Experts without communities Internationality, impartiality, and the

Abstract How and why has expertise become such a central component of modern global governance? Neither of two dominant IR takes on the topic—functionalist approaches to epistemic communities, and poststructuralist perspectives on governmentality—have offered satisfactory answers to this arguably urgent question. This is because, respectively, epistemic communities emphasise cohesion at the expense of disunity prior to formation; and because governmentality primarily applies to neoliberal polities. Neither travels well in time. To overcome these limitations and constructively bridge the two approaches, this paper suggests a conceptual rethinking based on a surprisingly neglected but pivotal case: the 1855 International Commission on the Isthmus of Suez. Based on original archival research, the paper showcases how modern expert-based global governance emerged in practice. It argues that expert-based global governance should be understood as a practice that constructs “internationality” as a categorical claim to impartiality. What made modern global governance possible was a notion of the international as a depoliticised category. This authorised experts as central agents of international order. Consequently, expert authority is not epistemic by default: the 1855 case shows that political favour can endow experts with authority, a nexus which internationality is then able to mask as impartiality. The nineteenth-century rise of the middle class, scientific internationalism, and informal empire made such masking more desirable than the open admission of political aims. The article thus offers a corrective to existing accounts and a new avenue toward historicising a central practice of modern global governance.

Keywords expertise, global governance, epistemic communities, governmentality, Suez Canal

Introduction

It hardly needs pointing out today that global governance is rife with deference to experts. From the WHO to the World Bank to the IMF, most challenges of international politics are met, at some point in the process, with the help of experts. Today, this practice seems obvious. An ever more complex, globalised world requires specialists who can bring their knowledge to bear on global governance. This is the optimist view, stressing the positive potential of expertise for improving international cooperation on technical issues. A pessimist view sees experts as often unaccountable technocrats imbued with a blind faith in science—the legitimate targets of populist reaction. In the International Relations (IR) discipline, the optimist view has a rough equivalent in functionalist approaches such as the epistemic communities framework, whereas the pessimist view tends to be reflected more strongly among poststructuralists who study EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES expertise through the lens of governmentality.1 Bueger suggests that across several generations that have studied expertise in global governance, two normative interpretations stand out: ‘A liberal-progressive narrative’ according to which ‘expertise leads to better futures and … enables cooperation’ and a ‘critical narrative’ where expertise ‘narrows down available policy options, stabilizes power relations, hinders emancipation or marginalizes actors.’ Given the centrality of expertise not only to global governance practices, but also to broader theoretical questions of authority in international politics, Bueger is right in urging scholars ‘to recognize that the Golem of expertise is neither the enemy of legitimate political orders, nor by necessity its friend.’2 And yet, the debate seems to have come no closer to bridging the divide between optimists and pessimists, instead continuing to talk past one another. In this paper, I argue that this is to a large extent due to a lack of engagement with history: failing to carefully historicise the idea and practice of expertise in international politics has led to two sets of assumptions that might actually be normative interpretations or unwarranted generalisations based on descriptions of the present.3 To improve the situation and develop a historically grounded shared vocabulary, this paper asks: how and why has expertise become such a central component of modern global governance? What is it about the idea and practice of expertise that has endowed it with such seemingly obvious purchase for IR? We think of expertise as a self-suggesting tool that helps us address international challenges—but what if it is instead the designation of challenges as “international” that allows some actors to claim international expert status?

The paper introduces a surprisingly neglected case of expert-based international cooperation—the 1855 International Commission on the Isthmus of Suez—to help scholars rethink prevalent understandings of expertise. In doing so, the paper builds on contributions from Science and Technology Studies (STS), global history, and the IR practice turn. My analysis does not offer a causal explanation but identifies the structure, criteria, and agents of a budding global governance practice. Combining global histories of the Suez Canal with the methodological strengths of historical-sociological IR, the case study combines a membership analysis of the Commission with a narrative account of its creation, use, and subsequent role in the canal enterprise. The paper argues that expert-based global governance should be understood as a practice that deploys “internationality” as a categorical claim to impartiality. What made modern global governance possible, in an important sense, was a notion of the international as a

1 These are stylised ideal types, and of course there are “optimists” who indeed view expertise critically, and “pessimists” recognising the positive potentials of expertise.

2 Bueger 2014, 51; emphasis original.

3 Recent studies of expertise in global governance include Sending 2015; Kennedy 2016; Jones 2019; Carraro 2019.

Draft · Please do not circulate 2! EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES depoliticised category or field. This authorised experts as central agents of international order. Consequently, expert authority is not epistemic by default: the 1855 case shows instead that political favour can endow experts with authority, a nexus which internationality can then mask as impartiality. The rise of the middle classes, scientific internationalism, and informal empire in the nineteenth century made such masking more desirable than the open admission of political aims. This sheds new light on a central practice of modern global governance in ways that may allow optimists and pessimists to engage in more fruitful conversation. It also implies a shift from experts as successful “depoliticisers” to depoliticisation itself as a potentially politically desired, i.e. politicised, form of governance.

To build the case, I first briefly discuss two prevalent accounts of modern expert-based global governance, epistemic communities and governmentality, highlighting to what extent their grasp of the role of experts remains unsatisfactory. I criticise both for their insufficient engagement with history, but also highlight important advances both bodies of scholarship have made. Second, I present a historical case study of the 1855 International Commission on the Isthmus of Suez as a key moment of modern expert- based global governance in the making. I show how this practice enabled a highly versatile legitimation of informal empire by constructing internationality as a categorical claim to impartiality. From this insight I then advance a historicised reconceptualisation of the place of experts in IR: what made modern global governance possible was a notion of the international as a depoliticised category, which authorised experts as central agents of international order. I close by summarising the theoretical ramifications of my findings and suggesting how we might better understand the relationship between expertise and global governance.

Experts in global governance: two approaches

Rather than attempt a full review of IR scholarship on expert-based global governance, this section will compare two particularly widely used approaches to the topic, epistemic communities and governmentality. To be sure, most standard accounts of global governance touch upon the role of experts. There is a wide array of voices on the role of experts that would exceed the scope of this paper: rational design scholars see experts as problem-solvers who mediate collective action problems.4 Liberal institutionalists, in turn, study them as bureaucratic or as private actors pulled in on an issue-by-issue basis.5 These accounts treat experts as a sub-class of transnational non-state actors, as a case of private authority, or as a channel for decision-making input.

4 E.g. Mattli and Woods 2009; Koremenos, Lipson, Snidal 2013.

5 Barnett and Finnemore 2012; Jinnah 2014; Voeten 2021, ch. 5.

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By contrast, epistemic communities and governmentality place central emphasis on experts as active participants and makers of global governance. Both, that is, highlight expert agency, and as such they have informed the largest portion of recent work on expertise in IR. In what follows, I outline and compare the frameworks on three dimensions: their assumptions about the relationship between politics and expertise; about the relationship between experts and other experts; and about the source of expert authority. I then identify the limits of their theories of variation in time and point to valuable insights that the remainder of the paper will further develop.

