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United States Department of Agriculture Mann Gulch Fire: A Forest Service Intermountain Race That Couldn’t Research Station General Technical Report INT-299 Be Won May 1993 Richard C. Rothermel THE AUTHOR work unit from 1966 until 1979 and was project leader of the Fire Behavior research work unit until 1992. RICHARD C. ROTHERMEL is a research physical sci- entist stationed at the Intermountain Fire Sciences Labo- RESEARCH SUMMARY ratory in Missoula, MT. Rothermel received his B.S. degree in aeronautical engineering at the University of The Mann Gulch fire, which overran 16 firefighters Washington in 1953. He served in the U.S. Air Force in 1949, is analyzed to show its probable movement as a special weapons aircraft development officer from with respect to the crew. The firefighters were smoke- 1953 to 1955. Upon his discharge he was employed at jumpers who had parachuted near the fire on August 5, Douglas Aircraft as a designer and troubleshooter in 1949. While they were moving to a safer location, the the armament group. From 1957 to 1961 Rothermel fire blocked their route. Three survived, the foreman was employed by the General Electric Co. in the aircraft who ignited an escape fire into which he tried to move nuclear propulsion department at the National Reactor his crew, and two firefighters who found a route to safety. Testing Station in Idaho. In 1961 Rothermel joined the Considerable controversy has centered around the Intermountain Fire Sciences Laboratory (formerly the probable behavior of the fire and the actions of the crew Northern Forest Fire Laboratory), where he has been members and their foreman. Modern safety techniques engaged in research on the behavior of fire. He re- used by 73 firefighters who escaped injury after being ceived his master’s degree in mechanical engineering trapped on the Butte Fire in 1985 are described for at the Colorado State University, Fort Collins, in 1971. comparison. He was project leader of the Fire Fundamentals research Intermountain Research Station 324 25th Street Ogden, UT 84401 Mann Gulch Fire: A Race That Couldn’t Be Won Richard C. Rothermel INTRODUCTION This paper is not intended to be a complete account of the events surrounding the Mann Gulch fire— On August 5, 1949, a wildfire overran 16 firefight- Maclean provides such an account in his book, “Young ers in Mann Gulch on the Helena National Forest in Men and Fire.” Rather, this paper examines the prob- Montana. Only three survived—the foreman and two able behavior of the fire and the movements of the crew members of an 18-man smokejumper crew that had during the last 20 min of the tragedy. The analysis is parachuted into a small valley or gulch near the fire. a reconstruction of what probably happened. Even These deaths were a shocking loss to the firefighters’ though events late in the story appear to be worked families and friends. The tragedy was also a severe out precisely, they cannot be verified and must be blow to the Forest Service, which had not experienced taken for what they are—reconstructed estimates. a fatality during a decade of smokejumping and was The Mann Gulch fire had serious consequences for extremely proud of its elite firefighters. Repercussions the Forest Service and its research branch. While in from this incident were severe and long lasting. Mann Gulch to investigate the fire during the fall of In 1979, some 38 years after the Mann Gulch fire, 1949, Harry Gisborne, the pioneer fire scientist in the author Norman Maclean contacted the Intermoun- Northern Rockies, suffered a heart attack and died. tain Fire Sciences Laboratory (IFSL) to help clarify Jack Barrows, who succeeded Gisborne, was directed the fire’s behavior for a book he was writing about to expedite research on fire behavior. He championed the tragedy. Maclean, who died in 1990, is well known modern scientific research, establishing the Northern as author of “A River Runs Through It.” His second Forest Fire Laboratory (now the Intermountain Fire and final book, “Young Men and Fire,” was published Sciences Laboratory) at Missoula in 1960. in 1992. Maclean taught at the University of Chicago, but spent his summers at Seeley Lake, MT, near his ANALYZING FIRE BEHAVIOR boyhood home in Missoula. His research uncovered conflicting stories of how the fire had overrun the fire- Analysis of fire behavior requires data on fuels, fighters. When Maclean learned that Frank Albini weather, topography, and the fire situation. Fortunate- and I were developing methods to predict fire behav- ly, Laird Robinson, a former smokejumper, teamed ior, he asked if we could use the same methods to re- up with Maclean to learn as much as possible about