Economic Crisis and State Autonomy: A Comparative Study of the PoIicy Responses of the , Britain, and 1967 -1 982

Elaine McCoy Politics Department The University of Adelaide January 1987

A thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D.

A,u¡.e!,, ^l - l, /o" t'? -320- E1aine McCoY Part II lrl

Part II State Enclave Government, Political Interests and Relative AutonomY

InthisPartofthethesis,Iraisecertaintheoretical issuesreÌatedtotheconceptoftherelativeautonomyof thecapitaliststate.ArenewedinterestamongMarxist state began scholars regarding the theory of the capitalist Marx and with Louis Arthusser,s ,,phirosophical reading" of a Marxist his inquiry into the status of the state within problematic. Atthusser's aggressive critique of contemporary Marxist humanism led him to attempt to construct a scientificallybasedsocialtheorywhichcametobeknownaS aspects of "structural ". Among the most important A].thusserianstructuralMarxismare]-)theexplicitclaim poriticar for Marxism that in analytical method and' itreplacesideologywithscience(theformerconstitutesa 2) that theoretical revolution in the history of ideas) , and properly the Marxian notion of historical materialism' understood,providestherevolutj.onaryleapfrommere of ideoJ.ogy to a science of history' A proper understanding historicalmaterialismforA]-thusseremploysan ,,overdetermination thesis" which explains regime transformationatcertain"historicconj.unctures"'Attn." rootoftheconceptofoverdeterminationisanideaof muttiplestructuraldeterminationswithinthehistorica] processwhicharecombinedinhistoricallyspecificwaysto produce concrete expressions of history' Economic Elaine McCoY Part II -32L-

determination is a fundamental part of thaprocess. Althusser interpretats the Marxian diatectic in a manner which has prompted a great deal of debate and theorízing around the role of the state in historical development. Most simply put, the debate has been around the extent to which any state, including capitalist ones, is constrained by a primary determination' usualty economic, or is relatively free. Is the state primarily political or a reflection of economic necessity? Are there "Ia\^/s" which exist, able to be scientifically discovered, and which govern the role of the state in a capitalist society? In Althusser's terms, does there exist a ,,structured totality" named ?1

That, very briefty, is the beginning of the debate regarding the relative autonomy of the capitalist state. chapter 6 wiIl examine some representative examples of the debate as it evolved in more detail.

It is my aim in the next three chapters to deal with the political constitution of the capitaList state' The present work uses the "state derivation" approach of contemporary German scholars to explore the question of state autonomy. This approach is outside the methodological and theoretical legacy of Althusserian structuralism which prompted a split between "structural" and "instrumental-" aproaches to state theory. Nevertheless ' I examine the structuralist/instrumentalist debate in order to discover the roots of the fallacy of "relative state autonomy" in Elaine McCoy Part II -322- both Marxist and liberal schoJ-arship on the state. The state derivation debate2 is largely concerned with the form of the state as it reflects the "anatomy of civil society", in this case, the anatomy of a civil society in crisis. The contextual elements of economic crj-sis and policy response have been developed in Part I. The fo]J,owing discussions of the deformation of the bourgeois constitution and the evolution of state apparatus toward increasingly centralized and i-nsulated institutions are concerned with the form of the capitalist state in crisis. Chapter 5 will express that fOrm aS an "enclave government" and buttreSS the preViouS empirical analysis with a theory of potitical reduction following the discussion of economism which has preceded Part II. The implications of encl-ave government for a theory of por^rer are dealt with in the second section of Chapter 5.

In examining the "peak" formal institutions of national government in a bourgeois order, I address a generaJ. pattern of development which has occurred in most western l-iberal uncludi-ng the three countries used in the present study. That pattern reflects the erosion of the political effj-cacy of the bourgeois order. The decLine of Iegitimacy enjoyed by the formal organs of bourgeois rule; the decline in the vitality of political parties ' and indeed, in the fundamental Processes of interaction within political parties; the atrophy of legislative representation; and the rise of fragmentary and oftenr ineffective, patterns of dissent aI 1 of these have Elaine McCoy Part II -323-

motivated a number of political analysts to address the "crisis" of politics in the last two decades.3 I characteríze these developments as an erosion of poJ.iti-cs, and emphasise the importance of this erosion's having occurred at a time when economistic policymaking, discussed j-n the previous chapters, is increasingly evident in all three countries under study.

Chapter 6 analyses the "interest-orientation" of both liberaL and Marxist variants of the autonomy argument. That analysis wilt expose the presuppositions about the state that both schools share, and explain how those presuppositions distort a theory of the capitalist state. There is one fundamental characteristic which comprises the main context of policy making within the present crisis in the development of capitalism. That characteristic is the preemption of political struggle the functional requisite for just government within a capitalist state by crisis management.-Ã This occurs as a direct consequence of the increased economism which a protracted recession/depression might be expected to provoke. Those who employ the autonomy-problematic in analyses of the capitalist state have underestimated this contextual influence upon both the functional requi-sites of governmental institutions within capitalism, and the new configuration of peak institutions and political processes.

The discussion of political interest is included to Elaine McCoy Part II -324- accomplish two objectives. First1y, it aims to distinguish state activity and the form of the state from the behaviour of persons. Secondly, it provides a critique of existing theories of the state which rely upon behavioural assumptions and methodologies in their explanations of the contemporary capitatist state. The concept of political interest aS it relates to the shape of modern government and the nature of policy outcomes Seems to me the lynchpin of much contemporary state theory. That concept, of necessity' estabLishes a behavioural category for analysis. These are the very categories which I believe have distorted a modern theory of the capitalist state.

When the unique identity of the capitalist state in crisis is reconsidered without the behavioural freight, preparation for a full discussion of relative state autonomy can be undertaken. I shall employ the concept of áutonomy as a "disclosing" tool, viz. , to establish autonomy as a developmental category which exhibits directionality. Furthermore, I wish to locate state autonomy within a notion of institutionaL "independence" versus "capture". This presupposes a theory of power based on class domination. I want to incorporate temporal variables which are pertinent to my analysis of the capitatist state' during the years 7967-LgB2, of two different sorts: acute and chronic crises. The notion of acute crisis establishs a threshold which might provide both opportunity and structural accommodation to state autonomy. Chronic crises as described in Part I of Elaine McCoy Part II -325-

the present work are shown to establish an imperative toward economism and decreasing state autonomy. Elaine Mccoy Part I I -326-

Footnotes

1 The present work wil,l not attempt a thorough investigation of the work of Louis Althusser nor of the school of writing on the state which might come under the rubric of "". For the most important writing of Althusser and representative writing of and about structural Marxism see Louis Althusser Essays in Self-Criticism, trans. Graham Lock (London: New' Left Books' 1,976) ¡ Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (London:A1Ien Lane, L969)' ¡ Althusser' Lenin and Phi I osophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New left Books, I97L), Althusser, and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New left Books, 1970). See also, Perry Anderson, umen s Within En Iish Marxism (London: New Left Books, 19B0); Norman Geras' À t USSCT S Marxismt An Account and Assessment", New Left Review' /.7r (I9721 , p. 20¡ Leszek Kolakowski, "ÀIthusser's Marx". Socialist Re ister (197f) ; John Lewis, "The Àlthusserian Case , Marx SM oda , L (L972) ¡ Frank Parkin, "The Academici z ng of Marx , Dissent, 2 (l-980 ) p. 3 ; Mark Poster Existential Marxism in France: From Sartre to Althusser' ( Prrnceton New Jers P rl_nce ton UnÍversit Press, I975) ¡ and Steven S ma t ,Rê ngA t usser i An SSA on ruc ura Marxism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984). 2S". John Hol J-oway and So1 Picciotto, State and Capital; A Marxist Debate (London: Edward Arnold L97B) , especially Bernhard Blanke, Ulrich Jurgens, and' Hans Kastendiek, "Chapter 6: On the Current Marxist Discussion on the Analysis of Form and Function of the Bourgeois State", pp. l0B. 3th" idea of "crisis" is commonplace in contemporary writing about l¡'lestern liberal democracies. It is interesting that commentary on the phenomena comprising crisis cuts across partisan divisions within the academic literature. "Left", "1iberal", and "conservative" analyses address the crisis of capitalism. For a relatively conservative vj-ew of the politicaL determinants of the British problem. See, for exampJ.e, Samuel Brittan, "The Economic Tensions of British ", in R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr. (ed.) , The Future That Doesn't Work: Social Democrac 's Failure in (New York: Doub eday, L917) and Peter Jay, "Englanditis" it: Ibid. For a survey of the "Jeremiahs" of the British crisis sõlõõl wh j-ch discuss the af ore mentioned and others, see william B. Gwyn, "Jeremiahs and Pragmatists: Perceptj-ons of the British Decline", in wiLtiam B. Gwyn and Richard Rose (eds.), for the British Politics Group of the Tulane Studies in Political Science, Britain: Pr ress and Decline (New Orleans: The Tulane Un VCTSI ty Press, 1-980). An Amer ican conservative analysis of crj-sis can be found in SamueI Hunting ton, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmon (Cambridge, Massac usetts: Harvar Un versL ty Press, Elaine l,lcCoy Part II -327 -

Huntington, "The Democr atic DistemPer", in Nathan Glazer and (eds. The American Comm onweaLth )New York: Irving Cristol ) ' Austra lian Basic Books , L976) - presen at yeo e conservative view of crisis may be found, generaJ.lY, in the journal See also Patrick O'Brien, bias of the ' Quadrant. the "Pofitical Conflict a nd the Sense o f Permanent Crisis in I in Patrick Wel ler and Dean Jaensch Australian PolitY (Richmond, (eds. ) , Res ons I ble Governnment in Austra lia Victoria: rummon Pub 1 Ls h ng or the Austra AS an Political Studies Association, l9B0) The "liberaf" views of cris l_s tend to range between sociological ana Lyses emphas izíng a decline of legitimacy of governmental a nd party aPParatus, and a systems-approach to development emphas ízing Partisan realignments and their imPact upon g overnment structures - Within that huge range' a var ied and highlY cautious use of the concept of crisis is us ed mainlY to estabLish t he direction of develoPment ("soc ialist" or "new right" usuaJ-I'y characterízing the dichotomous neo-KeYnes lan VCTSUS neo-classical. oPtions for macro-economic management) taki ng place in EuroPe and the United States - See for examp le Develo ent in Raymond Grew (ed. ) Crises of Politic al The United State s (Pr nceton, New JerseY: Euro and and Pr nceton Un vers y Press t 9 B) William P. AverY David P. RaPkin' America in a Chan I World Political For a asc nat ng EconomY. New Yor Longman t status exchange w ithin the liberal tradition regarding the of the concePt of cr isis and aPProP riate methodology for understanding and measuring i ts impac t see Mancur Olsont The Rise and Decline o f Nations Economic Growth Sta f I ation ' ]- d es (New aven, AS SAC usetts: ale ocl-a t to Un vers ty ress, 2l and a vo lume of considered rePIY (ed.), The PoIitical Econo that anaIYsis, Dennis Mueller t of Growth (N ew Haven: Yale University Press' 9B eLe has a long tr aditon of analYsis of the contrad ictions of capitalism and the extent to which sets of contra dictions promote crises - Fo r representatrve examples in contemPorary writing, see Miche I Àglietta, "ChaP ter 6¡ MonetarY SYstem, Credit and Crises" , in Aglietta' A Theor of Ca ita I ist - Dav d Fernba Re lation: The US EX rience, trans (London: Verso, 191 , p. 28¡ Aglietta' "WorId CaPitaIism in the Eighties", New Left Review, 136 (198 2l ¡ Samir Amin' Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank, and Immanual Giovanni (New MonthIY WaL Lerstein, namics of G lobal Crisis York: Manue Caste s, The Economic Crisis Review Press, 19 on Societ (Princeton, New ersey: Pr tnce and American Grundrisse: UN VCrSI ty Press, ); John E. ElLiot' "Marx's Destruct ion'", Journal of Vision of CaPitaLism's 'Creative I4B¡ Post KeY nesian Economics, l- /Z (Winter L97B/791, P. Ca italism in Crisis; Andrew GambIe and PauL V'lalton ' I nf Iation and the State (London: Macm an Press, l¡ Larry Hirschorn and Fred Block, "Ne\,r' Productive Forces and the Contradictions of ContemPo rary Capitalism", TheorY and 'l/3 (MaY L9791 36 3¡ Ian Hunt, "Arl ObituarY or a Society, , P. FaLl lt New Life for the TendencY of t he Rate of Profit to (Spring l-983) p- Review of Radical PoIitical EconomY , 151 E1aine McCoy Part I I -328-

131; Harry Magdoff and Paul M. Sweezy, The Deepeni_ng Crisj_s of U.S. Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981); Ernest Mandel, (London: Verso, IeTs lL972l) ¡ Pau l Mattick, Economic Crisis and Crisis Theory (gùhite Plains, New York: M.E. Sharpe, L9B1); and James O,Connor, The Fisca1 Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, L973) . 4ror a forthright and clear statement and analysis of the modern Liberal constitution from the point of view of British idealism, which I believe is the most developed strand of bourgeois state theory addressing the English constitution and which is in fact provides the ethical underpinnings for notions of the modern liberat state, see Bernard BosanqueÇ The Philosophical Theory of the State (London: Macmillan, l-9L0) , especiatly Chapters III, IV, and X, pp. 53-l-02; and 256-287 . Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -3

ChaPter 5 The Bourgeois State and Enqlave Government: Implications for a TheorY of Power

This chapter opens the theoretical discussion of the presentworkbyintroducingthenotionof''enclave government,,, illustrated with examples from recent British experience of parliamentary reform. The second section of the chapter extends the analysis to a discussion of po\^rer'

Section (a) : Enclave Government

The Erosion of the PrimacY of Politics as the Functional Requisite fot Governmental Institutions Within a Capita 1 i st State

An erosion of potitics can be understood in the following terms: a) a repudiation, in practice and by authoritative which provide means , of the most basic tenets of liberalism a rationale for the bourgeois order; b) an absence of cohesionacrossbroadsocialgroupingsonthesubstanceof political demands and on the methods of bringing those demands to the ,,machinery of government"; c) a "rel'ocation" of a politica] centre al¡'ay from maSS involvement; d) a relocationofkeypolicymakingorganswithingovernment away from partisan influence and the creation of executive decision making organs which are increasingly insulated from either bureaucratic or parliamentary review' These, in effect,comprisean,'enclave''governmentwhichdistorts Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -330- traditional parliamentary constitutions'

The Relative State Autonomy Arqument

A key notion in the state autonomy debate is the relative distance of politics from direct class or economiC determination. l That distance implies a freedom from control. In brief, the autonomy argument is as follows: The nature of contradictions within contemporary capitalism creates political uncertainties, muftiple interests, and increases the scope of social interaction which undermines class control. potitics escapes exclusively economic determination. Politics allows for an expression of the orqanized interests of a heretofore disenfranchised class' the proletariat, which is able to express its claims against the state in a complex and sophisticated manner' For example, trade union support for extended medical and safety benefits has compelled governments to enact legislation' This has Íncreased the fiscal crisis of the capitalist state, due largely to a multiplicity a similar demands arising from organized interests.2 Presumably capitalist interests opppose such programmes. The existence of such repudiates direct instrumental programmes ' therefore, control- of the state by capitalists'

Presumablycapitalistswould,iftheycould,exerc]-Se direct control over the political order and thereby minimize the effects of both social and market "waste" (e'9'' -33 r-- ' Elaine McCoY Chapter 5

unexpLoited potential for new markets due to heterogeneous cultural patterns, orr more mundanely' strikes) ' Likewise' upon economic rationalization would exert a direct influence policy. But direct influence is not apparent' The the intervention of a "contested space" arises from imperfectcorrespondencebetweentheneedsofcapita]ists together with the requirements of a capitalist economy, and of the overall scope and diversity of modern systems government.Avarietyofundeterminedpoliticalactivityis abletomoveintothatcontestedspace.Examplestakenfrom contemporary politics range from single-j-ssue manoeuvres to such as "ri-ght-to-birth" and ecology movements traditional class-based politics such as trade union the organizing and industrial action. To refuse to recognize is argued' is to relative autonomy of politics ' it ,,vulgarize,, political analysis and, more importantly' to missopportunitiesformountinganeffectivechallengeto capitalist rule-

A Critique of the Above Argument

Inspiteoftheappealoftheaboveargument,Icontendthat thesis the very phenomena adduced to support the autonomy politics are nothing more than an erosion of the efficacy of nor which neither engenders ne\^I poriticar opportuni-ties ' revealacontestedspacewithinwhichtomounteffective challengestoclassrule.Notonlyisthismisconceptì-onof but politics damaging to theories of the capitalist state' Elaine l4ccoy Chapter 5 -332- the autonomy theory is naive about the real world of political possibilities. The apprppriate site for class struggle is effectively displaced when an atrophied politi-caI order becomes the prescribed location for struggle.

Even \¡rere the "capture of politics" accomplished by organized interests representing the producing classes'3 th" result would not be control of the capitalist state, although it might further destabil-ize the bourgeois order' An "encIave politics" has developed within the formal institutions of government. It is only the outer bunkers of but political institutj-ons which are able to be contestedr4 unlike the trench warfare of the First World fVar, perimeter attacks are of little use to an assaul-t upon the capitalist state.

It is frequent in political science Iitelature to remark upon the increased complexity of bureaucratic and executive government as a common development in mature capitalist systems since the Second lrlorld War.5 fhi" is often conceptualized as an attribute of "modernity" ot t more rigorously, as a result of the increased burden on government due to the remarkabl-e rise of the welfare-state' Complexity and extension of the state have resulted in obstructions to direct appeal by citizens to governmentr âS the layers of processing mechanisms have proliferated' The increase in size and scale of government creates a series of Elaine McCoy Chapter 5 -333-

bl-ocks which effectively insulate government. So also have the organizations for private demand increased in size and scope. Trade associations, PoIitica1 action committees of one sort or another, "movements" of either long or short duration, "third-party" political parties, and professional lobby groups are examples of the means at one I s disposal to express political demands. At the same time, these ne$/ organizations represent layers of insulation which have an impact upon formal political bodies by l^/ay of Iimiting lateral entry to decision centres (e.9., the lobbying of members of parliament and ministerial staff). They also create a defensive "blanket of influence" around important political centres. This "blanket of influence" is a strategic enhancement of Iobbying positions by strong interest-organizations. It works through selective prohibition of access to potentially rivaL state clients.

As the reci-procal politicaJ. practices between state and citizen have increased in complexity and Scope' the general conditions of the political economy have degenerated in the three countries under study. The economic recessions in the United States, Britain and Australia have been discussed in Part f, and empirical data has been presented to substantiate these claims.

Many writers in both the Liberal and left traditions of poLitical analysis are devoting effort to understanding the phenomenon of decl j-ne. I view the decline as a unique Elaine McCoy Chapter 5 -334-

trade-off between the demands of an increasingly insecure economic system and a Liberal potitical constitution. The unique manner in which political practice is subordinated to economic management under capitatism during economic crj-sis is a function of: l-) the tradition of a liberal political philosophy which has defined the goats of bourgeois order' 2) the formal apparatus of government within the capitalist state and 3) the necessity to protect surplus generation and accumulation within capitalism through market mechanisms'

Some recent literature has described the contradiction between the impulse to democracy and the property orientation of liberalism.6 I choose to focus upon neither the phitosophy of liberalism nor the "legitimacy" questionT for my treatment of the contradictions of capitalism. Rather I locate the primary contradictionsB t"levant to the present period of capitalist development in the processes of production and market practices within the international of capitalist order. Neverthetess ' the configuration poJ.iticaL and governmental institutions maintains a place in this thesis as the exposed mechanism of increased class exploitation during economic recession and as generating secondary contradictions which have an impact uPon the development of the capitalist state.

I characterize the "erosion of politics" as comprasl-ng two parts. A functional subordination of potitical aims to the demands of economic management in times of crisis and a -335- Elaine McCoY Chapter 5

of the three restructuring of the basic constitution that countries under examination to accommodate subordination.9

RecaP itu lation of the erosion of Before considering concrete examPles far: politics I shall recaPitulate the argument so economtc an overall env ironment of Protrac ted Given within which the configurat ion of reces sion, the context o f this state activitY is exam ined has, for the- PurPose analY sis, three main characteristics: of 1 itics , r_) an erosion Po and Production 2) a spatial dislocation of PoPu Iations sectors and state" 3 ) a redesign of the "tüelfare ' of 2 rocess of erosion I L) above' is comPrised The âs fo l Lows : saons t and our s ivisions, divi of polit ics to economlcs t 1) the functiona1 subordination tenets of a) entailing the rePudiation of the basic liberalismr and a lack of cohes ion in the substance o f b) resulting in traditionall v potitical demands and of the processes bring demands and appeals; emploYed to o f government 2l a spatial re location of the aPP aratus an ttenglavett gOVe rnmental aPParatus t wh ich establishes f rom mass a) a relocation of governmen t avlay populations and from other b) a relocatiä., executive apparatus away governmental pätãt""f and bureauóratic departments'

ation of t itic s within the caPitalist The unl ue subordin recession derive from: e nt mes o pro rac econom c stat t polit ical- Phi IosoPhY within 1 ) the tradition of libera ise constitutions within surPlus accumulation and the monoPoIY charcater of ding) . -336- Elaine McCoY Chapter 5

The Erosion of Politics: A British I I lustration

gi-ves The crisÍs-prompted economism of British policymaking rise to the forrowing deveropments in governmental i_nstitutÍons. Firstly, efforts have been taken by successive governments representing both parties to "modernize" Whitehal]asanefficientdecision-makingapparatus.Ishall argue that the ,,rationalization" efforts of the modernizing planshaveconstitutedaprocessofinsulatingexecutive decision making from intra-party strife and increased to bureaucratic entrepreneurship at a time when resources accommodate party and administration demands are declining' Theisolationoftheexecutiveisnottotal,i.e.,private to citizens and select politicar advisors may gain access inner cabinet personnel or the Prime Minister through perSonalinteractionwiththeexecutive.Particularized access is a strategic enhancement of modern executive decisionmakingdesignedtobroadenexecutivepowerwithin the context of extended government' Moreover' the parliamentary system has witnessed a breakdown in party disciplinewithtwomajorconsequences:anincreasein power of the Government i-mpunity and a weakening of the CommonstoactaseitheraforumforpartydemocracyoraSa restraint uPon the executive'

CoincidentallY, the rise of Quango's and QcRsl0 has greatly strengthened the discretionary role of the executiverandcontributedtowhatoneseasonedobserver has is termed the "Absolute Premier" '11 And' finalty' what -337 - Elaine McCoY Chapter 5

duat termed British corporatism is the creation of Politj'cs and which which are spatially separate from each other involve separate jurisdictions' with the interest-corPorate jurisdiction disadvantaqed vis-à-vis the executive-enc lave jurisdiction-12

into a This modernization of executive government functionaldivisionof,,politj-calarenas''orjurisdictions for dispute rebuts the ideal notion of a representative ,,par1iament" (the tripartite sharing of power originally defendedineighteenthandnineteenthcenturytiberal a command thought) rl3 and delivers to absolutist executives ofthestrategicheightsofçJovernmentalcontrol.That controfamountstothecreationofanenclavegovernmentand isaradica]changeoftheBritishconstitutionwhi]e maintaining a bourgeois order '

TherationalizationofWhitehallrepresentsanincrease been in authoritative decision making which has constitutionatJ'yavailabletogovernmentsinGreatBritain. Itmaya}soresultinthesharpeningofideological divisionswithinministerialgovernmenttotheextentthat of strong secrecy and dispatch the recognized value executivesystemsbecomefunctionalvaluesforcabinet selection and the appointment of such key administration increasingly officers as parliamentary secretaries ' and special political common use (since Wilson's initiation) of means of advisers. Cabinet committees further provide a Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -338- preempting debate in the cabinetr âs do the distributing of "specialized" scrutiny of policy objectives and implementation among a pJ.ethora of ad hoc committees and liaison organizations -14

Maintaining Treasury aS the co-ordinating mechanism in government (after the brief interlude of introducing an alternative co-ordinating body, the Public Expenditure survey committee, under. provisions adopted from the Plowden committee and lasting from 1961 to L973 ) is also an especially fortuitous cirumstance for strong executive ruIe, as cash limits may be used as discretj,onary, which is to sêy, disciplinary, tools for executive sanction'

Absolute PremiershiP

It is not difficult to imagine how the nature of economic or national security crises promotes the natural expansion of the powers of the Premier. Tony Benn's discussion of prime ministerial prerogatives provides a 1-) The po1^ters of appointment and straightforward "ccou¡t,15 dismissal are constitutionatly acceptable prerogatives of the executive. While the virtuat prerogative to create peers may lie with the monarch, it is the Prime Minister whose advice amounts to actual prerogative' Add to this appointments such as chairs to the boards of nationalized industryr aPPointments for permanent secretaries ' ambassadors, chiefs of staff, heads of security services, and public and fringe boards as recorded in the civil Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -339-

Service Department Recordr âs well as scores of honorific appointments of one sort or another and the por¡'er of patronage is monumental. 2l Control of the policy agenda' bY virtueofsubstantivecontrolssuchastheinitiationof policy papers and the flow of information' and of process controls such as the composition of cabinet committees, is anobviousSourceofautocraticpo\^Jer.Thisbecomesmore crucial as a means of ensuring enclave government when the scaleofgovernmentinvo]vementincivillifemakes strategic decision making, as well as the timing of policy implementation, a "surgical" tool for extensive control from an executive apex. 3) Parliament Can be bound to foreign treaties without formal ratification, and the conduct of the military defense forces through the Defense secretary can be controlled to define and react to si-tuations of national security. 4) The power to dissolve Parliament is entirely unilaterarl9 and votes of confidence, or the threat of them' in Cabinet as weII aS in the Commons can create a situation of intra-party brinksmanship which has potent and cumulative disciplinarY effects.

The characterization by Tony Benn of the "Absolute premier,, and his call for a "Constitutional Premier" as an alternative are criticisms of the traditional role of Prime MinÍsters rather than expJ.anations about the ne$7 context within which these traditional powers achieve a potency pushingthelimitsoftheconstitutionofthetraditional bourgeoisorder.StronggovernmentisnotopposedbyBenn' Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -340- nor is the notion of an effective and preordinate place for the parliamentaray parties' But to 'halt the extension of executive po$¡er would take much more than party reform (e.g., the introduction of labour party democracy) ' The superordinate poh/er of the executive within a parliamentary system is as much a necessity of enclave government as is thedominanceofMinisterialcontroloverparty representation in the House of Commons '

L1 The medieval context of absotutist monarchy SECMS very like the contemporary context of absolutist premiership in two fundamental b/ays: there exists in both systems an absence of governmental apparatus appropriate to the demands being made upon authoritative institutions for the resolution of societal problemsi at the same time' the precarious transition faced by both medieval and modern systems necessitates that authoritative decisions be taken with some degree of predictability. e strong executive, like an absolutist monarch can act with dispatch and secrecy, but more importantly, the display of dominance itself counterbalances the spiralling tendencies of social upheaval during conjunctural points of transition toward a"atchy'18 Theappea]ofanabsolutistpremiertoamasselectorates Iiesperhapsintheessentialeconomyofeffortand efficacious results which single-mindedness brings to situations of uncertaintY.

Functional Reorqanization: Its Impact Upon Cabinet and Elaine l4cCoY Chapter 5 -341-

Ministerial ResPonsibif itY

The rationalization of whitehall can be seen in the organization of government busj-ness which has been accomplished during the l-9'lOs and 1980s ' Two notable innovations begining with the Heath Government in L970 and continuing through to the Thatcher Government, (with little revision during the Lg]4-L979 Wilson/Catlaghan years), have been the attempts to provide a functional division of departments with the creation of "Super-departments" in the Heath Government and the proliferation of cabinet committees for the purpose of liaison. Both innovations have increased prime ministerial control of policy development. A great deal of this reorganization of government business has entaiLed changes in some of the fundamental conventions guiding internal government administration in Great Britain. This has taken place in a seemingly paradoxical fashion. Ministerial responsibility has been drastically altered whiLe, ât the same time, the scope of departmental reach has been extended.19 Similarly, the role of the parliamentary party has been reduced, ât the same time that democratization of leadership selection has occurred in both the Labour and Conservative parties, through more extensive use of caucus mechanisms. The paradox of an overall extension of the reach 'of ministerial and party influence together with the strategic retrenchment of actual control of substantive policy developments by members of parliament, is illustrative of the "deformation of the Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -342-

Bri-tish COnstitution" which has coincided with enclave government in Britain.

Two recent developments in ministerial government iLlustrate the deformation of ministeriaf convention and the constitution: the decline of both collective responsibility in cabinet government and individual ministerial responsibitity vis-a-vis department decisions; and the use of Cabinet committees. Collective responsibility has existed as a central convention of ministeriat government in England for the past 150 y"ut".20 rt is an attribute responsible government, in that it provides both a disciplined method of finalizing policy decisions r and a clear indication of government policy. The well-known convention is summarj-zed 2L AS:

aIl Cabinet Ministers assume responsibilitY for Cabinet decisions and actions taken to implement those decisions. Furthermore: the convention has two well-known elements: a minister who refuse to accept a decision must resign; and the government must resign or request a dissolution if defeaLed on a vote of confidence in the House of Commons. ThebindingoftheloyaltyofMinistershad,inthe past, been accomplished by means of anonymity and harsh reprisal for the abrogati-on of the convention. In spite of the stitl rare formal suspension of the conventio1r,22 th" convention,s undermining in recent decades has been much commented rpo¡23 (..n., publication of the Crossman and E1aine McCoY Chapter 5 -343-

CastLe diaries,24 increased usage of Cabinet "leaks" to register dissentr25 public statements by Prime Ministers admonishing cabinet Ministers to abide by the convent Lon26 and undirected voting in the commons2T | . But discussion of the undermining of this aspect of the convention has not been directly tinked to the state autonomy thesis' what is remarkable about breaking the convention of collective responsibi]itybyindi-vidua].ministersisthecontinuation of their status within the government. To a great extent this attests to the increase of factions within established parties,andtothepowerwhichleadershipofafactioncan have "gone public" in some bring. Moreover ' factions t-nsEances.2B secrecy and the use of reprisal appear to be tools of po\^/er taken from the Prime ì4inister by the need to maj-ntaingovernmentalstabiJ.ityinthefaceoffactious dissent. However' such a view is mistaken'

The question is, to what extent does the existence of factions and the need to accommodate factional behavior in ministerial government weaken the strength of the executive or reverse the tendency to autocratic rule, commented upon by such observers aS Tony Benn? If the prime minister were' in fact, merely the first among equals' as the fiction of colÌegiaI administration would have it' then factious dissent would exact a serious tolI upon a tendency to absolutistpremiership.But,âsthediscussionofCabinet committees wi]1 illustrate, the Prime Minister, if not a presidentialexecutiveriscertainlyagreatdealmorethan Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -344-

firstamongequalswithintheapexofBritishgovernment. The argument here is that the increase of factions only strengthenstheabitityoftheexecutivetoachievea strategic dominance' Without the party as a unified restraint upon executive rule, factions are easily pit against each other and ideological solidarity ( if not personal cronyism) can be used by an executive to achieve a coherence which gains a cumulative advantage in the formulation and administration of government rul-e. Put more succinctlY: col IectivitY benfits Part rule; faction benefits executive rule. Moreover, it can be argued that the rise in factions is not so much an attribute of a "freed up" system of competing interests but' rather' a symptom of frustration as mass parties confront an increasingly autocraticexecutive.Powerhasaccruedtotheexecutive through the development of an enclave government' not through the default of political parties in exercising 29 "responsible government" '

Decline of the "No-Confidence" Dissolution PrinciPIe

Thesecondaspectoftheconventionofco]lective responsibilityunderexaminationhereistherequirement that a government resign or seek dissolution in the event of a vote of no-confidence. Presumably, this element of the convention binds executive loyalty to coJ.legial decisions in government the same hray that ministers' loyalty is bound to decisions. Both parties within parliament are' in turn, bound to party unity a consensual loyalty which Conveys Elaine McCoy Chapter 5 -345-

the notion of a mandate to rule though representation of a defined and unified programme. The iesignation of a minister from government is a declaration of "good faith" in keeping with the constitutional tradition of parliamentary norms and open government. (The liberal constj-tution of Great Britain institutionalj-zes the exercise of good faith through periodic turnover of government on the basis of Party responsibility and !h" ability of government to implement a mandated programme, or manifesto, of intention. ) In recent decades the rule of collective responsibitity has been relaxed. An authoritative source reports that in the last two decades what is understood by the convention of collective responsibility as regards government stability has changed. He sees the deviation from past practice of the convention as a change of signific..,..r30

What changed was not the basis of the Government's response but the number of defeats. Whereas previous defeats had been few and far bqtween (eleven in the period from L945 to L9701 , and did not impact themselves on Members' consciousness, the defeats of the 1970's v/ere too numerous to be ignored. There lvas an increasinÇ though by no means universaf realisation of what was entailed by the convention of collective responsibility. It was far more limited in scope than had genera I J-y been real ized . This in turn had significant political implications. Members began to be ar^/are that by defeating a government proposal they \^7ere not necessarily raising wider constitutional considerations. The "constitutj-onal reality" of the collective ¡ responsibility convention is a measure of "constitutional elasticity" (in this case of the limiting sort), which accepts that divisions in the Commons may result in discretionary voting. Such a degree of elasticity interacts Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -346- with the rise of factious tendencies in Parliamentr and as argued above' contributes to the Poi^/er of the "Absolute

Premier " .

