Fire today ManagementVolume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002

DUDE FIREIRE STAFF RIDEIDE

United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service Fire Management Today is published by the Forest Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC. The Secretary of Agriculture has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law of this Department.

Fire Management Today is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, at: Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: 202-512-1800 Fax: 202-512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001

Fire Management Today is available on the World Wide Web at .

Ann M. Veneman, Secretary April J. Baily U.S. Department of Agriculture General Manager

Dale Bosworth, Chief Robert H. “Hutch” Brown, Ph.D. Forest Service Managing Editor

Jerry Williams, Director Madelyn Dillon Fire and Aviation Management Editor

Dave Thomas Issue Coordinator

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, disability, political beliefs, sexual orientation, or marital or family status. (Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Persons with disabilities who require alternative means for communication of program information (Braille, large print, audiotape, etc.) should contact USDA’s TARGET Center at (202) 720-2600 (voice and TDD).

To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA, Director, Office of Civil Rights, Room 326-W, Whitten Building, 1400 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20250-9410 or call (202) 720-5964 (voice and TDD). USDA is an equal opportunity provider and employer.

Disclaimer: The use of trade, firm, or corporation names in this publication is for the information and convenience of the reader. Such use does not constitute an official endorsement of any product or service by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Individual authors are responsible for the technical accuracy of the material presented in Fire Management Today.

2 Fire Management Today Fire today Management Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 CONTENTS On the Cover: Dude Fire Staff Ride ...... 4 Dave Thomas and Wayne Cook What’s a Staff Ride? ...... 6 Paul Keller Human Factors in Fire Behavior Analysis: Reconstructing the Dude Fire ...... 8 Karl E. Weick Walk Back Into Tragedy: A Quantum Leap Forward ... 16 Paul Keller Site of the 1990 Dude Why Don’t We Just Leave the Fireline?...... 22 Fire on the Mogollon Robert W. Mutch Rim in Arizona, where six firefighters died in a The Staff Ride Approach to Wildland Fire Behavior blowup. A participant and Firefighter Safety Awareness Training: reflects upon his feelings A Commentary ...... 25 and experiences follow­ Martin E. Alexander ing the Dude Fire Staff Next Steps in Wildland Fire Management...... 31 Ride in 1999. Photo: Jerry Williams USDA Forest Service, Book Review: Managing the Unexpected ...... 36 Missoula Technology Dave Iverson Development Center, Book Review: How the Way We Talk Can Change Missoula, MT, 1999. the Way We Work...... 38 Jim Saveland Moose Fire: The Historical Perspective ...... 42 Stephen W. Barrett Estimating Canopy Fuels in Conifer Forests ...... 45 Joe H. Scott and Elizabeth D. Reinhardt The FIRE 21 symbol (shown below and on the cover) stands for the safe and effective use of Texas Volunteer Firefighters Benefit From New wildland fire, now and throughout the 21st century. Its shape represents the fire triangle Legislation ...... 51 (oxygen, heat, and fuel). The three outer red Traci Bowen triangles represent the basic functions of wildland fire organizations (planning, operations, and aviation management), and the three critical Bullets to Buckets: Florida’s New Helicopter...... 53 aspects of wildland fire management (prevention, Sylvia Melvin suppression, and prescription). The black interior represents land affected by fire; the emerging A Unique Aviation Tool for Firefighting ...... 55 green points symbolize the growth, restoration, and sustainability associated with fire-adapted Jill Evans ecosystems. The flame represents fire itself as an ever-present force in nature. For more informa­ tion on FIRE 21 and the science, research, and innovative thinking behind it, contact Mike SHORT FEATURES Apicello, National Interagency Fire Center, 208-387-5460. Websites on Fire...... 37 Safety First! ...... 57 Ed Hollenshead Three Small Smokes ...... 57 Stephen W. Barrett

Firefighter and public safety is Guidelines for Contributors...... 58 our first priority. Annual Photo Contest...... 59

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 3 DUDE FIRE STAFF RIDE

Dave Thomas and Wayne Cook

he theme of this issue of Fire Management Today is the staff A staff ride brings soldiers back to the T ride, a concept of organizational scene of old battles, whether won or lost, learning used for over a century by to directly reexperience the strategy the U.S. military, and how it was applied to the 1990 Dude Fire, a and tactics used on the battlefield. 24,174-acre (9,783-ha) fatal forest fire that burned near the Mogollon Rim in Arizona. • Wildland fires are complex organizational psychologist at the natural events that commonly University of Michigan who has Staff Ride defy honest attempts to think studied how firefighters behaved through and understand them; during blowups on the Mann Gulch At its simplest level, a staff ride • Hindsight often creates mis- and South Canyon Fires, cautioned brings soldiers back to the scene of perceptions of what actually the participants not to come too old battles, whether won or lost, to occurred on a fire; and quickly to conclusions about the directly reexperience the strategy • The root cause of the Dude Fire causes of the fatalities. From the and tactics used on the battlefield. tragedy may never be fully fire’s historical artifacts and the Custer’s defeat at the Little Big known. talks, each individual began fram­ Horn, Chief Joseph’s skirmish at the ing a mental picture of the reasons Big Hole River in Montana, and the The lessons learned by participants for the Dude Fire fatalities. Civil War battles at Gettysburg and in a staff ride are usually individual, Antietam are staff rides regularly personal, not easily categorized, and In This Issue conducted today to train soldiers. filled with emotion. The expectation The essays, articles, and book is that individuals will form their With the Dude Fire Staff Ride, we reviews that follow all derived from own conclusions and then, after the experience of attending the applied the framework of the talking and listening to other military staff ride to a plume- Dude Fire Staff Ride. Dr. Marty participants, form a shared vision of Alexander, a fire behavior research dominated wildland fire that blew what happened. up outside of Payson, AZ, in June scientist for the Canadian Forest Service, provides a timely critique 1990, killing six firefighters. This Before walking the old brushed-in staff ride was part of a national of the concept of the staff ride, firelines of the Dude Fire, staff ride including a discussion of both its interagency fire behavior workshop participants were given the raw in Phoenix, AZ, in March 1999. strong and its weak points. Dr. Karl materials of the fire’s history—shift Weick’s talk on the evening before plans, weather forecasts, fire the staff ride is included. Paul The staff ride is not a lecture or behavior and fire danger predic­ field trip. The basic assumptions Keller, formerly with the Zigzag tions, maps, video footage, and Hotshot Crew and the official used in developing the Dude Fire photographs. The night before Staff Ride were: writer/editor for the Dude Fire Staff going to the actual fire site, stu­ Ride, captured many of the conver­ dents heard talks on the history of • There may be no one correct sations and speeches on both the the staff ride from Glenn Robinson, fire site and during the final closing answer or chain of events leading author of The Staff Ride, a booklet up to the fatalities; dialogue in Phoenix. Thankfully, he that describes what a staff ride is was able to record the closing talk and how it is put together. Dr. Dave Dave Thomas is the regional fuels specialist of the fire behavior workshop, Bob for the USDA Forest Service, Intermountain Cleaves, of the USDA Forest Mutch’s heartfelt personal account Region, Ogden, UT; and Wayne Cook is a Service’s Washington Office fire of what the Dude Fire Staff Ride technology transfer specialist for the Forest research branch, spoke on deci­ meant to him. Service, Missoula Fire Sciences Laboratory, sionmaking. Dr. Karl Weick, an Missoula, MT.

4 Fire Management Today We have also included two book The next staff ride is being planned However, one group of people must reviews, though not directly about in conjunction with an interna­ be singled out for special thanks: staff rides or fire suppression, that tional fire use conference for the personnel of the Payson Ranger discuss organizational learning and winter/spring 2003. Staff rides fit District on the Tonto National the prevention of accidents. Dr. Jim the concept of “lessons learned.” We Forest. Without their support and Saveland, a research scientist at the believe that the wildland fire interest, the Dude Fire Staff Ride Forest Service’s Rocky Mountain community should consider fully would not have gotten off the Research Station in Fort Collins, integrating this concept into ground. ■ CO, reviews Harvard professors training, whether outside the Robert Kegan and Lisa Laskow classroom, hands-on, or perfor­ Lahey’s Seven Languages for mance based. Transformation: How the Way We Talk Can Change the Way We Acknowledgements Work; and Dave Iverson, a social The success of the Dude Fire Staff scientist with the Forest Service’s Ride was due to the hard work and Intermountain Region in Ogden, determination of organizers and UT, reviews University of Michigan participants, and to their willing­ professors Karl Weick and Kathleen ness to try a new method of organi­ Sutcliffe’s Managing the Unex­ zational learning. Something pected: Assuring High Performance clicked for everyone who partici­ in an Age of Complexity. These pated, and the whole event— books have much to teach both motivated by a team spirit— firefighters and the organizations magically came together. that manage them about increasing the level of firefighting safety. Jerry The hundred-odd participants Williams, Director of Fire and represented a diversity of occupa­ Aviation Management for the Forest tions—hotshot superintendents, Service’s Washington Office, used fire behavior researchers, staff ride Managing the Unexpected as a experts, fire management officers, building block for a speech on grunt firefighters, fatality investiga­ professionalism delivered in tors, meteorologists, claims adjust­ Dude Fire memorial erected by the local Scottsdale, AZ, in March 2002. In ers, attorneys from the Office of community. Photo: USDA Forest Service, the version of his speech reprinted Missoula Technology Development Center, General Counsel, survivors of the Missoula, MT, 1999. here, Williams notes that fire­ blowup, and more. That was an­ fighting agencies must make a other major reason for success. cultural change, shifting “the weight of accountability before an accident takes shape.” Fatality site What’s Next? on the Dude Fire. Photo: Following the Dude Fire Staff Ride, USDA Forest we evaluated this attempt to apply a Service, Missoula military concept to wildland fire Technology training, and we concluded that it Development was a success. We find support in Center, the wildland fire community for Missoula, MT, 1999. utilizing this learning tool in the future. Staff rides are now being used by all agencies at local and regional levels throughout the country.

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 5 WHAT’S A STAFF RIDE?

Paul Keller

ould a Civil War historian really help wildland firefighter safety The staff ride is a unique and highly successful C today? You better believe it. Case in point: the Dude Fire Staff approach to gaining valuable insights Ride. from past military encounters.

Yes, it’s true. In a quest to better ensure firefighter safety on wildland fires, the USDA Forest Service contacted noted Civil War and military historian Glenn Robertson. The result: a quantum leap forward for wildland fire safety and training.

A professor of military history at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College, Robertson literally revived and rewrote the book on military staff rides—a unique and highly successful approach to gaining valuable insights from past military encounters. The initial staff ride idea was implemented as a training tool after the Civil War. Robertson developed the staff ride concept into a three-phase process:

1.Prior to the actual staff ride, study the incident in detail; 2.Make an extensive, preplanned onsite visit; and 3.Combine the first two phases into the all-important “integration phase”—a discussion to identify lessons learned for future inci­ dents. A Golden Opportunity “I was fascinated to first learn how—through the staff ride pro­ cess—war colleges still use such

Paul Keller, a former hotshot and journal­ ist, is a contract writer/editor for the USDA Forest Service’s Fire and Aviation Manage­ ment Staff, Washington Office, Washington, William “Glenn” Robertson’s guide, used to develop the Dude Fire Staff Ride. DC.

6 Fire Management Today “The staff ride concept seemed a perfect vehicle for learning about what happened that day on the Dude Fire.”

–Dave Thomas, fuels specialist

historical battles such as contacted Robertson, the staff ride people who have never experienced Gettysburg, the Normandy Inva­ guru. Robertson had never before a staff ride should not mistakenly sion, and Little Big Horn to train in been asked to apply his staff ride assume that it equates the business leadership, strategy, and tactics,” process to a wildfire incident. But of firefighting with the business of noted Dave Thomas, the fuels he immediately saw the potential. war. In fact, it does no such thing. specialist for the Forest Service’s He agreed to volunteer his time as a “There is a major difference be­ Intermountain Region, Ogden, UT. consultant to help plan the Dude tween the two,” stressed Mutch. “In Fire Staff Ride. “It was a golden our business, the loss of life is Thomas helped plan a 1-week opportunity,” Thomas remem­ totally unacceptable.” National Interagency Fire Behavior bered, “a wildland fire learning Workshop for fire behavior analysts first.” Huge Success in Phoenix, AZ. He and his fellow The event was a huge success. The steering team members for the Robert W. Mutch, fire ecology organizers were Dave Thomas and March 1999 workshop realized that consultant and Dude Fire Staff Wayne Cook, a technology transfer the 1990 Dude Fire fatality blowup Ride participant, said that the staff specialist for the Forest Service’s that entrapped 11 firefighters and ride’s lessons will stay with him Rocky Mountain Research Station, claimed 6 lives had occurred in the forever (see his article beginning on Missoula, MT. Robertson, the staff nearby mountains. They knew that page 22). “I truly believe that the ride authority, experienced the vital and valuable lessons could still staff ride concept produced an Dude Fire Staff Ride in the same be learned from this tragedy fire. environment for an unprecedented way as his fellow workshop partici­ But how? learning experience.” pants. “You achieved 95 percent of 100 percent—you almost had it “The staff ride concept seemed a Mutch pointed out that even perfect,” Robertson told the steer­ perfect vehicle for learning about though the staff ride evolved from a ing committee members. ■ what happened that day on the military concept, it has nothing to Dude Fire,” Thomas recalled. So he do with war. He underscored that

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 7 HUMAN FACTORS IN FIRE BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS: RECONSTRUCTING THE DUDE FIRE*

Karl E. Weick

n the Dude Fire Staff Ride tomorrow, we will retrace the When the world is unpredictable, Osteps of people who were under as is often the case on a fire, pressure. Some of those people it is important to hold one’s meanings lightly handled pressure well. Some didn’t. For a richer understanding of the and to update one’s sense of what is happening. Dude Fire, we should focus on what happens when people are overcome by events; then we might be in a chair standing against a wall. She action. The language of tables, better position to prevent similar had been lunging against the wall, chairs, beds, and staircases can be a tragedies in the future. refusing to believe it was anything constraint on the imagination and but a stairway leading to the source on action. The mind stays more Making Sense of the fire. supple and pliable, the body more One key to safety in fire suppression flexible, when people deal with is how easy it is for people to make What Caroline Paul stumbled onto general directions rather than the sense of what they are facing. A is key to how we create the world specifics of mistakenly named good example is Caroline Paul, one around us. As Stephen Batchelor objects. Sometimes the constraints of the first women firefighters in (1997) puts it, “Meaning and its imposed by specifics are necessary the San Francisco Fire Department absence are given to life by lan­ and helpful. But when the world is (Paul 1998). The first time she was guage and imagination. We are unknowable and unpredictable, as allowed to take the nozzle of a linguistic beings who inhabit a is often the case on a fire—with its firehose and lead a crew into a reality in which it makes sense to difficult terrain, changing weather, burning building, the rooms were make sense.” Meaning is a product and uneven heating—then it is so filled with smoke that visibility of language, imagination, and important to hold one’s meanings was near zero. Paul nudged against what she thought was the first step of a narrow stairway leading into an attic. Again and again, she tried to find the second step and push her way into the attic, only to bump into something hard. Finally, a hand pulled her away and steered her into an unseen hallway. Later, when visibility was better, she realized that what she had thought was an attic stairway was in fact a

Karl Weick is the Rensis Likert Distin­ guished University Professor of Organiza­ tional Behavior and Psychology, School of Business Administration, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.

* This article is based on a presentation by the author at the March 1999 National Interagency Fire Behavior Workshop in Phoenix, AZ. The author spoke on the day Aerial view of “corner house” above Walk Moore Canyon, showing wildland/urban interface before the infield phase of the Dude Fire Staff Ride. conditions on the Dude Fire. Photo: USDA Forest Service, 1990.

8 Fire Management Today When people are under pressure, upward. Several pilots who learned they fall back on habitual, first-learned, to fly European F–104s were trans- ferred to a U.S. squadron of F–104s. overlearned responses. For the transferred pilots, the first fatalities all involved turning the plane over at low altitudes and lightly and to update one’s sense of much larger scale at Walk Moore ejecting themselves into the what is happening. This is the world Canyon. They include regression, ground. Again, people regress of sensemaking. tunnel vision, and misunderstand­ under pressure to first-learned, ing. overlearned responses. Caroline Paul, under the pressures of the moment, was unable to Regression. When people are Regression occurred on the South change her first sense that she was under pressure, they fall back on Canyon Fire when Don Mackey, crawling into a narrow attic. Nor habitual, first-learned, overlearned under pressure, went from acting was she able to notice enough of responses. In Paul’s case, she was like a crew leader with his head up the context around her to update more accustomed to meeting to a crew member with his head her label for what she faced. The resistance head-on, with intensified down, digging line.* For example, more resistance she encountered, force, than to circumvent it. So he offered to help Quentin Rhoades the more convinced she became and that’s what she did. sharpen his saw. Butch Blanco, the harder it was for her to disen­ under pressure, went from acting gage from her aggressive attack and The best example of regression I’ve like the incident commander to try something else. Fortunately, ever seen involves F–104 fighter acting like a crew boss. He collected someone else had a different view of plane pilots. The planes stationed in his own crew members and kept the situation, and Paul had enough Europe were the same as those in them around him, monitoring their presence of mind to heed the tug on the United States, with one impor­ whereabouts more closely than the her coat, retreat, and alter the tant difference: The European fire or the other crews. Both cases attack. planes ejected pilots from the illustrate the general principle that, bottom instead of the top. In a under pressure, administrators tend Human Factors European plane, if you got into to function at one level below the Paul’s case illustrates many of the trouble at a low altitude, you turned level to which they are assigned. human factors we will see on a the plane over so it would eject you They regress to first-learned re­ sponses.

To guard against regression, you need to practice; but make sure to practice the newer, more complex routines. Also, don’t take processes for granted: they unravel and constantly need to be rebuilt, for two reasons:

1. Safety is not bankable (Schulman 1993). A history of failure-free performances does not insure against the next error, and the organization is only as reliable as its next error. 2. If safety is not bankable, there is no stable resting place for an

* For a summary of events on the 1994 South Canyon Fire in Colorado, see Bret Butler and others, “The South Hotshots and engine near “corner house” on the day of the Dude Fire blowup as the fire in Canyon Fire Revisited: Lessons in Fire Behavior,” Fire the background backs into Walk Moore Canyon. Photo: USDA Forest Service, 1990. Management Today 61(1): 14–20.

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 9 organization. As P.R. Schulman The more frustrated people get, (1993) observes, “Unless con­ the less they notice—a potentially lethal oversight tinual reinvestments are made in improving technical systems, in the case of small spot fires and fine materials. procedures, reporting processes, and employee attentiveness, those performance standards that practice, practice, practice. Routine, Similar fixations might have have already been attained are well-rehearsed, well-learned perfor­ developed on the Dude Fire. The likely to degrade.” mances place a smaller demand on more novel the tasks that people on active attention than does the the fire were required to perform, Tunnel Vision. In Caroline Paul’s performance of tasks that are less the more cues they might have case, we see another common well learned. Furthermore, a good missed. For example, the incoming behavioral pattern for people under model of task demands and “a well- type 1 incident command team pressure: The more frustrated developed skill in discriminating “shadowed” the onsite type 2 team people get, the less they notice. The sources of useful (versus trivial) for 6 hours to get a good feel for the pattern here is robust (Wickens information” (Wickens 1996) can fire. If shadowing involved unfamil­ 1996). As stress, pressure, or slow the degradation of perfor­ iar activities, then the incoming arousal increases, the breadth of mance. people might have paid more attention decreases. We tend to attention to the onsite team mem­ ignore peripheral events; in the case However, it is difficult to perform bers than to the fire itself, thereby of small spot fires in fine materials, novel, complex, and variable tasks missing crucial information. that could be a lethal oversight. on automatic pilot. In Caroline Paul’s case, it was the first time she Misunderstanding. Caroline Paul’s Tunnel vision is especially impor­ was allowed to lead a crew into a case shows that we are slow to ask tant for people performing complex burning building. She was under for help and often even slower to tasks, because they have to pay enormous self-imposed pressure understand that others might see attention to a relatively large not to foul up. Under this intense the world differently. People under number of salient cues. In perform­ pressure, she became preoccupied pressure often fail to listen, pool ing a complex task, the minute you with a single cue—the unyielding information, and spell out their begin to ignore any cue whatsoever, wall that she supposed to be a reasoning. you immediately lose relevant stairway. information and your performance immediately suffers. This is what happened at Three Mile Island, the nuclear power plant in Pennsylva­ nia where an accident occurred in 1979. According to Christopher Wickens (1996), “… under the high stress caused by the initial failure, the operators appeared to be fixated on a single faulty indicator, sup­ porting an incorrect belief that the water level in the reactor was too high, thereby preventing their attention from focusing on more reliable indicators that supported the opposite (and correct) hypoth­ esis.”

