VYTAUTO DIDŽIOJO UNIVERSITETAS POLITIKOS MOKSLŲ IR DIPLOMATIJOS FAKULTETAS POLITOLOGIJOS KATEDRA

Giedrė Pranaitytė

THE BUSH DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP AND THE AMERICAN POWER IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Magistro baigiamasis darbas

Diplomatijos ir tarptautinių santykių programa, valstybinis kodas 62402S104 Politikos mokslų studijų kryptis

Vadovas Prof. Leonidas Donskis ______(Moksl. laipsnis, vardas, pavardė) (parašas) (data)

Apginta______(PMDF dekanas) (parašas) (data)

Kaunas, 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...... 3 SUMMARY...... 4 SANTRAUKA...... 5 INTRODUCTION...... 11 1. THE BUSH DOCTRINE: BETWEEN SECURITY, DOMINANCE AND DEMOCRACY.....15 1.1. Political Background of the Bush Doctrine...... 18 1.1.1. Political and Societal Consequences of 9/11...... 18 1.1.2. The European Dilemma and Troubles with the United Nations...... 21 1.2. The Development of the Bush Doctrine and its Elements...... 25 1.2.1. The Basics of the Bush Doctrine...... 25 1.2.2. The Elements of the Bush Doctrine and their Evaluation...... 28 2. THE PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP OF GEORGE W. BUSH AND ITS CHALLENGES...33

2.1. Theoretical Approach to the Presidential Leadership and its Types...... 35 2.1.1. The Politics of Articulation and Orthodox Innovation...... 35 2.1.2.Theoretical Considerations about the Politics of Disjunction...... 37 2.2. The Analysis of George W. Bush's Leadership and its Results...... 39 2.2.1. The Presidency of George W. Bush in Relation to Orthodox Innovation...... 39 2.2.2. The Leadership of George W. Bush and its Shift towards the Politics of Disjunction...... 41 2.2.3. The Impact of the Doctrine on the Leadership of George W. Bush...... 43 3.THE BUSH ERA AND PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN POWER...... 44 3.1. The United States as a Contemporary Empire...... 45 3.2 The Lack of Balance Between Hard and Soft Power...... 51 3.3. Three Major Mistakes of the Bush Administration...... 53 3.4. Difficult Challenges in the Wake of the Bush Era...... 58 CONCLUSION...... 61 LIST OF REFERENCES...... 65 APPENDICES...... 72

2 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (liet. Šiaurės Atlanto Sutarties Organizacija) NSS – National Security Strategy (liet. Nacionalinio saugumo strategija) U.S. – United States (liet. Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos) U.N. – United Nations (liet. Jungtinės Tautos) DOD – Department of Defence (liet. Gynybos departamentas)

3 SUMMARY Many discussions have recently been initiated about George W. Bush's policies and his presidential legacy. Positive attitudes towards his presidency are related to attempts of the Bush administration to prevent terrorist attacks on American soil in the wake of 9/11 and promote democratic ideals all over the world. Negative evaluations of George W. Bush's presidential years are frequently associated with his controversial foreign policy in the Middle East, the continuous military operation in Iraq, the widening unrest in Afghanistan, the erosion of the conservative regime and the weakening of American power in the world. Although most political scientists and commentators refer to the Bush doctrine while discussing the foreign policy of the forty-third president, it is evident that this term is interpreted in many different ways. Besides, numerous questions arise about George W. Bush's leadership style and the prospects of the American dominance. The main purpose of this thesis is to analyze what major elements constitute the Bush doctrine, how it is perceived in scholarly circles and in what ways American power has been transformed during the last eight years. The analysis of the presidential leadership of George W. Bush makes an important part of the paper as well. There are four major objectives to be attained: a) to examine the elements of the doctrine in a broader political context and explore the damaging consequences of the 9/11 attacks to the American society and the political climate inside the U.S. after this tragic event; b) to discuss the leadership of George W. Bush in relation to orthodox innovation and investigate the shift of his leadership from the politics of articulation to the politics of disjunction; c) to analyze in what ways George W. Bush's political mistakes relate to imperial ambitions of the United States and affect the lack of the balance between hard and soft power of the U.S.; d) to indicate what political challenges are likely to remain important for the United States after the Bush era. Finally, at the end of this thesis several important conclusions have been made. It is clear that the Bush doctrine cannot be rejected altogether due to the need of continuity. Importantly, George W. Bush truly appears to be the leader who not only caused divisions inside the Republican Party but relied exclusively on America's hard power paying too little heed to diplomacy and the benefits of the international cooperation. If the election of Barrack H. Obama have been very enthusiastic at first, some American politicians already criticize his strategy as too dependent on soft power and sometimes even naïve.

4 SANTRAUKA

George'o W. Busho prezidentavimas (2000-2008 m.) sukėlė didelį susidomėjimą akademikų ir politikų sluoksniuose. Įvairūs politologai ir analitikai, nagrinėdami prezidento vykdytą užsienio ir vidaus politiką, užėmė dvi priešingas pozicijas. Pavyzdžiui, Arthur'as M.Schlessinger'is, John'as G. Ikenberry'is ir Zbigniew'as Brzezinski's smarkiai kritikavo George'o W. Busho politinę epochą, atkreipdami ypatingą dėmesį jo klaidas. Juos domino padidėjusi įtampa Artimuosiuose Rytuose, užsitęsę karo neramumai Irake, nestabili padėtis Afganistane ir sumenkęs Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų diplomatinis svoris tarptautinėje arenoje. Kita vertus, tokie įžymūs politikos komentatoriai ir apžvalgininkai kaip Robert'as Kagan'as, Charles'as Krauthammer'is ir Robert'as G. Kaufman'as teigiamai vertino tai, kad George'ui W. Bushui pavyko užkirsti kelią naujiems teroro aktams JAV teritorijoje ir intensyviai skleisti demokratijos idealus nestabiliose valstybėse: Irake ir Afganistane. Tarp šių dviejų, priešingus požiūrius propaguojančių mokslininkų grupių bei jų pasekėjų, vis dar vyksta intensyvios diskusijos dėl George'o W. Busho politinių nesėkmių. Atkreipiamas dėmesys į prezidento sunkumus, patirtus bendraujant su Europos valstybių vadovais, politinę aroganciją, vienašališkai pradedant karinius veiksmus Irake, ir siekį dominuoti, neatsižvelgiant į Kinijos ir Rusijos norą kurti daugiapolį pasaulį. Ypatingai daug nesutarimų kelia Busho doktrina, prezidento lyderystės transformacijos ir JAV galios pokyčiai. Šio darbo tikslas – išanalizuoti, kokie svarbiausi elementai sudaro George'o W. Busho doktriną ir kaip per aštuonerius jo prezidentavimo metus pasikeitė Amerikos galia šiuolaikiniame pasaulyje. Didelis dėmesys skiriamas George'o W. Busho lyderystės analizei, kuri ne tik padeda įvairiapusiškiau įvertinti doktrinos poveikį politiniams procesams, bet ir leidžia geriau suvokti Respublikonų partijos susiskaldymo priežastis ir netikėtą naujojo JAV prezidento Barrack'o H. Obamos iškilimą. Magistro darbą sudaro šios dalys: dvi santraukos anglų ir lietuvių kalbomis, įvadas, trys dėstymo dalys, išvados ir priedai. Pirmoji šio darbo dalis yra skirta Busho doktrinai ir jos reikšmei aptarti. Svarbiausi doktrinos elementai analizuojami platesniame tarptautiniame kontekste. Daug dėmesio skiriama praktiniam jos taikymui, vykdant Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų užsienio politiką Artimuosiuose Rytuose, ypač Irake. Pristatant svarbiausius Busho doktrinos elementus, yra siekiama kuo didesnio objektyvumo, pateikiant įvairius mokslininkų, politikų ir politologų vertinimus šiuo sudėtingu klausimu. Kadangi Busho doktrina visiškai susiformavo po Rugsėjo vienuoliktosios teroro aktų, šiame darbe taip pat trumpai aptariamos šio įvykio pasekmės Amerikos visuomenei ir Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų padėčiai pasaulyje. Pirmiausia, Niujorke sugriuvus „Pasaulio prekybos

5 centrui“, kuris buvo laikomas iškalbingu JAV ekonominės ir finansinės galios simboliu, pasaulis pirmą kartą akivaizdžiai suprato, kad vienintelė šiuolaikinė supergalybė yra pažeidžiama. Daugelis paprastų amerikiečių pasijuto nesaugūs savo šalyje ir įbauginti naujosios grėsmės, dėl to, kad teroristinės organizacijos „Al-Qaeda“ nariai, nugalėję visas užkardas ir kliūtis, netikėtai sugebėjo įvykdyti sukrečiančius teroro aktus, nesulaukę nei žvalgybos, nei kariuomenės pasipriešinimo. Dėl šios priežasties, tolimesni JAV prezidento ir jo administracijos politiniai sprendimai ir diplomatiniai veiksmai daugiausia buvo orientuoti į nacionalinio saugumo užtikrinimą. Naujas valstybės vadovo požiūris į JAV nacionalinio saugumo iššūkius buvo pateiktas įvairiose viešose George'o W. Busho kalbose. Vėliau prezidento siūlymai buvo įtraukti į Nacionalinio saugumo strategiją, paskelbtą 2002 metais. Netrukus imta plačiai diskutuoti apie naujai atsiradusią Busho doktriną. Po Rugsėjo vienuoliktosios teroro aktų JAV prezidentas tapo ypač populiarus, nes Amerikos visuomenė, išreikšdama paramą jo vykdomai politikai, tuo sudėtingu laikotarpiu siekė pademonstruoti savo vieningumą ir susitelkimą. Demokratai ir respublikonai tuo metu atsisakė priešiškos retorikos ir kritikos vieni kitų atžvilgiu ir vieningai palaikė George'o W. Busho politiką, todėl, kad nenorėjo pasirodyti stokojantys patriotizmo ir siekė laimėti savo rinkėjų palankumą. Būtina pabrėžti, kad 2001 metais terminą „Busho doktrina“ pirmasis pavartojo įtakingas JAV politikos apžvalgininkas Charles'as Krauthammer'is. Šis terminas sėkmingai prigijo ne tik viešojoje erdvėje, bet ir akademiniame diskurse. Svarbu pažymėti, kad iki šiol įžymūs politologai vis dar nepasiekė bendro sutarimo ir nepateikė visuotinai priimto mokslinio Busho doktrinos apibrėžimo. Dėl tikslaus doktrinos elementų skaičiaus ir jų svarbos taip pat nesutariama. Pavyzdžiui, kinų politologas Zhiyuan'as Cui's ypatingą dėmesį skiria preemptyviniams smūgiams (preemptive strikes) kaip svarbiausiam Bušo doktrinos elementui. Tuo tarpu Robert'as Kagan'as ir Robert'as G. Kaufman'as skelbia, kad demokratijos skleidimo idėja yra svarbiausia Busho doktrinos dalis. Be to, Robert'as G. Kaufman'as visiškai atmeta unilateralizmą ir nepriskiria jo doktrinai. Reikia pastebėti, kad prezidento administracija sugebėjo sumaniai pasinaudoti Rugsėjo vienuoliktosios įvykiais, kaip pretekstu imtis agresyvesnių politinių veiksmų, siekdama įvairiomis karinėmis ir diplomatinėmis priemonėmis paveikti priešiškai nusiteikusias valstybes, tokias kaip Irakas, Šiaurės Korėja ir Iranas. Norėdamas atskleisti šių valstybių agresyvumą ir išryškinti jų keliamą pavojų pasauliui, George'as W. Bushas pavartojo politinę metaforą „blogio ašis“, kuri sukėlė pasaulyje daug diskusijų (Bush, State of the Union Address, 2002, pp. 4-5). Šiame magistro darbe mėginama palyginti įvairius mokslinius požiūrius, todėl vienodai sutelkiamas dėmesys į visus tris Busho doktrinos elementus: 1) preempciją ir prevenciją (preemption and prevention),

6 2) unilateralizmą (unilateralism) ir 3) demokratijos skleidimą (the spread of democracy).

Nors, kalbant apie Busho doktriną, terminai „preempcija“ ir „prevencija“ dažnai vartojami kaip sinonimai, tarp jų egzistuoja esminis skirtumas. Preemptyvinės karinės atakos dažniausiai vykdomos tik turint pakankamai įrodymų, kad atakuojamos valstybės grėsmė iš tiesų egzistuoja. Tuo tarpu prevencinis karas paprastai pradedamas, remiantis vien tik tvirtu įsitikinimu, kad priešiškos valstybės grėsmė yra reali ir neišvengiama, todėl būtina ją eliminuoti, smogiant iš anksto. Deramas dėmesys šioms subtilioms, tačiau reikšmingoms politinėms detalėms leidžia aiškiau suvokti Busho doktrinos esmę ir atskleisti tuos milžiniškus pokyčius, kurie įvyko Amerikos politikoje ir visuomenėje per pastaruosius aštuonerius metus. Antrojoje magistro darbo dalyje daugiausia dėmesio skiriama George'o W. Busho lyderystės ypatybėms. Remiantis Stephen'o Skowronek'o sukurta tipologija, sistemingai analizuojamas prezidento, kaip lyderio, vaidmuo. Aiškindamas savosios tipologijos svarbiausius principus, Stephen'as Skowronek'as siūlo visus Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų prezidentus priskirti keturiems skirtingiems tipams. Vadovaujantis šia sistema, kiekvienas prezidentas yra susiejamas su artikuliacijos politika (politics of articulation), rekonstrukcijos politika (politics of reconstruction), disjunkcijos politika (politics of disjunction) ir preempcijos politika (politics of preemption). Mokslininko mėginimas suskirstyti visus JAV vadovus į šias kategorijas, nepaisant skirtingų laikotarpių ir svarių istorinių aplinkybių, suteikia galimybę naujai pažvelgti į įvairių prezidentų vadovavimo stilių ir suprasti konkrečių asmenybių svarbą, susidūrus su valstybės valdymo iššūkiais. Norint deramai įvertinti George'o W. Busho lyderystę pagal šią tipologiją, derėtų susieti jo asmenį su artikuliacijos politika, kuri, savo ruožtu, yra neatskiriama nuo ortodoksinio inovatoriaus sąvokos. Iš esmės, Stephen'as Skowronek'as išskiria dvi ortodoksinių inovatorių kartas. Galima teigti, kad George'as H. W. Bushas priklauso pirmajai ortodoksinių inovatorių kartai, nes jis nepateikė originalių politinių sprendimų ar ideologinių naujovių ir vadovavo Jungtinėms Amerikos Valstijoms ištikimai sekdamas Ronald'o Reagano prerogatyvomis ir svarbiausiais principais. Tuo tarpu, jo sūnus George'as W. Bushas priklauso jau antrajai ortodoksinių inovatorių kartai. Keturiasdešimt trečiasis JAV prezidentas, skirtingai nuo savo tėvo, nestokojo asmeninės iniciatyvos, todėl mėgino sujungti konservatyviąją ideologiją su dabarties iššūkiais ir savąja lyderystės vizija. Galima išskirti penkis ortodoksinių inovatorių kriterijus: 1.) ideologinių nuostatų derinimas su naująja praktika, 2) polinkis nepaisyti netikėtų įvykių ir nesugebėjimas greitai prisitaikyti prie besikeičiančios

7 tikrovės, 3) greitas įsitraukimas į politinę konfrontaciją bei karinius veiksmus, 4) mėginimai sustabdyti arba bent jau sumažinti valdančiojo režimo skilimą, kad jis taptų patrauklesnis visuomenei, 5) menka galimybė būti perrinktam prezidento rinkimuose. Analizuojant George'o W. Busho lyderystės stilių ir atsižvelgiant į pirmuosius ketverius jo vadovavimo metus, galima daryti išvadą, kad šis prezidentas tuo laikotarpiu iš tiesų galėjo būti vadinamas ortodoksiniu inovatoriumi. Jis atitiko net keturis iš penkių nurodytų kriterijų, būdingų tokiai kategorijai priklausančiam lyderiui (Smulkiau trečiojoje magistro darbo dalyje). Pažymėtina, kad antrosios kadencijos metu George'o W. Busho vadovavimo stilius pasikeitė ir tapo glaudžiai susijęs su disjunkcijos politika. Šiam tipui priklausantys lyderiai privalo atitikti šiuos keturis kriterijus: 1) nesugebėjimas atsiriboti nuo valdančiojo respublikonų režimo klaidų ir pasiūlyti galimų alternatyvų, 2) nuolat pasikartojančios nesėkmės, siekiant inicijuoti vidines valdančiojo režimo reformas, 3) prezidento patikimumo smukimas ir jo valdžios sumenkėjimas dėl valdančiojo režimo erozijos, 4) prezidento pasmerkimas, sukeliantis politinę vienatvę.

Nepajėgumas išlaikyti didesnio atstumo nuo konservatyviojo valdančiojo režimo antrosios kadencijos metu bei naujų ir efektyvių politinių sprendimų trūkumas rodo, kad George'as W. Bushas palaipsniui tapo disjunktyviu lyderiu, atitinkančiu visus aukščiau išvardintus kriterijus. Daugelio politologų ir paprastų amerikiečių akyse šio prezidento asmuo taip ir liko neatskiriamas nuo karinių, strateginių, politinių ir ekonominių respublikonų klaidų. Tai sąlygojo tolydžio mažėjantį buvusiojo JAV vadovo populiarumą. George'o W. Busho pastangos sustabdyti arba bent sumažinti vidinius nesutarimus Respublikonų partijoje nedavė reikiamų rezultatų. Įtemptą padėtį dar labiau apsunkino pasitikėjimo krizė, kurią sukėlė skandalai dėl kankinimų Gvantanamo sulaikymo centre ir Abu Graibo kalėjime, nepakankamos pastangos likviduoti uragano „Katrina“ pasekmes ir ekonominės problemos. Be to, paskutiniųjų rinkimų metu abu kandidatai John'as McCain'as ir Barrack'as H. Obama stengėsi, kiek įmanoma, smarkiau kritikuoti George'ą W. Bushą, kad laimėtų nusivylusių rinkėjų palankumą. Šios transformacijos liudija, kad jo prezidentinė lyderystė labai įvairialypė ir teoriniu, ir praktiniu požiūriu. Trečiojoje magistro darbo dalyje ypatingas dėmesys skiriamas George'o W. Busho prezidentavimui ir jo užsienio politikos nagrinėjimui, atsižvelgiant į Amerikos galią ir jos pokyčius. Busho doktrina ir jos praktinis taikymas Irake atgaivino ginčus dėl Amerikos galios

8 teigiamos ir neigiamos įtakos pasauliui. Viena vertus, Jungtinės Amerikos valstijos yra dažnai lyginamos su Romos ir Britų imperijomis. Kita vertus, egzistuoja požiūris, kad JAV yra vienintelė šiuolaikinė supergalybė, kuriai negali prilygti nei jokios kitos valstybės, nei jokie ankstesni imperiniai dariniai. Amerikos visuomenė ir politinis elitas jautriai reaguoja į tokius vertinimus dėl trijų toliau pateiktų priežasčių. Pirma, JAV armijos vykdomos karinės operacijos, daugelio amerikiečių požiūriu, yra ne kas kita, bet laisvės ir demokratijos skleidimas, bandymai palaikyti taiką ir aktyvios pastangos atlikti būtinus atkūrimo darbus konfliktų zonose. Antra, kaltinimai imperinėmis užmačiomis Amerikos politinio elito atstovams atrodo nepagrįsti ir dažnai yra atmetami, tvirtinant, jog pačios Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos patyrė britų kolonizaciją ir todėl nesiekia vykdyti imperinės politikos. Trečia, pastabos dėl Amerikos imperializmo neretai paneigiamos, susiejant jas su marksizmo ideologija ir pasenusia sovietine propaganda. Remiantis Michael'io Ignatieff'o, Abdelwahab'o El-Affendi ir Niall'o Ferguson'o teiginiais ir praktinių politinių sprendimų pavyzdžiais bei Europos valstybių, Kinijos ir Rusijos reakcijomis, įrodoma, kad, nepaisant prieštaravimų, Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos dažnai yra laikomos nemėgstama, tačiau vis dar reikalinga šiuolaikine imperija. Šiame darbe taip pat analizuojamas sudėtingas kietosios ir švelniosios galių santykis George'o W. Busho prezidentavimo metu. Teorinį analizės pagrindą sudaro Joseph'o S. Nye svarstymai apie minėtas dvi galios rūšis. George'o W. Busho administracija buvo dažnai kaltinama, kad vykdydama savo užsienio politiką, pernelyg pasikliovė kietąja Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų galia. Tokia strategija pakenkė šalies reputacijai tarptautiniu mastu, o antiamerikietiškos nuotaikos smarkiai sustiprėjo Europoje ir Artimuosiuose Rytuose. Šiam procesui lemiamos įtakos turėjo sudėtingi nesutarimai su Jungtinių Tautų Organizacija dėl invazijos į Iraką. Taip pat JAV prestižą sumenkino nepakankamos pastangos atkurti taiką ir gerovę Afganistane, aktyviau kovojant su Talibanu. Dar vienas negatyvus veiksnys buvo nesėkmingi diplomatiniai žingsniai, siekiant, kad Teheranas atsisakytų savo branduolinių ambicijų. Be to, tarptautinį Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų patikimumą pakirto ir Ženevos konvencijų netaikymas įtariamiems priešiškiems kovotojams bei fizinių apklausos metodų naudojimas Abu Graibo kalėjime ir Gvantanamo sulaikymo centre. Atsisakydama siekti politinių kompromisų tarptautiniame lygmenyje, George'o W. Busho administracija dar labiau sumažino Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų švelniąją galią. Pastaruosiuose JAV prezidento rinkimuose Amerikos visuomenė nusisuko nuo Respublikonų partijos ir palaikė Demokratų partijos kandidatą Barrack'ą H. Obamą. Savo inauguracinėje kalboje jis pabrėžė būtinybę keisti JAV užsienio ir vidaus politiką. Svarbiausi naujojo prezidento tikslai yra spartus armijos išvedimas iš Irako, padėties Afganistane

9 stabilizavimas, reformos, esant pasaulinei ekonominei krizei, ir branduolinio nusiginklavimo skatinimas. Gamtos apsaugos srityje taip pat žadamos sparčios reformos, nes George'as W. Bushas buvo griežtai atsisakęs pasirašyti Kijoto protokolą. Šiuo metu Jungtinėse Amerikos Valstijose daug kalbama apie pokyčius ir naujus politinius sprendimus, tačiau pirmieji Barrack'o H. Obamos žingsniai liudija, kad jam bus gana sunku visiškai atsiriboti nuo savo pirmtako politinio palikimo. Žinoma, pokyčiai yra neišvengiami, bet tuo pačiu metu politikoje privalu išlaikyti tam tikrą tęstinumą, vengiant nereikalingų politinių sukrėtimų savo valstybėje ir pasaulyje. Šiame darbe siekiama įvairiapusiškiau pažvelgti į George'o W. Busho epochą, tačiau istorikų ir politologų dar laukia ilgas tiriamasis darbas. Pavyzdžiui, esminius George'o W. Busho ir Barrack'o H. Obamos politikos skirtumus bei panašumus bus galima deramai įvertinti tik po kelerių metų. Diskusijos apie galimą Amerikos galios smukimą taip pat dar nėra užbaigtos. Galima tik pastebėti, jog Barrack'as H. Obama daugiau naudojasi Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų švelniąja galia. Tuo tarpu keturiasdešimt trečiojo Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų prezidento George'o W. Busho doktriną ir jo politinius žingsnius galutinai įvertins istorija.