Epistemic communities: independence, cohesion, knowledge The epistemic communities framework, arguably the most well-known of approaches to the role of experts in IR, is part of functionalist work on global governance. On a functionalist view, which as mentioned is here stylised as “optimism”, scientific and technical experts can promote international cooperation as they supersede existing divisions by virtue of the unifying, borderless, and apolitical power of science and technology. Functionalists subscribe to a minimalist conception where ‘cooperation is more likely to be achieved if the contentious issues of high politics are put aside, if attention is given to pragmatic progress on matters of low politics where common interests were most apparent’.6 The implicit bottom-line is that experts are able to reduce contention by shifting focus to ‘low politics’, and that this process of depoliticisation is on average successful and beneficial. The epistemic communities framework partially relies on this set of assumptions. First developed by Peter Haas in the early 1990s, building on previous work in that direction by his father Ernst Haas, the concept builds on neofunctionalist sociology. It is defined as a functional response to growing complexity in world politics.7 Understood as a natural symptom of globalisation, complexity necessitates input from and deference to experts. In response, epistemic communities emerge and are endowed with authority for functional reasons. On a view of governance as regulation, epistemic communities step in as authoritative agents that improve the knowledge available to policy-makers. Epistemic communities are thus ‘networks of knowledge-based communities with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within their domain of expertise’. Their key characteristics are internal cohesion and consensus. They share beliefs about principles, causation, and validity, and even a ‘policy enterprise’ directed at problem-solving and enhancing ‘human welfare’.8 Epistemic communities are cohesive, non-political,

6 Hurrell 2005, 89; see also Murphy 1994.

7 ‘The international system has become more … complex.’ Haas 2014, 19. Also Jervis 1997; Rosenau 2003.

8 ibid., 29-30; emphasis added.

Draft · Please do not circulate 4! EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES merit-based, and recognisably impartial groups.9 The framework assumes that there is, and that we can reliably identify, a gulf separating expertise from partisan politics.10 In sum, the epistemic communities approach postulates that first, expertise and politics are analytically and empirically separate, experts being independent possessors of knowledge who are brought into the political process; second, experts relate to other experts as a community, their authority and efficacy growing as a function of the cohesiveness of their epistemic community; and third, the source of their authority is epistemic, based on their specialist knowledge (see Table 1). This is an empirically helpful framing: it suggests that we can reliably identify expert groups, label them, and then study what they do, how they do it, and to what effect. On the other hand, the approach pays less attention to variation over time: one proponent mentions, for example, that epistemic communities have ‘an identifiable intellectual ‘pre-history’’ but does not specify what exactly this pre-history looks like.11 By exception to a largely non-historical literature, Davis Cross has advanced the concept’s application to history.12 She maintains, however, that the persuasiveness of epistemic communities largely rests ‘on their degree of internal cohesion and professionalism’ and that ‘if an epistemic community is not internally cohesive, then it is less likely to be as persuasive as one that is.’13 The epistemic communities framework suffers from two main shortcomings. First, it carves out identifiable communities as usefully discreet objects of inquiry, but excludes, at least so far, the role of experts prior to their formation into a community. Second, the role of experts at the international level remains under-explored, as do the questions whether there is something distinctive about international expert governance. To echo a recent critique, the approach brackets the role of problem construction prior to institutional choice.14 It reifies actor interests (as cohesive, recognisable communities), but is bound to be silent on how these evolve in the first place. Functions overdetermine expert governance, leaving little room for experts without communities. While floodlighting the effects and uses of expert knowledge in global governance, and being sensitive to knowledge-dependent actor constitution, it is biased in favour of expertise— and in that sense belongs to the “optimist” camp—in a way that risks rendering it an exercise in policy improvement rather than critical inquiry. Relying on an intellectual

9 ‘The internal consensus … provides the glue for collective action amongst the individuals of the community. … Their track record … provides an ongoing warrant for their reputation for expertise and impartiality.’ ibid., 30.

10 Haas 1992; Haas 2004. For a recent critique see Esguerra 2015.

11 Dunlop 2000, 140.

12 Davis Cross 2007; Davis Cross 2013.

13 Davis Cross 2013, 147.

14 Allan 2018a; Allan 2018b.

Draft · Please do not circulate 5! EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES heritage that stems from early functionalist advocates and protagonists of expert governance themselves, the bias is unsurprising.15 It may also be a chief reason why the epistemic communities framework is rarely historicised. The basic problem, then, is not inherent in the logic of functionalist analysis: its conclusions do follow from its premises. But to understand how expert governance came to be taken for granted, and how it evolved as a practice even before its institutionalisation, the perspective is insufficient.

STS scholars have long insisted that such views not only overstate the separation of politics and experts but also black-box the role of contestation.16 IR scholars across the field accept this view. Hurrell notes several ‘legitimacy issues’: experts might turn into an interest group of their own; their ‘technical knowledge as purely technical and apolitical’ is a dubious idea; and the assumption that controversies could be resolved by technocrats working in intransparent institutional settings is ‘bound to raise questions of democratic legitimacy’.17 Kennedy suggests experts are political agents rather than mere providers of knowledge.18 Voeten similarly points to the ideological underpinnings of international institutions, including the use of expertise which he notes ‘is rarely neutral amid ideological conflict.’19 Finally as with all functionalism, an understanding of what functions an attribute (expertise) serves in action (politics) provides no clues about its meaning. No observation of rational behaviour proves its existence as an independent mechanism—as Boswell notes, government officials do not merely draw on expert knowledge to learn from it, they also use it to galvanise support, gain legitimacy, or consolidate their institutional or social position.20 Functionalists leave these aspects out for the sake of parsimony.

Governmentality: constitution, competition, relation Governmentality has emerged as a perspective in critical studies of modern global governance from the early 2000s. There has been lively debate about its merits, focused mainly on its applicability across space (to non-liberal states) and time (prior to the ascendancy of liberal internationalism).21 The concept was introduced to IR as an alternative to what Sending and Neumann identified as three unfulfilled promises of the

15 Murphy and Augelli 1993, 73-74; Murphy 2005, ch. 3.

16 Jasanoff 1990; Jasanoff 2004; Maasen and Weingart 2005.

17 Hurrell 2005, 89.

18 Kennedy 2018, 111.

19 Voeten 2021, 70.

20 Boswell 2009, 12.

21 Foucault 2007; Foucault 2008. In IR see Sending and Neumann 2006; Neumann and Sending 2007.

Draft · Please do not circulate 6! EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES global governance literature. Scholars originally set out to shift attention from government as an institution to government as a process; from states to non-state actors; and from the sovereign state to more dispersed sites of authority such as transnational advocacy networks and spheres of authority.22 Sending and Neumann argue that global governance scholarship is conceptually unequipped to study government as a process. They introduce governmentality as a lens that would capture both non-state and state authority without speculating about the relative rise or decline of each, studying process in terms of concrete practices. Governmentality comprises both ‘the practices of governing’ and ‘the rationality characteristic of the systematic thinking, reflection, and knowledge that is integral to different modes of governing.’23 It is also specific to neoliberalism, to Foucault a condition under which subjects are governed by not ‘governing too much’ as it imbues subjects with agency limited by norms. This was how Foucault understood the invention of society as a place in which power is exercised over free subjects.24 As an analytical category, therefore, it ‘focuses on how certain identities and action-orientations are defined as appropriate and normal and how relations of power are implicated in these processes.’25 Its logical presupposition is the autonomous individual. Neumann and Sending go a step further to argue that the international as a category can more generally be understood as governmentality: as they write, ‘the international is a political sphere increasingly defined by liberal norms’ and this change ‘transforms the modality of governing.’26 Others have developed and adopted this argument.27 Critics were quick to point out its presentism: if governmentality as a concept resulted from a genealogical study of changing practices of government through early modern and modern history, based on specific European experiences, does it make sense to extrapolate it to the level of an international “rationality” or “logic”?28 Joseph argues from a Marxist perspective that governmentality can only be applied to areas where liberalism prevails in an advanced form, and historical periods in which liberalism already existed roughly as we know it today.29 If governmentality rests on the free subject

22 Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Rosenau 2003.