The safeguard against tunnel vision, interestingly, is similar to the safeguard against regression: Fire approaches “corner house” on the Dude Fire. Photo: USDA Forest Service, Missoula Technology Development Center, Missoula, MT, 1990.

10 Fire Management Today When people interact with respect, • Several agencies responded to an they are better able to update their understanding escalating event, so information was not disseminated widely, even of what is taking place. though several crews were jammed into the same area. • The crews were just settling in Respectful interaction is fundamen­ Battlement Creek Fire saw a break­ and were strangers to one an­ tal. We are all ready to profit from down in self-respect when people other. the experience of others until it allowed the division supervisor’s • Some crews had new people. seems to conflict with our own. assessment to dominate their own • The environment consisted of Then we face the problem of how to reservations.** discontinuous fuels in complex weigh our own vantage point terrain, including a wildland– against that of others. Since our It is interesting that the preferred urban interface setting. knowledge is indirect and fallible handoff and briefing procedures in • Communication was difficult and our frame of reference limited, wildland firefighting tend to incor­ because 25 radios using 5 fre­ we cannot afford to ignore com­ porate all three imperatives. For quencies were distributed among pletely what others think is happen­ example, some crew bosses follow 150 people (Whitney 1999). ing. To pool our observations with this protocol: Here’s what I think • Some crews were sleep deprived, theirs for maximum adaptability, we we face; here’s what I think we a source of stress (Wickens 1996). must live by three imperatives should do; here’s why; and here’s • Everyone was potentially subject (Campbell 1990): what we should keep an eye on. to heat stress, an influence that Now talk to me! In this example, has been shown to produce 1.Trust. We must respect the there is trust (the crew boss invites cognitive confusion and to impair reports of others and be willing to observations from others and attention, memory, and situ­ base our beliefs and actions on listens), honesty (the crew boss ational judgment (Wickens 1996). them. gives his or her own candid ap­ What is especially tricky about 2.Honesty. We must report hon­ praisal), and self-respect (the crew heat stress is that people who are estly so that others can use our boss sets the stage for resolving suffering from it are unable to observations in coming to valid differences without either dismiss­ assess their own condition or to beliefs. ing his or her own observations or convince others of their needs. 3.Self-respect. We must respect our deprecating the observations of own perceptions and beliefs, others). When people interact with These features translated into seeking to integrate them with respect, they are better able to do specific problems for overhead the reports of others without what Caroline Paul could not do— teams and crews. For fire behavior deprecating them or ourselves. update their understanding of what analysts, the circumstances affect­ is taking place. ing other members of the fire Wherever tragedy occurs, it is likely overhead team and the people that there has been a breakdown in Context of the Dude under them determine whether one or more of these three impera­ Fire their analyses will be persuasive. tives. The Mann Gulch Fire saw a The case of Caroline Paul suggests Robert McDonald (1979) puts it breakdown in trust when Wagner that something similar might have well: “While it is important for you Dodge’s crew failed to believe that happened on the Dude Fire: Unfold­ to spend time tapping calculators, his escape fire would save them.* ing events created problems for conferring with fire weather people, The South Canyon Fire saw a sensemaking by producing pres­ and making long-range calculations breakdown in honesty when people sures of various sorts and making it of probabilities, it is most important had serious, unexpressed doubts difficult to integrate resources. for you to be involved in what’s about who was in charge, where the Specifically: happening in the trenches. Know escape zones were, and why they specifically who is on the line. were digging line downhill. The ** On the 1976 Battlement Creek Fire in Colorado, Know the critical points, and, three firefighters were killed and another severely burned on a ridgetop when a burnout fire lit below whenever possible, be close to the * For a summary of events on the 1949 Mann Gulch Fire swept over the crew’s position. For a brief discussion, see in Montana, see Richard C. Rothermel and Hutch Bret W. Butler and Jack D. Cohen, “Firefighter Safety action, with close communication Brown, “A Race That Couldn’t Be Won,” Fire Zones: How Big Is Big Enough?”, Fire Management with key line personnel. They Management Today 60(2): 8–9. Today 58(1): 14.

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 11 should feel a kinship with you and a reliability on you—that you are always at hand for consultation. They are your people—your per­ sonal responsibility. You may well have to be the most organized individual in the entire fire organi­ zation.” As a fire behavior analyst, if you nourish the relationships that McDonald describes, then you can frame your analyses in ways that will help people make more sense of their confusion, be less vulnerable to pressure, and take fewer exces­ sively risky actions.

The confusing situation that the overhead team faces can be de­ Firefighters congregate in burned area on the Dude Fire. Photo: USDA Forest Service, scribed as a continuous organizing 1990. of resources and fire. “The question of organization is never really Something similar goes for crews. tion of all the fire behavior rumor, solved because the fire constantly Crew bosses have told me that when gossip, science, and fire behavior changes,” note Pyne and others they attend an early-morning modeling. A good FBAN’s [fire (1996). “Nearly all suppression briefing (“the variety hour,” as they behavior analyst’s] job is to ‘make efforts are either building up or call it), their priorities are to find sense’ of all this fire behavior building down, and the organiza­ out the weather and the radio information from various sources.” tion they exhibit is the product of channels and to get enough maps The fire behavior analyst talks about these evolutions.” Rhona Flin for their crews. They do not always how fast the fire will spread, how (1996), who has summarized a large register the fire behavior analysis, hot it will be, and what size it will number of incident command depending on whether they are sure be when it stops spreading. For studies, argues that incident they have the weather, maps, and firefighters, that imposes a struc­ commanders face situations that radio channels. These crew leaders ture of regions, valences, and paths are surprisingly similar: are reaching for tools that directly on what was previously unstruc­ help them make sense of what they tured terrain. In other words, fire • Extremely difficult decisions, will face. To them, the fire behavior behavior analyis imposes order that • Ambiguous and conflicting forecast is a more indirect tool. Fire reduces confusion. It calms people information, behavior analysts might want to down, helping them notice more • Shifting goals, make weather, topography, and and be more aware, which in turn • Time pressure, vantage points—which crew bosses helps them feel more in control. • Dynamic conditions, consider crucial for their sense­ Done well, fire behavior analysis • Complex operational team making—more salient in their helps people know what they might structures, forecasts. be facing. It enables them to form • Poor communication, and expectancies, establish plausible • Significant risk accompanying Fire Behavior Forecasts goals, know what cues to look for, every course of action. Fire behavior analysis unfolds in and understand what actions might the context of sensemaking, pres­ be appropriate. It substantially Fire behavior analysts should keep sure, and complex environments. boosts their sensemaking. this list in mind in formulating According to the fuels specialist their forecasts for incident com­ Dave Thomas (1999), “The fire Some fire behavior analyses are manders. The question is, “Can I behavior forecast is the official surprisingly sensitive to the situa­ present my forecast so that it is record of what is supposed to tion of the people who have to act taken seriously by somebody in this happen on the fire. It is a summa­ on them (see the sidebar). Some situation?”

12 Fire Management Today forecasts, however, make it harder incident commander or crew boss. GOOD FIRE for people to make sense. One fire But they should be mindful of the behavior analyst put it this way: “It difficulties that overhead and crews BEHAVIOR is my personal view that most fire have with sensemaking. Fire FORECASTS behavior forecasts are not worth the behavior maps can help. If crew paper they are written on—they are bosses are eager to take a fistful of Some fire behavior analyses do too general, and the FBAN has not topographical maps back to their a good job of relating to the risked putting his/her name to a crews to give them their spatial user’s situation. Here are some forecast that is very specific. We bearings, then fire behavior analysts sample descriptions from fire tend to use opaque words like should do what they can to make behavior forecasts 41 and 42 on ‘extreme,’ ‘erratic,’ etc., maybe even crews equally eager for maps that the 1988 North Fork Fire in hiding under the fact that the give them their temporal bearings. Yellowstone National Park: numbers generated by Rothermel’s That will depend on how well the model are only accurate within a maps fit their style of sensemaking • “The addition of wind to the factor of 2.” and help reduce their uncertainty. total fire environment will push fires to high rates of It should be possible to use the Learning spread, with fire intensities language of lookouts, communica­ On the Dude Fire Staff Ride, our well beyond hand or ma­ tions, escape routes, and safety learning might be limited because chine control levels.” This zones (LCES) to help relate the we all have the benefit of hindsight. sentence clearly conveys the forecast to user needs. Forecasts of We already know that six people mechanism of change— long-range spotting could mean died on the Dude Fire and that five intensification of wind, the potential difficulty in maintaining survived the entrapment, two with effects of this change on both escape routes and safety zones, serious and three with minor burns. rate and intensity of spread, whereas forecasts of smoky condi­ Therefore, we have a strong ten­ and a forewarning that tions or fire movement into flatter dency to look for incorrect actions, containment by conventional terrain could portend difficulties for flawed analyses, and inaccurate means probably won’t work. lookouts. Translating fire behavior perceptions that produced the • “Fuel beds that don’t nor­ predictions into their possible tragic outcome (Starbuck and mally burn will become implications for LCES could be a Milliken 1988). We will tend to put available and burn.” This is form of respectful interaction, perceptions at the beginning of our another way of telling crew adding to the pool of information sequences and argue that percep­ leaders that what they think crews use in making sense of their tual accuracy makes all the differ­ won’t happen will happen. operations. The LCES formula has a ence and that the perceptions on The implication is that all of lot more flexibility than sometimes the Dude Fire were inaccurate. We their normal expectations believed, something I learned from will be less likely to look for correct might be violated. the way Paul Gleason uses LCES in actions that had no effects or • “Night fires have burned deploying his Zigzag Hotshots. The unclear effects, good analyses that with relatively high intensi­ L in LCES can mean more than just led to incorrect actions, and accu­ ties and rates of spread. Be one or two lookouts. Paul told me rate perceptions that got lost in bad prepared for significant of situations, for example in case of analyses. acreage increases from when a possible rock slide, where he you left the line yesterday.” deployed as many as 16 lookouts, However, foresight is ultimately This statement explicitly with only 4 people digging line. more important—and more diffi­ warns that a fresh start Thus, the ambiguous phrase “Fire cult—than hindsight. As fire might be necessary. It also behavior will be erratic” might be behavior analysts, you are in the provides a tangible means for underscored in a forecast by adding, foresight business; you know that it calibrating forecast credibil­ “which will warrant multiple is much harder to distinguish ity. If there has indeed been a lookouts.” accurate perceptions in advance significant acreage increase, from inaccurate ones. On the Dude then the rest of the analysis I am not encouraging fire behavior Fire Staff Ride, we will be in the is more believable. analysts to take work away from the fortunate position of having people

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 13 who can tell us what it was like to Part of our work on the Dude Fire Any word that is an absolute—such live through the Dude Fire. Serious Staff Ride will be to wrestle with as “always”—is a red flag that learning will take place when we this question: Do you agree that a invites a search for exceptions. take their accounts seriously and good scare is always worth more Under what conditions might it be neutralize some of the spurious than good advice? My point has the case that a good scare is worth advantage that hindsight seems to been to make you wonder whether less than good advice? Does a good bestow. you can learn much of anything scare on one fire apply to other from a good scare. A scare can fires? Which ones? If a good scare is I want to describe a drawing by the amount to little more than an the equivalent of a near miss, then firefighter Brian Tagavac shortly intense interlude of regression and does one interpret the scare as after he escaped the Dude Fire (fig. tunnel vision. If that is so, then a evidence that the system remains 1). It summarizes what he and his good scare fails to make much data basically safe—or basically danger­ crew think they learned from the available for learning. ous, because the escape was a close incident. The caption reads, “A good call and not everyone made it? Are scare is always worth more than a A good scare can be meaningful the lessons of a good scare lost and [piece of] good advice.” In the only if you first have some under­ overwhelmed by survivor guilt or drawing itself, everybody is running standing and advice you can apply flashes of posttraumatic stress with tool in hand; the person in the to make sense of it. Good advice disorder? foreground has his pack on. All of might take the form of the Ten this slows the crew in reaching Standard Firefighting Orders and Naked Truths safety. Rather than ordering the the Eighteen Situations That Shout There are no easy answers. One firefighters to drop their tools so Watchout, which might prove more thing we can be pretty sure of is they can run faster, the leader is helpful in sorting out a near-miss that moments of learning are short- yelling, “Go, go!” The fire shows experience than as a set of rules to lived. A perfect example comes from considerable spotting, as had been live by in fighting fire. Besides, a battlefields. According to Cohen forecast for the day. good scare often comes from bad and Gooch (1990), “In the chaos of advice. the battlefield there is the tendency

Figure 1—Drawing by firefighters who narrowly escaped the Dude Fire.

14 Fire Management Today of all ranks to combine and recast truths that belie the simplistic Schulman, P.R. 1993. The analysis of high the story of their achievements into conclusion, “The entrapment was reliability organizations: A comparative framework. In: Roberts, K.H., ed. New a shape which shall satisfy the caused by the downburst.” challenges to understanding organiza­ susceptibilities of national and tions. New York: Macmillan: 33–54. regimental vainglory. … On the Starbuck, W.H.; Milliken, F.J. 1988. References Executives’ perceptual filters: What they actual day of battle naked truths Batchelor, S. 1997. Buddhism without notice and how they make sense. In: may be picked up for the asking; by beliefs. New York: Riverhead. Hambrick, D.C., ed. The executive effect: the following morning they have Campbell, D.T. 1990. Asch’s moral episte­ Concepts and methods for studying top mology for socially shared knowledge. In: managers. Greenwich, CT: JAI: 35–65. already begun to get into their Rock, I., ed. The legacy of Solomon Asch. Thomas, D. 1999. Personal communication. uniforms.” Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum: 39–52. Regional fuels specialist, USDA Forest Cohen, E.A.; Gooch, J. 1990. Military Service, Intermountain Region, Ogden, If all goes well on the staff ride, misfortunes. New York: Vintage. UT. Flin, R. 1996. Sitting in the hot seat. Whitney, J. 1990. Memorandum of inter­ we’ll be able to recapture enough of Chichester: Wiley. view. In: Accident Investigation Report: the actual day of the tragedy to McDonald, R.J. 1979. Closing remarks: Fire Dude Fire Incident: 86–87. learn some naked truths. In doing behavior officer course. December 14. Wickens, C.D. 1996. Designing for stress. Portland, OR: USDA Forest Service, In: Diskell, J.E.; Salas, E., eds. Stress and so, hopefully we’ll get scared Pacific Northwest Region. human performance. Erlbaum: Mahwah, enough to have the lessons stick, Paul, C. 1998. Fighting fire. New York: St. NJ: 279–295. ■ but not so scared that we miss Martin’s. Pyne, S.J.; Andrews, P.L.; Laven, R.D. 1996. details. In those details lie the Introduction to wildland fire. New York: Wiley.

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 15 WALK BACK INTO TRAGEDY: A QUANTUM LEAP FORWARD

Paul Keller

sudden, ironic breath of cross- slope wind whirls into J.P. “Even though I was on the Dude Fire accident A Mattingly as 40 people in investigation team, I learned a lot on the staff ride. hardhats and boots weave downhill … I now better appreciate those people and tighten around him. The former Alpine Hotshot superinten­ who were there on that fire.” dent surveys the scattered clumps –Dave Goens, meteorologist-in-charge of alligator juniper and manzanita, looks up, and holds these people in his eyes. Mattingly nods reflectively. It is as if Death Race being back on Arizona’s Tonto Mattingly looks at his watch. It is “We are standing in one of the most National Forest, down inside Walk time to move down the old dozer significant places in my entire Moore Canyon, has helped crystal­ fireline to where Paul Linse is career in fire. This is the exact spot lize his memories—memories he waiting. As the group walks, its where I thought I had the most wants and needs to share with these members continue individual opportunity to die.” attentive ears. conversations targeting different aspects of the Dude Fire blowup “There was instant fire everywhere. until they completely encircle And it was growing quickly. There Linse. were 50-mile-per-hour [20-m/s] winds pushing every single spot The former Flathead Hotshot that took. And every spot did take.” superintendent points downhill. It is his turn to remember. For 15 minutes, Mattingly shares insights about what happened on “I was in a death race from the that terrible fire blowup day: what bottom of the canyon to right here. he did, what others did around him. To this exact spot.” As Linse speaks, He then answers a volley of ques­ his audience examines the terrain, tions. the ground cover, the breaks in the surrounding ridges. They imagine These people in the hardhats and how it must of have been that day. boots have obviously studied this wildfire incident, the tragic Dude “It was one of those life experi­ Fire (named for nearby Dude ences,” Linse continues. “I’ll never Creek). Their queries are knowl­ forget it. By the time I got up there edgeable and thought provoking. to the safety zone, this was all They trigger discussions about involved. Believe me, it didn’t take Front page news in the Arizona Republic. everything from plume-dominated Photo: USDA Forest Service, Missoula long.” Technology Development Center, Missoula, fire behavior and suppression MT, 1990. tactics to chain-of-command Linse, Mattingly, and former Zigzag orders. Hotshot Superintendent Paul Paul Keller, a former hotshot and journal­ Gleason now lead the group a few ist, is a contract writer/editor for the USDA Forest Service’s Fire and Aviation Manage­ more chains down the dozer line. ment Staff, Washington Office, Washington, DC.

16 Fire Management Today The group has finally reached the LaTour waits for everyone to get He Was On Fire place where firefighters were forced settled around him. All eyes— “This,” Mattingly says, sticking out to take a stand, where firefighters somber, attentive—are focused on his arm and slowing the pace, “is died. A total of six crosses are the wildfire survivor. And the where we first observed Jeff Hatch, pointing up into a cloudless sky. crosses. the injured firefighter, walking up the line. At this point, the fire was All talk stops. The pace slows. “As soon as I got into my shelter, I running, spotting, and crowning.” Everyone passes in silence. Just started talking to people. I could down the line, Dave LaTour waits hear the crew from inside their “He was on fire,” Gleason remem­ beside the last cross. shelters saying, ‘We’re going to bers. “There was smoke coming off make this, we’re going to be okay.’ him. He was burning up.” Sheltering Up They were trying to cheer each On that infamous day, with an other up. They were sounding Questions—and answers—now estimated 70-mile-per-hour (30-m/ optimistic. We knew it was going to crackle. After 30 more minutes of s) wave of fire charging his crew, be a difficult situation, but I think insights, followup questions, and LaTour radioed that they were we all thought we were going to discussion, Gleason leads the little deploying their shelters. He walk away from it; we were going to contingent to where the drainage counted those around him, yanked make it. But when that first flame drops, narrows, and forces a single- his shelter out, dropped to this very front hit us, everything changed.” file descent. It was here, on the patch of earth, and pulled it over afternoon of the Dude Fire blowup, him—for what were no doubt the Reflects one participant after that Gleason found—one by one— longest 45 minutes of his life. Latour’s talk: “I looked at how tight the perished firefighters. that drainage was where those But somehow, LaTour endured. Six people deployed. I thought that’s an As they turn a bend beside logs others around him did not. Expla­ awfully tight spot. I had pictured blackened by fire, two white crosses nations for his survival and their something a bit more open. So I suddenly rise from the earth. An demise are among the theories the was even more impressed with what open fire shelter stretches out in group today will surmise, discuss, those people went through as they front of each cross, where a hardhat wrangle with. hunkered down in that little drain­ and Nomex shirt and pants are lying age.” in eerie faceup, prone positions. LaTour continues: “As soon as that first wave of fire hit us, I heard Curtis Springfield screaming. He was yelling that he couldn’t take it.

“I was shouting almost constantly through the whole event, telling everyone to stay in their shelters, to stay down. But quite frankly, when the flame fronts were passing over us, the sound that we heard was indescribable. It was so loud that— beyond somebody screaming right next to you—you really couldn’t hear anything else.

“The winds were lifting the shelters up. Active flame and large amounts of burning debris came into my Crosses and firefighter equipment marking location of two fatalities on the Dude Fire. shelter and up against my body. My Photo: USDA Forest Service, Missoula Technology and Equipment Center, Missoula, MT, personal feeling is that at some 1999.

