Successful examples of participatory regional planning at the meso-level

Towards sustainable land use through negotiated conflict resolution

A.M.Hoefsloo t and L.M. van den Berg (editors)

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Report 164

DLO-Staring Centre, Wageningen, 1998

\ ABSTRACT

Hoefsloot, A. and L.M. van den Berg, (eds) Successful examples of participatory regional planning at the meso-level; Towards sustainable land use through negotiated conflict resolution, 1998. Wageningen, DLO-Staring Centrum. Report 164. 136pages . 14 fig.; 6tab. ; 61 ref.

Six local examples, from four continents, of overcoming the contradictions between economic survival of farming communities and the need to stop environmental degradation are systematically analysed. For each case the perceptions are discussed, that stakeholders had ofth e problems at hand, along with the relations between the various categories of stakeholders. This is followed by a discussion of the negotiation process that took place between the stakeholders, including the role of initiators and mediators. Special attention is paid to the involvement of different knowledge systems in this process. Conclusions are drawn about conditions leading to success of the respective cases.

Keywords: stakeholders, participation, negotiation, land use planning, environment, wildlife, soil conservation, agriculture, Africa, Australia, Bolivia, Gelderse Vallei, mediation, facilitation, problem perception, land degradation.

ISSN 0927-4499

© 1998 DLO Winand Staring Centre for Integrated Land, Soil and Water Research (SC-DLO), Postbus 125,NL-670 0 ACWageninge n (TheNetherlands) . Phone:+3 1 317474200 ; fax: +3131 7424812 ;e-mail : [email protected]

No part ofthi spublicatio n mayb ereproduce d or published in any form orb y any means,o r stored in a data base orretrieva l system,withou t the written permission ofth e DLOWinan d Staring Centre.

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Projectnumber 7723 [Report 164/IS/03-98] Contents

Preface 9

Acknowledgements 11

Summary 13

1 Introduction 19 1.1 General background and purpose ofth e study 19 1.2 Methodology used 20 1.3 Reading guide 22

2 The state of the art 23 2.1 Introduction 23 2.2 Negotiations as essential element in integrated land use planning 24 2.2.1 Negotiations atth e level of the central government: setting the margins 25 2.2.2 Interest and competence ofth e different government levels 26 2.2.3 Negotiation between all stakeholders at the meso-level 26 2.2.4 Mediation and win-win solutions 27 2.3 Dealing with different knowledge systems atth e negotiations table 27 2.3.1 Land use planning based on'scientific'knowledge 28 2.3.2 'Indigenous' knowledge as basis for locally steered development 28 2.3.3 Negotiations between stakeholders with a different knowledge base: clashing or working together? 29

3 'ROM' Project Gelderse Vallei (TheNetherlands ) 31 3.1 Introduction to the region and the project 31 3.2 Perception ofth e problem byth e different stakeholders 32 3.2.1 The problem as seen by the initiators 33 3.2.2 The problem as seen by other public agencies 34 3.2.3 The problem as seen by the other stakeholders 35 3.2.4 Overview ofth e perceptions of the parties involved 36 3.3 Description and time frame ofth e approach 36 3.4 Negotiations 38 3.4.1 Negotiations at different levels 38 3.4.2 The outcome ofth e negotiations 39 3.4.3 Mediation and decision making 41 3.5 Information as input inth e negotiations 41 3.6 Conclusions 43

4 Nature Conservation as local interest in the Chobe Enclave (Botswana) 45 4.1 Introduction to the region and the project 45 4.2 Perception ofth e problems by the different stakeholders 48 4.2.1 The start of the new approach 48 4.2.2 The problem as seen by the initiators of the new approach 50 4.2.3 The problem as seen by the International Donor Agencies 50 4.2.4 The problem as seen by government institutions 51 4.2.5 Overview of theperception s of the parties involved 53 4.3 Description and time frame ofth e approach 54 4.4 Negotiations 55 4.4.1 Negotiations at different levels 55 4.4.2 The outcome ofth e negotiations: win-win solutions 56 4.4.3 Mediation 57 4.5 Dealing with different knowledge systems: clashing or working together? 57 4.6 Conclusions 58

'Planificación Micro regional' in Comanche (Bolivia) 61 5.1 Introduction toth e area and background ofth e project 61 5.1.1 National context 61 5.1.2 The municipality Comanche 63 5.1.3 Micro-regional planning 64 5.2 Perception ofth e problem by the different stakeholders 64 5.2.1 The problem as seen by the initiators ofth e new planning approach 65 5.2.2 The problem as seen byth e central government 67 5.2.3 The problem as seen by the municipality 67 5.2.4 The problem as seen byth e Dutch donors 68 5.2.5 The problem as seen byth e peasant organizations 68 5.2.6 Overview of the perceptions of the parties involved 69 5.3 Description and time frame ofth e approach 70 5.4 Negotiations 71 5.4.1 Negotiations at different levels 71 5.4.2 The outcome ofth e negotiations 72 5.4.3 Mediation 73 5.5 Information as input inth e negotiations 73 5.6 Conclusions 74

Integrated catchment management in the Murray-Darling Basin (Australia) 75 6.1 Introduction toth e area and background of the project 75 6.2 Perception ofth e problems by the different stakeholders 78 6.2.1 The Conservationists 78 6.2.2 The Commonwealth and State Governments 78 6.2.3 The farmers 79 6.2.4 The local authorities 80 6.2.5 Overview of the perceptions of the parties involved 80 6.3 Approach chosen for the management of the Murray Darling Basin 81 6.3.1 Agreement on land degradation asth e central problem 81 6.3.2 Specific programs 82 6.3.3 Landcare as the community based approach within the NRMS framework 84 6.3.4 Landcare in the Boorowa River Catchment (taken from: Hayman, 1996) 86 6.4 Negotiations 87 6.5 Information as input inth e negotiations 87 6.6 Conclusions: meeting atth e meso-level 88

Rural developments in the Western part ofth e Sous-préfecture of OUESSE (Benin) 91 7.1 Introduction toth e area 91 7.2 Perception ofth e problems by different stakeholders 94 7.2.1 The problem as seen by the Ministries 95 7.2.2 The problem as seen by the initiators (DFRN/PGRN) and the CFD 96 7.2.3 The problem as seen byth e CARDER and the GERAM team 97 7.2.4 The problem as seen by the local organizations 98 7.2.5 The problem as seen by Mahi farmers (men and women) and others local inhabitants 98 7.2.6 Overview of the perceptions ofth e parties involved 99 7.3 Description and time frame ofth e approach 99 7.3.1 Organizing fora and setting priorities about the problems 101 7.3.2 Networking for using expertise from other organizations 101 7.4 Negotiations 102 7.4.1 Four levels 102 7.4.2 Mediation 103 7.5 Dealing with different knowledge systems 104 7.6 Conclusions 105

8 Land use management inth e Meket Woreda, Northern Wollo (Ethiopia) 107 8.1 Introduction 107 8.1.1 Area and population 107 8.1.2 Revolutions that changed the structure of rural society 108 8.2 Perception of the problems byth e different stakeholders 110 8.2.1 The problem as seen by the initiators ofth e new approach 111 8.2.2 The problem as seen byth e Woreda Administration and the Regional Government 112 8.2.3 The problem as seen byth e Ministry of Agriculture 112 8.2.4 The problem as seen by the local leaders 113 8.2.5 Overview ofth e perceptions ofth e parties involved 114 8.3 Description and time frame ofth e approach 116 8.4 Negotiations 117 8.5 Dealing with different knowledge systems 120 8.6 Conclusions 121

9 Discussion and conclusions 123 9.1 Introduction 123 9.2 Circumstances determining success 124 9.3 Methods in negotiation 127 9.4 Recommendations 130

References 131 Preface

Against the backdrop of a steadily growing world population, land and its associated natural resources like water and biodiversity are becoming increasingly scarce commodities. Little wonder therefore, that competition and the number of conflicts over the access to these resources are steadily rising. Where conflicts over the use of land in the past often had an economical background, growing environmental concerns have over time developed intojus t as strong an issue. Similarly, the concept of'land useplanning 'whe n it wasfirst develope d primarily addressed the economical, i.e. productive, factors and considerations rather than environmental concerns as associated with various options for land use.

It was June 1992 at the occasion of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro when the need for integration of policies in various fields with a view to sustainable development first became globally recognized. Decisions which were taken with regard to a plan of action in different development sectors to be pursued through this integration have been laid down in a document which is commonly known as Agenda 21. Chapter 10 of this document, titled 'Integrated approach to the planning and management of land resources', primarily deals with the reorganization, and where necessary the strengthening and reorientation, of relevant decision making structures. The concept of land use planning is thereby regarded as an eminently practical way to resolve conflicts while achieving an effective, efficient and sustainable use of land and its natural resources. Operational aspects of planning and management however were specifically not dealt with inAgend a 21.

'Operationalization of Chapter 10o f UNCED's Agenda 21' then became the subject of an international workshop held in 1995 in Wageningen, the Netherlands. The workshop was organized by FAO and the Netherlands government with a twofold objective:t o formulate recommendations and policy options onth e implementation of Chapter 10 to be submitted to the Commission on Sustainable Development and to exchange knowledge and experience on the planning and management of land resources. As an input for the discussions, participants from various countries presented more than 30 cases of integrated land use planning at the meso-level. The DLO-Winand Staring Centre (SC-DLO) acting as secretariat for the workshop at the time, afterwards took the initiative to select six of the submitted cases which were considered successful and studythes e in greater detail.

Within the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Department for Rural and Urban Development, DRU, is charged with various tasks in support of the Dutch financed development programme as it relates to regional development. The department considers land use planning to be an important tool that may be used to bring about desired changes in the use of natural resources which are both socio- economically sustainable as well as environmentally beneficial. The concept of land use planning however is often associated with a non-sustainable, top-down development approach. In its role as a knowledge broker, DRU decided to financially

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998O 9 support the initiative of SC-DLO in order that successful examples of truly participative forms of land useplannin g would become more widely known.

The document now in front of you presents the results ofth e study undertaken bySC - DLO which reflect the efforts ofvariou s stakeholders to comet o anegotiate d solution of various problems of land use in vastly different circumstances. It is intended that this publication will serve as a practical reference for various events of capacity building and knowledge sharing attended bythos e who are involved in the process of planning for sustainable rural development.

A.W.F.Roo s Director Rural and Urban Development Department Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 O 10 Acknowledgements

Many people have contributed to the study reflecting in this report. The actual work of organising the material and writing most of the chapters was done by the first editor, Lex Hoefsloot, asa temporar y member of staff of SC-DLO.Th e second editor, Dr. Leo van den Berg, acted as the inspirator of the study, supervisor of the project, and sparring partner for the various drafts produced. He also undertook final editing after thefirst autho r had donehi sjo b and went abroad.

- Many people contributed to the different case-studies. Some by commenting when drafts were written, some by sending first-hand information on the planning process and the results, while others sent valuable literature on the cases.

- The case ofth e Chobe Enclave is almost completely written on the basis of first­ hand information by Chief Lux Masule of the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust, Mrs. Makgosa of the District Administration and Joanne Addy of the Kalahari Conservation Society.

- For the description and analysis of the planning process in Comanche, Bolivia, we received valuable help of Harrie Oppenoordt (NOVIB), while Paul Hoogendam ofth e University of Cochabamba gave helpful comments. Mr.Osca r Aguilar (director of SEMTA) provided the first author with the necessary information onth e local processes.

- The Australian case is written solely on the basis of literature available. Dr. M. Melville (University of New South Wales) gave valuable comments on the draft version.

- The case on the Gestion des Terroirs approach in Benin is completely written by Constant Dangbegnon, PhD-student atth e Wageningen Agricultural University.

- The case onNorther n Wollo,Ethiopia , could onlyb e written because ofth e good cooperation with Ir. Henk Peters (SNV-Ethiopia). In his attempts to improve the draft version sentt o him, heactuall y wrote part ofth etext .

- Ir. Pieter van Ginneken (consultant) and Ir. Jan Joost Kessler (AIDEnvironment) gave valuable comments onth e complete draft version of this report. It helped to put together the conclusions ofth e study.

- For the overall analysis of the whole report, Dr. L.M. van den Berg (DLO- Winand Staring Centre, Wageningen), Ir. P. van Ginneken (consultant) and Ir. J.J. Kessler (AIDEnvironment) reviewed and made comments on the first complete draft of the report. These comments were incorporated by the first author to improve both his analysis of the individual cases and his overall conclusions.

SC-DLO Report 164• 1998O 11 - Last but not least, we want to mention Dr. Aad van Wijk of the Department of Development Cooperation of the Winand Staring Centrum. Because of hisvisio n that something new had to be started at his department, this study was made possible andth e follow-up guaranteed.

Lex Hoefsloot &Le o van den Berg, Wageningen, 11/9/98

SC-DLO Report 164• 1998 • 12 Summary

Introduction

This report is the result of an investigation into the main factors for success in interactive regional planning processes in both the industrialized and the so-called Third World countries. The starting point for this investigation was an international workshop held in 1995 in Wageningen, where representatives of more than 30 countries presented their most successful cases on participatory regional land use planning, thus responding to a questionnaire set up on the basis of mostly Dutch experiences until that moment.

One ofth e recommendations ofth e workshop wast o investigate thoroughly anumbe r of the most interesting cases in order to identify the main factors for success. Eventually thiswa stake n up byth e DLO-Winand Staring Centre for Integrated Land, Soil and WaterResearc h in 1997.

The focus of all case-studies has been on the process of negotiations between all important stakeholders, starting from the assumption that regional planning is necessary to solve or prevent conflicts over the use of land and other natural resources. Environmental degradation features as a conflict situation in all selected cases.

The material for the case studies consisted of literature, reports (mostly made available by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands), and personal comments by people 'on the spot'. The latter was thought to be essential for getting to know the perception by the different stakeholders of the problems in the region. Therefore much effort and time was put in getting local stakeholders or other people 'on the spot' interested inthi s study and communicating with them.

The criteria for selection ofth e case-studies were: - Negotiations had to be an essential element inth e planning process - Private stakeholders as well as one or more departments of the central government had to be involved in the process. Therefore the case-studies would focus onth e meso-level. - The case-studies had to come from different countries, with a majority from those inth e 'Third World'.

Following these criteria, a selection was made from the cases presented at the workshop in 1995. Other cases came forth out of an inventory of Dutch-financed projects on land-use planning (Hoefsloot & van Ginneken, 1997, presented at an internal workshop of the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation), and one case (from Benin) waspropose d byProf .N .Rölin ga t Wageningen University. Probably there will be other interesting and successful cases in countries which were not present at the workshop, and therefore this report does not intend to be complete in itsovervie w of successful cases.

SC-DLO Report 164 • 1998 • 13 The case-study framework

All cases are studied using the same framework. The first step in each case-study was to understand the perception by each stakeholder of the problems in the case-study region. As explained, one of the basic assumptions of this study is that participatory regional planning implies negotiating about the outcome of the planning process. In order to understand the negotiations in each case-study and draw conclusions about the methods and strategies used, it was necessary to understand the starting point of each stakeholder in the negotiations as well as the relations between the different stakeholders.

Secondly, the planning and negotiating process itself was analysed. Important points were: — Whower eth e initiators ofth e 'new approach'? - Howdi d the negotiation and planning process evolve? — Whatwer eth e important characteristics ofth e process? - Wasmediatio n an important element?

The third topic which received special attention in this study, consisted of the 'knowledge systems' on which the different stakeholders base their perception and analysis of the problems inthei r regions. In order to get a better understanding of the positionstake n up inth e negotiations it isnecessar y to understand the way ofthinkin g and the knowledge base of each stakeholder. The way to investigate these was mainly by identifying the different sources of information (like 'scientific' information gathered via universities or agricultural extension services or 'indigenous' informati­ on based ontraditiona l values) used byth e stakeholders inth e negotiations.

The sixcase s investigated are: 1. The Netherlands: the Gelderse Valley. This is an area of some 580 km2 where intensive livestock farming is causing severe environmental problems and in competition with the development of nature and recreation areas. The traditional (largely top-down and technocratic) governmental planning approach failed in this Valley. A new approach was tried, with the formation of a negotiation platform of2 5differen t institutions and organisations. 2. Botswana: the Chobe Enclave. This is a remote region of some 300 km2 surrounded by national parks and nature reserves, where the agricultural and hunting activities of the local people compete with wildlife and nature conservation pursued by the national government and international conservationists. As the approach of 'law and order', to control illegal hunting, failed, ane w approach based on mutual responsibility wasworke d out. 3. Australia: the Murray-Darling Basin. This is a huge water catchment area where soil degradation by agricultural exploitation is threatening the ecology and the economic base ofthat same agriculture. Community based action supported by governmental programs isth e basis of an alternative wayt o convince the farmers to change their agricultural practises. 4. Bolivia: the municipality of Comanche. This is a rural area and part of the highland plateau of Bolivia where environmental degradation is threatening the socio-economic base ofth e living systems ofth e rural population while the urban

SC-DLO Report 164 • 1998 • 14 problems normally dominate the development efforts. Micro-regional planning executed by agrarian syndicates wastake n over byth e municipal government. 5. Benin: the sub-prefecture of Ouessè. This case covers the western half of the subdistrict of Ouessè, where the traditional (sort of shifting cultivation) agricultural system causes environmental problems which threaten the livelihood of the population. At the same moment it is a case about the first attempt in Benin ofdecentralise d rural development. 6. Ethiopia: The Meket Woreda. This is a district in Northern Wollo where the people suffered two famines (1974 and 1985) and a long civil war. Society is changing from a feudal system (until 1974) to a more modern society. An internationally financed project intends to find a compromise between the very centralised-paternalistic development approach of the government and a participatory bottom-up approach.

From the analysis ofth e cases three types of conclusions are drawn. The first isabou t the conditions determining success,th e second about the methods used in negotiation and the third about knowledge systems.

Conditions determining success

From the very start of a regional planning process onwards, there are some important conditions to betake n inmind :

One is the way the region is defined. Among the six cases studied the regions were determined along two different 'borders'. In the four 'Third World' countries the regions are defined along administrative boundaries, while in the two industrialized countries the regions are defined along ecological boundaries. This difference only came up while analysing all cases, and therefore was not object for study. This resulted in the hypothesis, that an ecological region definition demands a strong democratic basis in society and well-developed local administrations.

Another important question is which stakeholders should participate in the planning process. From the review ofth e literature (Chapter 2) it wasconclude d that preferably all important stakeholder groups should participate in the interactive planning process,bu t some questionswer e also raised: - Who are the important stakeholders? - Can informally organized groups participate along with formally constituted organisations and institutions?

From the analysis ofth e sixcase s it isconclude d that it isno t necessary to have all,o r virtually all stakeholders participating, as long as the main controversies are covered by those who do. In all cases great efforts are made by the initiators of the process to get a number of important stakeholders participating until the dynamics ofth e process become such that the development instigated by that process can not be ignored anymore. Equally important is that the main, opposing viewpoints are somewhat balanced numerically. No single category of stakeholders should be in a position to simply overrule the others by majority vote. While the number of stakeholders participating seems to be a strategic choice, so is the possible participation of

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998O 15 informally organized groups.I nth e Netherlands and Bolivia participation is limited to the formally constituted fanners organizations which are strong organizations. In Australia and Ethiopia much effort ispu t inth e participation of informal groups.

A third important condition is the monetary inflow into the region. In all cases a substantial monetary flow can be recognized towards the region. In five of the six cases the funds are made available by external parties (central governments in the cases of the Netherlands and Australia, international donor agencies in the cases of Bolivia, Ethiopia and Benin), while in the case of Botswana, as a consequence of the negotiations a substantial part of the funds could be generated and invested inside the region instead ofgoin gt o central government.

Although a comparison with failed project would be necessary to be sure, it seems plausible that the availability of a substantial monetary flow is a critical factor for success. In all six cases some funds were set aside for facilitating the negotiation process, but far more money was available as premium on successful completion of the process, usually by either releasing orreroutin gpre-existin g monetary flows.

Methods in negotiation

Based on a review of the relevant literature (see Chapter 2) some theoretical recommendations were formulated while creating the framework for analysing the cases.Thes ewere : - The different government departments and representatives should 'speak with one voice' during the negotiations in order to create clarity about the problem deflnition(s) and the margins for negotiations; - The measures proposed in the outcome of the planning process should be of voluntary nature towards the individuals in the region, in order to be a stimulant towards decision taking byconsensus ; - A successful process of negotiations would need good mediation, in other words some people or institutions should be considered as having a 'neutral' position towards the 'conflict' situation so that they could take up the role as facilitators and intermediaries.

After analysing the different cases,th e following conclusions can be drawn: 1. About 'speaking with one voice': in practice this seems less important than in theory. In at least three cases it became clear that part of the negotiations took place among the different government institutions involved, while in another case this aspect remained unclear. The disagreement among government departments did not prevent them from participating successfully in the planning process, and the negotiation platforms created the possibility of alliances with 'private' stakeholders. An interesting question that can not be answered by this study, is about the possibility that the process would take less time if the government representatives would speak with onevoice . 2. About the voluntary nature of the measures proposed in the outcome of the planning process: infive o fth e six cases the individuals (farmers and other local people) are free to decide whether or not to participate in the activities develo­ ped. Thus the principle of voluntary participation seems important. The only

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998O 16 exception is the case in Botswana. This is due to the nature of the conflict: agriculture and hunting versus wildlife management. The solution was sought in restricted hunting. This can only be executed if all other hunting is prohibited, therefore voluntary participation is out of the question in this case. It must be understood, however, that also in the other cases participation is made much more attractive (e.g. through financial subsidies or tightening of national laws) than non-participation. 3. About the importance of mediation: in four of the six cases mediators can be clearly distinguished, in the sense that in those cases some people or an institution successfully took up the role of facilitating the discussions and negotiations, while at the same time avoiding to take up a strong position itself. Somediatio n seems important, but the characteristics of the mediators were very different, ranging from an NGO to the Provincial Government or to local politicians. In the light ofthi s study it can only be concluded that strict neutrality ofth e mediator isno t that important (in almost all cases the mediators do have a direct interest in the process). What is important is that the mediator must be acceptable to all importantparties .

The role of different knowledge systems and new information in the negotiation process

While creating the framework for the analysis of the cases, much emphasis was put on this issue, but it proved difficult to deal with, probably because most reports are written by the same kind of people and institutions: those who are convinced that the 'scientific knowledge system' can provide the appropriate ideas for solving the most important problems. Investigation on the spot is necessary to get an in-depth view on the ways knowledge and information are dealt with. Nevertheless, there is some evidence in the cases that due respect for local knowledge systems, especially if shown by facilitators, helped to pave the way for fruitful negotiations. It not only provides an insight in local variations, but also helps building a sense of trust and confidence among stakeholders who felt threatened and neglected in the pre-existing situation.

The case of the Chobe Enclave is somewhat special. Here it became very clear how 'scientific knowledge' and 'indigenous knowledge' can match in solving a problem. The scientific knowledge provides the policy makers with the necessary data for defining the hunting quota, while the indigenous knowledge provides the local communities with the abilities for a sustainable wildlife management. This leads ust o a more general conclusion: indigenous knowledge on its own will not guarantee sustainable development, nor would scientific knowledge. Somehow the different knowledge systems have to bebrough t together ina constructiv e way.

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998 O 17 1 Introduction

1.1 General background and purpose of the study

'Land use planning as a top-down and static exercise has not only deserved its bad reputation, but it is also bound to fail, especially today. Indeed, perhaps the term 'planning' in itself should be avoided because of these past connotations' (Fresco, 1994). In the introduction of the book 'The future of the land', Fresco makes clear that the traditional way of land use planning has not brought many satisfactory results. In her analysis she states that the mere reason is that 'we do not know very well how to deal with conflicting societal goals...'. She partly sees this as a challenge for improving the (computerized) models which can serve as technical tools for land use planners. But she also states that 'planning can never bejus t atechnica l venture, but must involve a long-term participatory process which gives a voice to those groups that are seldom heard'. In other words, an essential part of the planning process involves negotiations between the (governmental) planners, land-user groups and other interested parties.

The goal of this book is to determine essential elements for success in processes of participatory integrated regional planning. To this end it gathers experiences from different continents on these negotiation processes in integrated land use planning. It builds on the outcome of an international workshop titled 'Integrated approach to planning and management of land: operationalization of Chapter 10 of UNCED's Agenda 2T' which was held in Wageningen, the Netherlands, in 1995. At the workshop more than 30 cases of integrated land use planning through negotiations at the meso-level were presented. Some of those are worked out in more detail in this book, always with the negotiation process at the meso-level as point of departure. Lately it is becoming widely recognized (e.g. Fresco, 1994) that the negotiation process is an essential element in integrated land use planning. Until recently the participation of the land-user groups was seen as important only in the implementation phase of the technocratically developed plans. Nowadays it is becoming recognized that this isno t enough, that the different stakeholders must have a say inth e planning process itself in order to assure arealisti c and widely supported basis for the integrated land use plan. But there is still very little recorded material on the negotiation process in the context and as an essential element of integrated land use planning, while there are bookshelves full of books and reports on the more technocratic side of integrated land use planning via computerized model-building. Therefore this booktake s the negotiation process ascentra l theme.

The view on integrated land use planning that will be expressed will be in accordance with Chapter 10o f UNCED's Agenda 21, the Agenda for the twenty-first Century as adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develeopment in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and with the recommendations made by the workshop mentioned before. Chapter 10call s for an 'integrated approach to the planning and management of land resources through re-organizing and, where necessary, strengthening of decision-making structures, including policies and planning and management

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998 O 19 structures. Such an approach recognizes the need for participation of all stakeholders in land use decision making ' (Kwakernaak, 1995: 9). The workshop, in its recommendations 1.9 and 2.3, respectively, calls for identifying sources of 'funding to carry out integrated land use planning and management with full stakeholder participation' and for governments to 'incorporate indigenous knowledge and methods of land resources management into their policies and development programs and assist people's organizations to do likewise, whereby research will be needed to uncover this knowledge and incorporate it into formal data bases and planning procedures'.

Both Chapter 10 and the Workshop stress the need for participation of all stakeholders in integrated land use planning, but judging from the widely divergent views on participation, the meaning of participation for the process of integrated land use planning remains unclear. The recommendations proposed by one of the working groupst oth e plenary meeting ofth e Workshop were more specific: 'Planning of land use should take place on the basis of the participator}'negotiatin g processes in which all stakeholders are involved' (Kwakernaak, 1995: 38).A ttha t level itwa s recognized that inorde r to beeffectiv e in integrated land use planning, participation should equal negotiation processes. This istake n as the starting point for the analysis of each case study. Therefore, in the way the cases of integrated land use planning will be described, the emphasis will beo nnegotiate d conflict resolution.

One element not to be forgotten in recording the cases is to what extent the planning process has actually changed the existing land use. Or to put it in another way, to what extent has the outcome of the integrated regional planning process been implemented? This shall be one of the main criteria used in this report for evaluating the cases, because especially in land use planning it iswel l known that a lot of plans are designed and decided upon, but a lot of them are never implemented, and if so, the implementation often deviates far from the design.

This report is on successful cases of negotiated natural resource management and does not aim at criticizing the societies described in the case-studies. In all cases, the planning process was already underway or had ended. The stakeholders participating in that process were known. What was not known, were the stakeholders who did not participate in the described process. For instance, in a number of cases one might suspect that a critical gender-analysis might reveal an under-participation of women(groups). But we have chosen not to concentrate on a (power)analysis of the participating and non-participating groups of society, butt o concentrate instead onth e factors for success or failure in the methodologies of natural resource management used, taking as main criterion the degree to which the different planned interventions actually were implemented.

1.2 Methodology used

The first question to be answered here is about the choice of the cases: Why these cases, and how were they found? We defined a case as successful, if the big majority of stakeholders involved evaluated the case as such. By applying this criterion we

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 O 20 tried to avoid criticism on the norms and values asthe y exist in the different societies described inth ecases .

With the international Workshop in 1995 a start was already made in collecting material on interesting cases.Th e workshopparticipant s had been asked to bring with them descriptions ofprojects , whereby: - Negotiations were an essential element inth e planning process - Private stakeholders as well as one or more departments of the central government were involved inth e process.Therefor e the case-studies would focus onth emeso-level .

From that startingpoint , the following stepswer emade :

- Of all the cases presented, a selection was made merely on criteria about the performance of negotiation-platforms in the case description. In first instance fiveAfrica n cases and the Australian one were selected, while it was decided to present one case from theNetherlands . - Thenex t stepwa st o renew the contacts with the persons that presented the cases duringth e workshop. Only intw o ofth efive cases ,peopl e showed interest in co­ operating in this study, both from Botswana. From these, only one was selected because ofth e criteria to present cases from asman y countries aspossible . - Out of a review of methodologies in fifteen land use planning projects, that were financed by the Dutch government (Hoefsloot & van Ginneken,1997) , two projects were selected because ofthei rmethodolog y used. - In the process of studying the relevant theoretical concepts and discussing these with Prof. Röling of the Wageningen Agricultural University, contact was made with one of the PhD. students, Ir. Constant Dangbegnon from Benin, who wrote Chapter 7.

One very important criterion duringthi s whole process wasth e availability of enough and relevant material in the Netherlands. This is probably the most important limitation in the whole research process.Althoug h in all cases contact was made with people on the spot, in five of the six cases, the main part of the description was written in the Netherlands, to be completed and corrected by stakeholders and independent sources onth e spot.

Reviewing this process of case-selection, it can be concluded that it is rather by coincidence that these cases arepu t together in one report. This impliestha tther e isa good chance that there will be other relevant and equally successful processes of regional planning through interactive policy making going on in the world, and this reporttherefor e only intendst o contribute toa starting discussion.

After the process of case-selection, the research methodology in five of the six cases (one case was written by Constant Dangbegnon under supervision of the first author) followed more or lessth e following steps: - Background material on the country, the region, the people, the land-use, the conflicts and the methodology was collected and studied.