10 INTRODUCTION

George W. Bush's presidency has evoked much interest in academic circles, yet political scientists and observers still argue about the impact of this political era. Analyzing his presidential legacy, it is impossible to avoid discussions about the Bush doctrine and its impact on American power. Besides, the leadership style of the forty-third president of the United States leaves nobody indifferent. The idea to examine this controversial question and discuss its meaning to the presidential leadership and American power derives from the belief that there many contradictions concerning the political heritage of George W. Bush which require a wider analysis. The main elements of the Bush doctrine were presented by the president in his official speeches after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 2001. Scholarly views towards new trends in the American foreign policy during the presidency of George W. Bush range from enthusiastic support to harsh criticism. There are many political scientists and analysts who openly reject the Bush doctrine, including Zbigniew Brzezinski, Andrew J. Bacevich and Arthur M. Schlesinger. They are convinced that all principles, which have been introduced by George W. Bush, increase the willingness of the United States to act unilaterally. When the Bush administration announced its refusal to make a difference between active terrorists in arms and their passive supporters, influential European political observers came to a conclusion that the United States had been “engaged in a dangerous and risky game of global social engineering” (Peter van Ham, 2007, p. 47). However, countries of Eastern and Central Europe adopted a much more flexible position towards the Bush doctrine than Western European states, especially Germany and France. Most critics hold the opinion that the United States is not superior to any other sovereign state. Thus, it must obtain an international permission from the U.N. to undertake military action. The Bush doctrine has often been associated with America's attempts to ignore the traditional attitude towards the war as a military campaign that should be conducted out of necessity and merely in self-defense. Preemptive action has been considered to violate legal standards and restrictions for the warfare of the international community. Arthur M. Schlesinger, for instance, notes that “Americans favor greater involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, favor a standing UN peace force, even favor increased spending on foreign economic aid” but people's opinions have been completely ignored by the aides of George W. Bush (Schlesinger, 2005, p. 17). In addition, much critique has come to light due to frequent assertions of American officials that other countries will never be permitted to develop military capabilities equal to these of the United States in order to prevent the emergence of other potential adversaries. These aspirations of George W. Bush have been strongly condemned by China and Russia. These

11 influential countries promote the model of the multipolar world that would include several major powers operating on equal grounds. Supporters of the Bush doctrine such as Charles Krauthammer, Robert Kagan and Robert G. Kaufman repetitively emphasized the process of global democratization as the most important objective for American foreign policy. It was believed that the promotion of the Western model of governance would undoubtedly help the United States to defeat terrorism which had affected New York and Washington as well as major European capitals, including London and Madrid. According to Charles Krauthammer, the analysis of the Bush doctrine should not be limited only to preemption because this concept is inseparable from “the idea that the fundamental mission of American foreign policy is to spread democracy throughout the world” (Krauthammer, 2008, p. 2). The Afghan campaign as well as the war in Iraq have frequently been justified by the necessity to create new patterns of democracy which would be attractive to the Arab world. Besides, the administration of George W. Bush has made the security of the United States their absolute priority. In their opinion, the sovereignty of other countries might be breached if the direct intervention of the U.S. anywhere in the world would eliminate terrorist threats or neutralize hostile dictatorships. It was believed that the removal of dictators could justify the use of military force because oppressed people should be given a chance to experience freedom and democratic achievements. It should be remembered, however, that “the natural right to be free” cannot be exercised successfully without developing “the capacity to be free” (Kesler, 2005, p. 2; italics in the original). It usually takes much more time for post-dictatorial Islamic societies like these in Iraq and Afghanistan to adapt to a new reality. The presidency of George W. Bush not only transformed the foreign policy of the United States but contributed to the erosion of the conservative regime inside the country. Therefore it is essential to examine his leadership style on the basis of Stephen Skowronek's typology. The analysis is focused on the evaluation of George W. Bush's presidency in terms of orthodox innovation. Much attention is paid to a gradual transfer of his leadership from the politics of articulation to the politics of disjunction. In order to ensure a more systematic analysis of George W. Bush's leadership style, certain actions of the president must be explained by applying a theoretical framework and practical observations alike. The question of American power is also included into the thesis as an indispensable supplement to the analysis of the Bush doctrine and its consequences. At present, the main challenge to the United States is to get rid of the negative image of the so-called contemporary empire and develop innovative strategies which would decrease its reliance on the hard power and encourage the application of the soft power. Wishing to understand the roots of this problem in a

12 wider context, it is necessary to analyze major mistakes of the Bush administration in the Middle East and discuss international reactions to them. There are, of course, many ways to achieve the balance between two types of power and the newly-elected president of the United States Barrack H. Obama is currently trying to shape his own doctrine to make the U.S. more attractive to the rest of the world. Obama's approach seems to be different from that of George W. Bush in many respects. For instance, international consultations with twenty leading countries of the world on economic issues at the London summit of 2009 are given preference to unilateral decisions. His leadership style is shaped by restraint rather than decisive steps. However, it might be difficult for Barrack H. Obama to distance himself from the Bush doctrine as much as he would like to because the situation in the Middle East is extremely troubling and the Al-Qaeda network still constitutes a serious threat to the U.S. and the European Union.

The Objectives of the Thesis The research problem of this thesis is focused on the analysis of the Bush doctrine and its influence on the presidential leadership of George W. Bush and American power. There are four major objectives to be attained in this paper: a) to examine the elements of the doctrine in a broader political context and explore the damaging consequences of the 9/11 attacks to the American society and the political climate inside the U.S. after this tragic event; b) to discuss the leadership of George W. Bush in relation to orthodox innovation and investigate the shift of his leadership from the politics of articulation to the politics of disjunction; c) to analyze in what ways George W. Bush's political mistakes relate to imperial ambitions of the United States and affect the lack of the balance between hard and soft power of the U.S.; d) to indicate what political challenges are likely to remain important for the United States after the Bush era.

Methodological Approaches This thesis is written combining comparative, analytic and descriptive approaches that merge into one harmonious whole. The comparative approach is particularly useful for the discussion of different attitudes towards the Bush doctrine. It also assists in understanding different positions of American, French and German leaders. Making comparisons, one can also perceive major blunders of the Bush administration in the Middle East more rapidly.

13 The analytic approach is needed to examine the presidential leadership of George W. Bush more systematically. It also enables to analyze presidential speeches and other important documents, including the National Security Strategy of 2002. Separate elements of the Bush doctrine, the question of American power and its future perspectives after the election of Barrack H. Obama also require an extensive analysis. The descriptive approach is instrumental to present a theoretical model of orthodox innovation. The clarity of explanation of important concepts such as soft and hard power of the United States or the American empire also depends on the accuracy of description.

The Overview of Literary Sources Analysing the Bush doctrine and different aspects of the presidency as well as the foreign policy of the United States during the last eight years, various sources of information have been used. These include scholarly books and articles, publications, presidential speeches, official addresses, and available documents. Although George W. Bush has recently left presidential office, his political legacy attracts much attention. Books provide much valuable information. They are written by such prominent authors as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert G. Kaufman, Timothy J. Lynch, Robert S. Singh and Scott A. Silverstone. Theoretical considerations about the presidency of George W. Bush are thoroughly presented in the academic works of Stephen Skowronek. Most of the books used in this thesis appeared during the period of the last three years (2007-2009). Additional pieces of information have also been found in numerous scientific publications and collections of scholarly articles. The most valuable journals have been the following: Foreign Affairs and The National Interest. Many interesting interpretations about the legacy of George W. Bush have also been presented in the leading American newspapers and magazines such as Time, The Washington Post and The Atlantic Monthly Presidential speeches, addresses of various political leaders and necessary official documents have been found on different governmental websites. All of them are included into the list of references at the very end of this thesis. Much interesting material was collected during five months of intensive studies at the University of Bergen (Norway), in 2008. The assistance of professor Gunnar Grendstad and his remarks on the presidential leadership and the Bush doctrine were helpful as well. I am also thankful to my supervisor professor Leonidas Donskis for his assistance and understanding.

The Structure of the Thesis This thesis consists of two summaries in English and Lithuanian, the introduction, three

14 major parts, the conclusion and two appendices. The first part of it is devoted to the extensive analysis of the Bush doctrine. It presents numerous arguments that explain its development. This complex process of change in the foreign policy of the United States is investigated in a broad international context. It is aimed to reveal the essential constituents of the Bush doctrine as objectively as possible in order not to get caught into a swampland of empty manipulations. Special attention is paid to the shocking aftermath of the 9/11 attacks as well. The second part of this thesis argues that George W. Bush has changed his type of presidency during eight years in office. The analysis is based on Stephen Skowronek's theoretical observations about orthodox innovation and the typology of the presidential leadership. This approach is useful since it provides alternative means to evaluate George W. Bush's presidency in relation to the politics of articulation and the politics of disjunction. The main two challenges have been to test if the president meets the criteria for orthodox innovators and if his later policies can be termed disjunctive. Interestingly, George W. Bush seems to be the president who has managed to fit into both types of leadership. These transformations also reveal that George W. Bush has experienced many political challenges, including the tremendous loss of popularity. Some of these difficulties are closely interconnected with repetitive endeavors to implement the Bush doctrine into practice and a hostile political reaction to military failures in Afghanistan and Iraq. The third part of the of the thesis analyzes the impact of the presidency of George W. Bush and his controversial foreign policy on American power. Different attitudes towards the role of the U.S as it is seen in Russia, China as well as in Western and Eastern Europe are also compared. Considerable attention is paid to the much debated concept of the American empire as well as to Joseph S. Nye's ideas about soft and hard power.

1. THE BUSH DOCTRINE: BETWEEN SECURITY, DOMINANCE AND DEMOCRACY

The Bush doctrine is quite a controversial concept which continues to provoke heated discussions among numerous diplomats, international security professionals and politicians. Quite frequently one might feel tempted to analyze George W. Bush's foreign and security policies on the basis of principles which have been developed by different schools of political thought. There is a strong argument among leading scholars which political theory might be more successfully employed as a tool for the analysis of the Bush doctrine. According to Mary Kaldor, this concept cannot be separated from the tenets of idealism since the members of the Bush administration have been inclined to initiate “a powerful moral crusade” and especially eager “to convert the rest of the

15 world to the American dream and to rid the world of terrorists and tyrants” (Kaldor, 2004, pp. 195-196). At the same time, there is a widespread belief among some political scientists that the examination of the Bush doctrine and its practical usage should be at least partly connected with theoretical patterns which have been introduced by the proponents of realism. Tymothy J. Lynch and Robert S. Singh, for instance, point out that during the second presidential term George W. Bush's position has shifted much closer to “the mix of realism and idealism” and indicate that his doctrine to some extent relates “a belief in Wilsonian ideals to a conviction in realist means” (Lynch and Singh, 2008, p. 271). Besides, there have been some attempts to examine the doctrine from the neo-realist perspective. This approach, according to James Kurth, not only allows to scrutinize certain political steps of the forty-third president but helps to trace “analogies with some of the United States’ Cold War strategies” and puts a special emphasis on “splitting strategies” that have been employed “to divide and diminish the global Islamist threat” (Kurth, 2005, p. 644). However, there also exist some opposing opinions among the proponents of neo- realism concerning George W. Bush's legacy. It should be noted that some of them remain “critical of the Bush strategy because they do not think it is in the US national interest” while others tend to justify the doctrine “on geopolitical grounds” (Kaldor, 2004, p. 200). Obviously, much more time and effort is still necessary in order to indicate which school of thought has managed to grasp the essential features of the Bush era better and theorize about them in more depth. In this thesis the Bush doctrine is analysed on the basis of innovative ideas developed by such outstanding scholars as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Michael Ignatieff, Robert Kagan, Robert G. Kaufman, Charles Krauthammer, Timothy J. Lynch, Joseph S. Nye, Robert S. Singh, Stephen Skowronek and many others. The variety of attitudes towards the presidency of George W. Bush and its outcomes allows to evaluate the Bush doctrine in a broader context. Insightful arguments of Arab, Chinese and Russian scholars, including Abdelwahab El-Affendi, Zhiyuan Cui, Jing- dong Yuan and Alexander Zhebin show that the Bush doctrine has influenced the contemporary understanding of international relations in various countries. Having in mind that the United States still occupies the dominant position in the world and the presidency of George W. Bush has recently come to an end, it is important to examine and evaluate his doctrine and leadership style as well as the question of American power. Such an analysis is significant and beneficial because it helps to find out why the United States has lost much of its credibility on the international arena, perceive for what reasons the forty-third president has ended up being highly unpopular abroad as well as in his own country and explore his major political failures and successes. As becomes evident from recent developments, it might be difficult for Barrack H. Obama to distance himself completely from the political legacy of his

16 predecessor despite strong attempts to initiate large-scale political and diplomatic changes. It should be emphasized that there is no universal definition of the Bush doctrine which would be completely acceptable to all academicians. In fact, the scholarly analysis of this concept is far from being complete. Numerous viewpoints and opinions happen to be really useful in this case since they reveal some additional aspects of the doctrine. Besides, there exist many disagreements in relation to its theoretical foundations and practical application. Some influential scholars believe that the Bush doctrine is nothing more than “the tilt towards unilateral action and strengthening American primacy” but at the same time they seem to agree that “the essential features of the Doctrine will probably remain in place as loadstars of American policy” (Singh, 2006, p. 12-13). Other analysts, on the contrary, openly express their support for the ideas of the forty-third president as sufficiently effective and highly necessary in the face of terror attacks on American soil and political challenges on the international arena. Despite serious military failures, political miscalculations and diplomatic faux pas, some scholars tend to reject multi-voiced critique and boldly claim that “the next president will employ elements of the Bush Doctrine, if for no other reason than this: it has succeeded at protecting the U.S. homeland” (Dowd, 2008, p. 3). Besides, there is a third group of prominent political scientists and observers who either claim that the Bush doctrine is not functional or, at worst, hold the opinion that George W. Bush's principles in the realm of foreign policy can hardly be called a well-defined doctrine. For instance, Philip H. Gordon openly supports the idea about the complete decadence of the Bush doctrine and points out that even “if the rhetoric of the Bush revolution lives on, the revolution itself is over” (Gordon, 2006, p. 75). This position puts an emphasis on the absolute necessity for the next presidential administration to formulate new preferences and prerogatives in order to renew America's role in the world. Meanwhile another important scholar, John G. Ikenberry, who has also analyzed the Bush doctrine from the historical perspective, aims to prove that George W. Bush's approach to foreign affairs can merely be defined as “a neoimperial vision in which the United States arrogates to itself the global role of setting standards, determining threats, using force, and meting out justice” (Ikenberry, 2002, p. 44). In order to examine these diverse opinions in more depth, it is necessary to discuss the essential elements of the Bush doctrine relating them to security problems, indicating challenges to the American dominance after the Cold War, and putting a special emphasis on the long lasting commitment of the United States to encourage the spread of democracy all over the world. Wishing to maintain a high degree of objectivity in this thesis, the term “Bush doctrine” will be employed neutrally without any negative or positive connotations.

17 1.1. Political Background of the Bush Doctrine After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States of America emerged as the center of the new political universe due to its economic potential, military strength and political supremacy. John G. Ikenberry aptly explains the situation stating that “[t]he United States began the 1990's as the world's only superpower and its advantages continued to grow through the decade”(Ikenberry, 2004, p. 83). Clearly, other countries and nations, including democracies and dictatorships, simply had no other choice but to accept the new reality. Political leaders all over the world could either love or hate the American dominance but they were unable to ignore or challenge this obvious fact. Interestingly, a sharp decline in American power, credibility and status took place namely during the presidency of George W. Bush (2000-2008). In fact, the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington can serve as a mark indicating the exact moment when the American supremacy in the realms of politics and economics started to falter. At that time questions about changing political circumstances and dramatic challenges to the United States of America became especially significant. For this reason, the president made a decision to review the main principles of the national security and affirm America's readiness to defend its “democratic values and way of life” (NSS, 2002, p. 7). His resolute approach to foreign policy of the U.S. and personal eagerness to protect vital interests of his country at any cost have been widely debated to the present day. Wishing to explain major political and societal factors influencing the so-called Bush doctrine and its outcomes in more detail, it is necessary to focus on two major challenges which have left an ineradicable mark on the American political and societal landscape: the event of 9/11 and the refusal of the United Nations Security Council to authorize the incursion of the U.S. army into Iraq. The evolution of the transatlantic cooperation among the United States and its European allies also merits considerable attention. The first subsection of this chapter is devoted to the analysis of the damaging effects of 9/11 to the American society and its political perspectives. The second subsection examines changing relationships between the United States and its allies in Western Europe after the terrorist attacks. A special focus is placed on unexpected tensions between the U.S. and the U.N., the urgent need to revise the role of NATO and controversial reactions to the Iraqi campaign in France and Germany.