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 17 point, everyone’s shelters were To prepare for the staff ride, all ence from the onsite visit to identify breaking down and being lifted up. participants were mailed a compre­ how lessons learned can be applied People were being burned to the hensive history of the Dude Fire, to future incidents. This is why point that they thought they were including weather and fuel mois­ Forest Service organizers of the going to die. There was a lot of ture summaries, fire weather March 1999 National Interagency screaming and I realized people had forecasts, sequence-of-events Fire Behavior Workshop in Phoenix, gotten up and moved. summary, the Dude Fire Accident AZ, chose to dedicate a portion of Investigation Report, and even the their week’s activities to this unique “But as soon as they got out of their Dude Fire shift plans. examination of a wildfire. shelters—that was it.” Known as the “preliminary study,” Like all tragedy fires, the Dude Fire No Ordinary Field Trip this first phase of the staff ride still generates questions. No doubt Welcome to the Dude Fire Staff ensures enlightened discussion and about it, the Dude Fire Staff Ride Ride: an indepth examination of interaction during the second helped answer many. Explained one this 1990 event—a blowup tragedy phase, a day of in-the-field stops participant, “The staff ride made me wildfire. and presentations called “stands.” think of how many times we read Dude Fire Staff Ride participants about fatality or near-miss fires and Don’t picture an ordinary, run-of­ experienced a daylong series of we generate this picture and these the-mill field trip. The staff ride is a eight different stands (see the ideas of what went wrong. But I unique, comprehensive, three- sidebar). At each stand, presenters now realize that unless you get into phase event that blends prestudy wove specific instructional objec­ it in the depth we got into on the and in-the-field observation with tives into the discussions. Present­ staff ride, you really don’t under­ interactive dialogue. In this case, ers included local district person­ stand. It’s really easy to want to the staff ride was designed to gain nel, the Dude Fire type 2 incident draw simple conclusions. That’s significant insights into a blowup commander, other overhead team why, for me, doing the staff ride in on a fatality wildfire that entrapped members, suppression crew veter­ that depth was so valuable.” 11 firefighters and claimed 6 lives. ans, National Weather Service meteorologists, and accident “Three words summarize my investigation team members. experience on the staff ride: illumi­ nation, detail, and clarity,” said “The people who were directly Gerry Day, manager for the North­ involved in the Dude Fire who west Area Coordination Center. volunteered to participate at the “Those three things struck me as I various stands had a tremendous read through the staff ride materials investment in the staff ride’s beforehand and prepared. But I success,” said Mike Hilbruner, Dude don’t think I could have taken the Fire Staff Ride Steering Committee quantum leap that I did on the staff cochair and applied fire ecologist ride without going to the site, for the USDA Forest Service’s walking down through Walk Moore Washington Office. “They didn’t shy Canyon, and feeling the wind that away from this opportunity to was blowing as we heard the actual participate. We truly appreciate accounts from the individuals.” their valuable contribution.” Hotshot Initiative The subsequent “informed” interac­ Explained another Dude Fire Staff tion—an indepth dialogue between Ride participant: “The most impres­ staff ride presenters and partici­ sive thing I learned on the staff ride pants—serves as the staff ride’s was the initiative shown by the lifeline, one of its many dividends. hotshot supervisors. Until I actually Dave LaTour standing at the fire shelter In this final phase of the staff ride, went up there, I had thought there deployment zone on the Dude Fire. Photo: participants blend information from might be a little green grass around USDA Forest Service, Missoula Technology the preliminary study with experi­ Development Center, Missoula, MT, 1999. the homes—there wasn’t. And we

18 Fire Management Today STANDS FOR THE DUDE FIRE STAFF RIDE

A total of 135 people—in groups • Presenters: of 45—experienced the March None (a 1999 Dude Fire Staff Ride in 8 in­ time for the-field presentations/discus­ respectful sions (called stands). The stands, and reflec­ designed to stimulate interaction tive silence). between participants and present­ • Discussion ers, told the story of the 1990 Topics: An Dude Fire blowup in chronologi­ opportunity cal order. to visit this site in a Stand 1 moment of • Site: Fire camp location (with a silent panoramic view of the fire’s reflection. topography). • Presenters: Fire management At this point, Staff ride participants at a stand. Photo: USDA Forest Service, officer and district ranger from the groups Missoula Technology Development Center, Missoula, MT, 1999. the host Payson Ranger District, abandoned the Tonto National Forest. buses and walked from stand to • Discussion Topics: Entrap­ • Discussion Topics: Ignition; stand along the Dude Fire dozer ment and deployment chronol­ seasonal severity; geography; line. ogy; “get-on-the-ground” management response in this message; fire behavior/weather, type of fire/locality; general fire Stand 5 including difference at this behavior and weather. • Site: Safety zone. location and the safety zone. • Presenters: Four hotshot super­ Stand 2 intendents on the fire; National Stand 8 • Site: On buses traveling Weather Service meteorologist. • Site: Control Road and Walk through the Whispering Pines • Discussion Topics: Early- Moore Canyon. residential development in the morning operations; fire behav­ • Presenters: Type 1 team fire wildland–urban interface. ior/weather; wildland–urban behavior analyst; Tonto Na­ • Presenter: Bus facilitator. interface; location of overhead, tional Forest Fire and Aviation • Discussion Topics: Fuels; including fire behavior analysts; Management staff officer; terrain; suppression options. transition from type 2 to type 1. assistant U.S. attorney involved in Dude Fire litigation. Stand 3 Stand 6 • Discussion Topics: • Site: Control Road and Fuller • Site: Inside the perimeter of the Postdeployment; fire behavior/ Canyon (inside the burnover Bonita Creek Estates residential weather; fatalities; litigation. perimeter). development. • Presenters: Type 2 incident • Presenters: Hotshot superinten­ The morning following the field commander; National Weather dents. visits, the official “integration Service fire weather forecaster. • Discussion Topics: Burnout phase”—discussing how to apply • Discussion Topics: Night fire operation; tactics; fire behavior/ lessons learned to future inci­ behavior/weather; evening fire weather; lookouts, communica­ dents—took place in nearby operations; crew deployments/ tions, escape routes, safety zones; Phoenix, AZ. This phase actually evacuations the first night; chronology of finding the burn began immediately after stand 8 escape route. victim. as individual discussions started on the bus ride to Phoenix. Stand 4 Stand 7 • Site: Permanent memorial for • Site: Entrapment site. the fallen Dude Fire firefighters • Presenters: Entrapment survi­ in the Bonita Creek Estates vor; accident investigation team residential development. member.

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 19 learned that there was no safety continued. “But equally important “This was happening during transi­ zone until the hotshots burned out is the ability to disengage when we tion [from the type 2 incident that triangle on the upper end. feel we’ve reached the limit. I management team already onsite to defend the type 1 firefighters and the incoming type 1 incident “And when things went [bad] and type 1 supervisors and all of the management team]. And after the they couldn’t get anybody on the people who have this attitude.” staff ride, I started thinking about radio, here was this safety zone, and several recent fires in which we they got 180 people into it— When To Disengage encountered problem events during including urban firefighters and The Dude Fire Staff Ride helped transition. And yet, I’ve never heard dozer operators and the whole enlighten participants on a gamut this subject emphasized, talked works. Not just their own crews. of safety and headsup issues that about, or be a key item in any of our And this was on their own initiative. apply to all wildland fire environ­ training. So I think we have some­ They didn’t get permission to build ments. A case-in-point is knowing thing to work on here.” the safety zone. They did it on their when to disengage. own. I think we have to rely on this Said another staff ride participant: type of spontaneous mission of “From an operational standpoint, I “All conditions on the Dude Fire people.” can think of half a dozen experi­ were out of the norm. They were ences—some very recent—in which experiencing extremes. When we Echoed Dave Goens, meteorologist­ an attempt to do the right thing get into these situations, somebody in-charge for the National Weather under the pressure of the moment needs to pick up a banner and hit Service in Missoula, MT, “The thing has caused us to literally disregard people on the head and say, ‘This in that struck me most about the staff everything we know,” explained a not a normal fire. It is going to take ride was that even though I was on staff ride participant. “And, to me, some different strategies on this fire the Dude Fire accident investiga­ that’s part of what was going on out to keep our people safe.’ I think the tion team, I learned a lot. And I there on the Dude Fire. The pres­ onus to do that is on us as fire helped write the Dude Fire accident sure to do something—to pull off a behavior analysts. If we are starting investigation report. I now better marginal chance to protect the to get that feeling that something is appreciate those people who were subdivision—took everybody out of out of ordinary then we need to there. I want to personally thank all the loop. A critical piece of informa­ push as hard as we can to get that the hotshot foremen who were put tion that the fire had come around information out to as many people into that situation. I couldn’t build below them was lost. as we can, especially directly to the a medal big enough to give to people like Dave LaTour, Paul Gleason, Paul Linse, and J.P. Mattingly. They are heroes.”

“For me, the Dude Fire Staff Ride illustrated why it is important to defend the type 1 firefighters’ ‘can­ do’ attitude,” explained Gleason, Dude Fire veteran and staff ride presenter. “Being a type 1 fire­ fighter for over 20 years, one of the enjoyments of that job is to go into chaos and make sense out of it. And this ‘sense’ is to do effective fire management and safe fire manage­ ment work simultaneously within this environment.

“That’s part of the reason we are attracted to the job,” Gleason Aerial view of fatality sites in Walk Moore Canyon. Photo: USDA Forest Service, 1990.

20 Fire Management Today command and general staff. We as the day goes on and fire behavior for other fires. “I came here as an need to take a prudent measure in potential increases—as on the Dude ops chief,” one said. “I was struck, safety. This needs to be done and Fire—we need to reevaluate and too, that there are not simple discussed at length every chance validate escape routes and safety solutions for this. I’ve walked you get.” zones, perhaps on an hourly basis.” through South Canyon and spent a lot of time there. But, after the staff Planning for Safety Dude Fire deployment survivor ride for the Dude Fire, I realize that “On the staff ride,” explained Dave LaTour’s insights on fire rather than saying what was right another participant, “I asked the shelters proved particularly insight­ or wrong in South Canyon, we need people who had been on that fire if ful. “We need to tell people what to to do what we did here on the Dude there was any way we could have expect when they get into their Fire Staff Ride. Talk about it. made that assignment safe. What shelters,” LaTour emphasized to the Expand our training base so that we we came up with was to put an staff ride participants. “They need to see more of the things that are abort time on a mission such as know that their shelters are going taking place around us and more of that. Perhaps give the mission a try, to blow around—that they’re going what contributes to what happens.” but identify a time during the to see and hear things outside their operational period, in advance, that shelter. But, most importantly, Yes, the Dude Fire Staff Ride was after a certain time—beyond noon people need to know that their the first. But, due to its apparent or 1 p.m.—this mission is no longer shelter is the best place they can be, success as a training and learning a valid mission if you haven’t yet even if they are getting burned. tool, it won’t be the last. Partici­ got it secure. At that time I would Staying close to the ground is the pants said they intended to share preplan to abort that particular key to survival. That seemed to be new lessons and insights gleaned on mission. what saved those of us who lived. the staff ride back at their home People need to know that if you get units, including through revised “I also now realize that we need to out of your shelter, you’re going to training courses. look at escape routes and safety die.” zones as changing with fire behav­ More staff rides for other wildland ior potential. Once we have escape More Rides Planned fire events are now in the planning routes and safety zones identified, The success of the Dude Fire Staff stages. Certainly, the staff ride during the night burning period for Ride prompted many people to concept and opportunity can also be instance, they may be effective. But suggest that staff rides be planned used on other types of fire events, including near-miss fires, fire successes, and even wildland fire use. And, of course, as with the Dude Fire, the staff ride is also a vital tool for learning from fatality wildfires to prevent life-threatening situations in the future. For, as we now realize, to truly learn, we must go back with keener eyes and minds and walk the ground where our fellow firefighters have fallen. ■

House burning on the Dude Fire. As one staff ride participant put it, “All conditions on the Dude Fire were out of the norm.” Photo: USDA Forest Service, 1990.

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 21 WHY DON’T WE JUST LEAVE THE FIRELINE?

Robert W. Mutch

Editor’s note: When Bob Mutch, the eminent fire ecologist and former fire researcher and fire management officer for the USDA Forest Service, stood to give the closing remarks at the National Interagency Fire Behavior Workshop in Phoenix, AZ, in March 1999, he surprised many. Mutch explained that he had planned to show a series of fire behavior slides and give a prepared talk; but, because of the impact of the previous day’s Dude Fire Staff Ride, that had all changed. The following is based on Mutch’s closing remarks at the workshop.*

started out the Dude Fire Staff Ride without any idea what a staff I’m sure you’ll never forget that moment I ride is, although we had very good as he spoke so quietly about this terrible, briefing information. Perhaps my terrible event that he lived through experience yesterday on the staff ride was not too unlike your experi­ and some did not live through. ence. Shift in Thinking Jeff Hatch; then working back up Inner Voice that steep hill, trying to get this But I still didn’t totally appreciate As I got to the stand where we met person who was badly burned to Tony Sciacca and John Holcom**— what Tony, John, and all the others safety—suddenly, this breathless­ down through Dave had really done up there where they had burned-in ness became symbolic for me. It that safety zone to provide safety for to me. Finally, we were finished at started to symbolize what he and so that last stand. I didn’t get six paces 180 people—my thinking mode many others went through that day. started to shift. Then we went down down that dusty Walk Moore trail That breathlessness seemed very on that clear, bright day, when the line and met Paul Gleason. He appropriate. was a little breathless. I thought: suddenly this inner voice started “Well, he’s come up a pretty steep talking to me—it just came from Then we heard J.P. Mattingly and the experience, I’m sure—and the hill, it’s going to take him a mo­ Paul Linse. That’s when a huge ment to catch his breath.” little simple voice said this: “Why transition started happening for don’t we just leave the fireline?” me. The thinking part was slowly But the more he talked about what just disappearing. I was absorbing I made a few more steps down that went on that fire blowup day— emotions and feelings. going down into that canyon where dusty trail and another voice spoke the visibility was 200 feet (60 m); to me. This voice said: “Bob, take Then we went down to that spot— half the slides out of your program going down into a situation where I’ll never forget it—with Dave it was probably too late and finding tomorrow morning. Because, while LaTour.*** I’m sure you’ll never it might be nice to look at some forget that moment, either, as he slides, there are more important Bob Mutch is a fire management consult­ spoke so quietly in such a soft- things to talk about than slides.” ant in Missoula, MT. spoken way about this terrible, terrible event that he lived through, Now I have decided not to show a * Bob Mutch’s remarks were captured by Paul Keller, a some others lived through, and former hotshot and journalist who contracted with the single slide, because I don’t think USDA Forest Service to help document the Dude Fire some did not live through. That was we have time to look at any slides Staff Ride. He wrote the editor’s note introducing this when it really struck me—almost— article. today. There is more important about what was happening on this business in this room than seeing a ** Tony Sciacca and John Holcom were hotshot staff ride through Walk Moore few 35-millimeter slides. superintendents on the 1990 Dude Fire on Arizona’s Canyon. Tonto National Forest. They were involved in an on-the­ spot decision to burn out a safety zone for 180 people I want you to know that it is a first threatened by the oncoming flames. During the Dude Fire Staff Ride, they and others waited at critical points *** Dave LaTour took the staff ride participants to the for me to come prepared with a on the fire site (called “stands”) and made presentations spot where 11 entrapped firefighters deployed their fire to staff ride participants. shelters and 6 of them died. slide presentation and not show a

22 Fire Management Today single slide. To me, that helps mind. I could think of nothing else. But if planets can align themselves underscore the significance of the As we gathered to ride back on the to give us a bad time out there— experience I had on the staff ride bus last night and during the ride like they did on June 26, 1990— through Walk Moore Canyon. back, we shared some feelings— why can’t we align some opposing mostly feelings, not thoughts. Last planets to neutralize that effect that Leaving the Fireline night, I recalled something Marty we don’t want to see again on the So let’s talk for a moment about Alexander told us earlier in this fireline. Some things we don’t ever leaving the fireline. workshop. He said that sometimes want to see again: a crew going the planets align themselves to give down toward a control road and I stayed up late last night because us serious fire behavior situations encountering such a black wall of the staff ride was ever-present in my and difficulties. flame and smoke across the trail that they had to turn around and go back to a very inappropriate place where they had to take a stand. It was a stand of last resort.

So let’s talk for a moment about lining up our planets in our favor— in opposition to the potential negatives on the fireline. We have a host of tools. We don’t need to wait for further research. We don’t need to wait for somebody to filter things down to us, saying, “Do it this way. This is how it should be done in the future.” We know in our hearts how it could be done in the future. We just need to put all those pieces together.

Hotshot superintendent (in blue hardhat) discussing his experiences at a stand on the Dude Fire Staff Ride. Photo: USDA Forest Service, Missoula Technology Development Lining up the Planets Center, Missoula, MT, 1999. These are some of the planets I thought about last night, the ones in our favor.

One has to do with our fire danger rating system. It has to do with the knowledge that we have at our fingertips—the ability to determine what the energy release component (ERC) percentile level is before we ever embark on a fire assignment. Are we at the 95-percentile level at the end of June on the Tonto National Forest? Or are we at the 97.5-percentile level?

That’s one of the planets that gives us some advance information about how easy or how difficult our assignment might be. A lot of Staff ride participants descending into Walk Moore Canyon. Photo: USDA Forest Service, Missoula Technology Development Center, Missoula, MT, 1999. intuitive and even some experimen-

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 23 It’s the first time I’ve come prepared with a slide presentation and not shown a single slide. That helps underscore the experience I had on the staff ride. tal work has been done to feel that first raindrop on your show us that when we’ve hand. If your glove is off, reached the 80th percentile in maybe it makes a small ERC, fires become difficult to impression in the dust on your control. That’s one piece of hand. And you say to yourself, information that we have. “Another indicator, another planet lining itself up!” What about the Haines Index at 5 or 6? That is a significant And we use all this and maybe indicator that potentially couple it with the “siren” that signals plume-dominated fire Dick Rothermel suggested* or behavior. whatever else we need to do to get the word around—the Let’s put all the planets word that it’s time to leave the together. Let’s say we come to fireline for awhile. It’s time to a fire in the summer near the get the message out to leave Mogollon Rim in northern the line while there’s still Arizona, and we know we’re at plenty of time to do something the 97.5-percentile level in about it. ERC. We also know we have a Haines Index of 5 or 6 that day. Remarkable Job We also have three or four That is some of what I finally well-placed lookouts around felt as I walked down through the fire at strategic vantage Walk Moore Canyon. Only the points—lookouts who are Cross erected at fatality site on the Dude Fire. Photo: people who were there on that knowledgeable about fire USDA Forest Service, Missoula Technology Develop­ ment Center, Missoula, MT, 1999. terrible day in 1990—the day behavior. The lookout is not of the Dude Fire—will fully be someone who couldn’t make it out of camp that day able to appreciate the consequences of that event. because he or she has a blister, so we put that person However, I think they did a remarkable job of sharing up on a mountaintop somewhere with a radio. Instead, what they experienced that day with the rest of us. I we have people who are knowledgeable about fire hope my remarks give some sense of the impact they behavior and know what they are looking at. had on those of us who experienced the Dude Fire Staff Ride and our sobering walk through Walk Moore Our lookouts start reporting that there is a convection Canyon. ■ column building and being sustained up to 20,000 to 25,000 feet (6,000–7,500 m). We couple that “planet” * For more on the concept of an audio emergency signal for wildland firefighting, see with the next “planet,” which means that some of you, A.G. Bell, “Air Horn Helpful in Fire Emergencies,” Fire Control Notes 32(1) [Winter somewhere—in a vehicle, on the line, or on an engine— 1971]: 9, 15.

24 Fire Management Today THE STAFF RIDE APPROACH TO WILDLAND FIRE BEHAVIOR AND FIREFIGHTER SAFETY AWARENESS TRAINING: A COMMENTARY

Martin E. Alexander

felt very fortunate to have been able to participate in all three My experience on the Dude Fire Staff Ride I phases of the Dude Fire Staff Ride suggests that the wildland fire community that took place on March 3–5, 1999. has an excellent opportunity to develop Like the other staff ride partici­ pants, I found the whole experience its own unique staff ride tool. to be extremely beneficial to my gaining a deeper understanding of the complexities involved in fire various sources over the years (e.g., Although the wildland fire behavior and the associated Campbell 1995; Gleason 1991; community’s adaptation of the firefighter fatalities resulting from Goens and Andrews 1998; Johns military staff ride (Robertson 1987) the major run of the Dude Fire on 1996; Mangan 1996; MTDC 1990; concept provides a powerful learn­ the afternoon of June 26, 1990. NFES 1998a; NFPA 1990; Putnam ing technique, we need to recognize 1995a; Rosato 1991; Rothermel that it isn’t necessarily a cure-all for I am thus greatly honored to have 1991), including the official acci­ increasing wildland firefighter been asked to contribute this essay dent investigation report (USDA safety awareness. Instead, it is just for the special issue of Fire Manage­ Forest Service 1990), and a conver­ another tool in our toolkit. None­ ment Today dealing with the Dude sation I had with Dude Fire veteran theless, my experience on the Dude Fire Staff Ride. I sincerely hope that Paul Gleason in Missoula, MT, in Fire Staff Ride suggests that the the comments offered here, based June 1994. wildland fire community has an in part on the Dude Fire Staff Ride experience coupled with a 30-year career in wildland fire, will lead to enhancements as well as extensions of the staff ride concept in the future for training fire behavior analysts (FBANs) and in further developing firefighter safety aware­ ness training. Strengths and Limitations Prior to the Dude Fire Staff Ride, I had only a superficial appreciation for this incident based on bits and pieces of information gleaned from

Dr. Marty Alexander is a senior fire behavior research officer with the Canadian Forest Service at the Northern Forestry Participants in the Dude Fire Staff Ride at the fire shelter deployment site. Photo: USDA Centre, Edmonton, Alberta. Forest Service, Missoula Technology Development Center, Missoula, MT, 1999.