SC-DLO Report 164• • 1998O 21 Contact with people on the spot was made via fax, e-mail and telephone. Concrete questionnaires (for each case different) were sent to them, once they had showed interest. Usingth e network of Wageningen Engineers working inthir d world countries, in four cases valuable information was gathered from non-stakeholders, and the context descriptions were checked. In this process Ir. Henk Peters made such valuable and extended comments, that in fact we ended up writing Chapter 8 together. On basis of the available material, a first incomplete draft was written of each case-description. This was sent to as many local people as possible with the request to give comments, complete it if possible and propose changes. In all cases this sèsp proved to be very important to complete the picture and to get a better view onth e nuances. Then an improved version was written and sent to the respondents again with a last call for comment. At the same time the second author went through each draft, checking on itsmethodology , its consistency and itsanalysis .

1.3 Reading guide

This book is organized inth e following way. Chapter 2give s a short overview of the theories on integrated regional planning emphasizing the need of a negotiated outcome. The role of the different stakeholders in the negotiations is discussed, as well as some methodological aspect of the negotiations. One key-element for reaching successful negotiations isth e recognition of the existence of different but all valuable knowledge systems. Central government planners will base their arguments on a totally different knowledge system than the local land users. Most data used by the first group will be more or less 'scientifically' based, while most data used by farmers or other land users will have their basis in tradition and direct observation of the actual land-use processes. The interaction of these different knowledge systems will beworke d out inth e second part of Chapter 2.

Chapters 3 to 8 are the recordings of the different cases, one case per chapter. For each case the important stakeholders and the main problems are introduced, to be followed byth e perception ofth e problem(s) byth e different stakeholders through the use of a problem-stakeholder matrix. After that, the main stakeholders and their perception on the problem(s) shall be discussed. Then the focus of the description of each case shall shift to the process. Therefore first the approach chosen and time frame shall be discussed, followed by the negotiations themselves with emphasis on the participation of the stakeholders, the outcome of the negotiations and the way the outcome was reached. As last part of the description of each case an analysis of the use of information as input inth e negotiations shall bemad e and conclusions shall be drawn onth e main factors for success orfailur e ofth e project.

Inth e last chapter some general conclusions are drawn from the cases presented.

SC-DLO Report 164• 1998• 22 2 The state of the art

2.1 Introduction

All over the world different organizations like FAO and Wetlands International, as well as national governments, are nowadays stressing the need to operate through negotiation platforms at the meso-level as a way of integration of spatial and environmental planning. The FAO calls these platforms: District Land Use Planning Group (FAO, 1995). Wetland International calls them Community Management Areas (Deschamps, 1994),whil e the Dutch Ministry ofHousing , Spatial Planning and Environment usesth eter m Steering Committee (VROM, 1995).

Although these negotiation platforms have different names, there are several features they have in common: - They function as the negotiation platform between government authorities at different levels, local resource user groups and other interested parties. - To facilitate the participation of the local resource-user groups and other local stakeholders, the negotiation table will be placed in or very close to the area in dispute. - The negotiations have to be action oriented, meaning that within a limited time- span the platform must have decided upon concrete activities and their implementation plan. - The goal is satisfying the needs of all. This means that so-called win-win solutions are sought and formulated: solutions from which every party involved ist o gain. - The decisions taken by the platform are binding to all parties, meaning that all parties (authorities as well as local organizations, firms, NGO's etc.) share the responsibility for the implementation ofth e decisions taken.

Those are some of the methodological points of departure for structuring integrated regional planning through negotiated conflict resolution. It will be clear that the responsibility of each stakeholder in this process will be different. Central government departments have a responsibility to the whole of the national society, while local governments will be most interested in the direct well being of their community. Local resource-user groups have a responsibility only to themselves and the future of their kin. Thus the role of each stakeholder in the negotiations will be essentially different. This notion isworke d out at the theoretical level inth e first part ofthi s chapter.

Negotiations are built on two elements: power and arguments. Assuming that negotiations are needed to reach the expected outcome, power only can be exercised through the use of arguments. Arguments are built on knowledge, but not all knowledge is comparable. It can not be expected that a farmer will fortify his argument with statistics or scientific research. Nevertheless (s)he may be very knowledgeable about the local situation (socio-economically as well aswit h technical

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998 O 23 concepts like soil-quality) and might express this in mythical terms, for instance referring to religion inarguin g against the exploitation ofth e forest ona certai n spot.

More so, it is essential in negotiations to give room (not only in time, but also by showing respect) to all stakeholders to build up their case in order to reach a shared vision on the needed developments in the region. In the second part of this chapter some ofth e implications ofwha t isargue d here,wil l beworke d out.

2.2 Negotiations as essential element in integrated land use planning

Integrated land use planning is a way of resolving conflicts over land usé (Dent, 1995)throug h lookingfo r solutions that integrate social,economi c and environmental goals via a process of negotiations between all stakeholders. This book will focus on the negotiation processes at the meso level, thus looking for planning methods where both public organizations (through the different government institutions at all levels) and private organizations meet. The meso level (van den Berg et al., 1995) is defined as the highest possible level of aggregation at which local stakeholders can perceive concrete problems and solutions to their land resources. It is also the lowest level at which departments of the central government can negotiate with other stakeholders about the social, economic and environmental goals. In order to facilitate this negotiation process it is argued that it would be desirable if the boundaries of the meso-level region are ecological boundaries instead of administrative ones, so that causes and effects ofenvironmenta l problems within that region canb etraced .

The two main criteria for evaluating integrated land use planning (van den Aarsen et al., 1995:24 )are : - Is the outcome of the planning process sound and sustainable? This is the normally asked question onth e technical quality ofth e plan with an emphasis on sustainable development. - Isther e sufficient community support for the outcome of the planning process in society? This question is essential in integrated land use planning because of the element of'resolving conflicts' (see definition above).Th e mere recognition that integrated land use planning has to do with conflict resolution, leaves no other possibility (besides implementation by use of force) then creating a sufficiently broad basis of support for theplannin g process.

Negotiations are essential for creating a sufficiently broad basis in local society while participation of the central and provincial (or district) government in those negotiations isnecessar y inth e light ofth eenvironmenta l and socio-economical goals setb yth e national and regional society.

The way competencies are divided between government levels is different for each country. In some countries the major part of the planning process is delegated to the lower levels of government, while in other countries the implementation is decentralized. What can be said in general is that each government level has its own specific interests in the integrated land use planning process. The lower levels of government in general are more closely related to the private stakeholders who havea

SC-DLO Report 164 • 1998 • 24 clear interest inth e region, and thus their positions can easily be mutually influenced. In case the lower levels of government are elected, their popularity might influence the position they take in the negotiations. They also might put more weight in certain local processes, while the higher government levels tend to be more interested in the overall processes.

The implications for the planning process are that at the negotiation platform there will not be one government, but several governmental stakeholders with different interests and competencies, which havet o find awa y ofcooperatio n between them.

2.2.1 Negotiations at the level of the central government: setting the margins

In integrated planning the stakeholders in a certain region are mutually dependent. This also counts for the government institutions at all levels. The central government will not be able to successfully implement regional plans totally on its own without causing big social tension. Neither can the local stakeholders. They need the legal framework, the financial means and certain knowledge from the governmental departments and other parties inorde rt o beabl et opus h certain developments.

In Third World countries another type of stakeholder participates also: the international donor agencies. They have often certain thematic interests, irrespective of where they operate: for instance, most international donors have special interest in capacity building at local level, institution building and in maintenance of the biodiversity. With the funds they have available for Third-world cooperation, they can play an important role.

Different steps inth e planning process can be distinguished. The first step consists of negotiations between different departments at central government level, sometimes with a decisive role for the international community. This is either to agree on the problem definition and on which stakeholders need to be invited in the planning process, or to agree first on the main development that must take place in the region and based ontha t decision on which stakeholders must be invited atwha t time.

One essential element in both types of processes is that the different departments at central government level must agree on 'speaking with one voice' in the negotiations with other stakeholders during the whole planning process, not to make their argument stronger, but to avoid uncertainties about the 'room for manoeuvre' at the meso-level negotiating table. It is necessary that at central government level the different departments involved reach consensus on the main developments they would like to instigate inth e region. In thiswa yth e legal and financial framework for the integrated land use planning process atth e meso-level iscreated .

Sometimes the initiator of the integrated planning process is not one of the departments of the central government, but the provincial (or district) authorities or even private organizations that have the strength to push forward certain developments. In those cases, the central government departments have to catch up

SC-DLO Report 164 O199 8 a 25 and go through the same steps as described above while avoiding to frustrate the process. The framework to be created byth e central government departments must be in concordance with the ongoing process, otherwise the initiators will not see their own interest for getting involved with the central government departments.

2.2.2 Interest and competence of the different government levels

So far we have focused on the process at the level of the central government. In integrated land use planning the district and local levels of the government institutions also play an important role, often from another angle then the central government departments. Each government level has its own defined competence of decision taking and of action. During the last decade decentralisation of competences form the central to local governments has spread all over the world. As a result, the district (provincial) and local governments have often acquired extensive competences over land use planning. In integrated land use planning it is essential that these competencies are respected by the higher levels of government, because each government level is needed in the planning and implementation process. Integrated planning has to be a cyclical process in the sense that planning and implementation are continuous and ever repeating phases of the overall process. Implemented elements must be evaluated continuously and the evaluation must be used as learning points in the ongoing planning. This can only be done through effective cooperation ofal l levels.

Local governments tend to have different interests from those of the central governments. As the local government has apositio n much closer to the local private stakeholders, their position in the negotiations is less predictable than the position of higher levels.

2.2.3 Negotiation between all stakeholders atth e meso-level

As we have seen in the introduction, also non-governmental stakeholders must be involved in integrated land use planning, and they even might be the initiators. Here we must think of grassroots organizations, such as farmers unions, environmental groups, local chambers of commerce and industry, but also of large industrial firms, banksetc .

In many situations it is clear from the very start which stakeholder-organizations at least should be invited, but a problem might be that other stakeholders do not havea formal organization which can represent them. In that case an estimation must be made of the importance for the planning process of the participation of these stakeholders. In case these stakeholders should be included, one should look for the most relevant informal organisation form. Each member of a community is part of different informal organizations inside and outside of that community (e.g. the community itself,th e church, family-clans, etc). Some ofthes e informal organizations might function as representative organization at the negotiation platform. Including informal and formal organizations in the same negotiations can give another

SC-DLORepor t 164 • 1998• 26 dimension to the negotiating process. Through some of the cases, we will come back tothat .

The FAO and others state that the negotiations at the meso-level should be action- oriented (see introduction), thus decisions have to be taken within reasonable time and the platform must make it difficult for stakeholders to frustrate the process by claiming moretim e for research etc. The point then is what is the procedure for decision making. Can decisions only be taken by consensus, or to put it in another way, has every participating stakeholder the right to veto a decision? Or can decisions be taken by majority orjus t the most powerful stakeholders?

2.2.4 Mediation and win-win solutions

It is considered essential for the implementation of integrated land use planning that emphasis is put on finding win-win solutions in the negotiations. No participating stakeholder should be left with the feeling that he or shewil l loose by implementation ofth e outcome ofth e planningprocess . Every stakeholder must be satisfied at leastt o some extent, have the feeling that he or she could easily have been worse off without it. This does not mean that the outcome has to be optimal to each stakeholder, that would not bepossible .

One of the implications of the will to find win-win solutions, is that decisions preferably should be taken by consensus. That isth e most effective way to avoid that any ofth e stakeholders will boycott the implementation of the plan because they can not agree onth e decisions taken. The question then isho w strictly consensus decision making should betaken . In negotiations with ten stakeholders, to what extend does it matter if one stakeholder does not agree? This question can only be answered in the practice ofeac h project, and itwil l also depend on how influential the stakeholder is.

It must be realized that there are always stakeholders at a negotiation platform, who will not put automatically much effort in finding win-win situations. Most stakeholders will concentrate on their own interest first. One way to overcome this problem isb yputtin g a good mediator on charge ofth e negotiation process. Heo r she must be recognized by all stakeholders as independent towards the most conflicting interests inth e project, and an expert in communication processes. The mediator will function as chairman ofth e negotiating platform and will have the freedom to discuss issues with any stakeholder. In that way the mediator is free to choose the most appropriate way of dealing with conflicts. Inthi s process it isth e prime responsibility ofth e mediator tocreat e the so-called win-win situations.

2.3Dealin g with different knowledge systems at the negotiations table

Knowledge and information play an important role in integrated land use planning. But knowledge is not objective in the sense that it is equally valued by all stakeholders. In relation to agriculture, researchers now recognize that some farmers

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 • 27 structure their agricultural activities according to the 'scientific' knowledge (= knowledge developed at research stations and Universities and spread through the extension services), while other farmers base their agricultural decisions on their 'indigenous' knowledge system which often is based on experience in their socio­ economic and physical environment and traditions. As a matter of fact, most farmers are themselves trying to blend both knowledge systems in one way or another. The problem in relation to regional planning, is that many stakeholders who follow a certain knowledge system consider other knowledge as inferior to theirs. Still, a large majority of government employees, university personal, extension officers and agricultural researchers are convinced that the scientifically developed knowledge is far better equipped to guarantee sufficient agricultural production and development than indigenous knowledge. In the context of integrated land use planning this is a problem because the conviction that one's knowledge is superior has a negative influence on open negotiations.

2.3.1 Land use planning based on 'scientific' knowledge

In integrated land use planning government decision makers often base their plans on analyses of complex databases. Soil maps are made, climate data are gathered, hydrology and geo-hydrology is studied. The next step that is made sometimes is a farming system analysis in ordert o have access to the necessary socio-economic data. Then if possible, computerized simulation programmes are developed and used in order to predict certain developments on the basis of all available data. It is often assumed then that with an objective, computerized analysis of future developments land use plans can be made.

The value of all the databases mentioned above is beyond discussion. The problem liesno t within the information gathered, but inth e assumption that integrated land use planning is a process that can be driven mainly by objective analysis of all data. This assumption ignores the fact that integrated land use planning is about resolving conflicts over land use. Conflicts seldom can be solved by merely applying the results of an objective analysis of the problem situation. Almost always normative elements and values and sometimesjus t power relations play a very important role in conflicts. Hence, scientific data gathering and analysis alone is not enough to get satisfactory results from the integrated land useplannin g process.

2.3.2 'Indigenous' knowledge as basis for locally steered development

A lot of what happens in a certain region is based on locally available knowledge. Most often this knowledge finds its roots in the traditions of the people and in the experience the local stakeholders have with the ongoing and former socio-economic processes in the region, as well as experience with the technical possibilities (knowledge of the soil, climate, ground water, crop varieties, animal species, etc.) of the different sites inth e region. This indigenous knowledge forms the basis of a lot of (usually small scale) developments inth e region. The central government is involved

SC-DLO Report 164 • 1998 • 28 in this kind of developments by defining the legal framework and structuring the national economy (availability ofcertai n financial incentives, market structure,etc.) .

In rapidly changing or environmentally degrading situations however, the locally available indigenous knowledge is likely to be less appropriate to steer the needed process. New information (scientifically based) is needed, not to replace the indigenous knowledge butt o complete thepicture .

2.3.3 Negotiations between stakeholders with a different knowledge base: clashing orworkin g together?

Often, integrated land use plans fail to be implemented because local stakeholders will not cooperate or even boycott the implementation phase of the plans. According to their information and knowledge, the plans probably do not assure sufficient benefits for them.

The meso-level negotiation platform can stimulate all stakeholders to interchange relevant information and via open discussions 'create 'rich pictures' in which stakeholders begin to see another's point of view, avoiding the practice of reducing diversity to uniformity' (Röling, 1996). That might prove to be the most successful wayt o work on common solutions.

From this point onwards, the situation might become different comparing the situation in industrialized countries with the situation in third world countries. In the industrialized countries all desired information isreadil y available or can be collected within limited time. Information gathering is not the problem, but the questions that arise are:wh o defines what kind of information should begathered , who has access to the information and is the analysis of the information made by independent sources? A distinction should be made here between the scientific information from government or academic sources and the 'indigenous' information from the local stakeholders.

Example: In a certain project one of the first studies commissioned by the Meso-level Regional Planning Committee was research on different styles of farming encountered in the region. The reason to commission this research was mainly to convince the different departments of national government of the fact that, besides the 'scientifically designed' rationality of farming, there are other, at least equally rational styles of farming that can assure a future to the farmers. For the farmers themselves this of course is common knowledge, to the Ministry of Agriculture this was new. On the other hand, in the planning phase of the same project new scientific knowledge was needed, mainly about the ecological consequences of proposed developments. Those ecological studies proved essential in the negotiations aimed at finding win-win solutions for both economically and ecologically driven stakeholders.

SC-DLO Report 164• 1998 • 29 A platform at meso-level should be the way to spread both the scientifically based knowledge and the indigenous knowledge. At the same time the platform, because of its democratic nature, is the ideal structure for an effective control on all research done that might influence the regional planning process.

In Third World countries information is often scarce and not complete. In case the information isavailable , often a more or less objective analysis ofthat information is missing, leading to non-utilization of the information (Dent, 1995). So, where in the industrialized world the meso-level platform can assure a more democratic flow and use of information and can direct and control specific research, in the third world countries the meso-level platform should be used in great extent to overcome the lack of relevant scientifically based information, while the possibilities to issue new investigations to fill gaps in the knowledge of certain stakeholders are very limited. This can be because of financial and capacity constraints, and because of the time- pressure.

Once the meso-level platform is installed, it is very important to agree on a time­ frame for the whole process, including the implementation ofactions ,an d stick totha t time-frame in order not to frustrate the local stakeholders. 'No-regret' steps should be defined and included in the time-frame in order to assure progress while definite decisions are not yet taken. But finally all stakeholders must commit themselves to the outcome ofth e planningprocess .

It is widely investigated and confirmed that a local population, based on its history with the local situation, possesses a deep and thorough knowledge of social, economical and environmental processes. This knowledge might be the basis for future developments in third world countries. The meso-level platform brings together the different local groups with representatives of governmental departments and sometimes environmental NGO's. At this platform the scattered 'indigenous' knowledge must be interchanged and completed. Some government representatives perform the role of facilitators of the necessary means (this gives the government the needed possibility to steer the process), others are controllers of the legal framework. Functioning in this way, one specific problem will arise: indigenous knowledge almost never isrecorde d on paper, it isjus t in the heads of people. Thus, first of all a good attempt should be made to make the indigenous knowledge available for the negotiations. This can be done for instance through the use of different participatory appraisal and planning techniques (e.g.participator y soil classification (Röling, 1996) and territorial mapping, social mapping, Rapid Appraisal of Agricultural Knowledge Systems (RAAKS), directed at the local stakeholders and facilitated by communication experts.

SC-DLO Report 164 • 1998 • 30 3 'ROM' Project Gelderse Vallei (The Netherlands)

3.1 Introduction to the region and the project

The Gelderse Vallei (Guelderland Valley, in short: the 'Vallei') is an area of 58 000 ha in the centre of the Netherlands (see Figure 1) with more than half a million inhabitants. It is situated between two ridges of high nature value, the river Rhine in the south and a lake in the north (see map). It is densely populated and the dominant economic activity in the countryside is intensive livestock farming on smallholdings, while some of the villages in the Vallei contain important industrial areas.

Kesteren • Centre of municipality Provincial boundary Main water course Gelderse Vallei îo km Figure 1 Gelderse Vallei catchmentarea, The Netherlands

The intensive livestock farming is causing severe ecological problems to the Vallei and to the nature areas surrounding it, due to acidification (by NH3-deposition which is for 75% produced inside the region), high amounts of manure spread on the land (high P205 and nitrate surplus) and the lowering of the surface- and ground water table. Despite these ecological threats the Vallei is still considered as an important recreational area because of its landscape and nature values. Furthermore authorities at all levels are concerned about the economic situation in the Vallei. Almost all scenario-studies undertaken for the agricultural sector in the Vallei predict that by the

SC-DLORepor t 164O 1998• 31 year 2010, 10-45% of all farms will be closed due to economic reasons (VROM, 1995).

In the past the ecological and socio-economic problems in the Vallei were addressed by the national, provincial or local government, each in its own way. Most of these policies aimed at reducing the manure production and deposition. However, all those policies failed. 'Not only did some of the policy instruments turn out to be largely ineffective, but the policy instruments in general insufficiently took into account the relations ofth e various sub-problems that are present inth e Vallei. Furthermore there was great opposition to the Policies on the part of farmers and municipalities because ofthei r radical economic impact' (Glasbergen &Driessen , 1994).

When in 1988 the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM) launched their new approach of region specific integrated (= spatial and environ­ mental) planning, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Province of Gelderland proposed to include the Gelderse Vallei as one of the pioneering projects. The Vallei became one of the 'ROM-gebieden': one of the regions in which the integration of 'RO' (physical planning) and 'M' (environmental planning) wast e be implemented.

3.2 Perception of the problem by the different stakeholders

In this ROM-project three ministries of the central government, the provinces of Utrecht and Gelderland, 5 representatives of the 14 municipalities, 2 water boards, farmers organizations, banks and agribusiness, nature and environmental action groups, worked together in the planning process as participants in the ultimate decision making body: the Vallei Committee. But before the Vallei Committee was installed, the 3Ministrie s with the 2 Provincial Governments demarcated the central problem of the Vallei Project as 'agriculture versus nature/environment'. In Figure 2 these stakeholders are shown with their mutual relationships. In the following subsections the different perceptions of the problems in the Vallei by these stakeholders will be the central point, first by highlighting some issues of the most important stakeholders and after that bymean s ofa problem-stakeholde r matrix.

SC-DLO Report 164• 1998• 32 Ministry of Ministry of Traffic Ministry of Enviroment and Water Management Agriculture (VROM) (V&W) (LNV)

Province of Province of Utrecht Gelderland

Urbanized Agricultural Municipalities Municipalities

Environmental Agricultural Organizations Bank+Agribusines

Farmers Organizations

Recreational Waterboards Organization

Figure 2 Schematic overview of the important stakeholders and their mutual relations viz. ROM Gelderse Vallei]

3.2.1 The problem as seen by the initiators

The whole process was initiated byth e Province of Gelderland in 1987.Th e Province thought it necessary to develop measures to restructure the intensive livestock farming in order to assure a sound economic basis for agriculture in the Vallei that at the same time would decrease the negative influence of agriculture on the environment, because the ecological situation in the Vallei was considered very critical.Acidificatio n was seen as athrea t to nature inth e ridge areas surrounding the Vallei. Inside the Vallei streams should become less polluted and the landscape qualities should be enhanced.

At the same time the Ministry of Agriculture also was interested in developing new initiatives in the Vallei. Until the beginning of nineties the usual planning methods regarding agriculture in the Vallei had failed. The farmers in the Vallei had maintained their independence over the decades. Livestock farming in the Vallei, as in the rest of the Netherlands, had intensified very much, but differently from that in other regions inth e Netherlands. Interm s of land the average farm sizewa s far below the national average but the number of animals per hectare was way above the average. Furthermore, the indebtedness with the banks was very low in comparison with other regions, and therefore the farmers could react differently on economic measures, which always had been the preferred wayt o influence agricultural practice.

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 O 33 Another characteristic was that the percentage of organized farmers was only about half ofth e national average.

In short, the farmers did not respond to the national and European agricultural policy aswa s expected, while the environmental problems caused byagricultur e were rising. Because of the very intensive livestock farming, acidification and manure production had reached unacceptable levels,threatenin g the water quality in the lake north of the Vallei and the high nature values of the ridges. The interest of the Ministry of Agriculture was how to solve the environmental problems caused by the intensive livestock farming while atth e sametim e restructuring agriculture to gain influence on the fanners.

3.2.2 The problem as seen by other public agencies

Other public entities involved inth e project are: - The Ministry ofHousing , Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM). - TheMinistr y ofTraffi c and Water management (V&W). - The Province ofUtrech t (asmalle r part ofth e Vallei is situated inthi sprovince) . - 5Representative s ofth e 14 municipalities located inth e Vallei. - 2Representative s (1pe r province) of allth ewate r boards. - Therecreationa l board ofth e province of Gelderland.

In this paragraph only the Ministry of VROM and the municipalities will be discussed. The position of the other stakeholders in the planning process becomes sufficiently clear with the problem-stakeholder matrix (seetabl e 1).

TheMinistry ofVROM The perception of the problems by the Ministry of VROM was based on the goals formulated in the NMP (the National Environmental Plan) and accepted by Parliament in 1989. In this plan nationwide emission and deposition standards were given and the objective of VROM was to reach those standards. This defined the interest of the Ministry of VROM in the Vallei: the levels of mineral emissions into the soil, water and air were very high, and the biodiversity was declining due to the fragmentation of nature areas. VROM therefore agreed to include the Vallei in their experimental way of regional planning. For them it was the opportunity to tackle the big environmental problems inth e Vallei, and to get a stronger foothold in the policy making of spatial planning. Spatial planning is also under the competence of this ministry, butth e combination ofthes e competences wasfairl y new and uneasy.

The municipalities There are in total 14municipalitie s with (part) of their territory in the Vallei. But the relative importance of processes in the rural parts of the Vallei (mainly agriculture, tourism and recreation) in the total of the economy of each municipality is very different. Because ofthos e differences the desire to actively participate in the project and the perception of the problems in the Vallei was very different among thé 14 municipalities.

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 O 34 Some of the municipalities are situated in the centre of the Vallei, and economically highly dependent on agricultural activities in the Vallei. Their perception of the problem was dominated by the agricultural lobby. Other municipalities are located at an edge of the Vallei or at favourable places for industry and transport. The share of agriculture inth e overall economy ofthes e municipalities is very low.Therefor e their interest in the project as demarcated by the leading government institutions (the problem ofagricultur e versus nature) wasals o low.

Among the 5 representatives of the municipalities in the project, all types of municipalities were found.

3.2.3 The problem as seen by the other stakeholders

The private organizations involved in the project are different farmers organizations (intota l with 8representatives ) and 3differen t environmental organizations.

Thefarmers organizations Inth e problem-stakeholder matrix they are presented as 1 stakeholder. In reality their position in the discussions sometimes differed slightly, but for the understanding of the negotiation process these differences are not very relevant, because concerning the important issuesthe y formed one front.

From the very start ofth e project onward, the farmers felt that they were the accused. Therefore almost all their arguments were pointed at broadening the problem- definition of the project. For them the main problem was lack of clear policy by the different ministries, meaning that the measures taken by the ministries so far, were not coherent andth e way of implementation had not been very effective.

Another point made byth e farmers wastha t urbanization and traffic could turn outt o be bigger polluters of the nature areas surrounding the Vallei than agriculture. The government institutions were accused of being very selective in their approach for solving the environmental problems. This feeling was fed by the fact that the central accusation about the pollution caused by agriculture was not made based on field measurements, but was calculated by way of models. The fanners did not have the sametrus t inth e computer calculations asdi dth e other stakeholders.

A third point made by the farmers was directed at the nature lobby concerning the loss of biodiversity. The farmers argued that it was very shortsighted to restrict farming in order to restore biodiversity, because biodiversity was just one of the fashion waves,whil e farming had been there for centuries already, always taking care ofnature .

Although the farmers from the very start of the project organized their defence by adopting reactive problem definitions, they were also aware of the fact that the situation in the Vallei was critical. For them, a clear indication of this was that the average age of the farmers was rising steadily. Because of national rules and laws it became increasingly difficult for them to take over farms in an economically viable

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998O 35 way. The farmers found that national ecological laws, which functioned in other regions, were far too strict for the Vallei. Strict implementation of these laws would make it virtually impossible for many of them to continue. Not participating in the project was no option for the farmers organizations. Something had to be done, and the project opened possibilities of financial support and perhaps even adjustments to national rules.

The environmental organizations The way environmental organizations perceived the problem was very similar to the perception of the main government stakeholders. Because of the demarcation of the project by the government as being a project for solving the agriculture versus environment (including nature) problem, the environmental organizations, in the scope of the project, were not interested in discussing the environmental problems caused by urbanization and traffic. For them it was convenient to stick with agriculture asmai n polluter ofth e countryside and surrounding nature areas.

Because ofth e similarity ofthei r goals with the goals ofth e initiators and mediator of the project, the environmental organizations in the first year tended to follow the arguments of the initiators and mediator in many discussions. Later on, when it became clear that the government institutions were willing to reach compromises with the farmers organisations, the environmental organisations came to stand as a more independent partner in the discussions, trying to build a stronger case for the protection ofth e environment.

3.2.4 Overview ofth e perceptions of the parties involved

The following matrix of stakeholders-problem perceptions (Table 1) gives a quick overview ofth e different points of view concerning the situation inth e Vallei. Onth e vertical axis are listed all stakeholders participating in the negotiation platform. Horizontally the main problems are recorded as argued in the negotiations by different stakeholders. In each square the position of the stakeholder towards that problem is summarized.

3.3 Description and time frame of the approach

As recorded in 3.2.1 the project was initiated in first instance by the Province of Gelderland and the ministries of Agriculture and VROM. After reaching a preliminary agreement over the demarcation of the project and the main problem definition (see 3.2), they approached the Ministry of Traffic and Water management (V&W) and the Province of Utrecht tojoin . At the end of 1989thes e five institutions signed the starting covenant.

At that moment it was decided that the Province of Gelderland (as non-sectoral and thus more 'neutral' institution) would be the leading party and would supply the project with its chairman. Furthermore, as none of them knew how to solve the agriculture versus environment problem, the five agreed that it would be a very open

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998 • 36 process in which all important stakeholders should participate, andtha t thecost so f running this negotiation process (about US$250 000) would be shared amongthem .