1.1.1. Political and Societal Consequences of 9/11 The damage done to the United States by the terrorists of the Al-Qaeda network happened to be extremely extensive. At present, it is possible to distinguish four major consequences of this tragic

18 event that can be easily traced back in political and societal spheres. All of them permeated the American society while the Bush administration was challenged by the necessity to develop new responses and propose innovative patterns of behavior in the political arena. The obvious vulnerability of the United States is the first consequence of the 9/11 assaults. The destruction of the World Trade Center and the plane crash into the Pentagon suddenly made the entire world understand that “the United States was vulnerable” (Renshon, 2007, p. 1). It should be noted that these two institutions operating in Washington and New York have always been regarded as eloquent symbols of the American military might and financial strength. Therefore many political scientists and sociologists have become involved in making guesses if these dramatic events should be regarded as symptoms of the weakening of the most powerful country in the contemporary world. A great variety of pessimistic and optimistic views toward the prospects of the United States and its dominance has been offered. Michael Cox, for example, compares the political situation in the United States after 9/11 to the decadence of the Roman Empire and states that this dramatic parallel might be useful to define “America in an age of pre- emption” (Cox, 2007, p. 2). From this perspective, Islamic terrorists might be called postmodern barbarians who have the potential to accelerate the emergence of the new international order. Meanwhile, Robert Kagan remains more optimistic and firmly convinced that “American predominance does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world” (Kagan, 2008, p. 41). This attitude is based on the conviction that the United States should retain its current status as a superpower and succeed in protecting democratic values. Any other scenario, in the opinion of George W. Bush's supporters, might imply that the entire Western civilization is doomed to succumb to terrorist threats and eventually fall into decay. The intimidation of the American society can be called the second consequence of 9/11. In fact, the inhabitants of the United States experienced a national psychological trauma of alarming proportions because nobody could feel secure anymore. The sense of fear and helplessness was extremely strong due to people's apprehensions that “they were personally vulnerable at home and at work, as well as abroad” (Renshon, 2007, p. 1). Millions of Americans suddenly realized that the menace of terrorism had already transgressed all limits to enter straight into the heart of their homeland. Consequently, the focus of attention suddenly shifted to “the process of securing the nation against further terrorist attacks” (Cox, 2004, p. 44). All subsequent political decisions and diplomatic moves have been framed in terms of potential terrorist assaults. Many additional security measures have been introduced inside the country and the level of secrecy has risen. However, those individuals who experienced a personal loss of their relatives and friends might not be able to recover from the shock to the full. Many of them tend to separate their lives into

19 two parts: before and after 9/11. Other people quickly managed to suppress their fears in order to sustain their usual lifestyles. But their innocent faith that the United States is immune to all dangers due to its impressive military power has been shattered. According to Michael Cox, “there are some deeply worrying signs” which explicitly show that “the American state becomes [...] more intrusive, and many of its people less and less tolerant” (Cox, 2004, p. 44). This change might be very pernicious to the overall development of the U.S. and affect its role as the only superpower of the contemporary world in a very negative way. The overwhelming trust in George W. Bush as a protector of the nation in the aftermath of the attacks makes the third consequence of 9/11. Wishing to demonstrate clear signs of national unity, the American society offered unconditional support for their Commander-in-Chief. Just two days after the event, the Washington Post and ABC News conducted a poll, which revealed that 91 percent of respondents supported the president's endeavors to give an adequate response to terrorist acts. (The table containing polling results is presented in Appendix I.) This huge surge in popularity allowed George W. Bush to achieve several important objectives at a time. Firstly, he managed to avoid extensive critique because his opponents were afraid to appear unpatriotic in the eyes of the American public. Secondly, he distanced himself from the presidential heritage of his father George Herbert Walker Bush. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the newly-elected president “subsequently confirmed in various comments that for him 9/11 was a call to a special mission, a personal epiphany with touches of a divine vocation” (Brzezinski, 2007, p. 142). Due to the impressive support, the president could also enjoy more freedom of action and incorporate many controversial concepts such as preemption into the National Security Strategy of 2002. Besides, the presidential administration took an advantage of the situation and immediately pushed the United States into “a new era of asymmetrical warfare against an enemy bent on the abolition of Western culture and willing to do anything to realize that objective” (Mantho, 2004, p. 10). Consequently, a much-debated approach of George W. Bush related to dealing with potential terrorist threats and other challenges came into existence. At present, it is widely known as the Bush doctrine. To make extensive military campaigns and preemptive action more acceptable to the American people, George W. Bush had to demonstrate the necessity to make quick decisions. Therefore the tragedy of 9/11 was exploited by the president as an excuse either to initiate the large-sale warfare beyond the borders of the United States or to expand military operations if need be. According to Michael Cox, this pattern of behavior stems from “a very long American tradition of genuine crises being tapped to serve a wider foreign policy purpose” (Cox, 2004, p. 32). There is no doubt that the assaults of September 11 served as an excellent pretext for the

20 United States to confront its adversaries much more aggressively. In 2002, making a State of the Union address, George W. Bush indicated that Iran, Iraq and North Korea have the necessary potential to inflict “a grave and growing danger” upon the United States (Bush, State of the Union Address, 2002, p. 5). In that speech quite a strong emphasis was put on the obligation to get rid of all threats and most people understood this message as a warning that terrorist attacks might happen again. The only means to prevent that from happening, in the president's opinion, was “to eliminate the terrorist parasites” and break “an axis of evil aiming to threaten the peace of the world” (Bush, State of the Union Address, 2002, pp. 4-5). This speech revealed that the United States is going to use its hard power and soft power unilaterally in order to protect its safety. In fact, the unprecedented display of military capabilities during two campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq combined with strong diplomatic pressure on North Korea and Iran makes the fourth consequence of 9/11. All above-mentioned consequences add valuable insights to the analysis of the Bush doctrine. They are truly helpful if one really wishes to perceive those huge changes that took place in the American society during the last eight years. They also provide a wider context to the presidency of George W. Bush and its political outcomes to the United States. These consequences also assist in understanding why George W. Bush's foreign policy continues to provoke so many disputes in the scholarly world as well as in the popular media.

1.1.2. The European Dilemma and Troubles with the United Nations Although the international community was quick to express its support for the United States immediately after 9/11, the situation started to alter due to subsequent wars and strong waves of insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, the initial support of traditional allies to the United States can easily be proved by the fact that “just over 24 hours after the terrorist attacks on the United States, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked the treaty’s mutual defence guarantee for the first time in the alliance’s 52 years” (Gordon, 2002, p. 2). At that dramatic moment the leaders of major European countries wanted to demonstrate clear signs of the transatlantic unity with the United States. The situation was truly exceptional because nobody had ever predicted that the strongest ally of the North Alliance Treaty Organization would be under attack. It has been expected that NATO members will take the advantage of this extraordinary situation by revising the role of the alliance after the Cold War period. As Ronald D. Asmus points out, “NATO's narrow and military-focused framework” has no longer been sufficient to confront “the new reality” (Asmus, 2005, p. 99). In order to protect themselves against terrorism, European

21 and American partners have frequently been encouraged to set new objectives and develop innovative programs of their common action. Closer ties between the United States and the European Union were presented by political scientists as a possible solution to a problem of global terror. The allies were anticipated to create “a magnetic pole” which would inspire and “attract other countries and regions to coalesce around a common view” (Asmus, 2005, 99). In other words, intensive processes of globalisation were expected to eventually settle major issues on the international level as well as renew the alliance from within. Another challenge was to develop such a flexible cooperation strategy which would meet the basic interests of all partners living on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Talking about the prospects of close and effective cooperation among NATO allies, Frank J. Ciluffo and Daniel Rankin have indicated that “new threats are by their nature dynamic, amorphous and moving targets” and for this reason the only way to eliminate them is to use “the world's resources to mount a cohesive global response” (Ciluffo and Rankin, 2001, pp. 12-13). These political commentators believe that neither the United States nor the European Union might secure its safety alone. Initial aspirations to create a long lasting unity appeared to be desirable but hardly attainable. Deep cracks between European and American positions became especially noticeable when the representatives of the United States failed to obtain an official consent of the United Nations Security Council for the military invasion into Iraq. In 2003, making his address to the United Nations Security Council, the U.S. Secretary of State Collin Powell tried to achieve three major objectives. Firstly, he sought to demonstrate the firm resolve of the Iraqi dictatorial regime and its supporters to accumulate large quantities of chemical and biological weapons and use them against potential enemies. This argument was made on the basis of the belief that “Saddam Hussein's use of mustard and nerve gas against the Kurds in 1988” had just been a beginning and that it should be regarded by the international community as a dangerous precedent (Powell, 2003, p. 15). Consequently, the possibility of other chemical or biological attacks in Iraq as well as outside its territory was expected to be swiftly eliminated. Secondly, Collin Powell concentrated on Iraq's ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons of mass destruction. After making a detailed presentation, which, had been based on the analysis of the intelligence data, he came to a disturbing conclusion: Saddam Hussein already possesses two out of the three key components needed to build a nuclear bomb. He has a cadre of nuclear scientists with the expertise, and he has a bomb design. Since 1998, his efforts to reconstitute his nuclear program have been focused on acquiring the third and last component, sufficient fissile material to produce a nuclear explosion. To make the fissile material, he needs to develop an ability to enrich uranium. (Powell, 2003, p. 10)

22 Having in mind that the United Nations had previously endeavored to prevent the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein from developing a nuclear capacity, this argument seemed particularly important at the time. It should be noted that numerous U.N. inspections, strict economic sanctions as well as the Resolution 1441 achieved little progress if any. No breakthrough took place due to repetitive attempts of the Hussein regime either to mislead the international community or to reject all possibilities of fruitful cooperation. Therefore the representatives of the United States believed that the military invasion into Iraq was the only way out of the political impasse. According to Stephen Ryan, the Bush administration was eager to demonstrate that by taking up the task to overthrow the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein “it was saving the UN from the consequences of its own inaction” (Ryan, 2006, p. 179). Thirdly, Collin Powell paid special attention to the linkage between the dictatorial regime and leading members of Al-Qaeda. He even predicted that this relationship might gradually transform into “the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al Qaida terrorist network” which would most probably include “classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder” (Powell, 2003, p. 12). Despite complex diplomatic moves, the U.S. Secretary of State failed to convince the United Nations Security Council to authorize military attacks against Iraq. In the end the Bush administration had no other choice but to act on its own and invade Iraq without obtaining a necessary resolution from the United Nations. George W. Bush's decision to start the Iraq campaign without a necessary authorization from the U.N. provoked many disputes about the legitimacy of military actions of the United States. Many critics of the Bush administration held the opinion that the American presence in Iraq was the manifestation of American unilateralism. According to Arthur M. Schlesinger, the operation “Iraqi Freedom” should be regarded as a practical application of the Bush doctrine, which not only openly rejects “the strategy that won the Cold War – the combination of containment and deterrence” but also formulates a completely new approach to foreign affairs by turning a preventive military strike against possible adversaries into “a matter of presidential choice” (Schlesinger, 2005, p. 21). In fact, the president's determination to send American troops to battlefields in Iraq has frequently been justified by the assumption that the regime of Saddam Hussein might possess a great variety of weapons of mass destruction. After some time, the situation of the United States became especially unenviable since no evidence of their existence had ever been found. Strong discord with France over the U.S. policy in the Middle East caused much damage to the transatlantic relationship between two countries. For example, in his speech to the United Nations Security Council the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Dominique de Villepin strongly

23 objected to the American military presence in Iraq in order to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Expressing the French government's disapproval on this matter, he not only exposed bitter disagreements between traditional allies but also argued that “for France war [could] only be the last resort, and collective responsibility, the rule” (Dominique de Villepin, 2003, p 1). Being made on the eve of the U.S. military campaign, this statement demonstrated that the rift between French and American political positions grew quite deep. Analyzing the reasons for the French opposition to the dominance of the United States, Robert G. Kaufman puts an emphasis on “an unsavory combination of envy and delusions of grandeur that undermines France's true national interest” (Kaufman, 2008, pp. 83-84). Truly, many French politicians seem to be in the horns of a fatal dilemma. On the one hand, they often emphasize negative aspects of the unipolar world. On the other hand, they are unable to propose any sound alternatives which would be more or less acceptable to all key players, including the European Union, the United States, Israel, China, Russia and the Arab world. Besides, tensions between France and the U.S. due to different positions concerning the war in Iraq should not be overestimated. The ambiguity of the situation is revealed by the fact that “at the same time France has helped the U.S. in counterterrorism operations and both worked effectively at the UN to pressure Syria to withdraw from Lebanon” (Renshon, 2007, p.10). This pattern of behavior proves that French and American diplomats are very likely to apply double standards and forget their political quarrels in the name of common interests. Other worrisome signals of dissension came from the German Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. He repetitively condemned the war in Iraq as an unnecessary precedent and denied the possibility of the German-U.S. military cooperation at the start of the operation “Iraqi Freedom”. According to Klaus Larres, the tension between Germany and the United States can be explained by the fact that “the German government, as well as many other European administrations, has recognized neither the dramatic depth of the emotional and political upheaval in U.S. politics since the September 11 attacks nor the genuine, popular U.S. concern over vulnerability to international terrorism” (Larres, 2003, p. 34). It should be noted that immediately after the attacks the majority of Americans demanded their president to show a high degree of certainty and resolve. Initially, they concentrated on the war against terror in Afghanistan and regarded it as a necessary evil, which seemed to be indispensable to ensure security inside the country and defend the vital interests of the U.S. After some time, the terrified nation has been easily persuaded that the extension of the warfare into Iraq is necessary to eradicate threats of terrorism and overthrow the potentially hostile regime of Saddam Hussein. German leaders, in the meantime, observed such an unexpected twist of events openly showing their discontent. Yet more, they seemed really

24 worried by the warlike rhetoric of the forty-third president of the United States. However, the application of double standards can also be hard to deny having in mind that “the German Secret Service's information aided the invasion” (Renshon, 2007, p. 11). In fact, these political contradictions manifest that much more additional information is still needed to find out hidden compromises and comprehend their significance to the Iraq War. The troublesome development of events on the international arena at that difficult period might be evaluated in many different ways. After failing to acquire the international mandate for military actions in Iraq, supporters of the Bush administration started blaming their traditional allies as well as numerous opponents for holding excessively anti-American views. Robert Kagan, one of the leading neo-conservative intellectuals, has clearly indicated that the origins of anti- Americanism are related to the incapability of other countries either to compete with the United States on equal grounds or to provide a commonly acceptable solution to the Iraq question: No one should lightly dismiss the current hostility toward the United States. International legitimacy matters. It is important in itself, and it affects others' willingness to work with us. But neither should we be paralyzed by the unavoidable resentments that our power creates. If we refrained from action out of fear that others around the world would be angry with us, then we would never act. (Kagan, 2006 p. 2) This passage reveals that the neo-conservative wing of the Republicans tends to rely on the military and political capabilities of the U.S. to a great extent. Besides, this polemical attitude sheds some more light on George W. Bush's political strategy after the 9/11 attacks. Analyzing Robert Kagan's idea about the need to reject the critique and give preference to unbridled action, it becomes evident that the presidential administration has always been inclined to follow its goals without paying any heed to accusations of unilateralism and imperial ambitions.

1.2. The Development of the Bush Doctrine and its Elements The Bush doctrine has gradually taken shape in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Some initial features of America's changing approach towards the international security system have been first mentioned in a series of George W. Bush's speeches. Later, his suggestions were successfully incorporated into the National Security Strategy of the United States of 2002. In order to present this political phenomenon in its entirety, the first sub-section is devoted to the basics of the doctrine, which can be traced down in George W. Bush's speeches and official addresses. The second sub-section is focused on the analysis of the elements of the Bush doctrine and their scholarly evaluation. 1.2.1. The Basics of the Bush Doctrine Making his first address to the nation after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the

25 president publicly made a solemn pledge to “find those responsible and bring them to justice” without setting apart “the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them” (Bush, 9/11 Address to the Nation, 2001, p. 2). Responding to an unexpected security crisis in the U.S., he expanded the circle of potential suspects by separating them into two interrelated groups, namely, the perpetrators of terrorist attacks and their supporters. This alarming message to the world was quickly perceived as an early signal predicting important changes in the realm of international relations. According to Stanley A. Renshon, “declarations of preference and intent” became an inseparable part of the foreign policy of the United States during the presidency of George W. Bush (Renshon, 2007, p. 4). In fact, such a harsh reaction of the president after 9/11 might be easily explained by the emergency of the situation. However, the decisive position of George W. Bush acquired great importance because “the White House strained [...] to magnify the president's role in shaping an American response” and for this reason he “evidently felt the pressure to appear in charge” (Quirk, 2006, p. 160). At that time, George W. Bush wanted to establish himself as a decisive leader who can offer reliable solutions and defend the vital interests of his country without wavering in his convictions. Although diplomatic, military and economic capabilities of the United States remained unequaled by any other country, George W. Bush realized the absolute necessity to counter the global terrorism. Importantly, his strong commitment to protect America's security was closely connected with the complete dominance of the U.S. on the international level. Speaking to a Joint Session of Congress, the president surprised the international community by establishing a categorical dichotomy: “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress, 2001, p. 4). This huge step towards unilateralism provoked strong fears about the formation of a democratic empire, which might pressurize any sovereign state by using its military and economic powers in an unprecedented way. The scope of attention of George W. Bush suddenly shifted from individuals and groups to nations and entire regions adding a geopolitical dimension to the problem. The situation on the international stage became very serious after George W. Bush's public statement that traditional strategies of containment and deterrence were no longer as effective as they should be. In his address to the West Point graduates, the president indicated that even if “these strategies still apply” the United States might use its indisputable right to “strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world” (Bush, Commencement Address, 2002, p. 2). The rest of the world turned very anxious since nobody could clearly indicate what political actions could result in the preventive use of the American military power. It is worth remembering

26 that during the Cold War era the entire defense system of the United States was mainly focused on the Soviet Union as the one and only equal contender in the nuclear arms race. At that time ordinary American citizens could easily identify their enemy with a particular state. Other countries either had to take sides with one particular superpower or remain neutral and maneuver cautiously between two adversaries. After the assaults of 9/11, the traditional awareness of the national security was altered greatly in the United States. According to Alastair Finlan, these terrorist attacks were “breathtakingly asymmetric” and the Bush administration had to deal with unexpected dangers “stemming not from a nation-state but rather from a small band of transnational terrorists” (Finlan, 2006, p. 150). It became evident that previous foreign policy strategies such as deterrence and containment, could have been helpful to successfully compete with the Soviet Union or the Communist China, but they would no longer be useful for defeating the shapeless Al-Qaeda network. Being aware of the potential danger that terrorists might acquire weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration concentrated on the possibility of turning to the preemptive action or preventive attacks. The difference between the two seems quite difficult to grasp but the complexity of the issue lurks behind seemingly insignificant details. In order to develop a deeper knowledge and avoid subjective interpretations, one should compare two important definitions provided by the Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. The term “preemptive attack” is concisely defined as “[a]n attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent” (DOD Dictionary, 2001, p. 428). This definition implies that preemptive action should be applied as a means to deter the enemy from attacking when a particular threat is clearly identified and confirmed on the basis of available intelligence and military data. The concept of “preventive war” is employed to describe “[a] war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk” (DOD Dictionary, 2001, p. 432). As becomes evident from the definition, a possibility of the actual clash between two adversaries in the nearest future is much less likely. Interestingly, the emphasis in this case is put not on evidence but rather on the assumption that the military confrontation cannot be avoided. Therefore a clear preference is given to a military campaign which would precede any hostile intentions and anticipated actions of the enemy. Explaining the necessity to engage into the warfare against Iraq to the United Nations, George W. Bush clearly stated: Above all, our principles and our security are challenged today by outlaw groups and regimes that accept no law of morality and have no limit to their violent ambitions. In the attacks on America a year ago, we saw the destructive intentions of our enemies. [...] With every step the Iraqi regime takes toward gaining and deploying the most terrible weapons, our own options

27 to confront that regime will narrow. And if an emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to terrorists allies, then the attacks of September 11 would be a prelude to far greater horrors. (Bush, Remarks at the United Nations, 2002, pp. 2-5)

These arguments prove that the idea about the removal of Saddam Hussein and subsequent military operations has stemmed from the Bush administration's predictions of the sombre future. In other words, widespread beliefs that Iraq is likely to acquire nuclear weapons of mass destruction and possibly share them with terrorist groups might have encouraged the political elite of the U.S. to take prompt action. The fact that any proofs about the existence of such weaponry have never been found in Iraq demonstrates the lack of reliable intelligence and concrete evidence and it adds even more controversy to the issue. Therefore the Iraq campaign should be termed preventive, although some elements of preemptive action can also be noticed. Importantly, the prospect of massive and deadly terrorist acts sometimes results in the application of extreme means as a last resort. However, there always exists a political temptation to exploit possible threats as an impulse for strengthening global dominance. Advocates of George W. Bush's foreign policy continue to believe that “[the] post 9/11 world of alliances is complicated” due to economic competition and ideological tensions (Renshon, 2007, p. 11). Numerous critics of the Bush era stand in stark opposition to this attitude and emphasize that the entire world is turning more and more hostile to the U.S. due to the excessive arrogance of American politicians. According to Arthur M. Schlesinger, it is worth remembering that an unnecessary display of dominance provides “no substitute for friends and allies, nor is it a substitute for wisdom” (Schlesinger, 2005, p. 19). The members of the Bush administration have often been blamed for giving preferences to their objectives and paying little attention to the international reputation of the country. In Zbigniew Brzezinski's opinion, the United States was deprived of the “moral standing in the world” due to well-entrenched beliefs of the Bush administration that America should “act on its own, irrespective of the views of its allies” (Brzezinski, 2007, pp. 136 and 147). These opposing attitudes have already sparked fiery debates about the delicate balance between democratic values and unilateral foreign policies. However, it might be complicated to find easy and clear answers which would help to solve this long-lasting problem. 1.2.2. The Elements of the Bush Doctrine and their Evaluation Major aspects of the Bush doctrine were officially discussed in the National Security Strategy, which had been published in 2002. This important document immediately attracted great attention of numerous political scientists who examined it from many perspectives. Sometimes these analyses were strikingly different in their content and dependent on political viewpoints of each

