Dismantling Colombia's New Illegal

DISMANTLING COLOMBIA’S NEW ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS: LESSONS FROM A SURRENDER Latin America Report N°41 – 8 June 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. ENDING NIAGS: THE GOVERNMENT’S OFFER ................................................... 1 A. THE GOVERNMENT POSITION ON NIAGS ..................................................................................... 1 B. IMPLICATIONS FOR NIAG MEMBERS ........................................................................................... 3 C. IMPLICATIONS FOR VICTIMS ......................................................................................................... 4 III. ERPAC’S PROFILE ......................................................................................................... 5 A. SOCIAL AND TERRITORIAL CONTROL ........................................................................................... 5 B. ECONOMIC INTERESTS ................................................................................................................. 7 C. HUMANITARIAN IMPACT .............................................................................................................. 8 IV. THE SURRENDER ........................................................................................................... 9 A. THE RUN-UP ................................................................................................................................ 9 B. LIMITS OF THE CURRENT APPROACH ......................................................................................... 10 C. THE POST-SURRENDER SCENARIO ............................................................................................. 12 V. TOWARDS A SURRENDER POLICY ........................................................................ 13 A. DEALING WITH THE GREY ZONE ................................................................................................ 13 B. GETTING INCENTIVES RIGHT ...................................................................................................... 14 C. BEYOND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION ............................................................................................. 15 VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 16 APPENDICES A. MAP OF COLOMBIA .......................................................................................................................... 17 B. MAP OF THE EASTERN PLAINS ......................................................................................................... 18 C. GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................... 19 D. PARAMILITARY WHO’S WHO IN THE EASTERN PLAINS .................................................................... 20 Latin America Report N°41 8 June 2012 DISMANTLING COLOMBIA’S NEW ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS: LESSONS FROM A SURRENDER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The surrender of the Popular Revolutionary Anti-Terrorist criminal organisations (BACRIMs in the Spanish acronym) Army of Colombia (ERPAC) in December 2011 risks go- and not part of the internal armed conflict. For the same ing down as a failure. Only a fraction of the group took reason, NIAG members are also not eligible for considera- part; leaders may be getting away with short prison sen- tion under transitional justice measures such as the 2005 tences; and the underlying criminal and corrupt structures Justice and Peace Law (JPL). will likely remain untouched. The impact on conflict dy- namics in the group’s eastern-plains stronghold has been A wholesale extension of DDR and transitional justice limited. As worrying, the lack of transparency, including mechanisms to NIAGs would be unwarranted, but the ex- of international oversight, has damaged the credibility of clusive reliance on the ordinary criminal law to try their the process, leaving the impression that an illegal armed members has its downsides. First, it leaves victims with- group has again outwitted state institutions to the detri- out legal guarantees and benefits extended to the victims ment of the public and particularly of the victims. The au- of the guerrillas and the paramilitaries; a March 2012 Con- thorities need to draw the right conclusions from the pro- stitutional Court ruling might, however, open the door for cess. Otherwise, the lack of appropriate instruments to some NIAG victims to be covered by the new 2011 Vic- manage collective surrenders will continue to hamper ef- tims Law. Secondly, it leaves former fighters without a forts to combat groups such as ERPAC that have grown clear perspective of civilian reintegration, thus increasing into one of the country’s top security challenges. risks they will take up arms again. Serious crimes commit- ted by NIAGs need to be fully investigated and prosecut- The surrender of 272 members – slightly more than a third ed, but a more expansive approach to dismantling these of ERPAC’s total armed strength – was the first time a groups is also required where there is a sufficient link to New Illegal Armed Group (NIAG) with roots in the demo- the armed conflict. bilised paramilitaries had chosen to give up its weapons. Pressure to surrender had been building, externally and Contrary to government hopes, the ERPAC process re- within the group, since police killed its founder, alias vealed the limits of its surrender strategy, rather than vin- “Cuchillo”, in December 2010. The former mid-level dicating it. The attorney general’s office had little choice paramilitary leader had made ERPAC the dominant ille- but to free most of the fighters almost immediately, as on- gal armed force in parts of Meta, Guaviare and Vichada ly nineteen leaders were originally subjects of an arrest departments, with a key role in drug trafficking and other warrant. This obliged prosecutors and the police to recap- organised criminal activities. But with substantial links to ture ERPAC members one by one, an onerous, still in- the regional and local political elite as well as to parts of complete task. The public outrage was understandable, the security forces, ERPAC was always more than an or- but more damaging is that the process will likely fail both dinary criminal outfit. It exercised strict social control in to punish those responsible for serious crimes and to have its strongholds, including through targeted killing of com- a structural impact on ERPAC’s business activities as munity leaders, and was responsible for displacements, well as its corrupt links with politicians and security forc- child recruitment and sexual violence. es. Potential information from rank-and-file members on ERPAC operations appears not to have been fully exploit- ERPAC members currently face criminal proceedings be- ed. Leaders do not face a credible threat of serious crimi- fore ordinary courts. They may seek benefits provided for nal charges and thus have little incentive to collaborate by the criminal justice system such as the reduction of seriously with the judicial system. sentences in return for accepting charges. But they are not eligible for the benefits of the government’s demobilisa- But the problem goes further. The government’s sharp tion, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program. This conceptual distinction between parts of the conflict and is because the government considers groups such as ERPAC organised crime groups – upon which the logic of the sur- Dismantling Colombia’s New Illegal Armed Groups: Lessons from a Surrender Crisis Group Latin America Report N°41, 8 June 2012 Page ii render was built – poorly reflects on-the-ground complex- 3. Improve the civilian perspective for former NIAGs ities. Groups such as ERPAC do not fully replicate the members by introducing basic reintegration benefits, paramilitaries, but they cannot and should not be consid- subject to strict criteria of eligibility, judicial records ered in isolation from the broader context of the internal and behaviour. armed conflict. This means that dismantling the NIAGs 4. Clarify the handling of young NIAG members, who involves more than investigating and punishing individual should be eligible to enter the Colombian Institute criminals. It also requires dismantling corrupt networks, for Family Welfare (ICBF) program for child soldiers, guaranteeing victims’ rights and preventing rearmament. despite the government’s classification of NIAGs as Given its current weakness, reconciling such disparate in- criminal organisations rather than part of the armed terests overburdens the judicial system. The Santos admin- conflict. istration deliberately left the field to the attorney general’s office, but the shortcomings revealed in the ERPAC expe- 5. Improve institutional guarantees for NIAG victims rience have highlighted the need for an explicit surrender by an extensive and pro-victim interpretation of Law policy that goes beyond individual criminal prosecution 1448 (2011), and if this proves ineffective, consider and has active government leadership. introducing legislation to ensure equal treatment for them. After the Uribe administration long downplayed the NI- 6. Strengthen victims’ rights to truth by introducing an AG threat, President Santos has taken a stronger stand, administrative program similar

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