The changing constitution of Great Britain displays an organic process of change' It is not the result of the deliberatemachinationsofanelitebutanatura] institutional response to the "times". There have been in the past two decades more deliberate attempts to rationalíze whitehall: the functional division of departments and the increased use of cabinet committees discussed directly be I ow.

Control PubIic Service Reform: A Further Vüeakening of Party

The Iiaison between Government and the public service occurs most obviously through ministerial administration of Public Service Department".3l Two of the most ambitious tinkerings with public service organization in Britain in recent times have been the re-structuring of Government Departments consequent to a pair of White Papers one during the conservative Heath Government, and the second during the conservative Thatcher Government described by a former permanent Secretary32 as "two milestones in WhitehatL 77 evoLution,r.)) Those documents are "The Re-organization of centrar Government,, (cmnd . 4506, Lglo) and "Efficiency in Í'lhiIe the f irst the Civil Service" (Cmnd ' B 2g3 ' l-9Bf ) ' sought to reform government by way of re-structuring, the EIaine McCoY Chapter 5 -347 -

second sought reform by introducing managerial efficiency' The fundamental thrust of the first attempt at reform was a matching of Department to function, considered an advance upontheo]derbasisoforganizatio¡whichmatched department and client grouP. Functional efficiency was to be gained in the amalgamation of Departments into huge ,,super-Departments" which l¡¡ere to achieve both economies of scale and efficiency of co-ordination, intra- and inter-departmentally. Greater professionalism, a la the Futton Royal Commission Report recommendations of L967 ' was to be gained by streamfining informatÍon flows and with the clear recommendation of alternative policy optionsr âs well as with fixing departmental responsibility along functionaL lines. F.urthermore, the creation of a Central Policy Review staff (CPRS) and the introduction of a Programme Analysis and Review (PAR - phased out in L919) were meant to enhance ministerial control over departments and provide "fresh ideas,, for policy review. It is arguable whether CPRS achieved its aim of establishing a more rigorous Ministerial control over departme.rt=.34 And in the case of PAR, it has beensaidthathavingbeencapturedbyTreasuryfromits inception, it was nothing more than a co]]ection of the ,,same old faces" Iacking innovative ideas or the ability to pose problems as opposed to mediating competing interest".35

Because the bureaucracy is a pLace of many varied and diverse entry points into the machinery of government policymaking and implementation, it has been, traditionally' Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -348-

afearedorganization.ThismaybeespeciallySoinBrj-tain which where ministers do not possess their own cabinets with to administer their Departments. Nor have they been traditionally specialists in the substantive fields under their administration. while the most recent decades of conservative re-organization sought to effect change in a streamlining of departments, government backbenchers have sought greater scrutiny under the terms of individual ministerial responsibility. But as the quantitative burden of Ministerial administration has increased with the growth in scale of Departme.rt=,36 so too has the qualitative demand from commons scrutiny. The twin burdens of complex administration and closer scrutiny in government have been of focussed upon the intermediate r.ever of authority, that individual ministerial responsibility vis-a-vis the commons' MostaccountsSeemtosuggestthatattemptstoreformthe machinery of government have very minimal impact'38 Neither through restructuringr âs in the case of Heath' nor through ,,re-styl Lzingr,, as in the case of Thatcherr3T has an impact policy been felt. what might be characterized as a factious environment within party poritics is expressed as categorical divisions in departmental poticy environments'

of Prime Ministerial Coordination: A Further, Streng thening Executive Control

While reformist efforts in the public service and the the Commons have been relativelY ineffective in bringing Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -349- administrativeapparatusofgovernmentintotheorbitof ,,rational,, and broad party controlr3S the prime minister has hadtheadvantageofempl.oyingspecialistadvisorswhoare not only attached to key ministers deemed central to policy formation39 but who have direct access to the executive' Thus, a crysta]tization of policy objectives can occur at a timeandplaceful.lycontrol]'edbytheexecutive.The advantageofsuchcoherenceinthefaceoffactionand is 40 f unctional departmental dÍvision "not*o']" '

The degree of control which a cabinet or an individual minister exercises over the policy-making process is crucially dependent on the ctãrity of the government's pãii"i"" and the care with which they have been worked ã"1-i" opposition. The style of the policies of the government as a whole witl reflect the relationships within the cabinet and of course the style of chairmanship and J.eadership adopted by the prime minister. Enclave Government and the Constitution

If political parties are prone to faction resutting in undisciplinedpoliticalorganization,andifbureaucracies in are reduced to specialized functional units resulting apolitical organization, then it might be hoped that at reast one formar constitutionar body, the House of commons, is capable of an ordered politics of the kind ordained by nineteenth-century tiberal thought and chiefly defending the progressive character of the bourgeois order. Representation and the oversight of the executive are the raison d'être of lower houses in al1 Iiberal constitutions. They support the bourgeoisorderthroughmechanismsoforderJ.y representation(usuaJ-lypoliticalparties)'andthrough Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -350- functional control of the Government (most importantly through bills of supply). Most contêmporary analysts in this field have decried the demise of the House of commons as an efficient body of representation and oversiqnt'41 But they have faiLed to see the decline as a functional requirement of bourgeois government in times of crisis'

The consensual interaction discussed at the outset of this section as fundamental to politics within a bourgeois order and so necessary to the stabirity of the capitarist state is simply a projection of two fundamental characteristics of or-derIy mass politics: rePresentation and contror. They are liberal in character because they promise justice through appeal by an orderly process of dissent (usuallyelectionsrbutalsopreparationofreferenda'and such intermediate measures as introduction of private members' bills) - They also reflect capitalist social organization because they organize reciprocal responsibilities accordi-ng to a process of exchange (e'g', the quantity of votes exchanged for a share of representational "voice" as in either a general election or the counting of support in a vote of confidence) ' If the popular representative body within a bourgeois order can neither futfil lhese requisites for Iiberal constitutj-onal rule'norestablishsurrogateprocesseswhicharevirtual representations of these, then a constitutional void exists ' a I ibera l The important question is , then , how necessarY is constitution to the continued existence of a bourgeoise -351-- E1aine McCoY Chapter 5

order?

Section (b) : Power and the Capita I ist State the rast The institution of enclave government, described in for section, has come about as a reaction to the need greaterexecutivecontrolofstateapparatusinacapitalist systembesiegedbyeconomiccrises.Enclavegovernmentisa system-response to a fundamental contradiction in capitalist in development, viz-, the maintenance of a bourgeois order the face of critical economic decl in".42 As discussed, bourgeoisorderhasbeensynonymouswithanorganicliberal constitution-Asindicatedintheprecedingsection'a strongcasecanbemadethatadeformationoftheBritish in constitution illustrates a similar process occurring other capitalist states. The first section ended with the questionofhownecessaryaliberalconstitutionistothe continued existence of a bourgeois order' The present sectionwi]Isuggestananswerbydiscussingthenatureof 41 power within caPitalism''-

Thediscussionisundertakentobuildacritiqueofthe autonomyargument.Itwi].lbeshownthatthedevetopmentof is an encLave government within a bourgeois order from a accompanied by a shift in the use of power by rulers concentration on gathering political consensus among mass publicstoadirectanddisciplinedmethodofensuring surplusexpropriation.Thisisashiftincapacityaswel]' as in the tacticaJ- employment of po\^¡er by rulers' Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -352-

This shj-ft is associated with the ne\^/ context of an enclave government. Concentrated po$ter at the centre enlarges state capacity to exercise power and is accompanied by new techniques of doÍng so' These techniques are increasj-ngly coercive and increasingly visible. They are no longer ,,embedded" or implied in the preemptive practices of political actors which convinced earlier theorists of power that non-events constituted power relations..44 Nor are they ,,inscribed,, on the institutional arrangements of politics in such a manner as to determine class domi-nation in the last instance, mediated by the risk factors present in political confIict.45 The negotiation of the social contract between capital and labour has become subordinate to an emphasis upondirectcreationofsecurityforthecapitalistmodeof production. Labour discipline and increased centralization of contror.-decisions affecting factor employment in the production and disposition of economic surplus are the main components of this securitY'

Iproceedherewiththeassumptionsthatthebourgeors order is not necessarily synonymous with a liberal constitution and that the state is the concentration of class rule within capitalis*.46 The presupposition of this workisthatpo\^/erderivesfromcontroloverthemeansand rerations of economic production, guaranteed by capitaJ-ism as class domination. I clarify the "relationaL" notion of pO\^/er. Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -3 53-

In order to derive a coherent paradigm from the vast amount of commentary and theor izíng about poh/er and the state I shall concentrate on two treatments which I believe provide the most pertinent elements of a "reLational" theory of power. These are the works of Nicos Poulantzas and Stephen Lukes. 47

Nicos Poulantzas and the Relational TheorY of Power

Nicos Poluantzas has attempted to define the problem of power within capitalism as one of class conflict, but one bounded specificalty by social, relations. Power is neither explicit nor impticit in relations of economic production f or poulantzas, but exists onJ.y at the level of social relations. In his discussion of power in capitalism, Poulantzas believes that it is crucial to delimit the ,'fiel.d', of the concept of po\^/er by distinguishing between structures and social relations within capitalism, precisely because of the relational nature of power. Both the capacity for and exercise of po\^rer of one class depends upon capacity and exercise in the opposing class. The relationship between classes vis-a-vis power is direct. Hovlever, the point at which po\^/er comes into ptay between classes aLso denotes the a priori effects which structures (here aS "ensembles of leveIs" ) have on SOciat practices between classes. structures seem in this sense to predispose both the capacity for and exercise of power' Powerr oD the other hand, "specifies" the effects of structures by concretizfng the precise moment and manner of struggle between classes. -354- Elaine McCoY Chapter 5

poulantzas undertakes these limiting definitions of the concept of po$¡er to avoid what he têrms "the most important contemporary misinterpretatio¡5"48 of po\^ter ' He argues against the view that:49

thefoundationofclassesandc]assconflictisnot in the relations of production' but in the global distribution, ât every leveI of power il:lU' 'authoritarian' societiãs: that is to sâY ' inside societies characterized by a grobar organization of domination u"ã subordi-nation consisting of an ;i;;;;ritarian' distribution of ' this po$/er at every Ievel. This misinterpretation of power' according to Poulantzas, leads to a crucial mistake in a comprehension of the nature 50 of power 3

s case relations of Production area eciaÌ either of ere a ons of powerr or PO\^/ef I S it of production- This pr posed in that involves a confus ion between struc tures and class practices and thus imprisons the rePlY available to Marxist science in an ideo Iogical dilemma according to Poulan,tzas the relational In other words ' ' of aspect of povrer should not be conceived as a relationship the an economic level to a social 1evel either in derivative or interactive sense but as a relationship betweenclassesnotthemse]vesreducibletopo\^'er'nor derived from power reLations. For Poulantzas, cLass escapes a structural determination because it is universal ' vühile affected by levels and the ensemble of levels of economic' social, and potiticat organization' class is neither derived is from any particular level or ensemble of levels ' nor class practice reducible to these structural determinants' SimilarIy'powerescapesastructuraldefinition.Although -3 55- Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 not conceived of as a universal category as is class, por^/er merelyspecifiestheeffectsof'structurespredisposing class activity. As a signif ier, in this sense' pov/er is predisposing doubly ,,reIationa1,, : it relates practice !o situations(aspecificconjunctureofensemblesoflevels interactingwithclassstruggle)'anditrelatesclassesto each other in concrete struggles'

poulantzas wants to specify and refine these relational power' aspects of por^/er to exclude a "global" conception of HeSetSforthadefinitionwhich,inanuJ.ysis,isproperly of used aS a concept ,'indicating the effect of the ensemble the the structures on the relati-ons of the P ractices of varaous classes in conflict." 51 lt is this that objectifies interest. I shall pursue this point shortly'

Pou]antzascriticisesanothertheoryofpowerdirectly an opposed to the global one' which attempts to establish assymmetry'between political groups and economic c1.==e"'52 This would amount to a dichotomj-zation of c}ass: c]ass aS this economic category, and grouP as political practice' In rupture, Poulantzas sees a confusion similar to the point class-in-itse:rf/cLass-for-itself division'53 Àt this intheanalysisPou]antzasintroduceshisnotionof interests.

Thecontrollingdefinitionofpo\^¡er,forPoulantzasIS ,,the capacity of a social class to realize its specific )*5L objective interests." Poulantzas asserts that this E1aine McCoY Chapter 5 -35 6- definition is neither decision-oriented;55 nor derived from a preoccupation with legitimacy;56 no. does it concern capacity-as-function.57 Poutantzas' denials are made on the grounds that his o$/n interest-perspective is neither ,'voluntarist", "historicist" r flof ,,functionalist-integrationist|' .5B without assessing Poulantzas' preliminary defense of his relational theory of power as it integrates an interest perspective, I shall proceed to his own statement of the utility of such a perspective for Marxist analysis.

Poulantzas presents four utilities which his theory of povrer provides. 1) It relies on a frame of reference which is class struggle, and is able to designate, "a clear line between the places of domination and s.ubordination"'59 2l "This concept of power refers to the capacity of a class to 6o real-ize specific objective interestsrr:- and aS such is able to incorporate class organization in its analysis ' Organization points to the limits which are the "effects of the structure in the relations between the various practices of the cfasses in conflict.6l- ' Although necessary' organization is not a sufficient realj-zation of class power: 62

interests' of The capacity- of a class to real-ize its which organization of its povùer is the necessary condition, depends upon the capacity of other classes to realize tfrãir intãrests. The degree of effective power of a class dePends directlY on the capacity of other classes, in the framework o fthed etermination of c lass practices in the limits set by the practices of other cfasses. StrictlY sPeaking, power is identical with these limits in the second degree. Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -357-

This is an expression of relational theory par excel Ience. Capacity,organizationandinteractionasprovidinglimits: these are the key elements in this reLational theory of power. In Poulantzas' theory the voluntarism of bourgeois conceptions of po\"¡er is presumably overcome through an inclusionoftheconstraintsofclassandclass organization. The functionalist dilemma is overcome through aninclusionoftheoppositionalcharacterofclass interaction which makes the structural or predisposing constrai.nts on the exercise of po\^rer always tentative- 3)rt incorporates a theory of interest' Just as the notion of capacity, above, is explained by using a method of spatial demarcation(regionallimitsrandsymmetryof]-evels encompassingclassinteraction),thenotionofinterestis al-so subjected to demarcation. In this case the demarcation is one of spatial extension: objective interests denote the extension of a field of class practices which encounters and movesagainstthepracticesofanotherclass.Interestis ,,objectified,, as the threshold and horl_zon of a designated field of class practice. The field is struggl"'63 The capacity of a class to realize its objective interestsl åna so its class po\^rer' depends on the òapacity, and so on the po\^ier, of its opponent' 4)Ithastheabititytospecifybothinterestandpower.It formulates a notion of relatively autonomous interests according to the levels upon which they operate' Relatively to autonomous interests are abre to be specified according thelimitsimposedonclasspracticestakenatspecified Ievefs,independentofpracticesinotherlevels.The Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -358- specification of interests aIlows for a specification of 64 pO\^¡ef :

in a capitalist f ormation characterízed bY the specific autonomY of the leveIs of structures and practices, and of the respective class interests, we can clearlY see the d istinction between economic po\¡iter, I itica I êYt ideological Power , etc. , according to e capac Yof a class to rea Iíze its relativelY autonomous interests at ea ch level. Poulantzas makes great cl.aims of exPlanatorY and analytic utility for hj-s relational theory of power. unfortunately they rest on an abstraction which renders the theory almost purely sPeculative, and its claims to analytical and explanatory strength unfounded. These shortcomings are the result of a refusal to place brute force at the centre of a theory of power and the capitalist state. without a comprehension of that essential brutality, a convoluted and tortured language strives to explain (and explain away) the potential and actual tyranny of class rule. It seems ironic that the system of capitalism which is capable of inflicting such a high degree of immedj'ate and obvious deprivation upon such great numbers of people should be so elegantly portrayed in the speculative theory of the contemporary Power theorists. But a more programmatic critique of Poulantzas is now in order'

Proqrammatic Critique of Poulantzas

At the risk of some redundancY I must restate Poufantzas' clai-ms described above in order to provide a systematic refutation of them. Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -359-

C].aimone:employmentoftheconcept''c]'aSSstruggle,' isu.,ffio..."?'u...ofreference,theefficiencyof which is the á¡irity to designate places of domination and subordination. l,ihile Poulantzas does strive to employ class struggle as the frame of reference for his relational theory of po$/er he does so by mischaracterizing class relations as a) inherently charged with "struggle", and b) occurring on ,, sites,, conf orming to the structura ] ist notions of delineated regions, Ievels, and ensembles of ]eve]s whose boundaries exist as limits to the interaction between and amongtheclasses.Itishighlyproblematicthatclass struggle, while imminent given the nature of exploitation' in fact and in practice animates the relations among classes. Indeed, to the sorrob¡ of some and the gain of othersrwhatpassesasclassstruggleisoftenthemost meagre sort of reformism. The political stability of capitalist regimes, in and of itself, makes the supposition about class struggle very arguable, as do the wrj-tings of an extensive and serious schoot of thought which attempts to understand class quietude on the basis of such notions as 65 a I renatron .

Furthermore, when articulated cLass struggle does occur' as in the most recent cases of the coal. miners' strife in Britain, it is seems not to conform to structural detimitation. "Regions" of the structural configuration of capitalism appear very permeable in the real world of class strife, and the "effects of ensembles of feve1s" predict neither the site nor the duration of conflict. The "clear Elaine McCoy Chapter 5 -360-

line between the places of domination and subordination" as an index of cl,ass struggle cannot be establsihed by mere assertion.

C1aim One fails on both counts of its stipulation.

Claim Two: Power, conceived as a capacity to realize objective interests, and "identical with the limits" delineated by confronting organizations escapes both voluntaristic and functionalist disabilities. This assertion is so close to early philosophic (British) and analytic (American) /pluralist claims as to beg irony. Liberalism became acutely beleaguered by theoretical criticism at the turn of the century (e.9., Freud's attack on rationality; Graham WalLas' introduction of the notion of differing "rationalities"; "Crowd" theorists like Le Bon who dj-scussed the danger of ne$/ mass collectivities; Robert Michel.s' work on the unrepresentative nature of modern polj-tical institutions)66. The defense was then raised by progressive liberals on the basis of a definition of "community" poh/er characterizing groups as uniquely j-nvested with the power to realize "objective interests". These were precisely the group-theory claims which raised the status of pluraLism to a defense of democracy!

Neo-Marxist relational power theorists and pluralist relational theorists have used the same bolt-hole to escape the paradox which a conflation of pob/er and interest promotes. The flaw here is not simply that pluralism distorts reality because it fractures classes into groups, thereby introducing a voluntaristic fallâcy, while a class Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -361- category escapes the faLlacy' Rather it is that using the ttob conc of or anization to ectif interests renders obi ective interest synonymous with po\^Ier. Since this conflation of power and interest contains a serious methodoJ.ogicalandaphilosophicalparadoxtheoristshave attempted to get rid of the paradox by simple removal: power then becomes a capacity and interest becomes objective' one encounters in both liberal and Marxist relational po\^/er theory a convoluted attempt to justify the removal by reasoningfromabstractions.Poulantzas'c]aimtohave escaped bourgeois fallacies is unwarranted'

Ctaim Three: Spatial demarcatj-on enhances an understa n90 oth po$/er and interests. Whileitistruethatcapacityandobjectivity,aS qualities, may be efficiently conceived by using spatial categories, it is unlikely that the spatial categories used to characterize each woul-d demonstrate any kind of symmetry' Capacity as organization, and objectivity as the extension of "ground covered" within a field of class practices ' are used here as not only symmetrical terms ' but as interchang eabLe conditions - Indeed' organization is a specific kind of capacity which "covers ground", that is, estabLíshes domain. To distinguish them with jargon is disastrous. Poulantzas fails to enrich his relational theory of po\^rer with the stipulation of spatial categories '

Claim Four: Po\^/er and j.nterest can be specified on the basis ot their existence on relatively autonomous leve I s within the general field of class practices ' Elaine McCoy Chapter 5 -362-

The investiture of autonomy here r âs a function of discrete levels of class interaction, seems an intuitively reasonable theoretical exercise. Methodologically, it lends itself to investigation and explanation. But this is perhaps the least j-nnovative claim of Poulantzas' relational theory of power' indeed, it approaches ordinary sociotogical investigation of pLural, status grouPS.

The use of interest in characterizrng state activity is explored in closer discussion in Chapter 7. Other state theorists provide a richer and more straightforward employment of interest, one less confounded by a relational theory of power. For noh7' \^/e can obtain from Poulantzas' theory a kernel common to relational theories of pol^ter: Power is an interaction among people in conflict, and can be specified as the limiting nature of the conflict vis-a-vis the projection of j-nterests-

Steven Lukes and the Relational TheorY of Power

Now I shall consider the work of Steven Lukes which provides a good' way to round out the overall definition of a 61 relational theory of Powe r. Lukes', Power: A Radical Vj-ew, remains the most ambitious attempt in recent years to provide a systematic explanation of contemporary theories of power. Although offering only a very brief account of those theories, the nine chapters of the book clearly spell out a model which empJ,oys three "dimensions" of approach to the concept of power. The one-dimensional, two-dimensional, and Elaine McCoy Chapter 5 -363-

three-dimensional approaches are also differing aspects of a relational definition of power and serve to elucidate the interest-burden which informs the relational definition' consider Lukes' own sunmary at the end of chapter 4.

... Ir]he three-dimensional vi e\^/ of Power involves a thorouqhqoinq critique of the behavioural focus of the first two views as too individ ffiows for consideration of the many waYS an which potential issues are kept out of Politics, whether through the operation of social forces and instÍtu tional Practrces through individuals decisions. This, moreover' can or conflict occur in the absence of actual- ' observable ' which may have been successfully averted though there re'mains here an imPlicit ref ere nce to Potential conflict. This potential' however' may never in fact be actual ízed. What one may have here is a Iatent conf I ict , which consists in a contradicti on between the IN terests of those exerc ising power and the real interests of those they exclude. These later may not express or even be conscious of their interests ' but the ide ntification of those interests ultimate 1y always rest on empirically supported and refutab 1e hypotheses. -364- Elaine McCoY Chapter 5

the Lukes provides a schematic summary of his view of three views of Pol¡/er on P' 25"

One'Dimewional View d Power

Focus on (a) behaviour (b) decision-making onflict s, secn as PolicY Preferences re- articiPation

Two-Dimensional View d Power I focus nondecision-making issues covert) conflict s, seen as PolicY Preferences or grievances

Three-Dimensional View d Power

d control over Political agenda ugh decisions) issues (c) observable (overt or covert) and latent conflict (d) subjective and real interests

6 This conflict is latent in the sense conflict of wants or prefcrences between

tainable.) Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -365-

Without going over the details of Lukes' critique of behavioralist and neo-behavioralibt writing,6B I shall examine his own "third dimensional" view of power with the aim of deriving some paradigmatic elements of the relati-onal view of power. Lukes rejects a precedural critique of early behavioural. views of po!,/er as too superf icial. The American school, in having produced an anatytical approach to power, based its investigations upon assumptions which placed both conflict and the decisional process at the centre of their theories of power. The neo-behav ioural ists, whi le criticising the emphasis upon decisionaJ' processes, maintained a tacj-t intellectual loyalty to behaviouralist methodology in three ways. Firstly, observable behavior in situations of conflict sti11 provided the data for analysi-s, and with thatr ârl emphasis upon the decisional categories of power is maintained.69 S."ond1y, the emphasis upon situations of conflict fuIly accepted by both behaviouralists and neo-behaviouralists disallows a fundamental critique from the neo-behavioraLists and points to the shared fal lacy of both schools: a reLiance on I,Jeberian categories of interaction between individuals and colLectivities in society. And thirdly, the definition of a ,, non-decis ion,,7 0 is a process-oriented term in that non-decisions are grievances not all'owed entry into the formaL decisional process of politcs.

The three fauLts of the one-dimensional and two-dimensional. theories of the American analYtic school are Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -366- portrayed as inadequacies rather than as resting upon ' and f undamenta 1 ly f lawed assumptions about po\^ter the capitalist state. Lukes' critique is straightforward. His 71 ovrn three-dimensional view:

involves a thorou oln criti ue of the behavioral focus of the rS two v ews as too individualistic and ãTlows for consideration of the ma ny \^/ays in which tential issues are kePt out of politics, whether ough t e opera tion of social forces and institutional Pract ices or through individuafs' decisions. This' moreover' can occur in the absence of actual, observable conflict' which may have been successfullY averted though there remains here an implicit reference to po tential conflict. This potentia I , however, may never, in fact, bê actual ized. What one maY heve here i s a latent conflict, which consists in a contradiction be tmests of those exercising PohÌer and the real interests of those they exclude. These latter may not express or eve nbe conãcious of their interests, but, as I shall argue, the identification of those interests ultimately a lways rests upon empirically refutable hypotheses' In Lukes' schema, "rea1" interests and latent conf l-ict are tied together in a power definition which seeks to discover ,,a serious sociological- and not merely personalized expJ-anation of how potitical systems prevent demands from becoming political issues or even from being made"7l . The method he suggests to accomplish this aim is to specifY the identification of an exercise of power as either "effective" or "operatiVe", and to proVide a "COunterfactual" SituatiOn from which an observer could deduce that in the absence of power an different outcome would probably have resulted. This methodol o9Y, according to Lukes, alLows for an inCIuSion of "overdetermined" responses to the exercise Of a pO\^¡ef . That is, when more than one variable occurs l-n power equation (e.9., A and A' both significantly influence Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -367 -

B,s actions) it can nevertheless be assumed that a threshold-effect has occurred which determines an outcome' This is termed an "effective" exercise of power. without such an exercise of por^rerr âfI alternative outcome can be assumed. This is termed a relevant counterfactual' when a single variable can be identified as determining an outcome ina,,norma]'''(ongoing)stateofaffairs,theexerciseof power is termed ,,operative" r72 and results in control per se. In such cases a relevant counterfactual is more easily derived since the point and direction of the power exercise is more easily observed. In Lukes' view both effective and operative exercises must be included in any serious espe cial ly po\^¡er which is social lY consideration of Pob/er ' embedded. He views his method as pragmatic in the sense of providing a case-study approach, and scientific in the sense ofgeneratingrefutablehypotheses.Refutationwould presumably focus upon the status of competing "rel-evant counterfactuals" and upon the question of which variables are legitimately included in defining an overdetermined exercise of pot.t-73

Lukes defends his three-dimensional view of po$/er as containing conceptual and methodological utiLities similar to those claimed by Poulantzas. of the four claimed by Poulantzas, only lhe first, cfass struggle as a frame of reference, is not explicitly also claimed by Lukes' The capacity to realize objective interests, the demarcation of interest as beyond or "outside" the effective and operative Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -368- exerciseofpo!./er,andtheabilitytospecifypoh/erand interestbymeansofmethodologicaluseofarelevant counterfactual are all explicit in Lukes' relational theory of po\,ùer. rndeed, these utilities indicate the key principlesofsuchatheory,theprogrammaticstatementof whichissetoutbelow.MycritiqueofLukesismadeon virtual.Iy the Same grounds aS of Poulantzas. That is, I argue that the binding of power to interest confounds an operational definition of power since it confuses what is essentially the subjective category of interests. (see the definition and discussion in chapter 6) with an essentially objective one of power, (compulsion by brute force or the threat of brute force). To the extent that power and interests coincide, they do so merely temporally. Either may logically exist without the other. Neither is reducible to the other.

combining the interest-orientations of Poulantzas and Lukes (an undertaking about which they themselves would have grave reservations¡ 74 the following principles of a relational theory of po\^ter can be put forward. Firstly, power is the capacity as well as the immediate ability to ef f ect outcomes. Secondly, por^/er is the result of intentional human action including organization' Thi-rdly' power is intersubjective, that is, occurring between and by among people even though sometimes once- or twice-removed temporal or spatial circumstances ' Because capacity ' organization, and interaction chiefly characteríze power' -369- Elaine McCoY Chapter 5

and because these qualities also characteti-ze interests ' a fallacy of compositionT5 promotes the next two and final principles.) Fourthly' power is intimately conected with interests and finally, the concept of Po\^ter a1lows for a concept of objective interests'

Itisthe]astoftheconceptuall.eapsintheseriesof the definitions derived from the relational analyses of Lukes and Poulantzas which invalidates the general concept of a relational theory of power as it pertains to a conSideration of state autonomy' For it is the objectifj-cation of interests which provides the archimedj-an pointforboththeexerciseofpower(thesiteorlocation ofstateautonomy)andthearticulationofindependent interests (uncoerced by state authority or economoic determination).Thisparticularaspectoftheconceptual f]awinstatetheorywillbeexaminedinChapter6.At present I shalL simply argue that the empirical and analytical construct of my notion of enclave government repudiates the relational- theory of po$/er in two \^/ays' It suggeststhatpowerisexercisedaccordingtoaneconomistic imperative whose chief institutional effect is governmental insuration and the concentration of power in an executive- The site or location of po\^'er becomes, in this instance' irrelevant to the exercise of po!^/er because the exercise of po\^/er is constituted by the reach of unilateral authority invested in the executive by the clrcumstance of crisis and here competled by an economistic imperative. Retationality 70- Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -3 is reduced by circumstance to increasing degrees of state compuJ.sion. secondly, interests' themselves becomes increasingly determined by survival- imperatives. on the personal leve1, individuals become reactive agents in a context of diminishing opportunities. Examples of the sociaL disintegration surrounding such behavious in contemporary capitalist societies abound'

Conclusion

In the first section of this chapter I set out the notion of an enclave government as a 1ogically consistent and historically evident form of government wj-thin a capital'ist state.Ididnotrelyuponrelationa]poweroratheoryof interests to explain enclave government. I describe the evolution of encl.ave government as a response,to crisis and the increased loss of autonomy which the capitalist state exhibits during crisis.