Table 1Stakeholder-problem perception matrix for ROMGelderse Vallei High Lowering Ecological Structural Lack ofclea r Pollution through Problems —• mineral water table fragmenta-tion economic policies ascaus eo f urbanizationan d surplusi n problemsi n problems traffic agriculture agricultural Stake J, sector Holders Ministryo f Major threat Threatt o Important Not their Beyond the scopeo f Beyond the scopeo f VROM to nature naturem threatt o competence, the project this project; other surrounding biodiversitv but sensitivet o departmento f areas it. VROM isworkin g on it. Ministryo f Seena s Threatt o No direct No interest Beyond the scopeo f Sewage waters Traffic and threatt o drinking and interest the project recognized as Water water irrigation problem management quality water facilities Ministryo f Recognized Threatt o Recognizeda s Recognized Beyond the scopeo f Nodirec t interest Agriculture as major agriculture possible cause possibilityo f the project threatt o of losso f economic nature biodiversity disaster, but this was not their main worry. Provinceo f Threatt o Threatt o Threatt o There are ways Beyond scopeo f Recognizedth e Gelderland nature nature, biodiversity to avoid project, but as problem,bu t (was main agriculture and economic mediator they were beyond scopeo f mediator in the drinking water disaster:b y sensitivet o project. planning departing from argument process) narrow economic rationalityo f farmersi n Vallei. Provinceo f Samea s Samea s Samea s Samea s Same as Gelderland Same asGelderlan d Utrecht Gelderland Gelderland Gelderland Gelderland Agricultural Not Not known Lobbyfo r Economic Main reasonfo r Urbanization and its municipalities accepteda s biodiversity disaster is at existing problemsi n pollution isa smuc h the main threatens hand the Vallei part ofth e problem problem economicso f farming Urbanized Naturei s Not known Naturei s Not known Not known Agriculture ismai n municipalities threatened threatenedb y threat tonature . by agriculture Sewage watersar e agriculture seen as problem. Water boards Threatens Similart o Similart o Similart o Similar to Farmers Similar to Farmers water Farmers Farmers Farmers Organization Organization quality Organization Organization Organization

Fanners Not Threatens Is merely Notas Reason forexistin g Urban pollutionan d organizations accepteda s agriculture followingth e dramatica s problems inValle i traffic are asmuc h main fashion economic part of the problem problem studiessay , as agriculture becauseo f different economic rationalityo f farmers from rest ofth e country Environmental Main threat Agriculturei s Main threatt o Not their Clear policies exist Beyond scope ofth e organizations to main cause biodiversity concern but are neglectedi n project. environment this region and nature Agricultural Roleno t Role notclea r Role not clear Role notclea r Role notclea r Role not clear Bankan d clear Agribusiness

Recreational No No important No important No important No important role No important role organization important role role role role

SC-DLO Report 164 • 1998O 37 A Steering Committee would be installed, formed by representatives of all stakeholders, and the Steering Committee would be the ultimate decision making body concerning the project. In that committee no group of stakeholders (recognizing central and provincial government as a group, farmers organizations as a group, etc.) would have amajority , soconcession s hadt o be made byeveryon e in ordert o be able to take decisions. As an incentive, the Ministries promised extensive funding on the condition that the committee would agree on one regional plan. Ifnot ,ther e would be no funds.

But still, installing the Steering Committee was not an easy task. In 1989 the three ministries and the two provinces involved signed a covenant, which can be seen as the formal start of the project. From that moment it took about a year of careful negotiations before the Steering Committee was formed. One of the sensitive issues was the representation of all the municipalities (van den Berg et al., 1995) and another the participation of the environmental action groups who were concerned about their credibility. As one group put it: 'We carefully considered whether we would lose credibility as a conservation organization by negotiating about the action plan' (quoted in VROM, 1995).

The five initiators had a time frame in mind, that within two years the Regional Plan shouldb e signed byth e whole Steering Committee.

Another important element in the approach was the execution of concrete small projects from the very start of the Vallei project onwards. It was seen as important towardsth etota l population ofth e Vallei to show them that the Vallei Project was not only a paper producing project, but that action was undertaken as soon as possible, including several before adoption of the overall plan. Every inhabitant of the Vallei was encouraged to supply ideas for small projects. After discussion and ratification in the Steering Committee such aprojec t would be adopted and anumbe r of members of the Committee would adopt it and become responsible for its progress. At the end of 1992 already more than 30 projects were carried out. To the Committee these small projects also served as field experiments for possible solutions. The experiences gained with the execution of the small projects enriched the discussions in the Committee.

3.4 Negotiations

3.4.1 Negotiations at different levels

As observed earlier in this chapter, negotiations in the course of the Vallei project took place at various levels of society.A tfirst, th e departments ofth e three ministries and the two provinces negotiated about the problem definition, the approach and the provision of the necessary means before the formal start of the project. At that level the project was demarcated as aprojec t about agriculture, environment and the use of space.Thi sdemarcatio n proved very important inth eres t ofth e project.

SC-DLO Report 164G 1998 • 38 A second level of negotiations started with the formation of the Steering Committee, when negotiations started at regional level. Within the framework of the Committee 25 representatives, reflecting the heterogeneity of some of the categories of stakeholders, had to negotiate an outcome for the problems in the Vallei. The formal decisions in the project had to be taken by this Committee. To facilitate the decision making in the Committee, it was felt that a common basis for discussions had to be created. As starting point for this process, the Committee decided to commission studies on 4 important issues: (1) agriculture, (2) nature and landscape, (3) environment and (4) change of functions (of agricultural land, buildings, etc). For each study an expert institution (University or Research Institution) was contracted by the Committee.

In order to guarantee a fluent communication of the researchers with the Committee, each study was 'adopted' by three or four members (called 'mentors') of the Committee. These 'mentors' had the obligation to supervise their study. As hoped by the initiators, these stakeholders started to feel somewhat responsible for the study. This proved to be very important in the discussions within the Committee, because the results of each study would be defended by the 'mentors' in the Committee meetings. In Section 3.5 the importance of these studies for the whole process will become clear.

A third level on which negotiations took place, was between the different interest groups. For instance, the Committee had 8 members with a direct link to a certain faction ofth e farmers, some representing the traditional farmers organizations, others representing the female farmers association or the Agrarian Youth Organization. The youth organization and the non-religious farmers association were more radical in their proposals than the others, but decided to try and stand as one block with the other farmers, backed bypar t ofth e municipalities and thewate rboards .

3.4.2 The outcome of the negotiations

The central problem in the project was between agriculture and environment (including nature). To solve this problem the Committee, after more than 3 years, agreed on the regional plan. The basis of the compromise reached was the geographical separation between agriculture and nature through zoning following a national measure called the "Ecologische Hoofd Structuur": EHS (the ecological main structure). The objective of the EHS was to define ecologically important areas and link them with anetwor k ofecologica l corridors.

In the regional Vallei plan the EHS was introduced as measure to overcome the ecological fragmentation and toprotec t ecologically important areas from any form of pollution. The rest of the Vallei was defined as "agricultural zone'. In the EHS area (which is a substantial part of the Vallei) agricultural pollution must be reduced and in some places nature areas must be created for the construction of the network of ecological corridors. In order to make that possible, the plan provides for a conversion of 4200 hectares of agricultural land into nature area. Farmers situated inside the EHS are stimulated to move their farm away from the EHS to the

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998O 39 agricultural zone. With that purpose the Ministry of Agriculture made funds available to buy land in the agricultural zone, and to help farmers in moving their farm out of the EHS. At this point it is important to understand that in the Vallei plan it was agreed that no farmer would be forced to move, all cooperation was voluntary. But part of the plan was also that farms remaining inside the EHS will have to perform according toth e ecological standards prescribed byth e law.

Inth e remaining areas ofth e Vallei (the larger part),agricultur e is allowed to develop through the concept of 'shrink and grow'. National laws were interpreted in such a way that the possibility was opened to transfer emission rights from one farm to another under the condition that the total emission reached in the area as a whole would be less than before (= shrink). The transfer created the possibility for farmers to increase the total emission of their farm by buying land from other farms, or buying the emission-rights (= grow). With each transaction the transferred emission- rights were cut by30% .

An essential part of the agreement istha t all measures proposed are totally voluntary. This means that no farmer will be obliged to move from the EHS to the agricultural zone, and that the farms inth e agricultural zone with far too high emissions (based on old environmental permits) will not be forced to adopt to the new national ecological standards by investing in new technologies straightaway. In later years the government came back on this agreement, introducing ecological standards to which farmers had to comply.

As aresul t of the agreement the environment gains, because the total emission in the Vallei eventually will decrease. Also the farmers have the feeling that they gain, because before the start of the project the ideas of the ministries involved were much more drastic than the end-result. The farmers created space for themselves, and at least as important, they assured themselves of the necessary financial support from the government andth eprovinces .

The planning phase of the project has not been without conflicts. From the very start ofth e 3yea r planning period, the conflicts between farmers organizations on one side and government institutions,joine d by the environmental organizations, on the other played a big role in the process. During the first IV2 years the environmental organizations leaned heavily on the arguments and proposals developed by the governmental institutions and the provinces. But as the farmers developed their own plans and ideas and the governmental institutions started to compromise with the farmers, the environmental organizations realized that they had to develop their own criteria to participate in the discussions. So, in the course of those 3 years another party (the environmentalists) began to take on a more and more pro-active position and started to develop their plans for the Vallei, aimed at a better protection of the environment.

To some of the environmentalists the government institutions went too far in their compromises with the farmers organizations resulting in the Regional Plan. As a consequence of the plan, the allowed emissions in some parts of the Vallei will be higher than the national standard. Also the fact that fanners who are situated inside

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998O 40 the EHS can not be forced to cooperate with the plan, is a sign for these environmentalists, that in the negotiations too much attention has been given to the farmers and not enough toth e environment.

3.4.3 Mediation and decision making

Although the process was full of conflicts, after 3 years all parties committed themselves to one regional plan. Central to this success was, besides the positive desire of all parties to come to an agreement, the role of the mediator. This was the representative of the province of Gelderland, who was also chairman of the Vallei Committee. Heplaye d acrucia l role inth e ongoing process. In his opinion neither the government nor the provinces knew what to do about the critical situation in the Vallei. This is why the project was formulated with a very open approach in which the collective learning process was central. The different parties had to learn to understand the position of the others (van Tatenhove et al., 1994: 41-42). When interviewed, this mediator went on explaining that in the negotiations it was important not to take defensive positions, but to be on the offensive always, looking for 'win-win' situations for everyone. In the Vallei project this meant that the farmers agreed onth e creation of an EHS (ecological main structure) where agriculture would be restricted, in exchange for financial support and the stretching of environmental laws and permits by the government and provinces for the remaining agricultural land.Bot h parties hadt o give in, inorde rt ogai n (ibid.:43) .

The described process of negotiations and the view of the mediator on this process, had one important consequence for the Vallei project. Accordingt oth e chairman (and mediator at the same time) there was little opportunity to develop a consequent and sound plan on which consensus could be reached. This would have meant too long discussions in the Committee with the danger that the process would stagnate. In his opinion it was more important to keep the process going, because it would have been very difficult to restart the process once parties would have become frustrated. This is also why he pushed the Committee to agree on making a 'package deal': the whole plan had to be accepted or voted against. It was not possible to accept only a part of the plan (ibid.: 44), what made it very hard for the parties involved to open in-depth discussions on issues ofparticula r interest tothem .

3.5Informatio n as input in the negotiations

For the different parties in the project, gathering new information and obtaining knowledge about the different processes going on in the Vallei, has been very important. During the course of the planning process, the majority of the parties involved decided to undertake or commission research in an attempt to build a stronger case.

At the very start of the project the Steering Committee commissioned 4 expert institutions to carry out research on the developments in Agriculture, Nature and Landscape, Environment and Change in Functions.Jus t before the project started, the

SC-DLORepor t 164• 1998O 41 Agrarian Youth Organization had taken the initiative for a study on the possibilities for young farmers to take over farms. This study was the basis for a follow up during the first year of the project. The association of farmers also commissioned its own study on future developments in the Vallei, as did the environmental organizations and one municipality during the project. So almost all parties have been busy gathering arguments to build their case in the Committee. This raises the following question: what role has all this new information and knowledge played in the negotiations?

Because ofth e quantity of studiesdon e on behalf ofth e project, one might expecttha t in the discussions of the Committee the knowledge obtained by each study would be checked and completed on basis of information gathered by others, and thus steadily lead to acommo n vision onth e desired developments inth e region. Inth e case ofth e Vallei project this is only partly true. For instance, there has hardly been any discussions at all on the content of the 4 main studies commissioned by the Committee. Three studies were without any discussion accepted at their presentation and only one was taken to a second meeting because of procedural reasons. Within the Committee the content of the studies has not been object of discussion. Nevertheless the studies were accepted by the Committee as tools for the development ofth e Regional Plan although they were not coherent inthei r analysis of the situation in the Vallei, and at least the representatives of the farmers could not understand and follow the analytical part ofthos e studies (van Tatenhove et al., 1994: 29). To the farmers this was no objection to accept them as a tool, because they realized that the real negotiations only would start with writing the Regional Plan.

This means thatth econten t ofth eargument s has not been the most important element in the negotiations. What happened was that during the writing of the Regional Plan the negotiations were characterized by bargaining of potential land uses: "you can have this, if I can have that'. As explained before, in order to create 'win-win' situations, farmers exchange their farming rights in the Ecological Mainframe for expansion-rights inth e remainder ofth e Vallei.

It isno t meant to argue that allth e studies done on behalf ofth e Committee or one of its parties, have been useless. On the contrary, they proved important as negotiation tool. But the different parties involved did not pay that much attention toth e dataan d their analysis, nor to the implications of the recommendations made in the different studies. The studies were essential for getting the proposals of the different parties accepted as being viable, not withstanding the fact that other stakeholders did not agree ordi d not understand theanalysi s on which theproposal s were based.

One of the farmer-issued studies in particular proved to be important. Until that moment, all studies on the future of agriculture in the Vallei were done by government institutions which base their analyses on the accepted 'scientific- technocratic' development of agriculture. The outcome of these studies was that within 20 years 50% of all farms would be closed because they were too small to survive.

SC-DLORepor t 164O 1998• 42 The new study, commissioned by the farmers-organizations and done by the Agricultural University, showed that the economic rationality followed by the government research institutions, does not apply for the majority of the farms in the Vallei.Th e rationality of those farmers isessentiall y different, partly because they are satisfied with less income than normally accepted, and partly because they are only part-time farmers, who for the remaining time are involved in other economic activities. This became a strong argument for claiming more flexibility from the government side to create room for new ways of development. Among other things, this ledt o the stretching of someo fth e environmental lawsan dpermits .

The above mentioned role of new information and knowledge was recognized by the initiators ofth e project. At the start ofth eprojec t they made funds available,manage d by the Committee, to which each stakeholder could apply for financing research projects. Some of the farmers organizations made use of this facility, as well as the environmental organizations later on. Also in another way the initiators facilitated the stakeholders to build up their case. Recognizing that the communication between the representatives of the farmers organizations and the farmers would be crucial for guaranteeing that the arguments of the farmers representatives would be backed by reality and thus guaranteeing sufficient support by the farmers, the initiators made funds available to the Committee to support the farmers organizations to hold regular meetings in allvillages .

3.6 Conclusions

The process described in this case has made the following achievement. This approach for the Vallei opened new ways of development. Before the project started, it had proven very difficult for any of the authorities to get things done regarding agriculture in the Vallei. With the new approach, all stakeholders committed themselves to one regional development plan, although it is not very detailed and the cooperation onth e sideo fth e farmers istotall y voluntary and can notb e forced.

Mainfactors for success: - All participating stakeholders wanted to undertake action on the agriculture- environment problem, so all had a positive interest in the production of a regional plan and recognized their mutual dependency. - There were funds available for the process (facilitating studies, meetings, extension material,etc.) . - In the Netherlands there are enough specialized research bureaus for executing thenecessar y studies within limited time. - The competent government bodies demarcated the region and the problem- definition before the start of the project, thus preventing that the central government institutions became involved in a conflict on the definition of the problem. - In order to institutionalize the participation of all stakeholders, a negotiation platform atregion-leve l was installed ashighes t competent decision takingbody . - Agoo d economic perspective for the farmers wason e ofth e points ofdeparture .

SC-DLO Report 164 • 1998O 43 The process was characterized as very open, both in the Committee and to the outside world: informing the inhabitants of the Vallei and in particular the farmers, of the ongoing process and the plans in development was seen as very important. During the negotiation-planning process a variety of small projects were started and executed on behalf of the Steering Committee in order to create a positive atmosphere around the project, showing all people involved that things were changing. The project was led by a good mediator, who took care of the process. It is stressed by different participants that the voluntary nature of the process was essential. Otherwise the project would have met with strong opposition from the farmers. In principle, there are no losers in the Vallei. At least all participating groups are satisfied with the outcome. There are individual farmers, as well as environmentalists, who are not content with some aspects of it, but these are too few to be able to make a fist against the plan as a whole.

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 O 44 4 Nature Conservation as local interest in the Chobe Enclave (Botswana)1

4.1 Introduction to the region and the project

The Chobe Enclave is located in the north-western part of Chobe District (see Figure 3). It is more than 3000 km2 in size and has a total population of about 7000 people. It is surrounded by the Chobe National Park at the east, south and southwest sides. At the North and Northwest it borders with the Chobe river and its system of flood plains. At the other side ofth e river system liesth e Caprivi strip ofNamibia .

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Figure 3 The Chobe Enclave, Botswana

For two reasons the Chobe district is of special importance for the national economy. One istha t the Chobe District iswel l known for its wealth in natural resources, including an abundance of wild animals like elephants and buffaloes. At the Chobe perennial river boat cruising and fishing takes place. Hence the Chobe District is popular as a tourist

Most of the data on which this case is built, was collected and presented by Chief Lux Masule. Community Leader and Advisor to the Chobe Enclave Conservation trust. Without his help this Chapter could not have been written. Furthermore, the questionnaire presented by Mrs. D.A. Makgosa from the Chobe District Administration in Kasane at the Workshop in Wageningen in 1995 was of great help in structuring the case material.

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998 • 45 destination. The second reason is that the Chobe area contains the largest woodlands and forest of the country from where a big part of Botswana's construction timber, fuelwood and poles is extracted.

Despite the area's importance to the country's economy, the proportion ofth e population of the Chobe district and Ngamiland living below the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) is far higher than in the rest of the country (Barnhoorn et al.,1994) . This is merely due to its remote location from the economic centre of Botswana.

In Botswana there arethre etype s of land ownership: - freehold (6% of total): this is privately owned land (in former days primarily the white farmers), - state owned land (22%o ftotal) , - tribal land (72% of total): communally owned land with use rights allocated to the members ofth etrib e through the Tribal Land Board (Barnhoorn et al., 1994).

Almost all land in the Chobe Enclave is tribal land, which means that the land is owned by the tribe which can give the use-right to its members. A farmer in this way is fairly sure ofth euse-right s ofth e same area overth e years,bu t (s)he can not sell it.Al l families living in the Chobe Enclave are involved in arable farming. On average they have about 10hectare s of land for this purpose (Barnhoorn etal. , 1994).

Livestock farming in the Chobe Enclave takes place totally on communally managed land, which meanstha t all livestock owners have access toth e rangelands and the natural water resources. In 1997ther e were some 1300 0 head of cattle held in the area. Most of the cattle are grazed near the residential areas and held in the kraal for the night because ofth e risk ofattack s bywil d animals.

Agriculture, based on the flood plains, can provide the people with good yields and sustain substantive number of cattle in good years, but both high flooding and extensive droughts are acontinuou s threat to these activities,whil eth e occasional surplus ishar dt o sell because of the remoteness to the economic centres. Furthermore people face competition from wildlife by way of animals eating and trampling on crops (especially elephants) and prédation by lions, etc. Many people end up abandoning their farms. Migration of the young generations to the urban areas is a constant phenomenon due to lack ofjo b opportunities within the Chobe area.

The wildlife isprotecte d by law and can only be hunted with a licence. However the law allows onet o kill animals if they destroy orthreate n to destroy property (Makgosa, 1997, pers. comm.). The entire Chobe Enclave is zoned as a controlled hunting area, for which the Department of Wildlife and National parks sets yearly hunting quotas, which before the project started, were sold to private hunters or safari organisations. However poaching was an ever increasing problem and therefore a potential threat to the tourism industry as itthreatene d the existence of someo fth e wildlife species.

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 O 46 The economicimportance of tourismto Botswana Between 1966 and 1986 Botswana experienced a high economic growth per capita of 8.3% average per year. This meant in 1986 ate n times higher average annual income per capitatha n in 1966(Barnhoor n etal. , 1994). The basis ofthi s economic success ismainl y the successful exploitation of diamonds and in lesser extent of metals (copper, nickel, gold). But also trade and tourism has been successfully developed over the years, as its share in the Botswana national economy has remained the same (between 16 and 18%), meaning that in absolute figures revenues from these activities were also tenfold in 1986 compared with 1966.

Background tothe project In the mid 1980s,th e Communal First Development Area (CFDA) strategy was launched by the Botswana Government. The Chobe Enclave was chosen as one of those areas. 'A CFDA can be defined as a geographic unit below the district level, [....], in which, for a period of some years, intensive efforts are made to accelerate development [ ] After that period priority was to be shifted to another part of the communal areas.'(Barnhoorn et al., 1994:50). This new approach meant a complete shift in the policy of the government towards the remote rural areas. Until then all interventions from the government in the Chobe Enclave could be characterised as very paternalistic, centrally planned and with very little participation of the local people, while the different ministries operated in isolation from each other. Under the CFDA-strategy the idea was that the ministries of the central government would intervene in a coordinated way, thus improving their impact. For Botswana such an area-development oriented strategy was new: 'From 1966, when Botswana attained her independence from Britain, the Government followed the footsteps of the colonial government of restricting, through legislation, the local communities from utilising their wildlife and other natural resources sustainably. All revenues generated from wildlife and other natural resources went to the central government.' (Lux Masule, 1997,pers .comm.) .

Another element influencing the government's policy on the remote areas was that although the national government through the years launched various programmes to develop remote rural areas, none was very successful. This worried some of the international donor agencies.

As explained above, the economic development of Botswana depended primarily on the mining sector, while the national agricultural policy was geared to self-sufficiency on arable cropping and exporting beef. Huge efforts were made to develop the cattle industry, which had a very negative effect on wildlife habitats, mostly in Northern Botswana. This development worried some of the international conservation organisations.

Ever since independence, Botswana received increasing levels of development aid by international donors, amounting to almost the highest per capita level of aid in Africa

SC-DLO Report 164 G 1998O 47 (Barnhoorn et al., 1994: 31). The donor agencies involved played an important role inth e development of the CFDA-strategy. Through the CFDA strategy, in the case of the Chobe Enclave,th e new approach was initiated.

4.2 Perception of the problems by the different stakeholders

In the Chobe Enclave the sometimes conflicting interests of the different stakeholders (see Figure 4) led to a problematic situation. This can be understood from Makgosa, who comments on the position of the local population that is sandwiched between the National Park and the Namibian border, leaving them no way out: 'This alone created hostility towards any government officer dealing with conservation, especially those from wildlife and national parks. Poaching and illegal use of timber resources also increased' (Makgosa, 1997, pers. comm.). Different groups of society had different interests in the natural resource utilisation of the Chobe Enclave. In dealing with these conflicting interests,th e important stakeholders sattogethe r and found awa y out that was acceptable to all. The Chobe Enclave became the first area in which the CFDA approach was followed.

4.2.1 The start of the new approach

Lux Masule: 'In 1988, the Chobe Enclave local communities resumed talks with the government to get their natural resources back. In October 1989, they assembled at Kachikau for a workshop on wildlife and tourism opportunities, organised by the Communal First Development Area, the District Development Officer and the District Land Use Planning Unit. The workshop was attended by representatives of the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, members of the District Administration, the Kalahari Conservation Society and other organisations from the region. The workshop aimswere : - inform residents ofth e possibilities inwildlif e and tourism sectors, involvement ofcommunitie s indecisio n making,an d - define mechanisms for disbursement and control ofrevenues .

The workshop indicated that residents recognised the potential value of these resources and that they wanted to utilise them for their own development and benefit. The Kachikau initiative was taken by the district authorities in response to a study for the Department of Wildlife and National Parks which identified potential sites where community based wildlife projects could be established.'

This initiative eventually would lead toth e formation ofth e Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT).

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998 O 48 International donor communities

Ministry of Commerce Ministry of Ministry of Local and Industry Agriculture Goverment, (Tourism & Wildlife) (Forest Department) Housing and Lands

Chobe Enclave District Conservation Trust Administration

Village Trust Committees

Kalahari Conservation Society

Figure 4Schematic overview ofthe important stakeholders andtheir mutual relations viz. Chobe Enclave

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 O 49 4.2.2 The problem as seen by the initiators of the new approach

The new approach was initiated by non-sectoral development oriented district based government institutions: the Communal First Development Area (CFDA), the District Development Officer and the District Land Use Planning Unit. Their main concern was the improvement of the living conditions of the residents in the area through a coordinated approach between the different government institutions. The existence of the CFDA inth e Chobe District waso fprim e importance tothi sprocess .

As we have seen in Section 4.1, the creation of the CFDA, under pressure of part of the international donors, was a result of the recognition that former government initiatives had not led to significant economic developments for the better of the local population. CFDA was formed to coordinate all activities ofth e different government institutions.

At the same time the district authorities mentioned above began to realise that the Tribal Authorities had to be taken into account concerning matters of utilising the natural resources. Until then, central government had made various attempts to undermine the power ofth e Tribal Authorities (the local Royal families). For instance, under the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) the traditional competence of the Tribal Authorities for allocation of land to users was taken away from them. Instead part of the land use rights were given directly to individual farmers (very few in the case of the Chobe Enclave), and for the rest the Tribal Land Board was institutionalised, the members of which are partly appointed byth e government and partly elected byth e local people.

4.2.3 The problem as seen by the International Donor Agencies

The International Donor Agencies should be considered as two distinctive stakeholders, because the emphasis in their messages and conditions for providing aid, are essentially different.

Part of the actions undertaken by the donor agencies is primarily concerned with nature conservation. A lot of aid can be made available for this goal. One of the conditions for receiving aid from these funds istha t (economic) development inth e chosen areas should be restricted, whatever the consequences for the local residents. The donor agencies have played their role in the Nature Conservation Policy of Botswana, taking nature conservation (protection ofth e biodiversity) asthei r starting point.

According to the Okavango Wildlife Society (OWS) Botswana is the last area in Africa outside of Kenya and Tanzania with significant wildlife migrations. In Northern Botswana, buffalo, zebra, elephant, wildebeest, eland and others still move large distances seasonally for water and food, also crossing borders with Namibia (OWS, 1997). This makes Northern Botswana still a unique place to the International Community, although it is threatened by the fast expension of the beef-industry. As an

SC-DLO Report 164• 1998 O 50 attempt to contribute to the protection of the existing biodiversity in the Chobe Enclave, funds were made available by an international donor (USAID) for any promising plan developed alongth e guidelines of'Community Based Wildlife Management'.

The other part of the actions undertaken by (sometimes the same) donor agencies is oriented towards the socio-economic development of the people. In their perception the uplifting of the living conditions of the local people has priority above nature conservation. These donor agencies stimulated the Botswana government in adopting the CFDA strategy.

TheKalahari Conservation Society This is a Non Governmental Organisation (NGO) concerned with the conservation of wildlife and the environment through research and environmental education. They did not actively take part in the negotiations, but acted as expert institution on wildlife management. Its current involvement in the Chobe Enclave is through the execution of twocommunit y projects.

4.2.4 The problem as seen by government institutions

Ministry of Commerceand Industry Two departments from thisministr y are directly involved inth e Chobe Enclave case: - the Department ofTourism , - theDepartmen t of Wildlife and National Parks.

Toth e Botswana government conservation of itswildlif e resources iso fhig h importance. Large areas of the country are designated as National Parks (18%) or Wildlife Management Areas,wher e sustainable wildlife utilisation isth e most important economic activity. The attitude of the Government towards wildlife is also reflected in its policy paper: 'Botswana's wildlife resource must be seen in terms of its potential contribution to the economic well-being of the nation as well as in terms of its heritage and aesthetic value. Land use planning must accord the wildlife resource apositio n that iscommensurat e with its considerable potential economic significance' (Government of Botswana, Wildlife Conservation Policy section 2:1, quoted in:Mordi , 1991).

Basic to all tourist activities in Botswana is the wildlife, which is concentrated in Ngamiland and the Chobe district. Therefore the Department of Tourism was very eager to contribute to a solution of the natural resource management problem in the Chobe Enclave. In the Tourism Policy formulated in 1990 the Department also recognised that revenues generated through nature-based tourism should be returned to the rural economy.

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 O 51 In the policy of the Department of Wildlife and National Parks there was a shift towards 'promoting the sustainable utilisation of wildlife and citizen participation as a means to achieve nature conservation and rural development goals with citizens earning maximum benefits'(Lux Masule, 1997,pers . comm.). It was thought that the residents of the Chobe Enclave bore the cost of conservation with no returns to them because the area is sandwiched between the national park, forest reserves (both protection/conservation areas) andth e international boundary with Namibia.

Ministryof Agriculture The Forestry Department ofth e Ministry ofAgricultur e isth e competent authority for the Forest Reserves (see map). It has made a detailed proposal for the regulations (on the exploitation of the forest reserve) to be introduced for salvage logging operations and grazing. In 1995 the Ministry started to lease the Forest Reserve to the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT) for hunting and safari purposes. The CECT pays yearly royalties to the Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture for the lease of the area.

TheDistrict Administration This isth e administrative representation ofth e Central Government atdistric t level and it has to function as the channel between the government and the representatives of the local people. In the whole process the District Administration avoided to take clear positions in difficult discussions in order to maintain its position as facilitator of the process and the negotiations.

