early a start on it since I can’t see all of the fire. I’m not in contact with someone who can see the fire; I may need to look for another safety zone. Dang it, I’m not sure I have another one. What is the difference between a situation where the hairs stand up on the back of my neck and a situation where they don’t? Is it the mental slides of my experience carousel in my head? Who is the lookout for the lookout? Discuss within your crew. Discuss LCES and Common Denominators in Fatality Fires
Other similar incidents that deal with entrapments in light flashy fuels: 2017 - Parkfield Fire Entrapment 2016 - Sand Ledges Fire Dozer Burn Over 2016 - Pacheco Fire Engine Burn Over
You can’t outrun these fires – Great Basin Fuels/Fire Behavior Advisory (see link on page 4) – yet the lookout outran this one.
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t is easy to make sense of the events and circumstance associated with this incident and the lookout’s actions especially in retrospect. This incident does however provide some key I insights into new issues and helps reinforce existing safety practices and protocols. Posting a Lookout in the Green The Iron Mountain lookout chose his vantage point in the green a considerable distance from the fire. He did so because the area had been burned in the past and because the hazardous fuels conditions posed by the unusually dense cheatgrass were not recognized. A Hazardous Fuels Advisory had been issued before the Preacher Fire because fuel conditions like this had not been observed since 2005. The fuels advisory emphasized the need for firefighters to be positioned close to the black. Perhaps more emphasis should be placed on ensuring these advisories are received and understood by all firefighting personnel. We need to ensure information in advisories is communicated to fire crews and discussions are taking place regarding changes in firefighting tactics.
Communicating and Understanding LCES The lookout had the use of a truck but chose to walk to his vantage point. The crew boss was not aware of this fact and assumed the lookout had driven to his vantage point. This fact was not realized by the entire crew and crew boss until the fire escaped and the lookout was forced to retreat on foot. This incident serves as an important reminder to ensure LCES is completely understood by all members of the fire crew. Had the crew boss known the lookout walked to his first position and then relocated even further from his vehicle to his second position, there might have been some discussion about this action and its bearing on LCES.
Keep your Guard up As is often the case, a late afternoon wind shift occurred and pushed the fire out of its containment lines when it was nearly under control. The Great Basin is renowned for erratic late afternoon winds due to local terrain features and Zephyr winds. Combined with the unusually dense cheatgrass, this created the potential for an extremely dangerous condition that was not fully appreciated at the time.
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Train as you Fight As the lookout retreated from the fire, he realized he needed to leave his pack so he could move faster to outpace the fire. He knew he needed his radio. He struggled to disconnect his remote mic from his radio that was laced through his pack’s webbing. This was difficult, took longer than he expected and frustrated him. It resulted in him leaving his fire shelter with his pack as he ran off with his radio and hand tool. Given the difficulty in removing the remote mic from the newer KNG radios, it may be good practice for firefighters to utilize Velcro to attach their remote mic cord to their pack webbing for ease in separating their packs from their radios. Firefighters should wear their full packs during fire shelter deployment training.
Burn Protocol While retreating on foot from the fire along his escape route to his safety zone, the lookout temporarily lost sight of the fire. As he rounded a blind curve, he encountered the fire’s head and was briefly exposed to hot air and gases that resulted in minor inhalation injuries. His crew boss recognized this and initiated the burn protocol to ensure he received the proper medical evaluation and treatment. Under different circumstances the outcome could have been much different. The crew boss had a similar injury in the past and was familiar with the burn protocol and symptoms of inhalation injuries. This is something that should be stressed to all firefighters.
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Enhanced Fire Shelter Training
“Train Fire shelter training needs to also include how to separate your radio how you from your gear. Training should also fight.” address when trying to remove the radio is no longer of value. This training should occur more than once a year. It is common practice to weave the remote mic wire through the webbing of the fireline gear to keep it out of the way, and routed in the most comfortable, advantageous way. Having discussions and training on when trying to remove the radio is taking too long and becomes a deterrent to escape.