28 particular author. For this reason, no common agreement was reached either on the exact definition of the Bush doctrine, or on the number of its separate constituents. For instance, one of the most prominent Chinese political scientists, Zhiyuan Cui, claims that “[t]he doctrine consists of three basic elements” and persuasively supports his argument by paying special attention to potential preemptive strikes, the spread of democracy all over the world and the maintenance of the American military power (Cui, 2004, p. 241). Another viewpoint towards this complex issue has been presented by Robert G. Kaufman, a professor of public policy at the Pepperdine School of Public Policy. He holds the opinion that “the option of using force preemptively rather than reactively” as well as the obligation to “promote democratic regime change” are major two constituents of the doctrine (Kaufman, 2008, p. 1). Meanwhile, Robert Kagan separates the doctrine into three constituents. In his opinion, these include “the idea of preemptive or preventive military action, the promotion of democracy [...] and willingness to act without the sanction of international bodies” (Kagan, 2008, p. 37). Each of these three approaches captures important elements of the doctrine but none of them examines the concept in its entirety. Therefore, some additional insights might be revealed from ideas developed by Charles Krauthammer, Robert Singh, Jack S. Levy, Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Historically, the term “Bush doctrine” was coined by Charles Krauthammer in 2001. He initially referred to this concept as being focused on “American freedom of action” and compared the United States to “a uniquely benign imperium” (Krauthammer, 2001, p. 5). This idea stems from the belief that after the Cold War era America remains the only superpower in the world whose dominance is unquestionable and unrivaled. However, it should be strongly protected because ambitions of the French, the Russian and the Chinese to revive multipolarity might increase the probability of military conflicts and undermine the stability of the world. Charles Krauthammer predicted the political course that George W. Bush was inclined to take by indicating three major objectives of his administration. Firstly, the United States was expected to become “the ultimate balancer in every region” (Krauthammer, 2001, p. 6). In other words, it was believed that the U.S. should play the role of a global arbiter by taking sides with smaller states to ensure stability in many different regions. For instance, America's political and economic support for Taiwan might be interpreted as a guarantee for stability for the Western Pacific Region. Otherwise, this small country would be unable to defend its interests against the political and economic pressure from China. Consequently, a possibility of military conflict between these two states would augment dramatically. After the event of 9/11 the era of asymmetric warfare has come. The adversary has no longer been associated with concrete state-actors. The role of the United States as a benevolent

29 superpower has been rapidly adjusted to new challenges by giving preference to “the openly positive embrace of what has commonly been termed 'preemptive action' but is more accurately known as 'preventive' war” (Singh, 2006, p. 18). The old strategies of containment and deterrence have become less significant since the Bush administration could no longer be sure if they still are sufficiently effective under new circumstances. In the National Security Strategy of 2002 George W. Bush not only affirms the obligation “to promote a balance of power that favors freedom” but reminds the international community about “the essential role of American military strength” and underlines that “the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively” (NSS, 2002, pp.1 and 15). This statement clearly indicates that preemption makes the first element of the Bush doctrine. However, in many cases, preemption may easily transform into prevention. Although the Iraq War was presented by the Bush administration as a preemptive campaign, it appeared to be preventive. Therefore in this thesis preemption and prevention are seen as two interrelated constituents of the first element of the Bush doctrine. Wishing to understand these two concepts, it is necessary to have in mind in what respect preemption differs from prevention. When potential threats are quite urgent and their existence is proved by the intelligence material, the military action can be termed preemptive. According to Jack S. Levy, the preemptive war can be defined as “a response to the threat of an imminent attack” (Levy, 2007, p 177). This type of war is usually initiated out of sheer necessity to respond to credible threats. Besides, it might be authorized by international bodies because each nation is entitled to exercise the right of anticipatory self-defense. The Six Day War of 1967 might be regarded as a good example of the preemptive war. Israel was the first to attack the air force of Egypt in order to prevent Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq from starting common military operations against their country from three different sides at a time. Importantly, possible dangers to the security of the United States may also be indicated on the basis of anticipatory conclusions which have been made by politicians and intelligence officials. In this case, military operations should be regarded as preventive. According to Jack S. Levy, “[the] difference between prevention and preemption concerns the initiation of war” therefore it is much more difficult to legitimize the former than the latter (Levy, 2007, p. 178). The Iraq War remains the only example in human history demonstrating how prevention might be applied in practice. In this case, the Bush administration made a controversial decision to start the invasion unilaterally. Having in mind that the American military failed to find the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, this campaign might be evaluated merely as “a response to the more distant threat deriving from a negative shift in relative military capabilities” (Levy, 2007, p. 177). Therefore the intervention of the United States into Iraq has always been regarded by the

30 international community as preventive. It is necessary to bear in mind that traditional strategies of containment and deterrence, which have been useful while dealing with the Soviet Union, are no longer deemed sufficient to provide a necessary solution. Therefore they have already been supplemented by preemption and prevention simply because during the asymmetric warfare “international terrorists are invisible and unaccountable” and the inability to identify the enemy “calls for new strategies” (Schlesinger, 2005, p. 24). The Bush administration was harshly criticized for transgressing the international law and creating a very dangerous precedent. In fact, certain nations can choose to follow the American example and initiate other preemptive wars, which might turn out to be preventive in the end. Although the National Security Strategy argues that no state should ever “use preemption as a pretext for aggression” and explains that America's “reasons for [...] actions will be clear, the force measured and the cause just”, it would be more than naïve to hope that such aggressive and potentially dangerous countries as Iran or North Korea would pay heed to moral aspects of the warfare (NSS, 2002, p.16). Besides, the very idea about moral justifications for extensive military operations, which have been quite popular among American politicians, remains highly questionable after the scandal of torture at Guantanamo Bay detention camp. At present, most Americans believe that potential dangers of the Hussein regime might have been exaggerated. Moreover, George W. Bush and his aides are repetitively accused of getting involved into an unnecessary and costly war. Secondly, it was hoped that the United States would eventually “maintain the peace by acting as the world's foremost anti-proliferator” (Krauthammer, 2001, p. 6). This role became especially important after the assaults of 9/11 when security specialists voiced their fears about the possibility of attacks against major American cities. According to Robert Singh, “the next 9/11” has always been considered by the Bush administration to be “a matter of when and where, not whether” (Singh, 2006, p. 26). Therefore a potential link between terrorist groups and rogue states which might share their weapons of mass destruction with the network of Al-Qaeda or their followers is perceived as the biggest threat to the United States. Aiming to decrease the probability of nuclear, chemical and biological attacks against America, the Bush administration introduced a great variety of measures such as inventing new security technologies and missile defense systems, establishing new military bases in foreign countries or collecting more varied and reliable military intelligence. The National Security Strategy concentrates on the absolute necessity “to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States” but at the same time it is clearly stated that America “will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary”

31 (NSS, 2002, pp. 6 and 14). This statement indicates that the Bush administration has always been eager to use its economic, military and political powers to pursue certain objectives in the realm of foreign affairs without consulting international bodies. Consequently, unilateralism can be defined as the second element of the Bush doctrine. Interestingly, supporters of the Bush administration tend to reject accusations of unilateralism as groundless. They claim that the Bush administration has repetitively endeavored “to transform existing institutions and their practices” in order to make them function more effectively and share “the burden that the United States carries as the chief defender of the liberal world order” (Renshon, 2007, pp.18-19). There is also a tendency among some Republican conservatives to view the United Nations as being ineffective in fighting terrorism, vulnerable to corruption and prone to mismanagement. According to Brent Scowcroft, “the UN is a very weak instrument” which has been “built for a very different world” (Brzezinski and Scowcroft, 2008, p. 29). For this reason, it is frequently believed that the Bush administration was willing to work outside of the organization in order not to get trapped in conflicting interests of the U.N. member states. Critics of the Bush doctrine, on the contrary, openly suspect that the American political elite has been keen to ignore international institutions and important treaties. For instance, there were frequent disagreements between the U.S. and other states concerning the Kyoto Protocol. George W. Bush refused to submit this document to the Senate and accelerate the ratification process because certain provisions did not comply with economic interests of the United States. The president's decision not to join the International Criminal Court also provoked a big scandal. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, a strong hostility to supranational authorities is likely to “intensify America's global isolation” (Brzezinski, 2005, p. 3). This tendency might gradually undermine the ability of the U.S. to influence global processes of climate change in the future, too. Thirdly, Charles Krauthammer pointed out that the United States should “extend the peace by spreading democracy and free institutions” (Krauthammer, 2001, p.6). Looking from the historical perspective, America has always been perceived as the defender of democratic ideals in the world. This role was especially important during the period of the Cold War and immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At that turbulent time of change, Central and Eastern Europe desperately needed some political assistance from the United States in order to throw off their totalitarian yoke and initiate democratic reforms. As becomes evident reading the text of the National Security Strategy of 2002, the Bush administration followed in the footsteps of their predecessors, especially Ronald Reagan. They were strongly committed to “promote freedom and

32 support those who struggle non-violently for it” and accelerate “the development of democratic institutions” (NSS, 2002, p. 4). Having all these aspects in mind, the spread of democracy is regarded as the third element of Bush doctrine. The eagerness of George W. Bush and his followers to initiate democratic processes in the Middle East by using military power has been strongly criticized. It seems to be hardly possible to import democracy to such countries as Iraq or Afghanistan because their societies lack democratic traditions. Besides, the presence of the American military forces in the region makes processes of democratization much slower and less attractive to the local inhabitants. Zbigniew Brzezinski points out that “a combination of the use of force and democratizing slogans” is a very dangerous mix to apply in the Middle East due to painful memories about “colonialism under the British” (Brzezinski and Scowcroft, 2008, p. 24). The negative attitude toward democracy in that part of the world can be easily explained by the inclination of the Iraqis and the Afghans to view the United States of America as a new and hostile empire that seeks to dominate them. Besides, George W. Bush's attempts to pay a special attention to democratic changes in that region has frequently been interpreted as endeavors to direct the attention of the American public from military failures in this region. Supporters of the expansion of democracy consider this process as indispensable. Creation of new democracies, in their opinion, is the only way to secure the existence of the free world. Robert G. Kaufman, for instance, states that in the wake the World War II “few [...] were optimistic about establishing stable liberal democracy in Japan or Germany” (Kaufman, 2008, p. 130). Although the future of the Middle East remains unpredictable, democratic elections in Iraq as well as a noticeable decrease of the insurgency in that country may be interpreted as early signs of success and hope that democratic transformations may eventually materialize. The Bush doctrine can be compared to a triangle, which includes preemption and prevention, unilateralism and the spread of democracy. Opponents of George W. Bush and his foreign policy usually focus on the first two elements. Meanwhile the followers of the forty-third president put a special emphasis on the third one. In order to evaluate the political heritage of George W. Bush more objectively it is essential to find the middle ground between extreme positions and evaluate the impact of the Bush doctrine on the presidential leadership.

2. THE PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP OF GEORGE W. BUSH AND ITS CHALLENGES

The focus of scholarly attention in relation to the presidential leadership has recently shifted to

33 “typological theorizing as a new approach to systematic comparison” (Bennet and Elman, 2006, p. 456). There are numerous attempts to develop a comprehensive system which would allow to examine different presidencies and styles of leadership by using clear patterns of evaluation. It would also create ample possibilities for political scientists to make more accurate insights and conclusions. Scholars seek to diminish their reliance on changing political circumstances or personal traits of presidents. As Gary King explains, they are challenged by the need to acknowledge “that individuals are important and that presidents can be studied systematically” (King, 1993, p. 406; italics in the original). In other words, it still is quite difficult to merge presidents' individuality and the need for a systematic examination of their leadership skills into one coherent whole. Some challenging ideas about innovative ways of the analysis of presidencies have been proposed by the prominent American scholar Stephen Skowronek (1997, 2008). He offers a detailed analysis of the presidential leadership in the course of the American political history. Skowronek suggests the division of all U.S. Presidents into four recurrent types, which have been termed the politics of disjunction, the politics of articulation, the politics of reconstruction and the politics of preemption. In fact, his attempt to allocate presidents to four categories despite historical and political differences as well as distance in time can be regarded as a successful effort to overview “the problems of governing in modern America” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 2). In this section of the thesis the main objective is to test the place that the forty-third president occupies in Skowronek's typology. It has been argued that George W. Bush started his presidency as an orthodox innovator but later his leadership style changed in relation to the erosion of the governing regime. The research problem includes the following questions: Does the presidential leadership of George W. Bush conform to Stephen Skowronek's concept of an orthodox innovator? Does the erosion of the Republican regime change George W. Bush's leadership from the politics of articulation to the politics of disjunction? In what ways does the Bush doctrine make an impact on the leadership of the forty third president of the United States of America? This chapter of the thesis has also been subdivided into sections and sub-sections. At first, some significant theoretical considerations about orthodox innovation are provided and the most important elements of the politics of articulation and the politics of disjunction are explained. Later, it is analyzed whether George W. Bush meets necessary criteria to be labeled an orthodox innovator. Then, the attention is paid to the transformation of George W. Bush's leadership from the politics of articulation to the politics of disjunction. Finally, conflicting attitudes towards the doctrine, the presidency of George W. Bush and certain aspects of the election of Barrack Obama

34 are examined. 2.1. Theoretical Approach to the Presidential Leadership and its Types Developing his theory about the presidential leadership, Skowronek devotes much attention to the development of the political system throughout the American political history. He characterizes this process as “a recurrent sequence of change” and notes that major political coalitions are engaged into a perpetual struggle for power while each of them ardently supports “a particular approach to public policy questions” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 28). When a certain political coalition succeeds in occupying a dominant position, it usually creates a governing regime which initially possesses a high degree of resilience and makes a huge influence on political trends and institutional activities on the federal level. Later, as inevitable changes occur in the political arena, the regime is no longer able to meet “the manifest governing demands of the day” and gradually becomes weak (Skowronek, 2008, p. 29). Importantly, the disintegration of the governing regime is expected to happen when the dominant political coalition is troubled by internal discord and no longer fulfills the expectations of its supporters. As Skowronek notes, the process of “erosion in majority-party support” cannot be separated from inevitable failures of the president to accomplish “the difficult task of keeping faith with a ruling coalition in changing times” (Skowronek, 2008, pp. 63 and 45). When the authority of the Executive is undermined by his inability to implement important political objectives and the unity among the representatives of the governing regime disappears, another political coalition comes to power and establishes a new regime. Every president of the United States has to develop a relationship with the dominant regime either in opposition or affiliation. Skowronek defines the presidential leadership as “something of a struggle between the individual and the system” and emphasizes that “the system changes as well as the incumbent” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 77). It remains clear, however, that at first one needs to understand the political stance of the Executive and grasp the essential features of his leadership related to it. Later, many challenging questions about concrete presidential successes and failures in the realm of politics ought to be raised.

2.1.1. The Politics of Articulation and Orthodox Innovation In order to understand the development of the leadership of George W. Bush in more depth, one really needs to perceive the politics of articulation which is inseparable from the concept of orthodox innovation. In fact, Stephen Skowronek distinguishes two generations of orthodox innovators and indicates that George H. W. Bush represents the first one since he has emerged as a faithful follower of Ronald Reagan's policies unable “to articulate his own vision for the nation”

35 (Skowronek, 2008, p. 104). Being too much related to the previous president, George H. W. Bush could not adapt to changing circumstances, develop adequate schemes of governing and propose workable solutions to new problems freely. To put it simply, orthodoxy has exerted too much power on him through conservative supporters. Consequently, some of his major new initiatives have been rejected as unacceptable. George W. Bush, being more distant in time from Ronald Reagan, belongs to the second generation of orthodox innovators. Contrary to his father, George W. Bush has endeavored to construct “grand superstructures on the regime's foundations” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 100). He has also tried to adjust the conservative ideology to the present and implement his vision towards politics and governance into reality. The president has supported some new ideas by endorsing compassionate conservatism, which would combine “rights-based claims to entitlements and the virtues of individual responsibility” (Milkis and Nelson, 2008, p. 430). Special attention has also been paid to social activity of religious organizations. Following Stephen Skowronek's approach, one can easily notice that George W. Bush's support for conservative ideals stands for orthodoxy, which derives from political heritage of Ronald Reagan's presidency. Meanwhile proposals to provide more assistance to vulnerable circles of society add some hues of innovation and transform George W. Bush into “Reagan Plus” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 135). As Stephen Skowronek notes, “[t]he object of a politics of articulation is to fit the existing parts of the regime together in a new and more relevant way” (Skowronek, 1997, p. 41). This challenge is usually entrusted to the leaders who are referred to as orthodox innovators. Interestingly, orthodox innovators are defined by five important criteria that explain their actions, choices and political decisions. The commitment to tread in the footsteps of strong presidents and combine their ideology with new practices makes the first criterion for orthodox innovators. As Skowronek explains, orthodox innovators “galvanize political action with promises to continue the good work of the past and demonstrate the vitality of the established order in changing times” (Skowronek, 1997, p. 41). The main challenge for the president is to make the political regime acceptable to different groups within his party and wider circles of society at the same time. It is quite a complicated task, indeed, because the supporters of the president have to be persuaded that potential innovations do not undermine their interests and political ideals. The second criterion for orthodox innovators is related to their inclination to disregard unexpected events instead of adapting to a new reality. It should be emphasized that the orthodox innovator usually sets an explicit political agenda and tries to implement it despite possible obstacles or unfavorable circumstances. According to Skowronek, this type of leadership requires the president “to stand fully committed up front, fully revealed in one's commitments, and ready

36 to act” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 123). In order to implement his objectives, the president needs to foresee future events and make influence on them. The only way to achieve this complex aim is “to insist on tight control from the center” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 137). However, this approach might deprive him of flexibility while searching for compromises and alternatives. The eagerness of orthodox innovators to get involved into political confrontation and military action serves as the third criterion. Skowronek explains this phenomenon by calling such leaders “muscle-flexing presidents, impatient to complete the work of their predecessors” who sometimes overestimate the influence of the United States, especially in the realm of foreign policy (Skowronek, 2008, p. 136). On the one hand, the president can take advantage of the warfare and achieve three important political objectives: strengthen the governing regime by rallying its supporters for a clearly defined cause, expand the presidential powers and make the potential critique from the opposition seem unpatriotic. On the other hand, the failure to attain some goals of the initial agenda and achieve a rapid victory undermines the authority of the Executive. Meanwhile, the governing regime experiences a crisis and remains “overburdened with responsibilities, ideologically distended, and tumbling into disarray” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 141). The fourth criterion stems from the necessity for orthodox innovators to diminish divisions within the governing regime and make it more acceptable to the troubled society. As Skowronek points out, the politics of articulation implies a constant need “to mitigate or assuage the factional ruptures within the ranks of the establishment” (Skowronek, 1997, p. 41). In this situation, the leadership of the president depends on his ability to re-unite the followers and fend off the opposition. However, orthodox innovators, in most cases, fail to get these tasks accomplished and the governing regime continues to split into petty factions. The fifth criterion is based on the assumption that orthodox innovators usually have little chance of re-election. They often lose the election for the second presidential term due to the inability to meet the expectations of the constituents and the representatives of the governing regime. A typical orthodox innovator usually takes high risks because after dashing initial hopes and making too many political mistakes he might end up his presidential career being “swamped by charges of betrayal” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 136). In fact, some presidents of the United States might be called orthodox innovators, including such outstanding figures as “James Monroe, James K. Polk, Theodore Roosevelt, and Lyndon Johnson” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 100).

2.1.2.Theoretical Considerations about the Politics of Disjunction The politics of disjunction is another “cell of the typology” which assists in examining the presidential leadership (Skowronek, 1997, p. 36). In fact, it possesses four distinctive criteria that

37 reveal which presidents can be characterized as disjunctive. This presidency type is important to the full-fledged analysis of the legacy of George W. Bush since it explains some of the most significant transformations on the political stage, which have taken place in the United States during the last four years. The first criterion for disjunctive leaders is connected with their inability to distance themselves from the unsuccessful governing regime and provide new political alternatives. Here, the presidents emerge as being “affiliated with a set of established commitments that have in the course of events been called into question as failed or irrelevant responses to the problems of the day” (Skowronek, 1997, p. 39). Due to important changes or unexpected difficulties, political obligations of the governing regime fail to produce desired results and the general public becomes dissatisfied with it. In this case, the role of the president becomes unenviable because he is “caught between the stark demands [...] for regime maintenance and the blunt charges of regime bankruptcy” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 90). In other words, the president is transformed into a mediator between the representatives of the establishment and its opponents. As the political climate gradually becomes unfavorable, the leader is very likely to find himself forced in a tight corner by the “[o]pen recognition of serious problems within the establishment coupled with a promise of continuity” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 90). The tendency to make repetitive failures while trying to instigate inner reforms of the governing regime is defined as the second criterion for the politics of disjunction. When the president puts a special emphasis on the need to implement necessary changes within the political establishment, he elevates the expectations among the members of society and makes “a promise to fix things up” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 88). However, the regime remains quite defensive, despite its rapid erosion, and eventually the process of change is brought to a sudden halt. When numerous attempts to ameliorate the situation give no effective results, the constituents start to believe that “the task of breathing new life into an old order seems to be beyond the political capacities of the presidential office” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 88). Therefore the Executive experiences a big loss of the popular support and his abilities to influence political processes diminish. The third criterion is associated with the decrease of the presidential credibility and authority due to the continuous erosion of the regime. The failure of disjunctive presidents “either to forthrightly repudiate or forthrightly affirm their political inheritance” inevitably provokes “a crisis of political legitimacy” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 90). To put it simply, the president is seen by the people and the media as inactive and dysfunctional, while the members of the regime turn away from him and start searching for a new leader. According to Skowronek, the disjunctive

38 presidents sometimes “press major departures of their own from the standard formulas and priorities set in the old agenda” but these desperate measures merely underline their inability to act as true change-makers and accelerate the disintegration of the regime even more (Skowronek, 1997, p. 40). The opposition, in turn, exploits this situation to its own benefit by emphasizing the presidential passivity and by denouncing the ills of ineffective politics. The widespread condemnation of the disjunctive president leading to his political loneliness can be termed the fourth criterion. When all endeavors to provide adequate solutions to long-lasting problems appear to be futile, the leader quickly becomes the main target of political scapegoating. The opposition also makes a good use of the situation to increase its chances to come to power. As the Executive is turned into “the premier symbol of systemic political failure”, the presidential election seems to be the only way out of this political impasse since a new regime needs to be constructed (Skowronek, 1997, p. 39).