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 25 excellent opportunity to develop its Future staff rides would have to be linked own unique staff ride. to a major event in order to justify the time The two greatest values of the staff and expense of organizing a staff ride relative ride are: to how many people would attend.

1. Onsite experience. Rather than just reading about the incident, National Interagency Fire Behavior presentations and discussions that you get to actually visit the site Workshop. This was not unlike the took place at the stands were and obtain a “firsthand feel” for field trips to the 1949 Mann Gulch videotaped and edited into a Dude the fire environment, the opera­ Fire included as part of the first Fire Staff Ride videotape produced tional setting, values at risk, and National Fire Behavior Training by Paul Keller. This was certainly other things—a sentiment Course held in Missoula, MT, in fortuitous, because it captured expressed very well in the video March/April 1958 (McDonald 1979) information and the personal Battles Lost (NFES 1998b). For and the Wildland Firefighters feelings of certain individuals example, without actually having Human Factors Workshop, which involved in the incident, such as visited the site of the 1949 Mann was also held in Missoula, June 12– Paul Gleason. It might not be Gulch Fire as I did in June 1994, 16, 1995 (Putnam 1995b). Future possible to acquire this information I could have never fully appreci­ staff rides would have to be linked at any other time. ated from simply reading Nor­ to a major event of this kind in man Maclean’s (1992) book just order to justify the time and ex­ Like many others who participated how difficult the foot travel pense of organizing a staff ride. in the Dude Fire Staff Ride, I was would have been in the very mesmerized by Dave LaTour’s loose soil. Videotape Value account of death and survival; the 2. Interaction with those involved. Four groups of some 135 partici­ USDA Forest Service’s Missoula You are able to talk to individuals pants were involved in the Dude Technology and Development who were actually involved in the Fire Staff Ride. A number of the Center has incorporated his testi- incident or who participated in the subsequent accident investi­ gation.

Although these are certainly strengths of the staff ride, they also constitute a limitation for some people, because not everyone who would like to attend can, due to the expense involved and the timing of the event. Furthermore, it would be extremely difficult to assemble the same group of individuals for the eight stand locations (or presenta­ tion/discussion stops) associated with the field phase of the Dude Fire Staff Ride, as described by Paul Keller on page 19, on any sort of regular basis.

We need to bear in mind that the Author at the site of the 1949 Mann Gulch Fire tragedy in northwestern Montana, just 11 Dude Fire Staff Ride was, in effect, a days prior to the firefighter fatalities on the 1994 South Canyon Fire in western Colorado, as part of a field trip for fire behavior analysts and others held following a fire behavior field trip for FBANs, albeit a very workshop in Missoula, MT, June 21–23, 1994. This experience, like the Dude Fire Staff significant one, held in conjunction Ride, had a lasting effect on the author’s perspective on fire behavior and wildland fire­ with a major conference, the first fighter safety. Photo: Marty Alexander, Canadian Forest Service, Edmonton, Alberta, 1994.

26 Fire Management Today I would strongly recommend that any future In this way, we could visit fatality staff rides videotape all the presentations and sites at our leisure, much in the way we view other historically discussions at each stand in the meaningful places. Admittedly, the interest of historical documentation. personal element of being able to talk with the actual personnel involved in the incident—a monial into the new Using Your Building Institutional strength of the Dude Fire Staff Fire Shelter video (NFES 2001). I Memory Ride—would not apply. However, would strongly recommend that this disadvantage is small compared A formal staff ride like the one on to the advantage of more widely any future staff rides videotape all the Dude Fire is highly appropriate disseminating information in order the presentations and discussions at for FBAN and wildland firefighter each stand in the interest of histori­ “to use the lessons of the past so we safety training. However, we need to don’t have to keep relearning them cal documentation. This value- find ways to make information from the hard way” (NFES 1998b).** added aspect of a staff ride should a completed staff ride available to a not be underestimated as we look to wider audience so that future Mining Our Past justify the time, expense, and effort generations might benefit, in of planning and carrying out staff addition to the select few who were Following the Dude Fire Staff Ride, rides in the future. able to attend. If we are truly I was haunted by the fact that—in serious about establishing and spite of the information provided to In 1997, I suggested at a fire safety maintaining an institutional the participants in a three-ring conference that perhaps an annual memory, then we should take the binder titled “Dude Fire Staff Ride fatality fire study tour should be following steps: developed in which a small group (perhaps 25 people) would visit a • Where possible, develop a simple network of selected sites (perhaps 6) marked trail with interpretive in different regions over a 2- to 3­ signs for as many fatality fires as week period, with each stop facili­ possible, or alternatively for a tated by a local historian for each preselected few designed to fire (Alexander 1998). For example, illustrate certain principles. A Karl Brauneis (1997), a forester and large number of memorials fire management officer on the already exist (Gulliford 1997). Shoshone National Forest, has • Create a national register of made an extensive study of the 1937 fatality fires in the form of a Blackwater Fire in northwestern Website that allows one to down­ Wyoming (Brown 1937) and would load an incident summary; a self- make an excellent guide. guided study booklet or pamphlet, complete with a map linked to the I also suggested that there was an interpretive trail system outlined overwhelming need for a compre­ above; and perhaps other infor­ hensive case book on fatality fires; mation, such as reports and Pyne and others (1996) have made a articles, photographs, and video start at this. Although there is an clips of interviews with personnel obvious role for the kind of extraor­ involved in the incident.* dinary indepth coverage of a fatality Payson District Fire Management Officer Pat Velasco at a stand on the Dude Fire fire that Norman Maclean (1992) Staff Ride. Photo: USDA Forest Service, did for the 1949 Mann Gulch Fire, Missoula Technology Development Center, the wildland fire community also * For example, Smith (2002) conducted interviews in Missoula, MT, 1999. 1994 with five Civilian Conservation Corps survivors of requires the “Reader’s Digest” the 1937 Blackwater Fire; and the marvelous encapsulated version, such as documentary by Smith (2000) commemorating the 60th ** Notably, in the late 1990s, Dr. Jason Greenlee, former anniversary of the U.S. smokejumper program contains executive director of the International Association of Rothermel’s (1993) Mann Gulch an excellent series of interviews related to the 1949 Wildland Fire, made a strong effort to put up many of Mann Gulch Fire, including one with Bob Sallee (the the wildland firefighter fatality accident investigation synopsis. last remaining survivor). reports on the association’s Website.

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 27 Preliminary Study” and the 17­ A CASE FOR WILDLAND FIRE BEHAVIOR minute excerpt on the Dude Fire from the NFES (1998a) video— RESEARCH UNITS there still seem to be many unan­ swered questions and perhaps It has been gratifying to see the recognition of the human dimen­ conflicting opinions. Admittedly, sion in wildland firefighter fatality incidents (Braun and Latapie some questions might never be 1995; Putnam 1995b) and in recent case histories (e.g., Maclean definitively answered. However, new 1992; Maclean 1999). I can still vividly recall the daylong presenta­ information has emerged as a result tion by Jim McFadden of the California Department of Forestry Fire of undertaking the staff ride of the Academy on California fatality fire case histories given at the Forest Dude Fire. For example, while it is Technology School in Hinton, AB, in the mid-1980s. His case well known that both live and dead studies certainly emphasized the importance of human factors as fuels were at critically low moisture well as fire behavior as contributing factors. levels, the fact that fuels had accumulated in the area for at least Brewer Fire Mystery 30 to 35 years is not documented We have in some cases failed to adequately follow up on our analysis anywhere in the literature on the of the fire behavior and the associated fire environment on fatality Dude Fire; yet this general concern fires, but especially on near-miss incidents (Munson 2000). The with respect to firefighter safety has Brewer Fire in southeastern Montana, in which the Wyoming been enunciated elsewhere, espe­ Hotshots were forced to deploy their fire shelters on the evening of cially with respect to the wildland– June 23, 1988 (NFPA 1988), constitutes a case in point.* Thoele urban interface (e.g., Mutch 1994; (1995) provides an excellent account of the incident in the opening Williams 1995). chapter of his book Fire Line: The Summer Battles of the West. I first learned about the Brewer Fire in March 1989 from a presenta­ I was invited to attend the critique tion made by John Krebs and Byron Bonney, the fire behavior team luncheon meeting that analysts (FBANs) assigned to the fire, at a fire behavior workshop followed the integration phase of held in Missoula, MT, following the notorious 1988 fire season. the Dude Fire Staff Ride on the morning of March 5, 1999. At that I eventually acquired a copy of the official Bureau of Land Manage- session, I recommended that a ment/Forest Service investigation team report on the Brewer Fire technical report along the lines of shelter deployment. And I also acquired a copy of the investigation the excellent publication by Butler team’s videotaped interviews with the Wyoming Hotshots from and others (1998) on the 1994 Mike Rogers, the crew’s superintendent. South Canyon Fire in western Colorado should be done for the The investigation team assigned to the Brewer Fire shelter deploy­ Dude Fire, including an analysis of ment concluded that the erratic change in fire behavior and the the prevailing burning conditions burst in fire intensity were due, more “than to any other factor,” to in light of previously held views the low foliar moisture content in the ponderosa pine trees result­ regarding blowup fires in the region ing from the drought conditions at the time. No moisture content (Bates 1962). samples were taken to confirm this as far as I know. It is worth noting that the investigation team had neither an FBAN, a fire As Thomas (1994) points out, we weather meteorologist, nor a fire researcher assigned to it. need to avoid falling into the trap of assuming that experience will make * The author admittedly has more than a passing interest in the Brewer Fire, having been a member of the its lessons available automatically, Bighorn National Forest Inter-Regional Fire Suppression Crew—the forerunner of the Wyoming Hotshots—in 1972 and 1973. and therefore failing to keep sys­ tematic records to track the results of our decisions and failing to analyze these results in ways that reveal their key lessons (Russo and Schoemaker 1990). There is, as well, the concern that we might be

28 Fire Management Today The team also found that the sudden calm and temperature rise failing to interpret the evidence (estimated to be 15 oF [8 oC] in just a few seconds) felt by crew from past outcomes for what it foreman Neil Beisler and another crew member could not be really says because we are tricked by explained or substantiated from the available weather information. hindsight effects (Russo and It was Beisler’s alertness that enabled the crew to seek refuge in Schoemaker 1990). We owe it to time from the ensuing blowup in the grassy meadow where they those who have been entrapped and deployed their fire shelters. killed or seriously burned on wildland fires to do as thorough a While acknowledging that live and dead fuels were at exceedingly job as possible. low levels, I have been bothered over the years by the fact that there has never been an explanation for what triggered the Brewer Paying Tribute Fire blowup. On the basis of an article that I came across in In closing this essay, I’d like to pay Weatherwise (Schlatter 1995), I now wonder whether the Brewer tribute to the Dude Fire Staff Ride Fire blowup was triggered by a heat burst (HB) event. An HB is a Steering Committee for their rare summertime mesoscale weather phenomenon,** resulting innovation and efforts in organizing from a downburst of air in the wake of a dissipating thunderstorm. a highly successful event, as well as It usually occurs at night. Gusty surface winds, sudden and some­ to those responsible for publishing o o times spectacular increases in air temperature (e.g., 26 F [14.5 C] this special issue of Fire Manage­ in 15 minutes), and rapid decreases in relative humidity are ment Today on the Dude Fire Staff commonly associated with heat bursts (Schlatter 1995). Ride. The Dude Fire Staff Ride and this resultant publication constitute Need for Followup a glowing example of the wildland The time has come to seriously consider the establishment of fire community paying homage to permanent, full-time national operational fire behavior research its fallen firefighters. Thus, “the units in the United States, Canada, and perhaps elsewhere. The living have remembered the dead, sole purpose of these units would be to undertake field investiga­ and therefore, the dead go on tions of past and recent wildfire occurrences involving firefighter living” (Gulliford 1997). fatalities and near misses, emphasizing the case history method (Byram 1954). Such a unit should be staffed with FBANs, a fire References weather meteorologist, a fuels specialist, a fire operations special­ Alexander, M.E. 1998. A wildland fire ist, a geographic information system specialist, a computer sup­ behavior researcher’s perspective of port specialist, and a “wildland fire psychologist,” supplemented by firefighter safety in Canada [Abstr.]. In: Proceedings Canada/U.S. Wildland Fire contractors and fire research personnel on a part-time basis (e.g., Safety Summit; 1997 September 29– short-term assignments and secondments). October 2; Rossland, BC. Fairfield, WA: International Association of Wildland Again, if we are truly serious about establishing and maintaining Fire: 37. Alexander, M.E.; Thorburn, R.W. 2001. institutional memory when it comes to wildland firefighter safety, Fireline safety training course available we would find ways to make this happen. As Chandler (1976) has on CD-ROM. Fire Management Today. so rightly pointed out, “Time and time again case histories have 61(2): 45. Bates, R.W. 1962. A key to blowup condi­ proven their value as training aids” (e.g., Alexander and Thorburn tions in the Southwest? Fire Control 2001; Cheney et al. 2001; Moore 1959; NFES 1996). Notes. 23(4): 95–99. Baughman, R.G. 1981. Why windspeeds increase on high mountain slopes at night. Res. Pap. INT–276. Ogden, UT: ** Chandler (1976) felt that more than half of the fire-behavior-related wildland firefighter fatalities in the USDA Forest Service, Intermountain United States were the result of mesoscale phenomena (i.e., weather changes resulting from causes too localized to be identifiable from the basic network observations, yet too widely separated to be reasonably Forest and Range Experiment Station. deduced from observations at a single local station). The increase in windspeeds on high-mountain slopes Braun, C.C.; Latapie, B. 1995. Human at night constitutes a good example (Baughman 1981). decisionmaking in the fire environment. Fire Management Notes. 55(3): 14–18. Brauneis, K. 1997. 1937 Blackwater Fire investigation. Static Line. 3(4): 9–10. Brown, A.A. 1937. The factors and circum­ stances that led to the Blackwater Fire tragedy. Fire Control Notes. 1(6): 384– 387.

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 29 We need to find ways to make information from a completed staff ride available to a wider audience so that future generations might benefit.

Butler, B.W.; Bartlette, R.A.; Bradshaw, L.S.; Mangan, R.J. 1996. Investigating wildland Putnam, T. 1995b. Findings from the Cohen, J.D.; Andrews, P.L.; Putnam, T.; fire entrapments. Tech. Rep. 9551–2845– wildland firefighters human factors Mangan, R.J. 1998. Fire behavior MTDC. Missoula, MT: USDA Forest workshop. Tech. Rep. 9551–2855–MTDC. associated with the 1994 South Canyon Service, Missoula Technology Develop­ [Updated July 1996.] Missoula, MT: USDA Fire on Storm King Mountain, Colorado. ment Center. Forest Service, Missoula Technology Res. Pap. RMRS–RP–9. Fort Collins, CO: McDonald, R.J. 1979. Closing remarks. Fire Development Center. USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Behavior Officer S–590 Course binder. Pyne, S.J.; Andrews, P.L.; Laven, R.D. 1996. Research Station. Marana, AZ: USDA Forest Service, Introduction to wildland fire. 2d ed. New Byram, G.M. 1954. Atmospheric conditions National Advanced Resource Technology York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, Incorpo­ related to blowup fires. Stn. Pap. No. 35. Center. rated: 526–535. Asheville, NC: USDA Forest Service, Moore, W.R. 1959. Training in the Ten Robertson, W.G. 1987. The staff ride. CMH Southeastern Forest Experiment Station. Standard Fire Fighting Orders. Fire Pub. 70–21. Washington, DC: United [Reprinted as: National Fire Equipment Control Notes. 29(2): 58–60. States Army Center for Military History. System Publication NFES 2565 by the MTDC (Missoula Technology Development Rosato, C. 1991. FPA casebook of fires: National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Center). 1990. Dude Fire entrapment Forest, Tonto, Arizona, USA. Fire Boise, ID.] (video). Missoula, MT: USDA Forest Prevention. 241 (July/August): 33–35. Campbell, D. 1995. The Campbell Predic­ Service, Missoula Technology and Rothermel, R.C. 1991. Predicting behavior tion System. Second ed. Ojai, CA: D. Development Center. and size of crown fires in the Northern Campbell. Munson, S. 2000. Application of accident Rocky Mountains. Res. Pap. INT–438. Chandler, C.C. 1976. Meteorological needs investigation methods to wildland Ogden, UT: USDA Forest Service, of fire danger and fire behavior. In Baker, firefighting by case study method. M.S. Intermountain Research Station. D.H.; Fosberg, M.A., tech. coords. Thesis. Missoula, MT: University of Rothermel, R.C. 1993. Mann Gulch Fire: A Proceedings of the Fourth National Montana. race that couldn’t be won. Gen. Tech. Conference on Fire and Forest Meteorol­ Mutch, R.W. 1994. Fighting fire with Rep. INT–299. Ogden, UT: USDA Forest ogy; 1976 November 16–18; St. Louis, prescribed fire: a return to ecosystem Service, Intermountain Research Station. MO. Fort Collins, CO: USDA Forest health. Journal of Forestry. 92(11): 31– Russo, J.E.; Schoemaker, P.J.H. 1990. Service, Rocky Mountain Forest and 33. Decision traps: Ten barriers to brilliant Range Experiment Station: 38–41. NFES (National Fire Equipment System). decision-making and how to overcome Cheney, N.P.; Gould, J.; McCaw, L. 2001. 1996. Extreme fire behavior and tactics them. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster The dead-man zone—A neglected area of (video). Pub. NFES 1407. Boise, ID: Incorporated. firefighter safety. Australian Forestry. 64: National Wildfire Coordinating Group. Schlatter, T. 1995. Anatomy of a heat burst. 45–50. [See also: .] (Bass River, NJ; Dude, AZ; Golden Gate University of Wyoming, Department of Gleason, P. 1991. LCES—A key to safety in Estates, FL; Lauder, CA; Mack Lake, MI) Communication and Journalism, the wildland fire environment. Fire (video). Pub. NFES 2566. Boise, ID: Laramie, WY. Management Notes. 52(4): 9. National Wildfire Coordinating Group. Smith, S. 2000. Smokejumpers: Firefighters Goens, D.A.; Andrews, P.L. 1998. Weather NFES (National Fire Equipment System). from the sky (video). National and fire behavior factors related to the 1998b. Battles lost (video). Pub. NFES Smokejumper Association (http:// 1990 Dude Fire near Payson, AZ. In: 2565. Boise, ID: National Wildfire www.smokejumpers.com/). Preprint Volume, Second Symposium on Coordinating Group. Thoele, M. 1995. Fire line: The summer Fire and Forest Meteorology; 1998 NFES (National Fire Equipment System). battles of the West. Golden, CO: Fulcrum January 11–16; Phoenix, AZ: Boston, MA: 2001. Using your fire shelter (video). Pub. Publishing. American Meteorological Society: 153– NFES 1568. Boise, ID: National Wildfire Thomas, D. 1994. A case for fire behavior 158. Coordinating Group. case studies. Wildfire. 3(3): 45, 47. Gulliford, A. 1997. Fire on the mountain: NFPA (National Fire Protection Associa­ USDA Forest Service. 1990. Accident Tragic death and memorialization of the tion). 1988. Wyoming crew survives investigation report: Dude Fire incident, Storm King Fourteen. Montana the entrapment on Brewer Fire. Wildland multiple firefighter fatality, June 26, Magazine of Western History. 47(2): 44– Fire Management Briefings. 1(2): 1, 18– 1990, Southwest Region, Tonto National 57. 20. Forest. Johns, M. 1996. Dude Fire still smokin’. NFPA (National Fire Protection Associa­ Williams, J. 1995. Firefighter safety in Wildfire. 5(2): 39–42. tion). 1990. Wildland fires. Alert Bull. No. changing forest ecosystems. Fire Maclean, J.N. 1999. Fire on the mountain: 90–4. Quincy, MA: NFPA. Management Notes. 55(3): 6–8. ■ The true story of the South Canyon Fire. Putnam, T. 1995a. Your fire shelter— New York, NY: W. Morrow and Company, Beyond the basics. 1995 edition. Tech. Incorporated. Rep. 9651–2829–MTDC. Missoula, MT: Maclean, N. 1992. Young men and fire: A USDA Forest Service, Missoula Technol­ true story of the Mann Gulch Fire. ogy Development Center. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

30 Fire Management Today NEXT STEPS IN WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT*

Jerry Williams

ildland fire is a high-risk, high-consequence business. The necessary next steps will represent a profound W It is influenced by high change in how we plan and execute the high-risk, social expectations and a low high-consequence fire program that we are political tolerance for failure. Our environment is surrounded by charged with leading. uncertainty and danger. It is con­ trolled more and more by our Managing Risk In today’s press of managing a ability to measure, manage, and We face a wide variety of pressing large, complex fire program, we mitigate risk. issues, including contracting, have a lot of “spots coming across training, the initial abatement plan our line.” However, before we “dig In our history, every meaningful from Thirtymile, leadership, more line,” we should “get up on advance in wildland fire operations workforce diversity, and the Na­ the ridge” and spend some time has been marked by some reduction tional Fire Plan. Moreover, we must reflecting on where this program is in uncertainty or mitigation of risk, not overlook preparedness for the right now. What has changed almost always following some fire season that lies ahead. Each of around us? Where do we need to accident or tragedy. Our under­ these issues deserves our careful direct not only our management standing of fire behavior, the attention; we need to work on all of energy, but also our leadership technological advances in the tools them. However, I want to get us energy? we use, the protective qualities of thinking about our vulnerabilities. I the gear we wear, the training we want to make the point that opera­ Karl E. Weick and Kathleen M. employ, and even some of the early tional professionalism needs to be Sutcliffe, in their work Managing explorations of what we call “hu­ measured in terms of our ability to the Unexpected, examined what man factors” have all made our better manage the risks that sur­ they call high-reliability organiza­ work safer. round us. tions in “exotic” lines of work, Still, the tragedies at Dude, South Canyon, and Thirtymile and the accident at Cerro Grande remind us of the danger that is always present in our world.**

Jerry Williams is the Director of Fire and Aviation Management, USDA Forest Service, Washington Office, Washington, DC.