TheTribal Land Board Almost all land in the Chobe Enclave is tribal land, administered by the Chobe Tribal Land Board (TLB). Itsmember s are partly elected by the Chobe Enclave inhabitants and partly appointed by the tribal authority, the District Council (an elected council) and the Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Lands (Lux Masule, 1997, pers. comm..). The TLB assigns families the use right for arable cropping of a certain area. The family normally is sure of those rights as long as the land is used, but the Land Board at any time hasth e right to withdraw those userights .

The TLB in the Chobe Enclave is more important than in other regions of Botswana where part of the best land had been given to individual farmers or was converted into state-owned land, and part of the decision-making powers of the TLBs had been reallocated to government departments. Because of the marginal agricultural development possibilities of the Chobe Enclave, the TLB remained the decision making body over allocation of land use to the residents, respecting their traditional rights sotha t their way of life would continue unhampered. 'The traditional hunting rights of the residents within the Chobe Enclave, and the lawful entry of other Botswanas for reasons not associated with commercial tourism, hunting or game capturing, will be exercised according to current legislation and should be respected.' (Masule, 1997, pers. comm.).

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998 O 52 Therefore the Chobe Tribal Land Board isa n important body where local representatives, as members ofth e TLB,mee t with members appointed bygovernmen t institutions.

The TLB had no clear position towards the problem situation, because it was itself a platform where different interest groups meet.

TheTribal Administration This isth etraditiona l representation ofth etribe .A s LuxMasul e points out about hisow n position: 'the Tribal Administration, where I belong, deals with all customary cases, norms, traditions, custom and is headed by a chief or his appointee (depending on the size of the village or settlement), who presides over cases at village level at the Kgotla (=traditional gathering place). I am a commoner. I was appointed because of my past known experiences and capabilities of having researched much about the traditions, customs and culture of my people, which was supported by the present chiefs predecessors and senior citizens. My boss isth e chief who is from the Royal House' The chief from the Royal House ispar t ofth e Tribal Administration.

Theirpositio n inth e Chobe Enclave iso nth e side ofth e residents. 'The presence of large numbers of game animals is met with mixed feelings by the area residents. On the one hand, high game densities frequently result in crop damages by elephants or buffaloes and prédation of livestock by hyenas and lions. On the other hand, the wildlife resource also adds the income situation of many Enclave families in the form of employment with safari companies or through hunting and the sale of meat and skins.' (Barnhoorn et al., 1994:95).

4.2.5 Overview of the perceptions of the parties involved

Table 2give s a quick overview of the different points of view concerning the situation in the Chobe Enclave. On the vertical axis the important stakeholders involved in the natural resource management of the Chobe Enclave are listed. Horizontally are recorded the main problems as argued by different stakeholders. In each square the main position ofth e stakeholder towards that problem issummarised .

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 O 53 Table 2Stakeholder- problem perception matrixfor Chobe Enclave Problems —* Low income/bad Wild animals Thehabita t of Revenues from job opportunities destroy crops,ea t wildlife is getting tourism and to local people cattle and kill worse forestry are people threatened Stakeholders J, International No direct interest Reverse problem Core problem: Might bea Nature definition biodiversity isa t strategic interest. Conservationist stake Donor Society International Core problem in Interest of local Only interested in Development Development- remote rural areas people mustb e asfa r asi t possibilities? oriented Donor accounted for matches with local Society interests Ministry of Recognised as Sob e it,the yd o Coreproblem : has Importantt o Commercean d important factor that already for to beth e centrei n maintain and Industry (Tourism leading to conflict ages. negotiating further develop and situations solutions tourism Wildlife/National Parks) Ministry of Has been their This isa Nodirec t interest Part ofthei r funds Agriculture concern overth e problematic arefro m royalties (Extension last decade situation: noclea r over forest Services,Fisher y already. Several position taken exploitation and Forestry programmes tried. Dept.) Kalahari Community Reverse problem Coreproble m Ecotourism canb e Conservation development isa definition developed. Society prerequisite for successful nature conservation District Oneo fthei r main Growing problem Nodirec t interest This isthreatenin g Administration concerns aspopulatio n is the economic base increasing ofth e district Tribal Land Board Main concern Growing problem No direct interest Are important as population is economic increasing activities:hav et o be maintained. Tribal Coreproble m Threatening Reverse problem Iso fthei r concern Administration economic basis definition: people only asfa r asth e and life ofthei r first! local people people benefit economically from these activities

4.3Descriptio n and time frame of the approach

In our questionnaire, Makgosa (1995) of the District Administration explains the motivation to define a new approach: 'A strong need to balance utilisation and conservation was existent. It was evident that this could even raise the level of the

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998• 54 economic base,henc eth e setting aside of ahuntin g quotat o bemanage d byth e residents. The thinking was that after the quota raises enough revenue, the money could beplante d into utilisation of other resources such as those of timber and fish. Once the residents understand their role in the management of these resources, they are likely to guard and protect them, ensuring conservation, broadening of the economic base, and raised revenue inth e area.'

The process started with a workshop in 1989 that became known as the Kachikau Initiative. In the years after this workshop 'a series of consultations followed, which involved the government, NGOs (in particular the Kalahari Conservation Society), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the five villages situated in the Chobe Enclave. The consultations were conducted through workshops, seminars and traditional public gatherings known as dikogtla.' (Lux Masule, 1997, pers. comm.). Forth e purpose ofthes e consultations and discussions the villages had chosen a number of delegates. USAID was involved in the consultations because they were interested in facilitating the process of 'community based wildlife management' by financing the building of an office, of transport facilities to the project, and financing the appropriate education ofth e necessary employees ofth e project.

The rounds of consultations resulted inth e formation ofth e Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust which was only formally established in 1993. Masule: 'The formation began with the election by each of the villages of committees of 10peopl e called the Village Trust Committees (VTCs), to represent their interests in projects involving a range of natural resources, including wildlife, forestry, fishing, tourism and thatching grass. Each of the five VTCs then appointed two of its members to a Board of Trustees, named the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT), which would represent the enclave as a whole in the conservation and management of itsnatura l resources.'

The objectives of the CECT lie both in the management and exploitation of the natural resources, the socially just use of the revenues, as well as in the education of the community. The Chobe Tribal Land Board, as an advisor and facilitator, attends all CECTmeetings ,wher e it isrepresente d byth e Deputy Board Secretary.

4.4 Negotiations

4.4.1 Negotiations at different levels

The consultation phase (both in the institutions and in the villages) took more than 2 years. People belonging to different stakeholder groups had to be convinced and reach consensus about the solution of the problems in the area. At District level different non- sectoral government departments wanted to start this process sharing more or less the same idea (see Table 2). The most viable way of finding a solution for the conflicts between the local people and the nature conservationists was that the local people, who

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 G 55 bore the burden of wildlife conservation with hardly no return to them, should benefit onewa y orth e other. But opposition wasme t during the consultation phase. At one side, within the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) opposition was met because 'some people questioned the idea of reserving a national resource for a small section of the population' (Makgosa, 1997, questionnaire). There was need of a constant link between the process going on in the area and the DWNP Headquarters in Gaberone. The local officers ofth e DWNP provided that link.

At the other side,amon g the residents there were also groups that did not liketh e project. 'Some people who lived onhuntin g felt they have been robbed of livelihood and initially opposed the project. Other people still prefer to keep livestock and engage in arable production, but prédation and crop destruction prevent full gains.' (Makgosa, 1997, questionnaire). Furthermore atth e beginning there was a lack oftrust . People thought the DWNP had ahidde n agenda with the whole project.

4.4.2 The outcome of the negotiations:win-wi n solutions

The Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust became the first community based natural resource management organisation in Botswana to be granted, by means of the DWNP, an annual wildlife quota. The CECT therefore started lease contracts with the Forestry Department (US$1300p.a. )an d the Chobe Land Board (US$2800 p.a.) in ordert o getth e full management rights onth e Chobe Enclave area.

The CECT decided to sell the hunting quota to interested safari operators. The right to shoot one bull elephant can be sold for as much as US$10 000 (Child, 1995), although the CECT in its first year sold the hunting quota too cheap. In the years following, it could sell the quota for agoo d price. In addition to holding tenders for wildlife quotas,th e CECT selects and pays Community Escort Guides (CEGs) who accompany and monitor hunters and record data on the enclave's wildlife resources.

In 1995 and 1996 85% of the income generated from selling wildlife quotas was distributed equally among all the five villages for use by their residents in developing projects approved by each village. The remaining 15% was retained by the CECT for administrative and educational purposes and for the lease-royalties it had to pay. All the villages have now launched projects funded by the wildlife hunting quota, like grinding mills, a petrol station, a camping ground, a co-operative store, a moving museum and timber exploitation. As a result of the agreement, poaching and illegal timber extraction have decreased significantly inth e Chobe district.

USAID granted the CECT US$ 300 000 in 1996 for the establishment of an office, for transport facilities and radio communication. Furthermore a Community Development

SC-DLO Report 164• 1998 • 56 Advisor is paid through this grant, as well as the training of the Project Development Advisor employed byth e CECT.

4.4.3 Mediation

During community meetings locally based civil servants acted as facilitators. These community meetings are described by Makgosa as 'very open and sometimes very emotional. The kgotla was used as the forum for negotiating, because it is the most widely used and gives everybody equal chance. Meetings were held in each village soa s to keepth e group small, but later acombine d meeting was held.'

Later on, in the same questionnaire when asked about the threats to the project, Makgosa (1995) states 'the non-presence of the local politicians in some of the initial stages of negotiation'. The District Administration relates that 2 councillors acted as mediators during the consultation rounds. They are politicians coming from the Chobe area, who were elected for the National Parliament. They are common members of the Chobe communities (in the sense that they do not belong to the Royal family), but as national politicians they represent the Government politically. The moment these local politicians became involved, problems were overcome.

4.5 Dealing with different knowledge systems: clashing or working together?

The negotiations inth e case ofth e Chobe Enclave in fact were about: - different concepts of wildlife management. In short: the colonial versus the local- traditional way, - whowl l shareth e benefits ofth e exploitation ofth ewildlif e resources.

The way wildlife used to be conserved and managed in Botswana was (and is) by establishing National Parks, Wildlife Reserves and Wildlife Management Areas. In the perception of Lux Masule (see Section 4.1) this is the colonial, imposed system of restricting the local communities from utilising their natural resources in a sustainable way. He argues that the way of wildlife management through the CECT places it backi n the hands where it has been for centuries, the local communities. 'At the Chobe we live side by side with wildlife. Therefore, the idea of conserving our wildlife did not come from outside but it was an in-born one [....] The CECT approach to natural resource management consists ofth e following: - traditional laws,ancestra l places (chiefs areas) andtotems , - anti-poaching units and community crime prevention committees of which all members ofth e community ofth e age above 18ar e member, - consultations to reduce crop losses due totrampling , live-stock prédation, damage to traditional water sources, damage topropert y and loss of lives.' (Masule, 1997,pers . comm.).

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998• 57 The (inter)national society can not rely just on the traditional way of wildlife management now that population pressure increases, the living-standard expectations of local residents change and international interest in wildlife (conservation as well as hunting) is growing. Therefore legislation is necessary, and what was at stake in this project was finding awa y of combining the positive sides oftraditiona l management with central control.

The result of the negotiations is promising. By means of the CECT, the local communities can exercise the traditional system, while the government maintains its control by means of the setting of quota and the permanent advisory role to the CECT. The traditional management system prevails, but the margins are closely defined. In setting the margins, scientific knowledge plays un important role. Defining the yearly hunting quotas for the Chobe Enclave, which is the central element in the agreement, is based on biological models and monitoring systems.

As an example may serve the next explanation on what happens when a wild animal attacks cattle or people. Masule (1997, pers. comm.).: 'the attack by the problem animal is reported to the Village Trust Committee or the CECT. These report the incident to the nearest local or central government police station o if problems occur, the traditional structure first of all intends to involve the governmental control institutions in order to deal with it. Inthi s way all parties work together.

4.6 Conclusions

The process described in this case has made the following achievement. Conflicting interests of (national and international) wildlife management and (local) agriculture could beturne d into ajoin t plan of action to safeguard these interests. Special about the circumstances in this case, is that the conflict is about profitable economic activities in the same area: agriculture at the one hand and wildlife management through selective hunting and tourism at the other hand. The recognition of this opened the possibility of looking for real win-win solutions. - Sustainable Wildlife Management is guaranteed through a system of hunting-quotas and a combination of government and local control on the maintenance of the quotas. - The Chobe communities, through the described process, became the managers and prime beneficiaries of ane wprofitabl e economic activity.

Strongpoints inthe approach chosenare: The national Government, through its national administrative structure, respected the responsibilities of the traditional tribal administration. In addition, the national Government admitted the right of the local people to the revenues of the exploitation of the natural resources. The Local Tribal Administration admitted the right of the national and international community on good wildlife management.

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998O 58 Crucial wasth e role ofth e mediators. As common members of the local society they had no share in the representation of the Chobe people in the negotiations, and as national politicians, they had no share in the representation of national interests in the negotiations. But because of their features, they were recognized by all parties as being one ofthei r own (at least partly).Thi s opened the way to successful mediation.

Another conclusion to be drawn, is about the cash-flow into the Chobe Enclave. This consists of two different sources. One is the income generated by the exploitation of the hunting quotas, the second isth e donation of USAID to the CECT. Both cash flows into the area made it very attractive for the local people to become part of the Community Based Wildlife Management scheme.

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 O 59 5 'Planification Micro regional' in Comanche (Bolivia)

5.1 Introduction to the area and background of the project

In Comanche (see Figure 5) the Bolivian non-governmental organization SErvicios Multiples de Tecnologias Apropiadas (SEMTA = Multiple Services for Appropriate Technologies) followed the methodology developed by the ProgramaCampesino Alternative) de Desarrollo (PROCADE = Peasant Program for Alternative Development). PROCADE isth e rural development programme ofa nationa l network of NGOs called UNITAS, and was financed from 1994-1997 by the Dutch Government through the Consultative Body of Co-Financing Agencies of the four Dutch co-financing agencies (GOM).

PERU

Lake £\\ SQr,

\i»S •Coro,co ^S?" Copacabanan/ 2 •ChuLumani n r\ I I 1/ I A Tiahuanato bULI VIA (BRAZIL / Comanche Q »Cochabamba \Santa AS * |Cru z /- i Poopo\\ —\ y ) X Sucre I \ Nf t ^ «»Târabuco I // • Potosi ) I • Uyuni Boyuibe/ \ I CHILlT*™ Tanja \ Laguna V ™«" # pYaguiba Coloradaiolorada a« Jy "•• ' < Lagunal. A p r F M T , M . \ P A R A G U A Y L___ Verde '—j ARGENTINA \ —^ Internationalboundar y Highland plateau 30okm

Figure5 Comanche municipality, Bolivia

This case ispartl y about the integrated municipal plan made in Comanche, and partly about the methodology developed and applied byPROCADE .

5.1.1 National context

Bolivia is among thepoores t countries in Latin America, whileth e rural population is among the poorest ofth e world. According to a study in 1992 done by IFAD (an UN agricultural organization) no less than 97% of the rural population lived in extreme

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 O 61 poverty (van Lindert & Verkoren, 1994). Until the beginning of the 1980s Bolivia knew more military coups than years of independence since the end of the colonial period. From 1982 onwards Bolivia entered in its democratic period, which started with a disastrous economic development characterized with almost world-records in inflation (up to 25 000% per year). In 1985 the Government decided to follow the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund and proclaimed the New Economic Policy as the Bolivian version of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). As a consequence 20 000 civil servants became unemployed. It took until 1992befor e real economic growth was achieved again.

Comanche is part of the highland plateau of Bolivia. The rural highland areas of Bolivia traditionally are dominated byNGOs , what is caused by the overall policy of the Bolivian governments. Before 1982 the economic policy of the different Governments was very urban biased with exceptions for the mining industry and big- scale commercial farming in the eastern lowlands. Towards the central highland's rural communities the government had only a social policy formulated (education and health services) as they saw commercial agricultural production in these circumstances as not viable. 'On the one hand, the dominant state, by excluding the countryside, the peasant economy, etc., ruled out the chance of making the whole country viable. On the other hand, the NGOs, by questioning the state model, by considering it to be totally erroneous, by doubting the prospects of large enterprises, exports and commercial agriculture, by abstracting completely the logic of the state and the international organizations, concentrated exclusively on their own, on their poor, on their peasants, on their marginals. '(Toranzo Roca, 1985). So during those years akin d ofdivisio n ofwor kwa screate d between the state and theNGOs .

Also from 1982 onward the government did not intend to formulate a viable agricultural policy for the highland's rural areas. Government policy was characterized by an almost total lack of agricultural policy: 'with the marginalized position always occupied by the Sector Publico Rural-Agropecuario(SPRA : rural- agricultural public sector) within the state's structure, to which may be added its growing weakness, both internally and as far as its negotiating capacity abroad is concerned. The SPRA is extremely weak,[....],an d it has no stable policies. '(Cossio Cortez, 1995).

The division into two very different periods of state organization is also reflected in the role and position ofth e Bolivian NGOs in the society. Before 1982th eNGO s saw themselves as opposition groups to the state with the main task of organizing social organizations against the state in order to create real countervailing power, and their efforts were less development oriented. Every programme or activity launched byth e state was seen with great mistrust. In this period the NGOs were seen by the international donors as the only viable alternative for the non-functioning state. They directed lots of funds to the NGOs which, consequently, became dependant on the international donor community.

Beginning with the democratic elections of 1982, and more so from 1985 onwards, the NGOs had to review their role in the Bolivian society. As the democratic control of the government was functioning more or less satisfactorily, organizing opposition

62 O SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998 to the state was not in the interest of the rural communities and of the NGOs anymore. Also the international donors were starting to look with different eyes on the developments in Bolivia. A more constructive, development oriented, position was demanded from theNGOs .

One of the results ofth e changing role ofth e NGOs in the rural society is the start of PROCADE as a rural development programme of the NGO-network UNITAS. PROCADE is a product of the NGO's Drought Plan, launched in 1983 as an emergency response to the very critical situation in that year. In the years to follow this Drought Plan was transformed in PROCADE which over the years developed a Marco Estrategico y Programatico (MEP = strategic and programmatic frame), which was accepted by all 14 affiliated NGOs as the methodological framework for all their activities financed through PROCADE.

5.1.2 The municipality Comanche

Comanche is situated at 70 km from La Paz,th e capital of Bolivia, and has an area of about 200 km2. It ispar t ofth e so-called 'altiplano' or high-plateau ofBolivia , which is characterized by its predominantly flat or slightly inclined surface at an altitude of around 4000 m.a.s.1. Its climate israthe r harsh with atemperatur e range from 26.5° C to-1 5 °Can d aprecipitatio n concentrated inth e period between November and April of 561mm/yea r onaverage .I tha s atota l population ofabou t 5000 inhabitants.

Of all the land 61% is privately owned, while the remaining 39%ar e mountain areas composed of mainly rocks (PROCADE, 1994). About 8% of the land is used for arable cropping, 58%fo r animal husbandry, 2% for forestry and 10%o fth e land isi n fallow. The remaining 22%o fth e land isno t suitable for any use (PROCADE, 1994). Animal husbandry, and in particular the keeping of sheepan d goats,i sb y far the most important economic activity. On average each family owns some 150 sheep and goats, some cows and llamas and afe w chicken and ducks.

Through the ages the indigenous people developed awa y to survive in those difficult circumstances. As examplesw e can regard thetraditiona l ways of labour organization (aynf orfaena) which guaranteed families access to a lot of labour with various payment conditions. The traditional organization of land allocation (like aynoca3) has been an important means of avoiding conflicts over land used for cropping and by cattle between families of the same community. In the traditional organization of society access to land for landless families is also made possible through different systems of sharecropping or land rent (waqui, al partir, sataka). So the social organization of communities has been, and probably is essential in the creation and maintenance ofth eexistin g land use systems.

" 'Ayni is the institution of solidarity and reciprocity developed by the Andean civilization for enabling families to undertake works with ahig h labour demand.' (SEMTA, 1995). Faenaha s the same function, but is different in the obligations created for the family. JiThe purpose of aynoca is to organize areas of approximately 10-20 ha for between 100 and 200 cropping parcels, which in consequence guarantee that large areas of land in fallow are free for access to the animals. Aynoca makes it possible that the community protects its crops in an adequate way.' (Birbuet Diaz, 1992:42).

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998 • 63 According to a study made in Comanche 15% of all used land is irreversibly degraded, 45% is degraded in a still reversible situation and 40% is in a process of degradation (SEMTA, 1995).

5.1.3 Micro-regional planning

The actual process of Micro regional planning was initiated by SEMTA in the beginning of the nineties. SEMTA, in its work in Comanche, followed the methodology of 'Micro regional planning 'developed by PROCADE. Through a process in which they stimulated the farmers to realize self-studies of the area and discuss the results and ideas with the farmers of other communities, a municipal organization was formed, named CODECO (COnsejo de DEsarrollode Comanche = Board for the Development of Comanche) in order to canalize the demands of the farmers to the different intervening institutions, and if possible to obtain funds for development projects.

SEMTA itself wasan d ison e ofthos e intervening institutions and became involved in two projects in Comanche: pasture-improvement through soil and water conservation and cattle-development.

5.2 Perception of the problem by the different stakeholders

The actual situation in Comanche is causing serious and interrelated problems to its rural population. As described above, the two most demanding problems are the overall poverty situation (among the indigenous people and women in particular) in the rural communities and the high degree of land degradation. In the eyes of someo f the stakeholders (see Figure 6 for an overview) the extreme poverty situation is related to: - ahig h level ofmigratio n (more men than women)t o thecities , - suppression of the indigenous communities in their rights of self-determination ofthei r destiny, - the backward position of women as compared to men is slowing down developments.

64 a SC-DLO Report 164 • 1998 Structural Adjustment United Nations Programme Structure

Central Government

Departmental Coverment

Municipality ServiciosTécnico s of Comanche para la Mujer (SETAM)

Comanche

Consejo de Desarrollo Agrarian Syndicates Servicios Multiples de de Comanche (CODECO) (communities) Tecnologias Apropiadas

Programa Campesina Agrarian Central Alternative)d e Desarrollo of Comanche PROCADE

Team of International Federación Sindical Consultants Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos del a Provincia Pacajes FSUTCPP Consultative Body of Bolivian Network Dutch Co-financing of NGOs(UNITAS ) Agencies (GOM)

Dutch Ministry of International Cooperation (DGIS)

Figure6 Schematic overview ofthe important stakeholders andtheir mutual relations viz. Comanche

5.2.1 The problem as seen byth e initiators of the new planning approach

UNITAS/PROCADE PROCADE is an inter-institutional coordination programme of the Bolivian NGO- network UNITAS. To execute this programme a special programme-team was installed at the beginning of the 1990s, with the task of supervising the projects put forward by the NGOs participating in PROCADE. The PROCADE-team has responsibilities on financial as well as content aspects of the projects, and functions quite autonomously. In order to understand the position of PROCADE it is important to realizethat : - it is very dependant on international donor funds, and on Dutch donors in particular, - the NGOs, members of UNITAS, are in their own terms 'Institutions for the Promotion of Social Development '('PSD) with a long history, starting in the period between 1952 and 1982. Their core activities historically were in social organization inth e highland areas of Bolivia.

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 O 65 In the view of PROCADE the Bolivian state has 'historically an anti-peasant character '(UNITAS, 1994:17). Only recently this is changing, and a growing interest can benote d for developing the rural communities.

In thepas t the roleNGO s saw for themselves, was one oforganizin g opposition inth e rural areas. Since the democratic switch in Bolivian history, these NGOs started to reform themselves. They became more development oriented and from that interest started PROCADE. Over the years PROCADE evolved into a financing programme for projects of the affiliated NGOs which were developed and would be implemented according to 'four basic paradigms: integrality, participation, inter-institutional coordination and regional demarcation '(Soriano, 1994). All projects sent to PROCADE for financing, should be the result of a Micro regional plan with very clear criteria concerning environmental sustainability and the participation of the local communities including women. This model, on which all affiliated NGOs agreed in 1993, became known as the Strategic and Programmatic Framework (Marco Estrategicoy Programatico MEP).

What emerges immediately, studying the MEP, isth ever y close link existing between the criteria defined in the MEP and the main criteria used by the Dutch Donor Society.Bot h have as main criteria: - poverty alleviation, - environmental sustainability, - gender equality.

Both have as clear methodological starting point the self-determination of the local population.

The comparability is not a just a coincidence. Partly it is the reason why these Bolivian NGOs and the Dutch co-financing agencies (acting jointly as 'GOM') decided to collaborate. In the years to follow they got into lengthy discussions on the principles and strategies of their work, which explains also the similarity in criteria. The close link probably can also be seen as an indication of the importance of foreign finance toth e BolivianNGOs .

SEMTA This NGO was created in 1980, and immediately joined UNITAS. It is one the 14 NGOs participating in PROCADE. Itsworkin g area isth e province of Pacajes, where it concentrates on two of the four micro-regions, among which Comanche. Almost from the start onwards SEMTA developed activities in Pacajes along two interlinked lines: research and concrete actions. The area of interest was and is agricultural production asth e central economic activity ofth e rural families.

The view of SEMTA on the socio-economical situation of Pacajes has always been that the only viable way of development is an integrated one, meaning that economic development (= agricultural production development in an environmentally sustainable way) only stands a chance if the most important social issues (education, health) are also tackled. But part of the same vision on development is that SEMTA

66• SC-DLORepor t 164O 1998 wants to be aware of its own strong and weak points. SEMTA should not try and become active in all aspects ofth e needed socio-economic developments.

5.2.2 The problem as seen by the central government

Over the last decades the various governments never have been interested in the agricultural production potential of the highland areas. The only Bolivian region for which an agricultural policy was formulated were the eastern lowland areas, where big-scale commercial agriculture was stimulated.

For the highland areas like Comanche one of the most important results of this trend has been the easy decentralization of a part of the powers of government to the Municipality. In the process of decentralization the Government issued the Law on Popular Participation (LPP) in 1994. Two aspects of the LPP are of special importance to the regional planning process in Comanche, although it must be stressed heretha t no specific policy for Comanche or Pacajes is formulated.

One is that within the framework of the LPP it is prescribed that each municipality has to develop an integrated development plan. In a way the LPP formalized the positive result of integrated Micro regional planning which was initiated by different NGOs (e.g.throug h PROCADE). Inth e case of Comanche, this resulted in aboos t to the planning process already going on because the micro-region taken as basis for planning by the Indigenous Communities, SEMTA and other NGOs was in fact the municipality of Comanche (unlike other areas where the micro-regions did not coincide with the administrative borders ofth e municipality).

The second aspect is that the LPP stresses the importance of participation of the population inth e whole planning process.Thi s ismainl y expressed in: - 'The legal recognition of peasant and indigenous communities (under the name of Territorial Base Organizations TBOs) as collective subjects fully in their own rights. This implies granting legal status to the community, and the state's recognition ofth e community's form of organization and local leadership. - The creation of Comités de Vigilancia (Vigilance Committees), made up of representatives of the communities in each municipality, whose role it is to exercise social control over the municipal government regarding the use of resources and to guarantee community participation indecision-making . '(Cossio Cortez, 1995:82).

According to the LPP shared fiscal resources should be transferred from the central government to each municipality.

5.2.3 The problem as seen by the municipality

Little can be said about the role of the municipality in the planning process in Comanche. Probably the most important action of the municipality has been that it accepted the Plan Operativo Unicode Comanche (the Micro regional development

SC-DLO Report 164• 1998 O 67 plan), which waselaborate d byth e peasant organizations in collaboration withNGOs , as the Municipal Development Plan. This is remarkable because municipalities tend to be very urban biased because of the idea that for instance improving the sanitary urban system ismor e profitable in terms ofvote stha n investing inth e rural areas (see alsoPROCADE, 1995:62).

Despite the good cooperation between the municipality, peasant organizations and NGOs, 'even in this micro-region there are no municipal funds available for projects defined viath e Municipal Plan '(PROCADE, 1995;66) .

5.2.4 The problem as seen by the Dutch donors

There have only been indirect contacts between the Dutch Donors (the Co-financing agencies organized in the GOM and the Ministry of Development Cooperation) and the organizations working in Comanche. The GOM has been financing PROCADE with funds of the Ministry of Development Cooperation, and PROCADE has been financing SEMTA for part ofthei r activities in Comanche.

As for the perception of the GOM on the situation of the rural highland communities it isdifficul t to determine their initial position. All documents concerning PROCADE are the result of lengthy discussions between the GOM and PROCADE, and in that waythe y mutually influenced each other inthei r position, as is also made clear under the description of PROCADE. After the decision was taken to finance PROCADE, the GOM decided that it would not be realistic to undertake the necessary supervision and evaluations themselves, because of personal and organizational constraints. Therefore they delegated the supervision and evaluation on PROCADE to a Team of International Consultants, which became a third party in the discussions between PROCADE and the Dutch Donors.

To the author it was not possible to extract clear positions for each party involved in these discussions.

5.2.5 The problem as seen by the peasant organizations

At this stage it is necessary to describe in short the history of the peasant organizations as this reflects also the evolution in their view on the development of Comanche. The peasant organizations in Pacajes go back to the year 1953,whe n the Federation Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinosde la Provincia Pacajes (FSUTCPP, Federation of Unions of farm workers and farmers of Pacajes) was formed within the national opposition movement against dictator Banzer. In 1979th e Agrarian Syndicate of Comanche (ASC) was formed, in which 29 indigenous communities were organized. The basis of the ASC lied in the creation of a strong opposition movement against amilitar y intervention.

Inth e yearst o follow, the political context ofth e country has changed towards amor e democratic model. This implied also a change of character ofth e peasant movements.