2.2. The Analysis of George W. Bush's Leadership and its Results The first objective of this section of the thesis is to test if George W. Bush meets five criteria for a typical orthodox innovator. The second objective is to analyze whether his leadership style has changed into the politics of disjunction. The presidency of George W. Bush is also examined according to four criteria for the disjunctive leadership. Besides, it is aimed to determine in what ways the forty-third president fits into theoretical models and whether he strays from them. It should be noted, however, that in this part of the thesis more attention is paid not to the dimension of the regime vulnerability but to the content of the presidency types.

2.2.1. The Presidency of George W. Bush in Relation to Orthodox Innovation Firstly, all orthodox innovators are expected to build their leadership on the ideological basis of their predecessors who have made the governing regime resilient to the political opposition. George W. Bush matches the first criterion since he has clearly been willing to come back to “the yet-unfulfilled promises of the Reagan Revolution” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 129). In fact, after winning the first-term presidential election in 2000, George W. Bush still had to establish himself as a credible leader of the nation. It was a difficult task, indeed, because a considerable part of the population questioned the legitimacy of his victory against the Democrat candidate Al Gore. Unable to impress the public in the realm of foreign policy, he decided to concentrate on domestic issues. As Sydney M. Milkis and Michael Nelson observe, George W. Bush has made an important step by choosing “to emphasize traditional conservative issues such as tax cuts, regulatory relief, energy production, and missile defense” (Milkis and Nelson, 2008, p. 428).

39 Besides, he often expressed a firm belief that the United States of America possesses an inherent obligation to support democracy all around the world. Secondly, orthodox innovators are unable to accept a new reality and they try to adapt all unexpected events to their initial agendas. It is obvious that George W. Bush meets the second criterion since sudden challenges in the aftermath of 9/11 have rendered him incapable to create an entirely new approach to foreign policy. It should be noted that the president has endeavored to offer simple solutions to the terrified America by stating: “Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done” (Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress, 2001, p.1). In fact, George W. Bush has chosen to lean on orthodoxy more by relying exclusively on the American power. It is essential to bear in mind that politics for an orthodox innovator is “a struggle for definition” while the leadership is equaled to “the assertion and control of definitions” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 122). After the terrorist attacks in New York, the president has established himself by providing clear ideas about his political identity as a wartime president and by protecting them at all costs. Importantly, making the inaugural address at the very beginning of his presidency, George W. Bush also expressed his readiness to “show courage in a time of blessing by confronting problems instead of passing them on to future generations” (Bush, Inaugural Address, 2001, p. 2). This bold commitment to make tough decisions if necessary can be interpreted as his political credo. By establishing his strong position from the very beginning and acknowledging “the value of definition in leadership”, the president has related himself to orthodox innovation (Skowronek, 2008, p. 121). Firm determination to use military force and get involved into the war against terrorism, instead of using an unexpected chance of creating new political standards of international cooperation, shows that George W. Bush conforms to the third criterion for orthodox innovators, too. In Stephen Skowronek's opinion, he has followed into the footsteps of previous orthodox innovators such as Lyndon Johnson by clinging to “national ambition, political arrogance, and imperial presumption” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 162). After a quick and seemingly decisive victory in Afghanistan, he made a fatal decision to extend the warfare into Iraq and overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein on charges of having Weapons of Mass Destruction. As Zbigniew Brzezinski puts it, the president has become involved in “a new global confrontation between good and evil, a confrontation that might even call for a solitary crusade” (Brzezinski, 2007, pp. 135-136). Due to the inability to prove the existence of those weapons and suppress the insurgency, the president was accused of various misdeeds, including bad leadership. This turn of events characterizes George W. Bush as an orthodox innovator who was expected to strengthen the Republican regime by winning “muscle-flexing wars” but his failure to get the job properly done has caused

40 “disaffection through the president's own ranks” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 165). Interestingly, George W. Bush emerges as a great risk-taker who has experienced a massive loss in a dangerous political gamble. George W. Bush meets the fourth criterion for orthodox innovators since he has not succeeded to put up a rebellion among his supporters. The president corresponds to the model because he has also tried to defend the conservative regime against the growing discontent of the American society and the rage of the Democratic opposition. However, his attempts to calm the constituents, re-unite the party and silence the opponents have not produced any positive results. In fact, strategic failures and military losses in the Middle East have infuriated the general public. The Republicans, in the meantime, have divided among themselves into two pro-Bush versus anti- Bush camps. Consequently, the conservative regime's power to govern the nation has been diminished. As Stephen Skowronek points out, “[o]rthodox innovators are not often elected twice” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 141). In this context, the re-election of George W. Bush in 2004 makes an interesting deviation from the theoretical model. It is the only criterion for orthodox innovators that the president fails to meet but this interesting fact proves his extraordinary political fortitude in times of crisis. George W. Bush's opposition to pro-choice policies and gay marriages as well as the support for the Christian concept of a family have appealed to religious voters. The re-election can also be explained by “a lingering effect of the 9/11 trauma” as well as “the general reluctance of the American people to depose their commander in chief in wartime” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 146). Thus George W. Bush has been given a second chance to serve as the President of the United States.

2.2.2. The Leadership of George W. Bush and its Shift towards the Politics of Disjunction Analyzing the development of George W. Bush's presidency, one can clearly see the shift of his leadership from the politics of articulation to the politics of disjunction. The failure of the president to separate himself from the conservative regime after the re-election as well as his inability to provide new solutions to the fatigued nation demonstrate that he meets the first criterion for a disjunctive leader. Despite harsh criticism from all sides, after the reelection George W. Bush has repeatedly insisted on the need to “[respond] to a global campaign of fear with a global campaign of freedom” (Bush, Remarks to the National Endowment for Democracy, 2005, p. 1). He has not been able to distance himself from previous policies because clearly defined commitments to defend the nation make the core of his leadership. Thus, in the eyes of the American society the forty-third president remains inextricably linked to military, strategic,

41 political and economic mistakes of the Republicans. In Skowronek's opinion, when the president is regarded as inseparable from the disintegrating regime, he is very likely to end up in “the impossible leadership situation” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 90). In fact, these words turn out to be prophetic for George W. Bush since he is no longer seen as an inspiring leader but rather as a political outcast, being rejected by both major parties as well as his people. The development of George W. Bush's presidency towards the limited control over the Republican Party and stark divisions within the conservative regime prove that the changing pattern of his leadership corresponds to the second criterion of the politics of disjunction. All presidential endeavors to stop or, at least, diminish struggles among moderate Republicans and the neo-conservative wing of the party seem to be limited and inefficient. According to Stephen Skowronek, the split between these two groups has grown wider due to “rising schismatic pressures” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 146). Much harm to the regime has also been done by the attacks of the Democrats who continue to demand for the military withdrawal from Iraq. The president's failure to protect his political position or reject it decisively has caused a deep credibility crisis. His ambiguous stance regarding such controversial questions as the legal status of Guantanamo prisoners, the use of torture during interrogations, huge financial expenses on the Iraq War and the inadequate governmental response to the after-effects of the natural disasters such as devastating hurricanes in the Gulf Coast region or forest fires in California has frequently been highly beneficial to the opposition due to “the widening disjunction between established power and political legitimacy” (Skowronek, 2008, p. 31). The process of the disintegration of the regime has been further accelerated by growing economic challenges. Finally, recent credit and housing crises have added their share of additional tension to the forty- third president. All above mentioned facts lead to an observation that the third criterion for the politics of disjunction must also be applied to noticeable changes in the leadership style of George W. Bush. The unenviable position of the forty-third president becomes obvious while analyzing recent discussions on the American foreign policy and domestic issues. At the end of his second term George W. Bush was no longer seen as a trustful and strong leader of the nation. Instead, he has been loudly blamed by his own party for failures in Iraq, poor economy and diplomatic concessions to North Korea's nuclear ambitions. The Democrats, in turn, have denounced him for inflexible policies towards Iran, the housing crisis and failed deregulation practices. Any attempts of the president to achieve a compromise or propose an acceptable solution made him into “an easy caricature of all that has gone wrong” (Skowronek, 1997, pp. 39-40). In other words, the forty-third president has been depicted to the troubled Americans as the incarnation of all evils

42 that need to be wiped off. In the course of the recent presidential race Barrack Obama's success of getting elected depended on his ability to criticize the president and the governing regime which lost the support of the constituents. The most popular slogan of the last election has recently been: “We do not need four more years of Bush's policies!” This extremely negative attitude towards the presidency of George W. Bush and his political denouncement prove that he meets the fourth criterion for the disjunctive leader. 2.2.3. The Impact of the Doctrine on the Leadership of George W. Bush Stephen Skowronek's theoretical observations about George W. Bush as an orthodox innovator really help to cast a new glance at his failures and successes. After analyzing George W. Bush's leadership according to five criteria for orthodox innovators, one comes to a conclusion that the forty-third president, indeed, can be allocated to this category. Importantly, he fails to meet just one criterion out of five. Skowronek's typology of the presidential leadership also gives an excellent possibility to pay more attention to the transformation of George W. Bush's leadership style from the politics of articulation to the politics of disjunction. The analysis shows that four criteria for the politics of disjunction are applicable to his second presidential term. Some valuable insights from the works of scholars as well as the president's speeches have demonstrated how challenging and many-faceted the leadership may be in theory as well as in practice. Commenting on the presidency of George W. Bush and his legacy, political scientists divide among themselves into two opposite groups. Some of them denounce George W. Bush's leadership as a complete disaster and claim that “there is no alternative but to rank him as the worst president in the U.S. history” (Foner, 2006, p. 2). Meanwhile other scholars tend to remain more positive. According to Vincent J. Cannato, George W. Bush should be given some credit because he “has steered the nation through the post-9/11 world” by preventing other attacks on American soil (Cannato, 2006, p. 2). These strikingly different viewpoints are difficult to reconcile. The Bush doctrine and its application made the political stance of George W. Bush especially complex inside the United States as well as abroad. Being engaged in two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, he could not pay sufficient attention either to ripe economic problems of the United States or to internal divisions in the Republican Party. If some conservatives openly grumbled about George W. Bush's inability to lead the country into economic prosperity, the critique of the Democrats was very harsh. According to Scott C. Smith, when “Bush took office, the U.S. economy tanked” but no active measures were taken except “[blaming] both Bill Clinton and the war on terror for the health of the economy” (Smith, 2004, p. 1). Despite sombre predictions of democratic commentators, the positive response of Americans to the capture of

43 Saddam Hussein and victorious results of the presidential elections of 2004 demonstrated that George W. Bush could still count on the popular support at that time. However, during the second term of presidency the popularity of the president went down dramatically and discord within the Republican Party increased. There were at least three reasons that might explain such a swift change. Firstly, the Iraq War turned out to be quite unsuccessful and very expensive. Secondly, the situation in Afghanistan did not improve as rapidly as expected and the number of American casualties continued to rise. Thirdly, democratic processes in the Middle East were also seen as two slow and ineffective. Housing and credit crises as well as the imminent threat of economic recession similar to the Great Depression added even more complexity to the political situation. The Washington Post and ABC News conducted another poll at the beginning of 2009, which revealed that merely 33 percent of respondents approved George W. Bush policies. (The table containing polling results is presented in Appendix I.) Analyzing this data, one may conclude that George W. Bush can hardly be called a successful leader. In fact, the forty-third president stepped down from his office being rejected and alone. He was not only stigmatized by his own party but became highly unpopular among his compatriots. However, it should be taken into consideration that his presidency has been influenced by unprecedented challenges and unexpected problems. According to Timothy J. Lynch and Robert S. Singh, George W. Bush earned some credit despite numerous failures in domestic and foreign policy because his “administration correctly faced up to jihadist Islam as an existential threat of generational character” and pointed out to the danger of nuclear terrorist attacks which continues to be quite real, although the majority of Americans would most gladly prefer to ignore it (Lynch and Singh, 2008, p. 259). Indeed, one may love or hate George W. Bush but it should be admitted that he has always endeavored to search for necessary solutions under most demanding circumstances. Naturally, some of his decisions appeared to be unsuccessful but it is far too early to make final assessments and indicate what might have been different. Clearly, the leadership of George W. Bush remains a broad field of study and it is hardly possible to cover everything at a time. Therefore many questions still should be raised and many more interesting observations could be made on this controversial question.

3. THE BUSH ERA AND PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN POWER

The development of the Bush doctrine and its application during the Iraq War revived disputes about American power and its manifestations in the world. On the one hand, the United States is frequently compared to the Roman and British empires. On the other hand, it is referred to as the only one contemporary superpower which remains unique in itself and can hardly be matched by

44 any imperial predecessors. In addition, there are disagreements in academic circles about a possibility of the American decline and its probable results as well. The aim of this section of the thesis is to discuss the question of the so-called American Empire, explore Joseph S. Nye's ideas about soft and hard power of the United States and examine major political mistakes which have occurred during the presidency of George W. Bush. For the sake of comparison, additional attention will be paid to some aspects the U.S. election of 2008 and several difficult challenges that Barrack H. Obama must face after taking up the presidential office.

3.1. The United States as a Contemporary Empire When the term “empire” is applied to describe the current status of the United States, it usually provokes quite negative reactions in the American society. Addressing the graduates at the West Point Military Academy in 2002, George W. Bush touched on this delicate subject and denied all imperial ambitions by stating that “America has no empire to extend or utopia to establish” (Bush, Commencement Address, 2002, p. 2). There are three major reasons which explain why comments about the American empire are so irritating to the majority of citizens of the United States. Firstly, military operations of the U.S. army are traditionally regarded either as acts of liberation or as courageous endeavors to keep the peace and initiate the works of reconstruction in the conflict areas. Secondly, it should be remembered that most Americans tend to perceive the United States as a country which is well aware of the ills of the British colonization and reluctant to follow the same pattern of behavior. Thirdly, accusations of American imperialism are quickly written off because they tend to be labeled the relics of the Soviet propaganda and Marxist ideology. Instead, it is commonly preferred to use the term “superpower” which seems to be much more attractive due to “a dramatically appealing gloss” that inevitably derives from “America's new global standing” (Brzezinski, 2007, p. 131). Another way to explain the American dominance is to refer to the United States as a hegemon which is entitled to ensure the international order and its functionality by demanding the rest of the world to fulfill concrete requirements. According to Robert Kagan, attempts to establish a “benevolent hegemony might strike some as either hubristic or morally suspect” but they can be justified by the fact that traditional allies of the United States such as Japan, South Korea and Israel are “supportive of its world leadership role” (Kagan, 1996, pp. 2-3). To make things even more complex, peace and stability, in the opinion of most American conservatives, are hardly possible under different circumstances. However, contrary to such categoric evaluations, the current world order remains strained because “the United States is perceived as having an indispensable role to perform, one of such vital importance that there is no reason why it should always be subject to the same rules of the international game as everybody

45 else” (Cox, 2004, p. 40). In fact, scholarly interpretations in favor of the current status of the U.S. are frequently criticized by the opponents as being partial and unwilling to acknowledge the dark side of the global dominance of the United States. Therefore, long-lasting disputes about the American Empire have never been brought to an end. The traditional assertion that the United States is averse to all empires because of its own historical experience as a former British colony remains questionable in the context of international relations during recent years. As Andrew J. Bacevich points out, it has been very useful for many American presidents to create “the myth of the reluctant superpower” which is based on a false assumption that “Americans [are] asserting themselves only under duress and then always for the noble purposes” (Bacevich, 2002, p. 8). It is clear that such a unique image helped to maintain the credibility of the United States and encourage the world's complaisance to its dominance in the past. Truly, the American history is full of interesting examples of territorial, political and economic expansion. If the Spanish-American War of 1898 should be seen as the very first attempt to acquire “a new and prominent position in world affairs”, the global war on terrorism is obviously related to “remaking the world in the service of American interests and ideals” (Milkis and Nelson, 2008, pp. 202 and 432). Political circumstances and the scale of events in both cases might be different but intentions lurking behind them are strikingly similar: to control other countries and expand the sphere of influence of the U.S. The idea about imperial ambitions of the United States is frequently rejected by some American academicians and the political elite since it cannot be entirely separated from Marxist ideology and the critique of the capitalist system. Besides, hostility towards American imperialism is sometimes equaled to encouraging America's return to isolationist policies. However, the imperial question seems to bother liberal minds as well. In this context, it might be useful to remember Michael Ignatieff's characterization of the United States as “an empire lite” which is very unlikely to live through a dangerous epoch of global terrorism if it fails to acknowledge that “diplomacy, backed by force, is always to be preferred to force alone” (Ignatieff, 2003, p. 11). Having in mind, that American military operations are exploited by the Al-Qaeda network as an inducement to attract new individuals to terrorist groups, it is evident that decisive diplomatic steps in combination with limited martial measures could have produced far better results. In the eyes of the Arab world, for instance, the U.S. army clearly stands for an occupying force being able to wipe out all forms of armed resistance, excluding terrorism. For most inhabitants of the Middle East painful parallels between the British rule and the American presence are quite obvious. As a political scientist Abdelwahab El-Affendi explains, the invasion into Iraq has always been interpreted in this region as the symbol of American aspirations “to

46 bring about not only political change, but also a cultural transformation in areas such as education, religious values, and political norms” (El-Affendi, 2004, pp. 269-270). Therefore all attempts of the U.S. army to bring the insurgency in Iraq to a halt are often regarded by the locals as being inseparable from an extensive imperial agenda. Looking from the Arab perspective, the enemy is not so different from that of colonial times because the Americans and the British share the same cultural background and even speak the same language. However, one important difference between the United States and the United Kingdom has been pointed out by Niall Ferguson, a famous American historian, who claims that the defenders of the British Empire “regarded long- term occupation as an inherent part of their self-appointed 'civilizing mission'” while advocates of the American supremacy prefer “to shore up the local potentates more or less covertly” (Ferguson, 2003, p. 7). In other words, the contemporary version of the American empire seems to be less formal and more dependent on making alliances with potential collaborators in different regions. The support of the United States for the Afghan president Hamid Karzai and strong relationships with the Kurdish minority in the north of Iraq, for example, show that the Bush administration has been very much interested in using local leaders to expand the limits of American power in the Middle East. This strategy seems to be necessary and almost unavoidable because “the direct rule over subject populations, such as Europe exercised during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, are simply too costly in the twenty-first century” (Nye, 2004, p. 119). George W. Bush's ambition to enlarge the American sphere of influence has been strongly condemned by China and Russia since these two countries promote the idea of the multilateral system to deal with international challenges. According to Jing-dong Yuan, “the long-term American strategic objective of sustaining its primacy even to the extent of empire building” might be damaging to China as a potential Asian superpower and evoke “the erosion of international organizations” (Yuan, 2003, p. 118 and 124). However, the members of the Chinese government remain quite cautious to express their objections and seek to avoid direct confrontation with the United States over the question of dominance. Economic and trade interests play an important role in this case. Business ties happen to be quite beneficial and they soften the Chinese opposition to the Bush doctrine because the financial strength of this country is closely connected with its extensive imports to the United States. Meanwhile, Russian political leaders are more openly opposed to the model of the unipolar world. They often voice their fears about the American military preeminence on the global level. As Alexander Zhebin indicates, Russia has always been inclined to defend its position that “the new world order should be multipolar, reflecting the existence in the world of different centers of influence” (Zhebin, 2003, p. 148). Applying the term “multipolar”, Russian representatives and diplomats usually imply that the