* Based on remarks made by the author at the National Fire and Aviation Management Meeting from February 25 to March 1, 2002, in Scottsdale, AZ.

** For more on the Dude Fire, see the related articles in this issue; for the other incidents, see Bret W. Butler and others, “The South Canyon Fire Revisited: Lessons in Fire Behavior,” Fire Management Today 61(1): 14–20; Hutch Brown, “Thirtymile Fire: Fire Behavior and Management Response,” Fire Management Today 62(3) [in press]; and “‘Remember Los Alamos’: The Cerro Grande Fire,” Fire Management Today 60(4): 9–14. The Dude Fire torching and crowning. Photo: USDA Forest Service, 1990.

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 31 including wildland firefighting. (For The Ten Standard Firefighting Orders a review of the book, see the article must be firm rules of engagement. by Dave Iverson beginning on page 36.) The authors found that high- reliability organizations, despite the trying conditions around them, have “less than their fair share of accidents.” They attribute our overall success to our determined efforts to notice the unexpected in the making and stopping its devel­ opment. They go on to say that if we have difficulty halting the development of the unexpected, we focus on containing it. And if containment is compromised, we focus on resilience and rapid restoration of function.

Weick and Sutcliffe also note that, when we’re successful, we maintain a high state of situational aware­ ness. Yet when we fail, we make it our habit to bounce back from Burned area on the Dude Fire. Photo: USDA Forest Service, Missoula Technology Develop­ ment Center, Missoula, MT, 1990. tragedy, knowing that tragedy— however unwanted—is an ever- present threat in wildland fire Mistakenly, we may be focusing our relied on. The necessary next steps operations. As they put it, we are fixes only on the margins. will represent a profound change in “pre-occupied with failure.” Perhaps how we plan and execute the high- ironically, then, our growth and The Challenge risk, high-consequence fire pro­ improvement depend on the very Weick and Sutcliffe challenge us as gram that we are charged with introspection that accompanies managers to maintain an “aware­ leading. failure. ness of discriminatory detail” and focus on our “ability to discover and Several factors limit our decision Operationally, I believe that we are correct errors that could escalate space and our operating space: absolutely tenacious in becoming into a crisis.” At the operational sharper and safer. However, in the level, we have reacted to errors • The fuel complexes that we work past few years, a recurring pattern quickly. Over the past several in are more flammable than ever suggests that we may need to go years—in response to the four before over more extensive areas; beyond mere operational fixes. The events described above—we have • Growth remains unconstrained in pattern is based on four events: focused on policy and process. Our the wildland/urban interface; fire policy has changed. Our burn • Ecological perspectives challenge • The Dude Fire in 1990, with a loss plans are more complete, our fire us to conduct landscape-scale of 6 firefighters; management plans are more restoration and maintenance • The South Canyon Fire in 1994, detailed, and our large-fire situ­ treatments; and with a loss of 14 firefighters; ational assessments are more • A large portion of our workforce • The Cerro Grande Fire in 2000, thorough. is new and developing skills that with a loss of 235 homes; and are not acquired quickly. • The Thirtymile Fire in 2001, with I do not wish to demean any of a loss of 4 firefighters. these improvements. However, I We must respond to the fuels, believe that we need to go beyond demographic, ecological, and the fixes that we have traditionally workforce factors that shape our

32 Fire Management Today For extended attack, we need to establish risk Conditions on the fireline can thresholds that indicate impending danger. rapidly change. In the pressure of the moment, it is easy for people to overlook something important. That is why we must encourage our firefighters to speak up when they notice safety being compromised. As Weick and Sutcliffe point out, “people who refuse to speak up out of fear enact a system that knows less than it must to remain effec­ tive.” We must promote a working environment where even our greenest firefighters feel free to speak up.

Following an accident, a “stand­ down” should be an accepted practice for those involved, until the facts can be sorted out. How­ ever, it is a shame that our focus on accountability too often occurs after an accident. Culturally, we must Memorial for the six firefighters killed on the 1990 Dude Fire. Photo: USDA Forest Service, Missoula Technology Development Center, Missoula, MT, 1990. shift the weight of accountability to working environment. There are Firm Rules of four steps we can take to better Engagement CODE OF measure, manage, and mitigate The Ten Standard Firefighting CONDUCT FOR risk, ranging from our activities on Orders must be firm rules of FIRE SUPPRESSION the fireline to the plans that guide engagement. They cannot be simple us: guidelines, and they cannot be As wildland fire managers, we “bargained.” They are the result of must lead by observing these • Make our rules of engagement hard-learned lessons. Compromis­ principles in our daily con­ firm, ing one or more of them is a duct: • Improve our extended-attack common denominator of all tragedy operations, fires. On the Dude, South Canyon, • Firefighter safety comes first • Position ourselves for long- and Thirtymile Fires, the Fire on every fire, every time. duration, landscape-scale fire use Orders were ignored, overlooked, or • The Ten Standard projects, and otherwise compromised. • Address fire-related issues in our Firefighting Orders are firm. We don’t break them; we land management planning. The Fire Orders mean little after we don’t bend them. are in trouble. That is why we must • Every firefighter has the The four steps are tied to our routinely observe them and rely on right to know that his or her Brookings Strategic Agenda and them before we get into trouble. We assignments are safe. consistent with our Fire and know that no fire shelter can ensure • Every fireline supervisor, Aviation Management Program survival all of the time under all every fire manager, and every Emphasis, the two documents that circumstances. Entrapment avoid­ administrator has the emerged from our Fire Directors’ ance must be our primary emphasis responsibility to confirm Meetings, respectively, in Denver, and our measure of professional that safe practices are known CO, on March 27–29, 2001, and in operational success. Portland, OR, on December 4–6, and observed. 2001.

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 33 the time before an accident takes The next step is to develop zonal fire shape. We must embrace the rules management plans, where treatments can be of engagement as a way of doing business—as a professional stan­ planned and sequentially executed dard. Violation of any Fire Order across jurisdictional boundaries. must prompt management or supervisory intervention and, unless rapidly corrected, be unargu­ operations. Historically, some 70 Though few, extended-attack fires able grounds for release from the percent of our fatalities are associ­ are inarguably our most important fireline, release from the incident, ated with such transition fires. fires. The danger that surrounds or—if egregious—serious person­ Extended attack typically occurs at them and the consequences when nel action. high fire danger levels, when we fail—in terms of costs, losses, fatigue and drawdown at the crew and damages—are enormous. They However, we must not adhere to the level are exacerbated by slim deserve a more deliberate, more Fire Orders for fear of punishment. management oversight and over­ disciplined strategy. We must embrace the Fire Orders extended supervisory controls. The because we owe it to one another. danger grows even greater because Fire Use Projects In that sense, the Fire Orders must time is almost always compressed. Cerro Grande taught us that become a shared obligation, where landscape-scale fire use projects in the leader’s situational awareness Remarkably, we have strategies in the vicinity of high-hazard fuel depends on participation by the place on both ends of the wildfire types might require something entire crew and where the crew’s spectrum but no coherent approach more than a better burn plan. On a participation is tempered with to the fires in between. With few landscape scale, we need coordi­ respect for the leader’s responsibil­ exceptions, we deal with transition nated fire planning across jurisdic­ ity. Borrowing from the aviation fires as best we can with what we tional interests and sequenced community’s model of Cockpit/ have and hope that we come out treatments for effective risk mitiga­ Crew Resource Management, we okay. Too often, we do not. As Weick tion. must focus fireline operations more and Sutcliff note, high-reliability on what is right than on who is organizations “differentiate between This year marks the 30th anniver­ right. normal times, high-tempo times, sary of the wilderness fire manage­ and emergencies and clearly signal ment program. Wilderness fires Extended-Attack which mode they are operating in.” were our first experience with Operations It is time we did the same for our landscape-scale, long-duration fire About 90 percent of the wildfires we transition fires. use projects. Overall, our experi­ deal with are suppressed with little ence with wilderness fire has been notice and effort and at minimal We need to take the next step by very positive, but its use has been cost. By contrast, about 5 percent of establishing risk thresholds that confined to very large areas where our fires, virtually from the outset, indicate impending danger. The boundaries were generally consid­ are destined to become large, costly thresholds will prompt us to ered safe. events. It is the fires in between position management oversight, that challenge us now. These are supervisory control, and crew The uncertainty surrounding the fires that rapidly transition capabilities to more safely and landscape-scale fire use projects is from relatively benign events to effectively deal with the potential often enormous, owing to the long major conflagrations. They are for extended-attack operations. The durations (and long exposures) among the most dangerous fires we National Wildfire Coordinating usually associated with these face. Group has sanctioned this effort. projects. Risk mitigation is most We are working with the USDA effective at the point of deciding Dude, South Canyon, and Forest Service’s Research staff and whether or not to proceed with the Thirtymile are our most recent with the Predictive Services Branch project. But unless the project area examples of the tragedy that can at the National Interagency Fire enjoys defensible boundaries where result during extended-attack Center to have preliminary support managers can intervene when the in place by summer 2002.

34 Fire Management Today We need to look beyond our fire management intensity potentials. Therefore, the plans and resolve some of fire-related issues objectives set in LRMPs, however remote their effects might seem, raised by the decisions we make in directly bear on firefighter safety, our land management planning. suppression costs, and protection opportunities for communities at risk. unexpected occurs, a decision to LRMPs, not in the fire management proceed is generally irreversible. plans; consequently, it is the LRMPs Until we resolve the issues associ­ The “galloping pony” fires that can that set acceptable limits of social, ated with land management plan­ result—where we know all we can economic, and ecological risk. Fire ning, fuels will continue to accu­ do is hold on—don’t give us much management decision space in mulate and the improvements we “cushion” where the margins of risk terms of safety, cost, and risk is make to our fire management plans are already very narrow. largely predetermined in LRMPs. will realize no more than marginal Yet the LRMPs rarely get the after- benefits. The next step is to look The Federal Wildland Fire Manage­ action scrutiny that a wildfire beyond our fire management plans ment Policy provides the framework should prompt when it destroys and resolve some of the issues for expanded fire use. However, the valuable resources and costs tens of raised by the decisions we make in condition of many forest types millions of dollars to suppress. our land management planning. precludes the use of landscape-scale prescribed fire treatments without Weick and Sutcliffe note that high- Higher Level of risk mitigation measures that go reliability organizations are “reluc­ Professionalism well beyond simple burn plan tant to simplify the complexities As wildland fire managers, we know requirements. The next step is to that define their environment.” For that our most important resource is develop zonal fire management most of us, LRMPs are cumber­ our workforce. In the uncertain, plans, where treatments can be some, complex documents that high-risk, high-consequence planned and sequentially executed seem only indirectly related to environment we work in, the across jurisdictional boundaries. We safety, cost, and risk. For many of measure of professionalism is a must start with protective treat­ us, these plans seem abstract or recognition of our vulnerabilities ments next to the highest values at obtuse in relation to the operational and an uncompromising respect for risk and work outward. dimensions of wildland fire man­ our limits. A developing workforce agement. Although the Forest must rely on leadership to learn Land Management Service typically spends about $600 these lessons. As leaders, then, we Planning million per year fielding a fire must make safety more than a Over the last 2 years, many people suppression force and another $500 platitude. We must make it a have focused on the viability of our million per year suppressing responsibility. fire management plans. Clearly, the unwanted fires, we often lack plans need to be updated and enthusiasm for the large-scale By “taking the next step,” I mean completed. However, fire manage­ LRMP revisions or amendments aspiring to a higher level of profes­ ment plans are only as good as the that might help reduce the poten­ sionalism in wildland fire opera­ land and resource management tial for destructive, high-intensity tions. As leaders, we each occupy a plans (LRMPs) they are based on. fires. position of influence. We can influence policies and procedures; The Forest Service’s Line Officer Our reluctance comes at a cost. In but even more important, we can Team, in its annual letter for 2002, drier forest types, inaction or poorly influence our people through our encouraged regional foresters to conceived resource objectives values and beliefs. Our values give special attention to fire-related inadvertently favor dense, multi- should infuse our standards and issues as LRMPs are revised. The storied stand conditions. The re­ shape our actions if they are going letter reminds us that resource sultant fuel loads, especially during to mean something to our people. ■ objectives are established in the drought years, greatly increase fire

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 35 BOOK REVIEW: MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED

Dave Iverson

articularly on transition fires, the unexpected is par for the The authors’ goal is to help us learn to cope Pcourse. Our interagency in real-world organizations and to work together wildland fire organization and the to improve them. land management agencies that support it should be constantly prepared to manage the unexpected. ment and adjust organizational Focusing on the behavior accordingly. Weick and Unexpected Yet how many times have we seen Sutcliffe contrast mindfulness to Oddly enough, it is by studying executives and administrators mindlessness—following the HROs that we can see firsthand just attempt to manage the unexpected rules—which is useful, too, in the how important it is to focus on the after the fact by blaming it on right context. “unexpected,” to learn to act someone—usually someone else? mindfully. In HROs, you ignore the Managing the Unexpected: Assuring The authors define mindfulness as unexpected at your immediate peril. High Performance in an Age of “the combination of ongoing In other organizations, you can Complexity (John Wiley & Sons, scrutiny of existing expectation, ignore the unexpected for much 2001), by Karl E. Weick and continuous refinement and differ­ longer, pretending that somehow Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, offers insight entiation of expectation based on the universe will eventually align into this problem. But the reader newer experiences, willingness and itself with your vision and mission. shouldn’t expect easy answers, capability to invent new expecta­ because the authors’ goal is to help tions that make sense of unprec­ In Managing the Unexpected, Weick us learn to cope in real-world edented events, a more nuanced and Sutcliffe explore the shadow organizations and to work together appreciation of context and ways to side of organizational culture that to improve them. For that, we must deal with it, and identification of many other authors overlook. They abandon the search for quick fixes new dimensions of context that stress things like “dynamics of and embrace the reality of living in improve foresight and current surprise,” “preoccupation with complex, adaptive systems and functioning.” That is certainly a failure,” and “reluctance to sim­ organizations. mouthful—and a mind-full. How­ plify.” Even the terms they use are ever, Weick and Sutcliffe stress that unexpected to those who are Staying “Mindful” sometimes you can’t wrap complex steeped in win/win or quick-fix Why the title “Managing the Unex­ subjects into the neat, tidy packages reactive management cultures. pected”? The reason is simple. Most too often seen in the business and of the time, we can’t manage the management literature. In a subchapter titled “Enhancing human and natural environment to Awareness and Anticipation,” Weick conform to the wishes of an organi­ Weick and Sutcliffe spend a lot of and Sutcliffe advise us to, among zation. More often than not, it time leading us through a study of other things: works the other way around. As we “High Reliability Organizations” try to manage organizations to (HROs), such as flight deck crews • Cultivate humility; function well despite the variability on aircraft carriers, where you • Be glad when you’re having a bad of the environment, we need to be really don’t want things to go day; constantly “mindful”—a key wrong. They do this to help us • Create an error-friendly learning concept for Weick and Sutcliffe—to better understand pitfalls and culture; watch for changes in the environ- strengths in the management of all • Develop skeptics; organizations. Only by learning • Be suspicious of good news; from mistakes can we learn to do Dave Iverson is the regional economist for • Seek out bad news; and the Intermountain Region, USDA Forest better—to adapt. Service, Ogden, UT.

36 Fire Management Today • Treat all unexpected events as such as chapters devoted to “Why like “Thirtymile,” “South Canyon,” information, and share this Planning Can Make Things Worse,” and “Dude”—I wonder whether we information widely. “Assessing Your Capabilities for could have done better in our fire Assured Performance,” and under­ suppression efforts had our broader Creating a Learning standing the importance of paying agency cultures and our more nar­ Organization attention to “Organizational Cul­ rowly framed firefighting cultures Even this short list serves as a handy ture and the Unexpected.” been more mindful. Weick and Sut­ launching pad for creating a learn­ cliffe’s book is a start down the path ■ ing organization. But there is much As I reflect on recent tragedy fires of increasing our mindfulness. more to Managing the Unexpected, on public lands—fires with names

WEBSITES ON FIRE* Ecological Restoration Institute Lands in Transition Established in 1998, the Ecological Restoration Lands in Transition consists of eight questions and Institute (ERI), in the School of Forestry at North­ feedback to help users learn more about the history ern Arizona University (NAU), supports ecological of the Lake Tahoe Basin, how people and fire have restoration through education, research, and a affected the Tahoe forest, and what it all means for common forum for open, objective consideration of today’s forests. After the questions, the user can ecological restoration issues. Through experimenta­ pretend to be a forest manager, responsible for tion and research, often in collaboration with making difficult decisions that balance the interests partners such as the USDA Forest Service, ERI of the people and the forest’s health. As the forest develops comparative information on passive man­ manager, you consult with experts and see the agement versus active management using tech­ results of your decisions. niques such as thinning and prescribed burning, particularly in the dry ponderosa pine forest type. The site, developed by the Gould Center for Geogra­ ERI’s Website provides information about past and phy Education and Outreach, Department of Geogra­ current research projects, answers to frequently phy, Pennsylvania State University, with funding asked questions about ecological restoration, and from the USDA Forest Service, Pacific Southwest links to many NAU sites. Region, Lake Tahoe Basin Management Unit, is very media intensive. Several movies provide interesting Found at graphic representations of the effect of fire in the Lake Tahoe area. Almost all the photographs, tables, * Occasionally, Fire Management Today briefly describes Websites brought to our attention by the wildland fire community. Readers should not construe the and graphs can be magnified to improve readability. description of these sites as in any way exhaustive or as an official endorsement by the USDA Forest Service. To have a Website described, contact the managing editor, Hutch Brown, at USDA Forest Service, 2CEN Yates, P.O. Box 96090, Found at Washington, DC 20090-6090, 202-205-1028 (tel.), 202-205-0885 (fax), hutchbrown/ [email protected] (e-mail).

