EVALUATION
PERU, ALLIANCE EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE JUNE – NOVEMBER 2001
FINAL REPORT
Consultant – Michael Clulow Evaluation Team Members – Maritza Pinzón, Nelly Claux, Ana María Marquez, Raúl Luna, David Throp, Omar Delfín, Juan Pari, Jorge Mariscal, Agustín González
January 2001
Contents
Executive Summary 3
Notes on the evaluation 6
1. Analysis of achievement of objectives and impact on target population 9
2. Analysis of efficiency of intervention 23
3. Analysis of sustainability of results and impacts 28
4. Analysis of appropriateness of Alliance response 32
5. Analysis of Alliance Management 42
6. Recommendations 46
Appendices
Appendix 1: Evaluation Timetable
Appendix 2: Draft Evaluation Framework
Appendix 3: Participants in Evaluation Meetings
Appendix 4: Newspaper cuttings
Appendix 5: Children’s drawings and other materials produced by beneficiaries during the evaluation
Appendix 6: Photos
NB: Appendices have not been translated. Appendices 4 to 6 are only included in the original English copy of the final report, submitted to Save the Children UK in London.
2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In response to the earthquake of June 23rd 2001 which caused widespread destruction in southern Peru, the three Alliance members with a presence in the country (UK, Canada and Sweden) have been working with five national counterparts in four geographical areas (Ayacucho, Arequipa, Moquegua and Tacna) to implement a relief and rehabilitation project which incorporates both conventional assistance (shelter, bedding, clothing, household equipment and rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure) and educational and training work to promote children’s rights and disaster prevention and preparedness. Although this project is yet to finish, with work on the latter areas due to continue into the second half of 2002, it was considered important to conduct an evaluation of the project at this time.
The fact that the evaluation has been made of work in progress, albeit with many key components fully or nearly fully implemented, makes clear that it is not intended to be an evaluation of how effective the project has been with a view to reporting to donors and portioning out praise or blame. Rather, this is intended to be a contribution to a process of mutual learning by the members of the Alliance and their counterparts in the project on the basis of which the present project can be completed more effectively and future decisions can be taken on a more solid basis. Consistent with this orientation, the evaluation was conducted by a team of Save the Children staff from the various Alliance members involved and members of two counterpart organisations (Mallku and PREDES) with the consultant functioning principally as a coordinator, facilitator and reporter. There were some difficulties in putting together this team but the results were very positive and the author of this report is indebted to the other team members for their contributions and support.
Although this is not intended principally as an impact evaluation, a significant proportion of the report is necessarily devoted to the consideration of the effectiveness of the components of the project which have been or are nearly completed and of the initial indications of impact of the other components. In this respect, it can be stated that the project has been largely successful. Most importantly, the overall objective of “ensuring adequate health of children in badly affected rural areas receiving little support” has been fulfilled through the provision of bedding, warm clothing and shelter in poor rural areas, often distant from the major towns and cities which received the lion’s share of aid from other organisations. Save the Children’s assistance contributed significantly to reducing the incidence and consequences of acute respiratory infections. As a doctor consulted during the evaluation put it: “there have been many cases of acute respiratory disease but the distribution of blankets avoided a crisis”. Children’s clothes distributed in all project areas and the establishment of good quality temporary housing modules, particularly in the Moquegua and Tacna departments, and of anti-seismic houses in Arequipa, will continue to contribute to this aim while the housing also helps fulfil the objective of contributing to the rapid reconstruction of rural communities. Rehabilitation of canals was carried out rather more slowly than might have been wished but has nevertheless ensured opportune sowing of major season food crops in most areas and will provide better production conditions than would have been possible otherwise both in this season and for some time to come.