23 Sending and Neumann 2006, 657.

24 Foucault 1997, 73-79; quoted in Hindess 2005, 394. See also Foucault 1991; Foucault 1989, 261. For an excellent history of the social and its significance for international relations see Owens 2015.

25 Sending and Neumann 2006, 657.

26 Neumann and Sending 2007, 698.

27 E.g. Dean 2002; Lipschutz 2005.

28 Selby 2007; Chandler 2009; Joseph 2010.

29 Joseph 2010.

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epistemic communities governmentality relationship politics/expertise separate mutually constitutive relationship experts/experts cohesive competitive source of expert authority epistemic relational

Table 1. Comparison of theoretical assumptions of the epistemic communities and governmentality approaches. as a technical instrument, and thus freedom as a technical modality through which it governs, at the level of general theory it may end up masking ‘the continued anarchy of international relations and the dominant structures and relations of power.’30 It might be that this is a case of talking past each other. Sending and Neumann nowhere say that international organisations deploying the logic of governmentality do so successfully or without a mismatch between their own self-inscribed liberal premises and the non- liberalism of most of the world they claim to speak on behalf of. They admit that governmentality operates through civil society, but this does not by itself exclude non- liberal polities on a supposedly international claim. Instead the ‘liberal programme’ might be better understood as ‘a universal tendency rather than a global actuality’.31

By and large, given its focus on practices and rationalities underlying the actual conduct of government, as well as Foucault’s best-known writings on the relationship between power and knowledge, governmentality urges us to view expert-based global governance as specialist knowledge specifically directed to the purposes of political power: as “power/knowledge.” In contrast with the epistemic communities framework, then, the governmentality lens views the relationship between expertise and politics as mutually constitutive (expert knowledge is called upon by politics: only then does it come into being as such); the relationship between experts and other experts as competitive (if expertise grants power there will be a contest for it); and the source of expert authority as relational (it is not their knowledge on its own that imbues experts with power, but the use to which this knowledge is put). Table 1 compares the frameworks, highlighting their contrast in terms of the relationship between experts and politics, that between experts and other experts, and in terms of the source of expert authority each theorises.

A missing piece: change over time So far this paper has shown that there is cross-paradigmatic interest in the study of expertise and its role in standard practices of international relations. Clearly, the study of

30 Joseph 2010, 230.

31 Vrasti 2013, 64 and 51.

Draft · Please do not circulate 8! EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES knowledge-based global governance practices and practitioners is of considerable import to functionalists and poststructuralists alike. It should thus be a fruitful area of inquiry and dialogue across IR divides. Epistemic communities and governmentality scholars do share some assumptions in common; it is their application that has deepened the divide. When Haas originally promoted the study of epistemic communities it was in opposition to singular notions of truth.32 Such a constructivist take easily matches the poststructuralists’ baseline assumptions. And when Haas posits that the use of expertise ‘contributes to state control over domestic society’ this arguably sounds very close to governmentality governing through autonomous subjects in civil society.33 Generally however, IR research on expertise suffers from limited historical portability and so tends to be either limited to the post-1900 era or sidelined altogether. Such presentism is unwarranted if it means that as scholars we turn a blind eye to variation in time. It is also ironic given periodically stated intentions to turn to history. As mentioned, Davis Cross has applied epistemic communities to a historical study of diplomats and bureaucrats, and with fascinating results.34 Still, her study is limited to identifying cohesive communities. Unformed communities of experts, even where they are involved in global governance practices despite their disunity, fall by the wayside. Governmentality, in turn, has been criticised for travelling in time only poorly given its conceptual reliance on neoliberalism. Ironically, this has created a situation in which governmentality scholars sideline the challenge by refraining from historicising expertise: indeed governmentality in IR is almost exclusively applied to the post-1945 era.35 In both cases, the limitations are unfortunate. But even self-consciously historical IR contributions on the role of technical and scientific experts limit themselves by focusing on group cohesion.36 Across the various approaches in IR, experts are almost ubiquitously conceptualised as belonging to networks or communities with particular commitments, subscribing to particular ideals, defending and promoting a particular view of ‘what makes the world hang together’.37 And yet prior to the late nineteenth century, these actors rarely ‘hung together’—but engaged in global governance anyway.

32 Haas 2004.

33 Haas 2014, 24-26.

34 Davis Cross 2007.

35 This is unsurprising: to Foucault, governmentality is a historically specific phenomenon and the culmination of a long genealogy of modern government practices. Governmentality is then not a lens to explain expertise but a practice to be explained.

36 E.g. Murphy 1994; Marsden and Smith 2004; Yates and Murphy 2019.

37 Ruggie 1998.

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In response to these contributions, this paper intends to historicise the role of experts in modern global governance by asking how the relationship between the two developed in practice to the point of becoming a standard component of global governance. But if the epistemic communities and governmentality frameworks are conceptually and methodologically wanting, how can we historically study the emergence of expert-based practices instead? In a recent study of scientific cosmologies underlying changing historical international orders, Allan conceptualises the role of experts along two possible trajectories: what he calls ‘recursive institutionalisation’ entails a stage of ‘associational change’ where associations strategically deploy scientific ideas for problem- solving, or ideas set off a discursive reconfiguration that alters ends and purposes of associations.38 Though still bound to the identification of groups, this is a much more open-ended approach to history. Sending in turn, who more recently moved away from governmentality to a Bourdieusian practice-theoretical approach, on the one hand builds on a budding research agenda on expertise in IR that analyses the very notion of expertise rather than taking it for granted as an empirical category. On the other hand, he makes a crucial contribution to this literature by directing its attention to history, based on the observation that thus far the focus of research has been on conditions under which experts may shape policy outcomes—next we should, Sending argues, consider ‘what constitutes ‘expertise’ in the first place’.39 Sending’s work represents a turn to sociologically conceptualising expertise as a constructed authority relation rather than a straightforward epistemic qualification: ‘a “source” of authority is not just there for an actor to draw on but must itself be constructed, nurtured, and made effective in particular settings.’40 A way of concretely studying changing practices across time is Bruneau’s proposal to study the changing content of education in the careers of international practitioners.41 Scholars can study criteria of inclusion and exclusion in education and training, in turn requisite for membership among international practitioners—arguably particularly among experts. This is not least how historical IR can trace gender, social, cultural, and racial hierarchies, stratification, and closure to answer that difficult question of who actually ‘governs the globe.’42 These are promising avenues for opening up the question of how expertise is constituted: not only socially, in terms of their habitus or

38 Allan 2018a, 21.

39 Sending 2019, 391.

40 Sending 2015, 5.

41 As Bruneau writes, ‘studying major historical shifts in the way groups of people … process information and make choices, can shed new light on the micro-level mechanisms through which macro-level transformations … take place.’ Bruneau 2020, 15-16.

