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The Colombian Conflict Character List Colombian Cabinet

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The Colombian Conflict Character List Colombian Cabinet Integrated Crisis: The Colombian Conflict Character List Colombian Cabinet: President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo: President of Colombia Luis Fernando Jaramillo Correa: Minister of Foreign Affairs John Smith: CIA Station Chief Morris D. Busby: American Ambassador to Colombia Rafael Pardo Rueda: Minister of National Defense General Jorge Enrique Mora: Eastern-Amazon Command General Carlos Alberto Ospina: Northern-Andes Command General Mario Montoya Uribe: Southern-Pacific Command General Miguel Maza Marquez: Director of the Administrative Department of Security Rudolf Hommes Rodriguez: Minister of Finance Luis Fernando Ramirez: Ministry of Social Services Carlos Curecure: Business Community Representative Jaime Giraldo Angel: Minister of Justice General Rosso Jose Serrano: General of the Colombian National Police Colonel Hugo Martinez: Commander of Search Bloc Conference for Marxist-Leninism and Communism in Colombia: Manuel Marulanda Velez: Secretary General, FARC Victor Suarez Rojas, “Mono Jojoy”: Chief of Armed Resistance, FARC Ivan Marquez: Western Bloc Commander, FARC Ivan Rios: Northwest Bloc Commander, FARC Luis Devia Silva, “Raul Reyes”: Chairman of the International Commission, FARC Martin Caballero: Southern Bloc Commander, FARC Simon Trinidad: Eastern Bloc Commander, FARC Tomas Medinas Caracas: Revenue, FARC Marilu Ramirez: Chief of the Antonia Narino Urban Network (RAUN), FARC Father Manuel Perez, “El Cura Perez”: Secretary General, ELN Nicholas Bautista, “Gabino”: Deputy Leader, ELN Francisco Galan: Chief Spokesperson, ELN Antonio Garcia: Military Commander, ELN Francisco Caraballo: Head, EPL Edgar Castellanos: Head, ERP Alberto Morales Restrepo: Head, Jaime Bateman Cayon Group Conference for a Conservative Colombia Fidel Castano: Head, Peasant Self Defenders of Cordoba and Uraba Carlos Castano: Commander, Peasant Self Defenders of Cordoba and Uraba Vicente Castano: Commander, Peasant Self Defenders of Cordoba and Uraba Salvatore Mancuso: Business Associate, Peasant Self Defenders of Cordoba and Uraba Miguel Arroyave, “El Arcangel”: Head, Bloque Centauros Henry de Jesus Perez: Head, ACDEGAM Ernesto Baez: Commander, ACDEGAM Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, “Jorge 40”: Head, Northern Bloc Carlos Mario Jimenez: Head, Bloc Central Bolivar Rodrigo Perez: Commander, Bloc Central Bolivar Victor manuel Mejia Munera: Head, Bloque Vencadores de Arauca Yair Klein: Mercenary Christina Smith: Chiquita Brands International Special Representative Juan Perez: Ecopetrol Special Representative Tom Carpenter: Drummond Coal and Mineral Industry Special Envoy Conference for Pan-Colombian Narcotics Trade Pablo Escobar Gaviria, “El Patron”: Head, Medellin Cartel Roberto Escobar Gaviria: Chief Accountant, Medellin Cartel Fernando Galleano: Medellin Cartel Gerardo Moncada: Medellin Cartel Diego Bejarno, “Don Berna”: Chief of Security, Medellin Cartel Gilberto Orejuela, “The Chess Player”: Head, Cali Cartel Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela: Head, Cali Cartel Helmer Herrera, “Pacho”: Chief Trafficker, Cali Cartel Jorge Salcedo: Chief of Security, Cali Cartel Guillermo Pallomari: Chief Accountant, Cali Cartel Juan Garcia Abrego: Head, Gulf Cartel Alberto Orlandez-Gamboa: Head, Barranquilla Cartel Leon Montoya Sanchez: Head, Norte del Valle Cartel Daniel Barrera Barrera: Head, San Jose del Guaviare Cartel Jose Evaristo Linares-Castillo: Head, Eastern Plains Cartel Congress of the Republic of Colombia Social Conservative Party Representative (14) Liberal Party Representative (16) Patriotic Union Party Representative (3) M-19 Democratic Alliance Representative (3) National Salvation Movement Representative (4) Conservative National Movement Representative (4) Western Colombia Populist Party Representative (1) .
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