In Section (b), I have examined several relational theories of po$ier. I have discovered that the conflation of interest and power which characterises these theorj-es introduces a fallacy of composition regarding the capitalist state. The concept of the state then expresses a location of power rather than a form of coercion. As merely a site or location, the state can then be assumed to function in muttipte ways, including relatively autonomous \^,ays ' For example, it can mediate conflicting interests. If the state is merely a ]ocation it can be assumed to be, by definition' -37 L- E1aine McCoY Chapter 5

relativelY autonomous'

AlternativelyrmYanalysisassumesthatthestate]-Sa greatdea]morethana]ocationorsiteofconflict.Asl statedinChapterL,,,pohrerisinfacttheobjectivereality of of domination,,. As such, it is the tangible expression enclave the capitatist state' I derive the notion of an governmentfrommyhypothesisaboutthedeclineofautonomy whichacapitaliststateexhibitsduringcrisis,.Empirical context of observation has supported the hypothesis ' The crisis has been established in Part I' The policy responses ofthreebourgeoisgovernments,alsoexaminedindetailin Part -rhaveprovidedsupportforthedecliningautonomy posture thesis. Restricted policy options and generally, the The ability of economism, have been explained in Chapter 4' ofgovernmentstodisciplinetheirpopu}ationsduringcrisis enclave is an expression of state po\^rer ' The idea of governmentdevelopedinthischapterextendstheempirical observationofdisciplinarypoliciestoatheoryofstate pos¡erinacontextofcrisiswhichpositsthreeconditions. power' The The state is a form of power not a location of the most capitalist state moves to achieve immediate ends, pressingofwhichiseconomicsurvival.Thetermsof surviva].willvaryaccoxdingtothepositionofeachstate withintheinternationalmarket.Forexample,thetermsof of survival for the United States wilt be an extension hegemoni-ccontrol;forBritain,deepeningausterity;andfor Australiaashiftofclientstatusinamovetowhatlhave -372- Elaine t"lccoy Chapter 5 termed dependent accommodation on the United States ' As discussed in Part I, survival requires marginal competitive advantage which is motj-vated by the logic of surplus accumulation rather than by any observabre national that interests. The form of the state is an expression of compulsion.Finally,thestateisnota',power-broker''but powerful.Thenextchapterswillelaborateuponthis preliminaryinvestigationbyrefutingassumptionsaboutthe capitalist state and political interest' -37 3- Elaine McCoY Chapter 5

Footnotes

an ls"" an exPanded discus s ion of the debate and extended bibl iograPh j'c citation in Chapter 6 ) 'o'connor, op. cit- 3"ti. olin wright, "Class Boundaries i n Advanced Capitalist Societies", New Left Review,98 ( Ju 1yl Augus t L976\, P. 3- 4thi" is in opposition to Grams.i'? discussion of the m noeuvre in military warfare merits of either pä-"ition or notion and its anard;-tã-óoliricaJ. srraregy. My use of the of an enclave'pofitics aoes not Aerlve from his discussion (nor of Luxemturg's as discussed on p' 233) ' However ' arguing by ur,åiogí, I would- say in my rejection of Gramsci's Éópnistication of thé miÌitary v¡eaponry and scheme that th; times renders the battLe-organization-p";ilio'ul/manoeuire of contemporary in dichotomy of lactics obsolete poJ.itics- Antonio Gramsci' selectiols either war or noare and GeoffreyIroT=the prison Notebooks, trans. and ed. Quintin pp' ffií yorx: rnternational Publ,ishers I L971- ' 2LO-239¡ and pp 275-276' For a clear exposition 9tt9. "titique especially as regards th9 heritage of the war of of Gramsci, seÇr Perry Ànderson, "The position/maneuîer diõrrotomy- l00 Anti-nomies of Antonio Gråmsci". New Left Review' (November Lg7i-JanuarY L977\, P' 5' 50= this relates to a specifically bourgeois state see, Slate Apparatus and Social Joachim Hirsch - "The and Reproduction: Elements of a theoiy" ' in HoIloway pièciotto, oP- cit., P. 57' 6or.., (New York: The worf , The Limits of itima f, Has Socr aI DemocracY a Free Press, L9 )an ,wo (October L97Bl, 53' Future?", Com rativ Po t- IlLL P' 7rh. original statement remain s a powerfuJ. concept. The core of the aefinj-tion is given in the original author's o\^ln language, and taken from Jurgen habermas t Leg itimation McCarthy (Bos ton: The Beacon Press, Criãis; trans- Thomas obleme im Tg75 ffrankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag as Legit imationsPr Sp atkapitalismus 19731 )' first (and The economic crisis-ã"ã*pr. lof capitalism] is the pãinãp" onlyl in wcrLd histery of a svstem crisis characterizãa in the foLlowing \^Iay: namely' -that the dial.ectical contradiction between members of an interaction context come to pass in terms of insol-ubte system- contrãdicEÏon's or structurally displacement of steering problems - Through this - conflicts of interest to tÉe level of system steering' systems crisis gains an objectivity rich in contrast' Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -37 4-

They have the appearance of naturaL catastroPhes that break forth from the centre of a system of PurPosive rational action. While in traditional societies antagonisms between socia 1 classes were mediated through ideoJ-ogical forms o f consciousness and thus had the fateful ob ectivit of a context of delusion, - - - in ra cap al tsm, c ass antagonrsm SS t Led from the intersubjectivitY of the life -worId into the sub-stratum of this worId. Commod ity fetishism is both a secularized residual ideology and the actual IY functioning steering principle of the economic sYstem. Economic crises thus lose the character of a fate accessible to self-reflection and aqu rre the ob ectivit of inex licable contin ent, natural events. The eol ogrca core as sh l_ t o groun evel. tp. 3ol with the appearance of functional weaknesses in the market and ãysfunctional side effects of the steering system, the Ëasic bourgeois ideology of fair exchange Re-coupling the economic system to !h" potitical"ãffapses. ... creates an increased need for îegitimation. The state apparatus no longer' âs in fiÉ.t"1 capitalism, merely secures the general conditions of production, but is now actively engaged in it. tP. 361 The political sYstem requires an inPut of mass loYal ty ]-n that is as diffuse as Po ssible. The outPut consists sovereignly executed admin istrative decisions - OutPut crises have the form of a rationa I it crisis in which administrative sYstem oes not succee din the received reconci J. ing and f uI f i t l ing the imperatives from the economic sYstem- InPut cr ises have the form of ale itimation crisis: the legitimizíng system does not succe nma nEãTnfng the requisite level of mass Loyalty while the steeri-ng imPeratives taken over from the economic sY stem are carried through- A Ithough both crisis tendencies arise in the po1, itical sYstem ' theY differ in the form of aPPe arance. The rationalitY crisis is a disPlaced sYstemic crisis which, Iike economic crises exPress the c ontradiction between socialized production' for non-generalized interests and steering imperatives - This cr j'sis is converted into the withdrawal- of legitimation bY way of a disorganization of the state aPParatus. The leg itimation crisis ' bY contrast, is directl y a legi timat ion crisis. It does not proceed bY waY of endangering system integration, but results from the fact that f ul-f il lment of governmental Planning ta sks p Iaces in question the structure of the dePo I iticiz ed public realm and, thereby, the f orma I J-Y democratic secur ing of the private autonomous disPosition of the means o f production. tp. 46) Elaine McCoy Chapter 5 -37 5-

o 'As opposed to using a conc ept of "determinatio n in the last instance" such as that use d by contemPorarY Marxist French structuralists, I find Ma o Tsetung's formula tion of primary (or princiPal ) contrad ictions distinguish ed from secondary contradictions to be more straightforward and possessing greater util.itY- See Mao Tse tung, t'On Contradiction" (August L9371 , in Selected Readi S ( Peking : Foreign Languages Press, L97Il espec a v e sections dealing with "The Particularity of Contradiction" and "The Principal Contradiction and the Principal Aspect of a Contradiction"¡ PP. 95-1L7. 9R" a caveat I r add that I will not be dealing explicitly with the mil,itarization of the capitalist state in this tñesis. This is an obvious drawback. In terms of both functional impact and structural importance, the increased militarization of the nation states of the United States and Britain, and to a lesser extent of Australia, is certainly of great importance. The impact on the economies of these countries of the increased share of the military budget out of GNP is an important variable in any explanation of inflation' uneven development of product sectors, and of the contraction of gIobaI economic markets, not to mention i-ndirect influences on currency movements ' regional destabilization of dependent economies, and, in geñera1, the anarchic uSe of material production. The õonstraints of time and space require that this important phenomenon of the milita rization of the capitalist state be treated only marginaJ.lY in this thesis. Needless to sâY' militarization of the capitalist state is synonomous with an erosion of politics as a martial order prrma facie wouLd be. See Seymour MeIman, Profits Without Production (New (New York: AIf red Knopf , L9 B 3 ) ; MeJ-man York: McGraw-Hi11, L91O)¡ Melman'' Econ (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1'974 ; and lvle man, The War onom of the U. S. . New York: st. Martin' s, L97Ll. QGA s an acronym e noting "quasi-governmental agencies" and should be distinguÍshed from QUANGOs which may denote either "quasi-autonomous na tional government organizations" or "quasi-autonomous non-g overnmentaL organizations" - The proJ. if eration of these bod ies in the real-world of government administration seems to have produced a simil,ar proliferation of acronyms in the lit erature which reflects the confusion, both real and aPparen t. For a taxonomY of QGA characteristics see Patrick Dunleavy and R'A'W' Rhodes, "Beyond Whitehal- I " in Patrick DunleavY' And re\^/ GambIe, and Gillian Peele (eds. ) Deve I ooments in Britith Politics (London:The Macmillan Press, 19B3), p. r-0 9 llrony Benn, "The case f or a Constitutional PremiershiÞ", Parì-iamentary Affairs, 33/I (Winter l-980) as cited and discussed in Philip Norton' The Constitution in Flux (Oxford: Martin Robertson, L9B2l , p' 41" E1aine McCoy Chapter 5 -37 6-

l2n.rdg"t..y discretion gives the executive a powerful jurisdictiónal ãdvantage. For the manner in which this is a á..r"1opment characteriètic of monopoly capitalism see James O'Connorr oP. cit., PP - 70-79. l3rh. triumvirate of the Monarch, the House of Lords and the House of Commons, with the Commons dominant by convention, acðãrai.rg to ii¡eral precept- The failure of parliament as a funcLion of the failure of the House of Commons to fulfill its constitutional function is wel l-discussed. See , f or example, Col in Leys, oP' cit '- ' PP' 240-252¡ p. Norton, "The Èouse of commons and the Constitution: The Challenge of the 1970's", Parliamentary Affairs, 34/3 (Summer 19Bi), p. 270. For the failure of p;;ti.*åntarianism as it relat s to the institution of the House of Commons, see Ralph Miliband, oP. cit., PP' 20-53'

14l,lutgat"t Thatcher's Cabinet reshuf f le of l-9Bl- allowed her to clear out the "h/ets" and consolidãte "dry" solidarity within the cabinet. Her use of a "war cabinet" during the Fatklands invasion included such unprecedented steps as appointing cecil Parkinson, chair of the conservative Party tã- tne Deience Committee, and meeting regularly while the cabinet, âs a whofe, remained largely uninformed about the progress of events or the directj-on of war policy during the ã*"íg"r,"y. Whether there exists at present ?n gq lg Prime Minister's Department to coordinate Prime Ministerial advisors' viewã is questionable. If regular meetings of close advisory staff constitute a quasi-department to rival format ministãrial Departments then such quasi-departments may exist periodically. Further, Margaret Thatchers's re-do of the Management and Personnel office in 1-981, virtually establishing a new department under the Cabinet Secretary ána appointíng a "clõse colleague", Lady Young' to the ministerial- lost of that department increases central co-ordination, and presumably also ideologicat discipline' The Department of Managemen! and Personnel now has the i."po.r=ibitities for recruitment and personnel, as weIl as "a iratching brief on management and .efficiency"- For an excellent discussion of these implications see GilIian peele, "Government at the centre", in Patrick Dunleavy, et al. , op. cit. r PP - 92-98 - 15tony Bennr oP- cit-r PP. lBff' 16 Ibid. An older Pat tern of nineteenth-century Cabinet governmeiETequired the C abi-net to take the decision to resign or request dissolut ion in the event of a vote of no-confidence against the government in the House of Commons. LloYd George establishe d premier decision mak ang l-n See Hans Daalder, Cabinet Reform in Br itain this centurY. p- 4, L91,4-l-963 (London: Oxf ord U nl-vers ty Press, 9641 (London: S phere and HaroLd Wilson, The G ove rnance of Britain I op. cit. Books , 1,97 7 ) as di scus sed I n Norton' Const tution, ' EIaine McCoY Chapter 5 -377-

p. 61 - l7P"t.y Anderson, Linea es of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, 97 t$nA transitional conjuncture involves a situation where class struggJ.es within and among class reLations have developed to a póínt where a previously secondary class relation seriouãIy threatens to become primary' To determine what the current ãonjunture precisely is, where the bal-ance of class forces lie, whether it is transitional or not' etc., are always the key objectives_ of Marxist theory": stephen nesniåk and ricnará wolff, "The Theory of Transitional conjunctures and the Transition from Feudalism ¿; CapitaLism in Western Europe", Review of Radical political Economics, Ll/3 (Fall r-gu g) p. 3 - For a critique seeHerbGintisr"Or¡theTheoryofTransitional ðonjunctures,,, Review of Radical Pol.itiòal Economics, I]-/3 (Fall L979\, P- 23-

l9tleville Johnson, In Search of the Constitution (London: Methuen, f9B0) . 20t"rini"teriaI responsibitity developed as a convention between the L7g2 dismiãsa1 0f a Lord chancell0r by !ùm. Pitt the Younger , for pubLic disagreement with a government measure, and 1832i on the authority of Norton' Constitution ' op. cit. , P.61 - 2ls.o. de Smith, Constitutiona l and Administrative Law (London: Penguin, Lgl 1), as quot in IbÍ d. ' P. 1 22"Th" only occasion in the past 50 years when the suspended taê in L932 when Liberal convention has been the members of the cabinet were permitted to dissent on i=",_r" of tariff protection. .:. The precedent was added to in Lg77 when Mr. Call,aghan suspended the convention to allow ministers to vote agaiñst the second reading of the European Assembly Elections Bi11": Ibid' ' p'64' 23S". Anthony Bfrch, "westminister and whitehaLl"' in Gwyn and Rose, oP- cit., PP' 57-12'

24 The Castle Diaries L974-76 (London: Barbara CastJ'e ' oñr B and R.H. . Crossman, The Weidenf etd ç Nicols Methuen, Crossma n Diaries, edi ted by Anthony Howard (London: L97 9 ). 25P""I", op- cit., PP. gL-92' 26o*ong Bltt,'- others, James Cal-laghan, Tony "19-,Francis pym have provoked prime ministerial reprimand. Harold wilson Seemstohavebeenespeciallyunfortunateinhis premiership, rravinq to remi-na botñ cabinet and ministers B- Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -37

Ex about the s itting on the Labour PartY's National ecutive convention several times: rePorted in HaroId WiIson, A Personal Record: The Labour Government L964-10 (London: J. son overnance. We e e &N co son) ' P. ia , op. cit., P. 193 and as quoted in Norton, Constitut ofì r op. õTE. ' pp.63-65. 27On the part of junior ministers this is like]y not to beto]'eratedu''ato]eadtoimmediatedismissa]. 28th" formation in May 1gB5 of a new and unprecedented faction in the Conservativä Party which is vocal to the point of exploiting media interest in order to voice factious dissènt is a case in point. Their behaviour as a voting block in the House will determine the seriousness of their intent. 29rh. seminal- misunderstanding of the thesis of respon sible government can be found in the American reform tract, Toward a More Res nsibl,e two-Part Governmen (New Po cal Science York: nehart t t9 , âD Amerlcan t Association Publication. 30Nottorr, cit'' p' 6B' "The belief ConstitutionI-imffitãnt op' that a def eat on any issue necessitated resignation or a disãol'utiõn may be described as a constitutionaL myth: it was based on no authoritative source nor upon any ãor,=istent practice _of behavior. " Norton delineates tniee types of deieat: defeat on no-confidence ,,".""sitating resilnation or dissolution; defeat on a central, issue whereÉy the Government reassesses its strength and either seeks a cônfidence vote or resigns; and a defeat on an issue which the Government may seek Ço reverse. in the future. Discretion as to the nature of any defeat other than within the power of the Goverment. see al-so P' the f irst is Myth and Norton, "Government Defeat in the House of Commons: neafity", PubIic Law (Winter ]-97B), p' 360' 31rr," se rvice Yearbook l_980 lists some 256 civil 3B departments a s epartments r o \^7 cha pproximatelY are of significance. See Ian Bidqe, et âI. The New British ' a 5 New Yor PoliticaL S stem and Societ IN tne---Tg 3 Longman ' I , P. 32nrtriak Nairne \^/as permanent secretary of the Security from L975 to 19 81, . Department of Health and Social the The DHss was lcnown as the "elephant" aña was one of super-departments created under the Heath Government' 33n.ati.k Nairne, "Managing the ElePhant: Reflections on a Giant DePartmerlt", The Political QuarterIY, 54/ 3 243' (JuIy-SePtember 1983) ' P' . 34__IþIO. - Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -379-

3 sHrrgh Hec r o and Aaron WildavskY' The Private covernment of Public Mone (London: Macmr llan, L974) , PP. -l, as quo e n orton, Constitution, op. cit., note L7, p. 7t - 36r'ot exampl ô the increased burden of demand placed on Ministers due t o Britain's entrY into the EEC has contributed to the discussion of "ministerial overload": "Economic Peele r oP. cit. , p. 90, and Andrew Gamble, PoIicy", ChaPter 6 i; Patrick DunleavY, et âf., oP' cit', pp. 145-149.In1 ''For example, see Max Beloff and Gilian Peele, The Government of the Un ited Kin om : Political Authorit l-n a Chanq nq Soc ety (Lo on: den e &N co son, 3Bro, exampre, Margaret rhatcher empLoys approximatery 22 poJ.icy advièors, not unlike the between 20 and 30 empioyed- by Callaghan. These are political appointments, inienãe¿ tó give Éfr" Prime Minister greater control over both civil servants and factious coI)'eagues'

39"ti.r, sedgemore, The S ecret Constitution (London: Hodder & Stroughton), P- 0. 40P."1", op. cit., p-101- 4L Ra1ph Miliband, The State in Ca italist Socie (New York: Basic Books l-9 69 ) - See espec a y Chapter 4, " The Purpose and Role ' of Governments" ' p. 68. The Point is rei-terated and extended in MiIiband, Ca italist Democrac op. cit., Chapter 2, "Parliamentriani SM 42 The tendencY for the rate of Profit to fall duetoa rise in the organic composition of caPital is the operational defin I tion of economic decline. Government attempts to counte ract the decline invo lve the provision of policies designed to increase the rate of expJ.oitation and to ameliorate socl'a I conditions which P rompt civil strife - See, for examPle, , "Notes on Some Problems o f State Intervention", Kapitalistate, r ( L973 ) P. 10e; Aglietta' oP. cit., Chapter 5, PP- 273-315¡ ManueI Castells, The Economrc CrÏsîs and American Societ (Princeton, New 0) especiallY PP- 41, Jersey: Pr nceton Un ver s l- ty Press ' 75; and C1aus Offe, "The TheorY o f the CaPitalist State and the Problem of PolicY Forma tiont', unpubJ. ished manuscript, CaIif ornia, I4aY L9B4 ' 43rt seems timely to clarify the notion of a "bourgeois order" as part of the present discussion of power. Bearing in mind that a bourgeois order is not necessarily synonymous with a liberal co.r"úitrrtion, I stress three components to stipuLated definition which follows. These are, the is a cfass-ordered following-Z) Marx, 1) bourgeois society soéiety; its "inner structure" (see quotation immediately below) is made up of capital' wage labour' and private Elaine Mccoy Chapter 5 -380- property; and 3) its dynamic is comprised of contradictions arising from the irre concilable and irreducible nature of class exploitation. S ee Karl Marx, Grundrisse; Introduction to the Criti ue of Political Econ , trans. Martin Nicolaus (New Yor V tntage Boo S om House' 7973. IOriginal J.y pubì.ished in GermanY: Grundrisse der Kritik der Poltischen Okonomie, Rohentwurf, 19391 ): ----Eourgeois society is the most developed and the most complex historic organization of production. The categories which express its relations, the compiehension of its structure, thereby also. aLlows insights into the structure and the relations of production of all the vanished social. formations out of rhose ruins and elements it built itself uP, whose partly still uncomquered remnants are carried along tuitn it, whose mere nuances have deveJ-oped expì-icit significance within it, etc.... Further' since bourgeois society is itself only a contradictory form of dãvelopment. Relations derived from the earlier forms will often be found within it only in an entirely stunted form, or even travestied- tpp. l-05-1061 ' Further in the essay, Marx insists that the Sequence whereby economic categorie"ã." presented in historical analysis is crucial to añ understanding of the contemporary world' Landed property and ground rent do not form the appropriate startin!-pãint for economic analysis, as they might in previoué ñistoric times. The sequence of analysis, according io Marx, should conform to relationships among the categories of economic structures rather than historic, chronological develoPment : capital is the all-dominating economic power of boürgeois society. It must be the starting point as wetl as the finishing point (of bourgeois society). It would therefore be unfeasible and wrong to let the economic categories follow one another in the same sequence as that in which they are historically ¿eðisive. Their sequence is determined, rather, bY their reLation to one another in modern bourgeois society, which is precisely the opposite of that which seems lo be their natural order or which corresponds to historical develoPment - Further, in specifying the order for a prospective critique of political ãconomy (the partial notes of which comprise the Grundrisse), Marx specifies the following: The order obviously has to be (1) the general, abstract determinants which obtain in more or less all forms of society, but in the above-explained sense ' (2) The categoii_es which make up the inner structure of bourgeois society and on which the fundamental classes restl CapitaJ., w.g" Iabour, landed property ' Their interretátion. Town and country. The three great social classes. Exchange between them. CircuLation. credit Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -381-

system (private). (3) Concentiation of bour eofs societ in the form of the state- V ewed nre at on to ]. se T e unpr uc rve c AS SC s. Taxes. State debt- Public credit. The population. The colonies. Emigration. (4) The international relation of production. Internati onal division of labour. InternationaL exchange- Export and imPort. Rate of exchange. (5) The world market and crises. tP- 108, mY emphasis l 44u.n. schattschneider, The Semi-Soverei n Peo Ie: A Realist View of Democra n Amer ca (New Yor Ho L, S - R ne art an w nston, and Peter Ba chrach and Morton Baratz, "To Faces of Po\^Iertt , American Political Science Review (December 1'962l' , pp - 950-95L , 45Ni"o" Poulantzas State, Power Socia 1 ism, op. cit., especiallY "Part Three:' a ean conomy Todaytt, pP- r63-194. 4 6Frederick The Ori in of the Famil , Private Engels ' Pro ert , and the State (Lo orlr l-93 ) and V. I. Len lft r State an Revo ut ron New Yo rk:International Publishers, ßø Moscow: ). 47nti*u.iry, Nicos PouJantzas Classes in Conte ora Capitalism, trans- David Fernbach '(Lo on: New tBo s, Lq75 lParis, L974 as Les Classes SociaLes dans le Capitalismel); Poulantzas' Political Power and Socia l õlãsses-;ans. TimothY o'Hagan (London: New Left Books, 1973-TParis, l-968 as Pouvoir Politi ue et Classes c L. ¡ Socialesl ) ; PouLantzas, State, Power, Soc sm. op. and Lukes. Power. op. cÍt.. 4B Poulantzas, Political Power and Social CIasses, op. cit., p . r_00. 49 rbid. 50 rbid. 5l Ibid. , p. 101, tr,) "The asymmetry is, l! the normal conclusion of such theories of elites and political c lass f ol lows automaticallY: t he groups which take Part in Politica 1 (i. e. power) relations differ in their theoretical status , from economic social c asses, ose exper ence l-s e sewhere acknowledged: Ibid., P- l-03. 53 Ibid. , p. 104 . 54 rbid. 55tbid., note B, as for example, is Harold Lasswell and Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -382-

A. Kaplan. Power and Societ : A Framework for Socia l PoI t rcs: o Gets ât, When' Inquiry' (195 and Lasswell ' How, f936. 56rbid. TheorY , note 9, as for examPle is M. Weber, The of sociãT aña Economic Organization (Glencoe , L964't . 57tbib., note 10, p. l-05' as for example, is, T. Parsons. Structure and Process in Modern Societies. Glencoe 1960. 5Blbid. , pp 104-105. 59 rbid., p. 105. 60 rbid. , p- 107. 61 rbid. , p. 108. 62 rbid. , p. l_11. 63 rbid. , p- LL2. 64 Ibid., p. l-13. 65rn" subjects of alienation, class consciousness, and and a loose amalgaíration of psycho-analytic,- Philosophical Marxist approaches sucñ as that characterized by the prolific "Fiankfurt SchooI" are extensively addressed in contemporary literature, especialty. during the post-war years io thé end of the 1960s. This work is much too extensive to offer even representative citations for here ' A continuing source of articles and reviews using this approach ñay ue found in the journal, Telos (New York) -

66 The E o and the Id (London: Hogarth Sigmund Freud ' PTeSS, 1935 ÍL9271) ¡ Gra am Wa âSr Human Nature in Po L itics ( IlIin ois: UniversitY of I lIi ffi OBt Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd (New York: Viking Press lre ); (New' L96 [18 951) and Robert lichels, Pol itical Parties 0 ; d l-n David Yor k: The Free P ress. 1966 [1915]), as d l-scusse Lo ic of Ricci, C ommunit Power and Democratic Theo : The Pol itica Ana SIS, apter : The a llenge to L l- bera SM: York : c a Sc nce an the StudY of Politic a I Por¡Jer " (New Random House, L97L), PP- 32-49' 67l,ark"" r Po\^ter, oP. cit ' 68tbid. , p. 25 - 69 rbid., pp- l-B-19. '70 rbid. , p- 24. 7L rbid., p- 38. Elaine McCoY Chapter 5 -383-

72t¡ia., pp. 40-4L. 73lbid., pp. 46-48, where Lukes admits the difficultY in locaEÏ.ng and identifYing a relevant counterfactual, but displaces the question of difficulty with an evasive discussion of Gramsci- 74lbid., pp. 54_56, where Lukes distances himself from PouIantZãF quite exPI icitlY : Of course, oDe always has the alternative of stipulativelY redefining 'Power' in terms of structural determination. This is the Path that Poulantzas takes. . - - But this concePt uaI assimilation of power to structural determination s imply serves t o obscure a crucial distinction which is theoretical ly necessary to make, and which the vocabu lary of power articulates. MY claim is that to identify a given Proc ess as an 'exerci-se of power' , rather than as a case of structural determination, is to assume that it is in the exerciser's or exercisers' Pobrer to act differentlY- Lukes wants to maintain this distinction chieflY in order to locate power-holders: The point of locating Power is to fix i"=pott"ibility for consequences nç19 to flow from action t ot inãction, of certain specifiable agents. My own point is that Lukes' aim to gain a specifigity of power-source and therefore demonstrate responsibility for the consequences of po\^/er is as doomed as PouLantzas' as long as the concept of power remains 'entangled with the notion of interesl, theräby adhering to a relational notion of power. Lukes and Poulantzas have more in common than not as theoreticians of Power- 75e f.Ilacy of composition derj-ves precisely from an indeterminancy 'of .*p..ãsion which contains ambiguity and suppressed quãntificãtio.t, (e.g', how much of one component of a related group is responsible for explanation. of another component. Cónsiãer the following phrase, "Wisdom and .o,ri"g" go together". Does this mean that aLl courageous peoplá aie wièe; that all wise people are courageous; or a different combination? The faIlãcy of composilion is the ðpposite of the fallacy of division. V¡hite the latter argues träm premises about the whole to conclusions about any part of the whole, the former does the opposite. In the case of .¡aflacypower and interest, I believe that there is a further of nypostaiization, which regards an abstraction as if it were concrete- It seems to me that po\^/err âS a concept, is particularly subject to the fallacy of frypo"i"iizatio'n and espec-iatly ão when linked to a notj-on of - For a survey of logical and interests-as-objective in Paul phiLosophic fallacies see J' L' Mackie' "FâIIacies" ' Elaine McCoy Chapter 5 -384-

Edwards (ed. ) The Enc cl rao Philoso , vol. III (New York: Macmillan' a ô ree ress, , PP . 169-L79, and S. Moris EngeI, v'tith Good Reason An Introduction to Informal FaIIacies, on New or : St. Mar n S¡ B5- Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -3

Chapter Six

The State and Political Interest: Liberal and Neo-Marxist Treatments

Introduction

Politicalinterestisaconceptwhichhasbeen traditional ly employed in liberal contract theory, in pluralist notions of " interest group liberalism"; in democcrati-c elitist theoryi and recentlyr. within Marxist theories of the state. while use of the concept has been vaLuable in disclosing varieties of political activity such as sub-governmental and committee policy negotiations and the manner in which political conflict is mediated, it is arso the case that an inadequate bounding of the concept has led to confusion in attempts to theorize the state.l

Thischapterprovidesacritiqueoflibera]and Marxist schools of thought which conceive of the state as a keydeterminantofpolitica]developmentinmature capitalist societies. I examine these schools of thought according to 1) the derivation of political interest; 2l the identity of the state; 3)the character of political activity among private persons; 4) the character of state activity; and, finaLly, 5) what determines political development in mature caPitalist societj-es'

I undertake a critique of representative writing in these schools for the Purpose of gaining a measure of Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -386- methodological refinement, and in order to clear the Path of certain conceptual obstacles that impede an examination of political autonomY-

American Liberalism

American liberalism is characterLzed by the expression of two political "realj-ties" which have identified that system of thought and of government since the days of the Constitutional Convention. Those realities are incrementalism and the fracturing of the democratic polity into diverse and competing interests. Before industrialism which established a geographic and sectiona)- superiority in the north-east on the united States of America2; before the establishment of a stable two-party system in that country which developed the unique characteristics of local and state independence from the national organization and non-dues-paying membership3, before the extension and incorporation of the North American continent which fixed the scope of a vast and resource-vÙealthy nation beyond anything experienced in the European motherland; before any of those events in the historical development of the united states, a form of government had been contrived and a plan for government had been stipulated' The legacy of such government is incrementalism and pIural interests.

Interest theorY has developed in the United States as the chief method of anatysJ-ng Politics and of conceptualizing the state. The remainder of this section Elaine McCoy Chapter 6 -387- will concentrate upon the substance of the American theory of government as regards a theory of interest . Recent work of Charles Lindblom and Theodore Lowi will be examined i-n the succeeding paragraphs- Not only do these scholars provide a straightforward and articulate representation of American liberalj-sm, they also emptoy interest theory in a manner which attempts to enlighten a general theory of politics, including a theory of the state. My critique of their work is designed to encompass a critique of American pruralism as it links interest theory and state theory.5

The Lindblom Thesis: Incrementalism and Interest

As an economist, Lindblom has been astute in recognizíng the !.rays in which timing and position have an impact upon the political syst erIL The most articulate defense of ,,incrementalism" the pacing and scheduling of political demands - lt¡as offered by LindbJ-om at the ouset of the great 6 liberal celebration of pJ.uralism in America - His scholarship has continued to explore the political behaviour which accounts for a unique configuration of stability in American politics. The measured and highly Iucid conservatism of his work has resulted in a kind of intellectual understatement which appears to have demonstrated a greater lasting povter than other components of the "liberal celebration". A recent work of his which provides tire clearest integration of the terms of ,,polyarchal control" ,7 incrementalism and decision making, Elaine McCoY Chapter 6

and most clearly expresses the notion of interests in a pluralist framework.

Lindblom's arguments about the Iimits on polyarchal control in a market-based, private enterprise system revolve around the dual nature of leadership which has evolved in these systems.B only one of the leadership systems is subject to polyarchal control, that of government through electoral politics. The competing system, that of business' is composed of "officials" who may only be controlled peripherally, through market preference as it effects efficiency pricing. This may be thought of, alternatively, as control of output.9 Not only does this control fail to constrain the political activity of business in a polyarchy' but the patterns of all political behaviour in a system of polyarchy dominated by business appear as the result of manipluation by business. with Lindblom, this manipulation j-s characterízed as the deliberate manipulation of volitions. Business participates in polyarchy as an unequal partner in leadership. It exercises authoritative control through a strategic use of political resources and through thespecialabì-lityofbusinesstoshapeboththe preferences and volitions of citizens. In other words, strategic position is not simply a control of the distribution of political resources per se but a self-engendering process of compliance. Market control preempts political "equilibrium". Elaine McCoy Chapter 6 -389-

The limits of polyarchal control, then, are the limits imposed by a constitutional preemption of authority by one set of Leaders over another in a system of dual and implicitly rj-va] authority patterns. UnIike the Marxist conception of social division, there exists in Lindblom's analysis a dual rather than a dialectical antagonism which is not class-controlled. Rather, the antagonism is sectorally defined: business versus government hierarchies. And unlike the Marxist conception of the interaction between rival parties, a dynamic of circularity rather than class struggJ-e motivates political and economic leaders. Nevertheless, in Lindblom's work, a rivalry exists and is ever implicit despite the elegant structure of mutual accommodation within the state. The limits on polyarchal control of authority become increasingly apparent as business privilege grows.