68 O SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 In comparison with other areas in Bolivia, the farmers in Comanche are well organized. One of the indicators for that is that they formed already the Council for Micro regional Development (CODECO) before the Law on Popular Participation was announced. Through CODECO the farmers were actively involved in the micro- regional planning of Comanche. CODECO became the economic arm of the 'Central Campesina de Comanche '(the fanners syndicate of Comanche) (PROCADE, 1995).

5.2.6 Overview of the perceptions ofth e parties involved

Table 3 gives a quick overview of the different points of view concerning the situation in Comanche. On the vertical axis the main stakeholders involved in the development process of Comanche are listed. Horizontally are recorded the main problems as argued by different stakeholders. In each square the position of the stakeholder towardstha t problem is summarised.

Table 3 Stakeholder- problem perception matrix for Comanche Problems —^ Rural highland Ongoing deterioration Women ina Indigenous communities are of theenvironmen t backwardedpositio n communities living inextrem e tomen suppressed StakeholdersJ , poverty TheCentra l It will takesom e Noclea rpositio n This is aseriou s They must begive n Government years, butth eNE P problem inBolivia n the opportunity to will improveth e society. Totackl eit . influence theirow n poverty situation. the sub-secretariat for development at Meanwhile gender-issues was local level emergency created programmes will be implemented Dutch donors This isthei rmai n The sustainability of Improvement ofth e Self-determinatio n concern production systems is relative position of ofth e indigenous more important thana women mustb e people isessentia l higher productivity integral parto fth e programme PROCADE Their basic concern: This isa ver y important Women dohav ea n The indigenous blame iso nth e problem, buti t canonl y economic function in communitiesmus t urban-biased be tackled inrelatio n to therura l commu­ beth e subject of government improvement ofth e nities.Thi s function developments institutions. socio-economic must beth ebasi s for situation ofth epeople . theirparticipatio n in the programmes SEMTA Their basicconcer n Socio-economic Not aver y clear The indigenous development musttak e position inth ecas eo f communities are place ona environ ­ Comanche the subjects ofthei r mentally sustainable own developments basis Municipality Problems ofth e No clearpositio n Noclea rpositio n Atloca l level this urban people areo f isno t animportan t another naturetha n issue the rural people:e.g . more need for sanitation program. Indigenous They areth e subjects No clearpositio n Through the No sustainable communities ofth e poverty Federation ofWome n development is situation theyparticipat e inth e possible ifth e development indigenous processes communities don't taketh e leading role

SC-DLO Report 164• 1998• 69 5.3 Description and time frame of the approach

From the second half of the 1980's onwards, different attempts have been made in Bolivia to create and implement aregiona l planning approach, mostly by initiatives of NGOs. These experiences underwent acertai n evolution along the geographical scale they have been working on: from Subregional or Provincial to Micro regional or Municipal. As Soriano (1994) states: 'of the four basic paradigms of planning: integration, participation, inter-institutional coordination and geographic scale of working, none of the first three have been reached satisfactorily, not by the State (central orregional ) and not by the NGOs.Departin g from this conclusion, the fourth was modified, lowering in scale,an d adjusting the variable geographic scale totha t of micro region'. The planning and development attempts made in Pacajes and Comanche reflectjus t thisprocess ,wit h SEMTA as one ofth e leading parties.

From 1985 onwards the Government implemented the guidelines of the Structural Adjustment Programmes issued by the IMF. The Bolivian government designed the New Economic Policy (NEP). In order not tojeopardiz e the democratization process the NEP could not just be implemented without offering compensations to the population. A number of emergency programmes were launched, all financed by international funds. In this way the Bolivian Government became a keen player, following the international discussions with great interest and in some cases they were the first country to implement international agreements. For the government policy on planning processes for the highland areas the international process called Agenda 21, or the follow-up of the Rio-conference of 1992, became important. 'Bolivia has the distinction of being one of the first countries to take Agenda 21 and use it asa comprehensive framework for itsnationa l development strategy. Aspar t of its major reform of government, a Ministry of Sustainable Development was established, with considerable policy and planning authority. [....] Capacity 21 was asked to help Bolivia to decentralize its institutional structures to the level of departments, and to create mechanisms for local participation in development planning. [....], the real purpose of Bolivia 21 ist o create radically better processes of decision-making at the local level based upon a better understanding of complex development challenges. '(Capacity 214, 1995).

In the region of Comanche, in 1987 the provincial peasant organization FSUTCPP and SEMTA made up a contract for a diagnosis of the Province of Pacajes. On basis of this diagnosis the Agro-economic Strategy for Pacajes (ASP) was developed in which strategies for planning, claim making power and natural and human resource management leadingt o the desired developments are defined. This document sparked off profound debates and reflexions among the indigenous communities about their own future. After long internal debates the FSUTCPP in 1990 organized the first agro-economical congress for Pacajes. At this congress it was decided to create a Direction Board for Pacajes with the aim to implement theAS P (PROCADE, 1994).

4 Capacity 21 isa UN-programme implemented byth e UNDP. It was created to assist developing countries indesignin gnationa l Agenda2 1programme s asfollow-u p ofth e Rio-conference of 1992.

70 O SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 In the time following this congress the discussions on micro-regional level went on, and slowly it became clear that the differences between the 4 micro-regions in Pacajes are too big to be overcome easily. The people organized in the Agrarian Syndicate of Comanche proposed to create their own organization directed at the economic development of Comanche: CODECO (COnsejo de DEsarrollo de COmanche) isforme d (PROCADE, 1994).

Thevisio n of SEMTA on regional development isundergoin g aparalle l development. Alongside with the developments towards the recognition of micro-regional differences among the peasant-organizations, SEMTA also abandoned the ideas of Provincial development and opted for processes of micro-regional planning and development. These experiences of SEMTA later on were materialized also in PROCADE, in the development of their framework for micro-regional planning (Brozovich, 1994).

In 1993 CODECO and the Agrarian Syndicate of Comanche organized the first workshop for peasant leaders on Micro regional planning. The goal was to formulate the first Development Plan for the Micro region5Comanche. As inputs for this plan they used the information gathered and analysed in the Agro-economic Diagnosis of Pacajes (of 1987) together with an inventory of the natural resources of Comanche, made by themselves together with SEMTA, and they made visits to other micro- regions inorde rt o learn from theirexperiences . Together with the Non-Governmental Organizations working in the region, like SEMTA and Servicios Técnicos para la Mujer (SETAM, Technical Services for Women, a NGO concentrating on women and environment/ecosystems), the Comanche Development Plan was given shape and the different participating organizations took responsibility for the implementation of partso fth eplan .

In 1994, after the implementation of the Law on Popular Participation, Comanche Municipality adopted the plan aspar t ofth e Municipal Development Plan.

5.4 Negotiations

5.4.1 Negotiations at different levels

In the micro-regional planning process of Comanche negotiations between various parties took place at different moments and different levels. At the highest level we have seen that only recently the State is developing activities, like the LPP,tha t have a positive impact on the situation in Comanche. Butthes e initiativeswer e the result of negotiations between the Central Government and the international community. The annual report of the Bolivian government on the programme 'Decentralization of Sustainable Development', implemented with UNCED-funds of Capacity 21,states : '...the Law of Popular Participation provides the integration of local communities into

5 Micro region refers to a geographic area defined by primarily geographic and ecological boundaries. In the case of Comanche these boundaries coincided in great extent with the administrative boundaries of the Municipality. Therefore the Micro region Comanche was defined as the Municipality of Comanche.

SC-DLO Report 164 • 1998 O 71 decision making and has changed the planning process in Bolivia[....]. Departmental (read Provincial, author) Agenda 21s, for example, were prepared through a series of hundreds of meetings and workshops at various regional and local levels. Majors, councilmen, prefects, NGOs, and donors were integrated into the decision-making process and in the development of monitoring guidelines. Capacity 21 played an integral role in the drafting and implementation of this law '(Bolivia 21, 1995). The influence of the international donors on the (micro)regional planning processes, guaranteeing the participation ofth e local population, can hardly be overestimated.

The other negotiations that have taken place during the planning process in Comanche, are between: - Thedifferen t indigenous communities of Comanche. - The Agrarian Syndicate of Comanche (through CODECO) and the NGOs SEMTA and SETAM. These negotiations were in practice probably very intertwined with those amongth e indigenous communities. - PROCADE and the Dutch GOM with the Team of International Consultants as third party. - PROCADE and SEMTA. - The Municipality and CODECO, with probably the Agrarian Syndicate of Comanche also participating.

Probably the only negotiations that took place through akin d of negotiation platform, are the first mentioned, those between the leaders of the 29 indigenous communities, leading to the formation of CODECO and the First Development Plan of Comanche, intertwined with the negotiations with theNGOs .

5.4.2 The outcome ofth e negotiations

The negotiations resulted inth e Municipal Development Plan of Comanche. The Plan consists of: - A programme to raise economic productivity with sub-programmes for agriculture, animal husbandry and post-harvest production. - A social programme with sub-programmes for health, education, housing and sanitation. - An environmental programme concerning activities inbot h the economic and the social programme.

Since the formulation and acceptance of the Plan, fund-raising has been the bottleneck for its implementation. About half of the plan (52%) would be executed with locally generated funds, but each activity also needed partly funds from outside the municipality. Until the end of 1995, SEMTA (partly through PROCADE) and SETAM were the only organizations which provided external funds. This meant that the projects executed were productivity improvement of the animal husbandry, and improvement ofth e natural pastures through their conservation and recuperation.

72 H SC-DLO Report 164• 1998 Although the Municipality accepted the plan as part of the Municipal Plan, at the end of 1995 none of the activities had been financed through the Municipality. The Municipality still had no meansavailabl e for executing their part ofth e plan.

5.4.3 Mediation

In all documents commenting on the experience of micro-regional planning in Comanche the role of SEMTA is considered crucial to the whole process. Nevertheless the exact nature ofthei r role is not explained. Thus it is not possible to comment on their role as mediators between the different indigenous communities, between the Agrarian Syndicates at Provincial and Municipal level and between CODECO and the Municipality.

5.5 Information as input in the negotiations

Two different negotiation processes must be distinguished. Those between the Government and the international donor community leading to the Law on Popular Participation, and those between the indigenous communities and the NGOs leading to the execution of concrete projects (recuperation of natural pastures and the development of animal husbandry). Between those two negotiation processes there are similarities and differences. The similarity lies in the confrontation of western scientific concepts of structuring society with Andean traditional concepts. The differences lie in the way of approaching those essentially different concepts: with respect orwit h neglect.

It took the government until 1994, when it issued the LPP, to fully recognize the indigenous communities as partners in developing the highland rural areas, while at the otherhan d some features ofcommunit y organization probably have been essential for surviving in such a harsh environment and for maintaining the existing land use systems. In the first section ofthi s chapter the local way of labour organization, land allocation and access to land was explained. With the LPP the Government for the first time recognized these communities as Territorial Base Organizations, and gave them certain rights as community.

The approach of the NGO SEMTA to the problem of the not easily understood traditional organization of communal society, has been essentially different. SEMTA almost from its start onwards initiated a series of studies of the different aspects of communal society in Comanche, and through those studies SEMTA developed ideas on how to improve the existing land use systems by making use of the different aspects of social organization of society. The reciprocal way of labour organization Ayni became a very important instrument in the SEMTA-project 'Recuperation of Natural Pastures '(SEMTA, 1995). Consequently SEMTA was working with the land users and not necessarily the land owners. This respect of the Andean organization of communal society probably ison eo fth e main factors for success ofSEMTA .

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 O 73 One can not argue that the consecutive governments or other institutions, including many international donors, did not know about ayni. faena, aynoca,waqui, etc.:th e importance of those concepts was already known for a long time. But there is a difference between having accesst oth e information and approaching that information with respect, even if it does notcoincid e with the prevailing ideasan d knowledge.

5.6 Conclusions

The process described in this case has made the following achievement. The interests of peasant communities, as formulated in their agro-economic strategy, were recognized for the first time byth e urban-biased provincial and local administration. This greatly reduced the prevailing antagonistic sentiments.

Mainfactors for success One thing that proved to be of particular importance in this case, was the political shift at national level during the 1980's. The democratization of the Bolivian society eventually led to the decentralization of power and competences to the local governments.Althoug h in monetary terms the governments inth e nineties did not pay more attention to the highland areas then before, the democratization and decentralization processes had the effect that NGO's and peasant organisations were forced to stop seeing the government and politicians as the opposition. They were forced to define concrete solutions in a constructive way. This proved decisive in developing the Micro regional planning methodology.

One interesting characteristic about the process described in this case, is that the actual government involvement (irrespective of the level of government) has been very limited. It could be argued that the only contribution from the central government has been to adopt the Micro regional planning methodology developed by the NGOs, and that the local government in the case of Comanchejus t took over the plan developed by the peasant organisation for their own municipal plan. So the government at different levelsjus t took advantage of the work of the NGO's and the peasant organisations. Nevertheless this action by the government proved very important, as it took away the feeling of being on opposite sides. It created the atmosphere for consensus building.

74 • SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 6 Integrated catchment management in the Murray-Darling Basin (Australia)

6.1 Introduction to the area and background of the project

The Murray-Darling basin is the biggest water catchment of Australia and it comprises an important proportion of all agricultural land. Its management involves four different states: New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Queensland, and is therefore also of federal (the Commonwealth Government) importance. See Figure 7.

State boundary Regulated river Unregulated river Boorowa catchment

look m

Figure 7Boorowa Catchment within Murray-Darling Basin

Between one third and half of Australia's agricultural output is produced in the Murray-Darling Basin. Agriculture is of major importance to the economy of Australia: The agricultural sector provides 25%o f the BNP of Australia and of 25- 35% of all exports (Allwright, 1992).Th e above figures emphasize the importance of thiswate r catchment areat o theAustralia n economy.

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998 O 75 Within the Commonwealth economic long-term strategy agriculture remains an important economic sector, which Australia sees as one of its major export opportunities. Due to high labor costs but easily accessible agricultural high- technology, the sector enables the production of primary bulk goods (Vanclay, 1994: 48), primarily for the East-Asian market.

But agriculture is in crisis. Partly because of changing economic policies of the Commonwealth Government (less protection of domestic production, less subsidies for intensification of agricultural production), partly because of worsening production circumstances due to land degradation leading to higher production costs and/or lower productivity. Farm income is under enormous pressure:th etypica l wheat-sheep farms of Australia had ayearl y income of less than US$2000 in 1991-1992 (Vanclay, 1994:45 ) as compared to a minimum wage of about US$6000 per year. Two third of the country is used for agriculture, while only 10%o f all soils are regarded as having deep, arable soil. Apart from those 10% good arable soils, the soils are shallow, unstable and of low fertility. This is also reflected in the size of the farms. Property sizes (not including horticulture) range from 200 to 2000 hectares in generally reliable rainfall areas, up to 60 000 hectares in more marginal areas, and from 650 to 1300 0 square kilometers inwha t iscalle d the outback (Allwright, 1992).

As a result of the above mentioned problems and trends, agriculture in the Murray- Darling Basin is changing. Some of the consequences such as a gradual increase in economic scale, are taken for granted or even encouraged. Other consequences, such as lower productivity per hectare, are reason for worries to the economic policy makers. Productivity is falling primarily because of land degradation, what is also seen as one of the most important environmental problems in this huge catchment of floodplain rivers. It is caused by processes of water- and wind-erosion as well as by salination processes primarily because of rising groundwater tables in the dryland areas and inadequate water-management practices inth e irrigation areas.

In Figure 8 the chain of effects of land degradation is shown, highlighting also the main interests ofth e different stakeholders involved.

76 • SC-DLO Report 164• 1998 •Ecologicalproblem s

Landdegradatio n duet o salinationan derosio n Conservationists areao finteres t

-Landclearin gt o maintain farm production

Water pollutioni nriver Murray

Ruralareas : it becomes economicallydifficul t to Depopulation Farmerssel lfarm s Parto ffarm sbecom e maintainsocia lservice s of ruralarea s and movet o cities economically notviabl e atstandar dlevels .

Fig.8 Cause-effect chainof land degradation inAustralia.

Federal Murray Darling Basin Goverment Commission Community Advisory Council State State Catchment Goverment Management Committee

Regional Cathment Management Committee

Municipality

Community of Local Landcar e Common Concern Group

Local Industry

Local Environmental Local Farmers Organization Organization

Australian Conservation National Farmers Society Federation Figure9 Schematic overview ofthe important stakeholders andtheir mutual relations viz. the Murray- DarlingBasin and Boorowa Catchment inparticular

SC-DLO Report 164• 1998 • 77 6.2 Perception of the problems by the different stakeholders

The important stakeholders forthi s area are shown in Figure 9.

6.2.1 The Conservationists

The conservationists are worried about the ecological damage caused by land degradation, which is seen as one of the major issues. Their preoccupation for land degradation hasvariou s reasons: - Already in 1975 over 51% of Australia's agricultural land was identified as needing treatment (Toyne, 1989).Thi s is increasing every year. - Two-thirds of Australia's forests and woodlands have been cleared over the last 200 years (Toyne, 1989).A significan t part ofal l the forest, woodlands and other natural habitats isprivatel y owned land. Onthos e private estates, nowadays land- clearing is still going on affecting heavily the habitat of native plants and animals. - Degradation ofagricultura l land will lead farmers to clear new land. - The present trends in farming are directed at increasing the economic scale and the labor productivity. The type of agriculture corresponding with that trend is leading to an ongoing land degradation, because it is primarily concerned with short-term profits. Assisting farmers inthei r attempts to do something about land degradation is seen by the conservationists as a way of changing the economic rationale of the present way of farming. This change will eventually lead to an overall improvement ofth eenvironmenta l care of farms.

For the conservationists land degradation is one of the major indicators of the stress caused bymoder n agriculture onnativ e plant and animal populations.

6.2.2 The Commonwealth and State Governments

The Commonwealth and State Governments are preoccupied with land degradation primarily because itthreaten s one ofth e core economic activities ofAustrali a that has been the basis ofth e economic development ofth e country. As an indication: directly after the second World War, 80% of all exports came form agriculture (Vanclay 1994: 43). Agriculture still is considered of major importance to the present Australian economy, and will continue to be so,accordin g to the long-term economic strategies of the Commonwealth Government. Land degradation on the present scale is seen as a threat to the overall economy. The annual cost of lost production caused by land degradation is estimated to be approximately US$400 million (Brownhill, 1989;Toyne , 1989).

To the State, farmers are not only important economic producers but also the prime keepers of Australians nature. This last role is politically of growing importance: 'In political terms the environment has become an issue. For example,thirt y years ago it was unheard of for governments to win or lose an election over damming ariver , and

78O SC-DL ORepor t 164• 1998 yet that is what happened in Tasmania. At both state and federal level some seats have been fought almost entirely on environmental issues/ (Brownhill 1989).

Another cause of preoccupation for the Federal and State Governments is that the small rural towns are losing their economic viability in the sense that the per capita expenses on social services (schools, health care, etc.) are becoming too high to be politically justifiable towards the rest of society. Over the last decades, each year more farmers are selling their properties (and moving to the cities) because their farms are no longer viable. As a result the number of inhabitants of rural towns is ever-decreasing, government departments are regionalising their services to bigger centers, and all this is having negative consequences on non-agricultural enterprises inthes e areas (Stone, 1994:208) .

In the rationale of the governments, the downward spiral of decreasing population in the rural areas must be stopped in order to maintain a social base for life in the countryside, which in turn is essential for maintaining the production base of Australian agriculture.

6.2.3 The farmers

A third group of people affected by land degradation areth e farmers. More and more farmers are coming to a situation in which their farms are no longer economically viable. Reasons for the crisis on many farms are partly the economic policies of the different governments (less protective measures, less subsidy systems, less credit facilities), as well as land degradation. The latter is already recognized by farmers for many years, although the problem was considered of minor importance in the past decades. Research on the perception of land degradation problems among farmers (Vanclay, 1994)make sclea rtha t alarg e majority of farmers see land degradation asa serious problem, but in most cases affecting other farms rather than their own. Individual action seemst o be aproble m inman ycases .

Over the last few decades the political power of the farmers has changed along with their status in Australian society. In former days people looked upon farmers in the following way: 'they worked hard to produce 'essential' food and fiber for a growing nation. By the sweat of their brow and ingenuity they tamed the bush and turned the deserts gold with grain. The 'man on the land' battled flood, fire and plague, not only to feed and clothe the country but also to create national wealth through growing vital exports.' (Stone, 1994:204).

Because of this status the farmers controlled the agricultural policy agenda up to the 1970's. But as land degradation was starting to have its effect on agriculture, Australian society wasals o changing: 'Advocates emerged topromot e environment, alternative lifestyles, animal liberation, health and fitness, organic methods, occupational health and safety, trade unions, agribusiness and value-adding. Each vied for the attention of the media and the government, seeking to influence research priorities and the expenditure of the ever-

SC-DLO Report 164• 1998• 79 diminishing budgets of Departments of Agriculture. Farmers typically responded to those groups as implacable enemies' 'The farmers sense of powerlessness grew.' (Stone, 1994;206) .

6.2.4 The local authorities

A last group that is affected by land degradation are the local authorities. The problem of the decreasing rural population, as sketched above, is primarily their problem. Of the approximately 1200 Australian rural towns (population between 200 and 5000) 40% are experiencing population decline and associated economic decline (Bridge, 1992). First of all the local politicians and civil servants saw their power base was deteriorating as depopulation went on. Secondly, agriculture is the economic base of rural communities. Most people one way or the other are tied to agriculture, andthu sar e directly or indirectly affected by land degradation.

6.2.5 Overview ofth e perceptions of thepartie s involved

Table 4 gives a quick overview of the different perceptions concerning the situation in the Murray-Darling Basin. Onth e vertical axis the important stakeholders involved inth edevelopmen t process ofth e Basin are listed. Horizontally are recorded the main problems as argued by different stakeholders. In each square the main position of the stakeholder towardstha t problem is summarized.

Table 4 Stakeholder-problem perception matrix for the Murray-Darling Basin Problems —*• On-site pollution and Lowering Off-site pollution Depopulation degradation production levels (most important: ofrura l areas in agriculture water pollution) Stakeholders \. Conservationists This can notb e This can beturne d Iti s aproble m to Not ofthei r allowed anymore. intoa n instrument the ecologyo f direct concern Promotion oflan d care toconvinc e water isneede d aswel l as farmers ofth e stricter regulations needst o change Commonwealth and This isno t theirprim e Thisi sa threa t to Waterpollutio n is This mustb e State Governments concern, except in Australian threateningth e stopped places considered of economy and to health ofth e because high importance byth e thesocia l structure inhabitants ofth e maintaining electorate inth ecountryside . big citiesi n social services southern Australia becomes difficult. The farmers Not theirprim e Thisi sth e core Not theirprim e This makes life concern,bu t iti s problem:income - concern more difficult. recognized asa n levelshav e fallen Publican d important factor dramatically private services causing decreasing movet oth e pro-duction levels bigger city- centers. Theloca l authorities To some,th e This isth e causeo f This is aStat e This isth ecor e ecological damage is a therea l problem: affair problem: problem, toother sno t depopulation ofth e without enough rural areas people,th e rural townswil l disappear.

80 O SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998 6.3 Approach chosen for the management of the Murray Darling Basin

6.3.1 Agreement on land degradation as the central problem

The approach followed in the Murray Darling Basin is based on the analysis that all parties involved agree on the central problem (land degradation). This means that in this case there is no real conflict situation, and thus the main objective in structuring interactive planning was to guarantee community driven strategies and plans to battle land degradation. The responsibility of the different government institutions lied in creatingth e conditions for local action.

There was a growing concern about the declining quality of the natural and cultural environment of the Murray-Darling Basin, with negative effects on the economy, the drinking water of Adelaide and the wild fauna and flora. In order to deal with the Basin's problems in a coordinated way Commonwealth and State Ministers came together inNovembe r 1985t o set up the 'Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council'. This Council comprises Ministers representing land, water and environment matters for the States of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and the Commonwealth (Junor, 1989). Each government has the power of veto over particular programs and projects. This power is very rarely used. Occasionally, independent arbitration is used to break through an impasse in decision making (Normanetal., 1996).

In 1987th e Council installed aworkin g group of specialists of all four states with the main task to develop an integrated management strategy for the Basin. After the working group came up with a first draft of the management plan in 1988, the Council installed the 'Murray-Darling Basin Commission' for its further development and implementation. The Commission works with State and Commonwealth government agencies and with community groups to coordinate and accelerate efforts in land, water and environmental management within the Basin. Priority is given to issues where cooperative action between Basin governments and the community is required, orwher e actions inon e State mayaffec t other partso fth e Basin.

In 1986 the 'Community Advisory Council' (CAC) was established to 'provide a direct avenue of communication between the Basin community and the Ministerial Council' (Landcare, 1996). The CAC enables community participation in natural resource management issues in the Basin. It includes representatives from catchment groups, local government and industry organizations and provides the Ministerial Council with community views on Basin issues.

In the box below the personal history of the current chairman of the CAC, Mr. Clive Thomas, istake n from the Australian Journal of Soil and Water Conservation (Vol. 9 no 2, May 1996). This gives the reader an idea of the close relationships between state government, local government and non-governmental organizations.

SC-DLO Report 164 • 1998O 81 Murray-Darling Advisory Group gets new chairman The peak community advisory group to the MDB Ministerial Council, The Community Advisory Committee (CAC), has a new chairman. He is Mr. Clive Thomas, a wool and grain producer from Forbes in Central Western New South Wales. He is the fourth person to hold the position since the CAC was established in 1986. Membership of the CAC is made up from 21 regional representatives and four special interest groups. Announcing the latest appointment, the Chairman of the Ministerial Council said Mr. Thomas has represented the Lachlan Catchment on the CAC from 1992 to 1994 and had a strong background in natural resource management. He became involved in natural resource management through his membership of the Lachlan River Advisory Committee, and the Shires and Local Government Water and Resources Committee. He has been on the Board of Greening Australia6 and the National Land care Advisory Committee7.

In 1989 the MDB Commission formulated the Natural Resource Management Strategy (NRMS). The main principles of the NRMS for the Murray-Darling Basin are(Junor, 1989): - Sustainable management, meaning: . conservative use ofth e soil, . ecological diversity should be maintained, . all activities require an environmental impact assessment and a system of monitoring byth e landowners, . monitoring of environmental changes. - Social and economic equity: meaning that access to the natural resources should be guaranteed for all social groups as well as for future generations. Cost of implementation should be paid by the beneficiaries or according to the polluter/user-pay principle. - Economic efficiency - Performance evaluation: administrative control onth e programs - Community involvement concerning consultation as well as implementation and shared responsibility.

6.3.2 Specific programs

Several existing federal programs were concerned with the same problems as addressed in the NRMS, including the Community Land care Component, the Save the Bush Program and the One Billion Trees Program. Those programs were incorporated in the strategy while each State defined its own Integrated Catchment Management Program.

From 1992-1993 onwards the MDB Commission defined the 'One Stop Shop' principle.Thi sarrangemen t was introduced to make iteasie r for community groups to apply for assistance. One standard application form for all programs was introduced, and all programs managed the same time lines for submission etc. Within the NRMS it is defined that community groups can apply for funding of resource management projects within the Basin. Approximately 60%o fth e funds under theNRM S program are to be made available to the communities for their action plans (Gibson, 1990).

6 GreeningAustrali a isa nenvironmenta lNGO . 7 Hewa sappointe d byth eGovernmen t toth eNationa l Land careAdvisor yCommittee .

82• SC-DLO Report 164• 1998 This is mainly done via the Land care programme. Under the NRMS it is stated that farmers or others with an interest in participating in the NRMS, first have to form a 'Community of Common Concern' (CCC).

The CCC (like a land care group) has to develop an integrated 'Action Plan', which can be submitted to the State Catchment Management Committee. If accepted for funding, the CCC can appoint a government-funded coordinator to assist the CCC and liaise with the different government agencies involved. In the Action Plan submitted to the government for funding, the CCC has to make clear in what way (funds, labor, kind) the CCC will collaborate to solve the identified problems. In many cases this means that communities also seek to raise funds from private businesses, asth e grants to be made available will often have to be matched by equal contributions by the community (Gibson, 1990), although all private investments in land conservation are tax-deductible. Rick Farley, executive director of the National Farmers Federation comments: 'We need more effective incentives: the existing tax deductions simply don't have all that much relevance when farmers don't have taxable incomes' (Landcare, 1994).

Within the framework of the NRMS the different states and the federal government commit themselves onth e funds to be made available for implementing the catchment management. From that point on, each state defines the exact conditions and more detailed strategies ofprogram s and funding. New South Wales for instance has set up a structure, shown inFigur e 10.

Federal Sources of Funding N.S.W.-State Implementation Structure

StateCatchmen t Management Coordinating Committee -Natural SoilConservatio n Program (=Land care program) -One Billion Trees program Regional Catchment Coordinating and Management Committee decisiontaking body -Saveth e Bush program -NRMS Landcare groups and Implementing departments agencies

Figure10 Responsibilitiesfor catchmentmanagement inNew South Wales

The State Catchment Management Coordinating Committee consists of only state- officials. This committee is merely the formal link between grassroots implementing agencies and the government political system. In NSW it has installed Regional Catchment Management Committees for the more important tributary rivers in the State.

In the regional committees the majority of the members has to consist of farmers and other landholders/users to guarantee the link with practical work experience in natural resource management. Via advertisements people (farmers, landholders, land users

SC-DLO Report 164• 1998• 83 and others with an environmental interest) were sought to participate in the regional committees.Th e main roleso fth e regional committees are: - promote total catchment management policies, - advise on and coordinate the natural resource management activities of authorities, groups and individuals, - coordinate thepreparatio n ofprogram s for funding, - provide a forum for resolving natural resource conflicts and issues (Gibson 1990).

Through the Regional Catchment Management Committees and the local Landcare groups, the actual land users can exercise direct influence on land use planning activities and the allocation of federal and state funds made available to battle land degradation.