construct the behavior of the fire that caught the fire- the Mann Gulch fire. They persuaded the two living fighters at Mann Gulch. crew members, Robert Sallee and Walter Rumsey, to Initially, I was reluctant to comply with his request join them at Mann Gulch to reconstruct the final min- because of the controversy surrounding the fire and utes of the tragedy. This information, coupled with my desire not to reopen emotional wounds. But the their search of the archives and Robinson’s knowledge Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fire of the site, provided the data used to reconstruct the Laboratory at Missoula was conceived in the aftermath fire behavior and the movements of the crew. of the Mann Gulch fire. It seemed only right that we For those readers who wonder how it is even re- use the results of our research to help explain the com- motely possible to reconstruct these events, five types plicated interactions of fuels, weather, and topography of information make it possible: that produced such a tragedy. 1. The location of the crew’s movements and actions Several questions about the fire had never been were recorded; the distances between significant ac- resolved: tions were checked and measured by Maclean and • How did the fire, which was burning on a ridge Robinson. when the crew landed, get below them at the mouth 2. The crew’s foreman survived; his testimony dur- of the gulch? ing the initial investigation provided estimates of the • What was their position relative to the fire as it fire’s position with respect to the crew at significant progressed? moments. • Why couldn’t they escape? 3. Archived weather data and site maps were • Did the escape fire ignited by the crew foreman available. overtake his own crew? 1 4. Survivors Sallee and Rumsey recalled the types of the fire. The jump, completed between 3:50 and of vegetation cover they were moving through. 4:10 p.m., was considered routine by the foreman, 5. Calculations of the fire’s approximate rate of R. Wagner Dodge, and the jumpmaster, Earl Cooley. spread along sections of the route were integrated The fire’s size and location and the area where the with known distances and times to estimate the rate jumpers landed are shown in figure 1. The cargo drop at which the crew traveled. did not go smoothly; the plane, a twin engine DC-3, encountered heavy turbulence at normal drop altitude The fire’s rate of spread, its intensity, and its flame and was forced to climb before dropping the remaining length were calculated by using mathematical models cargo. Fire-fighting gear was scattered and the crew’s developed from a combination of laboratory fire ex- radio was broken. By the time the jumpers gathered periments and field data that were programmed for their gear, it was nearly 5 p.m. They did not feel the use by fire analysts in the field (Rothermel 1983). fire threatened them then. Surviving crew member The initial calculations, made with the fire behavior Sallee stated in the official report of the incident: chip developed for the TI-59 calculator (Burgan 1979), were verified with the BEHAVE computer program I took a look at the fire and decided it wasn’t bad. (Andrews 1986). It was burning on top of the ridge and I thought it would continue on up the ridge. I thought it prob- ably wouldn’t burn much more that night because THE SCENARIO it was the end of the burning period (for that day) The Mann Gulch fire was spotted at 12:25 p.m. on and it looked like it would have to burn down across a little saddle before it went uphill any more. August 5, 1949, a very hot and windy day. The fire was in the Gates of the Mountains Wild Area (now While getting the crew and equipment organized, the Gates of the Mountains Wilderness) just east of foreman Dodge heard someone shouting near the fire. the Missouri River, 20 mi north of Helena, MT. Tem- He instructed squad leader William Hellman to equip peratures that day reached 97 °F in Helena. The fire the crew and lead them down the north side of Mann started near the top of a ridge between Mann Gulch Gulch toward the Missouri River while Dodge went and Meriwether Canyon. Mann Gulch is a minor on ahead to see who was shouting. Near the top of drainage, leading into the Missouri River from the the ridge close to the head of the fire, Dodge met James east. It is funnel shaped, narrowing to a width of one- Harrison, a recreation and fire prevention guard from fourth mi at the river. The highest flanking ridge, the Helena National Forest. Harrison, based at nearby where the fire started, is on the south side of the drain- Meriwether Campground, had been the first to spot age between Mann Gulch and Meriwether Canyon.

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