The limits on potyarchal control are nothing more than the limits of subordination. They result from the fragmentation and pluralism of institutional polyarchy in government when confronted with a less heterogeneous (althoucg certainly not homogeneous) and better organized business leadershiP. ChaPter 11 of Politics and Markets spells out the comparative structuraL weakness of polyarchy in its ability as an institution to respond to popular demands.ll This weakness, when contrasted with business' wide dj-scretionary decision making capacities ' appears not only limiting but debilitating for government. Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -390-

A Critique of Lindblom

The main problem in Lindblom's analysis is his failure to recognize the chinks in the armour of business privilege' He ,'over-rationalizes" the privilege of business in three $¡ays.Inthefirstplace,Theemphasisonstructural subordination of polyarchy to business ignores the potential volatility of mass politics j-n a capitalist system, derived as it is from the class nature of a capitalist society' Substitutinga''circularity..argumentforoneof class-subordination reduces the scope of the analysis to an unacceptably narrow focus given its claim to expLain general stasis and something resembling regressed development in a macro-system. But the focus is understandable given Lindblom's emphasis on business' coalesced interests and its organizational predominance as a system of authority. But where is the state in all of this? Is the state synonymous with government and therefore simply a rival constellation of bureaucratic/governmental interests? or is the state a relational entity: that defined as the interstice between j.s business and governmental authority systems? or it simply the designated "Model", a general j-nstitutional arrangement of market forces?12 PoIitical behaviour is for Lindblom, like market behaviour, motivated chiefly by interests' Those interests are acquisitive within a system of scarcity and hence economic. The coalescence of interests is also motj-vated by economic decisions, mainly opportunity and cost.Whiletheseappeartobeplausibleaccountsof Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -391-

economic behaviour, and indeed, of political behavior within a System of capitalism where economic motives dominate, they fail to explain governmental behaviour oL t more importantly for this thesis, to identify and explain the state. Lindblom's insistence upon a recognition of the ubiquity of the market and its stultifying effects upon the politics of polyarchal control in effect dissolves the analytical category of State and renders politics a "state-less concept".

secondly, Lindblom maintains the faith in stability which characterizes p]uralism and its corollary, incrementalism, from the inception of the theory. His faith seems now to have turned to dismay and he seems to recognize stability as rigidity and "muddling through" as a political tiability. rr1) For him, stability now derives from the issue-orientation and ad hoc nature of dissent which insulates the Grand Issues of politics. While dissent in capitalist systems is issue-oriented and ad hoc in nature' it can nevertheless have the effect of destabilizing the position of business in politics and, indeed, the smooth functioning of market prerogatives. Lindblom fails to integrate a theory of crisis into his analysis sa as to provide a more realistic picture of the nature of mutual accommodation between the two great authority systems, I business a.nd government . Furthermore ' the historica mutations of such accommodation are lacking in Lindblom's analysis. Indeed, the historical dimension of the entire Elaine Mccoy Chapter 6 -392-

analysis is very thin and deals only retrosPectivelY with the emergence of business pr ivi lege .

Finally, there are also internal contradictions within business privilege which Lindblom fails to address. Not only the need to maj-ntain profitability, but the need to find markets to absorb increasingly J-arger commodity surplus, wiIl heighten intra-business competition, and have the effect of weakening both corporate discretion and the co-ordination of public policy which serve business interests. These aspects of Lindbtom's "over-rationalization" of business privilege stem from his use of interests, especially economic interests as the independent variable in his model of capitalist systems. hle can infer from his analysis that the plural demands which burden the state in an "open" society, coupled with the incremental disposition of those demands, that is, the serial consideration, bargaining and distribution of poJ.icy outputs, hampers state sovereignty as well aS limits state authority. But then why is the state necessary to capitalist soc].efy ^L4l

A Recap itulation of Li-ndblom's Incrementalism

As one of the two poles of American liberalism, incrementalism has provided a rather sophisticated analysis of the importance of temporal and situational superiority of business within the capitalist state. This superiority is Elaine lvtcCoy Chapter 6 -393- structurally determined, in Lindblom's analysis , by the nature of Liberal constitutions and the special nature of business interest. Incrementalism is the administration of interest in the guise of policy formation. It is an administrative technique whj-ch has the virtue of insuring superordination of a particular sort of interest, business i-nterest. Incrementalism exists within American liberalism as a constitutj-on of authority, and as such competes (and invariably wins in Lindblom's analysis) with de jure constitutional authority.

Incrementalism is often treated as an attribute of bureaucracy. It is understood to be epiphenomenal, that is, merely a manifestation of bureaucratic decision makj-ng and policy dispatch. With Lindblom, one recognizes that incrementalism is more than epiphenomena. Incrementalj-sm is one of the main structural components of the capitalist state. It is central to the maintenance of the capj-talist state because of its technical capacity to insure superiorj-ty of timing and position for business j-n the employment of business' political resources within a "popular" form of liberal government, i.e., polyarchy.l5

Having considered the importance of incrementalism to an analysis of American liberalism it is no\^r possible to turn to a consÍderatj-on of the second pole of pluralism, that is, a theory of political interest assj-gned to group interaction. The work of Lindblom has been used to introduce Elaine McCoy Chapter 6 -39 4- both the substance and the critique of incrementalism' the work of Theodore Lowi will now be used to introduce, in critical fashion, the content of "interest group IiberaIism". These analysts share a critical perception of contemporary American liberalism and a concern for authority and political development in the United States. They both address a theory of the state in their efforts to posit a macro-model and in their endeavour to establish an "identity", in principle, for the modern American state-

Lowi's Thesis: Interest Group Pluralism

Theodore Lowi's work on "interest group liberalism" represents another version of American political analysis of the liberal capitalist state. Like Lindblom, Lowi is concerned with the nature of authority and power in the American state. His perspective, however, is that of a political- scientist, and as such, Lowi employs an analysis of lega1 and political institutions. He is also explicitly concerned with developmental problems in the American capitalist state and his analysis is less vulnerable to the criticism of being ahistorical. Nevertheless, Lowi, Iike Lindblom, maintains a behavj-ourist orj-entation. Authority' conflict and interest are exhibited as behavioural categories. Liberalism remains with Lowi a description of the j-ndividual (or group) within the polity - (Lowi ' s problematic'is placed within the nexus: interests conflict authority, which¡ âs with Lindblomr âssumes that each Elaine McCoy Chapter 6 -39s- component of the nexus expresses a political characteristic, i.e., that each component expresses and comprises an element of power) .16 PIural political coalitions and governmental institutions remain merely contexts within which interests, conflict, and authority, as behavioral categories, provide the dynamic for poli'tical development.

The second iterationlT of Theodore Lowi's "End of Liberalism" is a concise and polished statement describing interest-group liberaIisml8 and its impact upon politlcal deveJ-opment in the United States. Lowj, argues that the United States has passed from a constutitional republic with clearly articulated guarantees for the representation of plural interests to a government of institutional and legal usurpations of representative order. The United States has passed from the original to a "second Republic". l-9 The "second Reþublic" of the Unitei States is characterized by the preponderance of administratj-on over representation- The Second Republic does not embody progressive political deveLopment for Lowi. As with Lindblom, it is the shift j-n the nature of authority and distribution of power which distresses Lowi and he seeks to demystify the nev/ administrative order by exposing a superordinate interest that of executive administration. Unlike in Lindblom's sets of authorities here. analysis, 1" see no competing Ratherr we See depicted a single, preponderant authority the constitutional executive. Neither does the executive Elaine l4cCoy Chapter 6 -396- gain preponderance through a subtle strategic usurPation of power. with or without the market, in Lowi's analysis' the executive bureaucracy indeed, the executive office of the presidency, has bY fiat reconstituted the bases of political order, hence the invective: "The End of LiberaLj-sm: The Second Republic of the united States"-38

Interest-group liberalism was a term coined by Lowi in L96g (when the first version of the The End of IdeologY appeared). Much like the invective raised against "revisionists" in other schools of thought, Lowi's attack on pluralist thought was for the most part based upon the pluralists' perversion of the tenets of classical Iiberalism. Interest group liberalism may be summarized as follows: a constellation of sentiments which has replaced the old public philosophy of capitalism, classical Iiberalism, and which advocates a positive state and an interventionist government through a system of processual and accommodationist poIitics.2l Interest-group tiberalism is lawless because it allows government neither the mandate to exercise authority nor the organizational means to promulgate authoritative decisions. (congressional government is overburdened by a plethora of issue-demands ' and according to Lowi, is too accessible. congress has responded as an institution by developping a "log-ro11ing" technique in the disbursement of its business. This technj-que expands the bounds of accommodation in an attempt to defer or circumvent conflict. The end result of Elaj-ne McCoy Chapter 6 -391 -

increasing issue-demands in Congress' while at the same time deferring conflict, is to inflate accomodationist policies and defl-ect responsibility to the aqencies administering programmes.) It is formless because it neither establishes boundaries for the legitimate use of coercive state povüer nor provides a formal arena for the debate and conflict which must necessarily arise in all democracies regarding public formation of the ends of politics.

Interest-group Iiberalism, then, seeks to repudiate state power by turning government into a purely administrative apparatus. Interests are tamed by embodying them within group formationt.22. conflict is tamed by transforming it into negotiation. Authority is domesticated by multiplying the Ioci and jurisdiction of "discretionary" rule-making.

Interest-group liberalism, as Theodore Lowi describes it, is a denial of institutionalízed authority which has paradoxically occurred at a time when the privatization of authority has become the chief response to the requisites of This has given mature capitalism: order and "ontror.23 capitalism a statist identity with no core or centre with which to associate authority, and, therefore, no centre toward which to appeal for social equity or toward which to E1aine McCoY Chapter 6 -398- fix responsibility- The capitalist state is a lawless and formless state. It is perceived only by its stifling and ubiquitous presence, that is, through its administrative apparatus.

ThebulkofLowi'streatiseisabillofparticulars regarding the failure of interest-group Iiberalism through its denial of the orthodoxy of early industrial capitalism' That orthodoxy, developed chiefly through the brilliance of Smith, Malthus, Ricardo and Georg"24 gives the market its due. The political expression of "giving the market its due" is conflict and competition, the actual enfranchisement of interests-as-individual prerogative rather than as group privilege. For Lowi, early capitalist orthodoxy also embraces a continuity of the relationship between economics and politics. Risk invigorates both systems. when pluralism establÍshed an inteLlectual disconti-nuity between the two great spheres of social life, and thus became an apology for the actual rupture between economics and politics, it qualified as an IDEOLOGY Par excellence. As ideology' pluralism contributes to the dj-sarray of the contemporary capitalist state. It does so chiefly by embracing positive government and facilitating interest group Iiberalism. The second Republic of the united states is for Lowi, and quite untike LindbLom's account , a denial of the original constitutioh. James Madison's carefully-1aid plan which was designed to fracture and regulate groups was relaced by pluralism's impulse to accommodate groups' The New DeaL's Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -399- success at merging and mobilizing groups became fuIly entrenched as a real-\^/orId political system by the time of the "new" Democratic experiment of the 1960s'

But what is potitics freed from authority, accordj-ng to l,owi?25:

The strength of Pluralism rested j-n a very great Part upon the propo sition that a pluratist societY frees politics by creating a discontinuity between the political wo rld and the socioeconomic wor1d. However there is a related Pr oposition that Present Pluralist theories either rej ect or miss altogether: In a luralist societ there is also a discont inuit between po t CS government. Furthermore: 2 6

The very same factors of competition and multiple power resourcès that free politics from society also frees government from both society and politics Group õompetition could neutraLize the most potent power c"nl"r" sufficiently to keep them all within the forma 1 structures of government.

The result of this is to render constitutional authority powerless; governmentr ân empty formalism; and social progress' mere expansion and multiplication'

A Critique of Lowi

While the main criticisms of Lindbtom had to do with his failure to provide a theory of crisis or to discern the chinks in the the armour of business privilege and the internal contradictions of the capitalist system, the criticism of Lowi is quite the oPposite. Lowi so overdramatj-zes the Ioss of any coherence and authority Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -400- within the American polity that his work is a study in the morphology of politj-cal crisis. Because he imagines that the end of Iiberalism is also the end of capitalism (like schumpeter), Lowi underestimates the resilience of the American liberal state as an expression of the resilience of

the capitalist orð,"r.27 .

Both Lowi and Lindblom, who are simultaneously critics and exemplars of American liberalism, See malfunction as the cause of the regressed development of polyarchy or liberalism/capitalism- That malfunction is within both of these theories of political interest due to an overload of pluraI interest-demands (in the case of Lowi) ' or an j-nterests overriding set of demands (superordinate business in the case of Lindblom). In both analyses interests intervene and disestablish legitimate authority patterns ' The centrality of interests as the explanatory variable which identifies either the nature of the liberal constitution (LindbIom) or the post-1iberal constitution (Lowj-) guarantees ahistorical analysis because it effectively gives independent variable status to individual

and group interests -

Whenappliedtoatheoryofthestaterâssumptions regarding the primary status of interests as a determinant of political development mislead observers into following either of the two paths of the common fallacy of Lowi and Lindblom: overemphasis on the efficacy of business :,1 t 4.i.. Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 4 01--\': ), iPri lt ir' J '1:! . ,,"' 'i1' "'- ri. -, interest-as-priviLege, ot a refusal to recognize state authority as a constitutionally contained and valid set of authorj-tative responses to political stimuli, some which may be interest-articulated and some of which may not b"'28

The remedies which Lindblom and Lowi prescr j-be represent another interesting parallel regarding the way they conceptualize the state. Again, it is at the point where they engage a theory of political interest that the similarity is most apparent. Lindblom would hope to restore the market to its original function as a clearing and exchange mechanism, Because the market is by implication formally anarchic, that is, absent rule, it cannot function as a system of authority, nor can those r¡tho derive their privilege from the market represent legitimate authority' But when those with an enhanced interest and a preponderant scope of influence derived from the benefits of the market (wealth and strategic position) assume a leadership role, political authority is overwhelmed. Lindblom would protect politics from ,'factious" interests just as his constitutional forbears would.29 He wishes to break business-government circularity. But since he values the unique capacities of the market to provide clearing and exchange functionS So necessary to capitalist enterprise' he is caught in a fundamental dilemma. Markets, as well as displayinguniquecapabilities,alsoembodyunique characteristics, the most important one of which for our present analysis is risk. Lindblom recognizes the energetic Elaine McCoy Chapter 6 -402- nature of risk. Risk drives competition and rewards success. If wealth were the only reward which market success brought, one might encounter relatively few problems30. But risk also aggrandizes interest through a process of successive capitalization. This process of "capitalization" hãs great utility outside economic categories. It overtakes politics.

Lowi,s remedy is, similarly, a provision of i-nsulation for politics from aggrandised interests. He follows a two-phase approach: 1) disciplj-ne is provided through an extensive promulgation and a rigorous codification of rule, termed by Lowi, "juridical democracy"Sl and 2)equity is provided by the formalization of the bureaucratic administration.32. Formalization acts to prevent the "capture" of administrative agencies by speciaL interest groups. Discipline and equity principles restore authoritative rule-making to government by clarifying and protecting essential governmental functions, which for Lowi are minimal and spelled out in constj-tutional interpretatj-on (usually jurudical in nature). As with Lindblomrs remedy, a fundamental dilemma remains: the measures prescribed incapacj-tate the system's dynamic. Risk is curtailed along with j-nterest, and "entrepreneural" creativity is curtailed along with agency. A strategy of reform designed to "rein in" superordinate interests (what in other times might be called "factious majorities" or even, " tyrannical majorities" ) is naive about the definition of a capitalist mode of production, and especial Iy Elaine McCoy Chapter 6 -403-

uncomprehending about the identity of the state within such a mode of production.35

within capital ism , j-nterests are correctly charactexízed. as the necessary "bridge" between economic and politicat life. The mistake comes in extending the scope of j-nterests beyond their functional, real-worId boundaries' To recapitulate: In a system such aS capitalism where the prerequisites for maintaining economic "veIocity"36 constr:ain aII other social considerations, interests are simply a vehicle for correspondence between economic necessity and political "participation". whether they be individual or group interests, this "currency of exchange" which enables correspondence between the two spheres of life I s merelv a representation of "value". RecalI the money-metaphore: like money, interests represents a vehicle 37 for payment and function as a unj-t of account' rnterests denote an exchange function- The ubiquity of exchange relations j-n capitlaist societies has been well-discus".d3B. For the purpose of the present discussion I shall only point out that to view interests as fundamentally determj-ning political development is to mistake a descriptj-on of correspondence between the two primary spheres economic and political - of a bifurcated social system for a description of the overall system. Moreover' failure to explain the, derivation of political interest; its expression as a behavioral category; and that expression as reflective of political development rather than as causal to political Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -404-

development, has misled analysts in their attempts to predict change and anticipate crisis.

Both Lindblom's and Lowi's analysis of American liberalism leave the interest-consensus assumptions wholIy in pIace. They both mistake government's handicap vis-a--vis the "overweighted" interests which burden it (preponderant business or constituencies under "permanent receivership" ) as a malfunctj-on in the process of countervalence' The "public interest" is either hobbled or contaminated by private demand. state interest is compromised. Their remedies aim to reconstitute a haven for state authority' to insulate politics either from the market or from constj,tuents. This would presumably restore the equilibrium between private and publi-c, between the market and government and between interest and authority. In short' the integrity of the primary function of government, mediation' would be reestablished and the "Public" character of the

government reasserted -

The assumed symmetry between private behavior (interest-demands) and state activity is a fiction which makes possible a theory of the state based upon interest. state authority is characterized as weighted interest recognized, ad hocr ërs that which prevails. Presumably state activity is. authoritative when it prevails as an indePendent and wej-qhty interest. It is non-authoritative, i.e. ful1y disabled or "captured", when it either does not prevail in a Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -405- political contest (a failure of countervalence) or when its jurisdiction regarding the arbitration of competing demands is not recognized (a failure of mediation). In any case one is,abletoidentifystateinteresLthroughgovernment activity of a behavioural sort: that which expresses cognate interest through observable activity. If this activity j-s not observed one assumes that "politics" is not at work' one may salr for example, that markets have overtaken politics or one may declare an "end of liberalism". The analysi-s is ' thus, prematurlY closed.

It is my contention that a premature closure of analysis regarding the state characterj-zes both Iiberal and marxist schools of thought. It is a constellation of interest-assumptions which have contrived a "blind aIley" for the respective analyses. The next section wilI treat a neo-Marxj-st school of thought and show how it is similar, ín effect to the liberal Positi-on'

The State and Political Interest: Some Writinqs in The Marxrs t Trad ition ItistheaimofthissectiontoshowthatSome influentj-aI writings in the Marxist tradition share with the liberat theory of the state the mistaken notion that the state has interests. Marxist and Iiberal theorists who share this view are led to erroneous notions about relative state autonomy. I'examine the writings of Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas to substantiate my position' Elaine McCoy Chapter 6 -406-

Turning to contemporary Marxist theories of the state in capitalist societies, one notes a serlous debate which stresses the status and functj-on of the state in a system of general exploitati-on, and and the terms of "development" of the capitalist state in "Iate", "mature", "monopoly capitalist", and "core" "tag"=.'9

Given those two loci of concern among Marxist scholars ' the underlying emphasis upon political interest is not as apparent as among American pluralists. Nevertheless, I shaLl argue that evidence of an interest-orientation is provided by the structuralist/instrumentalist debate of the 1960s' which remains unresolved in the 1980s. The split in that debate paralle1s the sptit among pluralists, albeit a more muted one, regarding a "systems" versus a "degiSional" orientation for political ana1ysis.40 Whil" the development of class has been the focus in comparative Marxist analyses of less "mature" capitaList economies, I argue that even there the definition of emerging and nascent classes contains an interest-definition which is, by and 1arge, mysË1ry1n9.,4L

The content of Marxist research into capitalist society is rich and varied. Marxist research has produced the most signiiicant rebuttal to contemporary liberal prescriptions regarding b.oth method and substance of political inquiry. More importantly, these studies adduce meticulous documentation about the i-nequity of capitalist distribution Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -407 -

and the waste of capitalist productj-on. Moreover, it is through the efforts of Marxist scholars and teachers that traditional social science and economics disciplines have been expanded to contain a critical dimension' The "creative apology" of the bourgeois liberal has been met with the ,,creative dissent" of the Marxist intellectual' Despite the SuccessbyMarxj.stintel]ectualsinconfrontingthe distortions and inadequacies of liberal political inquiry' state theory lies fallow. why? what motívates the use of an interest-orientation in attempts to theorize the modern capitalist state?

Forpluralistsareactionagainsttheancienregimeof institutional and lega1 analysis which preceded world v'Iar II in the American Academy, âs well as a reaction against the intuitive discernment of political development, have been frequently offered as explanations for motive.42 For Marxists, the "primacy of PoIitics"4J has been the tag-phraseforaninterestorientation.Twocircumstances are central among the many which one might argue have conditioned the Marxist orientation: firstlyr âs a kind of ,,negative 1egacy,, of the stalin years, there has been a great effort to avoid economistic reduction, i.e., a simple reduction of all social development to changes in the economic substructrrt".44 Secondly, the intellectual practice of western Marxists has been embedded in a social reality which contains two stark characteristics: the most important revolutions enabling a national claim to socialist politics B- Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -40 andcreatinguniquelynon-liberalgovernmentsinthe twentieth century have been the Russian revolution of I9I7 and the initiation of the People's Republic in china in Lg49, and within mature capitalist societies, bourgeois standards confine virtually aIl intellectual work and are the necessary context within which ideas are produced' consider these statements as logical corollaries from the proposition, "Class revolt has not undermined the constitutionar democracies of capitarist society in the twentieth century". Those statements also describe real-life circumstances. Taken together they form an intellectual environment which is, not surprisingly, coterminous with socj-a1 convention. The social convention of capitalism is Libera1i"r.45 In the lives of intellectuals, the absence of lived experience which serves to validate an abstracted theoryofsocialandpoliticaldevelopmentwitlresultin some sort of intellectual accommodatiOn. Praxis becomes habituation to the intellectual norms of liberalism' Even the most radical intellectual rebuttal 0f sociaÌ convention cannot escape the subtle conditioning to overarching convention. The absence of significant class strife, the stability of liberal governments, and the brutality with which these two are maintaj-ned in contemporary capitalist societies seem to compel a concern wj-th ideology and citiáenship within contemporary Marxist theories of the state. The Þtate itself is invested with pohlers of medi-ation and interest representation which few Iiberals would find

unfami I iar . Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -409-

The Leninist Model as a Heuristic Device

Two elements of a Leninist variant of l4arxj'st state theory will now be examined: the role of the state in political and economic exploitation and the developmental trajectory of the capitalist state. The propositions listed below wiIl stand as the counterpoint against which Iiberal and neo-marxist conceptions of the state wiIl be examj-ned:

and the manifestation of 1) "The state is the product 4b the irreconcilability of class antagonisms"' 2l "the state is an organ of class dominationr ârl organ of class ress Ion of one class bY another: its aim is the crea ono order" wh ich lega1 izes and PerPetuates this oppressj-?*? O" moderating the collisions between the cIasses. " the state is the product of the irreconcilable 3) "if is the force character of class antagonisms ' if it standing above society-it and 'incresaingly seperating itself irõmE', then is clear that the liberation of the oppr"s"eà class is impossible .,9t only without a violent revolution, but also witÞo]¡t the destrgclion, of the apparatus of sta created bY the rulinq cIaEs and in which this 'seperation' is embodíedrr. 4Õ 4) The abolitio n of one tYPe of state and its replacement bY another will not change the fundamental character of the sta te. " [E] very state is a 'sPecial repressive force' for the supression of the oPPressed or a c1ass. Consequent lÐ no state is either "free" "peoplets statett. 5) "The forms of the bourgeois state s are exceedinglY variegated, but their essence is the same: in one vJaY or anóther, all these states are in the Iast analYsis inevitably a dictatorshi of the bou eol_sl-e. The transition fr om caplta sm o ommun smw certainJ-y bring a great vari ety and abundance of political forms' but the essence will inevitab$ be only one: the dictatorship of the proletariat. 6) "To limit Marxism to the teaching of the class struggle means to curtail Marxism - to distort it' to reduce it to something which is accePtable to the Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -410-

bourgeoisie. A Marxist is one who extends the acceptance of class struggle to accePtance of the dictatorshi of the roletariat. 9"

Thesepropositionsestablishpoliticalprimacyforthe state and theY do so bY refuting the notions of autonomY as characterising ( relative or otherwise) and of mediation the state. The state, within these propositions, is derived from an irreconcilable social contradiction, that of class antagonism. while the idea of class antagonism may be considered an antagonism of "interests", i.e., the basis from which the state is derived, the actual product derived the state is separate from interest. It is a "form", âñ ',organ,,, which embodies violence I a "special repressive force" designed to compel subordination. this is nothing other than to say that the state expresses class power and domination.

the identity of the particular exPression of domination and po!.¡er of a state is established by the class in control' since all political development is at the same time social and economic development, the identity of the state can certainly not be reduced to economic (mode of production) or social (class struggle) categories. To refuse this sort of reduction is onry minimal common senser not analytical sophisticationr âs some recent theorists purport. But the antidote to reductionism must not be abstract idealization of the state. It is my argument that the attempt to posit relative autonomy for the state, and to support that Elaine McCoy Chapter 6 _ALL- position by employing either mediation of pluraI interests or legitimation of class conflict as the chief characterization of the capitalist state, is to turn av/ay from the problem of irreconcilable class conflict as the source of the particular state form under capitalism. Such an enterprise is mystificatory on two counts. First1y, class/state powerr âs a core concept, is either displaced by a behavioural category, interest, which redirects attention a!./ay from the fundamental social problems of exclusion and inequity by concentrating upon the plurality of behaviours and political demands which the interest-category, of necessity, promotes t ot secondly, it effectively neutralizes the category of state/class po$¡er by concentrati-ng upon the components of power I e.g. I wealth, position, sectoral alignments, or simply, "fractions" within class- This promotes the fiction that power is simply the aggregation of "weighted" interests or that a "totality" of preponderance exists only in the "last instance" of political/economic development. What an J-rony that such a "IaSt instance" should be propounded by theorists, when the weight, and indeed the burden of povier is more an existential reality today than it perhaps, has ever been. If analysts hope to find a chink in the armour of capital power within a capitalist mode of production which determines the capitalist state form, it seems foolish to ignore the organic whoIe, which is capltalism.

The descriptj-on of the capitalist state given above is Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -4L2- derivedfromthestatetheoryofLenin.Iwanttoemploythe Leninist state model as a heuristic devj-ce to expose the similaritybetweentheAmericanpluralistandSome neo-Marxist conceptions of the state in contemporary political theory. I summarize my o!.¡n position as follows:

To imagine the caPital ist state without, ât the same time, imagining revolution j-s to be caPtured bY reformist ideology- The Particu Iar distortion within this j-deologY entai I s a refusal to recogn ize the embodied violence which is the chief identitY of the capitalist state- The me thod of class domination under capitalism is violence. It is a violence of exclu S ION and domination, of brute au thority, and of selec tive deprivation. If there is a process of reduction wi thin capitalism, it is not the relativelY benign and, in anv case, irrelevant reduct ionism of the intellectua I enterprise. It is rather the actual reduction of human histor to e mor und na ure o ca ta st on to an stas S the re uct on of uman eract exchan e ocess; the t eduction of o l iti-c s to L, u n ssent a T uct on: the sence o ree om

The Appeal of the State AutonomY Thesis

In an attempt to avoid either economic or statist reduction (the components of vulgar Marxi-sm) ' some contemporary neo-Marxists have turned to an analysis of capi-tarism which stresses the primacy of politics. The state provides a focus for this analysj-s of politics in so far as it represents a) competing class interests in the determination of concrete policy, and b) historical examples of the fractional disputes within capital which indicate the lack of total class consoLidation of the ruling clas t.52 Change and development within capitalism are thought to be the result of these two primary political determinants, which are' 13- Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -4 notably, connected to the conception of poì.itical interest'

Theutilityofthismethodj-schiefythatitprevents a premature and embarrassing heralding of the "revo1ution", which so far has failed to materialize in mature capitlaist societies. More importantly, this method allows the analyst to compile a "record of account" which promotes a high calibre of scholarshlp and meticulous documentation of the programmatic success of capitalism in controlling class antagonj.sm and reproducing the commodity basis of capitalist production. The latter consists of a contribution to case-studies and policy impact analysis'

The liability of the method is the absence of a theory of politics which escapes liberal assumptions regarding the very basis of politics under capitalism. Liberal assumptions as they do in the tend to be trans-historical ' residing ,,nature-of-man Isic] " school 0f thought. That is precisely why the behavioural category of interest plays such an j-mportant part in the liberal definition of politics' The rational pursuit of ínterest is thought, under liberalism' to motivate aI1 behaviour, including political choice. The very nature of liberal constitutions articuLates and prescibes this doctrine of rational individual interest as the dynamic of politics. when Marxists accept the liberal constitutional design as the focus for inquiry, they may be successful in uncovering the inequity of political and economic distribution and in amassing an impressive Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -414- record-of-account which will provide evidence to counter cl-aims about justice which liberalism also wants to make' But,insodoing,Marxismwillfailtoprovideafundamental theoretical rebuttal to liberalism. If we attempt such a rebuttal while empl-oying liberal assumptions' we shall arrive at a stage of meaningless abstraction which confounds rather than crystallizes a general theory of the state. If they mainatin the interest-orientation which is the well-sprj-ng of liberal thought, Marxist intellectuals wiIl have been captured by assumptions which preempt the ability ofMarxisttheorytoconfrontthebrutalityofthe capitalist state with a decisive rejection'

Twostatetheoristswillbeconsideredin substantiating my ctaim that some contemporary marxist theorists of the state share an interest-assumption with contemporary liberal theorists, and' that those interest-assumptions prompt a fallacy regarding an appropriate identification of the capitalist state- That fallacy, I contend, is very like the fallacy of liberalism. After attempting to establish these two claims, I shall show that there is a split within the general Marxist tradition similar to the split withj-n liberalism which stresses either j-ncrementalism (a system's category) or dec j-sional patterns of political authority. The structuralist-instrumentalist debate provides a shorthand characterization of the Marxist

sp1 it . Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -4L5-

Miliband's Thesis

In a recent article, Ratph Miliband has addressed the problem of state autonomy in an excepti-onally straightforward way. Because it was his early debate with Nicos Poulantzas that initiated the structuralist/instrumentalist debate, it is worthwhile considering his statement. The article entitled, "state power and class Interests", continues an inquiry into the state which posits that the state is a "dominant" force in society rather than the instrument of a dominant clas"'53 Miliband offers this as an on-going refinement of the distinction first articulated in 1965 during the New Left Review debate, between a conceptualization of the staters acting on behalf of the capitalist classr âs opposed to the state working at the behest of the capitarist c1."".54

The basis for making a dj-stinction between direct ,,instrumental,, control 0f the state by a ruling class and a more subtle and mediated functional service to class domination (erroneously termed a "structural" orientation) r55 is a search for causality regarding what determines state activity. Àpart from the differences in orientation among Marxists r âfi emphasis upon either class directives or impersonal, structured constraints upon the state, Miliband notes that there is fundamental agreement as to the exte'rnality of causatio.56' Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -4L6-

the state was decisively constrained bY forces external to it, ãã ...the constraints originated in ena ona and internatio naI capitalist context in which it oPerated.

Miliband notes further: 57

As has been occasionatly noted in this connection, this Marxist view of the state as impelled by forces externa]toitsharesits'problematic,withthe liberal or 'democratic pluralist' view of the state' .,ãtritn"tanding the othèr profound differences between them: wherea" Én" Marxi_st view attributes the main constraintsuponthestatetocapitalorcapitalistsor both, the 'de'mocratic pluralist' one attributes them to pressures exerc j-sed upon a basi-cal Iy the various groups democratic stale by a plurali-ty of competing ' interests ana-fårties i.t society. In both perspectives' the state does not originate action but responds. to external forces: it may appear to be -the 'historical subject,, but is in faêt-ãã object of processes and forces at work in societY.

