Crew Cohesion, Wildland Fire Transition

United States Department of Agriculture CrewCrew Cohesion,Cohesion, Forest Service Technology & WildlandWildland FFireire Transition,Transition, Development Program 5100 Fire andand FatalitiesFatalities February 2002 0251-2809-MTDC Jon Driessen, Ph.D. Sociologist USDA Forest Service Technology and Development Program Missoula, MT TE02P16—Fire and Aviation Management Technical Services February 2002 The Forest Service, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), has developed this information for the guidance of its employees, its contractors, and its cooperating Federal and State agencies, and is not responsible for the interpretation or use of this information by anyone except its own employees. The use of trade, firm, or corporation names in this document is for the information and convenience of the reader, and does not constitute an endorsement by the Department of any product or service to the exclusion of others that may be suitable. 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USDA is an equal opportunity provider and employer. 1 Contents Introduction _____________________________________________ 3 Part I—Crew Cohesion at the Mann Gulch, South Canyon, and Thirtymile Fires ______________________________________ 4 Cohesion and Fire Crews—A Long-Standing Concern ____________________ 4 Intracrew and Intercrew Cohesion Problems in Three Firefighting Tragedies _____________________________________________ 4 The Mann Gulch Fire—Failure in Intracrew Cohesion _________________ 4 The South Canyon Fire—Failure in Intercrew Cohesion _______________ 5 The Thirtymile Fire—Failure of Intracrew and Intercrew Cohesion _______ 5 Come Down Out of the Rocks—That’s Not the Place to Be ____________ 6 More Intercrew Cohesion Problems at the Thirtymile Fire ______________ 7 Part II—The Discovery of Cohesion and the Welfare of People ___ 7 Cohesion—A Definition ____________________________________________ 7 Suicide—The Problem of Cohesion in Modern Human Groups _____________ 7 Accidents and Cohesion in Forest Service Crews________________________ 7 Part III—Firefighter Fatalities and Transition Fires______________ 8 Types of Wildland Fires ____________________________________________ 8 Stages in Wildland Firefighting ______________________________________ 8 Initial Attack Stage ____________________________________________ 8 Extended Attack Stage _________________________________________ 8 The Ambiguous and Dangerous Transition Stage—Fire and People ______ 8 Transition and Fatalities—The Munson and Mangan Studies ___________ 9 Part IV—Future Implications ______________________________ 10 Focus on the Money—Fires in Transition _____________________________ 10 Creating Context—Developing a Classification of Transition Fires __________ 10 Writing a Common Playbook—Connecting Context and Action ____________ 10 Finding the Unwritten Typology and Unwritten Playbook _________________ 11 Simulation Training ______________________________________________ 11 Serendipitous Outcomes __________________________________________ 11 Summary ______________________________________________ 12 References _____________________________________________ 13 Appendix A—Some Impressions of Different Wildland Fire Crews and Their Cohesion _______________________________________________ 14 Appendix B—Fire Crew Cohesion: Previous Recommendations________ 15 Acknowledgments I called on Chuck Whitlock to help me write this paper. I bounced many of my ideas off him because of his valuable knowledge of the firefighting community. A colleague, Raymond Gold, reviewed drafts of the paper and made suggestions that were to the point about sharing rules and game playing. I also used data from fire investigation reports, social science publications, popular books, fire handbooks, my own reports on Forest Service work crews, and my observations while on the investigation team at the Thirty- mile Fire. Several insights in the paper arose from my ongoing involvement in a project at the Missoula Technology and Development Center, Avoiding Entrapment in Wildfire. From our publications shop in the center, two additional people deserve special thanks. Bert Lindler patiently worked with me carefully critiquing and editing multiple drafts of the paper. Sara Lustgraaf rallied to meet the short deadline for the paper. She did a wonderful job with the typing and layout. 2 Introduction ike wildfire, my research into the The concept of cohesion, or how fire paper discusses crew cohesion during topic of cohesion in fire crews crews are or are not bonded, is woven different stages of firefighting. I draw LLsought its own direction. The topic through all four parts of this paper. In special attention to the role crew took me into considerations of the safety part I, I look at the role of crew cohesion cohesion plays during the dangerous of firefighters and eventually into the in three tragic fires. In part II, I examine fire transition period. In the final part, I connection between crew cohesion and how the concept of group cohesion discuss some implications the paper fire fatalities. I relied on numerous sources, became central in sociological studies has for future studies and for wildland which I have acknowledged, to help of human groups. I also discuss my firefighter training, concluding with a develop this paper. studies of cohesion and safety in Forest brief summary. Service field crews. The third part of the 3 Part I—Crew Cohesion at the Mann Gulch, South Canyon, and Thirtymile Fires Cohesion and Fire The Mann Gulch Fire— Failure in Intracrew Cohesion Crews—A Long- As the entity of a crew dis- Standing Concern In South Canyon Revisited (1995), Weick solved, it is not surprising that compared the Mann Gulch and South the final command from the “crew” Experts who have studied why people Canyon Fire disasters. He points to the leader to jump into an escape fire died fighting wildfires have long noted a lack of crew cohesion in both fires. The was heard not as a legitimate connection between fire crew cohesion Mann Gulch crew collapse is a clear order but as the ravings of some- and fatalities. Let’s look at this connection example of the consequences of a lack one who had “gone nuts.” in the context of three firefighting of intracrew cohesion. Weick wrote: tragedies. Since the crew did not know The South Canyon Fire— each other well, since Dodge knew Failure in Intercrew Cohesion only three of them, since several were on their first jump, and since The South Canyon fire illustrates the Intracrew and Inter- Dodge himself was rusty on lead- absence of intercrew cohesion. It would crew Cohesion Problems ing a crew, it was imperative to be hard to argue that the Prineville build some common understand- Hotshots lacked intracrew cohesion. in Three Firefighting ings and common action into Smokejumpers and helitack crews at the Tragedies this assortment of strangers. South Canyon fire also probably had That didn’t happen. cohesion within their own ranks. Strong Intracrew cohesion is the cohesion within intercrew cohesion did not exist among a single crew fighting a fire. Intercrew the three crews fighting the fire. Quoting cohesion refers to cohesion between Weick, quoting from Norman Maclean’s from the report of the incident investiga- different crews fighting the same fire as book, Young Men and Fire (1992), points tion team (USDA Forest Service 1995): well as their cohesion with fire managers. out that the smokejumpers at Mann Gulch were probably not a crew at all. They were In this paper I will focus on intracrew and merely “loosely coupled” firefighters with- intercrew cohesion of the ground crews. out any intracrew cohesion. Weick wrote: Cohesion with fire managers is critical during fire transition, but it will not be considered here. I will use the Mann Gulch, South Canyon, and Thirtymile Fires to illustrate the dangers when Intracrew Breakdown of intracrew and intercrew cohesion are not cohesion intracrew cohesion established before crews chase fires that blow up. Until recently, few of my studies have focused on wildland firefighting crews. I will blend my ideas on cohesion with some brilliant insights provided by Karl Weick, who wrote about the collapse of sensemaking in firefighting crews (Weick 1993, 1995). 4 Part I—Crew Cohesion at the Mann Gulch, South Canyon, and Thirtymile Fires As is typical in extended Intercrew cohesion attack situations, firefighting groups arrived on the fire at intervals from dispersed loca- tions and blended into the existing organization. Weick focused on the word “blended,” when he wrote: The key word there is “blended.” Blending sounds like something that occurs automati- Breakdown of intercrew cohesion cally, not something that people work at. Many would say it is hard to blend into an “existing organization” if that organization itself is invisible, as was the case for some people at

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