Specific work to promote children’s rights and disaster prevention only began in earnest in September so no firm judgements can be made on the effectiveness of the project in this respect but some positive progress is already clear. Early work with children has contributed to overcoming their fears, which were one of the major effects of the earthquake, while opportunities are being created for them to strengthen their participation in their communities
3 and make their voices heard. The increased openness of teachers and local authorities to new approaches have been and are being capitalised on with local authorities exploring the creation of a municipal office for the defence of children’s rights in Ayacucho, some new schools councils being created in Arequipa, teachers reproducing training on disaster prevention in Moquegua and creativity workshops and children’s rights days being held in schools in Tacna.
Consideration of the “appropriateness” of the project in its many facets suggest that, on balance, it was an appropriate response to the emergency. This judgement is based not only on the results of the work to date but also on the coherence between the project and Alliance mission, vision and approaches and on the fit between various factors including: the populations attended and the patterns of need and attendance by other agencies; the priorities expressed by women, children and men and the project components; and the counterparts selected and their capacity to implement the project and integrate Save the Children priorities and approaches into their work.
There have, of course, been limitations and problems affecting the project some of which should be highlighted. These include external factors such as: the difficulties of coordinating with other agencies, especially the national civil defence institute (INDECI); poor levels of community organisation in some areas; and the remoteness and isolation of several locations, especially the intervention area in Ayacucho and the main intervention area in Tacna. Internal factors which caused difficulties included: low budgets for counterpart personnel and transport; clashes of institutional culture generated by the counterparts lack of experience in emergency work; the small size of the project coordination team appointed at the beginning of August; some weaknesses in communication and reporting; the lack of a monitoring system; and the absence of guidelines on the promotion of active participation of children and the inclusion of women and girls and of people with disabilities. It should also be noted that fundraising for work on children’s rights and disaster prevention has been far more difficult than for other aspects of the project, underlining the gap between Save the Children’s vision of emergency work and that of the donor agencies.
These limitations and problems have principally delayed rather than impeded positive impacts. In some cases, this is partly due to convenient circumstances, e.g. the timing of the earthquake meant that reductions in availability of irrigation water did not have immediate, major implications for subsistence crops. However, it is mostly down to the work of the counterparts, their institutional cultures and the support they received from the Save the Children team. In this sense, it is important to stress some of the positive aspects of the ways in which the various organisations worked. All counterparts established working relationships with local authorities and community leaders; all of them encouraged communal working by beneficiaries; several of them managed to integrate emergency work with their regular programmes; and at least two of them (Labor and Mallku) took a team approach to project implementation. The support of staff from various Alliance members’ offices in Peru and elsewhere was crucial during the first month after the earthquake and the support of PREDES, officially considered as an advisor but in practice the fifth counterpart, has been enormously helpful from Day One.
Given the nature of this evaluation as a learning process, some emphasis has been placed on the development of recommendations, although they should perhaps be better understood as suggestions some of which can be directly acted on but most of which should be used to spark discussions that can lead to firm policy decisions. Some of the principal recommendations are:
4 In relation to the current project: • Decisions on the inclusion of counterparts in the new phase of work on children’s rights and disaster prevention must be taken soon. Consideration should be given to the limited resources available, the ability of the counterparts to dedicate staff to this work and the alternatives that may be available. • A workshop to exchange experiences and ideas between the counterparts would be useful, especially if held soon. • Mechanisms should be sought to promote children’s rights and disaster prevention with parents. • Alliance members should seek additional funding for the new phase of work.
In relation to future emergency work: • Careful consideration must be given to staffing needs. Small increases in personnel budgets which should not threaten funding can make larges differences to the quality of work. • Selection of counterparts should be made carefully. Existing Alliance counterparts can be good choices but their real possibilities of dedicating staff and time to the project and the intervention areas are paramount. • Plastic refuges should be avoided whenever possible, especially in winter months, given their poor thermal characteristics which reduce their effectiveness in safeguarding children’s health. • Means must be sought to speed-up the repair of irrigation canals. • Work to address the fears of children caused by rapid onset disasters and to counter increases in abuse and violence against children and women should be included in future projects. • Projects must include appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems including simple indicators which focus on Save the Children’ priorities.