Milibandbeginsthisanalysisbynotingthatitisthe entire perspective quoted above which has been challenged in recent times. The challenge has come by way of assertion: the state is ,,an autonomous structure a structure with a togic and interests of its ovJn not necessarJ-ly equivalent to, or fused with, the interests of the dominant class in society or the ful1 set of member groups in the polity '"58 He finds the challenge congenial to his own long-standing inquiry and clarifies his thinking on three points which are purported to contribute to the autonomy perspective' Those points are: r) that there exists an extended scope of state activity with its "permanent and active presence in class conflict and in every other kind of conf ¡ict"59 in contemporarycapitalistsocieties;2lthatapowerful Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -4L7- generation of ,,impulses to state action"60 occurs "within the state by the people who are in charge of the decision-making pohrer; and 3) that the source and content of these impulses to state action are interest-oriented with regard to' two particular advantages: executive privilege, and the interpretation of an executive mandate aS residing in a ',national interest". These three points combine to form a model which hopes to provide a richer explanation of state actj-on that either a state or economic reductionist argument might, in Miliband's view. The means by which this enrichment occurs is a shifting of the focus from external

I cauSality(''internationalaswellasindj-genous,,influences and constraints upon state decisiorr"6l to internal 62 causa I lty .

But it is ultimately a very small group of peoPle in the state often a single person - who decide what is to be done or not done; and it onIY in very exceptional cases that those who make the decisions are left with no range of choice at all.

The emphasis uPon the decisional, and indeed, the volitional, mode of political explanation is clear (for comparison,recalltheprecedingsectj-ononLindblom'S ,,voIitionaI" analysis). But Miliband notes that the degree of autonomy ¡ ox decisional freedom rests upon the "extànt to which class struggle and pressure from below challenge the hegemonyoftheclasswhichisdominantinsucha society.,63 (Again, recarr how Lindblom explains the problem of circularity and effecti-veIy dissolves that contingency') Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -418-

Miliband refutes the notion that the hegemony of the ruling class i-s sufficient to ensure an absence of state autonomy' asserting that the "challenge from below" wilI always make state autonomy problematic ín a \^ray such as to warrant a in shift ah/ay from an emphasis upon external causality explainingstatedecisions,toanemphasisoninternal causality as the dynamic component'

To suppose that class struggle has an impact upon the decisional predispositions of state decision makers in a bi-lateral exchange is purely speculatj-ve. Moreover, to assume a mutual recognition of class antagonism by deducing a political ,'equilibrium" resting upon tacit consent from a condition of relative political stability is a delusion of grandeur and produces a spurious methodology. Quietude may not j-ndicate a balance of class forces but, rather, the overwhelming success of class domination. In any case, the assertions which Miliband offers cannot be subjected to p.oof.64 Interpretation may abound but a method of validation upon which Marxist colleagues can build is absent hence my charge of the production of spurious methodology' Indeed, Latter-day liberalism has been criticized for these very same processes of deduction. That a similar tendency seems to be expressing itself in the Marxist discussion of state autonomy is noteworthy. It is also ironic that in an era of such'strong capitalist consolidation, the deduction should originate in the idealization of class struggle. rt is noteworthy, too, that the "internalization" of causality Elaine McCoy Chapter 6 -4L9- vis-à-vis state autonomy emphasizes the strongly psychological category of decision-making and volitj-onaI impulse. Autonomy in this case seems little more than a reified concept of the state. Futhermore, it is one which mistakes the subjectivity of decision making as rational choice. The "Scope of action[ which Miliband discusses is nothing less than the idealized breadth of human free will incorporated within state decision making.

points one and two of Mj-Iiband's analysis are corollarj-es to the general proposition: "The degree of autonomy which the state enjoys for most purposes in relation to social forces in capitalist society depends above alt on the extent to which class struggle and pressure from below challenge the hegemony of the class which is dominant in such a society-"65 rne scope of the state, its ubiquitous presence, and the impulses to executive dominance by state personnel reflect the tenuous security of capitaJ' within a strife-ridden context, according to Miliband. But reasoning from the class struggle in modern capj-talism is like reasoning from some such concept as the "state of nature,' in early liberal thought. The reality of the "original condition" is so remote from the existential condition of everyday life that an elaborate and fully abstract reasoning promotes the conclusions of the analysis. It is the contention of my thesi-s that class struggJ-e has been So muted, and in some cases fu}ly preempted, in most mature capitalist countries that to base a theory of the Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -420- state upon actual class struggle is impossible. The apparent absence of class struggle has caused analysts to attribute characteristics to the capitalist state which merely obfuscate that fact. In so doing, Marxist scholars are forced either to hark back to a far-away instance of an autonomous state (e.g., the second Empire of pt..r..66) or project the conditi-ons of a hypothetical state autonomy from the categories of psychology (eg, the decisional propensities of state "agents")67 :

verypowerfulimpulsestostateactionIare] generateä from within the state by people who are in ónutg" of the decision-making power'- These impulses undoúbtedly exist; and they cannot _ be taken to be with the purposes of the dominant classes. "y"o"v*"us The third point Miliband addresses is the content of ,,impulses to executive power". An interesting 0bservation about the manner in which self-interest is subsumed under the individual agent's conception of a national interest introduces the core problem: "what is the relationship of 6B state power to class interests?" The answer which Miliband offers is that throughout the history of capitalism, state agents have been attentive to the interests of capitalism' if not always controlled by the demands of capitalists. National interest is conceived to be national-capital interest.Inmaintainingasensitivitytoanational j.nterest, state agents are aware of their role in providing a context for the mai-ntenance of that interest. In l4iliband,s analysis, that context is social 0rder and Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -42L- national defense- This leads to Mil iband' s def ini-tive statement as to the nature of the state-c Ias s a 1 ignment .69 vj-s-a-vis Power and anteresf:

t an accurate and realistic model ' of the relationship between the dominant class in advanced capitalist societies and the state is one of artnershi between two different SC arate forces t ea AV ng I l- eac o er y many reads, Ye its own separate sphere of concerns This 'modeI' of partnership seeks to give due importance to the iirdepenaent and 'self-regarding' role of the state, and to mãke fu1l allowance for what might be called the Machiavellian dimension of state action'

Thechiefutilityofthismodelispurportedlythatit avoids ,,reductionism" and is adaptable to capitalist, social democratic or communist regimes. But therein I1es what I would consider the major liabirity of the partnership theorem. What distinguishes the state in these three different social systems?7o If it is only the terms of the partnership wherein state agents maintain autonomy vis-à-vis this or that class according to internal impulses, then a1I externalities are mere epiphenomena. Rather than avoid reductionism, the partnership theorem reduces the study of the state to the decisional mode so characteristic of pluralism.Indeed,intheearlydays,pluraliststhemselves worked to escape the reductionism of the legal/institutional paradigms preceding them. And for them' similarly' the positing of an internal dynamic to governmental processing ofthemultivariatedemandsandsupportswasthoughtto Elaine McCoy Chapter 6 -422- ensure an expansive methodology. It is only nohr' having realized the unreliabitity of these "internal" processes for explainj-ng injustice and failing to predict crisis' that they begin to search for a less confined terrain than the hearts and minds of people, whether in or out of pot"t-71

The same difficulty Nicos Poulantzas noted was "derived from a problematic of the subj ect"72 in the original New 13 Left Review debate :

This is a problematic of social actors, of individ ua 1s as the ori-g in of social action: sociological research thus leads finally o e search for fina I ist explanations founded on the motivations of conduct of the individual actors. This AS notoriously one of the aspects of the problematic both of weber and of coñtemporary funótionalism. To transpose this problematic of the subject j-nto Marxj-sm is in the end to admit the epistemotogical pri-nciples of the adversary and to iisf vitiating one's own analysis.

A more important problem than being "captured" by the method of one's adversary seems the reproduction of the error of the opposing method. But, in any case, the "probJ-ematic of the subject" does properly characterLze Mj-liband's "internalizati-on" of the dynamic of state activity. Subjectification of the state seems to me to be simple reification, and opens the way to a mystificatory discussion of the fully reified concepts of, state interests, authority and üolition, 'and of liberal motives as determinants of the state. Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -423-

The Poulantzas Thesis

Poulantzas, for his part, tried to solve the problem of the subj ecL/state dilemma by positing what he terms "objective functionsu 74 to describe and exprain how the "members of the state apparatu s,?5 serve on behalf of the ruring .r."",76

they belong Precl-sely to the State aPpara tus and ob ective function the actua 1 ization have as their the of the role of the s a S n turn means that bureaucracY, as a specl- fic and relativelY 'unified' social categorY, is the 'servant' of the ruling class, not by reason of its class origins, which are divergent, or bY reason o f its personal relati ons with the rul ing class, but bY rea son of the fact that its interna I unity derives from its actualization of the ob j ecti- ve role of the state. The tota lity of this role itse I f coincides with the interests of the ruling class.

The ,,objective role" of the stãte is the producti-on of unity within a context of class divis íon.77 This is put forth as both the explanation of the convergence of state power and class interest, and as the determinant of state form. At the same time, the prerequisite of state autonomy is posited as necessary to this preordinate and "objective" role, the production of unity: the coincidence of interest and power. The state must stand above particular interests in order to consolidate unity. Its "standing above" is guaranteed by its status as an objective structur""78 and its relationship with social classes (aIso enjoying the status of objective structures) through an "objective system and a system whose of reguJ.ar Connections ' a structure Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -424- agents, tment, are in the words of Marx, 'bearers' of it to trager.n (Y As in the case of a liberal Eastonian *"a"t""-model, or an incrementalist approach to an analysis of politics and authority, Poulantzas simply derives a "superordinate interest" from an ad hoc examination of state organization (in the case of Poulantzas, emphasis is put on the bureaucracy). He describes this "unity" as the ,'objective role" of the state. Between the structuralists and the incrementalist/systems theorists, h¡e have only a difference of terminotogy. Both are state functionalists and both posit "objective" characteristics in defining the state by way of the organization of interests, namely superordinancy (in the case of Lindblom, the superordinate interest is that of business; in the case of Poulantzas' the superordinate interest is that of capital) '

While Poulantzas appears to be avoiding reification of the state by employing an external determinant ( "the objective role" of the state), he is not. His "externality" is simply the successful organization of preponderant interests. The interest category ensures subjectification of the state, hence its reified definition with the structuralist method. whether internal to the state (via the motj_ves and conduct of "people in power"), or external to the state (in terms of the "objective" organization of interests) , the mistaken characterization of the state remains. As long as volition, j-nterest, and motives are Elaine McCoy Chapter 6 -425-

posited as the determining characteristics of state form' this will continue to be the case.

The Shared Analytical FIaw of Contemporary Theories of the State: A Leninist Critique

Following the sJ-x propositions introduced at the beginning of the discussion of the Marxist analysis of the capitalist state, and recalling that these are employed to provide a useful counterpoint to i-nterest-assumed theories ' the paralleIs between the Marxist and the 1j-beral pluralist school may now be explored. The propositions can be encapsulated in a single sentence of my oh/n restatement:

The state is always an organ of oppression, which has its genesis in irreconcilable class antagonisms and has as defining characteristics r âfr institutional ',separatenesè" from society and an apparatus capable of repressive force.

This is, admittedly, a reduced definition of the state. When Lenin propounded the original notions from which the definition is drawn, he did so for the purpose of saving Marx from the "canonization" which he believed was akin to making Marx safe for democracy. The revolutionary content of Marx'S thought, according to Lenin' h/as becoming adulterated by those who were intellectually afraid of Marxism, and who interpreted. the capitalist order to mean the de facto reconciliation of open class hostility, and the political Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -426- solution to deeper class hostility through the initiation of democratic reform of the state. These reformist thinkers erred mainly in attributing to the state a capacity for historic transformation which circumvented overt class confrontation. For them, the primacy of politics meant the efficacy of state-politics, while for Lenin, the primacy of politicsmeantlcompleterejectionofanythingbuta tactical exploitation of the bourgeois state. He makes his argument on the basis of textual references to Engels Karl M"r*,80 and on the basis of a a state theory which is deliberately reduced so as to encompass the actual reduction of social, politicat and economic life under capitalism' That reduction is the essence of a class society where under the bourgeois rule. Lenin terms that constj-tution of power the ,,dictatorship of the bourgeoisie", and contrasts it to an alternative type of constitutions, embodied by an alternative state form, which he cal1s the "dictatorship of the proletariat". The essence of the state within both constitutions is the same, in Lenin's analysis: power and oppression. The differences between the constituent systems arise in terms of their respective historic development: the strengthening of the state versus the "withering awayrr of the state.81 This view of Lenin's is decidedly non-liberal, but its value lies not in that vein alone' It provides a means by which to confront the interest-1aden assumptions of contemporary Marxist and Iiberal state theorists discussed in this chaPter. Elaj-ne McCoY Chapter 6 -427-

The character of state activity for Lenin has nothing whatsOever tO dO With the expresSiOn of an "autonomousw or "objective,' interest. It is a form of rule, the purpose of which is the provision of order by compulsj-on. what kind of order must be the J-mperative of state activity is determined by I itical rl_mac class dictatorshiP- This assumes neither a bifurcated nor a plural interest-nexus, but' rather I a unified constitution of power. The special constitution of po$¡er which determines state form both in essence and in the practice of authority does not preclude interest negotiation among groups or between classes ' but is seaerate from and above either the interest negotiations or the process of interest consolidation- This separateness and aloofness must not be mistaken for autonomy. The state is a class totality. Therefore Lenin argues that the complete form and apparatus of the bourgeois state must be smashed before the imperative of state activity, class rule' can be taken up by the proletariat. Even then, remnants of the bourgeois order will continue to find expression in the state.

The state is neither autonomous from class nor from history . Indeed, it is the locational context of class rule proximi.ty to contro1 of the means of production which

makes possible the " separateness and aloofness" of the sta te, and which generates the historic context within which the state is wi-thout interest but function s according to the Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -428- imperatives of domination. The conjuncture of the spatial and historic contexts ensures that the "primacy of politics,,, while a key problematic, is nevertheless a state imperative to domination. Thus state activity is not ,,motivated,, by interest and cannot be analysed according to theessentiallybehaviouralcategoriesofj-nterest articulation or interest mediati-on. The state is a tool 0f Bz domination. To "anthropomorphize" it by positing an interest-determination is to emp10y a reified concept and to closeanalysisprematurely.Thefallacycommontoboth pruralism and neo-Marxism regarding state theory I f argue' is this premature c1ásure. Reca11 proposition six, above: ,,To Iimit Marxism to the teaching of the class struggle means to curtaíl Marxism - tO diStOrt it, to reduce it to something which is acceptable to the bourgeoisj-e. A Marxist is one who extends the acceptance of the class struggle to the acceptance of the dictatorshiP of the proletariat- "

This is not to argue that the state exists in a "pure" form or even that revolution will fuIIy consolidate state power. That the state is capable of engendering a "mixed" constitution is no more than our intellectual forbears took B3 as common ""rr"a.

Finally, the determination of political development does certai.nly stress fot Lenin, the state and politics' The corpus of his work, beyond that examined here, continually Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -429-

addresses problems of voluntarism, spontaneity' economasm and a wide range of practicat political problems'84 But without an interest-orientation, the political development of capitalist societies for Lenin is the development of the sophistication of repression, in domestic and globaI terms. It is a development of potitics against history'

Conc lusion

The state in capitalist society wil-1 be understood' more clearly if state theory is capable of projecting structurally determined crisis as independent, although interacting with the motives, volitions, and predispositions of classes and groups. Historically sedimented patterns of class Ínteraction via state appeal have their expression in actual policy and in patterns of institutional ízed recognition of the developing routes of interaction' state theory does well to specify the boundaries of its inquiry' The state is not coterminous with society. The PoIiticaI Lenin is problematic, as stated by Engel s , Marx ' and preciselytheseparationandaloofnessofthestate.The specificity of that context refutes the notj'on of the state as an interest-bearing relation, and as an autonomous political instance or construct' The state is not "captured" by the cap italist class. It is owned by the capitalist class. The only interest that it is capable of, is the usurous one which debits history and impoverishes politics' Elaj-ne McCoY Chapter 6 -430-

Footnotes

t"y1 r mean an "inadequate bounding of . tlt concept" . absence of of,erational ãefinitions regarding' state activity, state identity, and state determinatj-on. I also mean thê'absence of teêts to allow the student of the capitalist state to replicate other theorists' studies and methods for the pn.po"è of validity testing. Not simply empirical methodã Lut simple and. concise statements of präpo=itions regarding any lnquiry into the capitalist state *o,rfa help to cÍarify-the areá of study. Since much of state theory is concerned with development and explanation it would seem that efforts to guãrd against idiosyncratic findings regarding the state (for which there exists no .ror*" iot alsprooi or replicabillty) would be desireable' 2charles Beard, An Economic Inter etation of the Constitution ( New Yor k: Macm ârlr ) 2 J- j-ca - Louis HarLz, The LiberaI Tradition fn Amer (New York: Harcourt Brace and WorI d, 19s5 For latter- day analysis see WilI iam J. Crotty and GarY C- Jacobson' American Parties in Dec I ine (Boston: Little, Brown, L9B0)' 4 AIe*i" de TocqueviIle, Democra in America , H.S. Commager, Jx. (ed-) (London Ox o vers ty Press L946, ' Eng 1 ish IoriginallY written and Pub Iished in France, LB35; translation, 18631 ) , for an ear ly sociological and Po I itica L analysis of the unique components o f American democra cy. SRobert Dahl is often cited as the most articulate spokesperson pluralism. His work on community power and pårticipation "iestablishes a rationale for studying politics as the vector of decision making, and he initiated a series ;; ;;þ.iõi¿; for measuring the extent. to which countries outside the united states approached what he considered the modern democratic idealt pã"t-war pluralist America' The io",-," upon decision making as key to the pluralist-notion of politì-cs has to do with mõre than the taming of democratic 'p.iti.ipationr âs in the case for example, of James Madison' demands It has to do with the transformation of political - into manageable and coherent "bargaining chips", the establishment ãf a political currency which not only motivates decision tnäfing among-alõng potitical actors ' but structures systems of nargáining political- "market" Iines. Not o"iv-äã the ínteraõtion of political. demands structure the nature of political decision makingr but- demands themselves must be iormulated in such a way as to function as "irpul=,' within a very discrete process of political nargaining. Much has been written about the nature ãf political iesouró"st who has them and who has not; whether or not polj-tica1 resources are cumulative or wfrãt determines the salience of political non-cumulative; of politlcal issues and therefore the relative weighting Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -43L- resources. However, it is more apProPriate to this thesis to concentrate on the timing and method of emPloYing Po I itica I resources to gain Pohter rather than on the distribut ion of resources. Therefore the work of RoberL DahI will not be treated in the text- His most s ignificant published writings âr€r Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theo (Chicago: The University o cago ress t , Critique of the RuI ing EIite Mode1", Amer ican Political Who Governs ? 52 (March 1- 95S) p. 463¡ Dahl' Science Review, Havent Democra and Power in an American Ci t New Ya eUn vers ty ress t 9 ) , and DahI, ec cut: Haven' PoI arch ; Partici ation and sition (New Connec cutt: Ya eUn vers ty Press ' 6 A huge literat ure exists on the topic of political of a resources within P luralism. The very definition "political resource", Iet alone who has them and what the long-term distr ibutional Patterns of them are, has occuPied the attention of man ypt uralist scholars - For a much applauded attemPt to systematize the study of Political resources and ParticiPation modes r see S idney Verba and Norman H. Nier Par tci tion in America PoIitical Democra ew Yor Harper a Row, 2l¡ and Social a Three Faces of S an s aw I and Graham Wootton (eds.), Pluralism: Political Ethnic and Reli ious (West mead: Goh¡er ' ; Fre er c L. o Ier t nforma on Sources o f Political Science 3rd. Edition (Santa â¡ California: Amer rcan Bib r09r' aphical Center, Ctio Press, L9 81). For a general review of wr iting Charles Lindbtom and Robert Pluralist L953) - Dah1, Po Iitics, Economics , and Welfar e (New York,

7 The term rr I a ll has never been succinctl defined o ts and ra ona z e ca ons n t on s re -roo u S c con ext. o ow rom tA. Po ar Par c on s ofl r op. c pP.

Cm9

¡Às¡li¡¡tbo

O0ùlkdGc¡d.nl ll

&*¿ lßlu¡¡n h<çmoicr b

,"T,lii;ä,i' Let me call a regime near the lower left corner of figure L.2 a cloée¿ hegemony' If hegemonic regime it is movj-ng shif ts upward, âs along p"tn f ' then toward greatei public õontestati-on. Without stretching language too far, one could say that a change in this EIaine McCoY Chapter 6 -432- direction involves Iiberalization of a regime; al_ternatively one might say that the regime becomes more competitive. if a regime changes to.provide greater párticipation¡ âs along pathll, it might be éaid to change loward greater popularization, or that it is becomiñg inclusive. A regime might change along one dimension and not the other. If we call a regime ne.ar the leftcorner a competitive o1ígarchy, then path I represents a change from a closed hegemony to a co*pètitiv" oli-garchy. But a closed hegemony might.also become more inclusive without tiberal ízíng, i.e. , without increasing the opportunities for public contestation, âs along path II. In this case the regime changes from a closed to an inclusive hegemony' Democracy might be conceived of as lying at the upper right corñer. But since democracy may involve *õre dimõnsions than the two in figure I.2, and since (in my view) no large system in the real world j-s fully demociatized,, I prefer to calt real world systems that are closest to the upper right corner polyarchies. Any change in a regime that moves it upward and to the righÉ, for example along path IIr' .may be said. to reþresent some ãegree oi democratization. Polyarchies, thènr rây be thought of as relatively (but incompletãfy) democratlzeð' regimes ¡ ox, to put it in anothèr wây, polyarchies are regimes that have been substantiaffy- poþularized and liberal ízed, that is, highly inclùsive and extensively open to public contestation. you will notice that although I have given names to regimes lying near the four corners, the large spaces in the miãafé of the figure is not named' nor is it subdivided. The absence of names partty reflects the hj-storic tendency to classify regimes in terms of extreme types; il also reflects my own desire to avoid redundant terminology. The lack of nomenclature does not mean a lack of regimes; in fact, perhaps the preponderant number of national regimes in the world ioaäv would fall j-nto the mid-area. Many significant chan-ges in regimes, then, would involve shifts within, intol or out óf this important central arear âs these regimes become more (or less) inclusive and increase (oi reduce) opportunj-ties for public contestation. In order to refer to regimes in this large middle area, I shalL sometimes resort to the terms near or nearly: a nearly hegemonic regime has somewhat more opportunities for contestation than a hegemonic regime; a near-polyarchy could be quite inclusive but would have more severe réstrictions on public contestation than a fuI1 polyarchy, or it might provide opportunities -for public c-bnteslation comparable to those of a f ul L þolyarchy and yet be somewhat less inclusive. IThis þrrågrupË is fõllowed by an extensive footnote #4, a þortíon- of which is reproduced here, with emphasis added, to indicate the full terms of apology imbedded Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -433-

in the definition of polyarchy: l Some readers will doubtless resi-st the term t arc asana terna vetot word emocra but I t S ortant to ma nta n ed st nct on tween mocrac as an dea s s ema e u onal arr emen s at e come to r ar e asa o r ect a rox mat ono an a an er ence shows, I I eve t at en same term SUS or both, need less confus ion and essential I lrre levant arguments ge n e way of analys s.... Sch.rIes Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Politcal Economic S stem (New York: Baslc Books, 19 tt ].P. f 9 Ibid., p. L46. 10ro understand the way in which business accomplishes these feats of superordinate control one must fo1low Lindblom' s analysis on three counts ' Firstly, it is stipulated that the historical evolution of private entärprise through market systems occurred coincident with the giowth of poÍyarchies. Ltre root of both systems - market and governmentäf : is found in liberal constitutions of goveinment. the established authority patterns in such ãonstitutions are primarily libertarian in nature, and only secondly democratic. Polyarchy and markets share a common origin. secondly, the legacy of wealth and power which has so favored the superordinate position of business aS a system of authority hãs two impoitant consequences. One is the enormous growth in scopã of business 'acti-vities (mainly through the capitalization of initial privi1e99 ) .which has rendeied the bùsiness person a "public personrr (170-175) ' Most examples of the public nature of the business person ãr. tied; in LindLlom's analysis, to the "public consequences of discretionary corporate decisions", such as decisíons regardi-ng "a natioñal industrial technology, th9 pattern of wórk orÇanization, resource allocation, and, of course, executive õompensation and status." (171) Although these åecisions are removed from the agenda of government' and thus from polyarchal control, they remain .public in terms of consequences regarding social organization within the political-economic system. Thus' government by the many' poiyärcny, facilitates rùIe by the Yery few. who remain üncônsträinea. Government can only articulate its concerns regarding these decj.sions through a peculiar exchange reÍation vis-a-vis busi.nessr câtled "inducement". Government inducements take the form of both political and market benefits given to business (e.g.' congenial corporate tax 1aws, virtual tax benefits, and the shaping of. certain market demands through, for example, the state provision of Lransport infrastruãture) . Thus, a "mutual adjustment" bordering on passive accommodation occurs between the two Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -434- sets of leaders and is not so much conspiracY as an anticipation of mutual benefit which accrues from a stable political-economic sYstem. Notonlyistheprivilegeofbusinessacontrolof the public but it is átso a direct j-ntrusion into polyärchal "g..ra",fro""á.rr"s for representation of autonomous intärests. 1'hat is, both corporãte financing of poJ.itical parties and the access to regislative hearings and committee deliberation goes beyond simþte interest-group lobbying, in Lindblom's account. The extension of control is explained by what LindbLoà characterizes as the "triple advantage" enjoyed by business: an extraordinary source of funds' readiness, and a continual and easy access to otÇ^îrirutional easiJ-y goíernment (194) . This triple advantage would . þe iecognized by Uârxist analyãts as class attribute, and they might agree that such advantage j-s both a constitutional and structural guarantee for capital against a power-disenfranchised proletaria!, if not an eleclorally-disenfranchised on". Thus the Ecory 9.f business activity irfri"ft af f ects agenda-setting, and the . direct irrti""i-"" into government ¡V business are two important consequences of the tegacy of wealth and power which business enjoYs. Third,andlessobviousthaneithertheaccountof historical accommodation between business and government or the legacy of wealth and power, is the "ominous specific possibíIiiy that populai control in both market and ior"rr,*"nt is in any êase circular. It may be that people are indoctrinated to demand to buy and vote for nothing other than what a decision-making elite is already disposed to grant themii (2021.'reinforces This is thã manipulation of volitions which not only business privi1e99 .but also legitimizes tñat privilege through the very mechanisms which are to safeguard ägainst- centralization of authority in the American constitutional design. The result is a circularity of both market and polyarchy which has as its consequences the reduction of poiitical ãiscourse and debate to secondary and peripheral isãuesi concomitantly, the "silencing" of debate over Grand Issues (205); the constraint of dissident volitons (210); and, perhaps most importantly, the "shaping of core beliefs" (211) . lllbid., pp. 145-156. This is an interesting chapter in terms ot- later discussion in this thesis of the work of Theodore Lowil anA, indeed, af a great deal of liberal of the nature of poþular control within discussion draws capitalism. The point-between of interest comes when Lindblom thä distincËion "control by result" and "control by process,,. The former is control of input and the latter is control of output. Lindblom sees the distinction as key to the political problem of polyarchy._ His placement of the potitical probiematic is rèmarXãU:-y similar to that of Marxist structuralists and witl be discussed below' The Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -435-

argument is: the control of delegated decisions is greater in economies tnan in potities, due to the efficiency-pricing mechanisms which are ãndogenous traits of markets' Markets are better able to register and sort out popular inputs than are polities able to accommodate popular control. I{hi1e ,'minor defects" (p. L49l in markets' monoþoties .rà only but it "Monopoly weakens responses to popular control ' äliminates a response or leads to a perverse one' as ".itnäris commonplace in polyarchy" (Ibid') Markets can withstand such phenomena as ine-gtot-ttt of monopoly without fundamental damage to the clearíng and dislributional mechanisms characterLzing markets. Polities are more vulnerable to unanticipated and un!.¡elcome development and more naturally resistant to popular control. When corporate discretionary decisions entär-the political process, given'.a) tl: nature b) the PredisPosition of esent a Product, the Political nd the results of Progressive ulnerabilitY fot PolYarchies' Lindblom stresses the necessity and the entry of the contradiction: political decisionË must involve delegation' It is ât tne point of delegation that control is lost and the contaminaiion of the political process ensues' Later sections of this thesis chãpter will ãddress the naj-vite of this line of thinking and indicate its affinity with other modes of thought wrrión posit an "autonomy" definitj-on of the ðã*po'e.rt" of'ãapitalisL society, whether they be termed potlarchal routãs, autonomous "political instances", or þatterns of authoritY- 12tbid., part vr,ff. chapter 19 and forward posits and expl.ir,ffi two fundamental models applicable to political economic analysis. The models are distinguished as two different orders of rationality: one' stresses synoptic piå..,irg guiaðã-bv a confidence i; the rational capacities ãi feopíe-in tfre p"sitive administration of society; which the other stresses a pragmatic skepticism regarding reason and rçpresents-ptã¡iå*-iofíing a model guided by volition and emplying incremental as the means of ordering reþresent a command versus a market society. t'lodels I and II politics economy and an authority-baãed (party) system of . ,"r"r"- an interest-group baseä system of interactive politics. Synoptic as against stiategic planning wil l produce proio,r¡a differeñces in the administration of interest and the provision of options for problem-soLving' of veto poh¡ers and the For example,'of thä---iegiãiäti". dispersion coalescence ma j or j-ties are proqrammatic institutional effects about whicñ Lindblom is concerned' 13 charles Lindblom. ,'Muddring Through',3 op. cit. 14rh" 'criticisms above ref er to Lindblom' s description of the structural and functional superordinancy of business iãaaersnip in a capitalist state. Two further crj-ticisms are pertinent to the discussion at hand. These are concerned Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -436-