47 world should be divided among few great powers. Consequently, Russian interests as well as political ambitions might be easily secured at the expense of smaller and weaker neighboring countries. The United States, in turn, is eager to defend its status as the sole superpower which is capable to ensure greater international stability by freely operating around the globe. But considerable changes may occur in the nearest future since America not only faces an economic recession and but it also needs Russian assistance in the Middle East and remains severely indebted to China. European attitudes towards the forty-third president of the United States and his doctrine are ambivalent, too. Central and Eastern Europe remains more positive towards the Bush era despite numerous misfortunes in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lithuanian support for the political stance of George W. Bush has been quite closely connected with his clear statements about the expansion of NATO: We knew that this continent would not remain divided. We knew that arbitrary lines drawn by dictators would be erased, and those lines are now gone. No more Munichs. No more Yaltas. The long night of fear, uncertainty, and loneliness is over. You're joining the strong and growing family of NATO. Our Alliance has made a solemn pledge of protection, and anyone who would choose Lithuania as an enemy has also made an enemy of the United States of America. (Bush, Bush to Lithuania, 2002, p. 1)

These words bear great significance to most Lithuanians who still remember Stalin's regime, dangers of totalitarianism and massive deportations to Siberia that took place from 1941 to 1953. Besides, the armed struggle between Lithuanian freedom fighters and the Red Army storm-troops during the period of resistance from 1944 to 1953 has never been forgotten. Analyzing this situation, one should bear in mind that the historical experience of Central and Eastern Europe is quite different from that of Western Europe. This region traditionally regards the United States not as a democratic empire but rather as a much-trusted ally. In fact, the members of the former Vilnius Ten group of nations as well as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic continue to believe that America, as Ronald Reagan has stated in his farewell address, “ [is] still a beacon, still a magnet for all who must have freedom” (Reagan, 1989, p. 5). For most inhabitants of these countries, national traditions and liberty make an important part of their respective national identities and, in their opinion, American power has always opposed the Soviet Union. Nowadays, the U.S. stands in subtle opposition to Vladimir Putin and Dimitry Medvedev's regime of controlled democracy in contemporary Russia. Therefore most Eastern Europeans tend to evaluate the presidency of George W. Bush more positively than the French or the German. In Western Europe it is extremely popular to criticize George W. Bush's foreign policy quite harshly and condemn the spread of democracy backed by force. Besides, there are numerous

48 attempts to shift the focus of attention to the necessity “to revive multilateralism” (Chirac, 2004, p. 3). Consequently, many fiery discussions have already taken place among scholars, intellectuals and political observers about the role of the president in the United States and the legacy of George W. Bush. In most cases, political misunderstandings among European and American leaders in the realm of foreign policy are considered to derive from different viewpoints towards power and its usage. Robert Kagan correctly refers to this complicated question as the main cause for frequent tensions between representatives of both continents: Rather than viewing the collapse of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to flex global muscles, Europeans took it as an opportunity to cash in on a sizable peace dividend.[...] Meanwhile, the very fact of the Soviet empire's collapse vastly increased America's strength relative to the rest of the the world. The sizable American military arsenal, once barely sufficient to balance Soviet power, was now deployed in a world without a single formidable adversary. (Kagan, 2004, pp. 140-141)

It is evident that European political leaders are inclined to accumulate their economic wealth instead of taking an active part in military action or solving international conflicts. Looking from the European perspective, there is no need to use the overwhelming military might if diplomatic and economic means can still be applied to achieve certain political objectives. Therefore, the decision of the Bush administration to initiate two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan without setting clear limits to them and developing an exit strategy has been interpreted by most Europeans as an example of irritating arrogance and imperial thinking. According to Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, few scholars still have doubts that the United States has transformed itself into an empire but there are many signs showing that “a unilateral exercise of power” might end up in causing “more and more resentment abroad to the point that other states may decide to work together to obstruct the chosen American course” (Daalder and Lindsay, 2003, p. 1). Although such predictions have been rejected by both sides, it is clear that the relationship between America and Europe remains complex due to different evaluations of the changing reality in the contemporary world. Some political steps and cultural peculiarities of the United States were frequently misunderstood in Paris or Berlin because “[t]he twentieth century taught Europeans and Americans different lessons” (Mead, 2002, p .1). Opposing attitudes towards such essential issues as the death penalty, the social welfare and religious practices have created a deep civilizational rift which often prevents a fruitful cooperation between the United States and European countries. Therefore, according to Walter Russel Mead, most ordinary Americans “don't think about Europe much, except as a vacation destination” while for the majority of Western Europeans “ [hope] for a world role more or less equal to that of the United States” (Mead, 2002, p. 1). It is important to

49 remember that George W. Bush experienced violent political attacks from his European partners for his eagerness to increase American power even more by supporting preventive attacks against the so-called rogue states and by employing strict political and economic measures against potential enemies. Harsh derision of the forty-third president of the U.S. in popular European newspapers and Internet sites for his idealistic rhetoric and strong Christian values serves as a proof that “Europeans think that anybody who believes all that crap is too stupid to make good decisions” (Mead, 2002, p. 1). However, it is fair to say, that American power, despite strong critique, causes much envy as well as fascination at the same time. At present, Europe seems to be unable to provide any military alternative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The European Union is constantly frustrated by its own powerlessness in the face of possible dangers and threats. Having this ambivalence in mind, it is possible to refer to the United States as an unloved but necessary empire. If the political elite of Europe endeavored to suppress its dissatisfaction with the Bush doctrine in the name of common interests, many ordinary citizens openly demonstrated their hostility by participating in huge anti-war demonstrations in France, Germany and Italy. It should be noted that during his second term in office George W. Bush repetitively tried to improve his poor image by visiting different parts of Europe. However, he did not manage to attain this aim due to the skeptical evaluation of his presidency and leadership skills. Most politically active people, especially those living in Western Europe, have become very critical to the political heritage of the forty-third president of the United States and they tend to regard him merely as “a man who connived in the use of torture, and who marched into Iraq without considering the consequences of his actions” (Elliott, 2008, p. 60). Although America's ambitions to dominate and control the world may seem intolerable and unattractive to many European countries, no other state currently possesses enough economic and military potential either to become a full-fledged rival of the U.S. or to occupy its place. Long-term perspectives of the European Union are truly inspiring but member states still need to achieve a greater unity in order to act as a single entity and exert strong influence upon the development of international relations on the global level. According to Donald Asmus, it has always been and still is very important for American political leaders to find common grounds with their European counterparts and achieve a compromise by “creating a new partnership” which would allow “to put the transatlantic relationship back together” (Asmus, 2004, pp. 135-136). The cooperation between both continents has become especially significant during the current economic crisis which demonstrates that American power has its limits. In order to meet future challenges and avoid economic and political chaos, Americans and Europeans need to develop new patterns of collaboration and pay sufficient

50 attention to the rising importance of Latin America, India and Asian countries. There are many new hopes that the start of the Obama presidency and the return of France to the military command of NATO may provide a new opportunity to strengthen transatlantic relationships considerably.

3.2 The Lack of Balance Between Hard and Soft Power The question of American power rightly seems to be one of the most interesting and challenging issues in the realm of international relations. Many distinguished and prominent scholars have tried to give it a clear and comprehensive explanation. Various characterizations of power have already been given on the basis of different theoretical approaches and practical instances. However, in certain cases, it is still difficult to comprehend its aspects and fully reveal in what respects it affects complex political decisions that often make a huge impact on people's everyday lives. In order to explain the concept of power in more detail, it is necessary to refer to Joseph S. Nye's ideas. Importantly, he mentions that power should be perceived as “the ability to do things and control others” and explains that it usually depends on “possession of resources” (Nye 2004, p. 117). Looking from this perspective, it becomes evident that there is a close link between the necessity to secure harmonious and undisturbed life of any society and timely action to protect vital interests of the country if need be. However, it is very difficult to attain necessary objectives by relying merely on military capabilities. Diplomatic measures alone sometimes happen to be insufficient as well. Therefore most states strive to maintain a delicate balance between both types of leverage which are usually referred to as hard and soft power. The term “hard power” is usually described as “the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will” (Nye, 2003, p. 1). In this context, the United States should be regarded as a very powerful country because it possesses a wide range of modern weaponry and innovative military technologies at its disposal. Charles Krauthammer indicates that “American military spending exceeds that of the next twenty countries combined” (Krauthammer, 2002, p. 7). Campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq and the rapid overthrow of Saddam Hussein serve as good examples of the American military preeminence. Besides, the U.S. is capable to exert a strong economic pressure upon other countries through its extensive financial system. By refusing to make investments in South Korea or Mexico, for instance, it can seriously damage the economy of these countries. The term “soft power” in the meantime is defined as “the ability to get what you want by

51 attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals” (Nye, 2003, p. 1). The United States is much weaker in this respect because important opportunities to use its cultural heritage, technological superiority, national business brands and political ideals as a means to extend to other nations are often missed. During last eight years, for instance, very little attention was paid to such important issues as the climate change, negative impacts of globalization and healthcare inequalities around the world. The Bush administration is strongly condemned by its opponents for concentrating merely on the military power of the United States. The idea about preemptive action, which had been included into the Bush doctrine, raised much awe and concern on the international level. According to Scott A. Silverstone, international debates about the American military capabilities have been especially sensitive because “war against Iraq was more widely seen as an illegitimate abuse of American power” (Silverstone, 2007, p. 173). Excessive reliance on coercion was particularly damaging to the reputation of the United States in the Middle East. Some time ago people living in that region were eager to drink Coca-Cola, listen to American music or watch popular Hollywood films via the satellite. In other words, they could make a clear distinction between American culture and the U.S politics. During recent years the anti-American sentiment grew much stronger. At present, most inhabitants of this region, except the majority of Israelis, tend to reject almost everything that is related to America. Frequent burnings of the American flag as well as George W. Bush's images and violent attacks on the U.S. embassies in predominantly Muslim countries such as Yemen or Indonesia show that the situation is getting worse. This growing hatred stems from the inability of the American government to look for necessary compromises and present its long-term political objectives in this region in a more attractive manner. According to Joshua Kurlantzik, such a serious situation is a direct consequence of “the excesses of the war on terror” which have undermined “the attractiveness of American values, since that attractiveness rests in part on foreign perceptions of the United States as a humane and lawful actor on the global stage.” (Kurlantzik, 2005, p. 422). The refusal of the Bush administration to apply Geneva Conventions to all terrorist suspects captured by the U.S armed forces as well as the torture scandal at the prison of Abu Ghraib undermined all attempts of the United States to be more acceptable to the Arab word and the entire international community. It may reveal, at least in part, why not all objectives of the U.S., no matter how important or urgent they were, had been attained quickly and efficiently despite America's military preeminence. The inclination to apply preemptive or preventive action or breach the international law proved that the forty-third president had always been more keen “to follow Machiavelli's dictum that it is far better to be feared than to be loved, and better to compel than to attract” (Peter van Ham, 2007, p.

52 47). However, the Machiavellian approach to contemporary politics can hardly be acceptable to the international world order of the twenty-first century.

3.3. Three Major Mistakes of the Bush Administration At the end of the presidency of George W. Bush, much attention was paid to his political heritage and greatest challenges to the foreign policy of the United States. It should be remembered that after the attacks of 9/11 the Bush administration acted so swiftly and resolutely as if American power had almost no limitations. The world, in the meantime, witnessed manifestations of the military might of the U.S. army during two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It should be remembered that George W Bush's initial objectives were twofold: to rally the shocked nation behind him and initiate the extensive fight against Islamic terrorism. According to Robert G. Kaufman, the president undertook an enormously difficult task to destroy “the culture of tyranny and oppression that spawns radical, implacably aggressive despotism” (Kaufman, 2008, p. 41). Other evaluations were more pessimistic. Analyzing the situation, Zbigniew Brzezinski was very critical to aggressive steps taken by America and he stated that the president had played the role of “the vigilante mobilizing domestic fears to pursue a self-declared existential struggle against the forces of evil” (Brzezinski, 2007, p. 179). After eight years of his presidency, however, it became evident that America's commitment to change the Middle East and push it closer the Western model of democracy had produced highly ambivalent results. It is possible to distinguish three major blunders which not only overlap with each other but haunt the presidential legacy of George W. Bush. The decision to invade Iraq without adequate preparation for the long-term insurgency is considered to be one of the greatest mistakes of his administration. The supporters of the presidential policies maintained that the toppling of Saddam Hussein was going to be an easy task having in mind great sufferings of the Iraqi people. But contrary to their optimistic expectations, the Iraqi society did not respond as positively to the American presence as expected. Thomas P. M. Barnett described the ambition of George W. Bush to democratize Iraq as “an unrealistic goal” (Barnett, 2009, p. 66). The president supported his position by reminding the international public that it was absolutely necessary to avoid future nuclear attacks on American cities. According to Robert J. Lieber, “it was believed that the timetable could drop to as little as one year if the Iraqis succeeded in buying or stealing plutonium or highly enriched uranium” (Lieber, 2007, p. 136). There existed strong suspicions that less predictable nuclear states such as Pakistan or Russia might secretly provide the dictator with necessary materials to create a nuclear bomb. All arguments about the possibility to use strategies of deterrence and containment against Iraq were also rejected quite quickly. The risk of a potential

53 nuclear conflict seemed to be extremely high because Saddam Hussein tended to act like “a gambler and reckless expansionist” and deliberately ignored “information and advice that differed from his own preferences” (Lieber, 2007, p. 207). Having these factors in mind, George W. Bush's decision to invade the country and destroy the regime in advance was accepted by the American society as a much lesser evil. The inability to find any weapons of mass destruction and bring the insurgency to a halt was often explained by the critics of the Bush administration as a consequence of the misuse of intelligence. Much emphasis was also put on “pressures for rapid results” and the lack of armed forces “to confront and control the widespread lawlessness” (Lynch and Singh, pp. 168 and 170). After dismantling previous political and social structures of the Hussein regime, the U.S. military proved to be incapable to provide any effective alternatives to them. The situation became very complicated because “the United States seemed to focus only on its hard power rather than its soft power” (Nye, 2004, p. 115). As a result the initial task to enter the country appeared to be much easier than sustaining the process of nation-building and providing each citizen of Iraq with a decent opportunity to create his or her welfare by legitimate means. Washington top officials happened to be ready to extol the military superiority of the United States and reluctant to take measured diplomatic steps, collaborating with neighboring countries and providing sound economic and social solutions to long-festering problems of Iraq. According to Thomas P. M. Barnett, growing discontent with America as a global actor undermined the attempts of the Bush administration to successfully implement “their own grand strategy of reshaping the Middle East” (Barnett, 2009, p. 27). In fact, most Muslim leaders, even moderate ones, considered the Iraqi campaign either as a process of neo-colonization or as a postmodern crusade. Therefore the Bush administration shifted the focus of attention from preemption to democratization There is little doubt that the arrogant behavior of the Bush administration has contributed to the formation of the negative attitude towards the operation “Iraqi Freedom” in the Arab world and elsewhere. At present, different ethnic groups that occupy separate parts of Iraq “are already becoming de facto self-governing” (Brzezinski and Scowcroft, 2008, p. 42). The prospect of the disintegration of Iraq into separate parts can provoke a major crisis which might easily be transferred to neighboring states and inflame the entire Middle East. To prevent this political nightmare from materializing, the Obama administration is expected to encourage the nationalistic sentiment among the inhabitants of Iraq by using diplomatic means instead of military ones and providing financial and economic assistance. If the Kurds, the Shiites and the Sunnis succeed in putting their hostilities behind and start regarding themselves as a single and united nation, the

54 stability within the country will be attained much quicker. If the process of inner reconciliation does not occur, chances are that the Middle East will fall into uncontrollable chaos. Naturally, this pessimistic scenario might contravene long-term interests of the United States, encourage terrorist organizations to take action and cause additional threats to the survival of Israel as a sovereign and democratic state. Failed attempts to crush the resistance of the Taliban and accelerate the process of reconstruction in Afghanistan constitute the second great mistake of the forty-third president. According to Marie Cocco, an influential political observer, the Bush administration was careless enough to pay too little attention to “the country where the terrorists had a haven, so that it has devolved once again into corruption, a flourishing drug trade and violent, regional factionalism” (Cocco, 2008, p. 2). Unluckily, the democratic model of governance was severely compromised in Afghanistan due to the failure of the U.S. government to reconstruct the country at least in part. In one of his interviews the president of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai made clear references to the Cold War period to explain why the Taliban remains so powerful in his country: The world pushed us to fight the Soviets. And those who did it walked away and left all the mess spread around. September 11 is a consequence of this. [...] Radicalism became not only an ideological tool against the Soviets but a way forward economically. The more radical you presented yourself, the more money the West gave you. [...] The moderates were undermined. Afghan history and nationalism were called atheism. The more you spoke of radicalism, the better you were treated. That's what we are paying for now. (Hamid Karzai interviewed by Baker, 2008, pp. 32-33)

By commenting on the damaging impact of the West, Hamid Karzai made a clear reference to America's role during the Afghan War with the Soviet army. From 1979 to 1989, armed groups of mujaheddins were unofficially financed mainly by the United States and Saudi Arabia. Paradoxically, the process of radicalization was supported by the American leadership since these actions seemed rational in the context of the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, ethnic conflicts and religious disagreements among different groups of Afghans were no longer deemed important to the rest of the world. According to Amir Lechner, after some time these experienced fighters were included into the framework of the Taliban while young radicals became useful to the newly-created Al-Qaeda network that sought to give “a boost for the global jihadist movement” and create “a united Muslim nation” which would defeat western societies by means of terrorism (Lechner, 2008, p.1). Consequently, the United States and leading European countries were turned into two primary targets of attack. The invasion of the U.S. military into Afghanistan after 9/11 was understood by most Afghans as an inevitable continuation of the previous warfare. Although the United States managed to achieve a quick military victory over the Taliban, the Bush administration failed to develop any long-term plan of reconstruction of the

55 country. Civilian casualties and the weak leadership of the Afghan president Hamid Karzai contributed to the sense of disillusionment among local inhabitants and evoked strong apprehensions of a state failure. Administrative theft, widespread drug-related bribery and various forms of fraud also diminished the prospects of sound economic development severely. According to the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, Afghanistan was ranked 176th out of 180 countries in 2008. (The table of the Corruption Perception Index is provided in Appendix II.) The members of the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda network in the meantime took advantage of the situation by increasing their influence, intensifying struggles with the U.S army and gaining huge revenues from the drug trade. Brent Scowcroft characterized the situation in Afghanistan as a successful attempt of terrorists “to recoup, rejuvenate, and operate” (Brzezinski and Scowcroft, 2008, p. 38). This implies that leading American politicians and think tanks made a big mistake by not taking into consideration lessons of history and all other subtle factors that could undermine the aspirations to import democracy to the Middle East. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, George W. Bush simply did not understand that it was impossible “to create a modern, centralized, democratic state in Afghanistan from the top down using essentially foreign troops to impose such a solution.” (Brzezinski interviewed by Dennis Stute, 2008, p. 2). In this case, the dominance of the hard power over the soft power was evident and the lack of balance between them did much harm to the future of Afghanistan. To put it simply, George W. Bush's decision to revise the status quo by transforming Afghanistan into “a free and stable democracy” was quite attractive in theory but highly unsuccessful in practice (Bush, Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment, 2003, p. 5). Strong hostility between the United States and Iranian leaders is considered to be the third blunder of George W. Bush's foreign policy. Looking from the historical perspective, the relationships between these two countries were quite friendly until 1979 when the rule of the Shah was suddenly brought to an end. As Robert J. Lieber has explained, the Shah “owed his throne to a 1953 coup engineered by the CIA” and conservative orders of the Iranian society regarded the U.S as “the guarantor for policies [...] they detested” (Lieber, 2007, p. 129). His attempts to modernize the country with the assistance of the United States provoked strong discontent among the leading mullahs and caused the Islamic revolution of Iran. The Ayatollah Khomeini's rise to power and the hostage crisis in the U.S. embassy in Tehran weakened the diplomatic cooperation between both states. Iran's aspirations to enrich uranium despite warnings from the international community and strict economic sanctions, which had been mostly initiated by the United States, transformed into two additional reasons for mutual hostility. After being elected president of the

