The 1876 Japanese Journalistic Reports and the Meiji Origins of Modern Korean Studies

Korea in the realm of reality: The 1876 Japanese journalistic reports and the Meiji origins of modern Korean studies Lionel Babicz The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Department of East Asian Studies If I had to choose one word to summarize the Japanese attitude towards Korea around the Meiji Restoration, it would be the word “ignorance”. In 1868, Japan was ignorant of Korean things. And this lack of knowledge was not only perceptible among the new leaders, but also among those that should have been the best informed of the Korean situation, namely the Tsushima domain. This ignorance may seem surprising, in view of the close Japanese-Korean relations of the Edo period (1600-1868). The two countries had succeeded in overcoming their basic differences on the nature of their relations (for Korea - equal exchanges between two vassals of China; for Japan - relations which had nothing to do with a Chinese world view, but originated in her own will), and had developed relatively friendly ties. The domain of Tsushima, headed by the So family, was the intermediary through which Japanese-Korean relations were held during the Edo period. These contacts were punctuated by the coming to Japan of “Korean embassies”. And a delegation of Tsushima, the wakan (Korean waegwan ), was established near Pusan. Moreover, this relative closeness favored the emergence of Japanese experts in Korean things, like Amenomori Hoshu (1668-1755), whose Korean language textbook ( Korin suchi ) was still widely in use in the Meiji period. Nevertheless, in the middle of the nineteenth century, the traditional frame of Japanese- Korean relations had been deteriorating for a long time. Tsushima-Korea trade was continuously declining, and since 1776, Tsushima had received regular financial assistance from Edo. No Korean official delegation had come to Japan since 1811, and that last delegation did not go farther than Tsushima. The growing distance between Japan and Korea was also perceptible in the intellectual field. Paradoxically, the growing strategic interest some Japanese thinkers were showing in Korea since the end of the eighteenth century expressed, by its lack of realism, how Korea was actually becoming an imaginary entity in Japanese minds. At the end of the eighteenth century, Hayashi Shihei was already speaking about the importance of Korea for Japan’s security. In the 1820s, Sato Nobuhiro turned to a more aggressive stance, and called for the conquest of Manchuria, Kamchatka, Korea and China. Both thinkers referred also to the legendary conquests of Korea by the Empress Jingu, and to the historical Korean expeditions of Hideyoshi. Sato Nobuhiro also justified his expansionist claims by the divine essence of Japan, ancestor of all nations of the universe. After 1853, similar ideas were expressed both by opponents and by supporters of the bakufu . Yoshida Shoin stressed the natural inferiority of Korea to Japan. Hashimoto Sanai called for territorial expansion to Korea and Manchuria, while Yokoi Shonan or Katsu Kaishu dreamt of commercial breakthroughs in the peninsula and on the continent. One may think that at least Tsushima would show a better understanding of Korean reality. In some sense, this was true. The domain attempted, even before the Restoration, to provide realistic assessments of Korea, but without much success. Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of the Restoration, Tsushima urged the new government to redefine Japan's relations with Korea, but only succeeded in showing its own incapacity and ignorance of the Korean reality. Tsushima was not even able to inform Korea properly of the Meiji Restoration. After Tsushima's failure, the Korean question passed gradually to the Foreign Ministry. But here again, the same ignorance and clumsiness characterized the approach to Korea. The most blatant expression of this ignorance was the agreement signed with China in 1871, whose declared objective was to convince Korea to accept Japanese requests. Japan’s agreement with China should lead Korea to consider her as China's equal, the Japanese wanted to believe. But the scheme did not work. Korea was not impressed, and continued to refuse the Japanese requests. One could even ascribe the political crisis of 1873 to Japanese ignorance of Korea. The real objectives of this major political confrontation were internal, and Korea played in it mostly a virtual and phantasmagoric role. It was the 1876 opening of Korea which partially broke this vicious circle of ignorance. Partially, because Korea would always preserve an imaginary dimension, would always remain to some extent wrapped in a layer of unreality. What transformed Korea into an object of knowledge was the growing perception of the strategic importance of the peninsula after 1876. Actually, this was not really a new thing. The importance of the Korean peninsula for Japan’s security, especially in relation to Russia, had been stressed ever since the end of the eighteenth century, and had been repeatedly