\,üith the characterization of business enterprise as an interest group. 1) Lindblom characterizes business interest as constituteã in the following manner: bu siness enterPrise j-s a specialized form of social organizati on which amplifies the power of business- The inordinate powe T of business is due to the exercise of authority by business. Business interest is not s I a tts cial" interes t. It is a set of author tat ve rules affect I the soc a order. Bus NES S nterest-as-aut or ty wor S I¡t th nan def rnes the rules within which the struggle over authorit y is conducted ( that struggte is confined to qovernment auth orities and bus iness authorities). Furthermore, the entrepreneur enjoYs a position of great strategic imPortance within that struggle: "the entreP reneur sits astride the whole market sYStem" (2291 and controls three markets, Iabour' consumer and intermediate markets - Business can a lso use its discretion to "terminate exchange" and effect some thing like a general strike in exchang e relations. This exPress ion of "authoritY" and l-s approaches a coercrve mechanism for control, certainly very different from the caPabilities of other interest grouPs. Unions' f or example, not o n1y have fewer political resources wi-th wh ich to comPete for authoritati-ve representation within polyarchy, but also are unaware of their inferior Po sition as comPetitors - O ther schools of thought might recogni-ze this non-percePtion as an asPect o f alienation and/or absence of class consciousness - More r_mpo rtantJ-y for Lindblom, the nature of labour interests ' and hence political activity, is qualitativelY different from that of business - Labour i-s sustenance to the workers who comprise the main "constitue ncy" of un j-ons as theY constitute an interest grouP. Livelihood is the onlY inducement needed to extract labour from the worker. Inducement' for business, on the other hand, is a prerequisite for Pr ofitable enterPrise (176) Business does not require homoge neity for its Position of Pr ivilege. Neither conflict between business and governmen t nor conflict within business undercuts business privilege' For government anticiPates business needs, even when signals expressing particular istic programma tic demands are weak or confused. Conflict is always constra ined by prudence (179): conflict will always lie within the range of dispute constrained by Ithe] understanding that they togèther constitute tñe necessary leadership for the They do not wish to destroy or seriously uñdermine"yõt"*. tñe function of each other' In pointing to the asymmetrical relationship between business and afí other "private" interest groups, including i;;;;;, political resources and discretj-onary influence,"i"-a-vis Lindblom ãiscloses the structure of superordinate po!./er relations within the capitalist.state. But as long as Ït" continues to view the statã as an interest-mediator (the pluralist/incrementalist model ) he cannot explain the derivation of business interests beyond maintenance of a Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -437-

stable market system, nor can he teII us abou t the political development of business-state interactj-ons' Needless to sâY, the absence of any class analysis whatsoever further limits Lindblom's analysis of potitical development' but even on his own terms and within the model he stipula tes, there is a premature closure of the analysis. 2l WhiIe arguing that the organization of business interests is strúctuial1y more efficient than that of other õro.rp=, Lindblom at tñe same time recognizes that government, as a competi-ng authority system, is constrained ÉV the nature of a ti-¡erat constitution. Minimal government exists within a J.arge and complex state. Authority within and of the state is characterized by adaptation complex and increasingly plural demands as society "modernizes" (L62-L6gl. Thé ãxeicise of authority is rationalized and maAe eff ícient -wIEñ-- tne state. For example, the low marginal cost of routj-nized authority patterns (in the guise of ãomthing resembting "administrative Iegislation" gttd the "norm of reciprocity" (31) are adaptive mechanisms within a complex state'. eut ihe limited cómpetence of polyarchies mirrors the Limited competence of markets in Lindblom's analysis, and contains an explanation.about the coincidental aisaËi1ity of both systemã in maintaining equilibrium' Polyarchiãs share with markets the "free" structure and coslly nature of exchange relations. Both systems are therefore incompetent as aútfrority systems because of their reliance upon inducement strategiès to gain equilibrium or ,,consensus,, (the political definition of market equilibrium) . The timitea competence o.f markets has its cóncomitant in minimal (Iiberal) government' Neithersystemisefficientatcompelling.the.,public good,,, that *oÊt sought-after and illusive universality in Iiberal theory. t"tarkãts and polyarchies are too susceptible to interpenelration of thðir opposites: markets, whose domain is the private, are undermined by the "P,rblig" scope of business; pãtyarcni.s, whose doma1n is the "pub1ic", are undermined by'thå privatization of their chief function' the authoritative all0cation of values. The vehicle for this process of undermining i" I of course, articulated business interests, and the meóhanism in Lindblom's analysis is that of "circularitY". l5ta seems that Lindblom has never come to grips with the anatgonistic relationship which incrementalist and decision-making modes of analyéis generate. Indeed, much of the I j_tefature on lmer ièan I ibera I i sm coup Ie the characteristics of incrementalj-sm and decision making, AS though they were entirely compatible and moreover as if they enjofed the same status as truthful explanation about the *"r,.rãr in which American liberalism works. I contend that Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -43 B- incrementalism is both a real-world characteristic and a method of anatysis, while the decisional mode is purely an artifact of *.thod. fni" is, of course, not to deny that decisions are made in government or that such decisions are property seen to be a ieaction to political 'stimuli". It is,-ratñer, to deny that decision making is ? political pfrå"õm"noñ'whiCh ai mediates competing and plural interests in society and b) which is a particularly aPt means of identifying modern liberal democracies. Important {ot the present thésis is the fact that it is pluralism -which has implanted the notion that mediation is a political activity. It is political when posited as central at the state leve1 because here mediation carries the weight of authority' This is perhaps the greatest of the pluratist fictions and one that I confont ín *y critique oi interest-modes of political analysis. 16s". also Lukesr oP- cit.. L7 The first edition of the book !.ras Theodore Lowi ' The End of Liberalism: IdeoI Pol ic and the Crisis oE e P c Author t e!,¡ Yor W. W. Norton 69). r ' what S tles ef irst and second edition describe crisis has wrought in America' in Lowi's view. 18o" a pejorative term, this definition of American liberalism was an attemPt by Lowi to turn the earlY pluralist, David Truman, on hi s head, and to negate the influence of the Precursor to pluralism, Arthur Bentley, bY showing how interes t-groups violate the Prec epts of the earlier theories wh ich exto 11ed the virtues of open and permeable grouPs which did not possess cummulati-ve Politic aI resources, and had over lapping membershiPs and cou 1d therefore be entrusted with delegated ( de facto) Power as clients of state-mandated programs. Otñers- sucn as HenrY Kariel and Grant McConne1I brought to bear similarlY critfcal arguments: Ar thur BentIeY, The Process of Government (Cambridge' Massachussetts: Hffi press,-T902 loriginal lY 19 0Bl ) ; Henry S. KarieI ' The Decline of America PIuraIism' Stamford California: Stanford vers t Press Grant Mc onne ,Pt vate Power a Amer can mocra (New Yor Knop tL ; and Dav and Truman t T e Governmenta I Process: PoIitical Interests Public Opan]-0n (New Yor k: Knopf, I 9s1). 19Th.odot" Lowi The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the Unit tates New Yor . Nor onr 1 20 Lowi has offered a Preamble to the unwritten Constitution of the Second RePubIic: PREAMBLE. There ought to be a national Presence in every aspect of the lives of American citizens. National power is no longer a necessary evil; it is a positive virtue. Elaine McCoy Chapter 6 -439-

Article I. It is the primary purpose of this national government to provide domestic tranquility by reducing rj-sk. This risk may be physical or it may be fiscal. In order to fulfil this sacred obligation' the national government shall be deemed to have sufficient power to etiminate threats from the environment through regulation, and to eliminate threats from economic uncertainty through insurance. Article II. The separati-on of por¡ters to the contrary notwithstanding, the center of this national government is the presidency. Said office is authorized to use any powers, real or imagined, to set our natj-on to rights by making any rules or regulations the president deems appropriate; the president may sub-delegate this authority to any official or agency. The right to make all such rules and regulati-ons is based upon the assumption in this constitution that the office of the presidency embodies the wiII of the real majority of the American nation. Artj-cle III. Congress exists, but only as a consensual body. Congress possesses all legislative authority but should limit itself to the delegation of broad grants of unstructured authority to the president. Congress must take care never to draft a careful and precise statute because this would interfere with the judgment of the president and his professional and fu11-time administrators. 2lwni1" Lindblom labours to define liberal democracy in a way compatible with his market-centred analysis, Lowi labours to define capitalism in a way which is compatible with his institutional-centred analysis. For Lowi, capitalism in Ame'rica was a public philosophy denoted by a revoluti-on as much against mercantilism as it was against colonialism. The birth of interests in the ne$/ Iand was a birth of market interest along Smithian patterns. But it also according to Lowi, !{as a triumph of politics in the' sense that interests were enfranchised along with the people who carried them. With enfranchisement of economic-cum-political interests came the introductj-on of the key invigorating dynamic for politics: the dynamic of risk. For Lowi engaging political risk seems almost synonymous with political participation. 22T n" question of whether interests can be embodied within groups is highly problematic, as is the similar question of whether interests can be embodied in classes. Recalling the discussion in Chapter 5' one which attempts to refute the notion of objective interest', we would have to consider whether groups or classes a) are capable of reconstituti-ng multiple subjective interests with such means as deliberation or public debate or voting, and b) whether groups or classes can demonstrate in discernable htays a si-ngIe Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -440- reconstituted interest- The gre at debates in western political theorY around the nature of Political representation and dissent have addressed the idea of politicaIlY constituted interes t, as have the contract theorists. For a survey of that writing see E-K- Bramstead and K.J. Melhuish, Western Liberalism: A History in Documents from Locke to Croce ( New York: Longman, L9B0) . 23lowi's ch ief complaint against alt of this is, of course' thatitisag rand mystification- In practice, the theory o f diffuse and fluid interest-grouP politics becomes an extremelY rigid system of privil ege. Because the new public PhiIosoPhY of interest-group liberalism Ís no philosoPhY at all ' but merelY a grab bag of sentiments about the nature of an "open societY" [for the or rginal conception see' Karl Poppor, The en Socie and Its Enemies, 2 hoo w nked. voIs. , ofl r 945 everyone S CAS y Questions of equitY before the law are rePlaced bY questions of procedura I due process i Partisan differences and i deologica 1 conflict are rePlaced bY concerns about organizational tactics and coalitional strateg j-es; the Potential for comPetition easilY becomes the Potential for oligopolistic contr oI over special interest "sectors" ; and, most imPortant Iy, the element of risk is unsuccess fully factored out of the political equation (15-19) . Unlike Lindblom, Lowi does not attribute the development of thi-s version of American l-iberalism to a deliberate manipulation of the volitions of the citizens (in othèr words Lowi does not opperate within an i.deological incorporationist frame) ' Rather ' a ',crisis of authority" jxi) in the United States is reported to have ocóurred during the 1930s in the wake of enormous social dislocation. The blueprint for- a positive and interventionist state which was laid then ra" subsequently and fu1ly articulated during the 1960s most ."p"ði.Ily during-bluepiint thê presidencies of Kennedy and Johnson. Secauêe the contravened both the actual and virtual proscriþtions on pohrer articulated i.r the Constitutionl a sublLe and devious circumvention of that system of politics was devised. Ratj-onalization for the subtle ã"nolution from a constitutional iepublic was provided by generations of political who have concocled an intellectual paradigm scientists time catled pluralism (57-61) . At the same ' organizational changes in the executive bureaucracy and within congress provided the programmatic response to the demands of the nehr constitution. These shifts are most clearly understood, wj-th Lowi's analysis, in the discretionaiy grants of power given within an j-ncreasing protiierátion of "regulatory" agencies. In discretionary legislatj-on Congress passing "nei-*ore Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -44L-

enacted its own demise as a representative branch of gðv"rtt*e.tt in the United States r al l the while ápplauded by the erstwhj-le academic community who saw in this development the modernization and the celebration of piuratist politics (not to mentj-on their own method of Political inquirY).

' Lowi has followed the schumpeterian line regarding the paradox of capitalism that and wilI is endangered by "r,Ér"pr"ñeuraIcapitãlism's success. "teãtinity The extension of the capitalist market as well as the increase of differenti-ation and spãciafization which are commensurate with such a aãvelopment are the parameters of success. But the consequences of tfris success are a further muJ.tiplication of dependencies, statuses and interests (19). The final dilemma of the old public philosophy and hence of the "paradise lost" of the otd public ðià.r of capitalisir, is the inverse relationship which exists between an increasj-ngIy rationalized market society (stressing production and exchange) and the ,'publié". Government is'no longer representative of a community of purpose. It has been separated from poIJ-tics and iransf ormed into an administrat j-ve iechnology whose purpose is accommodation to group demands. Indeed, politics itself has become mere 1og-roIIing and committee negotiation: "Administration mai indeed be the sine qua non of modernity" (2l-l'

capitalism seems to have outsmarted itself in Lowi's ãccount, and a large measure of the self-deception is due to the ease with which classical Iiberalism has been undermined by pluralism, and the capitalist system itself divested of its entrepreneural wirr and energy. In the place of the entrepreneur' interest'gro,r!- liberalism has given us the well-orguñir"ä group which has succeeded in wresting a "speciai imperiúm" (36), that of delegated authori-ty, as a political right.

Lowi formali-zes the Schumpeterian paradox by attributing a peculiarly American characteristic to his version oÍ tñe end of Iiberalism/capitalism' He describes the manner in which the American polity has responded to what he terms the two central sources of disäquilibrium in industrialized societies: alienation and conflict. The united states has applied the correctiïes of rationality and social control through a sophisticated administrative apparatus which succeeds ' ultimately, in merely displacing the problems of "modernit-y" rather than solving them. With Schumpeter' Lowi seems to believe that problems of social ' Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -442-

economic, and political development wiII yield only to the appl j-cation of creative volition- If SchumPeter is forthrig ht in declaring the entrepreneur to be the embodime nt of these characteristj-cs, Lowi is not' But his account of the denial of Smithian competition and freedom l-n so the United S tates is an indictment of the loss of will prevalent in conservative literature in the Unite d States since the failure of the "sixties revolution" and the rise S teinfels of the so-called new right Isee, e'g' ' Peter ' Neo-Conservatives: the Men Who Are Chan ln American Po cs r New ork: S mon & sc US T,L

244d.* smith, An EN IT into the Wealth of Nations and the Causes of the Wea Na ons ; Thomas lthus, Essa On ePr e u at on (1798); David Ricardo, Pr nc eso P ca Econ and Taxation. (1817); a enry George, Progress and Pover v (1 2Sl,oooi, op. cit., p. 36- 26r¡ia. - 27 got an excellent studY of that resiliencY, see AIan Vlolf e, The Limits of Legitimacy' op. cit. 2Brh. assumption here is that a constitution, written or otherwise, reþresents a deliberate social response to observable political behaviour and events at a specific poi.rt in time. A revolution, for example, does not represent constitional change not only because it is cataclysmic and outside a deliberate or conêensual frame, but because it j's temporal]y unbounded and its reconstitutive capacity is unknown. Political stimuli can either be dissident or supporti-ve behaviors or events. Non-events do not provide such stimuli. 29 cit. James Madison, Federalist No.10 ' op. 30s." for example, Theodore Lowi r "Àmerican Business, Public PoIicy, Case Studies, and PoIitical TheorY", World Politics, L6 (JulY 1964) P- 679. 31 of Liberalism' oP' Lowi, The End cit. r PP - 298-313 - Juridical democracY involve s one fundamental PrinciPle: "no rule of Iaw, no agencY" (30 0) . This princiPle is derived bY Lowi from a famosr rule laid down in a SuPreme Court decision in the Schecter case A.L.A. Schechter Poult Corporation v. U.S., 295 U. s. 4 95) , where e Court ru ed tnat the National Recove ry Act had unconstitutionallY delegated law-making Power lo the president in allowing him/her authoritY to PromuI gate fair comPetition codes - The rule has since been reverse d. aa "rbid. , pp. 302-305. Elaine McCoy Chapter 6 -443-

33M"di"on, op. cit.. 34John Stuart Mi11, "on LibertY", i n Essays on Politics and Society, 2 vols., J.M. Robson (ed.) (Toronto: UniversitY of Toronto Press, L9761. 35S"" , for example , Agliettar oP. cit.. 36rh" necessity for velocity to increase under capitalism is simply a reflection of the necessity of a rise in the consumption capacity of society given the tendency to a realj-zation crisis. See, for exampJ.e, Michael A. Lebowitz, "Marx's Falling rate of Profit: A Dialectical View" , Canadian Journat of Economics, 9 (79761 p. 247, and Manuel Castells, The Economic Crisis and American Societ ( Princeton , New ersey: Pr nceton Un versa ty Press, 980) . 37 charles P. Kindelberger, A Financial Histo of Western Europe (London: George Al 1en & Unhr D¡ 1984). 3B Ernest Mandel Late Ca italism, trans. Joris De Bres (London: Verso rL975,' orr-9 na1 1y Der S tka italismus, Suhrkamp, Verlag, I972)l and Ma , Marx st Econom IC Theory, 2 vo]s., (New York: Monthly Review Press' 1968). 39R"f"r to the bibri-ography of this work for an list of Marxist Iiterature in economic and political analysis. For an accessible survey of recent I'larxist economic theories of contemporary capitalist societies, and see Robert C. Cherry' Macroeóonomics ( Reading , Massachusetts : Addison-Wes ley ' 1980 ) . 40rh" differences between liberar and Marxist analysts are very great and have to do with fundamental questions of methodology, epistemological assumptions, focus of study and disposition of findings. The present thesis is not unmindful of Lhese and other fundamental differences and antipathies between the two schools of thought. For the specific purpose of addressing a problem regarding the progress of state theory, f have noticed and emphasized this unexpected similárity: the emphasis upon interest as defining the political character of the state in both schools of thought. My close inspection of this topic should not be read as an iñdication that I consider liberalism and Marxism to be corollary systems of thought nor that I see a path of convergence between the two traditions. 41S". the extended bibliography accompanying the present work for writings on c1ass. For the present, repr"setrtatj-ve works are listed below. That classes arise oul of opposing interests rather than out of objective location-vis-alvis the mode of production, i.e., private ownershj-p and control, is the basis of the disagreement. During class formation in transitional societies it seems partiõularly $¡rong to seek class identity in the opposition Elaine McCoy Chapter 6 -444- of interests. See, for exampJ-e, Herb Gintis, "On The Theory of Transitional Conjuncturesrr Rev iew of Radical Political Economy, 2/3 (Fall L9791 ¡ RodneY' H ilton, et aI . (eds. ) , The Transition From feudalism to Ca italism (London: Verso, ;B.H ndness P. H rst, Pre-Ca italist Modes of Production London: Routledge and Kegan Pau 5 rst n Resnick and Richard WoIff, "The TheorY of Transitional Conj unctures to Cap italism", Review of Radical Pol itica 1 Economy, 2/ 3 (Fal- 1 19791 . For cl-ass formation in contemporary societies see , f ot examPJ-e S imon Clarke, j-on ' " State, C lass and the ReProduct of Capital " , Kapitalistate, L0/LL (1983) p- 113; Claus Offe, "The Future of the Labour Market", TêIos, 60 (Summe r I9B4) p. 97¡ Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in C onte orar Ca italism, trans. David Fernbach (Lo on: ew Le tBo si New Yor ocken, L9lBl ¡ Step hen Resnick and Richard WoIff' "Classes in Marxisn Theory", Revi ew of Radical PoIiticaI Economics, L3/4 (Winter 1982) p. L¡ S abine Sardei-Biermann, Jens Christiansen and Knuth Dohse, "C1ass Domj-nation and the Politica1 Sy stem: A Criticat Interpretation of Recent Contributions by Claus Offe",, Kapitalistate , 2 (L9731 ¡ James Savage, "Postmaterialism of the Left and Right: Po1 itica l Confl ict in Pôstindustrial Society", Comparative PoIitical Studies, L7 / 4 (January 1985) P. 437 ¡ and Howard Sherman' "c1ass ConfIict and Macro-Policy: A Comment", Review of Radical PoIitica1 Economy, B/2 (Summer 1976) p.55. 42oavid Easton (ed.), Varieties of PoIiti-caI Theor (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Pren ce-Ha f ¿?-"See V.I. Lenin, Two Tactics of Socia1 Democra IN the Democratic Revolut on New Yor Internata nal Publishers, L9 35, Ioriginally, June/July f9051 ). As to the question of politics, and the Pertinent question Posed at the end of the treatise, "Dare We Win?". 441ot the defj-nitive diatribe, see Nicos Poulantzas, Politica] Power and Social Class ( New York: Schocken, 1978) ' 45 C.B. MacPherson, The Li-f e and Times of Liberal Democracy (New York: Oxford Univers itv Press, L979ì, . 46V.I. Lenin, State and Revolution (New York:International Publi shers, 1968 t orrg rrY' August L9L7ll, p. B. 47 tbid. , p. 9. 48rbid., pp.9-10. 49 rbid., p. 18. 50 rbid., p. 31. 51 rbid., p. 39. Elaine McCoy Chapter 6 -445-

52S"", for examPle, Fred Btock, "The Rul-ing Class Does Not RuIe: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State", Socialist RevoLution, 7/3 (May/June L9771' 53*uIph MiIiband, "State Power and Class rnterests", New Left neview, L38 (March/April 1983) p. 57 ' 54 Ralph MiIÍband, "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State", New Left Review, 82 (November/December L973) p' 85' 5Sw"b"ri"r, notions of increasing institutional te of develoPment may be differentiation as an attribut' properly termed " structural cha D9ê, and one may even deduce a measure of autonomy inherent in a Process of differentiation due to a functio naI inde ndence of tasks and ex ertise wi n success vely erent IA te un ts or examp et w h in a bureaucracY) But to term a Political instance, a power relation' or a constitution of soc ial norms (all of these, the state) a structural entitY, i S confounding. For a functionali st view of the PolitY of equa I absurdity, but which nevertheless providing a 1 oqical 1y coherent deduction of a functional po Iity from a social structure. See Talcott Parsons, "The PoliticaI AsPect of Social Structure and Process", j-n David Easton, Varieties of Political Theoryr 9P. cit.r PP- 7I-Lt3, 56tiliband, "state Power", op- cit-, p. 59 ' 571¡id., p. 57. 5Br¡id. States and , p. 59 , quoting Theda SkocPoI ' Social -Teîolution (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univers ity Press, L9791 , p. 27. 59rbid., p. 60. 6otbid., p. 62. 61 Ibid. , p 63. 62 rbid. 63 rbid. 64 uiliband. # 59 in the New Left Review debatesr PP. 53-55 , for his staffient on emplrlca I method. 65 lqiliband, "state Pohrer"¡ op. cit. ' P . 61 66lbid., p. 62, note 13, the quotation from Marx's The Civil wãrjn- France, here is ironic:

See Marx's famous descriPtion of the Second Empire as 'the only form of government Possible at a time when the bourgeoisie had alreadY lost, and the working class Elaine McCoY Chapter 6 -446-

had not yet acquired, the faculty of ruling the nation. But in contemporary society there is no evidence that the ir"" Lost", quite the contrary. The bourgeoisie "ãlready of the histórical specificity -ignoredoi the "decisive importance"- class struggle seems by Miliband even though he iãi.r" to júst such importance throughout the article' No doubt cfass struggle iè a key element of Marxist theory. But providing a litany of the importance of class struggle does neither promote tñe actual occurrance of that struggle nor initiate it. Indeed,Tõ-propound class struggle in its absence may do more to o¡struèt its development than brutal repression. 67rbid., p 62. 6B rbj-d. , p 64. 69 rbid., p 65. 70 and Revolution, 19: Lenin ' State P. Eclecticism is substituted for this is the most usual, the most widespread phenomenon to be met with in the official sociá1-Democratic literature of our day in relation to Marxism it gives an iif,-,"oiy satisfaction: it seems to take account all sides of the process, alI tendencies of development' aL1 contradicloty factors and so forth, whereas in ieality it offerê no consistent and revolutionary view of the process of social development at all' 7L For example, Eric Nordlinger, op' cit' 721¡i.o" Poulantzas, # 7O New Left Review debates r oP. cit., p . 58 73 rbi-d. , p.7L 74 rbid. , p. 74 75 rbid., p. 73 76 rbid. , p. 74 7 7Ni.o" Power op cit., PP. Poulantzas ' Political ' 27 6-303 . 7 8ooi.o" Poulantzas, #70 New Left Review debates r oP. cit. ' p70. 7 9 r¡ia' Borho=. are especiallY Frederick Engels, The Ori i-n of the Family, Private Property, and the State (Lo on: 19 E1aine McCoY Chapter 6 -447 -

Marx, ed. ) ; Eng¡les, Anti-Duhring ( London: 1933 ed- ) ; KarI The Civil War in France (London 1933 ed- ) ; Marx, The Brumaire o fLo uis Bona rte (London: 1933 Ei hteenth eof the ed. ia arl- Marx and Fr r c EngeIs ' Criti Social Democratic Pr rammes, from Neue Ze t, xx- on: Blv. cit., ChaPter r. Lenin, State and Revolution ' op. V. 82s"" A*y Beth Bridges, "Nicos Poulantzas and the Marxist TheorY of the State", Politics and SocietY (9ùj-nter L97 4l p. l-61. 83 of Aristotle. For example' Aristotle ' The Politics trans. Ernest Barker (New yor Oxfo Un vers y Press ' L962',,t . 84s." especialr y V.I. Lenin' I erialism as the Hi hest eofCa ital ism (New York: In ernat onal P shers t Sta An ax na 1y 9 161 ) ; Lenin' Left-Win Communism infantile Disorder (New York: In rnat ona S ers, t940, Iorigina Ily L9 021\; and Lenin, What Is To Be Done (New York: International Publishers , L929, or gr-na vL9 2 ). E1aine McCoy Chapter 7 -448-

Chapter Seven Conc Ius ion

The concerns motivating the research of this thesis !{ere originally of two kinds. In the first place, I believed that the idea of a relative autonomy of the capitalist state, while able to accomodate case-study analysisr Wâs damaging to a general theory of the capitalist state because it carried a behavioural bj-as in its notions of political j-nterest as "objective" or somehow objectified interest' In the second place, I believed that the level of abstraction required for a theoretical justification of the notion of relative state autonomy is so great as to give such theories a mystifying character. The concept of relatj-ve state autonomy was thus suspect because it both delimits and abstracts political inquiry in a manner which seemed to me to avoid the stark reality of the capitalist state, ví2., its injustice and brutalitY.

'I set about to test my ideas by constructing a hypothesis which could be tested in two ways which would serve to both expand an empirical base beyond the case-study method and generate a theoretical critique of sufficient strength to call into question the fundamental concepts of of a relative autonomy thesis. That hypothesis has been repeated many times throughout this work. Its chief attribute is that it establishes directionality for the observable phenomena comprising state autonomy. Having

examined the emprlcal data of the global and comparative Elaine McCoy Chapter 7 -449-

economic contexts j-nfluencJ-ng government policymaking for three countries, and extending the suggestions from those empirical findings to a theoretical critique of certain contemporary theories of the capitalist state I am no!{ prepared to offer three para1le1 arguments which support the hypothesi_s of this thesis and summarize its findings.

Firstly I have demonstrated that economic crisis has existed aS both an international context and aS a domestic fact of capitalist life for the three countries under study. Furthermore, the crisis has been a protracted one which displays periodicity. The interesting thing about the periodicity j-s that, whil-e an international construct to begin with, it becomes synchronized for the individual countries as the general period progreSSeS. Secondly' I have used examples from poticy responses in each of the countries to illustrate how the general policy posture within the countries became increasingly economistic during the period under study and that not only were the substantive policies economistic, but the administration of those policies necessitated instutionalizing economistic policy making. What began aS crisis mangement and emergency programmes have developed into entrenched institutj-onal practj-ces. This has led to a partial restructuring of the capitalist state. Thirdly, I have prepared a critique of existing relative state autonomy theories and shown them to be deficient as theories of rebuttal in a context of the deformation of the Iiberal order ¡ ot aS theories which contain explanatory 'l Elaine McCoY Chapter -450-

dominance or po\¡/er (eg. , regarding the nature of business the form of enclave government) -

Eachofthechapterscontainsstrongprimafacie evidence against the general notion of relative state autonomyasacharacterizationofthecapitaliststate during crisis. What follows now is a rebuttal of the relative autonomy thesis according to a four-point formulae addressing the constituent parts of the relative autonomy thesis.

The Failures of the Relative Autonomy Thesis: A Programmtic Rebuttal

Thefollowingdiscussionisapoin-counter-poì-nt argument which will systematize the findings of the present work into a coherent rebuttal of the notion of relative state autonomy. I operationalize the terms of autonomy as j-ts four tests: 1) whether or not the state generates "own" social base, i.e., a clientele somehow independent of the class divisions generated by the capitalist mode of production; 2l whether or not the state organizes its own sectoral interests; 3) whether or not the state exercises independent control of economic and social regulatory mechanisms; and 4l whether or not the state engages in increasingly direct appropriation of economic surplus ' Considering each point in order, then:

i'e'' a 1) Does the state generate its "own" social base' Elaine McCoY Chapter 7 -4 51_-

clientele somehow indePendent of the class divisions generated by the caPitalist mode of production?

Thisquestionisimportantbecause'accordingto assumptions about the forml rePresentative nature of bourgeois political systems, a large enough independent constituency might conceiveable empower the state by supporting an independent policy stance which might place it inoppositiontocapitali.stinterests.Suchacliente]e would presumably exhibit a primary loyalty to the "state" and might therefore act in ways not necessarily bound to conventional class loYalties.

This questj-on is addressed in the present work in two ways.Firstly,thediscussionofenclavegovernment indicates how an extension of the reach of the state through the strategic targetting of government policies does not implyareciprocalexpansionoftherepresentationof demands upon government. Government is able to "manufacture" clientele demands by manipulatingthe scarcity of certain public goods, thus employing a market-sty1e strategy to construct social wants and needs which are expressed as a demand function. Furthermore, the governments of capitalist states in crisis are, themselves, compelled to govern in a manner whÍch is increasingly insensitive to representative appeals. tfrêir key economic and social strategies are geared to survival in a hostile international economic envlronment' Discipline compelled by an economistic imperative in Elaine McCoy Chapter 7 -452-

poticymaking discloses the class character of the state. The strategy and effectiveness for enforcing economì-c discipline (e.g., "austerity" policies and various brands of "social reform" ) is guaranteed by an insular and centralized executive rule which is not so much in the interests of an instrumental client as it is part and parcel of the determination of class domination. Chapter 4 presents empirical evidence which suggests that j-f a clientele did exist it would be synonomous with an agglomeration of capitalist fractions and an explicit reflection of the class nature of the capitalist state. The exj-stence of an independent clientele who might act as agents of relatively autonomous interests or demands is not suggested in the , synchronous nature of policymaking for the three countries under study nor for peak international policy institutions such as the OECD.

The answer to this first questi-on, therefore, is no.

2l Does the state organizes its own sectoral interests? This question refers to the notion of a state bureaucratic c1ass, sometimes refered to as a "new c1ass", capable of organizing sectoral interests around the protection of bureaucratic priviledge. It can be applied to a relative state autonomy thesis because it suggests that a "state in cäpitalism" can derive some independence from class control by insulating itself from class struggle and class demands. When I discuss the enclave government in Elaine McCoy Chapter 7 -453-

Chapter 5. am I not suggesting such a possibility?

In my analysis I demonstrate how enclave government functions as executive rule constrained by the structural imperati-ves of economism. Empirical evj-dence suggests that the state-bureaucratic sector is "rationalized" and disciplined to a greater degree during economic crj-sis than would previously have been the case' If the state-bureaucratic form has the potential for pushing the limits of relative autonomy, that is not evident for any of the countries under study in the present work nor during the general time frame examined.

3) DoeS the state exercise independent control of economic and social regulatorY mechanisms? This question is perhaps the most central of the four to the concerns of the present work. Chapters 2 and 3 present evidence about the importance of central banks and government policy vis-à-vis the internationaL financj-aI system and I have examined the national policy of one of the countries, Australia, regarding the regulation of investment. Indeed, the policy illustrations from alI three nations suggest a central importance for the government regulatory mechanisms of modern capitalist states. Not only "h/hou and "what" regulates capitalist economies, i.e.' the economic policy makers and central administrations, but "how' regulation is administered is important to this question. My analysis j-n the three empirical chapters of Elaine lvtcCoy Chapter 7 -454- part I suggests that the "ho!v" has gravitated between ad hoc emergency poticies to an institutionalization of economistic decisions. Regulation appears to mediate some of the fractional demands of capitalists. In actuality, the imperatives guiding that regulation are the same structural requisites that compel economism as discussed in chapters 5 and 6.

The answer to this third question is therefore' yes' However, the method and substance of regulation in the example provided in this thesis suggest that regulation binds the state to a class imperative rather than serves aS proof of autonomy. Regulation does not support the relative autonomy thesis if the objects of and motivation for regulation are determined by constrained and increasingly class-bound priviledge as has been the case during the general period of crisis under study'

4l Does the state engage in increasingly direct appropriati-on of economic surplus? This question has been dealt with in chapter 2 with regard to the discusion about central government involvement in fj-nancial gambits to handle mounting debt, and in the chapters on the domestic economies ane policy. chapter 5',s discussion of enclave government and the minimalization strategy of. tr{argaret Thatcher also bears on the question. To answer the questj-on with competence a thorough examination of revenue policies should be undertaken as well as a Elaine McCoY Chapter 7 -455- examination of state expenditure in a comparative analysis' The constraints of time and space have limited such an inquiry in the present work. Therefore only a few observations wiIl be provided here. Firstly' there is evidence that conservatj-ve regimes such as those which have appeared in the three countries under study during the general period examined cut Social programmes and have built up defence as a gieneral policy. If this were indeed the case, then a direct appropriation of surplus other than taken as revenue would in any event be used to fund a military expansion. Military expansion in a capitalist state has been traditionally used to protect markets and colonize third and second world producers. Given these observations, a direct appropríatj-on of economic surplus would not support a relatj-ve autonomy thesis under the conditions of crisis examined in the present work. If anything it would extend class rule beyond the boundaries of the domestic economy and international finance which are under study here. Secondly' direct appropriation of the economic surplus might result in a "super-capitali-St" status for the state but certainly not an autonomous one given that, following chapter 6, intervening "state interests" would not deflect the path of economistic policy described througout this work.

My conclusions are aS follows. Firstly, I am confident that the empirical presentation supports a) that a condition of crisis has occurred during the years, L967'L982¡ b) that the temporal characteristics of the crj-sis display Elaine McCoY Chapter 7 -456- periodicity and that the three countries under comparative examination share the periodicity in an increasingly synchronic manner throughout the general period; and c) that the policy responses to crisis in all three countries has been r'economistic", aS defined in Chapter 5. Furthermore' these empiricaJ- findings warrant a theoretical critique of various strands of contemporary state theory which relie upon notj-ons of state autonomy. I have undertaken this critique in Part II of this thesis. My research and analysis support my hypothesis and lead me to concl-ude, further, that various forms of liberal and neo-Marxists writing on state autonomy are inadequate to explain the character of the capitalist state in crisis.