42 Avant, Finnemore, Sell 2010. On social closure see Keene 2013; Naylor 2018; Viola 2020.

Draft · Please do not circulate !10 EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES background knowledge, but also in terms of their politics and ideology and that of those routinely calling upon them. More specifically related to the role of experts is a growing body of literature on expert practitioners in nineteenth-century international organisations. Building on Murphy’s seminal work on international organisations as institutions devised to regulate industrial change and transnationally expanding markets, this literature continues to examine and theoretically develop the politics inherent in the design and activities of international organisations. Ravndal has written on the expertise-based authority claims of international civil servants at the Public International Unions.43 Yao most recently examined the 1856 Danube Commission and the highly political underpinnings of its functional justification.44 As a contribution to this burgeoning research agenda, this paper develops a theoretical argument based on the case of the 1855 International Commission on the Isthmus of Suez. To be clear, my analysis does not aim at causal explanation but intends to identify the structure, criteria, and agents of a budding global governance practice. Combining global histories of the Suez Canal with the methodological strengths of historical-sociological IR, my case study relies on a membership analysis of the commission, combined with a narrative account of its creation, use, and subsequent role in the Suez Canal enterprise.

The 1855 International Commission

When at all, IR scholars cite the Suez Canal as a straightforward example of modern international cooperation. To give one example, Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal imply such a story. Their book on institutional design lays out three causes for an ‘explosion of commercial activity’ in nineteenth-century Egypt: liberal elites, new technologies, and ‘the opening of the Suez Canal, which enormously facilitated commerce between East and West.’ Indeed, the authors contend, the canal ‘put Egypt at the center of global trade’.45 This functionalist narrative presents the Suez Canal as a rational solution to a technical problem.46 A natural force, commerce could flow more freely once a canal had pierced an equally natural obstacle separating the Mediterranean from the Red Sea. Anglo-French inter-imperial rivalry, the undermining of Egyptian sovereignty, and forced labour fall by the wayside.

43 Ravndal 2017.

44 Yao 2019.

45 Jupille, Mattli, Snidal 2013, 3 106.

46 Most work in IR refuses to engage with the history of the canal’s making and instead focuses on its political aftermath. See e.g. Axelrad Cahan 2019, 480.

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In global history, on the other hand, the Suez Canal tends to feature in histories of globalisation, reflecting the well-rehearsed story of ‘time-space compression’ in the second half of the nineteenth century.47 Huber’s recent intervention in this literature is a crucial departure and recognises the period as neither ‘an era of unhampered acceleration, nor one of hardening borders and increasing controls’ but instead one of ‘differentiation, regulation and bureaucratisation of different kinds of movement.’48 No such recognition has taken place in IR to date. Prevailing approaches fail to answer important questions, most importantly: how did expert governance emerge here as a practice? As I show below, expert governance was international from the start: the contexts in which experts interacted and practised their skills illustrate that. To internationalise was to legitimise, and experts were key agents of making this happen— key agents of rendering internationality a categorical claim to impartiality. The case of the International Commission then matters not only in that its ‘epistemic communities’ were in fact non-cohesive and politically contested, but also as it urges us to take the role of experts as pivots between imperial and international orders, and the roots of global governance practices in this mutuality, more seriously. A few caveats are important to note. The case study design of the research presented in this paper comes with the obvious limited generalisability of all historical research. For both practical reasons of linguistic access, and historical reasons of structural exclusion, my analysis pays little attention to the Egyptian perspective in its own words, for example. More research deserves to be done to develop this into a properly global history, which scholars on the forefront of that field have already done much to advance. On the other hand, the historicisation of expert-based global governance proposed here is but a beginning. To advance a much-needed conversation, mine is hardly a sufficient account of the making of expertise as a global governance practice and method—hopefully it is a step in that direction nonetheless. With that in mind, the below focuses chronologically on the context in which the International Commission came into being; its creation and work; and the effects of its output.

1834–50: Saint-Simonian beginnings The modern history of the Suez Canal is characterised by an intimate linkage between and simultaneity of the application of expertise and the creation of experts: its roots in early-nineteenth century technocratic political thought already attest to the inseparability of expertise from intended political application. It dates back to Bonaparte’s 1798 campaign to Egypt. Despite its popularity, Napoleon discarded his explorers’ idea of a canal at Suez, based on the scientific finding (later to be found erroneous) that a

47 Rosenberg 2012, 352-357.

48 Crucially, her work urges historians and others to view globalisation as made rather than natural. Huber 2013, 3; see also Huber 2012.

Draft · Please do not circulate !12 EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES difference in sea levels between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea would render the undertaking too complicated. Still the idea was captivating and inspired hopes for a Red Sea route that might boost the economic and military efficiency of Europe’s empires. Adding another incentive, from 1835 British correspondence and bills to India had moved shipping routes from the Cape to the Red Sea.49 One group particularly drawn to the idea were the Saint-Simonians, a network of students and graduates of the still relatively new École Polytechnique in Paris devoted to studying the technocratic social and political thought of Henri de Saint-Simon (1760– 1825). The ‘marriage of East and West’ was a central concern of theirs, along with the pacifying promise of science without borders.50 Saint-Simonian tenets reverberated across Europe: the order had not least created an unprecedented expert route into international politics by introducing numerical power-balancing, but also declared knowledge-guided mastery over nature a European imperative.51 Saint-Simonianism, characterised by a technocratic view of politics as the practice of regulating industry, tends to be relegated to histories of socialism and is typically ignored by IR.52 Yet its reach was remarkable, and former Saint-Simonians played key roles in the French establishment during the second half of the nineteenth century.53 The immediate precursor to the 1855 International Commission was a Saint-Simonian project too. Saint- Simonian sectarian leader Prosper Enfantin devoted his energies to ‘the great work of Suez… and further still, Panama.’54 By 1846, he had raised 150,000 francs and gathered several engineers and entrepreneurs to form the Société d’Études du Canal de Suez.55 The venture included engineers from Britain, France, and -Hungary, divided into three national chapters each tasked with a different geographical section of the Suez peninsula. And yet a Saint-Simonian Suez Canal never took off given internal disagreement, a lack of financial resources—a plight the 1847-1850 economic crisis only compounded—and poor timing, given the turmoil of the 1848 revolutions. Nevertheless, the Société d’Études did achieve one groundbreaking insight: the French chapter had discovered that Bonaparte’s engineers had been sorely mistaken—the levels of the Red Sea and Mediterranean were actually close to equal.56