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 37 BOOK REVIEW: HOW THE WAY WE TALK CAN CHANGE THE WAY WE WORK

Jim Saveland

he wildland firefighting com­ munity lives a repeating story. The authors invite the reader TSooner or later, disaster strikes into a deeper understanding of our being, and firefighters lose their lives in one that is more respectful of resistance the line of duty. An investigation follows; causes are determined and and consequently more supportive of change. remedies suggested. For a time, there is increasing vigilance for safe operations, but the vigilance short-term solutions, the authors 3. From the language of “New declines over time. At some point, focus on the deeper, underlying Year’s resolutions” to the lan­ disaster strikes again and changes in the way individuals and guage of competing commit­ firefighters lose their lives. The groups make meaning. The book is ments; and question arises, does anything ever for people interested in the possibil­ 4. From the language of big as­ really change? Do we ever really ity of their own transformational sumptions that hold us to the learn anything? learning, as well as for people language of assumptions that we interested in supporting the trans­ hold. Transformational formational learning of others—an increasingly necessary feature of Part 2 introduces three more Learning effective leadership. languages that serve to maintain How the Way We Talk Can Change and continuously improve the skills the Way We Work: Seven Lan­ As a student of conversations, I developed in part 1. These are social guages for Transformation (Jossey- have noticed that learning conver­ languages, with important implica­ Bass Publishers, San Francisco, sations often start by acknowledg­ tions for leadership: 2001), by Robert Kegan and Lisa ing and respecting silence. Another Laskow Lahey, examines obstacles important ingredient in setting the 5. From the language of prizes and to desired changes. As the authors stage for learning conversations is praising to the language of point out, “people tend to say ‘How what I call “removing the fixer”— ongoing regard; can we break down resistance—our overcoming the urge to fix others’ 6. From the language of rules and own or that of others? How can we problems. Seven Languages for policies to the language of public overcome our defensiveness? Transformation confirms the need agreement; and Reduce our fear?’ And so on.” The for both ingredients to creating a 7. From the language of construc­ authors invite the reader into a new supportive environment for trans­ tive criticism to the language of and deeper understanding of our formational learning. deconstructive criticism. being, one that is more respectful of resistance and consequently more The book is divided into three parts. Part 3 speaks to how we can prac­ supportive of individual and organi­ The first part introduces four new tice and develop all seven lan­ zational change. languages as tools for personal guages. The book takes a novel learning: approach to the subject of why “our Rather than aiming for the immedi­ own genuine aspirations for ate relief of symptoms or for 1. From the language of complaint change—personally and collec­ behavioral strategies to bring about to the language of commitment; tively” lead to “so little lasting 2. From the language of blame to change actually occurring.” Jim Saveland is an assistant station the language of personal respon­ director, Rocky Mountain Research Station, sibility; USDA Forest Service, Fort Collins, CO.

38 Fire Management Today Personal Languages The authors propose we can talk to” who reinforce the Commitment. Complaining, replacing the language languages we use. Our Big Assump­ tions give rise to our competing wishing, and hoping are the famil­ of blame with the iar modes of television talk. As the commitments, thereby anchoring the authors point out, the language of language of personal whole immune system. complaint is hardly conducive to responsibility. personal learning and reflective The authors recommend a four-step leadership. Still, complaints do process to overcome our big assump­ contain the seed of transformation, Competing Commitments. Next, tions: for “we would not complain about the authors explore why noble anything if we did not care about aspirations—what they call “the 1. Observe ourselves in relation to something.” language of New Year’s resolu­ the big assumption; tions”—often lead to little change. 2. Actively look for experiences that The idea is to use the energy in the We all share an immunity to cast doubt on the big assumption; language of complaint as a “gate­ change, often unconsciously. Where 3. Explore the history of the big way” for expressing personal we see a need for change yet fail to assumption; and commitment. The language of achieve it, we tend to blame other 4. Design and run a safe, modest commitment does not simply people or unanticipated obstacles. test of the big assumption. dismiss the complaint, but rather We fail to see that “it may be nearly “goes with the complaint, honors it, impossible for us to bring about any Our language communities embed us and invites the complaining person important change in a system or in “not just one Big Assumption but to follow the forward momentum organization without changing several.” However, we can turn our that is implicit in the complaint.” ourselves (at least somewhat).” “nest of Big Assumptions” in a posi­ From personal experience in the tive direction if we use it as “a home martial arts, I recognize this as the In other words, our commitment to for hatching new life, new forms, new language of aikido. change is often canceled by “an­ ways of making meaning that—if other commitment we hold that has nurtured—one day take wing.” Personal Responsibility. The the effect of preventing the authors also propose replacing the change.” What we are doing, the Social Languages language of blame with the lan­ authors point out, is merely pro­ Ongoing Regard. The regular guage of personal responsibility, a tecting ourselves, a normal human expression of genuinely experiencing subject I have written about in motive. In fact, self-protection is “a the value of a coworker’s behavior is connection with the South Canyon crucial act of self-respect.” The trick what the authors call “the language of Fire (Saveland 1995). When we first is to become aware that we are ongoing regard.” It has two aspects: stop blaming others, we tend to reacting in this way to the chal­ appreciation and admiration. Most shift the blame to ourselves. But lenge of change—to become aware organizations bestow formal praise personal responsibility goes beyond of our own competing commit­ and prizes—a practice rife with placing blame. As the authors point ments. problems (Kohn 1999)—but out, responsibility “involves more undercommunicate the genuinely than taking the blame or debugging Assumptions. The authors go on positive, appreciative, and admiring the system. It involves being able to to argue that we are enthralled by experiences of their members. learn from the behaviors we iden­ “Big Assumptions”—the assump­ tify, to learn from the story we tell tions that we take to be true. “If we According to the authors, three on ourselves.” I think of blame and are certain we know how the world qualities strengthen one’s communi­ reflection as being on opposite ends works—and this is how a Big cation of ongoing regard: of a continuum. When we see our Assumption operates; it creates reflection in a mirror or other certainty—why would we even 1. Being direct—that is, delivering reflective surface, we are better able think to look for a different reality?” appreciation or admiration directly to see ourselves. We all have support communities of to the person rather than to or “colleagues, willing partners, people through others; 2. Being specific; and

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 39 Our commitment to change is often canceled by “another commitment we hold that has the effect of preventing the change.”

3. Being nonattributive—that is, Deconstructive Criticism. We all The authors thus propose a third describing the speaker’s experi­ know the value of constructive alternative to destructive and ence rather than the person’s criticism, even though most organi­ constructive criticism. The idea is attributes. zations fail to deliver it well. Con­ to break down the “barriers to structive feedback is specific, learning” behind constructive The nonattributive quality is supportive, problem solving, and criticism by retreating from “a perhaps the most difficult to timely; destructive feedback is truth-claiming relationship.” “We practice. We tend to jump from our vague, blameful, threatening, and call this stance a deconstructive one perceptions of others to conclusions pessimistic. But constructive because its central intention is about their character, thereby feedback is not enough. As the neither to tear down nor build up passing judgment. As the authors authors point out, “many a relation­ but instead disassemble, and the point out, “If we characterize ship has been damaged and a work object of attention is not first of all people, even if we do so quite setting poisoned by perfectly the other but our own evaluation or positively, we actually engage— delivered constructive feedback!” judgment.” however unintentionally—in the rather presumptuous activity of Constructive feedback rests on the The language of deconstructive entitling ourselves to say who and assumption that the provider—say, conflict is not about making con­ how the other is.” a supervisor—has the only correct flict disappear. It can work well yet view of the situation. The supervi­ lead to even greater conflict. “We Public Agreement. The Ten Stan­ sor is privileged to (1) say what the exercise all the languages for the dard Firefighting Orders and the employee is doing wrong, (2) offer purpose of making our work Eighteen Situations That Shout help, (3) suggest a solution, and (4) settings richer contexts for learn­ Watch Out can be examples of give a timely message. The employ­ ing,” the authors conclude. “The public agreements. The authors ee’s role is to listen, accept, and kinds of change we are looking for take a fresh look at the purpose of gratefully receive. are transformational. They go to the such agreements. “We do not think roots. They are not about fixes at the value of shared agreements is to Constructive feedback presumes the surface.” prevent violations,” they say, “but to that the supervisor has “super create them.” Then, violations are vision.” The authors see this Carrying on the Work considered with curiosity in an assumption as counterproductive to The seven languages for transfor­ organization’s “classroom,” not learning, because “we have little, if mation allow us to focus on what used to trump up charges in its any, reason to check ourselves if we the authors call “our inner contra­ “courtroom.” Public agreements are assume we are right.” They propose dictions and Big Assumptions” not used to “give the troops their instead engaging in a conversation rather than using them as prisms marching orders” or to “cast out “with the same criticism in mind” for viewing reality. That, in turn, sinners”; instead, they become a but knowing that “we may not be facilitates “mental development and way for “responsible people to totally right or may even be wrong.” transformational learning.” A good collectively imagine a public life That turns our endeavor from way of deepening “a productive they simultaneously know they finding “clever ways to help the relationship with our inner work­ would prefer and know they will, at person see it our way” to exploring ings” is by building support com­ times, fall short of.” Falling short of “what’s been happening and munities that regularly use the public agreements is a learning whether our criticism is war­ seven languages. As the authors opportunity for oneself and an ranted.” point out, “The seven languages are opportunity for group reflection intended to be a steady supply of about competing commitments and oxygen to keep the flame burning Big Assumptions. for as long as our learning may need.”

40 Fire Management Today Most organizations bestow formal praise but undercommunicate the genuinely positive, appreciative, and admiring experiences of their members.

Leaders can further the languages Next Steps ness” (see, for example, by designing conversational space. Can changing the way we talk Csikszentmihalyi 1990; Gallwey “When you create a place for actually reduce the likelihood of 2000; and Heckler 1990). But that is something,” the authors note, “it is future fire fatalities and improve beyond the scope of this book remarkable how much more likely our individual and organizational review. the thing is to occur.” The authors performance? I think so. But there try to expand our limited concep­ is only one way to find out: Try it. References tion of leadership and learning. That’s what a group of us is plan­ Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1990. Flow: The Leadership is not about “the leader ning to do in the USDA Forest psychology of optimal experience. New ratcheting up his volume of York: Harper Perennial. Service’s Intermountain Region. We Gallwey, W.T. 2000. The inner game of work. attaboys”; instead, it is about will get together every other month New York: Random House. “creating channels or contexts” for to practice with the seven languages Heckler, R.S. 1990. In search of the warrior “relatively rare forms of speech at spirit. Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic and experiment with other reflec­ Books. work.” “Perhaps we need leaders tion exercises. You are invited to Kohn, A. 1999. Punished by rewards: The who are able both to start processes join us. trouble with gold stars, incentive plans, of learning and to diagnose and A’s, praise, and other bribes. New York: disturb already existing processes Houghton Mifflin Company. Changing the way we talk can be a Saveland, J. 1995. Creating a passion for that prevent learning and change, tremendous step in the right safety vs. management oversight and ■ the active, ongoing immune sys­ direction. However, more must be inspection. Wildfire 4(3): 38–41. tems at work in every individual done to develop “situational aware­ and organization.”

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 41 MOOSE FIRE: THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE*

Stephen W. Barrett

rom mid-August until early October 2001, a wildland fire At the stand scale, stand replacement fire regimes F burned about 71,000 acres have been relatively unaffected by people (29,000 ha) of Federal, State, and because the natural fire intervals are longer private land north of Kalispell, MT (see sidebar). Dubbed the Moose than the fire exclusion period to date. Fire, its size, complexity, and threat to homes and lands in multiple ownerships made it the Nation’s Instead, “stand replacement” fire Fork Valley were still experiencing top-priority fire for a time. After­ regimes predominate, where fires natural succession at the time of ward, questions arose about why after a century or more typically kill the Moose Fire. the fire burned so far and for so whole stands. The fires are driven long. primarily by regional droughts; at Fire regimes modeling suggests the stand scale, the stand replace­ that about 60 percent of the Moose No Simple Answer ment regimes have been relatively Fire acreage occurs in the two stand unaffected by people because the replacement regimes, where aver­ Was the fire a natural event or a natural fire intervals are longer age fire intervals are 150 years and horrible calamity caused by long­ than the fire exclusion period to 250 years, respectively. Interest­ term fire exclusion, global climate date. Thus, the stands in the North ingly, the Moose Fire killed about change, or other factors? There is no simple answer, because the question itself is too simple. Land- scape-scale fires burn across various MOOSE FIRE forest types, each with unique fire frequency and severity patterns. The Moose Fire began on August 14, 2001, when lightning struck dry These patterns represent “fire vegetation on the Flathead National Forest, north of Kalispell, MT. regimes,” which have been the Drought conditions prevailed, with total precipitation in August well focus of my research for the past below normal. Moisture levels in thousand-hour fuels stood at 8 to 12 two decades. percent, much lower than the historical low readings of 16 to 17 percent. Conditions were ripe for extreme fire behavior. Some fire regimes, such as the “nonlethal” type in dry ponderosa A rash of fires broke out in mid-August. In 4 days, fire crews from the pine forests, have been heavily Flathead National Forest and Montana Department of Natural Re­ affected by fire exclusion. The sources and Conservation responded to a total of 28 different fires. The resulting fuel buildups in many Moose Fire was first detected on August 16, when two smokejumpers areas have been exacerbated by walking out from another fire saw it from 4 miles (6.4 km) away. A high-grade logging. However, the helicopter overflew the fire and reported it to be half an acre (0.2 ha) nonlethal fire regime type is rare in in size and burning in heavy fuels at midslope. When crews and the valley of the North Fork Flat­ aircraft arrived on the fire a few hours later, it was 20 acres (8 ha) in head River, where the Moose Fire size and growing. occurred. Fueled by tinder-dry vegetation and driven by strong winds, the fire Steve Barrett, a consulting fire ecologist in escaped initial attack and repeatedly crossed firelines, spreading onto Kalispell, MT, has studied fire history State and private lands. On September 1, it crossed into Glacier throughout the Northern Rockies since 1979. National Park. Not until early October did crews finally bring it under control. By then, it had burned about 71,000 acres (29,000 ha), mostly

* This article is derived from an op-ed column that on Federal land. appeared in Daily Inter Lake, November 21, 2001.

42 Fire Management Today 60 percent of the stands that occurred in the North Fork Valley between 1889 and 1930. We are now burned within the perimeter, and elsewhere in the Flathead River in another drought-induced fire matching the historical pattern. basin between 1650 and 1680, period, perhaps begun in the late between 1730 and 1750, and 1980s. Undoubtedly, regional The remaining 40 percent of the burned acreage shows a “mixed severity” pattern. Burning ranged from light surface fire to relatively PLANNING FOR POSTFIRE SALVAGE HARVEST severe fire that killed all but the most fire-resistant larch and Following large fires such as the Moose Fire, proposals for salvaging Douglas-fir. This also fits the some of the fire-killed timber often emerge. Reasons for salvage historical pattern, which shows harvest range from reducing fire hazards to creating local jobs and, evidence of two mixed-severity fire on State trust lands, generating funds for schools and other public regimes, with average intervals of works. 30 years and 70 years, respectively. The USDA Forest Service and States such as Montana incorporate My North Fork Valley study shows biodiversity guidelines into their forest plans. The guidelines reflect that only the driest sites, occupying principles of wildland forestry popularly known as “ecosystem man­ less than 15 percent of the Moose agement.” In the context of postfire salvage harvests, ecosystem Fire acreage and wholly within management means retaining and emulating natural patterns and Glacier National Park, were affected processes, the same basic principles used in managing unburned by fire exclusion between 1926 and forests. For example, it means: 1988. However, several prescribed fires in recent years had reduced • Retaining “islands” of green and partially burned trees; area fuels prior to the Moose Fire. • Leaving snag patches of varying sizes, species, and densities; As a result, those stands are well on • Leaving plenty of downed logs for microhabitats and soil replenish­ their way toward a more natural ment; and condition. • Retaining some of the largest snags and partially burned trees, such as old larch and Douglas-fir. No Silver Bullet Fire-wounded trees provide particularly valuable wildlife habitat. Outside the park, such as on the Although relatively scarce in severely burned terrain, such trees can Coal Creek State Forest, a few old survive for centuries after a fire. When the trees eventually die, some larch stands previously thinned to persist as snags for another 100 years. Then, after falling to the forest emulate the effects of mixed- floor, the big trees provide microhabitats and soil nourishment for severity fires also survived the another century or so. All told, some of the trees scorched by the Moose Fire. This suggests that Moose Fire could still play important roles in the ecosystem in the ecologically appropriate logging year 2500 and beyond. (see sidebar) can provide a modi­ cum of fire protection. Logging is In fact, trees with dead tops are so valuable—and so scarce in some no “silver bullet,” however; the fire parts of the West because of long-term fire exclusion and other easily overwhelmed some of the factors—that the Forest Service has actually hired contractors to most heavily roaded and logged create such habitat by dynamiting and girdling the tops of large trees. terrain in the North Fork Valley. In much of the West, the highest quality (largest diameter) snags and Clearly, most of the unlogged forest partially burned trees occur in low- to mid-elevation montane forests, burned by the Moose Fire was still where most salvage harvest typically occurs. Upper elevation areas are on a natural cycle—unlike the often dominated by small trees, such as lodgepole pine “whips,” that heavily altered ponderosa pine are less valuable for wildlife and long-term nutrient cycling. There­ forest destroyed by the 2000 fires on fore, it is particularly important for salvage plans to closely follow the Bitterroot National Forest in biodiversity guidelines. west-central Montana. Studies suggest that major fire periods also

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 43 Logging is no “silver bullet”; the fire easily overwhelmed some of the most heavily roaded and logged terrain in the North Fork Valley.

droughts will continue to generate Canada, and from the Rocky Moun­ Service management policies. large fires well beyond the control tain Front to Oregon’s Blue Moun­ Equally groundless is the message of any firefighting organization. tains. In the context of the past four from the “zero-cut” environmental centuries, the Moose Fire ranks as a groups that today’s forests and fires Although the Moose Fire certainly rather average landscape-scale are all “natural,” regardless of was dangerous and frightening, event. historical fire regimes. consider what early-day residents had to endure. Archival maps show One last point: The forest in the Most forests—the ones we know countless acres burned in the North Fork Valley is dominated by and love today—were spawned by Flathead River basin between 1910 some of the most dangerous fire fires. The Moose Fire was a continu­ and 1929 alone—including some 40 regimes in the West. Were Federal ance of a primeval pattern. To me, percent of the forest on the west firefighters overly cautious on the the question is not how to prevent side of Glacier National Park. As for Moose Fire, as alleged by some large fires, but how society will individual fires, the Moose Fire angry local residents? You be the adapt to that dominant, inevitable pales in comparison to truly judge. force. holocaustic events such as the 1929 Halfmoon Fire and the great fires of Complex Story Acknowledgments 1910. Those fires swept across In summary, the fire history of the The author would like to thank Don hundreds of thousands of acres in a North Fork Valley reveals a much Black, program leader for Fire, matter of days. more complex story than the one Aviation, and Air on the Flathead told by various advocacy groups. National Forest, Kalispell, MT; and Amazingly, however, even 1910 is One protimber group, for instance, Fred Vanhorn, fire management readily dwarfed by the historic 1889 claims that the Moose Fire was officer for Glacier National Park, fire year. Evidence of the 1889 fires unprecedented and hence is a West Glacier, MT, for reviewing and reaches from southern Idaho to “wakeup call” to review Forest contributing to the article. ■ Jasper National Park in Alberta,

44 Fire Management Today ESTIMATING CANOPY FUELS IN CONIFER FORESTS

Joe H. Scott and Elizabeth D. Reinhardt

rown fires occur in a variety of coniferous forest types (Agee Because the effects of crown fires C 1993), including some that are are longer lasting and more severe than not historically prone to crown fire, surface fires, learning more about crown fires such as ponderosa pine (Mutch and others 1993). The head fire spread is a priority for fire managers. rate of a crown fire is usually several times faster than that of a surface fire burning under the same tion of the canopy fuels; specifically, estimates of specific leaf area and conditions, which leads to a signifi­ canopy bulk density (CBD) and canopy depth to estimate CBD. cant increase in the number of canopy base height (CBH). CBD, acres burned during a given period. usually expressed in kilograms per Inventory-based techniques use In addition, crown fires cause more cubic meter, is the dry weight of the individual-tree allometric equa­ severe and lasting damage than do available canopy fuel per unit of tions, which relate tree size to surface fires. Consequently, predict­ canopy volume, including the crown biomass, to predict the ing the behavior and effects of spaces between the tree crowns. available canopy fuel loads for every crown fire, determining the suscep­ CBH is the lowest height above the tree in a stand. Available canopy tibility of stands to crown fire, and ground at which there is enough fuel load divided by canopy depth designing treatments to mitigate available canopy fuel to propagate yields CBD. A variation of this the potential damage from crown fire vertically into the canopy. technique is to generate a vertical fires are priorities for fire managers. fuel profile of the stand. CBD is Available canopy fuel is the part then computed as the maximum Systems and Models that can burn in the flaming front 15-foot (5-m) running mean of a crown fire. The foliage and predicted for each stand (Scott and Researchers have developed models some branch wood, which is less Reinhardt 2001). of crown fire transition (Alexander than 0.25 inches (0.6 cm) in length, 1998; Gomes da Cruz 1999; Van are usually considered available Heuristic methods rely on expert Wagner 1977) and crown fire spread canopy fuel. Larger fuel pieces in opinion to estimate CBD. For the (Albini 1996; Gomes da Cruz 1999; the canopy do not burn quickly Selway–Bitterroot Wilderness, Grishin 1997; Rothermel 1991). enough to contribute to crown fire tables of CBD by cover type and Some of these models have been spread. CBD ranges from zero, density class were developed using incorporated into computer systems where there is no canopy, to about expert opinion, without quantitative to assess either surface and crown 0.4 kg/m3 in very dense stands. measurements (Keane and others fire potential (NEXUS [Scott 1999]; 1998). FFE–FVS [Beukema and others Existing Methods 1997]) or surface and crown fire None of the above methods have growth (FARSITE [Finney 1998]). Currently, canopy fuel is estimated using instrument-based, inventory- been tested against direct measure­ based, and heuristic techniques. ment (collecting and weighing the Both the computer systems and the fuel), so we do not know if their models need a quantitative descrip- Instrument-based techniques use ground-based passive optical estimates are reliable. Additionally, no previous studies have directly Joe Scott is a forester for Systems for sensors to estimate the Leaf Area Environmental Management in Missoula, Index (LAI ), which is the amount of sampled CBD to provide ground- MT; and Elizabeth Reinhardt is a research foliage surface area per unit of truth data to test the indirect forester for the USDA Forest Service, methods. Missoula Fire Sciences Laboratory, Rocky ground area. LAI is used with Mountain Research Station, Missoula, MT.