Aviation Frequency Allocations The agencies need to continue to explore opportunities Example of a KNG Radio with to reduce radio frequency conflict. This is a serious the mic cord interwoven into safety issue. the line gear’s webbing. Tactical aviation frequencies continue to experience bleed over from other aviation assets when there are multiple incidents. The bandwidth difference for the assigned rotor wing and fixed wing Victor frequencies are too narrow. There is significant bleed-over between the two that has serious safety implications. Communications Consider the use of Velcro loops to secure remote mic cord to your line gear harness, instead of weaving the cord into the harness webbing. This may facilitate the removal of your radio and remote mic quicker than trying to manipulate the detachment screw while under extreme pressures. Discuss with radio manufacturers the need for quick disconnect feature between the external speaker mic and the radio that allows for continued use of the radio. The connection between the KNG and other new-style radios and the remote mic can be difficult to disconnect in a timely manner. Under pressure, it can be extremely difficult.
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Consider the use of wireless technology for radio communications. This would alleviate the need to separate your remote radio mic from your radio if you had to immediately ditch your line gear. Training Practice unplanned event exercises and involve other federal, state and local cooperators. This will allow all agencies to become familiar with protocol and respond efficiently during an emergency response. Examples of two external mics attached to radios. The radio on the left is a KNG; Other the radio on the right is a DPH. Strobe lights. The use of signal mirrors to inform aerial and ground resources of your location has been used for several years. Signal mirrors are reliable when the light conditions are lined up but during times of low light, cloud cover or with the sun behind your position, these mirrors have limitations. There are several commercially available LED flashlights that have a strobe feature. These light weight, compact flashlights are powered by “AA” batteries. During times of low light or difficult sun location, the strobe feature of these flashlights can be used to positively confirm your location as a lookout, calling in aerial resources and/or communicating with other ground resources when describing your location. The strobe pattern of these 300 lumens flashlights can be seen by aircraft and ground resources during bright, full sun conditions over a considerable distance. These flashlights should not replace the signal mirror, only supplement their use.
Use of ATV/UTV. The terrain and fuel type surrounding the Preacher Fire would have been very conducive to the use of ATV/UTVs by the Iron Mountain lookout. It is common practice for crew lookouts working in flashy fuels to use vehicles as part of their escape plan to a safety zone. Hearing about washed out roads and no good turn arounds, the Iron Mountain lookout chose not to use a vehicle. If an ATV/UTV had been available for use, Iron Mountain lookout could have been able to escape the advancing fire much quicker. This increased speed of escape could have avoided the need for him to drop his pack or being picked up by the Type I helicopter. Although ATV/UTVs do bring their own set of risks to mitigate, they are a valuable tool when used appropriately. There has been an increase in the use of UTVs in recent years by crews and incident management teams. The advantages of ATV/UTVs as an additional tool in fire management and incident response had been proven. Not only can they be used by a lookout as part of an escape plan, this tool can also be used to resupply resources with drinking water, fuels, burnout equipment, medical supplies and emergency transportation. BIC lighter. These compact lighters can be used to burn out a safety zone in emergency situations. Carry a lighter in your pocket so you will always have one if you drop your line gear.
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Timeline of Events for July 24, 2017
Note: All times are approximate unless otherwise noted. 0230 ------A strong thunderstorm moved through the area, resulting in numerous lightning strikes. 0400 ------Sierra Front Interagency Dispatch Center (SFIDC) was notified of a possible new lightning-caused fire in the Pine Nut Mountains. 0630 ------Dispatch began assigning resources. Iron Mountain hand crew enroute. 0810 ------A type 3 helicopter inserted two Helitack firefighters for initial attack and began bucket work. 0830 ------Iron Mountain arrived at ICP and was briefed. The fire was estimated at 60 acres. Helicopters and SEATs on scene and began numerous load and returns.