In relation to institutional preparedness: • Save the Children should develop and maintain information on potential counterparts, probable keys sectors of intervention, prices and sources of basic supplies and possible short term staff including those of Alliance members that could be seconded. • Clear guidelines are needed on measures to promote the active participation of children, to ensure that children’s rights are kept in focus and that interventions promote the inclusion of people marginalized due to their gender, culture or disabilities. • It would be beneficial if Alliance members in the region could count on a small number of “permanent” emergencies staff.
Other recommendations: • Save the Children members in Peru and their counterparts should engage with current official consultation processes to advocate the inclusion of children’s rights and disaster prevention in their agendas. They should also develop relationships with other agencies that normally implement emergency relief and rehabilitation activities. • Alliance staff in general, not only emergency personnel, should take the time to participate in the systematisation and discussion of emergency projects. • This evaluation report should be shared and discussed with other Alliance members and with project counterparts.
5 NOTES ON THE EVALUATION
This evaluation was conducted from November 7th until December 9th, including time for preparing the draft report but excluding translation and incorporation of comments in the final version. This period included 21 days in Peru, of which 10 days were dedicated to field work. Appendix 2 contains the original methodological proposal which formed the basis of the field work. Although some modifications were introduced in the field, the basic methodology remained the same. It was based principally on the conduction of semi-structured group interviews of beneficiaries and key informants in mixed and segregated groups (by age, sex and relationship with the project). As and when possible and useful, these meetings incorporated dynamics such as participatory mapping, drawing by children and the recounting of personal histories. Some inspections of physical infrastructure (chiefly canals and housing / shelters) were conducted but more with a view to gaining opportunities to converse more naturally with beneficiaries than to trying to rigorously probe the quality of the work. Local authorities were consulted in several locations as were teachers and health professionals. Formal discussions with staff of all five counterparts were also conducted during the field work period.
In establishing the timetable for field work, priority was given to the ability to take some time to converse with the beneficiaries and other informants rather than to maximising geographical coverage. The majority of the localities visited were chosen due to having received support in the first and second phases of the project and with a view to covering the full range of project components. Localities that had only received support during the first phase1 or not at all were not visited on the grounds that it would represent an unjust intrusion and risk raising false expectations of support. Details of the visits and meetings are contained in Appendices 1 and 3.
In addition to field work, eight meetings with Alliance staff and evaluation team members were conducted and an extensive range of documents were consulted. Those documents included: • email communications between Alliance staff and with donors; • early information on the emergency in the form of Alliance updates and communications by other official and private agencies; • evaluations of needs made in each department in July; • project proposals and budgets; • contracts between Alliance members and with PREDES; • internal reports, reports by counterpart staff and reports to donors; • reports on project planning workshops held during July and September • Save the Children UK and Alliance documents on emergency policy and procedures; • newspaper reports from Arequipa and Tacna; • Systematisations / reports of Area 4 training events in Arequipa and Moquegua; • Educational materials produced by Save the Children in Costa Rica and by Mallku; • Venezuela emergency evaluation report and suggested tools for analysis of emergency work.
One element which is missing from this evaluation is consultation with representatives of other agencies such as INDECI, Caritas, Red Cross or USAID. It had been hoped to interview some
1 In this document the terms, 1st, 2nd and 3rd phase are used to refer to phases of project implementation which the evaluation terms of reference classify as Early Response (the humanitarian aid phase, which terminated between late July and September depending on the implementation area and was funded by ECHO and CIDA), Transition (relief with a development focus funded by DFID, JOAC, SC Norway and SC Sweden, implemented beginning in August 2001 and due to end in January 2002) and Consolidation (sustainable rehabilitation & children’s participation running from approximately November 2001 until the second half of 2002, currently only funded by SC Sweden).
6 of these or similar types of organisations but none were known to be present in the locations visited during the time of those visits and pressures of time before and after field work precluded the organisation of such meetings in Lima.