49 Huber 2013, 23.

50 Drolet 2015.

51 Yao 2019.

52 Exceptions include Mazower 2012; Kaiser and Schot 2014.

53 Murphy 2011, 39.

54 Quoted in Pinet 1894, 89.

55 Karabell 2003, 67.

56 Taboulet 1968, 96.

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1850–55: Concession and internationalisation Once the dust of the February Revolution had settled, the Suez Canal idea received renewed attention and support, despite Egypt’s closed doors. Former vice-consul to Egypt now assumed charge over the project.57 Lesseps managed to appropriate the Suez Canal project and so end the direct involvement of the Saint- Simonians; but most importantly, he engaged in expert governance in a way that labelled as “international” what was in effect an enterprise of informal empire. The replacement of isolationist, reactionary Egyptian viceroy Abbas with Saïd was a golden ticket for Lesseps, who knew Saïd as an old friend. It also coincided with the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, an agreement that famously settled British-American tensions over a Nicaragua Canal by binding both parties to never ‘obtaining or maintaining’ exclusive control over a canal if built, effectively amounting to a guarantee of neutrality. It also stipulated that neither signatory would ever ‘occupy, fortify, or colonise’ any territory in Central America. Setting a precedent for the possibility and legitimacy of a neutral canal, beneficial to global commerce, the treaty added momentum to the Suez project.58 Having worked there as French ambassador before, Lesseps returned to Egypt a private citizen. Making use of his credentials as a former diplomat, he was received as near-royalty—helped by the fact that his cousin Eugénie de Montijo had recently become Empress of France. Lesseps managed to secure what Enfantin had not: on 30 November 1854, viceroy Saïd granted Lesseps a land concession that would allow the former to set up a company for the construction of a canal, granting the right to operate for 99 years.59 Egypt was to receive 15% of the eventual canal’s annual net profits, with another 10% going to the founders of the company as listed by Lesseps (including, preemptively, Enfantin and other potential competitors), and 75% to shareholders. The concession also granted the right to import all necessary equipment and building materials free from Egyptian taxation. Lesseps enthusiastically wrote to the consuls of Europe to inform them of his grand achievement. Anyone, he proclaimed, ‘preoccupied with questions of civilization and progress cannot look at a map and not be seized with a powerful desire to make disappear the only obstacle interfering with the flow of the commerce of the world.’60 The realisation of this Saint-Simonian project amounted to informal empire,

57 Pinet 1894, 89.

58 Taboulet 1968, 102.

59 Huber 2013, 27; Boutros Ghali and Chlala 1958, 1-9.

60 Lesseps 1883, 172-202.

Draft · Please do not circulate !14 EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES driven and legitimated by the modernising spirit of technocratic internationalism.61 But despite the concession, Lesseps still had quite a few people to convince: Napoleon III; the British government, whose assent would be vital to the commercial success of the enterprise; and the Ottoman Empire, which legally still had the final word about land concessions and whose will Lesseps was not willing to surpass just like that.

1855–56: Getting the experts on board Since the 1840s, the canal had become a subject of increasing interest among engineers, and opinions were divided as to whether a Suez Canal would be feasible. Debate ensued over the choice between a direct route through the isthmus, which could compete with ’s Alexandria-Cairo railroad; or an indirect route via the Nile, benefitting Alexandrian trade. Despite mounting pressure from the Alexandrian merchant lobby favouring the indirect route, Saïd preferred the former in the interest of the canal staying at a distance from Egypt’s urban power centres, hoping this would keep European meddling with Egyptian affairs to a minimum. In Europe, too, expert debate picked up pace. As one historian explains, ‘the most heated debate was over control, and the technical debate was merely a proxy for a contest for fame.’62 But how and why could ‘technical debate’ play such a role? British skepticism in both politics and engineering circles was a serious obstacle for Lesseps. In 1855 he met with Lord Palmerston, who proved immune to diplomatic attempts at persuasion. The argument against the canal turned, or so it seemed, on technicalities: Palmerston did not think, as Lesseps would later recall, ‘that the canal was technically viable’ but also pointed out that ‘even if the engineering challenges would somehow be overcome, he felt that the opening of a new route to the East would undermine England’s position as the dominant power in world trade.’ Reference to expertise was blended with an admittance to an underlying political motive. In response, safely sticking to the technical level of engineering, Lesseps gave Palmerston his word that ‘an international commission of engineers would shortly be dispatched in order to prove once and for all that the canal and the jetties planned for Port Saïd were feasible.’63 The basic problem, for Palmerston as for the public, was that Lesseps’ enterprise was almost bound to appear as an extension of French imperial reach. Could it be genuinely international under such circumstances? Or was this a cover, a case of “reluctant internationalism”?64 Anticipating such suspicions, Lesseps constantly

61 Huber writes that ‘The concessions can be understood in the framework of an emerging informal empire, with European firms taking advantage of the weakness of local states.’ Huber 2013, 27. See also Todd 2011; Philips and Sharman 2020; Todd 2021.

62 Karabell 2003, 94.

63 Lesseps 1875, 221-27. English edition: Lesseps 1876.

64 Reinisch 2016; Pearson 2018.

Draft · Please do not circulate !15 EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES emphasised the canal’s international, impartial benefits for humanity and civilisation at large: he actively, that is, constructed internationality as a categorical claim to impartiality. In that vein, a whole array of commissions, surveys, and lobbying across Europe’s capitals followed. True to his promise to Palmerston but also to concession stipulations, Lesseps finally convened an International Commission for the Piercing of the Isthmus of Suez in 1855. This was significant at a time before the advent of the modern international organisation, even before the international public unions; the 1855 Commission thus effectively staked a claim to the meaning and scope of “international”. It brought together thirteen experts from seven countries—Egypt was not one of them —to examine existing plans and determine the optimal course of action. Lesseps wanted the Commission to test the accuracy of French and Egyptian precursory schemes, respectively, and settle the quest for the optimal route. The commission, as he put it, was ‘charged with the duty of examining the preparatory surveys of the preliminary scheme, of solving all the problems in science, art, and execution presented by the operation.’65 Membership of the Commission was, relatively unsurprisingly, exclusively European: around the middle of the nineteenth century, this did not yet contradict the label, still a neologism, of “international”.66 To select members, Lesseps had asked ministers of each country (Austria, , Holland, , Spain, England, France) ‘to name the engineer who is the most capable’. A commission ‘composed of such men’, Lesseps stressed in a letter to the editor of the anti-canal Times, surely ‘ought to remove all doubts, all mistrust, all anxiety, all timidity’ among investors and the general public.67 Who were these experts, and what made their credentials worthy of serving on the Commission? What were their motives for participating, and what did they derive their expert authority from? Table 2 provides an overview of all 13 members of the 1855 International Commission. Three features stand out. First, the fact that members were exclusively white and male aside, expert authority was far from homogeneous. Experts did not share a common type of education or degree: some where formally trained at engineering schools, others through apprenticeships, other still had little knowledge of engineering at all. And even though ‘the backers of the canal needed the seal that the engineering community could give’, this was not a commission composed solely of Europe’s top engineers. Rather it was a group selected for distinction in not only engineering but also military experience abroad. Second, the common criterion seems instead to have been a sort of international portfolio, tied to a mindset committed to the spread of progress through either military or technical preponderance. Third, although carrying the word “international” in its title, the commission was French-dominated— though it is interesting to note the aspiration to internationality as such, presumably

65 Lesseps 1876, 183-184.

66 Suganami 1978.

67 Lesseps 1876, 183-184.

Draft · Please do not circulate !16 EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES motivated by an expectation of credibility extending from that label. In sum, the project did not build on a straightforward scientific seal of approval. Instead it was legitimated by drawing from the relatively new political authority of expertise. No cohesive epistemic community was available: the Commission was composed of a wide array of figures, some with technical credential, many without—the label mattered more than the practice. Internationality as represented by the 1855 International Commission, in other words, was configured as a claim to impartiality, while in reality it was based on the universalism of white European men favoured by their nations’ political elites and with some “international” (to wit, multilingual and/or imperial) credential.