56 United States, George W. Bush inherited the discord between two countries from his predecessors. However, he brought even more antagonism to the surface by including Iran into the list of countries making the so-called “axis of evil” (Bush, 2002, State of the Union Address, p. 2). According to Samina Yasmeen, a categorical position of the U.S. president was interpreted by most political and religious leaders of Iran as well as ordinary people living in the Middle East as a clear sign of the “anti-Muslim bias in the Bush Doctrine” (Yasmeen, 2006, p. 98). There were widespread fears among the representatives of the Iranian political elite that the Bush administration might turn to preemptive action in order to stop their country from developing nuclear weapons. Washington officials, in the meantime, analyzed all available data trying to assess objectively how serious the Iranian threat to the American security might become. Staff Report of the House Permanent Select Committee on the Intelligence Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy of 2006 indicated that “Iran could have a nuclear weapon sometime in the beginning to the middle of the next decade” but the information was far from being complete at that time (Staff Report, 2006, p. 10). It had been frequently emphasized that the military conflict with Iran was considered to be quite real by the leading members of George W. Bush's administration. Such a dramatic turn of events might have resulted in unpredictable and devastating consequences for the entire Middle East as well as for the United States. According to Brent Scowcroft, the decision to attack Iran would most likely provoke “a general Middle East conflict in which the costs of Iraq would look minuscule” (Brzezinski and Scowcroft, 2008, p. 50). In fact, there has been a widespread agreement among American politicians and observers that the best solution would be to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, after analyzing all potential advantages and disadvantages, it has become evident that preventive attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities and military bases would neither hasten the regime change nor eliminate nuclear and terrorist threats completely. Thus, instead of initiating a new costly war with Iran, political and military leaders of the United States have chosen to limit Iran's access to advanced technologies and nuclear material. Numerous diplomatic steps were taken with the assistance of leading European countries, the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency. However these attempts gave no results because the Iranian leadership aimed to “buy valuable time to improve and expand their nuclear programs, extract as many carrots as possible, and play for legitimacy on the world stage” (Bolton, 2009, p. 2) Taking into consideration the Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's hostility to the United States and his ambition to turn Iran into a nuclear state, George W. Bush encountered a very complex political and diplomatic riddle. On the one hand, it was clear that Iran had earned a reputation of the leading sponsor of terrorism by supporting such organizations as Hamas and

57 Hezbollah. On the other hand, the United States had already been involved in two military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although, the forty-third president rejected military plans to extend the warfare into Iran, he was unable to find peaceful and diplomatic solutions to the Iranian problem as well. According to Thomas P. M. Barnett, “there was never any doubt among Western regional experts that Iran would benefit from America's decisions to topple both the Taliban and Saddam, its two neighboring enemies” (Barnett, 2009, p. 26). Interestingly, the Bush administration took very little action to change this troubling geopolitical situation. Therefore George W. Bush has been frequently blamed for failing either to block the rise of Iranian military and economic powers with the assistance of the international community or to communicate more intensively with some moderate Iranian officials in order to achieve some kind of mutual agreement. It is frequently stated that more decisive diplomatic steps of the Bush administration would have diminished the aggressiveness of this state. According to Robert Baer, due to the inactivity of the United States “Iran has evolved from a state with a third-rate military and a first- rate terrorist apparatus to a modern-day imperialist power” which can threaten its neighbors and exert strong political influence in such countries as Lebanon, Syria or Egypt (Baer, 2008, p. 1). Besides, its economic, financial and military potential, nuclear ambitions as well as the cooperation with Russia to acquire advanced technologies and weaponry cause many apprehensions in Israel and Saudi Arabia. The tension is so strong that the Israeli government might consider the option of a nuclear strike against Iran. Meanwhile the Saudi government is likely to assume the role of a moderate mediator between the United States and Iran. However, no reliable predictions of the future can be made since innovative ways of addressing the Iranian question still need to be proposed by the newly-elected president Barrack Obama and his administration. 3.4. Difficult Challenges in the Wake of the Bush Era During eight years of George W. Bush's presidency, many political and strategic mistakes were made and the prestige of the United States suffered several major blows. Firstly, two wars in the Middle East proved to be unsuccessful despite seemingly quick military victories. Secondly, George W. Bush undermined the international credibility of the U.S. by refusing to comply to international legal standards and allowing the usage of physical interrogation techniques against potential enemy combatants. Due to his inability to achieve political compromises on the international level and apply America's soft power, the anti-American sentiment became much stronger in different parts of the world. Thirdly, the economy of the United States entered the recession and after some time caused a global economic crisis. Therefore the American society started turning away from the Republicans and encouraged the Democrats to initiate rapid

58 political and economic reforms. These tendencies became especially obvious during the last presidential election in the United States of America. In the course of the recent presidential race the majority of the local population ardently supported the Democratic candidate Barrack H. Obama while relatively smaller groups of citizens campaigned for the Republican nominee John McCain. The big question of the election was whether Barrack H. Obama or John McCain would be more successful in providing a clear alternative to the Bush administration. Both candidates were exploiting the media and discussing such controversial questions as ending the Iraq War, economic problems, and a necessary relief for the middle class. In order to win the election Barrack H. Obama had to enumerate mistakes of George W. Bush and call for a change incessantly. Meanwhile, John McCain needed to assure Americans that he really is a reformer. However, John McCain did not succeed to establish himself as the Republican rebel and he represented a possibility of political stagnation in the eyes of many Americans. As the presidential victory of Barrack H. Obama, and a huge voter turnout demonstrate, policies of George W. Bush have left the Republican regime in shambles and the recovery process is going to be slow and painful for them. According to Michael P. McDonald, the presidential elections of 2008 can truly be termed historic because “approximately 131.3 million persons cast a vote for president, which is 61.6% of those eligible to vote“ (McDonald, 2008, p. 1). Following Stephen Skowronek's typology, this situation is clearly related to the politics of disjunction that has become especially obvious during the final two years of George W. Bush's presidency. Interestingly, reactions of Europeans and their political leaders in different countries concerning the election of Barrack H. Obama have also been varied: from the exhilaration in Germany to cautious comments in the Baltic countries. Importantly, due to the financial and economic crisis as well as military problems in the Middle East, the United States has been challenged to reaffirm its dominant status on the global arena. Thus, the newly-elected president Barrack H. Obama needs to find his own way to lead the country into the future and shape new relationships with its partners and opponents. In his inaugural address Barrack H. Obama has indicated the most urgent foreign policy challenges that need to be met by his administration by stating: “We will begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people and forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan. With old friends and former foes, we will work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat and roll back the specter of a warming planet”(Obama, 2009a, p. 3). By setting these priorities Barrack H. Obama has clearly endeavored to demonstrate that his presidency will truly be different from that of his predecessor. George W. Bush, indeed, was highly reluctant to initiate a wide political discussion on the military withdrawal from Iraq and claimed that the process of democratization would require much time, patience and effort. It was believed by the members of the Bush administration that any deadlines

59 for the withdrawal of the U.S. military from Iraq might be harmful to America's interests in the Middle East. Barrack H. Obama, on the contrary, has frequently made numerous promises to bring the Iraq War to a quick end. However, his early pledges to achieve this objective in the period of sixteen months have been rejected as unrealistic. After being elected president, Barrack H. Obama was cautious enough not to mention exact deadlines. Ambiguous explanations about the necessity to develop the innovative approach in order to solve the Iraq problem demonstrated the initial unwillingness of the Obama administration to speculate over this delicate subject. Importantly, during his recent visit to Camp Lejeune, the incumbent revealed his plans by stating: “Let me say this as plainly as I can: by August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end” (Obama, 2009b, p. 4). These words have been widely interpreted as an eloquent proof that the promise of change given to the American society will be fulfilled. However, some political observers remain quite pessimistic about the dawn of a new political era. According to John R. Bolton, “continuity between the two presidencies is hardly reassuring” since Barrack H. Obama's attempts either to convince Iran to forget its “strategic objective of acquiring deliverable nuclear weapons” or to persuade the leadership of North Korea “to abandon its nuclear program” seem to be equally unsuccessful like these of George W. Bush (Bolton, 2009, p. 1). The prospects of extending the warfare into bordering regions of Pakistan as well as troubling hostilities in Afghanistan add even more tension to the current political situation. According to Aryn Baker, “the war in Afghanistan threatens to destabilize an entire region” and for this reason “it has become America's biggest foreign policy challenge” (Baker, 2009, p 19). Consequently, Barrack H. Obama is simply left with no other option but to continue fighting in the Middle East despite his wish to end the warfare as soon as possible. George W. Bush's refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol caused a storm of protests worldwide in 2005. Therefore by making a clear commitment to fight the climate change Barrack H. Obama sought to separate himself from the heritage of the previous administration once more. However, no major breakthroughs in this sphere have yet been achieved. As Jonh M. Broder points out, contrary to optimistic expectations, Barrack H. Obama's “administration has taken a cautious and rather passive role on the issue” and newly-appointed Washington officials have been striving to persuade the international community that “they need time to gauge the American public's appetite for an ambitious carbon reduction scheme before leading any international effort” (Broder, 2009, p. 1). Having all these political trends in mind, it is possible to predict that George W. Bush's presidential heritage may affect the presidency of Barrack Obama much stronger than he would like to admit. However, much more time and scholarly evidence are needed to make an

60 extensive evaluation of the presidency of Barrack H. Obama and his leadership style. Besides, it is still too early to make any categorical assumptions but many interesting observations might be presented by the leading scholars later. The legacy of George W. Bush, in the meantime, will intrigue many historians.

CONCLUSION

1. The research question of this thesis has been oriented towards the analysis of the Bush doctrine and its influence on the presidential leadership and American power. Looking from the theoretical perspective, Mary Kaldor seeks to prove that George W. Bush's policies are related to idealism while Robert G. Kaufman emphasizes certain elements of realism. James Kurth, in the meantime, examines George W. Bush's legacy from the perspective of neo-realism. In the course of the analysis it has become clear that it might be very difficult to attribute the forty-third president to a concrete school of political thought because their proponents cannot reach a common agreement among themselves on this complex question. 2. Obviously, the Bush doctrine came into full-fledged existence after the 9/11 attacks. At first, the most important aspects of the new approach to the national security were presented in a series of George W. Bush's speeches. After some time various proposals of the president were included into the National Security Strategy of the United States of 2002. In fact, a prominent political commentator Charles Krauthammer is considered to be the first observer to apply this term and introduce it into the academic discourse as well as public discussions. At present, political scientists hold extremely varied views about the doctrine and its main elements. No common position has been developed in academic circles on the single definition of the Bush doctrine so far. Despite all misunderstandings and different interpretations, it is evident that by developing his doctrine and applying it in practice George W. Bush has endeavored to give an adequate response to the Al-Qaeda terrorist network and enhance the national security of the United States. This complex issue has provoked many debates and it has also divided the scholarly world as well as political circles. However, the newly elected president Barrack H. Obama is unable to fully reject the Bush doctrine as insignificant because he needs to guarantee the continuity in the realm of American foreign policy. 3. The number of constituents of the Bush doctrine may vary in the works of different scholars depending on their political stance. Interestingly, the Chinese scholar Zhiyuan Cui who holds quite a critical opinion of the Bush era, has placed a special emphasis on preemption as an

61 essential element of the doctrine. Meanwhile, such scholars as Robert Kagan and Robert G. Kaufman, who are in favor of George W. Bush's policies, have concentrated on the spread of democracy. In addition, Robert G. Kaufman has been quite unwilling to accept the idea of unilateralism as related to the Bush doctrine. In this thesis, however, equal attention is paid to all three basic elements: preemption and prevention, unilateralism and the spread of democracy. Although the terms “prevention” and “preemption” are often used interchangeably while speaking about the Bush doctrine, the essential difference between the two is also extensively explained in this paper. Considerable attention to these subtle but significant details truly allows to analyze the Bush doctrine more objectively and helps to acknowledge its negative and positive impact without relying on preconceptions. 4. The analysis of societal and political consequences of the 9/11 attacks allows to perceive in more depth in what ways the American society has been traumatized by the event. Obviously, the development of the doctrine and as well as its implementation in Iraq were necessary for the Bush administration to demonstrate to the world that America's vulnerability has been temporary. The forty-third president of the United States decided to make an advantage of this extreme situation and strengthen his political position by declaring a war against terrorists without having a clear exit strategy and exploiting his presidential powers as a Commander-in-Chief in wartime. At that dramatic period most Americans sought to diminish potential dangers by supporting decisive actions of George W. Bush in the Middle East. In the meantime, the president's harsh remarks on the axis of evil as well as his inability to cooperate with the United Nations in order to legitimize the invasion into Iraq provoked many apprehensions among European political leaders especially in France and Germany. Importantly, military victories in the Middle East proved to be insufficient and produced ambiguous results. In Afghanistan the democratic model of governance was compromised by corruption and lawlessness. Although the war in Iraq has been condemned worldwide as a big mistake and the insurgency has remained a problem in Iraq after the troop surge, initial signs of democracy might already be seen in this country since the latest provincial elections have been successful and quite peaceful. This situation is sometimes regarded by the Republicans as a strategic achievement conditioned by the Bush doctrine. 5. During the presidential years of George W. Bush international diplomatic measures proved to be insufficient to persuade Iranian religious and political leaders, namely the president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Ayatollah Khomeini, to abandon their nuclear ambitions. In this context it becomes obvious that the global peace and international security can merely be ensured through conscientious negotiations and long-lasting informal dialogues with partners and adversaries. However, George W. Bush still deserves some merit because his presidency has been marked by

62 extraordinary challenges of historic proportions. 6. The leadership style of George W. Bush's presidency has raised many questions to academicians as well as political practitioners. Another big challenge to the scholarly world has been to invent new analytical tools, which would allow to examine the presidential leadership in a more systematic way. A prominent American scholar Stephen Skowronek has developed an interesting theory which can be successfully used to analyze the leadership of American presidents by separating them into four different types. This thesis argues that George W. Bush has changed his type of presidency during eight years in office. Stephen Skowronek's approach is instrumental for the analysis since it provides innovative possibilities to evaluate George W. Bush's presidency in relation to the politics of articulation and the politics of disjunction. After investigating transformations of George W. Bush's leadership, it is possible to conclude that he fulfills all criteria for orthodox innovators except one. Besides his later policies can be labeled disjunctive due to the disintegration of the conservative regime and strong disagreements within the Republican Party. In fact, during his second term the president has met all criteria for disjunctive leaders. Looking from this perspective, it is possible to say that George W. Bush's leadership style has been quite dynamic all the time. 7. As a result of political and strategic miscalculations in the process of nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq, the prestige of the United States diminished. Torture scandals at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib damaged the credibility of the U.S. worldwide. Current economic and credit crises have already done much harm to the economic dominance of America. All these events have intensified the international debate about the drawbacks of the unipolar world and the need to construct a new multilateral system to deal with contemporary challenges in the realms of security, foreign policy and economics. If China and Russia are enthusiastic about the prospects of the multipolar world in order to promote their interests, the United States and Europe are still quite skeptical about this idea with the exception of France and Germany. George W. Bush's failures in the Middle East have been turned into an impetus to investigate the limits of American power. The political elite of the United States, at present, seem to be interested in combining hard and soft power in order to achieve better results in the realm of foreign policy. In this respect, one can easily distinguish the major difference between George W. Bush and Barrack H. Obama. The former president has been quite dependent on hard power and the incumbent is much more eager to apply soft power. It is essential for Barrack H. Obama to make necessary political compromises and initiate urgent reforms if he wants to maintain America's leading position in the contemporary world. However, he has already been warned by the Republicans not to be over-dependent on soft power.

63 8. The United States started its existence as an independent country by defying imperial ambitions of the Great Britain. Therefore remarks on the American Empire cause a sense of uneasiness among most Americans. However, it is impossible to deny that after the Cold War the United States has become the dominant military, economic and cultural superpower. For this reason, there have been quite many temptations for the Bush administration to believe that they can control the world without the assistance of their allies and partners in different regions of the world. The Iraq War may serve as an eloquent example of this dangerous tendency. Importantly, the American Empire is challenging not only due to its impressive military reach but because of cultural and democratic attractiveness. In fact, the arrogance of policymakers of the United States have diminished America's diplomatic influence considerably. Thus the Obama administration should restore the balance between hard and soft power. However, it might be difficult for the newly- elected president and his team to reject the legacy of George W. Bush for two reasons: political challenges are really complex and a limited degree of political continuity is essential to avoid unnecessary upheavals in the realm of foreign policy of the United States.

64 LIST OF REFERENCES

Books

1. Bacevich, Andrew J. (2002). American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy. Fifth Printing. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

2. Barnett, Thomas P. M. (2009). Great Powers: America and the World After Bush. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.

3. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. (2007). Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower. New York: Basic Books.

4. Brzezinski, Zbigniew and Scowcroft, Brent. (2008). America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy. New York: Basic Books.

5. Kaufman, Robert G. (2008). In Defence of the Bush Doctrine. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.

6. Lieber, Robert J. (2007). The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

7. Lynch, Timothy J. and Singh, Robert S. (2008). After Bush: The Case for Continuity in American Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

8. Milkis, Sydney M. and Nelson, Michael. (2008). The American Presidency: Origins and Development, 1776-2007. 5th edition. Washington, D.C.:CQ Press.

9. Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. (2005). War and the American Presidency. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company.

10. Silverstone, Scott A. (2007). Preventive War and American Democracy. London and New York: Routledge.

11. Skowronek, Stephen. (1997). The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton. Revised Edition. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

12. Skowronek, Stephen. (2008). Presidential Leadership in Political Time: Reprise and Reappraisal. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Scholarly Publications

13. Cox, Michael. (2004). Empire? The Bush Doctrine and the Lessons of History.// Held, David and Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias (ed.). American Power in the 21st Century. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, pp. 21-51.

14. Cui, Zhiyuan. (2004). The Bush Doctrine: A Chinese Perspective.// Held, David and Koenig-

65 Archibugi, Mathias (ed.). American Power in the 21st Century. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, pp. 241-251.

15. El-Affendi, Abdelwahab. (2004). Waiting for Armageddon: The “Mother of All Empires” and its Middle East Quagmire.// Held, David and Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias (ed.). American Power in the 21st Century. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, pp. 252-276.

16. Finlan, Alastair. (2006). International Security.// Buckley, Mary and Singh, Robert (ed.). The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 150-163.

17. Ikenberry, John G. (2004). Liberal Hegemony or Empire? American Power in the Age of Unipolarity.// Held, David and Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias (ed.). American Power in the 21st Century. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, pp. 83-113.

18. Kagan, Robert. (2004). Power and Weakness.// Held, David and Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias (ed.). American Power in the 21st Century. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, pp. 134-166.

19. Kagan, Robert. (2008). End of Dreams, Return of History.// Leffler, Melvyn P. and Legro, Jeffrey W. (ed.). To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 36-59.

20. Kaldor, Mary. (2004). American Power: From “Compellance” to Cosmopolitanism?// Held, David and Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias (ed.). American Power in the 21st Century. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, pp. 181-213.

21. King, Gary. (1993). The Methodology of Presidential Research.// Edwards III, G.C., Kessel J. H. and Rockman, B. A. (ed.). Researching the Presidency. Vital Questions, New Approaches. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 387-412.

22. Levy, Jack S. (2007). Preventive War and the Bush Doctrine.// Renshon, Stanley A. and Suedfeld, Peter. (ed.). Understanding the Bush Doctrine: Psychology and Strategy in an Age of Terrorism. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 175-200.

23. Nye, Joseph S. (2004). Hard Power, Soft Power, and “The War on Terrorism”.// Held, David and Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias (ed.). American Power in the 21st Century. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, pp. 114-133.

24. Peter van Ham. (2007). Power, Public Diplomacy, and the Pax Americana.// Melissen, Jan (ed). The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 47-66.

25. Quirk, Paul J. (2006). Presidential Competence.// Nelson, Michael (ed.). The Presidency and the Political System. Washington D.C.: CQ Press, pp. 136-169.

26. Renshon, Stanley A. (2007). The Bush Doctrine Considered.// Renshon, Stanley A. and Suefeld, Peter (ed.). Understanding the Bush Doctrine: Psychology and Strategy in an Age of Terrorism. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 1-37.

27. Ryan, Stephen. (2006). The United Nations.// Buckley, Mary and Singh, Robert (ed.). The

66 Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 173-188.

28. Singh, Robert. (2006). The Bush Doctrine.// Buckley, Mary and Singh, Robert (ed.). The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 12-31.

29. Yasmeen, Samina. (2006). India and Pakistan.// Buckley, Mary and Singh, Robert (ed.). The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 89-103.

Articles from International Journals

30. Asmus, Ronald D. (2005). Rethinking the EU: Why Washington Needs to Support European Integration. Survival. Vol.47, No. 3, pp. 93 -102.

31. Bennett, Andrew, and Elman, Colin. (2006). Qualitative Research. Recent Developments in Case Study Methods. Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 9, No.1, pp. 455-476.

32. Cox, Michael. (2007). Still the American Empire. Political Studies Review, Vol. 5, Issue 1, pp. 1-10.

33. Gordon, Philip H. (2002). NATO after 11 September, Survival, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 1-18.

34. Gordon, Philip H. (2006). The End of the Bush Revolution. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4, pp. 75-86.

35. Ikenberry, John G. (2002). America's Imperial Ambition. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 5, pp. 44-60.

36. Kurth, James. (2005). Global Threats and American Strategies: From Communism in 1955 to Islamism in 2005. Orbis,Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 631-648.

37. McDonald, Michael P. (2008).The Return of the Voter: Voter Turnout in the 2008 Presidential Election, The Forum: Vol. 6, Issue 4, Article 4, pp.1-12.

38. Yuan, Jing-dong. (2003). The Bush Doctrine: Chinese Perspectives and Responses. Asian Perspective, Vol. 27; No.4; pp.113-145.