Suggestions for further research which might be prompted by the present work are an inquiry into the course of state expenditure during periods of economic crj-sis in order to examine how far economistic policy making cuts into the legacy of the post-f¡¡ar capitalist state; an inquiry into the evolving form of an encfave government, especially as to how ',rationalization" of the bureaucracy and executive departments either support or fail to support class rulei and a sociological study paralleling the economic analysis undertaken in this thesj-s which would address questions of class, especially involving such questions as those surrounding. the "deindustrialization" Iiterature Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -457-

Chapter 3 Annex Comparative Historical Statistics L967 -L982 The United States, The united Kingdom, Australia

These data are derived from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development csr 1960-1983, Paris, 1985. Slight statistical variation in aggregate ue to my rounding error, and statistical discrepancies designated as such in the OECD tabulations. For the purposes of the present hlork' these variations do not significantly dislorl the presentation of the comparative data' Please refer to tfre original OACO nistorical data for information on method and the designation of statistical discrepancies. Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -458-

Section 1: 1983 Aqqreq ate Statistics

Table 3.1 ra 1C r ates: 1983 n ousands US UK Austral' ia total poPulation 23 449 6 56377 L537 9 males LL4L79 27 430 7675 females L203L7 289 47 7-t 03 population: L5-64 Years L55524 367 63 1009 9 total active labour force LL3226 2677 6 7055 maLe Labour force 64580 1616 5 4428 female labour force 48646 10 611 2628 unemployment LO1 L7 2984 694 employment 102509 23792 6361 I employment in agriculture 3.3 2.6 6.5 I emploYment in industrY 27 .6 33.1 28.L t employed in manufacturing 19.5 23.7 20.0 t employed in services 67 .4 62.9 64.2 armed forces as t total emPloYed 1.6 L.4 L.2 (statistical overlap in sectors accounts for the rounding error in Àectoral employment percentages. please refer to Labour Force Statistics for definitions. Percentages here are õãEfifãEêã-[sing the " emP Ioymen t" figure as a base-) Elaine l4cCoy Chapter 3 Annex -460-

Table 3.4' Main Y ates for Ca ital Transactions of the Nation nso o ars current pr e a ange ra s) Finance of Gross Capital Formation

US UK Austral ia consumption of fixed caPital 438.2 55.3 11. 6 net saving 60.1 27 .2 16. 2 surplus on current transactions -33.9 3.5 -\ 7 FINANCE Of GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION 533.2 75.5 32. 0 Gross Capital Formation increase in stocks -1r.8 .4 -1.2 gross fixed capital formation 549.1 75 'I 33 ' 3 cnoss CAPTTAL FORMATTON 533-2 75-5 32-O Elaine McCoy Chapter 3 Annex -46

Section 2: ulati on and Labour Force Statistics accordi to Historic Tre S

Table 3.5/ Total Population The united state@ngdom, Australia L970 - 1983 and Period Averages (Year to Year t change) Period averages 68/ 73/ LgTo 7L 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 73 83

US1 2 L.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 L.2 r.0 1.0 1 0 0.9 1 1 1.0 UKO 3 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 - 1 -.3 0 4

Aus 2 t 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.2 L.0 L.L L.2 L.L L.2 1.6 1 7 L.3 1.9 1.3

Table 3.6' Tota1 Labour Force The united Stat osr the U nited Kt ngdom, Austra 1 ia 1970-1983 and Period Averages (year to year t change) Period averages 68/ 73/ L97o 7L 72 73 7 4 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 73 83

us2 3 1.7 2.9 2.7 2.7 L.9 2.5 2.9 3.2 2.6 L.9 L.6 L.4 L.2 2 4 2 1

UK 3 -.4 0.2 L.4 0.2 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.8 L.4 0.1 0.1 0 2 0 4

Àus 3 6 2.6 2.2 2.4 2.s 1.9 1.2 L.8 0.4 L.2 2.8 1.6 2.L L.2 2 7 1 7 Elaine Mccoy Chapter 3 Ànnex -461

Table 3.7 ' Male Labour Force The unitea stateffigdom, AustraLia 1970-1983 and Period Àverages (year to Year t change) period averages 68/ 73/ L970 7L 72 73 14 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 73 83

US L.7 1 5 2.2 1.8 1.9 0 9 1.5 2.0 2.0 L .7 L.2 0.9 0.8 0.9 L.7 1. 3 UK -.7 5 -.4 0.1-1.1 0 6 0.6 -.3 - 0.6 0.1 -.3 -.7 -.4

Aus 2.3 2 2 L-5 1.6 1.6 0 9 0.9 0.4 0.3 1 .7 L.0 1.6 1.6 0.9 2.0 t.2

' Tab1e 3.8' Female Labour Force The united stat@dom, Australia 1970-1983 and Period Averages (year to Year t change) period averages 68/ 73/ 1970 7L 72 73 74 75 76 17 78 79 80 81 82 83 73 83

US3 4 2.r 4.0 4.0 4.L 3 5 4 0 4 25-03 8 2.9 2.7 2 3 1.6 3.6 3.2

UKO 5 -.3 1.3 3.8 2.3 1 3 1 2 1 6 L.4 2 6 L.L-L.2 0 9 1.3 1.2 1.1

Aus 6 4 3.5 3.7 4.0 4.L 3 8 1 4 5 0.6 0 2 6.2 1.5 3 0 2.0 4.2 2.7

Elaine McCoy Chapter 3 Annex -466

Section 3:Structure and Distribu tion of Labour Force in Production

Table 3.15' Male Labo ur Force as I of Male Iation 8MP and as t of Male at on 8MP The Unit s, eUn K fn¡ Austra 1 ia 1971-1983 and Period Averages US US UK UK Aus Àus (tl.'lP) (tMP') (tMP) (tMP' ) (tMP) (tMPr )

L91 L s3.3 85.1 60.0 93.6 58.6 9L.9 L972 53 .9 85.4 59.6 93.1 58.5 91.5 L973 54 .4 85 .4 59 .4 93.0 58.6 9L.4 L97 4 54.0 85.4 58.8 91.8 58.6 91.0 L975 55.0 84.7 59.1 92.L 58.5 90.4 L97 6 5s.3 84.4 59.5 92 -3 58.5 89.9 L977 55.9 84.1 59.3 91.6 58.0 88.8 1978 56 .4 85.0 s9.3 91.1 5'l .5 87 .7 r979 56.8 85.1 59.3 90.5 58.1 88.2 1980 56.8 84.7 59.5 90.4 57 .9 87 .7 87 19 81 56.7 84 .4 59.6 90.1 58.0 .6 L982 56.6 84.1 59 .4 89.3 5t .9 87 .2 1983 56.6 84.1 58.9 87.9 57.7 86.6 68/73 53.4 85.4 60.5 94.L 58.0 92.3 74/83 56.2 84 .6 55.3 90.5 58.1 88.3 Elaine McCoy Chapter 3 Ànnex -467

Table 3.16' Female Labour Force as t of Fema leP ulat ion t !-P and as t of Female at on t The Unite S s, e ng m¡ Austral ia L97L-L983 and Period Averages

US US UK UK Aus Àus ( (rrP) (tFÞ'¡ (TF P) ( 8FP' ) (trP) tFP' ) t97r 30. 4 49. 0 31.0 50. 6 28. 6 46. 1 L97 2 31. 2 50. 0 31.3 51. 2 29. 1 46. I L973 32. 2 51. 1 32.4 53. 1 29. 8 47. 8 L97 4 33. 1 52. 3 33.2 54. 2 30. 5 48. 7 L97 5 34. 0 53. 2 33.7 55. 1 31. 2 49. 6 L97 6 35. 0 54. 4 34.7 55. 5 31. 4 49. 7 L977 36. 1 55. 0 34.6 56. 2 32. 5 51. 1 L978 37. 4 57. 6 35.1 56. 7 32. 3 50. 5 L979 38. 4 58. 9 36.0 57. 9 31. 9 49. 9 1980 39. 0 59. 7 36.3 58 2 33. 5 52. 1 198r- 39. 7 60. 6 35.8 57 2 33. 5 52. 0 L982 40. 2 6L. 4 36.2 57 4 33. 9 52. 5 1983 40. 4 61. I 36.7 57 8 34. 1 52.7

68/73 30.3 49 .0 31.4 51.0 28 .4 45.8 74/83 37.8 58.1 35.4 56.8 32.7 51.10 -468. Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex

Table 3.I7 a E 1 nt Em I nt in riculture as I of Civilian e n te tates t Un edK ngdom, Austra 1971--l-983 and Period Averages

US UK AUS

3 .1 7.7 L97L 4 i 7.9 L972 4 L 3 .0 o 7.3 L973 4 .2 2 4 .2 2 .B 6.9 L97 4 6.9 L975 4 .1 2 .7 3 .9 2 .B 6.6 L97 6 6.6 L977 3 .7 2 .B 3 .7 2 .7 6.4 1978 6.5 L979 3 .6 2 .6 3 .6 2 .6 6.5 19 B0 6.5 19 8l 3 .5 2 .6 3 .6 2 .7 6.4 L982 6.6 19 B3 3 .5 2 .7 68/73 4.6 3.2 8'o ti7e3 3.1 2"t 6'6

Table 3.18' Em 1o nt E 1o ment in Industr as 3 of Civil i-an a T n tates, eUn K ngdom, ustra 1971-1983 and Period Averages US UK Aus

L97L 32.9 43.8 3 å: 5 L972 32.5 42.8 3 5. 6 L973 33.1 42.4 3 5. 4 35. 1 L9'7 4 32 .4 42.2 30.5 40.5 33. 7 L975 33. I L97 6 30. B 39.7 5 L9'77 30.9 39.5 32. 1978 31. r 39.2 3r. 6 L979 31.3 38.8 31. 3 31. 0 19 80 30.5 37 .7 30. 6 l9 81 30.1 3s.8 L982 28 .4 34.7 29. B 1983 28.0 33.6 28. 5 68/73 33.9 44.0 36.5 74/83 30.3 37 .6 31.5 -469- Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex

Table 3.L9' 1 t 1 ment in Manufacturi as 3 of Civilian eUn te tates, the Un dK ngdorlì r Austra a 1971-1983 and Period Averages

US UK Aus

L97L 24.7 36. 4 26. 6 L972 24.3 35. 3 25. 5 L973 24 .8 34. 7 25. 7 L97 4 24.2 34. 7 25. 1 L975 22.7 33. 1 23. 3 L97 6 22.8 32. 3 23. 3 L977 22 -7 32. 4 23. 0 L97B 22.7 32. 0 2L. B L979 22.7 31. 3 22. 1 1980 22.L 30. 2 2L. B 19 81 2r.7 28 .4 2L. 3 L982 20 .4 27 .6 20. 7 1983 19. B 26.7 20. 2 68/73 25.8 36.1 26.4 74/83 22.O 30.5 22.L

Table 3.20' Em nt E Io t in Services as 3 of Civilian Io a Un tates, he Un dK rtì ¡ Aus ra 1971-1983 and Period Averages US UK Aus

L97L 62. 7 53 I 5 5 I L972 63. 1 54 2 5 6 5 1973 62. 7 54 6 5 7 3 L97 4 63. 4 55 1 5 I 0 r975 65. 4 56 7 5 9 4 L97 6 65. 3 57 5 6 0 3 L977 65. 4 5'l 7 6 0 B 19 78 65. 2 58 1 6 2 0 L97 9 65. 2 5B B 6 2 2 1980 65. 9 59 7 6 2 4 19 81 66. 4 6L. 5 6 2 8 L982 68. 0 62 .6 6 3 I 1983 68. 5 63.7 6 4 9 68/73 61.s s2.B ss-s 74/ 83 66.1 s9.6 62 -0 Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -47 0

Table 3.2L' Government E lo nt as I of Tota1 E I ent Un te tates, e n te K ngdom, Aus al a 19?1-1983 and Period Averages

US UK Aus

L97L 18.0 18. B 22. 9 L972 L7 .7 19.5 23. 3 L973 L-7.2 19.5 23. 2 7 L97 4 L7 .3 19.5 23. L915 18.0 20.1 25. 5 1 L97 6 L7.6 2L.3 25. L971 L7 .L 2L.L 26. 3 L97 I L6.7 2L.L 25. 9 9 r97 9 L6 .4 2I.L 25. 1980 L6.7 2L.0 25. 4 2 19 81 16.5 2L.7 25. L982 L6.7 2L.B 25. 4 1983 16.5 22.0 26. 2

68 /73 17.8 18 - s 23.r 74/83 16.9 2L-2 25.4

Table 3.22 t Force Standardized Unem 1 ment Rates: ILO Defini tion as t Total Labour a e U n t e a êSr e n edK n9 orrì r Austra 1971-1983 and Period Averases

US U K Aus

L97L 5.8 3 9 1.9 L972 5.5 4 3 2.6 L973 4.8 3 3 2.3 L97 4 5.5 3 1- 2.6 L975 8.3 4 6 4.8 L97 6 7.6 6 0 4.7 L977 6.9 6 4 5.6 1978 6.0 6 3 6.2 L91 9 5.8 5 6 6.2 1980 7.0 6 9 6.0 19 81 7.5 t0 5 5.7 L982 9.5 L2. 3 1.L 19 B3 9.5 13. 1 9.9 68/73 4.6 3-s 2.0 74/83 7.6 8-0 6.1 Elaine McCoY Chapter I Annex -47L-

Table 3.23' Youth Une I nt as t Total Une m 1 ent The n t êsr t e n t K dom, Aus a lia 1971-1983 and Period Averages US UK Aus

L97L 47 .6 31. 0 39. 3 L912 50.0 29. 4 42. 7 L973 5L .4 24. 9 37. 5 L97 4 51.1 27. 5 4L. 4 L975 46.8 36. 2 47. 7 L97 6 46 .4 43. B 53. 4 L977 47.L 45. 6 57. 0 L978 49 .4 44. 9 53. 5 L979 48.8 44. 4 56. L l_9 80 45.9 46. 6 55. 5 19Bl 45.2 4L. 0 53.2 L9B2 40.9 40. 6 51.2 1983 38.8 39. B 48.6 68/73 49.3 28.2 40 -7 73/83 4s.4 4t.2 s1-B (youth unemployment is defined as under 25 years of age.) EIaine McCoY Chapter J Annex -472-

Section 4z Growth of ReaI FinaI Expenditure

Table 3.24' ReaI cross Fixed C ital Formation aa The Uni S êSr e te OIIì T ustral 1"971-1983 and Period Averages (year to Year Percentage changes)

US UK Aus

L97L 5. 4 1.9 6. 1 L972 8. 5 -0 .3 7 L973 7. 3 7.2 2. 5 L97 4 -6. B -4.L -0. B L975 -11. 2 0.2 -0. l_ L97 6 6 3 1.5 3. 0 L977 10 5 -2 .6 -1 3 L97B 9 5 3.9 2. 5 L979 3 1 2.3 1. I 4. B r-980 -6 1_ -5.2 19 Br 1 1 -8.5 11. 4 L982 -6 6 6.7 -2. 9 1983 B I 4.2 -9 .9 68/73 3.9 2.t 3 .1 '73 / 83 .3 -0.4 0 -7

Table 3.25' Real Gross Fixed Ca ital Formation: Re sidential Construction a The Un Sta s, ng OIIì T ustra t97L-1983 and Period Àverages (Year to Year Percentage changes) US UK Aus

L97L 3r.2 9 0 5. 0 L972 L8.2 2 8 7. 3 L973 -2.4 -2 3 1. 0 L97 4 -23.7 -10 3 -L7 . 3 ]-975 13 9 L2. 5 -14.0 o L97 6 2L .6 1 5 2 r977 L9.2 -B 6 -o 2 L97B 2.9 2 4 -0. 5 L979 -5.6 0 9 10. 6 1980 -20.2 -o 4 11. 9 19Bl -5.6 -1 ? 4 -? 1 L982 -15.3 11. 7 -23 2 1983 42.9 9. 4 68/73 7.79 -0.8 4.5 73/83 -1.9 -0 .7 -0.7 Elaine McCoy Chapter J Annex -47 3-

Table 3.26' Real Gross Fi-xed Ca ital Formation: Non-Residential Construc on The United States, the UñÏte¿ Xingdom, Australia L97I-L983 and Period Averages (year to year Percentage changes) US UK AUS

L97L -2 4 L.7 2.L L972 0 l -2.2 -4.5 L973 4 3 5.0 -0 .4 L97 4 -4 0 -6.2 4.2 L975 -9 5 L.4 -r.7 L97 6 -l- t 0.2 -10.0 L977 -1 3 -6.1 4.9 19 7B 9 0 -1.1 -0 .5 L979 3 B -2.8 -3.0 r-980 -0 3 -4.4 7.2 19 81 3 B -3 .5 2.6 L982 0 9.7 -t:t 1983 -6. 3 L.4 68/73 -0.6 1.98 l-3 73 / 83 -1.0 -0.9s 0.18

Table 3.2'7' ReaI Gross Fixed Ca ital Formation: Machine and E ]- ent e States, eUn te K ngdom, Aus al l-a 1971-1983 and Period Averages (Year to Year Percentage changes) US UK Aus

L97I 0:; -0. 7 1.8 L972 9.8 -0. 2 -1.1 L913 I 't .8 13. 1 4.9 L97 4 1.8 0. 7 -2.3 L975 -1 1.0 -1 0 4.7 L97 6 5.4 2. 6 5.6 L977 l_ 5.0 3. 9 -0.3 1978 1 3.5 8. 7 10.1 L979 7.r 6. 9 -6 .6 1980 3.3 -? 9 L7.9 19 81 1.8 -10. 0 16.1 L982 6.6 2. 5 -L2.4 1983 7.0 4. 1 68/73 6.2 3.68 3 - 1 73/83 2.2s 0.2s 3.8 Elaine McCoy Chapter J Annex -47 4-

Section 5: Industrial Structure of GDP

Table 3.28 Va1ue Added in l- culture as g GDP The Unit tates, eUn K , Austral l_a 1971--1983 and Period Averages

US U K Aus

L97L 2.7 2 5 6.3 L972 2.8 2 5 7.6 L973 3.9 2 7 8.5 L97 4 3.5 2 5 6.3 L975 3.3 2 4 5.5 L97 6 2.8 2 5 6.4 L977 2.6 2 3 4.7 L91B 2.8 2 I 6.7 L979 3.1 2 0 6.8 1980 2.7 1 9 5.7 19Bl 2.9 1 9 1982 2.6 2 0 19 B3 2.0 1 B 68/73 2.9 2-6 7-4 74/83 2.8 2-L 5.9

Table 3.29' VaIue Added in Industr aS T GDP The Unite S a €sr t n te K n oÍì r stral ia 1971-1983 and Period Averages US UK Aus

L97L 3 4 0 37 5 3 å 1 L912 3 4 1 38 8 3 7 0 L973 34. I 39 2 3 6 2 L97 4 33. 6 37 9 36. 3 L975 33. 1 37 0 36. 0 L97 6 33. B 36 2 35. 4 L977 34. 2 38 0 35. 1 1978 34. 2 3B 0 34. 2 L919 33. 9 37 3 34. 6 r980 33. 5 36. 6 35.2 19 81 33. 6 35. 6 1982 32. L 35. 6 1983 31. 7 35. 7 68/73 35.1 38-4 38.7 7 4/83 33 .3 2 -L 35.3 Elaine McCoY Chapter t Annex -475-

TabIe 3.30' Value Add ed in Manufacturi as T GDP The Un te Sta êSr eUn edK n m, Aus alia 1971-1983 and Period Averages US UK Aus

L97L 24.9 27 4 2 3.8 L972 24.9 28 3 2 3.0 L973 24.9 2B 5 2 2.5 L97 4 24.L 27 2 2 1.9 L975 23 .4 26. 3 2 1.3 L97 6 24.2 25. 4 2 0.8 L977 24.5 25. 6 2 0.4 L97 B 24 .4 25. 6 1 9.4 ]-979 23.8 24. 2 L9.2 1980 22.5 23. I 19.3 19 81 22.2 2L. 4 L982 20.9 2L. 3 1983 2L.L 2r. 0 68/73 26.0 28.2 25-0 7 4 / 83 24.9 24.0 20 -3

TabIe 6.3I' Value Added in Services as t GDP The Unite dS tates, the United Krng oIIìr Aus tral ia 1971-1983 and Period Averages US UK AUS

L97L 63.3 60.0 55. 6 L972 63.1 58. B 55. 4 L973 62.0 58.1 55. 3 L97 4 62.9 59 .6 57 4 L975 63.6 60.6 5B 5 r97 6 63 .4 61.3 59 2 L977 63. r 59.7 60 2 L978 62.9 59.8 59 2 L97 9 63.0 60.7 5B 6 1980 63.8 6t_.5 59 0 19 81 63.5 62.5 L982 65.3 62.4 1983 66.3 62.4 68/73 62.0 59.0 53-B 74/83 64.0 61.3 58.9 Elaine McCoY Chapter J Annex -47 6-

Section 6: S tructure of FinaI Demand

Table 3.32 I Private Final Consum tion Ex nditure as t GDP Un tes, eUn te ng OfIì ¡ stra a 1971-f983 and Period Averages US UK AUS

L97 L 62.8 61.5 60. 1 L972 62.6 62.8 59. 5 L973 6r.9 6L.9 59. 4 I97 4 62.6 62.9 58. 3 L975 63.5 61.1 59. 5 L97 6 63. B s9 .4 59. 6 L977 63. s 59.0 60. 4 L97 B 62.9 59.0 61. 1 L979 63.2 59. B 60. 0 r9B0 64.3 59.2 60. 2 l_981 63. s 59.6 59. 9 L9B2 65.6 59. B 61. 3 r-983 66.2 60.3 62. I

68 / 73 62.3 62.L 60.3 74/83 64.L 60.0 60-4

Table 3.33' Total OutIa s of Governm ent as t GDP The Un States, the Un edK oflì r Aus tra 1 ia 1971-1983 and Period Averages US UK AUS

L97L 32.3 38.1 2 6 2 L972 32.0 39. B 2 6 3 r973 31.3 40.7 2 6 7 L97 4 32.9 44.9 3 0 3 L975 35.6 46 .4 3 2 3 L97 6 34.5 45 .6 3 2 B L977 33 .4 43.7 3 4 1 L97 B 32.8 43.3 3 3 4 L979 33.0 43.L 3 2 9 1980 35.0 45.L 3 3 3 19 8l 35.3 47 .8 3 4 0 L982 37 .7 47 .3 3 6 4 1983 38.1 47 .2 68/73 3L.7 39.7 25.8 74/83 35.1 45.7 33.3 Elaine McCoY Chapter J Annex -477-

Table 3.34' Gross Fixed Ca ital Formation as g GDP The €Sr e n n orrì r Austr aI ia 1971-1983 and Period Averages US UK Aus

L97 L 18.1 1B 9 26. 1 L972 18.7 18 7 24 2 L97 3 19.1 20 1 22 9 L97 4 18 .4 20. 6 22 7 L975 L7.0 20. I 23 I L97 6 L7 .L 19. 5 23 0 L971 tB.3 18. 6 22 9 L97B 19. s 18. 6 22 B L97 9 l-9. B 18. 8 2L 9 1980 18 .5 18. 1 22 6 19 81 17.8 16. 5 24 4 L982 16.5 16.6 24. 0 r-983 16. B r-6.5 2L. 4 68/73 18.3 L9.2 25.3 74/83 L7.9 L8.2 22.9

Table 3.35' Residential Constructi-on as t GDP The United St;l; stralia 1971-1983 and Period Averages US UK AUS

L97L 4.8 3.9 4 9 L972 5.4 4.0 5 1 L973 5.2 4.3 5 2 r97 4 4.0 4.3 4 4 L975 3.5 4.7 4 9 L97 6 4.L 4.5 5 2 L977 4.9 3.9 4 7 l_978 5.1 3.8 4 2 L97 9 4.9 3.8 4 4 1980 3.9 3.7 4 9 19 81 3.5 3.3 4 7 L9B2 3.0 3.4 3 6 1983 4.0 3.6

68/73 4 5 4.0 5 0 74/83 4 0 3.9 4 6 Elaine McCoy Chapter 5 Annex -47 8-

Table 3.36' Non-Resi- dential Construction as t GDP The Un ted States, eUn t ngdom, Aus al ia 1971-1983 and Period Averages

US UK Aus

L97L 6 i 6.3 9.7 L972 6 2 6.3 8.8 L973 6 2 7.0 8.4 L97 4 6 6 7.4 9.4 L975 6 1 7.2 9 .1_ L97 6 5 6 6.7 8.0 L977 5 3 5.8 8.4 1978 5 7 5.6 7.9 L91 9 6 0 5.7 7.6 1980 6 2 5.9 8.0 19Bl_ 6 3 5.7 8.2 L982 6 2 5.6 8.4 19 83 5 4 5.2 68/73 6. s 6.4 9 -4 74/83 6.0 6.0 B-4

Table 3.37 a Machine and E ua nt as t GDP The Unit States, e t K ng orrìr Austral 1a 1971-1983 and Period Àverages US UK Aus L97I 7.0 8.8 11 0 L972 7.L 8.4 9 9 L973 7.7 8.9 9 3 t97 4 7.8 8.9 9 3 L975 7.4 8.2 9 4 791 6 7.4 8.4 9 B L977 8.1 8.8 10 0 L91B 8.7 9.2 10 7 I97 9 8.8 9.3 9 B 1980 8.3 8.6 11 0 19Bl- 8.0 7.6 L2 3 L982 7.4 7.6 11 0 19 83 7.4 7.8 68/73 7.3 8.7 10-7 74/83 7.9 8.4 10.4 Elaine McCoY Chapter J Annex -47 9-

Table 3.38' EX rts of Goods and Serv ices as 3 GDP a1 The Un te S €Sr e n te n9 onìr Austr ia 1971-1983 and Period Averages US UK Aus

L97L 5.5 23.3 L4. i L972 5.7 22.L 15. 4 L973 6.9 24.0 15. B t97 4 8.4 28.2 l-5. 5 L975 8.5 26.2 l_5. 4 L97 6 8.3 28.5 15. 5 L977 7.9 30.4 15. B L978 8.2 28.9 l-5. 2 L979 9.1 28.5 L7. 6 1980 I 0.2 27 .B L7. B 19 81 9.7 27 .L 15. 5 L982 8.6 26.7 L5 .4 19 83 7.7 26.8 14. B 68/73 5.7 22-B 1s.0 74/83 8.7 27-B 1s.9

TabIe 3.39' Im rts of Go ods and Serv ices as t GDP IIt Aus ral ia The U d States the Un dK ¡ l-971-1983' and Period Averages

US UK Aus

L97L 5. 7 2L. B L4. I L912 6. 1 22. I L2. 6 L973 6. 8 26. 3 13. 2 r97 4 8. B 33. 2 L7. 3 L975 7. B 27. 8 L4. 7 L97 6 8. 6 29. 5 15. 4 L917 9. 3 29. 5 16. 9 19 7B 9. 6 27. 4 L7. 1 L979 l_0. 3 28. I L7. 3 1980 l-1. 0 25. 2 lB. 6 23. B l-8. 7 19 81 10. 4 't L982 9. 5 24.4 18. 1983 9. 4 25 .6 16. 2 68 /73 5 .7 22 -B 14 .7 74/83, 9.6 27-0 r7.2 E1aine McCoY Chapter J Annex -480-

Table 3 .40' Trade Balance as B GDP The United States, the UñEêã-Engdom, Australia 1971-1983 and Period Averages US UK AUS L97L -0.1 1.6 -0. 1 L972 -0 .5 2.8 L973 0.1 -2 .3 2.6 L97 4 -0 .3 -5 .0 -1.8 L975 0.8 -1 .6 0.1 L97 6 -0.4 -1 .0 0.L L977 -L.4 0 o -1.0 ]-978 -L.4 1 .5 -1.9 L979 -L.2 0 .5 0.3 1980 -0. B 2 .6 -0. B 19 81 -0.7 3 .3 -3.2 L982 -0 .9 2 .3 -3.3 1983 -L.7 1 .1 -L.4 68/73 -0.1 o-4 74/83 -0.9 0.8 -L-4

Table 3.4L' Net Sav sastGDP The United States, eUn te K orrì r Austral ia f971-1983 and Period Averages us uK Aus L97L 7.6 10.9 1 ) 6 L972 7.9 10.1 l_ B 6 L973 10.1 LL.2 2 0 0 L97 4 7.8 6.0 1 9 9 1975 5.1 4.8 I 7 1 L97 6 5.7 5.0 1 6 3 L977 6.8 8.0 I 4 9 L97B 8.0 7.9 I 3 B L979 7.6 8.1 1 5 5 1980 5.0 6.1 l- 4 9 19Br 5.0 4.8 1 4 5 L982 2.2 6.2 1 2 2 1983 1.9 6.0 1 0 5 68/73 8.7 LL.A L7-4 74/83 s.3 6.3 L4-6 Elaine McCoY Chapter J Annex -481-

Section 7 z Prices

Table 3.42 t GDP: IM licit Price I ndex The united sta êSr eUn K dom , Australia 1971-l-983 and Period Averages (year to Year t change) US UK Aus

L97L 5 3 9.4 6.2 L972 4 4 8.3 7.6 1973 5 5 7.L 11. B L97 4 9 0 L4.9 L7.B L975 9 2 27 .2 15.9 L97 6 5 9 14.9 13 .5 L977 5 7 13.9 9.0 19 7B 7 4 11.1 7.5 L979 B 5 L4.5 9.6 19 B0 9 6 19. B LL.4 19 81 B 9 LL.7 9.0 L9B2 6 9 7.L 11.5 1983 4 5 5.1 8.6 68/73 5.1 7-5 6-8 73/83 7 .6 L3 -4 L2-L

Table 3 -43' Consumer Price Indices The United States, the UñTted-ffi-4om, Australia 1971-1983 and Period Averages i::::.:: i:::.:.::::::l . US UK Aus

L97L 4. 3 9. 4 6.L L972 3. 3 7. 1 5.8 L973 6. 2 o 2 9.5 L91 4 11. 0 16. 0 15.1 L975 o 1 24. 2 15.1 L97 6 5. I 16. 5 13.5 L977 6. 5 15. B L2.3 L97B 7. 7 8. 3 1.9 L97 9 11. 3 13. 4 9.L 1980 13. 5 18. 0 L0.2 1981 - 10. 4 l-1. 9 9.6 L982 6. 1 B. 6 11.l_ 1983 2 2 4. 6 10.1 68/73 5.0 7.5 5.6 73/83 8.4 L3.2 LL.2 Elaine McCoy Chapter , Annex -482-

t Table 3.44 Residential Construction: I licit Price Index S¡ Un omr s ra a 1971-l-983 and Period Averages (year to year t change)

US UK Aus

L97L 4.9 8.9 7.9 L972 5.6 L2.4 10.0 L973 9.3 25.7 2L.4 r97 4 10.7 27.3 22.7 L975 8.7 2L.L 16.1 L97 6 7.4 L2.5 12.0 L977 L2 .4 9.6 6.4 L978 13.2 9.7 3.4 L979 L2.7 17. 0 7.2 1980 9.4 23.3 L2.4 19 81 7.3 l_3 .0 L2.3 t982 3.1 3.4 10.4 1983 1.7 5.1 68/73 6.3 11.5 9.6 73/83 8.1 13.5 L2 .4 Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -483-

Tab1e 3.45' Producer Price Indice s: Manufacturi The Un t tes t eUn K ng oflì r Aus al ia L}TL 1983 and Period Averages (year to Year I change)

US UK Aus

L97I 2 9 9.0 4.9 L972 3 3 5.3 4.9 L973 9 1 7.3 8.7 L97 4 15. 3 21 .B t5.2 L975 10. B 23.0 15.1 L97 6 4. 4 L6.2 LL.4 L977 6. 5 L8.2 L0.2 L97B 7. 8 9.9 8.2 L97 9 11. 1 10.9 14.8 1980 13. 4 14.0 14.0 19Bl o 3 9.5 8.5 L982 4. 0 7.8 8.9 19 83 1. 6 5.5 8.l- 68/73 4.5 6-4 -t3/83 I.2 L3-4 rL.2

Table 3.46' Producer Price Indices: Food, Bevera CS Tobacco eUn tates, Un edK ng onì r Aus a a Period Averages (year to Year t change) US UK AUS 68/73 9.2 8.2 73/7e 6.3 L7 .7 10.6 7e/83 2.5 7.6 8.4 Elaine McCoy Chapter 3 Annex -484-

Table 3.47' Producer Price Indices: Chemicals The Uni ted States, the United K I ngdom, Austral t-a Period Averages (year to year t change)