1856-69: The politics of ‘ascertained facts’ By 1856, the Commission had finished its report, complete with a detailed description of the canal; a summary of its key findings were translated and published in English and Italian in the same year.68 The report became a centrepiece of the pro-canal campaign. It also placed emphasis on the expert-based superiority of the commission over the Egyptian government’s own engineers. The widely circulated English-language edition of ‘facts and figures’ noted, for example:

The scheme of His Highness the Viceroy’s engineers, includes a channel 100 mètres [sic] wide, preceded by a vast flushing basin and protected by an insulated breakwater 500 mètres in length. The International Commissioners cannot approve of these propositions. The establishment of a vast water-tight basin in the sea would be very difficult and very expensive. The necessity of flushings is not proved, and their efficacy is doubtful.69

The publication’s opening ‘Statement of Facts’ also stressed that the members of the Commission ‘have drawn … conclusions, which the scientific world may henceforth look upon as ascertained facts.’ Their report ‘suffices for the present to answer the expectations of the public, and to remove all doubts which, on grounds of prudence or policy might still be entertained as to the practicability of this vast undertaking. The question from an engineering point of view’ had been ‘fully solved’. But Lesseps also made sure to pay heed to the British imperial point of view. Stressing the advantages of steam power he made recommendations such as this: ‘The great shipping movement in the direction of the East Indies which will take the route by the Red Sea must, more than any other, yield to this general tendency to renounce the use of sails’.70 Convinced by the document, viceroy Saïd issued a second act of concession, this time explicitly for the long-contested direct route. In Article 3 of the 1856 Charter of Concession for a Suez

68 Lesseps 1856.

69 Lesseps 1876, 144; emphasis added.

70 ibid., 15-18 and 24-25.

Draft · Please do not circulate !17 EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES

Name Nationality Education Experience Key qualification

Alois Negrelli, Italian University of , • Chief engineer Schweizerische Nordbahn 1836–46; Transnational engineer of 1799–1858 University of • railways to , Poland, German states; large-scale public works; (1817 • 1850 President of the International Shipping Commission of Austria; prior surveys in Egypt graduate) • 1852 Austrian Delegate to International Commission for the Central with Enfantin Italian Rail; • member of Enfantin’s Société d’Études

Charles Jaurès, French French Naval • 1830 marine admiral on French expedition to Algeria; Military career, imperial 1808–1870 College, Angoulême • 1844 Morocco; distinction (1825 graduate) • 1852 Egypt; • 1855 China

Charles Manby, British Engineering • 1823 move to France to install hydrogen gas pipes across Paris for his Factory builder and 1804–1884 apprentice at his father's company; Fellow of the Royal father's Staffordshire • 1820s employment by French government to build state-owned tobacco Society Horseley Ironworks factories; from 1817 • 1838 back in England joined Sir John Ross’s India Company; • helped Samuel Colt build firearms factory; • 1853 named Fellow of the Royal Society; • 1856 named London Representative of Robert Stephenson & Co.

Charles Rigault de French École Polytechnique • 1830 French expedition to Algeria; Military career, imperial Grenouilly, (1825 graduate) • 1831 participated in forcing of the Tagus; distinction 1807–1873 • 1843 commanded corvette on China and India Seas station; • 1854 served as flag captain during Odessa bombardment in Crimean War; • 1857 Second Opium War; • 1857 punitive expedition Vietnam

Cipriano Segundo Spanish London; École • involved in establishing industrial engineering as a profession in Spain, and Key role in emerging Montesino Estrada, Centrale des Arts et creation of the Royal Industrial Institute modelled on French Engineering Spanish engineering 1817–1901 Manufactures, Paris schools profession; Director- (1837 graduate) • 1841/43 Public Works Officer for Spanish government General of Public Works • 1847 founding member and elected scholar at the Real de Ciencias Exactas, at time of commission Fïsicas y Naturales • 1854-56 Director-General Public Works for Spanish government

Edward Alfred John British Royal Naval College • standard career with Royal Navy: midshipman 1823 to South America, Naval commander of Harris, 1808–1888 1821–23 there until 1827, made Lieutenant in 1828 imperial credential, • 1839–41 commander North America and West Indies diplomat and MP • 1872 Knight Commander of the Order of Bath

Frederik Willem Dutch Delft School of • 1817 engineer in Dutch canal projects Known Dutch canal and Conrad, 1800–1870 Artillery and • 1825 Provincial Engineer for North Brabant railway pioneer Engineering (1817 • 1829 engineer for South Holland in Rotterdam graduate) • 1847 co-founder Koninklijk Instituut van Ingenieurs (KIVI) • 1839-55 Director-Engineer Hollandsche Ijzeren Spporweg-Maatschappij (HIJSM) • 1858-65 represents Egyptian viceroy at the

James Meadows British None; worked as • 1822 road construction works across Devon; Dock design, chain ferry Rendel, surveyor from an • 1827 builds bridge across Plym estuary, earning medal of Institution of invention, Medal of 1799–1856 early age Civil Engineers; Honour • 1831 invented the chain ferry; • 1852–53 designed docks in Genoa; • 1853–55 reported on harbour at Rio de Janeiro; • 1854–55 reported on river for Hamburg senate; • directed construction of East Indian and Madras railways; • 1855 Medal of Honour at Paris World’s Fair

Jean-Pierre H. French École Polytechnique • 1843 Secretary Nautical Commission in Algeria; Book on the ports of Aristide Lieussou, (1834 graduate) • 1846–53 Cartographic Evaluation of Algeria at the Marine Repository of Algeria 1815–1858 Maps;

John Robinson British Academical • Co-founder engineering consultancy McClean & Stileman; Eminent engineer; high McClean, Institution, • Advisor on Suez Canal to British government; status in both engineering 1813–1873 University of • Chairman, Anglo-American Telegraph Company; and politics Glasgow • 1864–65 President of the Institution of Civil Engineers; • 1868–73 MP for East Staffordshire

Karl Lentze, Prussian Prussian Surveying • 1823 enters Prussian civil service as land surveyor Chief engineer of civil 1801–1883 Examination 1823 • experience building bridges, canals, dykes engineering credential in • 1850 Head of Royal Commission for Bridges Prussia, experience • 1859 title of Geheimer Oberbaurat building bridges and • delegate for Prussia and Norddeutscher Bund on Suez commission canals

Louis M. A. Linant French None; travelled as • 1818–30 surveying work in the service of Viceroy of Egypt Muhammad Life in Egypt; stakes in de Bellefonds, mapping novice to Ali; Suez project as its chief 1799–1883 Greece, Syria, • 1822 first visit Isthmus of Suez; engineer Palestine, Egypt • 1831 Chief Engineer Public Works, Upper Egypt; • 1837 earned title of Bey; • 1854 chief engineer of Lesseps’ Suez project

Pietro Paleocapa, Italian University of Padua, • 1817 Venetian Engineers of Water and Streets Alpine tunnel engineer of 1788–1869 Military Academy of • 1813 prisoner of war during Napoleonic Wars acclaim, political favour Modena • 1825 commissioner for Vienna census as pro-unification activist • 1857 Fréjus Rail Tunnel works