6.3.3 Landcare as the community based approach within the NRMS framework

The Australian Government has realised that natural resource management on privately owned land can best be done by involving the landowners and users. This idea is the basis for the Landcare program as it started formally in 1989. Because of the important role Landcare plays in the Murray-Darling Management, the Landcare program shall beconsidere d inthi s section.

Landcare is described by one of itsmos t important advocates, as a 'community-based approach to the development of more sustainable ways of using the land' (Campbell, 1994). Initially it was a tripartite agreement between the Federal government, the National Farmers Federation (the leading farmers organisation) and the Australian Conservation Foundation (the leading nature conservation organisation). Federal government made considerable funds available for the programme. Upon its start, it immediately gained momentum. Farmers from all regions responded by establishing groups, and within a few years one quarter of all farmers participated in Landcare (Campbell, 1994).

Inth e Murray-Darling Basin initiative a large share of all funds directed at local level activities ischannelle d through the Landcare programme. This is one ofth e signs that Landcare hasbecom e politically important.

The ideao fth e Landcare programme istha t local people willing totackl e the problem of land degradation sit together and form a group, choose a chairman, decide on the strategy to follow, as well as to involve other groups in the community, and to actively do something about the identified problems. The group also decides on the (government) assistance it needs. Then, applications for funds and other forms of assistance are done,an d the plansar e implemented.

One important characteristic for the Landcare programme is that within 'thi s framework, individual farmers can not apply for funding. 'With National Soil Conservation Programme (NSCP) funds the Federal and State governments go to

84 a SC-DLO Report 164 D 1998 considerable lengths to avoid any individual pecuniary gains from fund disbursement. Only through well-developed group activity can farmers ensure that they access NSCP support. Farmers do this through both Landcare groups and at government level through their representative organisations. Farmer organisations play atwi n role in Landcare, brokering information necessary for the development of appropriate and workable policies and political promotion of program objectives of most use to farmers.' (Eliason, 1995). So in the government strategy collective community based action isessential .

In 1994 some 2000 Landcare groups were active all over the country, with a great diversity in composition, activities and (financial) assistance. By the government 'Landcare committees are encouraged to form with at least 60% of their members being primary producers inth e area.' (Begbie, 1989).

One of the interesting features of Landcare is that the success does not depend on government funding. Various groups decided not to depend on government funding and in cases where external funds were needed, they sought for private funds and found them. Landcare has become such an issue that local and national industry became interested in sponsoring Landcare groups, while other people took the initiative to establish foundations aimed specially at fundraising for Landcare: 'A new foundation has been established to raise A$10 million to fund Landcare projects to help save Australia's land and water. The initiative - The Landcare Australia Foundation - will be spearheaded by top businessman, yachtsman and Olympian, SirJame s Hardy.' (Landcare, 1994).

Partly this feature isals o a critique onth e conditions of the government funding, such asth e fact that funding isonl y for one year atth etime . When agrou pha s developed a plan for the coming 5years , each year a new application has to be made, and there is no guarantee that funds will be made available the following years. This means a threat toth e continuation ofth e group efforts.

Another feature of the Landcare programme and other government programmes aimed at community-based land and nature conservation, is their concentration on voluntarily undertaken actions. Farmers will not be forced to adopt certain measures in order to guarantee a certain degree of land and nature conservation. According to Philip Toyne, former director of the Australian Conservation Foundation and co- initiator of the Landcare programme: 'Landcare must face up to some difficult questions, such as the need for legislated regulations to ensure sustainable management and protection ofnativ e vegetation.' (Landcare, 1994) .

To get an idea of the functioning of the above mentioned programmes at local level, the case ofth e Boorowa River Catchment shall be presented.

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998O 85 6.3.4 Landcare in the Boorowa River Catchment (taken from: Hayman , 1996)

The Boorowa River Catchment covers 167 000 hectares on the south west slopes of New South Wales (NSW). Its main environmental problem is dryland salinity, which is causing also other problems (tree decline, water quality problems). In order to tackle those problems, the Boorowa Community Landcare Group was formed in 1989.

In the first years, activities ofth e group were mainly directed at getting known in the area. School visits were made aswel l astalk s to community groups. In 1992 a project officer was employed with NSW Salt Action funds (= a special programme established byth e state government ofNSW )t o make a salinity map on the properties ofth e group members. With abrea k in 1993,thi s work was continued in 1994an d 95 through funding byth e same programme.

The salinity mapping played a major role in the awareness-raising among the community members. The Landcare group-members actively participated in the mapping exercise, and with that knowledge they held talks at schools and other community places, while open community meetings were organised to discuss the problem of soil salinity and what to doabou t it.

In 1993th e Landcare group successfully applied to the Murray-Darling Basin NRMS for funds to implement soil-conservation works. In 1994 the application for funding the continuation ofth e same activities was approved again, while 2othe r components (pasture and tree-planting programmes) were funded on a 3-year base under the condition that each landholder payed half to two-third of the costs. Furthermore an investigation project, co-funded by the farmers and the Landcare programme, started, aimed at practical solutions for the salinity problem. The University of Sydney is involved for monitoring of the trials. Schools, with assistance of the Local Council and the Landcare group, started tree-planting projects, while the Landcare group itself succeeded in finding private sponsorship to purchase adirect-tree-seede r machine.

The Landcare group has put a lot of emphasis on monitoring all the works done and sharing the knowledge gained through the implemented projects. Each farmer reports to the group on all the works done on his/her property and the group compiles all information into agrou pprojec t report.

Within the Boorowa catchment five other Landcare groups were formed throughout the years.I n 1995,th eBoorow a Regional Catchment Committee (BRCC) was formed as an umbrella organisation aimed at learning from each other and coordinating the works through better communication. The first action of the BRCC was to commission the NSW Department of Land and Water Conservation to make a cost- benefit evaluation over a 50 years time span of the Landcare activities undertaken so far. This economic evaluation helped to re-design certain activities in order to be more cost-effective.

86 O SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 6.4 Negotiations

In this whole planning process at least two negotiating platforms can be distinguished. The first is the Regional Catchment Management Committee. This committee advises on and coordinates the natural resource management activities of authorities and local groups while it is also involved in the decision taking process about the funding of programs. At the same time, it provides a forum for resolving natural resource conflicts and issues (Gibson, 1990). This implies that negotiating processes are a basic part of the functioning of these Committees. Unfortunately no information wasfoun d onthos e negotiating processes.

The second negotiating platform isth e Landcare group itself. Within this group local people with different backgrounds (big and small farmers, teachers, environmentalists, etc.) sit together to plan the future of their community. Part of this planning process is deciding for what kind of activities and on whose land additional funding will be sought, while for virtually all funds the community has to put in half by its own means. It will be clear that negotiation processes also on this level are a basic part ofth e functioning ofth egroups .

Groups often seek cooperation with the local authorities in anearl y stage ofth e whole planning process. This cooperation not only strengthens their planst o change the land use in their community, but also serves a financial goal. If the local authority is willing to raise the community fund for Landcare,th e amount the Landcare groupca n apply for at regional or state level is equally higher (because at those levels the amount put in by the community is doubled). Therefore it can be concluded that at local level different negotiations take part: within the initiating group, and between the group andth e local authority.

The way the negotiations are given shape probably differ from community to community, as one of the characteristics of programs like Landcare is the almost complete absence of regulations about the formation and functioning of the local groups.

6.5 Information as input in the negotiations

Theplan spu t forward toth e Regional Catchment Management Committee are locally made, in the first instance by the Landcare groups or Catchment Committee and secondly with an additional input from the local authorities. As a result, the plans are made using locally gathered and shared information. In most cases, probably, this information will beunderstoo d byalmos t allpeopl e involved.

What might be an interesting issue, although no information could be found about it, ist o knowth e characteristics ofth e plans put forward to the Regional Committees,o f which funding was approved, as compared with plans for which funding was denied by the Committee. Reviewing the Australian Journal of Soil and Water Conservation from 1988 until 1996 gives the impression that within the Landcare programme emphasis is put on the scientific knowledge system. In different articles the use of

SC-DLO Report 164 • 1998O 87 computerised GIS-models at farm or community level is promoted, while in other articles about Landcare, among others written by leaders of the National Farmers' Federation (Allwright, 1992), 'whole farm planning' is promoted as being essential. This is based on aerial photographs and land-evaluation techniques. Allwright (1992) clearly takes position in the discussion about what kind of knowledge is needed: 'Knowledge systems having a two-way flow between growers and scientists or researchers, not to mention technicians and others, are vital. Once farmers have a more solid knowledge base and motivation to promote change then a strong dynamic exists upon which to develop a really effective program addressing production and environmental issues.'

What about farmers who do not understand the scientific knowledge and have their own ideasabou t 'good' farming? Dothe y participate in Landcare groups? Inth e context ofthi s study itwa sno t possiblet oanswe rthi s question.

6.6 Conclusions: meeting at the meso-level

The process described inthi s case has made the following achievement. Mechanisms were developed and implemented to make it in the farmers' immediate economic interest to undertake various measures against land degradation.

Top-down We have seen that the Federal and State governments have taken measures and created structures in order to stimulate community-based action directed at solving the overall problem of land degradation. Financial incentives are put forward on abi g scale to the local communities, technical assistance is made available on demand by the local communities, and the local people are invited to participate in various advisory boards like the Community Advisory Council at the Murray-Darling Basin level.

In the case of New South Wales the coordinating and decision taking body on issues related the MDB management, is the Regional Catchment Management Committee, in which more than half of the members are landowners. They are invited to participate through advertisements inth e newspapers.

Furthermore we have seen that the different governments influence the direction of the programmes via financial regulations, such as in the case of the funding of activities of the Boorowa Landcare group. Here, it was rule that at least half of the funds had to be put in by the landowners themselves, which could include in-kind contributions.

The conclusion is that although the ultimate control stays in the hands of the federal and state politicians and their institutions, concrete decisions about actions to be stimulated at community or catchment level are delegated to bodies consisting of people directly involved with the problems at grass-root level.

88 O SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 Bottom-up We have seen that, because of the possibilities offered by the government programmes, interested people at the community level form groups in order to undertake all kinds of action. In the case of the Boorowa Landcare group, the group took the initiative to get involved with different kind of institutions, such as the University of Sydney, the Department of Land and Water Conservation, the Salt Action programme and, through the MDB-NRMS, with the Landcare programme and pasture-an d tree-planting programmes.

Furthermore, at the community level, the initiative was taken to form the Boorowa Regional Catchment Committee, coinciding with the initiative of the Government of NSWt ofor m Regional Catchment Management Committees.

Amongth e national leaders ofth e farmers' organisations the feeling ofpossessin g the Landcare program has grown. At the 1991 Conference ofth e International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP), the vice-president of IFAP, also one of the leaders of the National Fanners' Federation (NFF), presented Landcare as a 'production oriented self help program, what runs parallel with IFAP's own preference for environment programs to be driven by farmers themselves' (Allwright, 1992).

Sharedcontrol What becomes clear is that at all levels in the Australian society a commitment has grown to tackle the problem of land degradation. Different initiatives were taken by various stakeholders, and all those initiatives have ledt oa ver y diverse overall picture of the activities undertaken and the structures with their regulations set up to stimulate action.

Control of all that ishappenin g lies inth e hands of different stakeholders. The federal and state politicians finally control the expenditures of the different funding programmes (Landcare, NRMS, Salt Action, One Billion Trees, etc.). But Landcare has become a real political issue. More than a quarter of all rural inhabitants of Australia are participating one way or the other in Landcare, and therefore public interest is high. This gives different non-political groups the possibility of social control on the government programmes. So states Eliason (1995) that the farmers' organisations actively intend to control the expenditures of the Federal Landcare funds by the state governments, in order to avoid that the latter use those funds to finance their personnel. To again quote Allwright (1992): 'Grower representatives want to keep Landcare focussed and ensure that funds actually reach farmers. One of the main tasks is to prevent government agencies funding themselves at the expense of farmers. In September, the NFF and Australia's peak green organisation, the Australian Conservation Foundation, proposed the restructuring of government programs involving Landcare and protection of habitat. We sought bureaucratic simplicity and active involvement offanner s in funding decisions. We'll get it'.

Also, the Australian Conservation Foundation is actively monitoring the activities undertaken within the framework of Landcare. Because environmental degradation in the rural areas has become such a political issue, organisations like this can influence these programmes through monitoring and participating inth e debates.

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998O 89 7 Rural developments in the Western part of the Sous-préfecture of OUESSE (Benin)

7.1 Introduction to the area

The Sous-prefecture of Ouessè is located in the North of the Département Zou, in the central part of Benin (Figure 11). It has a total area of 3200 km2 with apopulatio n of 52 000 inhabitants. The dominant ethnic groups are Mahi (53%) and Nago (47%) people respectively distributed in the Western and Eastern parts of the Sous-prefecture of Ouessè. This region is a savannah ecozone. The climate of the area varies between 'soudanien' and subtropical types. Ouessè is divided in many watersheds because of the presence of several seasonal rivers flowing through a diverse landscape. The rivers are covered bydegrade d gallery forests.

This case concerns the area traditionally occupied by Mahi farmers living in the Western part of the 'Sous-préfecture' of Ouessè. Among the native-Mahi there live a lot of migrants (approximately 23%o f the population of this region). The migrants (Fon, Adja and Berba ethnic groups) have moved from the northern and southern part of Benin to Ouessè. Although some of the migrant families are living there already for several generations,the y don't haveth e same rights asth e native families.

The Western part of Ouessè is a highly remote area, there is no telephone connection. Ouessè is among the remote Sous-prefecture where 'Radio Rurale' was set up for experimentation. The two roads connecting this area to the main road which links Benin andNiger , are sometimes not accessible duringth e rainy season.

Thursday is market day in Ouessè, and several trucks arrive for the transportation of the agricultural products (for example maize, groundnut, gari). The main activity is agriculture (men and women are involved), and Mahi farmers make a lot of money from it.Buyin gcar s for taxi,picku p and trucks isth e most important investment.

In 1994th e Cfa (=local currency) was devaluated by 50%. Imported goods became very expensive, for instance the price of agricultural inputs (fertilizers, pesticides) has doubled.

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998O 91 _y*^v "H (^ r^r^ " V\ \\ Wtt/W V //' ^>^ ^' Malanville "\ BENINVTT TT" l' \ \ \) B°*c \ û\s 's \ V Viy i' ƒ f i BENIN \ / 1 ^—> 1 i v s \ Kalalé /"^* •. Natitingou; \ • v.. 1 ^.s * Nikki ) • j y' j .'•> /

J / y Parakou / . • ( | \ i r \ \s \ \ / ni TOGO -S f-^\^ ) Ouessèi'l 0 ! ' ^ i • 9 NIGERIA '\\ |o il \ c \w jilj | zou i !\ | \ Abomey )\ l \ • 1 \ \ \s io / •'Vw C i International \ % r*. l\ S'. boundary m ) \ m ' +* !( Provincial \Lokossa, O 0> i boundary \ «s, y m i Pnrfn-Nnun 1 Cotonou^l Ouessè " 0 50k m 1 i

Figure 11 Ouessè

Mahi farmers practise shifting cultivation with no input like fertilizers. The consequence is the degradation ofth e agro-ecological environment through continuous land clearing, becoming worse with the growing population pressure. Space occupation follows a traditional Mahi-rule around twobasi c concepts: 'Ghetto' and 'Agbovê\ 'Gbého' isa recent fallow or a farming area abandoned by Mahi fanners. 'Agbovê' is a very old

92 O SC-DLO Report 164• 1998 fallow which holds fertile lands, and is mostly faraway from the villages. The appropriation of the 'Agbovê' is based on the respect of 'Houinnou' which means the 'front of the furrows'. The land occupation pattern of the Mahi farmers follows the direction of 'Houinnou'. When aMah i farmer orients hisHouinnou i non e direction, he is the owner of all the space ahead of his 'Houinnou'' until he meets with an obstacle likea river, ahil l etc.Th e consequences of such practices istha t the savannah area ismor e and more degraded with their cultivation practices through land clearing.

The farm plots in the 'Agbovë are very far from the village (sometimes 15 km). Mahi farmers construct small houses and live there during the cultivation periods. This always present opportunity of 'Agbovê' creates a way of life which has as consequence the loss of 'community sense' among Mahi farmers: Although the native Mahi-farmers are rich (some own up to 8trucks) , they could not take collective action to solve infrastructural problems inthei r village, like for instance the building ofa small bridge.

In 1990 the democratization process started in Benin with the 'Conférence Nationale'. The 'Marxist regime', which had been in power for 17 years, was abandoned and the Beninese chose a 'Liberal regime' and a multiparty system. A lot of private initiatives like NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) emerged. During the same period, the environmental consciousness of the political authorities was growing (MEHU, n.d.).A n environmental plan (PAE = Pland'Action Environnementale) was developed in 1991b y a national committee set up byth e government of the new political system. The Ministry of Environment was created in 1992 and one of its main tasks concerns the implementation ofth e PAE.

At national level, under the influence of the PAE, the PGRN (Projet de Gestiondes Ressources Naturelles),a natural resource management project, was created. The PGRN is supported byth e World Bank, the CFD (Caisse Française deDéveloppement - French Development Fund) and the GTZ (German International Development Organization). The PGRN is formally part of the Directorate of Forests and Natural Resources DFRN (Direction desForêts et Ressources Naturelles),bu t has a high level of autonomy for the implementation ofth e project.

The implementation of the PGRN has started in 1992. Ouessè was targeted as one ofth e sites of intervention. In the case of Ouessè the donor involved was the CFD and under their influence, PGRN for the first time in the history of Benin, signed a contract with a local NGO (GERAM) by which GERAM (Grouped'Expertise et d'Ingénierie Rurales pour l'Auto-promotion du Mondepaysan) became the main executor of the project in Ouessè. It was the first time that a local NGO became the main contractor, because intervention for rural development until then was in the hand of the CARDER(Centre dAction Régionalepour le Développement Rural), the only extension organization during the 'Marxist regime'. CARDER is still functioning inOuessè .

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998O 93 7.2 Perception of the problems by different stakeholders

Mahi people live in their own agro-ecological environment, and cope with the uncertainties caused by it for many generations.Thei r problems are multidimensional and embedded into the socio-economic development. A diagnosis of Ouessè revealed a phenomenon of continuous environmental degradation (through land clearing, tree cutting, firewood collection etc.).I n key words,th e problem can be described interm s of 'decreasing productive capacity of agro-sylvo-pastoral ecosystems' and increasing insecurity over land holdings.

When the Directorate of Forest and Natural Resources (DFRN) and the CFD decided to start a local PGRN-project in Ouessè, the different interactions between consultants and development professionals on the one hand and the Mahi people on the other side, provided the Mahi with the opportunity to put forward the problems as they perceived them. Several of these neither fitted the agenda of the project initiator DFRN, nor coincided with the immediate interest of donors like CFD which paid more attention to emergent issue such as the decentralization process in Benin. This difference in interest meantth e beginning of a new process, initiated byGERAM .

The desire of the PGRN to intervene in Ouessè and the different interests emerging, draws attention to several categories of stakeholders (see Figure 12). Success of the interventions can be expected if those stakeholders share common problems and perspectives to solve them, or if the stakeholders can reach an effective compromise about the actions to be undertaken. This raises inevitably the need to 'make visible' the perception ofal l the stakeholders at different levels of social aggregation: as well as from the intervening parties form outside (ministries, donors, ministries' department, project staff, extension organization,NGO) ,a s from the Mahi people and their organizations (the King of Mahi people and UDESCO, adevelopmen t association).

94 O SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 Ministry of Ministry of Environment Rural Development

: 3 iS. DFRN GTZ Directorate of Forest German Development and Natural Resources Organization

PGRN World Bank Natural Resource Management Project

CFD French Development Fund

INRAB GERAM National Institute for Agriculture Development

UIGREN UDESCO Union of Villages Union for the Social CARDER for Management and Econ.Dev . of Ouesse of NaturalRes .

Migrant Farmers (Fon,Adja , Berba,Fulbe )

Figure12 Schematic overview ofthe important stakeholders andtheir mutualrelations viz. Ouessè

7.2.1 The problem as seen by the Ministries

The Ministries of Environment and Rural Development are directly (or indirectly) concerned about the problems which evolve inth e context ofMah i people in Ouessè.Th e former holds the PAE which defines the policies and institutional framework of environmental problem resolution. The latter has mandate in the PAE for intervening to solve rural people's problems and enhancing sustainable development and poverty alleviation.

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998O 95 7.2.2 The problem as seen by the initiators (DFRN/PGRN) and the CFD

It is important to notice that the World Bank has played an important role (more than 60% of funding) for the emergence of the overall project PGRN. This case concerns the local PGRN-site in the region of Ouessè. The DFRN/PGRN and the CFD were the initiators of the local project in Ouessè, called: 'gestion rationnelle des ressources naturelles' (managing sustainably natural resources), with a special focus on watershed management.

TheDFRN/PGRN The main concern of the DFRN, a department of the Ministry of Rural Development, is the PGRN project. The ultimate aim of PGRM is to invert in Ouessè the trend of land degradation, which leads to a decreasing productivity capacity of agro-sylvo-pastoral ecosystems (Djohossou, 1993). In order to reach that goal the local population would have to change their traditional way of farming and of land-occupation. Therefore a participatory strategy was deemed necesarry. Following this principle, the general intervention objective was formulated: to support village communities for the sustainable management of natural resources in order to reinforce their capacity to master their own development. Amongth e specific objectives one can notice the following aspects: - engage local population in learning processes so that they are able to identify evolving resource management problems; - support agro-sylvo-pastoral sustainable management activities (soil and water conservation, tree planting, rangeland management, securing landtenure) .

TheCFD Since the beginning of the eighties the CFD was promoting the francophone approach to natural resource management called the 'Gestion des Terroirs' in Sahelian countries (e.g., Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal). The 'Gestion des Terroirs' approach is meant to stimulate the transfer of control over the management and use of the natural resources from the government structures to local people (Toulmin, 1993). This approach is being operationalised bydefinin g three inter-related systems: - the technical system, related to the physical environment; for example: soil erosion control, forest-management, etc.; - the socio-economic system, related to the organizational structures within which people live and organize their livelihoods, such as social structures at the household and community levels, mechanisms for the allocation of power between people and groups, incentives for improving the management of natural resources, and the return gained from investment innatura l resources; - the legal system and its administration, which determines the rights of access to land by different social groups, and the means by which these rights are enforced in practice.

96• SC-DLORepor t 164O 199 8 Following the Gestion des Terroirs approach, decentralization and the transfer of competences to Mahi people for mastering the evolution of property rights and landholding security was important for theCFD .

7.2.3 The problem as seen by the CARDER and the GERAM team

The CARDER As the main government centre for extension and rural development, the problem of natural resource degradation is of big importance for the CARDER. The CARDER still maintains its own structure in Ouessè. It has appointed a development officer (RDR = Responsable du Développement Rural), and has appointed the necesarry logistical backing toth e RDR. Then why could the new project not be their main concern since the CARDER is the main Rural Development Centre of the Government? It was thought impossible to develop a new participatory approach under the responsability of CARDER, because of its known top-down approach throughout its existence and the tendency to focus mainly oncotto n production by farmers (Dangbégnon, 1994).

In relation to the PGRN-project in Ouessè, CARDER is a non-active stakeholder. It merely intends to follow its own plans, but it is also following with much interest the process ofth e PGRN-project, born merely out ofa struggle for survival atnationa l level.

TheGERAM team The position of the GERAM as contractor of the PGRN is strategically important. As it was the first time in Benin that a NGO was made responsible for the execution of a government programme, a failure in implementing the project in Ouessè could have a negative impact on the potential role and capacity of the NGOs in general for promoting grass-roots development.

The main problem in the perception of the GERAM-team was the environmental degradation because of the Agbovê system. As described above (Section 7.1), native Mahi farmers always have the opportunity to clear more land in the 'Agbovê', faraway from their villages. This certainly would affect any intervention effort towards the improvement of land management to halt severe soil erosion problem. The problem was then seen by the GERAM team in terms of either the Mahi farmers would participate in project activities (such as tree planting, erosion control innovation such as gullies, contour cultivation, reaction to soil fertility decline)t o improve degraded watersheds near their villages, orthe y would continue to move furtheron to clear new lands for cultivation with relatively good yields without any external input (e.g., fertilizers), but jeopardizing the possibilities for future generations.

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998 O 97 7.2.4 The problem as seen by the local organizations

TheKing ofOuessè After the shift in the political system in 1990, most of the local kingdoms which had disappeared during the Marxist period (1972-1989) regained their authority. The Mahi people in the Sous-Prefecture of Ouessè are governed by the King of Ouessè. Traditionally the role of the King is centered around solving big conflicts and maintaining peace. The role of the King in development processes vis-à-vis the local government bureaucrats is not clearly defined, less so in the process of decentralization of certain responsibilities from central government administrations to the local level. Nevertheless, as explained by key informants, the King is always consulted by local government professionals and politicians. What is important for the King is to support different projects which can bring prosperity and peace among the Mahi people in Ouessè.Accordin g toth e King, the most important issue is: 'safeguard the patrimony and bring wealth inth e region'.

UDESCO The UDESCO {Unionpour leDéveloppement Economique, Socialet Culturelde Ouessè) is a development Association for Mahi people. This association is linked to the political system. The leaders are elected by Mahi people for the development of the Western part ofOuessè.

The PGRN project fits, to some extent,th e agenda ofth e UDESCO asthei r main concern is the development of the Mahi people in Ouessè, although in the view of UDESCO the main problem is the lack of infrastructure in Ouessè. The environmental degradation is only secondarily to that. Again, in absence of an effective decentralization of power to the local structures, it is difficult for local associations like UDESCO to have a real impact inth e crucial infrastructural problems ofOuessè.

7.2.5 The problem as seen by Mahi farmers (men andwomen ) and others local inhabitants

Mahi men and women are both involved in agricultural activities. Another local groupo f inhabitants isals o important in Ouessè:th e migrants (Fon,Adja , Berba ethnic groups) are looking for cultivated land which belongs to Mahi farmers. Among Mahi people and migrants are living Fulbe herdsmen, both old time cattle keepers and recent transhumants.

The problem of environmental degradation is well-perceived by the farmers who mentioned the following indicators: - the water inth e wells and rivers isdryin gup , - scarcity of firewood compared toth e past, - run-off ofwate r and land degradation inth e farm land,

98 H SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 - the agricultural plots are very far from the villages (the farmers have to move far to clear fertile land).

But, according to the same farmers, other problems are more urgent. Their daily livelihood ismuc h more threatened by problems like low labour availability, scarce clean water, lack of infrastructure and a transport problem of the bulk agricultural products after harvest (maize,cassava , groundnut, cotton).

The women would prefer financial assistance for the processing of agricultural products which provides an important source of income. The migrant farmers consider land holding security as crucial. Although some of them are working the same parcels of land already for years on arow , asthe yhav e no traditional land rights,the y are not allowed to plant trees (e.g., cashew trees, teaks, oil palm tree, etc.) on the parcels they are farming. Planting trees in Mahi society isa kin d of land appropriation.

7.2.6 Overview ofth e perceptions of the parties involved

Table 5give s a quick overview ofth e different points ofvie w concerning the situation in Ouessè. On the vertical axis are the important stakeholders. Horizontally are recorded synthesis of the main problems as raised by stakeholders. In each square, the perception ofth e problem and itsrelevanc e according to each stakeholder are summarized.

7.3 Description and time frame of the approach

As explained aboveth e GERAM team adapted the 'Gestiondes Terroirs'approac h to the context of Ouessè. The approach aimed at creating the conditions for 'learning through interaction between stakeholders'. Participatory processes aimed at sharing knowledge and decision-making power between stakeholders,wer e central inth e GERAM approach. The rationale of the approach is 'voluntary participation* and "partnership'. The project started with the implementation of activities only when the local people accepted to participate voluntarily on the basis of a partnership-relation with the initiators and the front-line facilitators. It was thought that the intervention would only be effective if the inhabitants in Ouessè would express inwritte n form (through alette r or any other form of contract) a demand for 'appui' (advice and assistance). But, this does not mean that the initiators did not have their own intentions as will become clear in the steps as described below (cf. Djohossou, 1993).

SC-DLO Report 164• 1998 • 99 Table 5 Stakeholder-problem perception matrix 'for Ouessè Problems— > Decreasing Insecurity of land Absence or Decentralization productive capacity holding caused by weakness of of agro-sylvo- informal rules of infrastructures pastoral ecosystems land allocation Stakeholders! Ministry of This is part of Problem indicated no position A condition for the environment global problem in the PAE solution of environmental problems Ministry of Rural This is important Important, this Constraint for Development since this ministry problem is raised in agricultural is governing a everyday political development No position project for discourse combatting the problem Very important, this This issue becomes Sometimes Can facilitate PGRN/DFRN is the 'raison d'être' one important important for partnership with of this project aspect of starting an indigenous people intervention by way intervention, help of cadastring build trust with local people The CFD Important issue Of particular Important but local Important for although they will interest, they people's financial impact at grass­ not be interested in propose cadastring participation is roots level funding activities needed The CARDER Important: it is also No clear position Developing rural No clear position Organization our concern since and actions infrastructure is our we are dealing with mandate Rural Development The GERAM Team Very important It is reality, causes First priority for Very important for problem, but has blockages for indigenous people the effectiveness of many dimensions intervention some actions The King of Mahi No position Important No position Can give a clear People statement to the recognition of his role in competition with local administration Leaders of Important as a Important and some Development Condition for UDESCO development initiatives are constraints of the effectiveness, problem of Mahi emerging region and this fits legitimation of local people, the aim of the agenda of the actions UDESCO UDESCO Mahi farmers and Important but Main source of Very important, No clear position others perceived tensions and serious problem of probably do not differently among quarrels and the development of understand this themselves conflicts the region and also concept for agriculture

100n SC-DLORepor t 164• 1998 7.3.1 Organizing fora and setting priorities about the problems

Initial fora As a first step, GERAM organized meetings with all the political-administrative authorities at different levels: the Sous-préfecture of Ouessè and the different communities and villages which are atth e Western part of Ouessè. At these meetings the objectives, aswel l asth e principal and secondary activities of the project, were explained (see Section 7.4).