stated in the first years of Meiji. The main approach said that two dangers might arise from Korea. First, in view of general Korean hostility to Japan, one cannot rule out a Korean attack on Japan, when the neighboring country feels strong enough to take action. Secondly, and this was the really big threat, Russia might seize Korea, and directly threaten Japan from there. The redefinition of this strategic perception during and in the immediate aftermath of the events of 1876 helped reinsert Korea into the sphere of reality, and gave birth to modern Korean studies in Japan. An example of this redefinition of Korea's strategic importance can be found in two articles published in the Choya shinbun , while Japan and Korea were still negotiating the Kanghwa treaty. These were detailed analyses of the danger of Russian territorial ambitions to Japan. A conflict between Japan and Korea, warned the newspaper, would give Russia a pretext for intervention, and favor its policy of expansion. This feeling of threat gave birth to the two first modern Japanese works which attempted to describe Korea in a scientific way. These two books were published in 1876, in the immediate aftermath of the Kanghwa Treaty. The first one was the Concise Description of Korea ("Keirin Jiryaku") by Sewaki Hisato and Hayashi Shinzo; and the second ? a Description of Korea ("Chosen Jijo"), a partial translation by Enomoto Takeaki of the History of the Korean Church by the French missionary Charles Dallet. These two books marked the beginnings of scientific study of the Korean peninsula in Meiji Japan. The two main authors of these books came from the domain of "Dutch studies" (rangaku ). Sewaki Hisato, better known under the name of Tezuka Ritsuzo, was one of the pioneers of the field. Throughout his entire life, he endeavored to introduce western sciences in Japan, and to attract young people to these subjects. In 1875, he was appointed commercial secretary ( boeki jimukan ) in Vladivostok. Japan and Russia had just resolved their territorial dispute and agreed, in May 1875, to exchange Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. The opening of a Japanese delegation in Vladivostok was the consequence of this improvement in relations. But this was to be Tezuka's last mission. In 1878, he fell ill, and died on the vessel which took him home. During his stay in Russia, Tezuka focused on the regional Asian situation, and became particularly aware of the importance of Korea for Japan's security, in face of Russia's ambitions. He thus felt the necessity of drafting an objective and detailed description - the word “concise” in the title should not mislead us - of the peninsula. The work appeared in two volumes in April 1876, cosigned by a certain Hayashi Shinzo, about whom we know nothing. The afterword also mentions the collaboration of a Korean named Kim Rin-sung, whom Tezuka met in Vladivostok. A second part was certainly planned, but never published. The book presented a systematic description of Korea: geography, population, government, language, customs, currency, units of measure, armed forces, fiscal system, etc. Altogether, the work comprised twenty-two sections in two volumes, with a particular focus on military matters in the second. Enomoto Takeaki is much more famous than Sewaki Hisato. A soldier and a politician, he was also a product of Dutch studies. He specialized in shipbuilding techniques in Nagasaki, and in 1862 was dispatched to Holland. He was back in Japan in 1867, on the eve of the Restoration. Assistant commander of the bakufu fleet, he fled to Hokkaido with all his vessels, before surrendering to the government forces in 1869. Freed from jail in 1872, he joined the new regime and was put in charge of the development of Hokkaido. And in 1874, it was Enomoto who negotiated with Russia the exchange treaty Sakhalin-Kurils. Immediately after the conclusion of the agreement, he began to translate, in St. Petersburg, Charles Dallet’s History of the Korean Church . Enomoto had a long-time interest in Korea. But it was the negotiations he held with the Russians, and the Kanghwa incident a short time afterward, which motivated his decision to translate Dallet's work. Enomoto felt a sense of urgency: the Korean question was of strategic importance for Japan's security, and a detailed and accurate knowledge of the peninsula was indispensable. The book which Enomoto chose was a new French book, published in 1874. This was a study of some eight hundred pages, in two volumes, made by the missionary Charles Dallet. As the title indicates, it was essentially an account of missionary activities in Korea. But a detailed introduction of some two hundred pages also presented "the history, the institutions, the language, and the customs of the Koreans". It was this part which particularly interested Enomoto. He translated thirteen of the fifteen original sections, to which he added the fifth and sixth chapters of the second volume, which dealt with the diplomatic problems raised by the persecution of Catholics in Korea.

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