Table 2. Members of the 1855 International Commission on the Isthmus of Suez. Draft · Please do not circulate !18 EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES

Maritime Canal, the Egyptian government now explicitly stated:

The Canal, navigable by large vessels, shall be constructed of the depth and width fixed by the scheme of the International Scientific Commission. Conformably with this scheme, it will commence at the Port of Suez; it will pass through the basin of the Amer Lakes and Lake Timsah, and will debouch into the Mediterranean at whatever point in the Gulf of Pelusium may be determined in the final plans to be prepared by the engineers of the Company.71

This was victory: a litmus test for international expert governance had yielded striking success. It had further been manifested loud and clear who could, and who could not, lay claim to international expertise. And yet contestation continued. Enfantin launched another vengeful campaign, lobbying the French imperial court to discredit Lesseps and enlisting Robert Stephenson, who he knew was opposed to a Suez Canal since his prior defection from surveying works with the Saint-Simonians. Stephenson was now a Member of Parliament and was unafraid to declare his grudge against Lesseps in public. Between 1856 and 1857 he emerged as a chief anti-canal expert. Once the International Commission had published its findings, the politics of building the Suez Canal were thus far from overcome. From a functionalist point of view, this is counterintuitive: why spend resources on expert governance if it did not remove doubt, establish certainty, and legitimate the enterprise once and for all? From an epistemic communities perspective, it would moreover seem strange that Lesseps was able to present a group of engineers, military officers, and stakeholders as an independent expert commission. So expert governance was based on something else, and served less straightforward functions with less secure returns. Expert contestation continued to accompany the ten years of digging the canal; usually intensifying during periods of heightened political contestation. Whenever political controversies arose— from the use of forced labour to colonial encroachment, from inter-imperial rivalries to the question of Egyptian sovereignty—expert contestation offered a way of either moving the conversation away from politics into the realm of technicalities, or recasting the same debate in technical terms. In 1857, the British parliament convened to discuss the merits of the Suez project and whether or not Britain should give Lesseps the support he so yearned for. This was prime-time for expert politics. The meeting of parliament took place at a time of heated debate in the wake of the Indian Rebellion. A Suez Canal ‘would make it possible to send reinforcements to India in half the time’ in case of future unrests— Palmerston’s opposition began to waver. Stephenson in turn, one observer noted, ‘would not venture to enter upon the political bearings of the subject … but would confine

71 Quoted in Spencer Price 1873, 42; emphasis added.

Draft · Please do not circulate !19 EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES himself to the engineering capabilities of the scheme.’72 A British journalist explained in an 1873 retrospective on resistance to ‘our high road to India’ that

while Lord Palmerston gladly welcomed Robert Stephenson’s condemnation of the project from the engineer’s point of view, his own opposition, though he was naturally glad of such distinguished professional support, was based entirely on political grounds. With members of Parliament, however, who failed to share the political terrors of the Foreign Secretary, the verdict of the great engineer was a fatal stumbling-block.73

This was precisely how expertise could, once more, be deployed as the means of rendering internationality a claim to impartiality: like the commission, the parliamentary debates too deflected an intensely political question into the realm of technicalities. Denying politics, as it were, thus had the advantage of presenting an absolute, objective answer; only actually to a different question. The controversy would remain unresolved, and British reluctance to back the Suez project continued for another while. On the other side of the Channel, in the meantime, enthusiasm had grown. Unconcerned by British opposition, Lesseps wrote to a friend: ‘If every great improvement had to be suspended until it was sanctioned by some official authority, the world would be stopped in its tracks, or it would move backward.’74 In October 1858, Lesseps announced the floating of 400,000 shares at 500 francs each. Though he had hoped that people all across Europe would eagerly acquire these, only 23,000 people ended up doing so—21,000 of whom were French. There was one caveat: the viceroy of Egypt had promised Lesseps to buy any outstanding shares, and so, honouring his word, he indeed acquired the remaining 177,000 shares.75 Finally in 1859 the Suez Canal Company or Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez was established in both Paris and Alexandria. Excavation and building works would commence the same year. By 1859, the purpose of the Commission had been met: expert auditing had justified the project to the public scrutiny of both British naysayers and hesitant potential investors across Europe, highlighting its technical feasibility and therefore, it appeared, its legitimacy. This step was well-aligned with the premises of Saint-Simonian technocratic internationalism, categorising a problem as technical and devising a corresponding equally technical solution. The jump to justifying something, on the basis of technical possibility, had been elegantly performed. And yet neither did political (often inter- imperial) disagreements disappear, nor did expert depoliticisation render the project merely technical. Even canal excavation works were politically charged. As one scholar

72 Lesseps 1875, 87-113; Hansard 1857.

73 Spencer Price 1873, 9.

74 Bonnet 1951, 301.

75 Karabell 2003, 151-155.

Draft · Please do not circulate !20 EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES noted, digging the canal was ‘an act of civilisation’, manifesting ‘French influence in the Near East.’ The concession effectively amounted to ‘a sort of French colonisation, including the organisation of a vast territory, the isthmus of Suez, and the settlement of European populations.’76 The scope of this paper cannot do justice to the full history here, but three aspects stand out: first, the workforce heavily relied on Egyptian, mostly forced, labour (known as corvée), while skilled labour was to be the near-exclusive domain of European employees.77 Second, the company behaved in ways often indistinguishable from a colonial power, complete with European settlement along the newly created canal zone towns, a company hospital, company-owned railways, and company-owned telegraph communication.78 Third, Lesseps tended to disregard the Egyptian viceroy’s hesitation about the enterprise, often ignoring Egyptian sovereignty altogether. Illustrating the resulting power relations, in 1864 the governor of Damietta, a region which included lands around Lake Manzala in the canal zone, demanded that fishermen active there pay Egyptian taxes. Lesseps rejected this out of hand, treating the fishermen as company employees, given that they had been fishing within the company’s canal zone, thus exempting them from taxes. This was a direct infringement on Egyptian sovereignty. 79Egyptian autonomy had begun to be eroded from within, through the activities of an essentially European company—notably not at the hands of a European government, but at the behest of a nominally universal company led by a French private citizen.

Expertise revisited: internationality as a claim to impartiality

A cursory glance makes it easy to view the history of the 1855 International Commission on the Isthmus of Suez as that of the straightforward application of technical expert knowledge to a challenge of what today we would call global governance. From a functionalist perspective, represented in this paper by the epistemic communities framework, one would assume that the problem at hand required input from the relevant epistemic community—engineering experts—which was then identified and drawn in. In fact however, this was a case of expert governance before a respective epistemic community was at all available. For the framework that poses a problem, leaving it unable to explain how expert governance was able to be effective without epistemic cohesiveness and political separateness. From a poststructuralist perspective, in turn represented in

76 Piquet 2002, 39.

77 More than 60,000 Egyptian peasants or fellahin joined the Suez works. Along with Greek and Sudanese workers, as well as labour migrants from the Arab peninsula, these provided the vast majority of the labour force. The number of forced workers peaked at 23,318 in April 1862. Thousands died. Huber 2013, 28.