39. Zhebin, Alexander. (2003). The Bush Doctrine, Russia and Korea. Asian Perspective,Vol. 27; No.4; pp.147-181.

Articles from the Press

40. Baker, Aryn. The Longest War. Time, April 20, 2009. Vol. 173, No. 16, pp. 16-21.

41. Baker, Aryn. The State of Afghanistan: An Exclusive Interview With Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Time. September 1, 2008.Vol. 172, No. 9, pp. 32-34.

67 42. Elliott, Michael. Farewell Tour. Time, June 23, 2008. Vol. 171, No. 25, p. 60.

Speeches and Addresses

43. Bush, George W. State of the Union Address. 29 January 2002, pp. 1-6. Found: http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/stateoftheunion2002.htm; Checked: 03 04 2009.

44. Bush, George, W. 9/11 Address to the Nation. 11 September 2001, pp. 1-2. Found: http://www.famous-speeches-and-speech-topics.info/presidential-speeches/george-w-bush-speech-9-11-address- to-the-nation.htm; Checked: 24 03 2009.

45. Bush, George W. Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the 9/11 Attacks. 20 September 2001, pp. 1-6. Found:http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/PDFFiles/George%20W.%20Bush%20- %20Joint%20Session%20Address%20on%20Terrorist%20Attacks.pdf Checked: 17 03 2009.

46. Bush, George W. Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York. 1 June 2002, pp.1-5. Found: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govdocs/docs/iraq/ 060102.pdf; Checked 17 03 2009.

47. Bush, George W. Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly. 12 September 2002, pp. 1-5. Found: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/un.htm; Checked:17 03 2009.

48. Bush, George W. President George W. Bush's Inaugural Address. 20 January 2001, pp. 1-3. Found: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html;Checked 08 11 2008. 49. Bush, George W. Remarks by the President to the National Endowment for Democracy. 06 October 2005, pp. 1-7. Found: http://www.ned.org/events/oct0605-Bush.html;Checked 08 02 2009. 50. Bush, George W. Bush to Lithuania: By Joining NATO Your Miracle of Freedom Goes On. 25 November 2002, pp. 1-2. Found:http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2002/November/ [email protected];Checked 17 11 2008.

51. Bush, George W. Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy. 06 November 2003, pp. 1-6. Found:http://www.ned.org/events/anniversary/20thAniv-Bush.html; Checked:08 02 2009.

52. Chirac, Jacques. Franco-British summit - Speech by M. Jacques Chirac at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. 18 November 2004, pp. 1-6. Found: http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Franco-British-summit-Speech-by-M,5721.html; Checked 14 11 2008.

53. Dominique de Villepin. Speech by M. Dominique de Villepin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the United Nations Security Council. 19 March 2003, pp. 1-3. Found: http://www.ambafrance- uk.org/article.php3?id_article=4917; Checked : 30 01 2009.

54. Powell, Collin. U.S. Secretary of State Collin Powell Adresses the U.N. 5 February 2003, pp.1-14. Found: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html; Checked: 20 02 2009.

55. Reagan, Ronald. Farewell Address to the Nation. 11 January 1989, pp.1-5. Found: http://www.ronaldreagan.com/sp_21.html;Checked 08 11 2008.

56. Barrack H. Obama. President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address, 21 January, 2009a, pp. 1-4.

68 Found: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/; Checked 02 03 2009.

57. Barrack, H. Obama. Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq. 27 February 2009b, pp. 1-6. Found: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama- Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/; Checked 02 04 2009.

Internet Websites and On-line Articles

58. Asmus, Ron. One Year On: Lessons From Iraq. Chaillot Paper, March 2004, No. 68, pp. 131-138. Found: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp068.pdf; Checked: 12 04 2009.

59. Baer, Robert. Iranian Resurrection. The National Interest Online, 30 October 2008, pp. 1-8. Found: http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20092; Checked: 12 04 2009.

60. Bolton, John R. Obama Promises Bush III on Iran. The Wall Street Journal, 2 January 2009, pp.1-3. Found: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123086106688148103.html; Checked: 12 04 2009.

61. Broder, John M. Obama, Who Vowed Rapid Action on Climate Change, Turns More Cautious. The New York Times, 10 April 2009, pp. 1-2. Found: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/11/us/politics/11climate.html?ref=energy-environment; Checked: 12 04 2009.

62. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Dilemma of the Last Sovereign. The American Interest Online, Autumn 2005, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 1-11. Found: http://www.the-american- interest.com/article.cfm?piece=56; Checked: 04 03 2009.

63. Cannato, Vincent J. What Will History Say? Time's On His Side. The Washington Post, 3 December 2006, pp.1-2. Found: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2006/12/01/AR2006120101497.html; Checked 08 11 2008.

64. Cilluffo, Frank J. and Rankin, Daniel. Fighting Terrorism. NATO Review. Winter 2001, No. 4, pp. 12-15. Found: http://www.nato.int/docu/rev-pdf/eng/0104-en.pdf; Checked: 05 02 2009.

65. Cocco, Marie. Soundbites the Least of Bush's Mistakes. The Washington Post, 13 November 2008, pp. 1-2. Found: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/11/soundbites_the_least_of_bushs.html; Checked: 12 04 2009.

66. Daalder, Ivo H. and Lindsay, James M. American Empire, Not 'If' but “What Kind'.The New York Times, 10 May 2003, pp. 1-3. Found: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/10/arts/american- empire-not-if-but-what-kind.html?pagewanted=all; Checked: 08 11 2008.

67. Dowd, Alan W. Elements of the Bush Doctrine Will Outlive the Bush Presidency. 5 May 2008, pp.1-3. Found: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2060;Checked: 06 04 2009.

68. Foner, Eric. What Will History Say? He's The Worst Ever. The Washington Post, 3 December

69 2006 , pp. 1-2. Found: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2006/12/01/AR2006120101509.html; Checked: 08 11 2008.

69. Ferguson, Niall. The Empire Slinks Back. 27 April 2003, pp. 1-7. Found: http://www.niallferguson.com/site/FERG/Templates/ArticleItem.aspx?pageid=147; Ckecked:14 04 2009.

70. Ignatieff, Michael. The American Empire: The Burden. New York Times Magazine, 5 January 2003, pp. 1-13. Found: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/pdf/NYTimesJan03Burden.pdf; Checked: 06 02 2009.

71. Kagan, Robert. Anti-Americanism's Deep Roots. The Washington Post, 19 June 2006, pp. 1-2. Found:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/18/AR2006061800900_pf.html; Checked: 06 04 2009.

72. Kagan, Robert. Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy. Reprinted from Foreign Affairs, July/ August 1996, pp. 1-8. Found: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm? fa=view&id=276; Checked: 25 03 2009.

73. Kesler, Charles R. Democracy and the Bush Doctrine. 26 January 2005, pp.1-6, Found: http:// www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.1218/article_detail.asp; Checked: 15 12 2008.

74. Krauthammer, Charles. Charlie Gibson's Gaffe. The Washington Post, 13 September 2008, pp. 1-2. Found: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/12/AR2008091202457.html; Checked: 06 04 2009.

75. Krauthammer, Charles. The Bush Doctrine, AMB, Kyoto and the New American Unilateralism. The Weekly Standard, 6 April 2001, Vol.006, Issue 36, pp. 1-7. Found: http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=474&R=13C1119C9F; Checked: 07 02 2009.

76. Krauthammer, Charles. The Unipolar Moment Revisited. The National Interest, Winter 2002/2003, Vol.70, pp. 5-17. Found: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/362/unipolar_moment_revisited.html; Checked: 06 02 2009.

77. Kurlantzik, Joshua.The Decline of American Soft Power. Current History, December 2005 / January 2006, pp. 419-424. Found: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm? fa=view&id=17781&prog=zch,zgp&proj=zusr; Checked: 15 01 2009.

78. Larres, Klaus. Mutual Incomprehension: U.S.-German Value Gaps beyond Iraq. The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2003, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 23-42. Found: http://www.twq.com/03spring/docs/03spring_larres.pdf; Checked: 13 02 2009.

79. Lechner, Amir. March of Jihad: The Evolution of the Global Jihadi Movement. Intersec, February 2008, pp. 1-3. Found:http://www.threatrate.com/MEDIA/MarchofJihadTheEvolutionoftheGlobalJihadi/tabid /126/Default.aspx; Checked:11 03 2009.

80. Mantho, Gerard Mark. The Bush Doctrine: Origins, Evolutions, Alternatives.The Project on

70 Defense Alternatives, Commonwealth Institute, April 2004, pp.1-33. Found: http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/0404mantho.pdf; Checked: 12 03 2009.

81. Mead, Russel Walter. The Case Against Europe. The Atlantic Monthly, April 2002, p. 1-2. Found:http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200204/mead; Checked: 08 11 2008.

82. Nye, Joseph. Propaganda Isn't the Way: Soft Power. International Herald Tribune, January 10 2003, pp. 1-2. Found: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1240/propaganda_isnt_the_way.html; Checked: 07 02 2009.

83. Smith, Scott. C. The Leadership of George W. Bush. 27 May 2004, pp. 1-2. Found: http://www.democraticunderground.com/articles/04/05/27_leader.html; Checked: 28 01 2009.

84. Stute, Dennis. Brzezinski: West Must Avoid Russia's Mistakes in Afghanistan. 16 October 2008, pp. 1-3. Found: http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3715692,00.html;Checked: 28 01 2009.

Documents

85. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002, pp. 1-35. Found: http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2002.pdf; Checked: 07 02 2009.

86. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2001, pp. 1-604. Found: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf; Checked: 07 02 2009.

87. Staff Report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy: Recognizing Iran as a Strategic Threat: An Intelligence Challenge for the United States. 23 August 2006, pp. 1-29. Found:http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps73446/IranReport082206v2.pdf; Checked:05 04 2009.

71 APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

The Approval of George W. Bush after 9/11

Date: 13 09 2001

Approve Disapprove No opinion 91% 7% 2%

Adapted from the poll conducted by The Washington and ABC News.

Source: Post-ABC Polls: Terrorist Attacks. 13 09 2001. Found: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data091401.htm; Checked 06 04 2009.

The Approval of George W. Bush at the End of the Presidency

Date: 17 01 2009

Approve Disapprove No opinion 33% 66% 2%

Adapted from the poll conducted by The Washington and ABC News.

Source: President Bush's Approval Ratings. 20 01 2009. Found: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/custom/2006/02/02/CU2006020201345.html;Checked 06 04 2009.

72 APPENDIX II

2008 CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX country country 2008 CPI surveys confidence range rank score used

1 Denmark 9,3 6 9.1 - 9.4

1 New Zealand 9,3 6 9.2 - 9.5

1 Sweden 9,3 6 9.2 - 9.4

4 Singapore 9,2 9 9.0 - 9.3

5 Finland 9,0 6 8.4 - 9.4

5 Switzerland 9,0 6 8.7 - 9.2

7 Iceland 8,9 5 8.1 - 9.4

7 Netherlands 8,9 6 8.5 - 9.1

9 Australia 8,7 8 8.2 - 9.1

9 Canada 8,7 6 8.4 - 9.1

11 Luxembourg 8,3 6 7.8 - 8.8

12 Austria 8,1 6 7.6 - 8.6

12 Hong Kong 8,1 8 7.5 - 8.6

14 Germany 7,9 6 7.5 - 8.2

14 Norway 7,9 6 7.5 - 8.3

16 Ireland 7,7 6 7.5 - 7.9

16 United Kingdom 7,7 6 7.2 - 8.1

18 Belgium 7,3 6 7.2 - 7.4

18 Japan 7,3 8 7.0 - 7.6

73 18 USA 7,3 8 6.7 - 7.7

21 Saint Lucia 7,1 3 6.6 - 7.3

22 Barbados 7,0 4 6.5 - 7.3

23 Chile 6,9 7 6.5 - 7.2

23 France 6,9 6 6.5 - 7.3

23 Uruguay 6,9 5 6.5 - 7.2

26 Slovenia 6,7 8 6.5 - 7.0

27 Estonia 6,6 8 6.2 - 6.9

28 Qatar 6,5 4 5.6 - 7.0

28 Saint Vincent and the 6,5 3 4.7 - 7.3 Grenadines

28 Spain 6,5 6 5.7 - 6.9

31 Cyprus 6,4 3 5.9 - 6.8

32 Portugal 6,1 6 5.6 - 6.7

33 Dominica 6,0 3 4.7 - 6.8

33 Israel 6,0 6 5.6 - 6.3

35 United Arab Emirates 5,9 5 4.8 - 6.8

36 Botswana 5,8 6 5.2 - 6.4

36 Malta 5,8 4 5.3 - 6.3

36 Puerto Rico 5,8 4 5.0 - 6.6

39 Taiwan 5,7 9 5.4 - 6.0

40 South Korea 5,6 9 5.1 - 6.3

74 41 Mauritius 5,5 5 4.9 - 6.4

41 Oman 5,5 5 4.5 - 6.4

43 Bahrain 5,4 5 4.3 - 5.9

43 Macau 5,4 4 3.9 - 6.2

45 Bhutan 5,2 5 4.5 - 5.9

45 Czech Republic 5,2 8 4.8 - 5.9

47 Cape Verde 5,1 3 3.4 - 5.6

47 Costa Rica 5,1 5 4.8 - 5.3

47 Hungary 5,1 8 4.8 - 5.4

47 Jordan 5,1 7 4.0 - 6.2

47 Malaysia 5,1 9 4.5 - 5.7

52 Latvia 5,0 6 4.8 - 5.2

52 Slovakia 5,0 8 4.5 - 5.3

54 South Africa 4,9 8 4.5 - 5.1

55 Italy 4,8 6 4.0 - 5.5

55 Seychelles 4,8 4 3.7 - 5.9

57 Greece 4,7 6 4.2 - 5.0

58 Lithuania 4,6 8 4.1 - 5.2

58 Poland 4,6 8 4.0 - 5.2

58 Turkey 4,6 7 4.1 - 5.1

61 Namibia 4,5 6 3.8 - 5.1

62 Croatia 4,4 8 4.0 - 4.8

75 62 Samoa 4,4 3 3.4 - 4.8

62 Tunisia 4,4 6 3.5 - 5.5

65 Cuba 4,3 4 3.6 - 4.8

65 Kuwait 4,3 5 3.3 - 5.2

67 El Salvador 3,9 5 3.2 - 4.5

67 Georgia 3,9 7 3.2 - 4.6

67 Ghana 3,9 6 3.4 - 4.5

70 Colombia 3,8 7 3.3 - 4.5

70 Romania 3,8 8 3.4 - 4.2

72 Bulgaria 3,6 8 3.0 - 4.3

72 China 3,6 9 3.1 - 4.3

72 Macedonia (Former 3,6 6 2.9 - 4.3 Yugoslav Republic of)

72 Mexico 3,6 7 3.4 - 3.9

72 Peru 3,6 6 3.4 - 4.1

72 Suriname 3,6 4 3.3 - 4.0

72 Swaziland 3,6 4 2.9 - 4.3

72 Trinidad and Tobago 3,6 4 3.1 - 4.0

80 Brazil 3,5 7 3.2 - 4.0

80 Burkina Faso 3,5 7 2.9 - 4.2

80 Morocco 3,5 6 3.0 - 4.0

80 Saudi Arabia 3,5 5 3.0 - 3.9 80 Thailand 3,5 9 3.0 - 3.9

76 85 Albania 3,4 5 3.3 - 3.4

85 India 3,4 10 3.2 - 3.6

85 Madagascar 3,4 7 2.8 - 4.0

85 Montenegro 3,4 5 2-5 - 4.0

85 Panama 3,4 5 2.8 - 3.7

85 Senegal 3,4 7 2.9 - 4.0

85 Serbia 3,4 6 3.0 - 4.0

92 Algeria 3,2 6 2.9 - 3.4

92 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3,2 7 2.9 - 3.5

92 Lesotho 3,2 5 2.3 - 3.8

92 Sri Lanka 3,2 7 2.9 - 3.5

96 Benin 3,1 6 2.8 - 3.4

96 Gabon 3,1 4 2.8 - 3.3

96 Guatemala 3,1 5 2.3 - 4.0

96 Jamaica 3,1 5 2.8 - 3.3

96 Kiribati 3,1 3 2.5 - 3.4

96 Mali 3,1 6 2.8 - 3.3

102 Bolivia 3.0 6 2.8 - 3.2

102 Djibouti 3,0 4 2.2 - 3.3

102 Dominican Republic 3,0 5 2.7 - 3.2

102 Lebanon 3,0 4 2.2 - 3.6

102 Mongolia 3,0 7 2.6 - 3.3

77 102 Rwanda 3,0 5 2.7 - 3.2

102 Tanzania 3,0 7 2.5 - 3.3

109 Argentina 2,9 7 2.5 - 3.3

109 Armenia 2,9 7 2.6 - 3.1

109 Belize 2,9 3 1.8 - 3.7

109 Moldova 2,9 7 2.4 - 3.7

109 Solomon Islands 2,9 3 2.5 - 3.2

109 Vanuatu 2,9 3 2.5 - 3.2

115 Egypt 2,8 6 2.4 - 3.2

115 Malawi 2,8 6 2.4 - 3.1

115 Maldives 2,8 4 1.7 - 4.3

115 Mauritania 2,8 7 2.2 - 3.7

115 Niger 2,8 6 2.4 - 3.0

115 Zambia 2,8 7 2.5 - 3.0

121 Nepal 2,7 6 2.4 - 3.0

121 Nigeria 2,7 7 2.3 - 3.0

121 Sao Tome and Principe 2,7 3 2.1 - 3.1

121 Togo 2,7 6 1.9 - 3.7

121 Viet Nam 2,7 9 2.4 - 3.1

126 Eritrea 2,6 5 1.7 - 3.6

126 Ethiopia 2,6 7 2.2 - 2.9

126 Guyana 2,6 4 2.4 - 2.7

78 126 Honduras 2,6 6 2.3 - 2.9

126 Indonesia 2,6 10 2.3 - 2.9

126 Libya 2,6 5 2.2 - 3.0

126 Mozambique 2,6 7 2.4 - 2.9

126 Uganda 2,6 7 2.2 - 3.0

134 Comoros 2,5 3 1.9 - 3.0

134 Nicaragua 2,5 6 2.2 - 2.7

134 Pakistan 2,5 7 2.0 - 2.8

134 Ukraine 2,5 8 2.2 - 2.8

138 Liberia 2,4 4 1.8 - 2.8

138 Paraguay 2,4 5 2.0 - 2.7

138 Tonga 2,4 3 1.9 - 2.6

141 Cameroon 2,3 7 2.0 - 2.7

141 Iran 2,3 4 1.9 - 2.5

141 Philippines 2,3 9 2.1 - 2.5

141 Yemen 2,3 5 1.9 - 2.8

145 Kazakhstan 2,2 6 1.8 - 2.7

145 Timor-Leste 2,2 4 1.8 - 2.5

147 Bangladesh 2,1 7 1.7 - 2.4

147 Kenya 2,1 7 1.9 - 2.4

147 Russia 2,1 8 1.9 - 2.5

147 Syria 2,1 5 1.6 - 2.4

79 151 Belarus 2,0 5 1.6 - 2.5

151 Central African Republic 2,0 5 1.9 - 2.2

151 Côte d´Ivoire 2,0 6 1.7 - 2.5

151 Ecuador 2,0 5 1.8 - 2.2

151 Laos 2,0 6 1.6 - 2.3

151 Papua New Guinea 2,0 6 1.6 - 2.3

151 Taijikistan 2,0 8 1.7 - 2.3

158 Angola 1,9 6 1.5 - 2.2

158 Azerbaijan 1,9 8 1.7 - 2.1

158 Burundi 1,9 6 1.5 - 2.3

158 Congo, Republic 1,9 6 1.8 - 2.0

158 Gambia 1,9 5 1.5 - 2.4

158 Guinea-Bissau 1,9 3 1.8 - 2.0

158 Sierra Leone 1,9 5 1.8 - 2.0

158 Venezuela 1,9 7 1.8 - 2.0

166 Cambodia 1,8 7 1.7 - 1.9

166 Kyrgyzstan 1,8 7 1.7 - 1.9

166 Turkmenistan 1,8 5 1.5 - 2.2

166 Uzbekistan 1,8 8 1.5 - 2.2

166 Zimbabwe 1,8 7 1.5 - 2.1

171 Congo, Democratic 1,7 6 1.6 - 1.9 Republic

171 Equatorial Guinea 1,7 4 1.5 - 1.8

80 173 Chad 1,6 6 1.5 - 1.7

173 Guinea 1,6 6 1.3 - 1.9

173 Sudan 1,6 6 1.5 - 1.7

176 Afghanistan 1,5 4 1.1 - 1.6

177 Haiti 1,4 4 1.1 - 1.7

178 Iraq 1,3 4 1.1 - 1.6

178 Myanmar 1,3 4 1.0 - 1.5

180 Somalia 1,0 4 0.5 - 1.4

Source: 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index. Found: http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table; Checked 06 04 2009.

81