Although this report is exclusive responsibility of the consultant, it is important to stress that the evaluation has been developed by a team (identified on the cover of the report and in Appendix 1). Members of the team contributed to the design of the evaluation methodology and to its improvement in the field. They facilitated many of the meetings with beneficiaries, including all meetings with children and women, and fed in their findings to the report. They participated in the process of reflection on the findings through formal and informal meetings, one-on-one conversations and email discussions. Field work was demanding and their dedication to and interest in the task of evaluation was greatly appreciated. Thanks are due to all members of the team in recognition of their contributions. In particular, I wish to thank: Save the Children UK emergencies coordinator for South America, Maritza Pinzon, who played a key role throughout all the field work and in subsequent analysis; Save the Children UK and Canada’s Peru programme coordinator, Nelly Claux, for taking the time to accompany the process in detail, including most of the field work, when she had many more demands on her time; the director of counterpart organisation Mallku, Juan Pari, for participating fully in the process; and to Omar Delfin of Save the Children Canada in Bolivia for injecting new dynamics (professional and personal) into the last part of the field work when the tiredness of other team members could have taken over.
The terms of reference for the evaluation included a requirement that a contribution be made to capacity building of counterparts. This led Richard Hartill to suggest the inclusion of Mallku’s director in the team as a sort of on-the-job experience. However, in practice, Juan probably contributed more to the evaluation than he learned. This is because, as became clear, he has 18 years of experience working in participatory planning. However, it is important to emphasise that his role was one of support. At no time did Juan attempt to assume a leadership role in the process nor to judge the action and achievements of the other counterparts.
In general terms, it is hoped that the style of the evaluation may be a positive influence on the counterparts in that the emphasis was on meeting with and listening to beneficiaries and others rather than, as sometimes happens, rushing around, looking at as much as possible and talking to project staff. However, most counterparts, especially Proyeccion and Labor, were anxious for the team to see more infrastructure and visit more places than requested, so they may not have really appreciated the approach.
Finally, two or three negative aspects of the organisation of the evaluation by Save the Children UK and the commitment of Alliance members should perhaps be made:
Management. Initial consideration of the need for an evaluation began in mid July and emails between David Throp and Steve Lewis show that many details of the process were already being discussed. Unfortunately, it appears that some of that early clarity was lost as, for example, Richard was surprised in late September to find that he was to interview candidates in a few days time, the organisation of the team was left until after the designation of the consultant and the designation of the project manager was defined on paper but not in practice2.
2 Four different people, including the consultant, effectively managed different parts of the work with consequent negative effects on clarity and co-ordination.
7 Duration. The 28 days allotted was too optimistic. By the time the consultant returns to Panama after debriefing in London, around 36 days will have been used, most of them lasting significantly more than the 7 hours specified in the contract definitions. The parts of the process which required significantly more time than that allocated in the terms of reference were the preparation phase and the writing and translation of the draft report. Greater preparation time would have had positive impacts on the field work.
Alliance commitment. Despite agreement several weeks before the evaluation began that an evaluation team composed of relevant staff from all three Alliance members should be created, it proved difficult to put together such a team: its exact composition was not clear until the same day that team members left Lima and it varied considerably over the course of the ten days. No members of Save the Children Sweden were able to participate and Save the Children Canada was only represented through Nelly Claux (who also represents Save the Children UK) and Omar Delfin who joined the team for the last 2 and a half days. Even the lead agency, Save the Children UK, proved unable to commit itself as fully as expected: Maritza Pinzon only arrived in Lima less than 24 hours before field work began which negatively affected the design of the evaluation methodology while David Throp was only able to participate in half of the field work and had to return to London before the Lima workshop to discuss preliminary findings. The date of that workshop also had to be brought forward to permit the participation of Save the Children Canada and Sweden regional directors.
In most respects, the constraints imposed by these problems have been overcome but a smoother and more efficient evaluation would have been achieved had they been avoided.