78 On European settlements along the Suez canal see Huber 2013, 30; Berchère 1863, 20.

79 On Egyptian semi-sovereignty see Donnelly 2006; Learoyd 2018. Also see Zhu 2020.

Draft · Please do not circulate !21 EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES this paper by the governmentality lens, one would assume that expertise features as a practice always enmeshed with political power: a method for rendering its object of governance legible on terms that facilitate governing it. But this presupposes autonomous individuals, hardly a given at the time nor the most important audience or constituency of international expert authority. My analysis of the 1855 International Commission does not fully map onto either approach. It demands a different understanding of expertise—one that is neither limited to epistemic cohesiveness and political separateness, nor limited to the context of neoliberalism. If the Suez Canal is understood as a representative case of modern expert governance, we may need to revise understandings of expertise that prevail in the literature. Historicising the phenomenon by asking how and why expertise became a central part of modern global governance yields a picture at odds with both functionalist and poststructuralist tenets. This picture requires a reconceptualisation of expertise in global governance, promising to bridge an unfortunate disconnect between optimistic and pessimistic scholarship on expertise in IR. The case of the 1855 International Commission suggests that expert governance was a means of achieving internationality as a claim to impartiality, effectively deflecting away from the politics of the Suez Canal project. This legitimated practices of informal empire by giving them a powerful stamp of approval. Ferdinand de Lesseps was able to forge and deploy a notion of international expert approval in his campaign to legitimise the Suez Canal enterprise vis-à-vis international shareholders, doubtful engineers, and suspecting politicians. Expert governance could thus deflect focus away from normative legitimacy to technical feasibility. Such a shift entailed discrediting Egypt’s own expert judgement, instead stressing how an already preferred option could best be carried out. This precluded arguably much more controversial normative questions of whether the canal should be built at all, who should build it, and who should own, control and profit from it. On this basis I advance two theoretical arguments as the basis for a historically grounded reconceptualisation of expertise. First, expert-based global governance can best be understood as a practice that deploys internationality as a categorical claim to impartiality. This paper thus historically confirms and theoretically develops recent insights of the practice turn in IR.80 Sending observes that expert governance ‘is the result of a successful claim to authority that was initially rooted in a claim to represent the international in an impartial and neutral way’.81 Allan similarly notes that governance objects like society, culture, or public health ‘could not be seen with the naked eye and so they had to be created and rendered legible by expert knowledge.’82 This paper corroborates and further develops these insights. A

80 Pouliot 2016; Bueger 2014; Sending 2015; Allan 2018a.

81 Sending 2015, 5; see also Orford 2011, 192-205.

82 Allan 2018a, 164.

Draft · Please do not circulate !22 EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES categorical claim to internationality refers to the labelling of an object of governance as international, i.e. the discursive move of lending a given issue, phenomenon, institution, or actor international significance. Internationality as a category was relatively new in mid-nineteenth century Europe, the term “international” itself only having been coined by Bentham at the turn of the nineteenth century.83 Crucially internationality is distinct from universality:84 reciprocity is always based on membership criteria and rules of conduct—which as historical IR continuously shows are always subject to change over time, expert-based policy-making emerging as one of them over the course of the nineteenth century. To internationalise the Suez question, for Lesseps, was a way of avoiding its alternative inscription with imperial significance. But how could he meaningfully internationalise his enterprise, which it was so easy for critics like Stephenson to “debunk” as French empire in disguise? Supported by scientific and technocratic internationalist currents which were already around and part of the Suez Canal idea, as its Saint-Simonian origins betray, expert approval was a direct avenue to internationalisation: to internationality as a claim to impartiality. Second, based on this expert authority is thus not always epistemic by default. In contrast with epistemic communities and governmentality studies, I argue that the authority of experts is not exclusively based either on their epistemic status as possessors of specialist knowledge, or on their political status as formulators of knowledge-based political interventions. The 1855 case shows instead that political favour can endow experts with authority, a nexus which internationality can then mask as impartiality.85 Depoliticisation can, after all, itself be a politically intended appearance. As historian Eric Ash has written in another context, ‘the ability to wrangle recognition and favor from powerful patrons, whose political influence and social status could be traded upon to establish or reinforce one’s own expert credentials when these were in question, could be at least as important as the possession of technical knowledge itself.’86 The conditions of possibility of internationality-as-impartiality—the rise of the middle classes, scientific internationalism, and informal empire—made its masking more desirable than the open admission of political aims. Expert governance, after all, was possible only due to the rise of meritocracy: roads to power based on education and

83 Suganami 1978.

84 Somsen 2008; Vrasti 2013.

85 Political favour and the selection or visibility of experts depend on criteria which always reflect historical context, whether based on civilisational markers, empire, race, or gender. It is in this way that expertise is able to generate a claim to impartiality that masks its own necessarily partial basis. To be clear, however, that partiality is not intrinsic to expertise but derives from its inextricability from politics: there can be no “clean” expertise that matters to political choices. The theoretical underpinnings of this argument will be the subject of another paper.

86 Ash 2010, 11.

Draft · Please do not circulate !23 EXPERTS WITHOUT COMMUNITIES certification, nominally merit, instead of (though often alongside) aristocratic lineage. A rising middle class spurred the proliferation of experts: a new actor type that soon found its way into politics.87 Scientific and technocratic internationalisms, in turn, channelled enthusiasm for the pacifying potentials of science. And finally informal empire, a ‘belief in the possibility of empire without annexation’, created a demand for invisible forms of imperial intervention.88 Internationality as a claim to impartiality was a promising, if fragile, response to that demand.

Conclusions

To ground a concept of expert-based global governance in history, the analytical and empirical separation of specialist knowledge and international politics can hardly be a starting point. It may be achieved in some cases, or we might consider it a desirable end goal. But neither practices nor practitioners emerge in a vacuum or in isolation from the contests, hierarchies, and violences of politics. Knowledge-based agents are no exception. This is in line with, but also adds to, existing historical-sociological studies in IR of diplomats, bureaucrats, and international lawyers, all of which have noted depoliticisation and the masking of inequalities as key effects of the mobilisation of expertise in international politics.89 If the notion of internationality as a claim to impartiality proposed in this paper holds more generally, which only further scholarship will be able to judge properly, international expert governance not only masked but also entrenched existing logics of inequality. Experts have historically served as powerful legitimisers of political projects, serving a technocratic politics whose goal was not maximum legitimacy, but maximum efficiency. International expert governance then, and the 1855 International Commission illustrates this, relied on a theory of international politics which propagated liberty, independence, and detachment, but actually legitimated and so facilitated inequality, dependence, and intervention. To conclude, this paper has proposed a theoretical reorientation based on a neglected case that simultaneously required and forged practices of expert-based global governance: the 1855 International Commission on the Isthmus of Suez. Reconceptualising expertise in more historically grounded as well as open-ended ways is a promising avenue not least towards establishing a versatile vocabulary across diverging approaches to global governance. Making expertise “un-obvious” is an imperative first step to moving beyond a choice between optimism or pessimism, and instead continuing to interrogate and innovate basic assumptions.

87 See most recently Dejung, Motadel, Osterhammel 2020.

88 Todd 2015, 268.

89 Lauren 1976; Koskenniemi 2006; Pouliot 2016; Pitts 2018; Tzouvala 2020.

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