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 45 Canopy Fuel Project need to directly sample an area up surface fuels using eight planar- The Joint Fire Sciences Program to 2 acres (0.8 ha) in size prevented intercept fuel transects (Brown and provided funding to the USDA us from using sites in national others 1982) at each plot. Forest Service’s Missoula Fire parks or wilderness areas. Addition­ Sciences Laboratory to investigate ally, we chose only sites approved We computed basal area for each the indirect methods of estimating for tree removal or that could be tree, sorted the trees by diameter, canopy fuels by comparing them exempted from environmental and assigned each tree to one of with the results of direct measure­ analysis. Four of the five sites that four treatments, which contained ments. The primary study objective we used were on National Forest 25 percent of the initial basal area. was to compare the results from the System land (table 1); one of these In the first treatment, we sampled indirect methods against real data. was in an experimental forest. The the smallest trees until reaching 75 Other objectives were to: fifth site was in a State-owned percent of the initial basal area. In university research forest. We the second treatment, we sampled • Document the vertical, horizon­ sampled only one plot on each site. the next smallest trees up to 50 tal, and size-class distribution of percent of the initial basal area, and canopy fuels for one stand in each We used two fixed-radius plot sizes: so on. We remeasured canopy fuels of five forest types; a 49-foot (15-m) radius for plots with optical sensors and took • Document the effects of progres­ with low stem density and a 33-foot photographs after each treatment. sive levels of tree removal on (10-m) radius for plots with higher By sampling in stages, we crudely canopy fuels; stem density. We conducted a mimicked progressive intensities of • Develop a preliminary canopy fuel standard inventory of each plot, low thinning and obtained more photo guide; and recording the species, diameter at canopy conditions. Our treatment • Calibrate and compare several breast height, tree height, crown samples did not represent the optical canopy sensors. base height, live crown ratio, tree canopy fuels of a stand with a health, and crown class for all trees naturally occurring basal area equal We chose study sites that are prone taller than 4.5 feet (1.4 m). Smaller to a quarter of the sample stand. At to crown fire in five major forest trees were tallied by species and each level of the treatment, we types. Although these sites provided height class on four subplots. After thinned a donut-shaped area a series of examples and a basis for sampling, we collected a cross- surrounding the plot so that the future, more extensive work, they section from the stump to deter­ trees outside the plot would not did not document the range of mine tree age and we mapped the bias the optical sensors. conditions within each type. The location of every tree. We measured

Table 1—Location and characteristics of the canopy fuel study sites.

Slope Elevation Forest type Location (percent) Aspect (feet [m])

Ponderosa pine/ Lolo National Forest, MT 6 NNE 3,450 (1,050) Douglas-fir

Douglas-fir Salmon-Challis National Forest, ID 25 SE 7,500 (2,300)

Climax ponderosa Coconino National Forest, AZ 11 S 7,575 (2,308) pine

Sierra Nevada Blodgett Forest Research Station, CA 7 NNE 4,250 (1,300) mixed conifer

Lodgepole pine Tenderfoot Experimental Forest, 7 NE 7,520 (2,290) Lewis and Clark National Forest, MT

46 Fire Management Today Table 2—Size classes and components for sorting branch biomass. Measurements We measured canopy characteristics Component/class Live Dead using several instruments—Licor LAI 2000, Accupar Ceptometer, Foliage ...... X – Nikon Hemiview digital camera, Lichen ...... X – and CID Plant Canopy Imager.* We also estimated canopy cover with a Cones ...... X concave mirror optometer (spheri­ 0–3* ..... X X cal densiometer) and a GRS densio­ Branch­ 3–6 ...... X X meter. A GRS densiometer indicates wood 6–10 ..... X X whether a point is beneath the tree crown. The fraction of points along diameter 10–25 ... X X a transect (or in a grid) covered by class (mm) 25–50 ... X X the tree crowns equals the amount 50–75 ... X X of canopy cover. Lastly, we photo­ graphed the stands using vertically 75+ ...... X X oriented 35-mm color slides, with *Finer than the finest size class used in most 28-mm and 50-mm lenses. previous studies.

We used direct measurement to determine the spatial and size class distribution of the canopy fuel at diameter, length, width, foliated top branches sustained little dam­ each plot. For small trees up to ratio, and field weight of every live age even when they were dropped about 16 feet (5 m) tall, we sampled branch greater than 0.4 inches (1 from more than 110 feet (34 m). each tree as a whole, recording the cm) in diameter within each meter number of live branches, crown in height. We noted the average Initial Results diameters, weight of live branches, vertical angle of branches for each On all five study sites, we sampled and weight of dead branches for meter and sorted a subsample of about 300 main canopy trees and each meter in height above the branches (7–10 percent, depending 300 under- and middle-story trees. ground. On about 10 percent of the on the species) into size classes and Our data include gross weight, size, small trees, we separately sorted the components (fig. 1). We also and x-, y-, z-coordinates for all live and dead branches into size recorded the weight of all sizes of branches within the study plots—a classes and components (table 2). dead branches and small live total of about 12,000 branches We collected samples to determine branches that were less than 0.4 weighing 14 tons (13,000 kg). We the moisture content of live and inches (1 cm) and sorted a sample sorted more than 900 branches into dead fuels by size class. We used the of dead and small live branches into size classes. Five conifer species moisture content data to correct size class and component. were present at the study sites: the field weights to oven-dry ponderosa pine, Douglas-fir, lodge­ weights for reporting and the size Because it was important that pole pine, incense cedar, and white class proportions from the sorted branches were intact before mea­ fir. We measured a very small trees to estimate the proportions on surement, we used special rigging amount of subalpine fir at the the remaining trees. equipment to lower trees that were lodgepole pine site. up to about 40 feet (12 m) tall. We For large trees, we measured could not safely lower the larger The study sites varied in initial individual branches and will sum­ trees, so we used spurs to climb the density and tree size (table 3). The marize to estimate the tree and bole, cutting branches along the main canopy in all stands was even stand biomass. We measured the way. Ground crews tended the aged. The ponderosa pine/Douglas­ climber, measuring and weighing fir and Sierra Nevada mixed conifer *The use of trade, firm, or corporation names in this branches as they came off the tree publication is for the information and convenience of stands had younger age classes of the reader. Such use does not constitute an official (fig. 2). The climber topped the tree endorsement of any product or service by the U.S. Douglas-fir or white fir in the Department of Agriculture. Individual authors are where the bole diameter reached understory, as reflected in their responsible for the technical accuracy of the material about 4 inches (10 cm) (fig. 3). The presented in Fire Management Today. estimated vertical fuel profiles. The

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 47 Figure 1—A lodgepole ponderosa pine forest type. The pine sample branch high density implies that we should before (above) and after (below) being sorted into expect high canopy fuel estimates. size classes. Photo: Joe However, because the trees grow at Scott, Systems for such a high density, the allometric Environmental Manage­ ment, Missoula, MT, equations might overestimate 2001. individual-tree biomass.

Using developed allometric relation­ ship for dominant and codominant trees, we made assumptions about the biomass of subdominant trees. In stands that are dense, the bio­ mass of dominant trees might be overpredicted by relationships derived from trees of similar size from less dense stands. Our direct measurements will shed light on whether canopy fuels are really that high in this stand, or if the allomet­ ric equations were overestimated.

Quantitative estimates of canopy fuels are needed to predict crown fire occurrence and behavior effectively, and to assess and miti­ stands without an understory— maximum 1-foot (0.3-m) CBD was gate crown fire hazard. The canopy lodgepole pine, ponderosa pine, and only slightly higher than the fuel study is testing several indirect Douglas-fir—had bell-shaped maximum 15-foot (5-m) running methods by comparing them with vertical distributions of available mean. direct measurement. This paper canopy fuels. The stands with an reports the initial results that were understory—Sierra Nevada mixed We completed fieldwork during the based on allometric methods. We conifer and ponderosa pine/Dou­ summers of 2000 and 2001. Data will report the comparison with glas-fir—had canopy fuel under the entry and analysis are underway, direct measurement when all the main canopy (fig. 4). and the results should be available data are available. soon. Based on allometric equations, the For more information, visit the highest available canopy fuel load Discussion and canopy fuels project Website at was in the ponderosa pine stand, Conclusion . Links to canopy while the lowest load was in the Allometric estimates of canopy fuels fuels project publications will be ponderosa pine/Douglas-fir stand reveal interesting relationships posted as available. (table 4). Similar to the available among the stands. The ponderosa canopy load, CBD was highest in pine stand had the highest canopy Acknowledgements the ponderosa pine stand and fuel load and the highest bulk lowest in the ponderosa pine/ The authors gratefully acknowledge density; several possible explana­ the dedication of the field and Douglas-fir stand. The Sierra tions exist. We located the plot in Nevada mixed conifer stand had the laboratory crews who worked on the highest density portion of a this project; and the valuable second highest load but had the high-density stand—the basal area second lowest bulk density because assistance of the forest and district was 50 percent higher in this stand personnel who located study sites, the fuel was distributed throughout than the next highest basal area. a deep canopy. In all stands, the completed environmental analyses, This plot does not characterize the and provided logistical support.

48 Fire Management Today The research was supported by funds from the USDA Forest Service’s Rocky Mountain Research Station and the Joint Fire Sciences Program, in cooperation with Systems for Environmental Man­ agement and the University of California at Berkeley, Center for Forestry, Blodgett Forest Research Station. References Agee, J.K. 1993. Fire ecology of Pacific Northwest forests. Washington, DC: Island Press. Albini, F.A. 1996. Iterative solution of the radiation transport equations governing spread of fire in wildland fuels. Fizika goreniya i zvryva. Siberian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 32(5): 71– 81. Figure 2—The ground crew measured and Figure 3—After cutting all the branches on Alexander, M.E. 1998. Crown fire thresholds weighed branches sent down by the the way up, the climber made a topping cut in exotic pine plantations of Australasia. climber, who used a self-rewinding tape to at about 4 inches (10 cm) in diameter. Even Doctoral thesis. Canberra, ACT, Australia: measure branch height. Photo: Joe Scott, when dropped from more than 110 feet (34 Australian National University. Systems for Environmental Management, m), there was very little damage to the top Missoula, MT, 2001. branches. Photo: Joe Scott, Systems for Environmental Management, Missoula, MT, 2001.

Table 3—Stand characteristics of the canopy fuel study site plots.

Quadratic mean Density of trees Basal area diameter >10 cm (4 in) Stand height

Forest type Species m2/ha ft2/ac cm in #/ha #/ac m ft

Ponderosa pine/ Ponderosa pine 22.7 98.7 24.5 9.6 240.3 97.3 22 72 Douglas-fir Douglas-fir 7.8 33.9 6.5 2.6 240.3 97.3 Total 30.5 132.6 – – 480.7 194.6

Douglas-fir Douglas-fir 29.2 127.2 15.3 6.0 859.1 347.8 17 56 Lodgepole pine 8.5 36.9 15.0 5.9 350.0 141.7 Total 37.7 164.1 – – 1,209.1 489.5

Ponderosa pine Ponderosa pine 69 300 18.8 7.4 2,067.4 837 15 49 Total 69 300 – – 2,067.4 837

Sierra Nevada White fir 22.8 99.1 33.7 13.3 169.7 68.7 34 112 mixed conifer Incense cedar 14.7 64.2 28.3 11.1 113.1 45.8 Ponderosa pine 8.9 38.6 63.1 24.8 28.2 11.4 Douglas-fir 0.4 1.7 19.0 7.5 14.1 5.7 Total 46.8 203.6 – – 325.1 131.6

Lodgepole pine Lodgepold pine 42.7 185.8 15.5 6.1 1,145.3 463.7 19 64 Subalpine fir 0.009 0.04 2.0 0.8 0 0 Total 42.7 185.8 – – 1,145.3 463.7

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 49 Beukema, S.J.; Greenough, D.C.; Robinson, Brown, J.K.; Oberheu, R.D.; Johnston, C.M. Gomes da Cruz, M. 1999. Modeling the C.E.; Kurtz, W.A.; Reinhardt, E.D.; 1982. Handbook for inventorying surface initiation and spread of crown fires. Crookston, N.L.; Brown, J.K.; Hardy, C.C.; fuels and biomass in the Interior West. Master’s thesis. Missoula, MT: University Stage, A.R. 1997. An introduction to the Gen. Tech. Rep. INT–129. Ogden, UT: of Montana. fire and fuels extension to FVS. In: Teck, USDA Forest Service, Intermountain Grishin, A.M. 1997. Mathematical modeling R.; Mouer, M.; Adams, J., eds. Proceedings Forest and Range Experiment Station. of forest fires and new methods of of the Forest Vegetation Simulator Finney, M.A. 1998. FARSITE: Fire area fighting them. Albini, F., ed. Trans. Conference; 1997 February 3–7; Fort simulator—Model development and Czuma, M.; Chikina, L.; Smokotina, L. Collins, CO. Gen. Tech. Rep. INT–373. evaluation. Res. Pap. RMRS–RP–4. Ft. Tomsk, Russia: Tomsk State University. Ogden, UT: USDA Forest Service, Collins, CO: USDA Forest Service, Rocky Keane, R.E.; Garner, J.L.; Schmidt, K.M.; Intermountain Forest Range and Mountain Research Station. Long, D.G.; Menakis, J.P.; Finney, M.A. Experiment Station: 191–195. 1998. Development of input data layers for the FARSITE fire growth model for the Selway–Bitterroot Wilderness complex, USA. Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS– GTR–3. Ogden, UT: USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station. Mutch, R.W.; Arno, S.F.; Brown, J.K.; Carlson, C.E.; Ottmar, R.D.; Peterson, J.L. 1993. Forest health in the Blue Moun­ tains: A management strategy for fire- adapted ecosystems. Gen. Tech. Rep. PNW–GTR–310. Portland, OR: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station. Rothermel, R.C. 1991. Predicting behavior and size of crown fires in the Northern Rocky Mountains. Res. Pap. INT–438. Ogden, UT: USDA Forest Service, Intermountain Forest and Range Experiment Station. Scott, J.H. 1999. NEXUS: A system for assessing crown fire hazard. Fire Management Notes. 59(2): 20–24. Scott, J.H.; Reinhardt, E.D. 2001. Assessing crown fire potential by linking models of surface and crown fire behavior. Res. Pap. RMRS–RP–29. Fort Collins, CO: USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station. Van Wagner, C.E. 1977. Conditions for the Figure 4—Estimates of the vertical profiles of canopy bulk density in 1-foot (0.3-m) layers start and spread of crown fire. Canadian for each sample stand. Curves for each site represent a 15-foot (5-m) running mean. These Journal of Forest Research. 7: 23–34. ■ estimates are summarized from allometric equations for individual trees, not from direct measurement. When available, direct measurements will be used to validate the accuracy of the estimates. The ponderosa pine site was in a very dense portion of a dense stand; available allometric equations probably overestimate its canopy biomass.

Table 4—Initial canopy fuel load and bulk density estimates. The estimates of canopy fuel load and canopy bulk density were made using existing allometric equations for individual-tree biomass, not with the direct measure­ ments made during this study.

Available canopy Canopy bulk density Maximum 0.3-m Height of fuel load (CBD)* (1-ft) CBD maximum CBD

Forest type kg/m2 t/ac kg/m3 lb/ft3 kg/m3 lb/ft3 m ft

Ponderosa pine/Douglas-fir 0.859 3.83 0.065 0.00406 0.082 0.00512 23 75 Douglas-fir 1.255 5.60 0.138 0.00862 0.153 0.00955 11 36 Ponderosa pine 2.241 10.0 0.333 0.02079 0.400 0.02497 12 39 Sierra Nevada mixed conifer 1.379 6.15 0.080 0.00499 0.085 0.00531 25 82 Lodgepole pine 1.255 5.60 0.129 0.00805 0.136 0.00849 15 49

*The maximum 15-foot (5-m) vertical running mean predicted for each stand.

50 Fire Management Today TEXAS VOLUNTEER FIREFIGHTERS BENEFIT FROM NEW LEGISLATION

Traci Bowen

irefighters putting personal safety on the line to rescue those Most volunteer fire departments F in need has become an all-too­ are in a constant struggle to raise funds familiar scene. Texas, in passing two for operational costs and training. pieces of historic legislation in 2001, acted to thank firefighters for their dedication. One bill provides funds for firefighter training and equipment, while a second piece of legislation offers workers’ compen­ sation and accidental death and disability insurance to these coura­ geous women and men. Firefighter Funding The Rural Volunteer Fire Depart­ ment Assistance program will provide $15 million every year for the next 10 years for equipment and training at volunteer fire depart­ ments with 20 or fewer paid firefighters. The revenue for the program will come from money collected from various insurance The Palo Pinto Wildland Strike Team, a volunteer hand crew from north-central Texas, companies. According to the Texas comes off a fire near Bluff Dale, TX. The strike team’s type 6 engine (lower right) was Department of Insurance, insurance purchased through a cost-share program with the Texas Forest Service. Photo: Texas companies will likely pass the $15 Forest Service. million a year on to policyholders, but because of the high number of fire coordinators conducted a policies sold in Texas, individual Don Galloway, Volunteer Fire statewide survey of all fire depart­ policies will increase by only a few Department Assistance Programs ments. “The results [of the survey] cents annually. coordinator for the Texas Forest will be used to design the assistance Service, agreed that the significant program,” Stanford said. “[The “The legislature took proactive increase in funding came at a great survey] will establish baseline data action in passing the Rural Volun­ time. “The impact of these pro­ for the fire service, as well as teer Fire Department Assistance grams is going to be tremendous determine what type of assistance program,” said Mark Stanford, chief for the rural fire service in Texas,” they need.” of fire operations for the Texas he said. “It is going to address three Forest Service. “This legislative key areas of need—equipment, Although volunteer fire depart­ support is historic in Texas. The training, and insurance.” ments in Texas will still rely on legislature should be commended donations, the assistance program for its foresight.” The Texas Forest Service will will ease the burden on depart­ administer the program, which will ments that cannot afford to replace Traci Bowen is a fire prevention specialist be up and running by September 1, wornout equipment or send mem­ with the Texas Forest Service, Granbury, TX. 2002. Texas Forest Service regional bers to outside training, according

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 51 Legislative support in Texas is providing more than just lip service to help firefighters help people. to Mark Stinson, fire chief in Heart A Proven Friend fire and emergency equipment to of the Pines. “Older equipment and Although these two programs are the Texas Forest Service. After Federal excess property are the significant accomplishments, the screening by the Texas Forest mainstay for many of the depart­ Texas Legislature has been a proven Service, the equipment is distrib­ ments. The ability to purchase new friend of the volunteer fire service uted to volunteer fire departments equipment will free up funds for for many years. In 1995, Senate Bill across the State. Before the Helping other things, such as training 1232 established the Volunteer Fire Hands Program, companies rou­ outside the department. The Department Motor Vehicle Self- tinely destroyed surplus fire equip­ assistance program will help us all Insurance Risk Pool—administered ment because they could not afford tremendously,” said Stinson, who is by the Texas Forest Service—to the liability exposure incurred when also president of the Bastrop help volunteer fire departments donating. County Firefighters Association. afford low-cost liability insurance on their equipment. Understanding and being thankful Firefighter Insurance for the bravery exhibited by Volunteer fire departments will Two years later, the legislation firefighters is the first step. The soon provide their firefighters with passed House Bill 680, the Volun­ State of Texas went a step further by workers’ compensation and acci­ teer Fire Department Helping establishing needed programs to dental death and disability insur­ Hands Program. This program help firefighters do their jobs better ance, thanks to the Rural Volunteer provides liability relief to industry, and more safely—ultimately ■ Fire Department Insurance pro­ businesses, cities, and other groups benefiting us all. gram. House Bill 3667 provided or individuals who donate surplus funding for insurance by assessing a 2-percent sales tax on the retail sale of fireworks. An advisory council will help put the insurance plan together, and fire departments will begin to reap the benefits of this program in September 2002.