0900 ------Iron Mountain arrived at the parking area. At the time Iron Mountain arrived Crew overhead discussed division on the Preacher Fire, it was being assignments. Captain 23 accepted division managed as a type 3 incident. assignment as task force leader (TFLD). Following guidance in the 2017 Captain 26 accepted assignment as task force Interagency Standards for Fire leader trainee (TFLD(t) for Division Echo. and Fire Aviation Operations (Red Assistant captain 26 assumed the crew boss Book), Chapter 11, Incident responsibilities. Management and Response, page 233, the type 3 organization split 0915 ------Air Attack requested two heavy air tankers. the fire into two divisions. During a type 3 incident, the 0945 ------Iron Mountain crew boss briefed crew on functional responsibility of a LCES and assigned a lookout. division supervisor can be 1000 ------Iron Mountain lookout arrived at first assigned to a “Single Resource lookout position after hiking from the Boss. Operational qualification must be commensurate with parking area. resources assigned (i.e., more 1030 ------Iron Mountain crew arrived at Division than one resource assigned Echo/Tango break at the heel/north end of requires a higher level of the fire. Iron Mountain briefed again on qualification).” LCES and tactics. Captain 26 being a fully qualified TFLD and captain 23 a 1100 ------Iron Mountain crew boss established positive TFLD(t), accepted the functional communications with Iron Mountain responsibilities of division lookout, using a crew frequency. supervisor and division supervisor trainee on Division Echo. 1115 ------Heavy air tankers arrived and began numerous load and returns. 1200 ------The fire grew to the south, to about 400 acres. Iron Mountain had to spread out, which impacted effective communications. Iron Mountain crew boss and assistant captain 23 began using the lookout as a “human repeater.” 1300 ------Iron Mountain lookout relocated to second lookout position to “have better communication with crews and division.” 1600 ------The fire appeared to be contained. Crews spread out to hold and improve fireline.
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Timeline of Events for July 24, 2017 (continued)
1650 ------Echo DIVS and DIVS(T) saw the slop over at division break and contacted air attack for aviation support at the heel. Winds pushed the fire to the north and east into Buffalo Canyon. All aircraft on scene were put in a holding pattern while a VLAT made a drop to check the fire’s spread to the east. The nearest structure was located about a half-mile to the east. 1715 ------Iron Mountain lookout moved off his second lookout position to Buffalo Canyon Road, which was his planned escape route. 1725 ------The slop over became established at the heel of the fire. All crews moved to the black (safety zone). 1727 ------Iron Mountain lookout called Echo DIVS, “I’m cut off! The fire is 400 feet behind me! I’m moving to the east on the road.” 1729 ------Echo DIVS called air attack with priority traffic, “I have a lost firefighter at the head of the fire! Requesting bucket support.” 1730 ------Iron Mountain lookout dropped his line gear to move faster. He had difficulty disconnecting his speaker mic from his KNG radio. 1800 ------Iron Mountain lookout lit fires to create a safety zone. That’s when he realized that he didn’t have his fire shelter. 1800-1812 Numerous communications occurred between lookout, crew and aviation assets. (There is a recording of these communications in this video: https://youtu.be/YFUjeXI67l4) – (This is the same video as on page 12)
1812 ------Type I helicopter landed. Iron Mountain lookout got on board and arrived at the Minden-Tahoe Helibase six minutes later. 1825 ------Iron Mountain lookout was met by local EMS. After brief discussion, EMS left the helibase without the lookout. 1840 ------Echo DIVS arrived at the helibase and met the lookout to discuss the event. 1910 ------Echo DIVS transported Iron Mountain lookout to a local hospital for evaluation. 1950 ------Echo DIVS and Iron Mountain lookout arrived at the local hospital. Physician referred the lookout to the regional burn center. 2100 ------Iron Mountain lookout was flown to the regional burn center. 2200 ------Iron Mountain lookout arrived at the regional burn center and was met by the home unit hospital liaison. 2300 ------Echo DIVS tied in with Iron Mountain crew at a hotel and conducted an After Action Review (AAR) 0200 ------July 25, 2017 - Iron Mountain lookout was released from the regional burn center.
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The yellow line was the path the lookout took from the parking area to the first lookout position. The red circle is the perimeter at approximately 0900. The fire was between 40-60 acres.
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The lookout arrived at his second location at 1330, approximately 3/4 miles from his first location. The yellow line was the path he took to his first lookout; the blue line is the path he took to his second lookout. The orange circle shows the perimeter of the fire at 0900 hours (40-60 acres); the red circle shows the perimeter of the fire at 1600 hours (400 acres).
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This map shows the lookout's path for the day and the location where the helicopter extracted him. The pink line shows the lookout’s route to where the helicopter extracted him. The lookout arrived at his second location at 1330, approximately 3/4 miles from his first location. The yellow line was the path he took to his first lookout; the blue line is the path he took to his second lookout. The orange circle shows the perimeter of the fire at 0900 hours (40-60 acres); the red circle shows the perimeter of the fire at 1600 hours (400 acres).
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