US UK Aus 68/73 2.0 4.8 73/79 L2.4 L7 .4 t-6.1 7e/83 7-2 8.3 L4.2

' TabLe 3.48' Producer Price Indices: Basi-c MetaIs The Un ited Sta tes, the United K IN gdom, Aus tralia Period Averages (year to year t change) US UK AUS 68/73 5.8 73/79 L2.5 L4.L 79/83 3.7 4.8 8.2

Table 3.4g' Producer Price Indices: MetaI Products Machiner and Equ pment The United States, thè United Kingdom, Austra 1 ia Period Averages (year to Year t change) US UK Aus 68/73 4.s 73/7 9 11.8 16.9 L4.9 79/83 s.l 8.1 Lt.4 Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -485-

Table 3.50' Producer Price Indices: Textiles Clothin and Leather States t Un dK nì ¡ Austra a Period Averages (year to Year t change) US UK AUS 68/73 3.6 73/79 5.3 L .r 79/83 s.0 6.s Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -486-

Täble 3.51' rts of Goods/Services: I ticit Price Index r SO s rv ES: c Pr eI n te s, e te K ngdom Australia ' Period Averages (year to Year t change) 'r;' ""uK ""4;; (exp) (imp) (exp) ( imp) (exp) ( imp) ';:å " " " " 'å.; 6lii; i'.7" 7.7 6.9 4.s 73/79 10.0 14.0 16.s 16.6 L2.2 L6.4 79/83 s.4 2.0 9-6 8.4 7 .7 8.0 'tt

i

\ \ !l l \ T I t \ I I I \ t \ / \ I \ \ ./ I \ I \ / a._ t-

-!t 5 , t -J c ¿ t t

'2 '/ 'r/ f ,/¿ o (o'e- zg6.E : r'1Oï 6 : poT.Ia LV'Z = 7,86T L96T IP.TauaÐ (6.0- = lL6I 3¿v\oï s'E ) ¿B'T = E86f-VL6Í (z'o- = 0L6f :/vlOT v'9 z b 6e'e E L6't- L9 6l (2. O- = 0L6f :/rtoI e,'9 = 9967 : r{6TI{) 6L'E = 0L6r-þ9 6T o áeuul : spo1:ed paleu6tsap aql roJ sa4e6a¡66e a6e:a¡e I ::

( sa6ueqc a6e1uac¡ad ¡ee,{ o1 reaÃ) .s'n : sacTfd laT.ret{ Ð ¿IO9 Teau l:o q1/{o-rÐ , T'E a:n61g sa1Pls palTun oq1 foJ sa.rnþTit /i,.r?unoJ T uorlcas

' 'EB6T tL6T pue !et6t L96r lelep T.reuqcuaq se elqlssod uaqn papnlcur sr 0¿6T V96I , a:aqn sêlllerJ-otuT1 êa'rq1 olgT popT^Tp sr saT;euuns .""ùj"lqtssod f oJ .Ã11c1po1:a¿ . sa:n6t3; apecerd saf e6a.r66e e6e:ene Jo soT-rpuuns . srua+s.,(s ssolce ]o uTqlT/"l loqlTA sêTqeTle^ Ie.TaAAS -ro oi,rf JO Sluaua^ou aq1 l:o 'uotlcadsul Ãq 'suoslledtuoc olelTITceJ 01 peptno:d ale soTcua-rPdsue:f,' 'scTlsr1e1s slunoccg IPuorlPN CIJSO luo-rJ po^T-rap o;e se;n6t3r asaq¡'

erletlsnv rtuop6ulx pa1Tuo aqú 'se1e15 pê1Tun êq,l ZB6T-1961 scTlsTlels ,{:eruung puP sa:n6td ÏecT-rolsrH el11e:eduo3 xauuv g :e1deq3

ÃoCct¡¡ auTeÏg - LBV- xauug E ¡a1det{C t,

,/ I / / \ I 7 \ I \ I I \ -a .'t ç'l .'J I 77 r / 1.t t / \ 1' t'rf / 1'rt t't, e,t, \ \ t', , \ t./ lt \ I I I \ I I I t \ I ..?t I \ ), t, I I t.t f'¿ , \ / t'? tit rr7 \ t'1 ¿'t ,./, I 9-/ I5 (t ó I 7 ¿'t ..t L'I t z', ¿'. J'I / ,.t a't t.t !- 3 t r! lcl I I .ar. r tal, ,t/t yr

I _-2 I ? -o12a

(e'z L96.1 :/Yroï 6 z9'9 Z86T L96T : poT.rê IerêuêÐ (z't = t86T : ¡'\O I E' TT R6T : rd6T 9t'B = EB6T-V L6I (e' z = L96f : ¡r\o Ï 6 I 0 6T: 89'? = EL6T.L96T (¿.f = 996T :¡t\oÏ 6.9 = 0¿6T :q6Tq) ZB'E -- OL6T-9967 :spo1:adpe4eu6'rsapaqlaolsale6a:66ea6e:aae¡oÃ:euung

( sa6ueq c a6e1uec¡ad :eeà o1 :eaÃ) 's'n : sacT-rd .raunsuo c .Z't ern6t¡

aureIA -887- xauuy E :a4deq3 .,{o3c14 7trffi

/ / \ / a / \ I a \ \ I \ / \ \ f I /

til/ /Jt. I I 4/tf ,

IJ ,a vv2 tÍl J// 'tL r/ -a 7 ',/ I I ¿ (u'E = 696I:/v\oï 6T Te'9 = Z861 696Í : poT-ra IP.rêuaÐ (E.E = þL6f : ¡'\O Ï eB/ s'6 -z 6I : 116T 9E'L = E86f-V L61 (r'e = 6967 : f'\O ï 8'9 = ÍL6T. : q6tq) 98'V = tL6f-696I :spor:ad paleu6tsaP êq1 roJ sa1e6a.r66e a6e.rene ¡ro Ã:euung êc.ro .rnoqel P101 t) .s.n :sa1eu ?uê I aun pazTpJepuels , €'e a:n6r¿

ÃoCclnt êureIg -6BV- xouuv g raldeq3

Elaine McCoy Chapter 3 Annex -492-

Figure 3.6' Government Ex enditure: U.S. Disaggrega ma nca egory, and nclud ing GDP (3 of total) ;#;ñü summary of average aggregates for the designated periods: L964-L970 = 6.84 @e.78 low: 1965 = B.17) L967-L973 = 7.82 (hr-gh: L967 = 9.78 1ow: L973 = s.70) L97 4-L98L = 5.4L (high: L97 4 5. B0 low: L978 = s.0s) General eriod: L967 19Bl 6.53 g 61 I Iow: 19 7B s.0s)

EDUCATION Summary of average aggregates for the designated Periods: I964-L970 = 4.L7 g l_ 4.47 1ow: I 964 = 3. B1) L967-L973 4.54 gh: 4.82 low: 1968 = 4.11) L9-14-L9BL = 4.79 75 5. l-5 low: L97B = 4.641 General riod: L967 1981 = 4.67 I 5. 1 ow 1968 = 4.11)

HEALTH Summary of average aggregates for the designated periods: L964-L970 = . 86 (high: L970 = .96 low: 1965 = . 81) 1967 -L973 = .94 (hrgh: L973 = 1.04 Iow: L967 = .821. L974-L98I = 1.10 (high: L97 1.18 low: 1981 = 1.0s) General riod: L967 1981 = L.02 low: L967 = .821 n?- ,t) /, ! I I 77î'-'- ?t'-* / \ T i ry7r.. . - I \ ¡¡ ¡¡ ,l¡o 'tr. I l t, îù \ I I ¿ \ / I \ / \ / \ \ I \ ,J

't- lt¿ ) ao ¡al tel ¿ct t st-, - t7 tt t ¡ t ,h.l ta, \ tt-l - I t t'( I t )rt a.' r/r7 fa5 ',Y. t ./\ tl2 tt- / ç'i î 1o" t('¡ t .) t cr7 .l't I \ I ,¿'J lt'l ttrr ó \ { tç ¡t'i , / .¿z ,4 7 ,¿l tl., / ttr., llt /t't ¡ ¡'I .t .7'2 t lcl I ,t.2 , , utl , \ 7 t' N þ s + I (- s R. (\ { ¡. \s 'v'.îV ' =2,477*+þ loc2

(eg'E EL61 :rqol : rt6 80'9 = T86T L96I : poT.r IerêuaÐ (e t's = T86T : rltO I 9f '9 çL6f : r¡6Tq) 67,'9 = T86I'VL6T (Eg's = tL61 :/vloÏ 80'9 = 8967 : r{6TrI) ¿8'E = e L6f- L96T (tt's = L96f : /vlo ï TT'9 = v96f : r{6TI{) 96'9 = 0L6I-V967 : spoT .rad pofpu6Tsap êq1 foJ sê1p6a.r66e o6P.ra^e Jo Ã:euuns SSCIAUSS JITgNd TVUTNAÐ (TE.¿ = L96I :/vloï =Q 69.6 = TB6T L96l :por-rê IP-rOuaÐ (Zf .Of = þL6I :/YloI 9t-ZT 0B6T :r{6Tr{) eZ'II = TB6f-VL6I (rE'¿ = Lg6I:/{Oï Be '6 : rt6 ?9'8 = t L6I-196f (os'9 = þg6f :/'roï 9L'B = OL6l : r¡6TtI) çE'L = 0L6I-V96I : spoT :ed pe?eu6tsap oq1 roJ se1e6a:66p e6e¡ane Jo Ã:euung Ãúruncas rvrcos (penulluoc sêT.retxuns,9't e:n6t¡)

-t 6v- xêuuv g :a1deq3 .ÃoCclrl auTeIg l.llc/) o P F P HU). ld o P ts \o \o ro iJÉ, H o \o r.O \OX É o q) \¡ Ot oro 3 5 { Ol o\ o3. È { )Èts= o È \¡ È F3, H. o I I ñ I I rÉÞ B ÉÊr. I P P. ts o P 0, H tsH tsH H. PP,fJ H 0, ts P. tsH OfJ. roo ro \oo tq \O P.K o P o tq o q \oo (q r.o lJ.< . o H o F j { 3. 3 ¡¡ I rl I s { co{ 5 -J{ -l 5 { { -J{(¡) .. o { P.. (r.. o(q O f \0 o QO. Ht @ fJ¡ o o ilP I A. H o ts F H ts ilP H ilP H ilo F ñ P H P H H ro r\c) \\ \o P. r.o r\o \o \o \o o0). \o P. ro \o \o O0) o / o \¡ or o\ ot Ot o< { o { il \¡ { Oì Oì o<. { { (, o, co (¡ (, ll)Or N P.O. P ¡.. @ o @ (¡ Pu) ts(¡co \¡ ts l-.o \ \ \¡ \o \o0) f1 -J { ÞfJ' ç .ll ll . P0J il il il il N il . ll ll HPJ' o o s ll lt ll .ll il uQr o ò !. P N) P coQ P @ { P \o ts Þ Þo o r.o o \0 oo. \ Oì È O. o \,1 o \ Or (, NN) FJ N) F F tsP ts N) o0) N { t\) NN) C)Þ. 7 s { or@ (¡@ Þ 5 t I Ol @ \¡ tO @ o ÉrQ Oì oto ÉQ. I / aa B'Q 1.. I'JQ. - ^J ts UJÈ P'f1 . o o Or ro Oì N o\o \o Or ts.ñ È coP Èè J L \ cto rtO ' Fd / @ \o KA' lrl rf Ê, tv <(a p)o ^dP 15 9, @ x P. N çfr o ta rt il rt O É o .J \ \ o @r / O. l-h B B I F o il o t P æ f{¡r O U) t / t_h N (, \ P o @ Qo U \ B ñ. r'ú P. Þ \ co o a v cf 5 \ cf \¡ çfo CN ç : - t-1 o I ¡ !fr o / I o o. o o X I Q¡o p, I o, ./ o (fr(n. H o (n (r) / H. H'. / ta uQo o I o I \ p) po É \ rt lf. B \ \ o o. P. / 7 o Q¡r rt It þr o @o H fir P. F.. o Qr o, o. a. ÈI :î \o È I -495- Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex

Figure 3.8' TransParencY: Comparison- of Aggregates: US (% of GDP) the (411 transparencies are to be found in a pocket inside ¡."f- åã"er of Volume II of this thesis )

Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -497-

Figure 3.10' Consume r Prices: U.K. (year o year percentage nges )

Summary of average aggregates for the designated periods: 1965 r970 4.6 (h igh: L97 6.4 Iow: L967 2.sl L967 L973 = ¿ 4 (h igh: L97 f= 9.4 low: L967 = 2-51 t97 4 1983 = 18.46 (high: L975 = 24. 2 1ow: 19 83 = 4 .6') General eriod: L967 L9B2 = 11.3 g low: L967 = 2.5\

I L/- I 7/7 .à,ào* ¿ It zZ-

I

IR ltl 4v¡- / t \ I a I t t.l ,.t I / 2.î 1.t T /.4 ,.7 c.) f_l f-at I I a.l I ¿ ,.t t-, 'J -t \ J Ct LZ I , \ t ,./ I , t, \ t./ I ¿ tt l-a 1-t I I I ¿-3 l./ / \ / ,f. 7¿ I \ / \ t.t z r.c lt'l a I \ t J¿ It ./ nt l.t .t / I I 7 / 7

llll I

Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -501-

Figure 3.74' Government iture: U.K. Disaggregat ma n categorYr ncluding GDP (g of total)

;;;;ñö periods: Summary of average aggregates for the designated L964 L970 = 6.62 .s+ low: L970 = 5.71) L967 L973 = 5.62 (hish: L967 = 6 .60 low: L973 = 4-84) L974 1978 = 4 .65 (high: L975 4 .86 low: L978 = 4 .36) General eriod z L967 L978 5.L4 g Iow: L978 = 4.36

EDUCATION Summary of average aggregates for the designated Periods: L964 L970 = 4.2L (highz 1970 = 4 .43 low: L964 = 3.97) L967 L973 = 4 .44 (high: 1972 = 4. 73 Iow: L967 = 4.26',, L974 1978 = s.02 gh: .15 low: L97 4 = 4.92l. General riod: L967 1978 4.73 h 7 low: L967 = 4-261

HEALTH Summary of average aggregates for the designated Periods: L964 L970 = 4.22 (high: 1966 = 4. 34 low: L964 = 3. e3 ) L967 L973 = 4.22 (high: L967 4. 32 low: L973 4.11) L974 L978 = 4 .49 (h igh: L97 5 4 .57 Iow: L974 = 4.251 General eriod: 1967 1978 = 4.36 g low: L973 = 4.11)

Elaine McCoy Chapter 3 Annex -504-

Figure 3 -L6' TransParencY Comparison of aggregates: UK (z of GDP) (411 transparencies are to be found in a pocket inside the bãck cover of Volume II of this thesis. ) Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -505-

Figure 3.]-'7' Growth rates of Expenditures During the Maj-n CycIe Phases of the UK EconomY 1959 1981 (g increase by year at constant prices)

1959-611961.''96'-5'96'72'972-31973.s'975-91979-81

0.6 -.{.0 F¡xc¿ inYcstrncnt 9.,1 0.? r0.7 2.9 6.9 -1.9 1.8 0.6 lswrancnt Lq rtoct¡ (cxP¡c¡sti rr % of TFE) 0.t {.2 0.3 -0.1 -lJ -2.5 E¡port¡ 1.4 ,.2 4.2 5.9 I t.6 2.2 5.,t {.6 : 3.7 0.9 l5 Cov€mment consümPtlon 2.7 2.3 2.t 2.2 4.7 4.8 2.6 ¡.0 Coosrmert'cxpcndllu¡s on goodr ¿nd ærvlc¿¡ 3.1 t.2 2.4 2.8 -1.2 5.4 lmgorrs 5.4 3.3 5J s.7 r t.7 -3.t -2.8 - 2.6 GDP (lwrage cttlmatc) 4.0 25 4.2 2.4 7.2 -1.{ -2.1

buccc ET(AS) 1982,FSa 19E2.

o o lo

t0 (nil f I / I o1 ) I / J ¿

o

-¿ l. .J -/ ( .ryorl) Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -506-

Figure 3.18' Infla tion in the U.K.: L967 1981 D saggrega ontr t n9 actors (t yearlY change)

Summary of average aggregates for the designated Periods: UNEMPLOYMENT L964 1970 = L.94 L967 L973 = 2 .64 L974 1981 = 5.66

WAGE RATES L964 L97 0- 5.63 L961 L97 3- 9 .44 r97 4 198 1- L6.54

RETAIL PRICE S L964 L97 Q= 4.43 L967 L97 3- 6.39 r974 19B 1- 15.53

IMPORT PRICE S L964 L97 0- 3.61 L967 L97 J= 8.36 L97 4 198 1- L7 .04

EXCHANGE RATE 1968 L973=- 5.68 L974 1981 = -10.70

MONEY STOCK L964 L970 = 6.47 L967 L973 = 13.34 1974 1981 = L2.I3 DAY LOST IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES (miIlions) L964 L970 = 4.70 L967 L973 = L0.00 L974 1981 = 11.16

Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -508-

Figure 3 .20' Consumer Prices: Australia (year to Year Percentage changes ) Summaryofaverageaggregatesforthedesignatedperiods: L965 1970 = 3.81 (h igh: L964 = 4.0 low: t96B = 2 .71 L967 L973 = 4.87 h g l= 9.5 low: 1968 = 2.71 L974 1983 = LL.4 @1s.1 /75 low: 1978 = 7.91 General ríod z L967 - L9B2 = 8.63 q l= .1 /75 low: 1968 = 2 .71

? ¿ '¿.:Y I '0.a I 4a ¿/,

I 1k Itl 4vr I I I a lì ,.' t t.l ,., t.t ,-? t,l <-z ) \ I a ía 1.. t.7 \ I c.j tl LO \ L.f t1 t.t \ /.t a.l ¡ 7.t t.t rJ L7 t./, (.? I tt.. t tJ-, / \ at.t \ 7 , \ / t7.l tt 1.7 7.' / t t< l.t a tf. 4.t at.t t.l t¿ I , r.ç t t /¿ / n. l.t l.t / / \ ./ \

< ^), t/at

-t'¿ fa a t't l'L 7't. , I t', t', t t'l t't a / L) ¿'t ,'t' .., o.l t.4 .J a t-/ ?t t t-, a., t't / i't ,', t', L/ ,,.i a., I / th D' ,tt t e', -ît ,'t I I >t ,7 5'5 I / a'f -1t 1.1 , \ ,) Ò't tt t, t'Í lr', '., ó t

/.,

'etþ ttl v, , , t vr. / til/ t¿

aw ¿ 7 ar/ -z 4, 't7 , ttl J./ Yr'l 7 r' ¿

(g'r OL 6T : /vfo ï ZB 6 ZZ'V = 7,861 696I : poT-ra IP.rAuêÐ (g'z = þL61 3 /Y10 ï 6'6 = EB6T 3 rI6Tq) B8'9 = EB6T VL6T (9'T 0L6I :i{oI 9'Z : r{6 ) V0'¿ = tL6I 6967 : spor:ad pê1eu6Tsêp aq1 foJ sa1e6a.¡66p e6e:e¡e Jo áeuuns ocfo .rno e101 t) eTTP-r1SnV :sê1eu 1ua I uaun pêzTp.repuels ,IZ'E a:n6tg

-60s- xouuv E ¡a+dPt{3 ,{oCc¡¡ aureItr

t I

1

/ -/ \ 7

?.' ,l' ,'aa t I -tlt r.tt a't3 t / lr. att , 't. t'41 l'rt t.rt / a'J' 7 I t's , 3ir/ L'u -¿ t'tt / ¿.t, , \ / / a I .-t t z'Jt I ì?l , a.t t r.I a.u ,zt ó a.y t'lt , r i¡' ,.at It I L-.1' , vta , 'trþ 4ft v, .¿at I I I zJ f¿ I ,) 7 2 (e'zr 696f :¿qol b 9'Vr Z86T L96T : poT TP-rauêÐ (6'ET v L61 : /vfo I . 9 LT, Ê867 : r{67 q) vz'9r = E86T VL61 ft' z't 696I :/v\oÏ q6Trl 0 'rT tL6 : ) 9V'7,f = EL6T L96Í (e 'or V96Í :/vloT s'z T B96T:116Tr{) L'Tf = 0L6M6f : spoT.rad pêf pu6Tsap aq+ foJ sale6o-r66e a6e.IaAP Jo Ã.reuuns

dCÐ o 8) PTIP-rlSnV:uoTl suoc IeUTJ luotl¡u.ra^oÐ . tz' E a.rn6rJ

.TT S- xauug g .ra1deq3 .,{oCc¡t aurelg Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -512-

Figure 3.24' Government E enditure: Australi-a Disaggregated n Categoryr and Inc ud ing GDP (8 of total)

DEFENCE Summary of average aggregates for the desi-gnated periods: L964 L970 = 3.98 (high:1- 967 = 4 .67 low: L964 = 3.36) L967 L973 = 3 .47 1 .67 low: .7 4l 1974 1981 = 2.30 (h ì-qh: 198 0 2 .52 low: L975 = 2 .18) General riod: 19 6 7 1981 = 2.89 9 4 low: L975 = 2 .18)

EDUCATION Summary of average aggregates for the designated Periods: L964 L970 = 2.94 gh: . l-9 low: L964 = 2.73l, 1967 L973 = 3.16 )= .46 1ow: L967 = 2.92l. L974 1981 = 4.72 (hish: L979 = 4.96 low: L974 = 4.33 General riod: L967 1981 = 3.94 (h q 9- .96 low: L967 = 2-921

HEALTH Summary of average aggregates for the designated periods: L964 L970 = 2.08 (high: L97O = 2. 13 Iow: 1968 = 2.041 1967 L973 = 2.L3 gh: .26 low: 1968 = 2.041 L974 1981 = 3.56 (hish: r-9 80 3.74 Iow: L974 = 2.87',t General iod: L967 1981 = 2.85 1 Iow:1968 = 2.041

Elaine ['lcCoy Chapter 3 Annex -5 15-

Figure 3. 26', Trans renc Austral ia Compar son o f Aggregates (t of GDP)

Annex -5r5- Elaine McCoY Chapter 3

Figure 3.26' TransParencY Australia Comparison- of eg-gregatãs: (% of GDP) inside the (A1I transparencies are t" nã iound ín a pocket back cover of Volume II of this thesis' ) I I 9 \ ,z \ / \ I I \ \ 7 /l ./ I \ \ \ ¿ Þ I crl z >t ) \ / I tr / ì 7!- \ I t.t llt t't l ¡ s'tt ¡ a \ I i1 f J ¡¡ / \ r'h s.it \ / a Ft l'J1 I J.r I \ L \ ^ J -/ tl lt '\ c'I t / tl ry )a \-.\ r /+ ÍLt L-ra t \ \, I L, a, t'.r¿ 2 ,rf t'.4 A 7 ßl/ Li / ttt t '7t /t, 4 t ¿ '0t 7',ll I lr \-a a .'lt rF r ¿¡ I t'at I t7E a'ta t'az Í-t2 'Lr. ut rl lt¿ .Yl t

I ã/, /r) ,/, 2l v T¿

(¿cc I ) EB6T þ967 eTrPrlsnv'tuop6u1y palTun aqü 'se1e1s palTun êq'l s6ur^Ps ssorÐ , LZ'E a-rn6TJ

oc-aê.rqfr, zv uoTlcas suosT-rPduoc ^rlun êuTPIg -9T E- xêuuv E -raldeqc ^,{oCclt Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -5L7-

Figure 3.28' Consumer Prices The United states, The United Kingdom' Austral ia 1965 1985 (t change from Previous Year)

,, z- .2 >),ù ¿ ,/- I d.t I I tt ¿(,

/ I tk 4v¡ I ( ,L I ltf t a ttÀ \; I r-t ti , t.J t,, t., \. I I / ,-? ,,? <., a t t.7 I , tl f.tt k / t.t ì t \ ¿.f I a ,.t t.t IJ l i \ \ J l7 A2 tt , It.. t r¡ t./ I \ \t II J v t /. rì , I 1 \ ( te,t \ I It I tt 1.7 z, t< / \ I \ I I , t 7 ,1. 4.t I \ q F / i \ x e¿ I r.ç I I 7 \ t ./ J I L t J¿ t ,tti t l.t /.t -/ (./ \ / \ \ I ( /.l r \ Tç \, r .l F \ / a Þtt

eJ

Elaine McCoy Chapter 3 Annex -519 -

Figure 3.30' Standardized UnemPloYment Rates The United states, The United Kingdom' Australia 1970 L9B4 (* total labour force)

., ,. 1 zl /:¡ tlt 'r/ ,/, /¿ r¿- /z ?t I tk Itl 4ø t ,) / I ttTD J I 'f t/ I /t I I t.t f.t ,3.1 t- t a trt 'J I ¿ h t t,t lt I ¡' , t.t îJ t.b I t_ t 4t f7 4.? I I I I a.a !.b t., \ J / I \ t 7 t.f l-a J-.- I t.t t.t t.t I ¡ J ,l t 1L L-r (t.t ¿.c I 7 7 ,.' \ \.- ¿-l ,-1 <.t t t 'l , t.r 7,t l l t l.J t.1 ,,J / I ¿1-/ 1.1 J ot ar.l 1.L

l-¿ 4 r(, kt¿ Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -520- section 5: Two-country comparisons: Australia/U.S.

Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -522-

Figure 3.32' Consumer Prices: Australia/U.S. (g changes Year to year)

'rào* ¿-? I M" a.

I I I tk /Jl êlt )lit I J¿. þ t.l rn t.l (t/' ù, / <- 2, I *a 2.7 \ t cf tl f-at \ , t.i / \¿ f/, ¿.1 \ ,.t t.t l't I L2 f¿ \ \ t, , / \ t //.1 \ \ I / t?.? I tt l-7 F ,1/ t1 I t \ ,f. at., \ ì t t.t e¿ I t \ t t tCt l.t l,t I \ T /\ I \ I \ 7 / \

4t4 ;l rtt 7' ,+a ,+ r t. t -r, 7'L /è t x- I ?ç t't l'¿ a a' J I I t', t't t a a ,'e t.t t'u a 7" T L') t'¿ 2'tt c., ..1 1.4 ) ^v r Ç (_ z'7 7t I l !-t a.t t', r '.r r \ 1 ,', t', n ,F t'l e'¿, a', I \ I / \ \ tlt ¿)t ,ì, t I -. t .,.t tt r't I a \ ü I ,t2 LT tf t5 r I t a.f ,ît r-i , é-t t, t'î ll a'l t , I / --1-' 1 I t t.l 2il yf , t , c/ta , f¡/ të i4

I lJ 7/ -7, (Í/ / '/" I ¿.7 '"("1 t

(ac:o¡r -rnoqel fe1o1 *) 's'o/erre.r4snv : sa+eu lueuÃolduaun pezrp-repuP4s ,E€'t a:n6'rg

-ez9- xêuuv g :e1deq3 ÃoCcl,l aureTg { {; !i 3F É \ I \t H \ ì .ír {r s { ìr c\ s É( \s i; \\ 5 tn ¡ I { I ( \ \ ìl iq ¡i \ sq

ì \ ¡ 3 ñ h !È \ sl -/ ¿< 7 ç- J ,t X ¡' c) \ É q 7 lr j J ì \ ¡ 01 3 l{ U) ù z \ c) Ð I \ g{ \ / (õ rõ \, I ¡ \ .q .r{ l r-t 7 o ì I rd I r' lr L a +J sS N l ¿ a J I L. d L s \ 1 ¿; + ¡ -Þr \ o $É s t 7 o (1.-l I ¿ U r) ::s I E rf¡ rd \ \ \ c0^ ¡ 0) OA I I Þ troO ?l .r{ ão(J r -t rd Þo -r{ a Él lr dP I f¡¡(9- ) Él r -¡ ) s

I lr L I * ì ì ll Elaj-ne McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -525-

Figure 3.35' Goúernment FinaI Consumption: AustraILa/U'S' (s GDP)

6 ¿ -L. i1 !L I .tz !: t1 /tl -.-, tk lJl 4v¡ rl tl^ I t I ¿

þ / ,tJ T Q.t rr.,".t t¿-1 , ¡21 n.t ,t., .l.l u î/ tt., ¿ 7 aZ.a \ \ t 7 J / ¿ , ,r., tt., a l/ t) I / , ,t., l- 4 v -v tL.t ,t., a.1 ..1 t / t ,t., n-L tt-t tr.t ,Ù.J / ¡t- I tÍ.L ¿3,1 L^ t,. f tf.L 4., 7tt , r.t ,t2 trL t t,L ) a a )/ 7 f

kt Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -526-

COII P¡\ R ISON ECONONf lC C ROWTH-AN I NTERN^TIONÂL cxchangc ratcs-log') (Pcr capilu incomcs ¡n.on.t"nt 1970 USS priccs at 1975 ust usA ó000 W. CcrmanY Swcdcn

/\ ust rali¡l

Japa n

/ Ncw Zcaland SingaPorc U.K. .7 Hong Kong

¿ ¿ -

Taiwan Malaysia

S. Korc¡

r97l l98l I 950 I 9ó0 Ycar 1899

Sourcc: World Bank Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -527 -

Section 6: Two-Country Comparisons: U'K'/U'S'

¡

e .ll \ t .J I I \ \ \ 2) .'t ç'l .,J / a 7-l r / t- ,,.' t \ ./ / l'I 1' / i .¿¿ t I \ I t-l zv , ¡ \ l- r.l lt I i / 5'tt ¿r/ t'tt l \\ \ I I rla t l I I .'2/ I \ t )'t Z2 z, I î \ I I t't t.t /'¿ 7 / I I t- l't t; I I t't t.i ,.? I 0'r /t ft tá / 2't .l L'l lt I 2,. 't ¿'z a / I , t l.r t.t .t c i! tti ,t/ yf T' I t\ I .7 II

, 'r2Y ttlr "7 ro

(:eeà o1 .rPaà sa6uPqc t) 's'n /'x'n :sacTfd rêunsuoJ ,Lt'€ a.rn6rd

aurelg -629- xouuv e -raldeqc ^ÃoCcln¡ , t:d iv>

7'L tÒ t t't /'ó 7't' I \ -4 1 t't t't f / t't t'l 1'il t -t' L't J'1, 2 v - 7 o., o't t.4 / 7 z'7 ,5 7t , \ t., t.t t'1 r \ i'.f t'7 /', ìl 7 ì I r.l 7'¿ o.t I \ / \ L' lrt I t .r.Y r't I 1 tt -\ // t't t J ,rt 1.1 t -/ a't ,) ó't I t't t'î / ,'l , t /

7 , cltr , , l tt, /$ yf I t¿ I

¿2, ,t/ r'y'vl 7'," 7 '/1 a F'

(ac:o¡ .rnoqel IP1o1 t) 'S'n /'x'n : saleu luau.ÃoTdtuoufl pazTp'rPpuPlS ,88't a-rn6Td

ÃoCcyt auTeTg -0 €s- xauuv E -rê1deqc Elaine McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -53 1-

Figure 3.39' Gross Savings: u.K./u.s. (t GDP)

V)*' Vù.r' /¿ ay' tl lllll.ll

,1, tî,y'' l' )

':r-r/ h¿ o tt{ /f? J tñ ) a lt tt. t 1 ?. -*l li ,, .. u,a 'lb tt. f lt ,t t?-t il ¿ ,t.r t u-t , tt/

t t/ a I / \ ,/ (ni t r.a tt J t I \ \ I \ I n./ \ I 7 \ \, r bl / t l / \ J \ _) ¿ \ r' 'l * lt \ il \ 7 I \ t \ I \ \ iil tl Elaj-ne McCoY Chapter 3 Annex -532-

Figure 3.40' Government FinaI Consumption: U.K. /u -S - (t GDP)

/L I y't !

I I IR /t'l 4v: 4 t ,. ) ,,., t \ -a / 1t .zJ / tr. t' ß \ \- I I n.þ t.ù L.L ' ¿ I .l L ,t -¿ \ 2. /î J / I \- , ar. t ,t ., l- F I -¿ I / I lf.? / t t., .7 lE '¡L tt.t tt.f 2 tt. f tl. t o.t t tt,a .l 1

4< 4t.t 3- Elaine McCoY -53

BIBLIOGRAPHY Elaine McCoY BibIiograPhY -s34-

BIBLIOGRAPHY Arti-cIes

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