Mike Fisher, the emergency man­ agement coordinator for Bastrop County and a member of the Rural Fire Advisory Council, said the legislation was a long time in coming. “This bill’s been introduced in the last four sessions,” he said. “Senator Ken Armbrister and Representative Robby Cook were finally able to get it passed. It’s my feeling that the governor is so aware of the needs of rural fire A private contractor donated this 750-gallon (2,839-L) pumper to the Texas Forest Service, protection that he signed the bill which passed it on to the Lake Kickapoo Volunteer Fire Department through the Helping even though it was a tax.” Hands Program. The program allows individuals and businesses to donate surplus fire equipment without worrying about liability costs. Photo: Texas Forest Service, 1998.

52 Fire Management Today BULLETS TO BUCKETS: FLORIDA’S NEW HELICOPTER

Sylvia Melvin

he newest inductee into the Florida Division of Forestry The Fire Snake’s sleek, aerodynamic body Tfirefighting armada recently gives it the agility to skim above the treetops underwent a facelift and name and maneuver around a fire scene quickly. change. No longer painted drab olive, the Bell AH–1 helicopter now sports a forest-green nose top, a black tail, and a white body with red equipment needed for the necessary to fill the bucket. How­ lettering. Known to Vietnam War helicopter’s new firefighting mis­ ever, the Snake’s powerful rotor pilots as a Cobra gunship, Florida sion. wash and heavy bucket prevent firefighters fondly call the chopper routine use of swimming pools. a Fire Snake. The wings, shortened The most visible change was by 18 inches (46 cm), do not carry installation of a cargo hook and Firefighting Capabilities weapons; and the turret, which Bambi bucket. The collapsible Using helicopters to fight fires is previously housed guns and bullets, bucket is made of a waterproof, not new in Florida; Hueys—the Bell has been replaced by a 25-gallon heavy-duty, tear-resistant fabric. It UH–1H helicopter—have been the (95-L) tank, which holds a is tethered to the chopper by several firefighting workhorse for the past firefighting foam concentrate. 20-foot (6-m) cables and can hold 13 years. However, the Fire Snake, approximately 320 gallons (1,210 L) with a top speed of 215 miles per Only the mission remains the of water. When the water is mixed hour (346 km/h) and a cruising same—eliminate the enemy. In with a foam retardant, the mixture capability of 160 to 170 miles per Florida, the enemy is wildfire. is the equivalent of about 3,000 hour (260–270 km/h), is 30 percent gallons (11,360 L) of water. Only 3 faster than the Huey! The sleek, From Cobra to Fire feet (0.9 m) of standing water is aerodynamic body, which is only 36 Snake In 1999, the State experienced unprecedented fire activity due to the persistent drought conditions in central and southern Florida. Cobra gunships were delivered for use by the Florida Division of Forestry; ownership remains with the Federal Government. Lear–Siegler, an aircraft maintenance and modifica­ tion company in Fort Drum, NY, undertook the task of demilitarizing the gunships. Each chopper lost nearly 2,000 pounds (900 kg) of weapons systems and armor plat­ ing. It was quite a challenge to rewire and install the special

Sylvia Melvin is a teaching assistant at W.H. Florida Forestry Fire Snake and collapsible Bambi bucket. Photo: Sylvia Melvin, W.H. Rhodes Elementary School in Milton, FL. Rhodes Elementary School, Milton, FL, 2001.

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 53 inches (90 cm) across, gives the The Fire Snake pilot Snake the agility to skim above the has an especially broad field of view treetops and maneuver around a fire scene quickly. in the “see-and-avoid” world of visual flying.

Because of the short tether used on the Snake, skilled pilots can drag the bucket close to the hottest parts Air Attack Role It is not unusual, particularly in of the fire to make accurate drops. When a fire warrants the use of air Florida’s many swampy areas, for Other helicopters typically use 80­ firefighting equipment to get stuck. to 150-foot (24- to 46-m) lines, attack, ground commanders can direct Fire Snake pilots to the When fire is threatening to quickly which can result in fewer accurate particular area of concern. Crews destroy everything in its path and drops unless the pilots are espe­ firefighter safety is a concern, the cially skillful. depend on the pilots to warn them of where the fire is going, what kind ground mission focuses on saving of fuel it is consuming, and what firefighters and equipment. But Of the three Fire Snakes in service now, with superior trained crews in Florida, two carry a Bambi the potential is of the fire raging out of control and endangering and unrivaled air support from Fire bucket and a third is equipped with lives and property. Pilots continu­ Snakes and Hueys, Florida can conformal tanks and a snorkel. The better fight and suppress one of the tank-and-snorkel system consists of ally assess the fire situation and relay the information to the ground fiercest enemies a community can two 200-gallon (757-L) saddle tanks ■ forces. face—a wildfire. and a flexible 10-foot (3-m) snorkel tube that is 6 inches (15 cm) in diameter, with a hydraulically driven pump. Each tank has a large drop door that allows for either individual 200-gallon (757-L) or simultaneous 400-gallon (1,514-L) drops. The tank-and-snorkel system eliminates the danger of snagging a bucket in trees or wires. Another advantage is that the snorkel requires less than 12 inches (30 cm) of water to draw from, and it can take up 400 gallons (1,514 L) of water in 15 seconds.

Fire Snakes offer a safety bonus: The pilot has an especially broad field of view in the “see-and-avoid” world of visual flying. Although Skimming, usually no more than 200 feet (60 m) above the ground, a Fire Snake makes a training drop on Florida’s Blackwater River State Forest. Photo: Michael Kassinger, Milton, Snake pilots sit in a relatively FL, 2001. confined space, they are shielded from flying ash, embers, and smoke by a fully enclosed cockpit. Air conditioning keeps the temperature comfortable.

54 Fire Management Today A UNIQUE AVIATION TOOL FOR FIREFIGHTING

Jill Evans

lthough both the firefighting crew on California’s Los Padres The National Fire Plan has enabled A National Forest and the Presi­ the Los Padres National Forest to contract dent of the United States fly in the for a helicopter that greatly improves same type of helicopter, they use the ships to accomplish very a crew’s firefighting ability. different missions. The forest’s Arroyo Grande helibase in San Luis Obispo County, CA, is the proud to wildfire suppression efforts,” said fires. Thanks to its newfound home of a Sikorsky S–61 helicop­ Ted Mathiesen, Arroyo Grande crew mobility, the crew is frequently the ter—the only wildland firefighting superintendent. With 29 years of first on a fire scene. If no clearing is helicopter in the Nation equipped experience fighting wildland fires, available for the large helicopter to to simultaneously carry both water Mathiesen knows how important it land, crew members rappel from and crew. The forest uses the ship is to have the right tools to success- the ship to the ground, where they to provide initial attack support on fully complete a job. “The value of make firelines and clearings for fires throughout southern Califor­ this helicopter to the local commu- other helicopters. nia and to support firefighting nity and the entire country is efforts nationwide. extraordinary,” said Mathiesen. Of the 28-person crew, about half are students who are participating Tax Dollars at Work Firefighting Success in a nationwide Forest Service The helicopter and flight crew at By the close of the 2001 fire season, apprentice program. Members of the Arroyo Grande helibase began the crew had responded to approxi­ the Arroyo Grande crew serve a 2­ their relationship at the start of the mately 30 fires in California. year apprenticeship in three disci­ 2001 fire season. In the past, the Because of the S–61’s ability to plines—engines, helicopters, and crew flew a smaller, 12-person Bell simultaneously transport hotshots. At program conclusion, 212 helicopter. The Sikorsky S–61 firefighters and water, the crew had successful students are eligible for type 1 ship, which belongs to the significantly reduced the size and fire positions within the State or largest class of helicopters, can intensity of at least five of these elsewhere in the Nation. On the Los concurrently transport up to 18 firefighters and drop up to 1,000 gallons (3,785 L) of water via a suspended bucket. The four other NATIONAL FIRE PLAN IN CALIFORNIA type 1 helitankers in the State can only carry and drop water. The National Fire Plan, implemented in 2001, was designed to “assure that fire management planning and firefighter personnel and re­ The Los Padres National Forest sources are prepared for extreme fire conditions in the future.” In contracted the S–61 with funds 2001, all national forests in California received $190 million in total provided by the National Fire Plan. allocations—a 50-percent increase from the previous year, thanks to “Taxpayers should know that money the National Fire Plan. The increased funding will allow the USDA from the National Fire Plan has Forest Service’s Pacific Southwest Region to hire 1,611 additional been well spent and has allowed this firefighting and support personnel, train 340 more apprentices, and crew to make a greater contribution purchase $22.5 million in firefighting vehicles during the next 3 years. Comprehensive plans have been established for fuels reduction, rehabilitation and restoration, forest health management, research Jill Evans is the information assistant for the USDA Forest Service, Los Padres and development, and community assistance. For additional informa­ National Forest, Santa Lucia Ranger tion about the National Fire Plan, visit . District, Santa Maria, CA.

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 55 Padres National Forest, apprentices their firefighting training or, if After the trainees have completed have the advantage of learning the ready, convert to senior firefighters their practice rappels, they “live tools of the trade in a program that and compete for career positions rappel” from an airborne helicopter. uses the unrivaled Sikorsky S–61. around the country. Each new firefighter must complete at least nine rappels before certifica­ During the winter, the Forest Rigorous Training tion. At training conclusion, the fire Service contracts the ship to either The crew maintains a strict training season is already raging, and the British Columbia, Canada; or Maui, regimen to ensure that everyone is crew is ready for any fire situation. HI. The ship returns to the Los prepared to perform all duties in Padres National Forest in early the helicopter and on the ground at When not fighting fires, the crew spring, when the crew begins the start of the fire season. The continues its equipment and intensive training. Each year, about season begins with a mandatory physical training activities. Crew half the previous year’s crew re­ safety refresher course, followed by members clear forest trails, perform turns to the Arroyo Grande station. physical training and interagency prescribed fires, and ensure that The crew is rounded out with new helicopter instruction. Each crew they stand ready to quickly board hires from the apprentice program. member begins rappel training and expertly operate their unique fire- ■ At the end of the fire season, the from the station tower—quickly firefighting tool, the Sikorsky S–61. apprentices will either continue progressing to a stationary ship.

56 Fire Management Today SAFETY FIRST!

Ed Hollenshead

he cover of the Fall 2001 issue of Fire Management Today (volume 61, number 4) shows a group of T firefighters digging line on a rocky ridge (fig. 1). Based upon what we can see in the photograph, the firefighters are working safely. However, just above the firefighters are three observers committing a number of safety violations:

• Their sleeves are rolled up; • The cameraman has no safety equipment; • None are wearing gloves; and • They apparently have no fire shelters.

Several readers commented on these safety violations. I want to thank them for their attentiveness to these important details. For me, they set a good example; their regard for and attention to safety is not situ­ ational, it is simply the way they do their work. Good job!

Ed Hollenshead is the fire operations safety officer for the USDA Forest Service, Fire and Aviation Management, Washington Office, National Interagency Fire Center, Boise, ID.

Figure 1—The safe, effective fireline preparation shown in this photo is offset by several safety violations committed by the three observers at top right.

THREE SMALL SMOKES

Stephen W. Barrett

he year 2000 was certainly an exciting time for a The solitude readily evoked a simpler time, when fire ecologist. One August day, I was in a vast nature alone ruled the Earth. Before any “Montana” T mountain wilderness, studying, of all things, fire and “national forests.” And long before the region history. Around noon, I noticed three small smokes became populated by folks at loggerheads over what across the canyon, caused by a recent lightning bust. has been and should be done to the land. And eastward, some 50 miles off, a 20,000-foot-tall mushroom cloud arose from a fire, both beautiful and Inevitably, however, my daydream was interrupted by awe-inspiring. the approaching smokejumper plane, coming for the three small smokes in the canyon. ■ Steve Barrett, a consulting fire ecologist in Kalispell, MT, has studied fire history throughout the Northern Rockies since 1979.

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 57 GUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORS Editorial Policy Paper Copy. Type or word-process the manu­ label all photos and illustrations (figure 1, 2, 3, Fire Management Today (FMT) is an interna­ script on white paper (double-spaced) on one etc.; photograph A, B, C, etc.). At the end of the tional quarterly magazine for the wildland fire side. Include the complete name(s), title(s), manuscript, include clear, thorough figure and community. FMT welcomes unsolicited affiliation(s), and address(es) of the author(s), as photo captions labeled in the same way as the manuscripts from readers on any subject related well as telephone and fax numbers and e-mail corresponding material (figure 1, 2, 3; photo­ to fire management. Because space is a information. If the same or a similar manuscript graph A, B, C; etc.). Captions should make photos consideration, long manuscripts might be is being submitted elsewhere, include that and illustrations understandable without reading abridged by the editor, subject to approval by the information also. Authors who are affiliated the text. For photos, indicate the name and author; FMT does print short pieces of interest to should submit a camera-ready logo for their affiliation of the photographer and the year the readers. agency, institution, or organization. photo was taken.

Submission Guidelines Style. Authors are responsible for using wildland Electronic Files. See special mailing instruc­ Submit manuscripts to either the general fire terminology that conforms to the latest tions above. Please label all disks carefully with manager or the managing editor at: standards set by the National Wildfire Coordinat­ name(s) of file(s) and system(s) used. If the ing Group under the National Interagency manuscript is word-processed, please submit a 3­ USDA Forest Service Incident Management System. FMT uses the 1/2 inch, IBM-compatible disk together with the Attn: April J. Baily, F&AM Staff spelling, capitalization, hyphenation, and other paper copy (see above) as an electronic file in one Mail Stop 1107 styles recommended in the United States of these formats: WordPerfect 5.1 for DOS; 1400 Independence Avenue, SW Government Printing Office Style Manual, as WordPerfect 7.0 or earlier for Windows 95; Washington, DC 20250-1107 required by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Microsoft Word 6.0 or earlier for Windows 95; tel. 202-205-0891, fax 202-205-1272 Authors should use the U.S. system of weight and Rich Text format; or ASCII. Digital photos may be e-mail: [email protected] measure, with equivalent values in the metric submitted but must be at least 300 dpi and system. Try to keep titles concise and descriptive; accompanied by a high-resolution (preferably USDA Forest Service subheadings and bulleted material are useful and laser) printout for editorial review and quality Attn: Hutch Brown, Office of Communication help readability. As a general rule of clear writing, control during the printing process. Do not Mail Stop 1111 use the active voice (e.g., write, “Fire managers embed illustrations (such as maps, charts, and 1400 Independence Avenue, SW know…” and not, “It is known…”). Provide graphs) in the electronic file for the manuscript. Washington, DC 20250-1111 spellouts for all abbreviations. Consult recent Instead, submit each illustration at 1,200 dpi in a tel. 202-205-1028, fax 202-205-0885 issues (on the World Wide Web at ) for such as EPS, TIFF, or JPEG, accompanied by a placement of the author’s name, title, agency high-resolution (preferably laser) printout. For Mailing Disks. Do not mail disks with electronic affiliation, and location, as well as for style of charts and graphs, include the data needed to files to the above addresses, because mail will be paragraph headings and references. reconstruct them. irradiated and the disks could be rendered inoperable. Send electronic files by e-mail or by Tables. Tables should be logical and understand­ Release Authorization. Non-Federal Govern­ courier service to: able without reading the text. Include tables at ment authors must sign a release to allow their the end of the manuscript. work to be in the public domain and on the USDA Forest Service World Wide Web. In addition, all photos and Attn: Hutch Brown, 2CEN Yates Photos and Illustrations. Figures, illustrations, illustrations require a written release by the 201 14th Street, SW overhead transparencies (originals are prefer­ photographer or illustrator. The author, photo, Washington, DC 20024 able), and clear photographs (color slides or and illustration release forms are available from glossy color prints are preferable) are often General Manager April Baily. If you have questions about a submission, please essential to the understanding of articles. Clearly contact the managing editor, Hutch Brown.

CONTRIBUTORS WANTED We need your fire-related articles and photographs for Fire Management Today! Feature articles should be up to about 2,000 words in length. We also need short items of up to 200 words. Subjects of articles pub­ lished in Fire Management Today include:

Aviation Firefighting experiences Communication Incident management Cooperation Information management (including systems) Ecosystem management Personnel Equipment/Technology Planning (including budgeting) Fire behavior Preparedness Fire ecology Prevention/Education Fire effects Safety Fire history Suppression Fire science Training Fire use (including prescribed fire) Weather Fuels management Wildland–urban interface

To help prepare your submission, see “Guidelines for Contributors” in this issue.

58 Fire Management Today PHOTO CONTEST ANNOUNCEMENT Fire Management Today invites you Rules Service (see sample statement to submit your best fire-related • The contest is open to everyone. below). Include your full name, photos to be judged in our annual You may submit an unlimited agency or institutional affiliation competition. Judging begins after number of entries from any place (if any), address, and telephone the first Friday in March of each or time; but for each photo, you number. year. must indicate only one competi­ • Photos are be eliminated from tion category. To ensure fair competition if they have date Awards evaluation, we reserve the right stamps; show unsafe firefighting All contestants will receive a CD– to change the competition practices (unless that is their ROM with all photos not eliminated category for your photo. express purpose); or are of low from competition. Winning photos • Each photo must be an original technical quality (for example, will appear in a future issue of Fire color slide or print. We are not have soft focus or show camera Management Today. In addition, responsible for photos lost or movement). (Duplicates— winners in each category will damaged, and photos submitted including most overlays and other receive: will not be returned (so make a composites—have soft focus and duplicate before submission). will be eliminated.) • 1st place—Camera equipment Digital photos will not be • Photos are judged by a photogra­ worth $300 and a 16- by 20-inch accepted because of difficulty phy professional whose decision is framed copy of your photo. reproducing them in print. final. • 2nd place—An 11- by 14-inch • You must own the rights to the framed copy of your photo. photo, and the photo must not • 3rd place—An 8- by 10-inch have been published prior to Postmark Deadline framed copy of your photo. submission. First Friday in March • For every photo you submit, you Categories must give a detailed caption Send submissions to: • Wildland fire (including, for example, name, USDA Forest Service • Prescribed fire location, and date of the fire; Fire Management Today Photo • Wildland-urban interface fire names of any people and/or their Contest • Aerial resources job descriptions; and descriptions Attn: Hutch Brown, Office of • Ground resources of any vegetation and/or wildlife). Communication • Miscellaneous (fire effects; fire • You must complete and sign a Mail Stop 1111 weather; fire-dependent commu­ statement granting rights to use 1400 Independence Avenue, SW nities or species; etc.) your photo(s) to the USDA Forest Washington, DC 20250-1111

Sample Photo Release Statement (You may copy and use this statement. It must be signed.) Enclosed is/are ______(number) slide(s) for publication by the USDA Forest Service. For each slide submitted, the contest category is indicated and a detailed caption is enclosed. I have the authority to give permission to the Forest Service to publish the enclosed photograph(s) and am aware that, if used, it or they will be in the public domain and appear on the World Wide Web.

Signature Date

Volume 62 • No. 4 • Fall 2002 59 5614

subscription(s) to Fire Management Today for $ 13.00 each per year ($ 16.25 foreign).

4/95

60 Fire Management Today