The initial fora provided the initiators first with general information about problems, difficulties, needs, means and resources available in the area. The main objective of this step was to explain the content and the context of the project and secondly to wait for those who wanted to participate and develop a partnership relationship to request assistance to solve certain problems.

Agreement fora A request for partnership aimed at an intervention, can be made by any individual, group or village. Once a request is made, agreement fora are organized. In the agreement fora, firstth e local stakeholders will present their problems and the needs for their resolution. Then,meeting s for discussing specific problems areplanned . For instance,ther e might be a forum about combatting soil erosion, which was raised as a problem by certain stakeholders, ora foru m on afforestation, aforu m on infrastructure realization,etc .

These fora concern specific issues and types of stakeholders. The discussion on each forum is about the relevance of the problem at stake, solutions already experimented on without success, the contribution (in terms of labour, money etc.) of local stakeholders to the cost of resolving the problem. The discussions at the fora aim at decision-making about the contour of the process of problem resolution (organization required, structuration, transfer of competences to local organizations, and trainingneeds) .

7.3.2 Networking for using expertise from other organizations

At this step, room for involving other strategic stakeholders is provided. The request for intervention or 'appui' can cover several aspects of development, involving different institutions. For instance, once a problem has been identified it might raise the need for specific research tofind a solution. Then arelatio n with a research institute would appear te be important. In the context of Ouessè, the Research-and-Development team at the INRAB {InstitutNational de la RechercheAgricole du Benin =Nationa l Institute for Agricultural Research in Benin) was involved for on-farm technology development. But, when for instance the agreement for the construction of infrastructural works ismade ,th e network will involve civil engineers.

SC-DLO Report 164• 1998 • 101 7.4 Negotiations

7.4.1 Four levels

In the discussion of the different steps of the approach chosen, there is one important aspect in the agreement fora which was not explained: negotiation fora. One of the difficulties in the approach chosen lies in the desire to satisfy all the demands and needs of local stakeholders while the main objective of the initiators of the project was natural resource management through the 'Gestion des Terroirs' model. This can cause a situation of conflicting interests within the project-organisation itself. The strategy designed to tackle this problem was the creation of a certain hierarchy concerning the nature of local stakeholders'demand s bycomparin g them with the goals ofth e initiators.

The first level concerns the requests which are according to the focus of the project. For example soil and water conservation practices, soil fertility restoration, afforestation, improvement of pastures etc. The second level concerns off-farm activities which generate additional income. It was assumed that the diversification of the sources of income would decrease the pressure on the natural resources. Moreover, it was assumed that when local stakeholders increase their income, they will be able to invest for innovative practices that help improving the use of natural resources. The third level concerns cultural activities: promotion of folk media, functional literacy and other local communication channels which can be used for sending messages or exchanging information with local people. The last level concerns social or socio-economic infrastructures such aswells ,maternit y hospitals, schools,marke t places etc.

This hierarchy of activities present the framework for setting negotiation policies. In concrete terms, the financial contribution of the project decreases from the first to the fourth. This means that negotiation space is available for whatever local stakeholders request, but the PGRN provides more financial assistance for the activities which are close to its own objectives. The request for an afforestation activity can receive 90% financial assistance while road construction can be limited to 15%.

Based on this framework, the GERAM team entered into negotiations with local problem-owners in Ouessè. The outcome of this process was the elaboration of the DDF {Dossier de Demandede Financement =Documen t for applying for funds) on the basis of three different leaflets in images and icons: (I) the first is a map of the location of the action to be undertaken in Ouessè; (ii) the second draws the budget needed for the implementation of the action; and (iii) the third figures out the planning of the activities through time scales.

The idea of negotiation about the DDF lies in its design process. The outcome is a shared understanding about the location (mapping exercise between GERAM and farmers) of the action to be executed in order to solve a problem (e.g. soil erosion). Agreement is also reached on the costs involved in solving a problem (who pays what? including a

102• SC-DLORepor t 164 O 1998 valuation of the contribution made by the local people in terms of labour, etc.), and finally agreement isreache d about the planning ofth e activities.Al l this is done by using icons which can be understood byth e farmers, for example, the sign of a half-moon was usedt o represent amonth . These concrete outcomes are synthesized in adocumen t called DDF and the participating farmers know the content. This procedure was applied in the development ofDDF s for bridge construction, tree planting activities, introduction of soil erosion control innovations, bee-keeping, and pig raising inOuessè .

At another level at different moments there were also negotiations going on, aimed at mobilizing existing organizations, bethe y local,NG O or governmental, intakin g upthei r share of the development activities in Ouessè, but within the framework of the GERAM- project. Questions that were frequently raised at the meetings were: Which organizations (NGOs, GOs) can be involved in the implementation of the project? What can their contribution be? An answer to these questions was not easy, and often came down to negotiations between the executor of the project in Ouessè the GERAM and government institutions.

The activities of the project proposed by the initiators, the PGRN/DFRN, in Ouessè overlap or compete with those of the CARDER organization. At the same time, both of them are linked to the MDR (Ministère du Développement Rural = Ministry of Rural Development). A compromise found was that some competencies of the CARDER organization should be used for monitoring and evaluation, advisory work and on-site discussion, and exchange ofexperiences .

7.4.2 Mediation

Mediation in the approach chosen concerns: (i) removing barriers to make the implementation of certain actions effective; (ii) assuring transparency for fund management towards local stakeholders; and (iii) involving stakeholders in the implementation process.

A concrete example of the first point is the mediation of landholding disputes between natives and migrants. Soil erosion control techniques introduced by the GERAM team involved tree planting while migrants are not allowed to do that on the natives' land they are using. The professionals of the GERAM team intervened to mediate those kinds of disputes, trying to persuade the landowner to allow the migrants to undertake tree- planting activities. Ina fe w instancesthe y were successful.

Concerning the second point, it isimportan t to explaintha t whenth e DDF is agreed upon after a negotiation forum (discussed above), some funds are given to the committee of local stakeholders for the implementation of the actions which were agreed on the basis ofth eDDF .

SC-DLO Report 164• 1998O 103 The third point makes clear the limitation of the 'who wants to participate approach'. After three years experiences with Ouessè people, the main objective of the project, combatting environmental degradation, was not reached yet. Soil and water conservation techniques (contour farming, tree planting, gullies) were only used at few places. Inorde r to adress this problem, a meeting was organized by the GERAM team. Local stakeholders from different target villages were invited, and its objective was to appreciate the progress of the project. Local stakeholders realized at this meeting that isolated actions by small groups in different villages whould not create a significant impact on the whole watershed or different micro-watersheds in Ouessè. A change towards an inter-villages platform for decision-making should enable more impact and collective action at the level of the watershed. After this meeting, a process towards the creation of the UIGREN ('Union Inter-villageoisepour la Gestion des Ressources Naturelles= Inter-villages Union for Management of Natural Resources) started. Representatives of different groups (e.g. beekeepers, tree nurserymen, carpenters, charcoal producers), coalitions (e.g. natives, migrants) and organizations (local NGOs, UDESCO) were consulted by an independent consultant contracted by the initiators (cf. Tinondé, 1997). The GERAM was the mediator of this process of creating a 'concertation' framework and raising local funds for natural resources management. The mediation is based on solving problems like misunderstanding between strategic groups (e.g., local formal administration vs UDESCO) and coalitions (e.g. natives vs migrants) in ordert o maketh eproces s ofth e UIGREN creation effective.

7.5Dealin g with different knowledge systems

'The knowledge system is defined as a set of actors, networks and/or organisations, expected or managed to work synergically to support knowledge processes which improve the correspondence between knowledge and environment and/or the control provided through technology use in a given domain of human activity system' (Röling& Seegers, 1991quote d in Röling, 1992:48) .

There are two key concepts - knowledge and environment - which retain attention and help understand the process observed in Ouessè. The knowledge systems depend on the worldview of stakeholders, their previous experiences and their thoughts about the environment they are living in. Problem perception by different stakeholders is greatly shaped by the context of sense making processes. For instance, for the initiators of the 'Gestion des Terroirs' project, natural resources management is important according to their context, but Mahi people in Ouessè faced more urgent problems (infrastructures) and they might not see (or consider) immediately those of the initiators. One can understand now that the knowledge systems, in this context, are linked to what potential stakeholders do and think. Knowledge is socially constructed in dealing with a complex reality which impinges priorities and a perceived degree of degradation of the environment. Potential stakeholders inevitably enter negotiation processes with different values,judgments , perception, multiple criteria and perspectives as these were revealed

104 O SC-DLO Report 164• 1998 in different steps of the approach chosen, negotiation processes and mediation. Cadastring activities implemented in Ouessè present an example of clashing knowledge systems. Some Mahi farmers did not understand the logic behind this activity while the iniators of the project saw cadastring of farm plots as the way to solve the problem of land holding insecurity. Having clarified the nature and diversity of the knowledge systems, one can move to the discussion about the extent to which different knowledge systems about the rural development processes in Ouessè can be dealt with.

From the approach chosen by the initiators of the project, including the negotiation and mediation processes involved, it seems to emerge that interaction between various stakeholders is one way to deal with the different knowledge systems in presence, about the project in Ouessè. Interactions, in the approach chosen, bring stakeholders, groups, coalitions, networks and organisations together when we consider the development arenas in Ouessè. We have noticed from different fora that any concrete action is the outcome of dialogue, negotiation, shared understanding, consensus formation, and other processes by which stakeholders move from strategic to communicative behaviour (Brand, 1990). We have seen how stakeholders realize the need to create the UIGREN after theyha d experienced different strategic actions atvillag e level.

It also emerges in the approach followed in Ouessè, that grass-roots development processes (fora with local stakeholders, DDF and actions) can help deal with different knowledge systems. In this case, the focus on grass-root processes creates room to work with the stakeholders. By doing so, the latter were able to exercise certain power and negotiation capacity in Ouessè. For instance, local stakeholders have appreciated their involvement in the negotiation and approval of a DDF (pers. com. C. Adjinacou, professional of GERAM team). This implies, however, that the outcome of the intervention processes isunknow n and emerges from interaction and social processes.

7.6 Conclusions

The process described in this case has made the following achievement. Mechanisms were developed and implemented by which local farming communities voluntarily began to adopt measures against environmental degradation.

Strongpoints M theapproach followed The participatory approach adopted in this case works even within a social, political and economic context, that is characterized by discontinuities, chaos, disorder and different perceptions onth e problematic situations. Inthi s way, the conditions for sustainable rural development in Ouessè can be achieved. By taking local knowledge and its related strategies seriously the approach aims at incorporating these into discussion about development processes. In this way, local stakeholders become aware of the need for interventions of the kind put forward by GERAM. Room is created for collective decision-making. The focus is also on participatory processes which can enable joint-

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 O 105 learning in order to get a shared perspective towards the resolution of commons problems. If necessary, the approach starts local (like in Ouessè) to move to a higher level (UIGREN) when possible.

Weakpoints in the approachfollowed In the approach followed, dealing with several issues (natural resource management, activities generating incomes, infrastructures construction) might be time consuming or might create a large deviation from the raison-d'être of the intervention project. The approach does not say anything about what would be the alternative solution if local stakeholders deviate from the main objective since the intervention processes can start only on the basis ofthei r requests and needs. Maybe,th e very strong incentive offered by the iniators for resource management as compared to other activities can be seen as a solution to avoid too large deviations from the main objective ofth e project in Ouessè.

106 H SC-DLO Report 164• 1998 8 Land use management in the Meket Woreda, Northern Wollo (Ethiopia)8

8.1 Introduction

8.1.1 Area and population

Meket Woreda9 is a district situated in the Northern part of Ethiopia at a distance of around 500 km north of Addis Ababa (Figure 13). It has atota l area of almost 2200 km2 and the population is estimated to be around 200 000 people. The district forms part of the Ethiopian highlands (1500-2500 m.a.s.1.) and the area is characterized by a degraded landscape of rugged terrain and high ranges between the valleys and the plateau summits or ridges. It is in many ways a disadvantaged district. It is part of the high risk area in terms of irreversible environmental degradation that characterizes most of the admini­ strative zone Northern Wollo. Rainfall is erratic, which in 2 out of 3 years causes food shortages in the area. The farming systems applied in Meket are characterized by low productivity, the landholdings are small (0.5 hao n average) as aresul t of overpopulation, whereas overgrazing represents an additional threatt oth edegradin g environment.

Amhara Region

AdministrativeWoreda so f Amhara Region, Ethiopia

International Regional AdministrativeWereda s -]-:-\-\-x- N.Woll o II Meket boundary boundary of Amhara Region zone Woreda Figure 13Meket Woreda, Ethiopia

Written with Henk Peters, SNV Netherlands Development Organization, Ethiopia. This case is drawn upon the experiences of a British NGO, SOSSahel, in its Wollo Agricultural Support Project (=WASP). 9 Meket isth e name of one of the eight districts (Woreda =district ) inth e zone 'Northern Wollo'.

SC-DLO Report 164 • 1998 • 107 The population in Meket is of the Amhara people, to whom the last emperor Haile Selassie and also the military leader of the Derg, colonel Mengistu, belonged (van Beurden, 1994).Durin g the major part of the Derg period (1974-1991) Meket was within the zone where the Derg and the EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front) battled each other. Whileman y young men from the Meket Woreda were recruited tofight a tth e Derg's side or resettled in Ethiopia's South-West, others formed opposition groups thatjoine d the EPRDF side.A s from 1989, when the Derg lost control ofth e area and anEPRD F administration was installed, Meket Woreda had to cope with the problem of absorbing runaway Derg soldiers and settlers. Meket also suffered during the great 1985 famine. Though the high parts of the Woreda were less affected by the drought itself, they fully shared the burden as a result of the inflow of distressed people from the lower areas inMeke t and other Woreda's (WASP, 1996).

The division of labour between men and women is strict. Men work the land and sell the occasional surplus ofthei r farm-production. Men (mostly young men) herd the cattle and they do the butchering. They build the huts and take care of the firewood collection. Women cook, take care of the children, brew beer, buy and sell herbs and vegetables, spin and take care ofth e water for the household.

In short it can be stated that life inMeke t Woreda ishard . The Meket Woreda is therefore confronted with seriousthreat st o itsexistence : - 2ou t of3 year sther e are food deficits, - there exists an increasing soil degradation and loss ofnatura l resources, - there are very few alternatives for other economic activities.

Most families can live only for 9month s onth e products from their own farm. The rest of the year they have to survive by working off farm. A high proportion of the younger women migrate to the cities. Social services are scarce in Meket. There are 18 primary schools, no secondary school, 1ne w health clinic and 5healt h stations, two doctors and one all-weather road (WASP, 1993an d WASP 1996).

8.1.2 Revolutions that changed the structure of rural society

Since 1974 Ethiopia has undergone several major changes, including three land reforms and the total restructuring of the administrative bodies. Although Ethiopian society until 1974 is often characterized as feudal (van Beurden, 1994), in Northern Wollo many of today's peasants are former (small) landowners. The landless people could get access to land by way of an arrangement with a landowner (type of sharecropping) and a considerable area was owned byth e orthodox church.

Through a land reform the Derg changed the land-tenure structure completely. From that moment onwards until today all land ispropert y of the state, including the land that used

108H SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 to belong to the church. Peasant families got a use-right on the land, which can be inherited, butno t sold.

However, when the opposition groups chased Mengistu's troops out of the area, the land reform was replaced by a second one. After the installation of power of the joint opposition groups a third land reform took place, also to allow returning fighters and other migrants to settle inth e area.

The Derg regime, that came to power following the famine of 1973 in which thousands of people in Wollodie d of hunger, wanted that the rural people ofNorther n Wollo would get access to the normal social services. In the Derg period, the existing neighbourhoods and villages were grouped into bigger geographical units and called Peasant Associations (PA), with their own elected PA-committees. These PAs (or Kebele Associations asthe y are called now), although designed to represent the interests of the communities, soon became instruments of oppression and tax impositions of the Derg regime: 'Exploitation of the small-scale peasantry was continued through authoritarian state-controlled peasant associations, forced and partly brutal uprooting of hundred thousands of people through collectivation and resettlement as well as forced recruitment of thousands of peasants' (Schmale, 1993:203).

After the change of government in 1991 the committees were replaced by newly elected persons, but the PAs remained as lowest administrative units.The present PA-committees do remain the community authority and the committees together elect the District Council, the highest decision making body of the district. From among the Council members 11person s areappointe d to form theday-to-da y district administration.

There are various types of social associations to which virtually all adult people belong. Religion-related social insurance organizations are the Sembetes and Mahebers which often use church facilities for their activities. But the most important traditional local organizations areth e K'ires which are mutual insurance associations10.

It is in this setting that SOSSahel started its 'Wollo Agricultural Support Project (WASP)' in 1994,finance d byth e Dutch Government.

10 K'ires are mutual insurance associations through which members contribute regularly to offset the responsibilities of burial costs. Virtually all adults are members of one of the K'ires. They are perceived locally as the most important local institution, maybe because the K'ire represents a self- defining unit managing resources and daily events of relevance to specific communities. The K'ire is male-dominated, although all female household heads are member of a K'ire (SNV, 1995). Each defines its own role and regulations. Some K'ires have internal saving and credit systems, some actively regulate the natural resource use (forests, pastures), and they always are the first forum to settle land disputes.

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998G 109 8.2 Perception of the problems by the different stakeholders

In Meket Woreda all parties involved (see Figure 14) agree on the state of the problem: poverty in relation to environmental degradation. But about the way to find solutions for this problem, the opinions differ substanially. What seems to be the biggest issue, is the role to be played by the local population. Historically the Amhara society is very hierarchical with an almost feudal structure (van Beurden, 1994: 25), based on the peasantry family structure. In this context, the peasants always kept their historic right to use land (Schmale, 1993;199) .

Underth e military regime the feudal characteristics vanished, butth e hierarchy remained. With the change of government in 1991 a process of decentralization started in which a federal state was created with nations according to the most important tribe in the area. So the Amhara high class stayed in power and formed the new Amhara National Regional State (ANRS) with a strong drive to develop the rural areas in a somewhat paternalistic way. The ANRS is one of the nine regions in the newly formed Federal Republic of Ethiopia. The ANRS counts over 100 woredas with an estimated population ofove r 15million .

Dutch Ministry Regional of International Government Cooperation (DGIS)

Department of SOS Agriculture Sahel

Local Wollo Agricultural Communities Support Programme (WASP)

Kebele leaders

K'ire leaders

Fig. 14Schematic overview ofthe important stakeholders andtheir mutualrelations viz.Meket Woreda

This was more or less the situation when the international donors appeared on the scene with their own objectives and goals about participation of the local population, environmental sustainability of development and their approach of Women in Development.

! 10O SC-DLO Report 164 • 1998 8.2.1 The problem as seen by the initiators of the new approach

The international donors were the initiators of the project that started in Meket Woreda. For the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGIS) Northern Wollo was one of the regions in Ethiopia on which it wanted to concentrate its financial aid. SOSSahel, a British NGO, had been interested to start working in Northern Ethiopia for some years already, but because of the bad safety situation this was not possible until the beginning of the nineties. After initial talks with the Ministry of Agriculture, SOSSahel and DGIS agreed upon starting a programme in Meket Woreda in Northern Wollo zone. In a neighbouring woreda DGIS financed a similar programme of the Dutch development organisation SNV.

To the initiators the core problem was one of stimulating environmentally sustainable socio-economic development for both men and women. But the position of DGIS and SOSSahel have been different. To DGIS the British NGO was the executing agency of the project they financed in Meket. DGIS has its own core objectives applicable to all its activities. These are: - poverty alleviation, - gender awareness, - sustainable development. These general objectives determine the position of DGIS towards the situation in Meket Woreda. The overall socio-economic situation in Meket was bad, and directly related to worrying levels of environmental degradation. An international evaluation mission of the WASP-project (WASP, 1996) describes the reality of Meket Woreda: 1 a physical environment that is characterized by a high incidence of soil erosion and deforestation as well as by erratic climatological conditions; 2 a population density that is too high to be accommodated with sufficient land to make a decent living under prevailing conditions; 3 insecure landownership legislation; and 4 as a result, wide-spread poverty and vulnerability of the people - a situation that is aggravated by illiteracy; lack of protected water points for human consumption and, partly as a result, overall poor health status of the population with high incidence of morbidity and (particularly child) mortality; and isolation of large parts of the woreda by lack of access roads, regularly create critical situations that can only be coped with by organising massive relief operations.'

For SOSSahel it was clear that outside intervention was needed in Northern Wollo in order to prevent future famines. But although the immediate problems were caused by environmental degradation, SOSSahel was convinced that the administrative structures in Northern Wollo were part of the problem. The feudal and central-Marxist history of the region had caused an almost complete separation between formal administrative institutions and local life. There was no collaboration from the local inhabitants in the administration. This frustrated any attempt to overcome the environmental degradation.

SC-DLORepor t 164 a 1998a 111 The focus of SOSSahel would be on both the environmental degradation and the participation ofth e local population inth e management and administration ofth e region.

According to the same evaluation mission (WASP, 1996: 2) 'the NGO SOSSahel supports and promotesth e approach (=th e Meket Rural Development Framework) on the premises that such venue a will actively involve all relevant levels of Local Government and the farmers communities themselves in Meket Woreda inth e development process; b will create adequate empowerment features on the levels of both Local Government andth e farmers communities inth e woreda;an d c must allow the donor supported NGOt o leaveth e scene in due course.'

8.2.2 The problem as seen by the Woreda Administration and the Regional Government

The Woreda Administration isth e highest body in the woreda (=district) . It is elected by representatives of all PAs in the woreda and it is responsible for all matters in the woreda: police and court aspects, tax collection and all development issues. The Administration is assisted by various line departments of ministries: agriculture, health, education, etc. In principle the heads of these departments are involved in all major decisions with regard to their respective areas of competence. For this the Ethiopian constitution has foreseen the establishment of a 'Woreda Development Committee (WDC)', to be chaired by the Woreda Administrator and in which development issues should be discussed. All heads of lineministr y departments are expected to bemembe r of this structure. In practice, however, the WDC hardly ever functions properly and decision making ismor e on an ad-hoc basis. SOSSahel saw a good opportunity in revitalizing this structure for their objectives.

The Woreda Administration is expected to follow the policy lines of the Regional Government, but in a number of (internal) affairs it is functioning with a high level of autonomy. The woreda council members elect again their representatives for the higher administrative levels. The Woreda Administration and the Regional Government were very aware of the critical poverty situation in Northern Wollo, with the two recent famines as extreme examples. In their view the on-going environmental degradation made the chances of such disasters only bigger. Therefore they approved the two 'sustainable agriculture' projects in Northern Wollo. New sustainable techniques had to be implemented.

8.2.3 The problem as seen by the Ministry of Agriculture

This is by far the most important line agency present in the district. The Department of Agriculture (DoA) is responsible for the improvement of agriculture, what is seen as the

112O SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 motor for the development of the Ethiopian economy by the Ethiopian Government. The DoA in Meket Woreda is expected to follow, in close consultation with the Woreda Administration, the policy lines ofth e regional and national ministry. Their main guiding policy is capital-led intensification of agriculture, in other words: to increase the yields by use of external inputs, while conserving the available natural resources. Next to staff at the district level, a number of Development Agents are stationed in the PAs as agricultural extension agents.

The following description, taken from the WASP-evaluation report of 1996,give s a good idea ofth e way this line ministry operates and about the position of this ministry towards the defined problems.Th edescriptio n isabou t the Soil and Water Conservation program.

Quote: 'The former approach to soil and water conservation was based on food for work payment. [...] The food for work approach isno w abolished and free labour mobilization is the norm of the day. However no adequate technical assistance is given under this system, as the number of Development Agents (DA's =civi l servants working for the Ministry of Agriculture) could not match the scale of the mobilization. Besides this, in most cases young children who are unable to do the work effectively, are sent to represent the family just not to be marked absent in case of a roll call. This reaction clearly shows the negative attitude ofth e population towards mass mobilizations.' Summary: Under this system the project did not develop any soil and water conservation activities in 1994 and 1995. Quote: 'In 1996, however, consultation was held with the relevant authorities at Regional, Zonal and Woreda levels to experiment on the idea of undertaking soil conservation activities on individual land holdings on development days. This meant that the individual involved in this exercise would be exempted from mass mobilization on development days. The idea was supported and agreement was reached to start implementing it on an experimental scale[ ]. 15 Farmers who volunteered, were given the necessary training in the use of the 'A' frame and bund construction!....]. DA's check on the performance of the fanners.' Quote: it was encouraging to hear that some families built up to 75m of bunds in just three days. This would have taken at least 30 person-days under mass mobilization. It was disappointing, however, to hear that the approach was not supported by some DA's on the pretext that other farmers who do not exercise the same approach, would demand the same privilege' (to be exempted from mass mobilization).

The Evaluation Mission then makes one last remark: 'The real concern is that land so conserved may be reallocated to another person inth e process of land reallocation' (WASP, 1996:25-26 )

8.2.4 The problem as seen by the local leaders

A distinction has to be made between the Kebele- or PA-leaders (who are formal leaders in the sense that the Kebele structure is legalized) and the leaders of traditional informal structures (the K'ires and Mahebers). The Kebeles or Peasant Associations were introduced byth e Derg-regime inthei r attempts to organize the rural population in active peasant groups. However, these newly introduced associations were based on a administrative unit that not necessarily correlates with the living pattern and the existing social organization of the population. Within one Kebele various neighbourhoods and

SC-DLO Report 164G 1998O 113 villages were combined, which were not always cooperative to each other. Also in one Kebele several (upt o 30-50) K'ires can be functioning.

In each Kebele, elections are organized on a regular bases for the Kebele-chairman and other members of the executive committee. This executive committee elects representatives for the District Council. The Kebele committee is delegated by the District authorities to be responsible for all matters related to the Kebele: security issues, development issues, tax collection, etc. Although the government institutions promote this way of election as 'democratic', in practice this isno t perceived as such byth e local population. Elections areparty-influenced , and leadership isver y politicized.

By the local inhabitants K'ire leadership is seen as essentially different form Kebele leadership: The K'ire chairman (always male) is publicly elected and the membership is entitled to replace the chairman should he behave improperly, '...leadership accountability was identified as a positive feature of the decision to distribute inputs through K'ires. Beneficiaries trusted the K'ire leadership to be fair and indicated that, unlike PA leaders, K'ire representatives were not only free from corruption but that their actions could also be monitored and controlled by the community.' (SNV, 1995; 6). In the same research it was concluded that the local communities showed more confidence in K'ire leaders than in PA-leaders. Onth e other hand,th e government institutions dono t recognize K'ire-leaders as local representatives as they do not want to erode the leadership ofthei r own, installed Kebele executive committees.

In the perception of the K'ire leaders poverty-problems as well as environmental problems are at least partly caused by the land-tenure system imposed by the powerful elites. Before 1974 the majority of the people had a secure access to land through the féodal system, asowner so r bysharecroppin g relations.

After 1974, during the Derg-regime, all land became public property, and the local inhabitants could get use-rights for successive years. The state always had the possibility of reallocating the land. From 1974 until today there have been three land reforms. Thus, because the tenure system changed, people got a high sense of insecurity about their land-use rights.Thi s encouraged them to focus on short-term results instead of long-term sustainability. An example: in the land-tenure legislation there is little room for manoeuvre when farmers have planted awoodlo t of eucalyptus on their land. Iftha t land is redistributed through a new land-reform, the farmer only remains the right on the first harvest of the eucalyptus, but any subsequent harvest is for the new user (WASP, 1993). By the local peoplethi s ismerel y seen asa n incentive for exploiting the land quickly.

8.2.5 Overview of the perceptions of the parties involved

Table 6give s aquic k overview ofth e different points of view concerning the situation in Meket Woreda. On the vertical axis the important stakeholders involved in the

114O SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 development process of Meket are listed. Horizontally are recorded the main problems as argued by different stakeholders. In each square the main position of the stakeholder towards that problem is summarised.

Table 6 Stakeholder -problem perception matrix for Meket Woreda Problems —• High poverty Poor cooperation The situation of Big insecurity over incidence among between government women is worse than land tenure, with rural population in structures and local of men. negative influence on context of population conservation of the environmental environment Stakeholders J, degradation Amhara This is threatening Not a problem This is not a problem: Not true: people must Regional the future of the men and women have have confidence in Government people their roles the government Woreda This is their main Not a problem: ? ? Administration concern, because it through the formal causes high risk of representatives famines (Kebele's) government policy will be implemented Ministry of Guiding principle is PA-structure Not interested ? Agriculture capital-led guarantees good intensification of representation of agriculture, while local interests conserving the available natural resources SOSSahel This is the most This is probably the This is true: the Farmers must get the important reason for most important objective of confidence needed intervening in the problem behind the interventions should for a proper land care area: famines like in environmental be to take into '73 and' 85 must be degradation account possibilities avoided for women Dutch Ministry Same as SOSSahel No clear position This is true: strongly 7 of Foreign concerned about self- Affairs determination and real participation of women in all developments PA-Leaders ? Not true: they ensure ? True, but people must (=formal local good cooperation! learn to trust the representative government structure) structures Informal Local Big problem: feudal Local people put Women have another True, is one of the Leaders (from and military regimes much more trust in role than men, and core problems K'ires) are to blame. the K'ire leaders! they are taken care of

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998• 115 8.3 Description and time frame of the approach

The initiative for the project was taken in 1994 by the SOSSahel. SOSSahel based its intervention on a double-track approach: on the one hand the project had to develop all kinds of immediate actions aimed at environmental protection (soil conservation, afforestation, etc) and 'women in development' in Meket Woreda, on the other hand the interventions of the project were more characterised by a strong emphasis on an overall empowerment-process of the local population, trying to develop a basis of local participation amongthos e inadministratio n and management ofth e region.

At the one hand, with approval of DGIS, SOSSahel started negotiations with the Woreda Government institutions in order to revive an existing formal management and administrative structure. This led to the installation of the Rural Development Committee (RDC) that would be the ultimate decision-making body for all project-activities. The RDC is chaired by the Head of the Woreda Administration. Permanent members are the zonal Directors of the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Health and Finance, while temporal members are the WASP-team leader and the WASP administrator and possible otherNGO's .

At the other hand, with approval of the RDC, the WASP-project team developed a bottom-steered planning methodology for community level:PAP I (= Participatory Action Planning and Implementation). 'PAPI aims to animate community groups to develop their own action plans based on joint analysis of problems and alternative solutions' (PAPI, 1996).

In 1996 within the RDC structure the Meket Rural Development Framework was agreed on. This consisted of: 'a- AWoreda-base d rural development promotion institution set-up consisting of: i- The Rural Development Committee, ii- The Community Development Unit (CDU),an d iii- The Community Development Fund (CDF),o nth e one hand; and b- Farmers' participation methodologies and procedures (that must be applied simultaneously by Community Based Organisations (CBO's),th e RDC-CDU-CDF set-up andth e WASPProject ) consisting of: i- Participatory Action Planning and Implementation (PAPI), ii- Participatory Land Use Planning and Implementation (PLUPI), iii- Participatory Technology Development (PTD),an d iv- other participatory methodologies still inth e making, onth e other hand.' (WASP, 1996).Th e CDU comprises eight members (four men and four women) selected from the Woreda line ministries byth e RDC.It sgoa l ist o eventually take overth e role of the WASP-team. The CDF is a donor-based fund at the disposal of the RDC for community projects. It has two signatories: the RDC chairman and the WASP accountant.

116O SC-DL ORepor t 164• 1998 The interesting question is, who are recognized as Community Based Organisations. In the point of view of the Government Institutions the CBO's would be the Kebeles. But WASP choset o start at the community level below the Kebele. In the PAPI methodology the guidelines defined on this issueare : 'divide community into men and women - for the rest of the meetings work separately with these twogende r groupsto : identify, prioritise and analyse collective problems *define existing and previous natural resources and land use practices *define all human resources available toth e village and possible interest groups *define different social groupsbase d onrelativ e wealth &possibl e interest groups' (PAPI, 1996).

The next steps are directed at making a Village Action Plan. In this approach the project team, following the PAPI-methodology, clearly foresees an important role for the community leaders. Through the PAPI-methodology the WASP-project team is restrained at various moments from taking over the role of the leaders in the communities.

At his stage, it is interesting to note that WASP in its documents avoids the use of some common terms in Ethiopian society, for instance the PAPI methodology only talks about leaders in general or community-leaders, leaving it open whether they are the Kebele- leaders or the informal (mostly K'ire) leaders, and at the same time the WASP-project team stresses the importance of involving Community Based Organizations (CBOs) without specifying the nature ofthes e organizations.

The overall approach chosen by SOSSahel was characterized by avoiding open confrontations with either government institutions or Kebele leaders. Within the Meket Rural Development Framework emphasis was on working together. Butthroug h concrete activities in the communities the WASP-team over and over tried to make their point clear to the parties participating in the Woreda Rural Development Committee, that the traditional CBOs could not be ignored (see also next section: Negotiations). This whole phase of giving shapet o the community-based planning strategy took almost 3years .

8.4 Negotiations

The main forum where negotiations have taken place aboutth e WASP-project was within the structure ofth e RDC. Butthe y are also found in other fora, like negotiations between the two international donors involved, negotiations between the different government officials outside the RDC and negotiations between the inhabitants (plus leaders) within the communities.

Onth e basis ofprojec t documents oneca n get an idea about the nature ofth e negotiations within the RDC.Par t of the discussions centred around the role of the Community Based

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998 • 117 Organizations (CBOs). At the beginning of 1996 the WASP-team had already made a step forward with the approval of the Meket Rural Development Framework. But, as analysed above, until then it proved difficult to define the nature of the CBO's to be included in the work of the project. The international evaluation mission of November 1996too k upth e discussion on the role ofth e different CBOs.

Although the Evaluation Mission avoidst o take aclea r position in this discussion when it assesses the institutional set-up of WASP (where the mission only talks about CBO's in general), in assessing the concrete project activities the Mission is clear in taking position: - Provision of seeds: This activity, although not planned in the original document, proved to be essential to get the support of the local people. 'The seed was distributed toth e beneficiaries through the K'ire structure which eventually endorsed its management as well. Atota l of 114 K'ires in 5 Kebeles were involved. The seed was given as adonatio n toth e K'ires who loaned itt othei r members with an interest (20-30%) as was agreed by the members. The K'ires have used this grain for establishing seed banks ofthei r own.' (WASP, 1996:18). - Control of Straiga (= a very harmful weed). The evaluation discusses the need to address the straiga problem, and come to the following conclusion: 'Bringing the straiga population down to a quarter of its present infestation level would be a great achievement already. Just this alone would increase the yield of sorghum by more than 30% of the present level. For effective implementation, this requires the involvement ofth e K'ires inth earea. ' (WASP, 1996:24). - Afforestation: this is a very problematic issue as it directly links to the land-tenure structure. The actual land-tenure structure discourages farmers to get involved with reforestation, because ofth e risk of another re-allocation of land. With the very high enthusiasm ofth e farmers as its only argument, the Evaluation Mission recommends the involvement of the K'ires with the establishment of tree nurseries and of K'ire woodlots (WASP, 1996:27-28). - Savings and Credit programme: 'Northern Wollo in general, and the project area in particular, has a poor history of credit repayment. None of the credits extended by Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations were repaid. [...] However, the level of repayment experienced by the seed program in 1995 through the K'ires showed encouraging results. [...] The K'ires lack economy of scale to run a viable and sustainable saving and credit program. However, they can play crucial roles in the process of saving mobilization and creditprovision. ' (WASP, 1996;32 ) Soth e evaluation mission is building a strong argument for involving the most important traditional social organization inth e project activities, by their evaluation of the concrete project-activities.

From that moment (1996) on, the WASP-team started working on a new project- document for the second phase, inspired by the positive evaluation. During the whole year of 1997 negotiations about the second phase went on within the RDC and between the RDC and the Regional Government. At the end of 1997 SOSSahel (through the

18• SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998 WASP-team) has reached an agreement with the RDC about the role of the formal and informal CBOs. This agreement was ratified byth e Regional Government, who gives the WASP-process an experimental status in its approach of working with the traditional CBO's.

In the draft project proposal for the next 7year s (SOSSahel, 1997)th e vagueness around the CBOs, that characterised the former documents, has disappeared. At the one hand, it is admitted that the traditional CBOs play an important role in the development of the Woreda: 'Such traditional CBOs include: k'ires, sambetes, ikubs and local blacksmith associations. A common aspect of Meket Development Programme's (MDP) methodologies isbase d onth erespec t and use of such CBOs as amean s of generating the initial trust needed to successfully animate people into initiating their own development. [ ] MDP is not necessarily aiming to empower the CBOs themselves. CBOs may or may not be democratic, desirable institutions: they may or may not have a place in the longer term development strategy of the Ethiopian government, but they can not be ignored at the initial stages of any attempt to strengthen the self-reliance of the people. This is because they represent an integral part of people's identity and life.' (SOSSahel, 1997: 22). At the other hand, the government-initiated Kebele-structure (the former Peasant Associations) also is given its place in the whole PAPI methodology and MDP: 'Communities and interest groups identifying their own projects as a result of PAPI will submit their proposals to their Kebele development committee (KDC), which will then pass it on to the Woreda Rural Development Committee (RDC). The KDC is an official Kebele structure with the following members: PA chairman and secretary, Development Advisor", any professionals in the kebele (e.g. teacher, health assistant, veterinarian technician, etc.), and an elected representative of the local community based organisations. The KDC represents the kebele equivalent of the RDC and is responsible for co-ordinating all development activities inth e kebele.' (SOSSahel, 1997:22-23) .

Within the Government institutions different negotiations have taken place, and will continue to take place. The draft of the new project document (SOSSahel, 1997) states: 'Concerns have been expressed by Regional Planners that government staff may be spending too much of their time on the PAPI animation process at the expense of their official routine activities. However, the initial participatory-action-planning exercises only last 3-4 days in each village. These will be carried out using week-ends and saint days and will therefore take only 5-10 working days in a year (about 2-4%) of the expert's official work time. Furthermore, all projects arising from the PAPI process are directly contributing to the Government's policy of farmer-led development and should not therefore be viewed as additional or 'NGO' projects but as part of the Woreda's internal development strategy. Both Woreda and Zone are therefore confident that the PAPI process as proposed will not conflict with government plans'.

11 The Development Advisor is an extension officer of the Ministry of Agriculture, working for one or a few kebeles.

SC-DLO Report 164 O 1998O 119 Negotiations have alsotake n place between the two international donors: DGIS itself was not directly involved in the execution, but through SOSSahel it influenced the process on certain moments. The most important interventions of DGIS involved pressure on SOSSahel to have its objectives of 'Women in Development' (WID) reflected in the project, and of developing internal monitoring and evaluation systems. At the beginning of 1996,th e project was not advancing satisfactorily on gender-related issues, something DGIS was concerned about. Until then no WID-expert had been appointed, but from the moment of the appointment onwards, the project made good progress related to their WID-objectives (WASP, 1996: 7 and 41). The DGIS-intervention directed at the development of internal monitoring and evaluation systems was done by pressing SOSSahel to appoint a fulltime expatriate project-director. The evaluation mission of November 1996 concluded that good progress was made on this point once the project- director was found in function.

Mediation It has not been possible to get a clear picture on the role of mediation in the different negotiations throughout the three years in which the PAPI-RDCproces s was given shape. However, it is interesting that SOSSahel took upon itself the mediator role. This role is also formulated as one of the challenges for Ethiopian Local Organizations by Schmale (1993: 206): 'Serve as a link or mediator between different nationalities and classes. Support the process of finding a political framework for peaceful co-existence of all nationalities. Engage in advocacy work for other issues such as democracy and policies infavou r ofth e hitherto marginalized such asth e small peasantry.'

8.5 Dealing with different knowledge systems

'Knowledge processes are embedded in social processes that imply aspects of power, authority and legitimation; and they are just as likely to reflect and contribute to the conflict between social groups as they are to lead to the establishment of common perceptions and interests.' (Long, 1992:27) .

In many ways the process that took place in Meket Woreda, was a silent struggle for power. For years already the dominant parties in the conflict (the central government departments on the one hand and the local communities on the other hand) had been ignoring the other's initiatives. The government by not recognizing the mere existence of the local social structures, and the local communities by exploiting their thorough knowledge of the local social structures. They knew how and when to frustrate (the forced working days for conservation works) or to take advantage of outside initiatives, like from the credit and savings initiatives from Government and Non-Government Organisations (0%repaymen t of seed distributed byth e Ministry of Agriculture in 1995, 1% repayment of FAO's 1994 oxen credit program). In the WASP-evaluation report (WASP, 1996: 32) it is analysed that the credit-initiatives from outside failed 'due to the hand-out mentality developed over many years of relief food supply to the area'.

120O SC-DL ORepor t 164 • 1998 Collective action seemst o be the basis of this 'power'. As pointed out above (see 8.4) the same report also summarises some promising experiences at the level of the traditional CBO's. These include self-initiated saving-and-credit groups with already an interesting sum of savings. By the evaluation mission it is concluded that there seem to be possibilities based on the influence of the traditional CBO's. It is also concluded that 'there is a general lack of awareness among the Woreda Agencies, including the RDC. The direction of the development of savings and credit groups and the legal framework under which they can bepromoted , are not known.' (WASP, 1996:32 )

In short, the WASP Evaluation Mission concludes that the traditional CBO's favour savings and credit programs, and that at the same time there is a complete lack of awareness and knowledge among the Woreda Agencies about the same subject. The knowledge systems have notye t mixed.

A consequence of the span of time over which the analysis of this case took place (the latest material used is from 1997) is that most of the 7 years during which government and local communities intend to worktogethe r are still to come. Events duringthi s period can not yet be described or analysed. It would be interesting to follow the negotiating process closely, in the hope that some essential changes in the relationships between these groups can be seen.

8.6 Conclusions

The process described in this case has made the following achievement. By acknowledgement of traditional, local leadership without opposing the top-down administrative structure, conditions for interactive policy making were created against all odds. Unlike in other cases, during the years described there was still no 'negotiation- platform' functioning, but all activities were oriented towards the goal of creating one.I n the negotiations for the second phase of the project, finally all parties agreed to participate in an interactive planningprocess .

Important factors for success: - SOSSahel had the courage to tackle the potential conflict about the role of the traditional Community Based Organizations in the project structure from the very start onwards. - SOSSahel took upon itself the role of mediator between the formal and the informal structures: • SOSSahel gained thetrus t ofth e Government Institutions bytakin gth e role ofth e Government Institutions seriously by involving them in all important project decisions and by taking the Kebele-leaders into account in the representation of the local people at Woreda level.

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 O 121 • Atth e other hand, SOSSahel was able to gain thetrus t of the local people through their concrete problem-solving activities, often using the informal CBOs as the most appropriate canal for intervention. Inthei r role as mediator SOSSahel clearly avoided to take sides inth e conflict about the role of the formal and informal structures. Towards both sides it argued on basis of reality and not on basis of ideologic ideas: 'like it or not, but they are important for any development'. The WASP-project had sufficient funds available in order to be able to undertake action when needed, and to stimulate active participation of important people.

122 O SC-DLO Report 164• 1998 9 Discussion and conclusions

9.1 Introduction

The starting point of this investigation was the conclusion drawn by observers and practitioners alike, that participatory integrated land use planning only can be successful if it iswidel y supported by allrelevan t stakeholders. Inorde r to ensure this support itwa s assumed that the different stakeholders must have a say in the planning phase, which meanstha tth e plan isarrive d atthroug h negotiations.

This realisation stood at the basis of a new approach in regional planning in the Netherlands. Since the beginning of the 1990's different regional planning processes were centred around a negotiation platform. In some cases the results were very promising. Problems that had been cause of serious conflicts over the last decades could be openly discussed in this way. The case of the Gelderse Vallei presented in this report is one of the most successful examples of this approach in the Netherlands. Similar experiences were heard from other countries, but an in-depth analysis of these negotiation processes under very different circumstances wasmissing .

Therefore, the objective of this report is to gather experiences from different continents on negotiation processes in integrated land use planning. Six cases from as many countries are presented, without the pretension of being complete. Each case is described in the same way, centring the presentation and analysis around the role each stakeholder played inth e region and around the role ofnegotiatio n processes in the planning process. Emphasis is put on the different knowledge systems of the stakeholders as an essential part ofthei r background defining the waythe y approach the negotiations.

In this chapter some conclusions will be drawn from the descriptions of the cases. The conclusions will be mostly on the methodology followed, trying to define determining factors for success in 'interactive policy makingprocesses ' world-wide. In that sense this investigation has to be seen as a starting point for understanding the possibilities and promises of this kind of planning processes. The main elements for failure remained beyond the scope of this study. The study does not tell us much about the circumstances under which participatory integrated regional planning processes do not work, where interactive planning will fail to come up with good solutions. This investigation is focused on successful cases, in order to learn and get inspiration from them when confronted with stagnation ora stalemat e situation in one's own planning situation.

One very important element to be understood is that the background of each of the six cases presented in this report is completely different. The most striking difference probably isabou t the economic situation ofth ecountry : two cases are from industrialised

SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 O 123 countries and four are from so-called Third World countries. This has all kinds of implications for the circumstances defining the negotiation process.Fo r instance: - The difference in school level among the stakeholders in some cases is much larger (Ethiopia, Bolivia: from illiterate to university degree) than in other cases (Netherlands: all stakeholders at least have followed secondary school if not higher education). - In some cases all stakeholders have access to the area and to information (Netherlands, Australia),whil e in other cases some stakeholders hardly ever come to the region and/or accesst o information might be denied to some stakeholders.

9.2 Circumstances determining success

About theproblem definition: consensus or conflict? This distinction is one of the factors determining the nature of the process, and its success. Reviewing the six cases, we learn that in 4 of them (the Gelderse Vallei, the Chobe Enclave, Ouessè and Meket Woreda) the important stakeholders did not agree on the main problems to be tackled in the region. In Comanche-Bolivia they still had to get used toth e idea of not being on opposite sides anymore and inth e Murray Darling Basin all important parties agreed on the main problem to be solved. As a result, in the four conflict-cases substantive negotiations were needed about which problem should be solved and the main strategy to be followed, before a common plan could be arrived at. In the othertw o cases the process was more open and anegotiatin g platform between the government institutions and the local stakeholders can hardly be determined. The process can be better understood in terms of the different parties taking advantage of each other in a constructive way.

Allow considerable timefor negotiation Before initiative wastake n to enter intoa proces s ofnegotiate d conflict resolution in each of the six cases parties were involved in some kind of stalemate situation. The cases showed that it not only can take a long time before stakeholders are made to agree that it is in their interest to work towards ajoin t plan of action to break the stalemate, but also from that moment on until such an agreed plan will be arived at. Even if the first step could be reached in a few months the second is likely to take several years. It may be instrumental for amediato r topu t pressure on the process, butthi s should be done for the sake of efficient negotiation and not because some facilitators or donors want quick results. It takes time for representatives from very different categories of stakeholders to get to understand the points of view of some of their opponents, to develop a confidence that by give-and-take solutions can be found that would be acceptable to all, and to convince those they represent of the benefits and need of concessions made in the process. Planning is also a learning process and it takes time to adjust one's knowledge system when confronted with aseemingl y conflicting one.

124 O SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 Monetary incentivesare of prime importance Inal l cases a substantial monetary flow can berecognise d towardsth e case-study region. - Inth eNetherland s the different departments ofth e central government, together with the provinces, make funds available aimed at stimulating the process itself, while other funds are promised, once all parties have committed themselves to one plan. - In Australia, both by the Federal Government and by the State Governments, funds are made available to stimulate problem-solving actions. - In Bolivia international donor agencies channelled funds to the area through the NGO-network programme PROCADE. - In Ethiopia international donor agencies channelled funds to the area through an international NGO in co-operation with the regional government. - In Benin international donor agencies channelled funds to the area through a local NGO. - Botswana isth e only case in which the external funds (from an international donor) were perhaps not decisive, because the important monetary inflow comes from the profits onth e sale ofhuntin g quotast o tourists.Bu tals o for the success ofthi s case avisibl e monetary flow wasver y important.

In other words, inflow of money is at stake, some for the process itself but more as a reward for successful negotiation. Ajointl y supported plan of action by all stakeholders was made conditional for putting this second inflow into motion or for diverting such existing flows toward the communities atstake .

Whichstakeholders should participate? In Chapter 2 it is stated that in interactive planning processes all important stakeholders should participate, and the question is raised which stakeholders are the important ones: only organisations formally constituted, or also informally organised groups? And how does one determine who areth e important stakeholders?

Reviewing the cases, we learn that there is quite some difference among them in this respect. In some cases groups can be distinguished that did not have a clear say in the decision makingprocesses : - In the Chobe Enclave-Botswana no evidence was found that women actively participated. - In Australia onlythos e farmers participated who were convinced of the danger ofo n going land degradation. The fanners must organise themselves in informal community groups. - In Comanche/Bolivia only the formally organised fanners participated in the planning process. - Inth eNetherland s only the formally organised farmers participated.

In other cases the participation of the local private stakeholders was left at their own initiative:

SC-DLO Report 164 D 1998D 125 - In Ethiopia the project is aimed at making broad participation possible, and especially of certain old traditional associations. - In Benin everybody is invited to participate, but on his or her own initiative and on conditions set byth e project. Formal organisation isno t aprerequisite .

From this it can be concluded that it is not necessary to have all, or virtually all, stakeholders participate. Depending on the situation it can be decided to limit participation to formal organisations (in the cases of The Netherlands and Bolivia: the formal organisations are strong), or to stimulate the participation of certain, new or old, informal groups. In the latter case the project puts certain conditions (see cases of Australia and Ethiopia) to their participation. Seeking balance among stakeholders regardingth e main controversies iswha t seemst omatte r most.

Defining the region:along administrativeor along ecologicalboundaries? In Chapter 2,o nth e basis of the theories so far, it was concluded that, whenever possible, ecological boundaries should be defined because it would be easier to find solutions for environmental problems asthes e often are particular toth e ecological zones.

Reviewing the six cases we learn that both types of regional delineation are used in practice: The 'ecological regions' are The Gelderse Vallei in the Netherlands and the catchments in Australia, The 'administrative regions' are The Chobe Enclave/Botswana, Comanche/Bolivia, and Meket/Ethiopia. Ouessè/Benin isapproximatel y half of anadministrativ e region.

The above signalled difference leads us to an interesting question: Why are in so-called industrialised countries the regions defined along ecological boundaries, while in so- called third-world countries administrative boundaries are followed? The case studies presented in this report do not give the final answer to this question, but the following hypothesis could be formulated: An ecological region definition demands a strong democraticbasis in society and well-developedlocal administrations. The idea behind this hypothesis is that interactive policy making within an ecological region gives more freedom to the local stakeholders. In the case of the Gelderse Vallei the regional plan only defines measures in very broad terms. It isu pt o the municipalities totur n such measures into concrete demarcations and use-prescriptions inthei r municipal 'land-use zoning plans' {bestemmingsplannen). The same high level of freedom counts for the communities in Australia.

126 H SC-DLO Report 164O 1998 9.3 Methods in negotiation

Whocan bethe initiator? In some of the cases the Central Government, or some of its departments, are the initiators of the new approach. They try to convince the other stakeholders that a negotiated solution ispossible ,an d they areth e ones feeling responsible for theprocess . - In the Netherlands the initiators areth e Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture andth e Province of Gelderland. - In Australia the initiators are the Federal Government together with the National Farmers Federation andth e Australian Conservation Association. - In Botswana the initiators areth e district based government institutions.

In the other countries it is more diverse. In Benin the process was started by a shared initiative between certain government institutions and the international donors; in the case of Bolivia the initiative was shared among the NGO's network and the government; while inth e case of Ethiopia the initiative was solelytake n byth e international donors.

Speaking withone voice? In Chapter 2, based on Dutch experiences, it was said to be important that the different government departments and representatives would speak with one voice during the negotiations, not to 'make a fist against the others', but to create clarity. All parties involved should knowwha t would beth emargin s for negotiation.

From the cases we learn that this appears less important than assumed. In the three cases from Africa part of the discussions and negotiations are held between the different government representatives,whil e inth e Australian case this point remained unclear.

Within this study it is not possible to say anything about the possibility that the process would take much more time if the governments representatives don't speak with one voice. Itwoul d be interestingt o find out.

Should the measuresproposed in the regionalplan beobligatory toevery individual or shouldparticipation be voluntary? In five of the six cases the individuals (farmers and other local people) are free to decide whether or not to participate in the activities developed. This principle of voluntary participation seems important.

In the analysis of the case Gelderse Vallei and other ROM-experiences in the Netherlands not only participation itself, but also a voluntary choice from among the options presented in the plan proves of great importance for an agreement with representatives ofal l stakeholders.

SC-DLO Report 164• 1998• 127 The Ethiopian case shows how an alternative to the obligatory participation (in collective workdays) is part of the negotiations. The outcome is that by way of experiment the government allows only for that district the participation to become voluntary.

In the Australian case the principle of voluntary participation is essential. As long as this principle is accepted, people are enthusiastic about the programmes aimed at countering land degradation. Once the State Government and recently the Federal Government are seriously trying to strictly regulate land clearing on private lands,th e electoral popularity (and thus the widely supported basis) ofth e Government isdecreasin g rapidly.

In Bolivia and Benin participation of individuals inth e activities following from the plan iscompletel y on avoluntar y basis.

The main exception seems Botswana. This isdu e to the problem in Botswana: agriculture versuswildlif e management. The solution isrestricte d hunting.Thi s can onlyb e executed if all other hunting is prohibited; therefore voluntary participation is out of the question here. It should be noted, however, that the local skeholders voluntarily committed themselves tothi s solution.

The case descriptions show, that the voluntary nature of measures proposed in all six planning contexts is to be considered as relative. This is the case in as far as the outside stakeholders provide strong 'carrots' for adoption and 'sticks' for those who prefer to continue to operate along non-sustainable lines. These 'sticks' were most clearly present inth e Gelderse Vallei case.

The roleof different knowledge systems and information inthe negotiation processes In the light ofthi s study this isprobabl y the most difficult issue to deal with, although its importance is evident. Investigation on the spot is necessary to get an in-depth view of the processes involved, but it seems that in all cases an appeal to local knowledge regarding environmental degradation and measures of redressing it has made important stakeholders more willing to act beyond immediate survival. In the Gelderse Vallei case it was a study commissioned by the farmers organizations and depicting the frequent deviations among them from a government-assumed economic rationale of farmers, which created the necessary room for negotiations. The plans put forward by the Australian Landcare groups for adoption and funding by the Regional Catchment Committees are locally made and based on local information. In Chobe, it was the acknowledgement of local information regarding crop losses and other harm caused by game that made parties more willing to seek cooperation. Inth e Comanche itwa s respect of some of the outside agents of change to the Andean traditional concepts and information that bridged the gapbetwee n some important categories of stakeholders. This applies equally to the Meket and Benin cases. The cases provide little information, however, as to the ways in which local information is linked up with the 'scientific' information, which tends to reach local stakeholders primarily through top-down bureaucratic channels.

128• SC-DLO Report 164• 1998 The case of the Chobe Enclave is somewhat special. Here, it became very clear how 'scientific knowledge' and 'indigenous knowledge' can match in solving a problem. The scientific knowledge provides the policy makers with the necessary data for defining the hunting quota, while the indigenous knowledge provides the local communities with the abilities for a sustainable wildlife management. This leads us to a more general conclusion: indigenous knowledge on its own will not be able to guarantee sustainable development, nor would scientific knowledge. Somehow the different knowledge systems havet o bebrough t together ina constructive way.

A related question about the cases is, whether the decentralisation process (Bolivia, Benin, Ethiopia) will have a positive influence on the discussions between the different knowledge systems.

The importanceof mediationfor interactiveplanning processes In most ofth e casesdescribe d noperso n or institute wasappointe d as xmediator ' inth e negotiation process.Nevertheles s inmos t casesmediatio n played aver y important role in reaching agreement between all parties. Mediation isth e involvement ofneutra l parties in negotiation processes (Van de Klundert and Glasbergen, 1995).Th e importance of mediation inth eprocesse s described inth e sixcase s can besummarise d as follows.

In four ofth e six cases mediation played a role that could be clearly distinguished. In the Gelderse Vallei,th e representative of the province of Gelderland functioned as mediator, his role is said to be decisive. In the Chobe Enclave, the two local politicians played a crucial role as mediators. The moment they became involved it proved to be possible to find solutions. In Northern Wollo, Ethiopia, the British NGO SOSSahel took upon itself the role of mediator, what proved to be decisive for all what was undertaken. And in Comanche, Bolivia it seems reasonable to assume that SEMTA played an important role as mediator, although inth e different reportsthi s role isno t distinguished clearly.

In the other two cases the situation was different. In the case of Ouessè, Benin, the local NGO GERAM at times had a role that resembles that of amediator , but mostly GERAM was the institution that directly negotiated withth e local stakeholders.

Only inth e case ofAustrali a it seems that mediation did not play an important role inth e whole process. This structure ofth e process was much more loosely defined, because the government did not intend to becomepar t of any conflict. It saw itself more as a financial facilitator than ason eo fth e partners inth e conflict.

Reviewing the characteristics of the mediators, we learn that the mediators in all four cases held a different position towards the conflict from that of the other stakeholders. Perhaps only inth e case ofNorther n Wollo inEthiopia ,th emediato r wasreall y neutral in the conflict, because SOSSahel had no direct interest inth e region. Inth e other cases,th e mediators had a certain interest in the development of the region, so, strictly speaking, it is hard to claim that they were neutral. But the essence of the supposed neutrality is that

SC-DLO Report 164 • 1998O 129 the mediator is acceptable to all parties, as was the case in the Gelderse Vallei because the province of Gelderland had not taken up strong positions in the prevailing conflicts. In the case of Botswana, the local politicians were accepted because they were the only ones who were really part of two conflicting worlds, and in Comanche (Bolivia) SEMTA, as an outside organisation, was the more or less objective provider of new information. So it can be concluded that even more than strict neutrality, the acceptability of mediators to all parties, because of specific features of their position, is an important characteristic for them to be successful.

9.4 Recommendations

As awa y of summing upth e main findings ofthi s study,th e following recommendations can serve future investigations. Investigate the main elements for failure of'interactive policy making processes". - Test the following hypothesis about the demarcation of the region: 'An ecological region definition demands a strong democratic basis in society and well-developed local administrations". - The cases from so-called 'third world countries' have shown that the international donors play a very important role. The question that arises because of that role is related to the 'ownership' and therefore to the sustainability of such processes when they are led by so-called outsiders. This deserves more and probably long-term research. - From theory it was concluded that it would be preferable that all government representatives would 'speak with one voice". Practice in these relatively successful cases had it, that this is rarely the case. Hence, this may well be not that important. However, one could also argue that the process took much longer than if the government's representatives had spoken with onevoice . - Although strong emphasis was put in the research on getting insight in the interaction of the different knowledge systems, it was concluded that investigation on the spot is needed for such an analysis. This is probably the most important topic to be studied because of the huge amounts of money made available for improving the so-called scientific knowledge systems while we don't know enough about their use or acceptance by various stakeholders and of their interaction with other knowledge systems.

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