8 1. ANALYSIS OF ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES AND IMPACT ON TARGET POPULATION
1.1. Achievement of the overall objective of the earthquake response.
The overall objective or aim of the Alliance’s earthquake response was defined in two different ways. In the proposals presented to CIDA, Save the Children Norway and ECHO the core of the aim was stated as “Ensure adequate health of children”. In the DFID and JOAC proposals and in the13th July version of the Generic Alliance Proposal, the aim was stated to be “Support those rural areas that are worst affected and receiving the least support, to meet the urgent needs of the homeless, particularly children and their families”. Given that the urgent needs of the homeless included the need for measures to protect children’s health, that the actions taken during the first phase focused on such measures and that the indicators for the overall objective in the DFID proposal focus on children’s health, the two formulations of the aim are complementary and can be synthesised for purposes of this evaluation as:
Ensure adequate health of children in rural areas that are worst affected and receiving the least support.
The urgent need following the earthquake to address the factors putting at risk the health of children was made clear during the evaluation by health workers in Cocachacra, Samegua and Quilahuani who all reported increases in cases of disease after the earthquake. In Quilahuani, the number of cases attended by the local health post increased from 15 to 40 per day. These informants corroborated the information collected by Save the Children counterparts in July which showed that the most important disease increases were in acute respiratory infections. There were also lesser but important increases in diarrhoeas, skin diseases and conjunctivitis.
In this context, the provision of bedding, warm clothing and shelter was vital for the reduction of the dangerous increases in incidence and consequences of acute respiratory disease. No statistics are available to prove that this actually happened as health records do not include data on the living conditions and receipt of donations by patients but health workers were clearly convinced that this had been important. For example, the doctor in Samegua indicated that there had been many cases of acute respiratory disease but the distribution of blankets had avoided a crisis.
It seems likely that the provision of tents played a specific role in reducing respiratory disease among their recipients. These compared favourably with plastic refuges provided by some other agencies, including USAID and ADRA, both in terms of their temperature characteristics - which was especially important in particularly cold locations such as the Candarave area - and in their durability – the PREDES advisor for Tacna and Moquegua reported that plastic shelters were already deteriorating by September. In communities of the Candarave area where both types of shelter had been received, residents rated the tents as less hot in the day and less cold at night. In addition, in two Candarave communities (Yucamani and Cala Cala) residents said that the tents were less permeable to the rain than plastic shelters3.
In Paucar de Sara Sara, the inclusion of children’s clothes in the immediate request for support made to CIDA speeded up their provision so that they were received during the latter part of the winter (August) rather than during spring in other departments. This relative timeliness and the
3 However, they can not be considered as impermeable as such. Peru’s climate prevented this being a problem as it does not rain in the highlands during the winter months and the rain in coastal locations is normally extremely light.
9 large numbers involved probably increased their effect on the incidence and severity of respiratory infections.
One cause of respiratory disease which was frequently mentioned by beneficiaries during the evaluation but was not addressed by project interventions was dust. In locations with dry, unstable slopes the earthquake and after shocks provoked frequent landslides for some time which caused the presence of enormous quantities of dust in the air, especially during the first week4. The effects of this dust might have been mitigated with the use of simple dust masks or, given the likely delays in distribution time, the dissemination of advice on the importance of taking such means as possible to reduce dust inhalation.
The project does not seem to have significantly impacted on the occurrence or effects of other diseases. Restoration of water supplies through canal repairs and treatment with chlorine tablets came rather late in that, by the time they were implemented (from August onwards), the worst phase of disruption and overcrowded and unhygienic living conditions had already passed and other measures had already been implemented by other actors: • Communities had made makeshift repairs to canals during the first week or so after the earthquake; • Health workers in Samegua and Quilahuani reported that they worked intensively in education campaigns to improve hygiene in food preparation and promote the appropriate use of chlorine during the weeks following the earthquake; • In some locations other agencies provided temporary drinking water systems. USAID information released on 26th June and to which Save the Children had access indicated that they had provided six water bladders and 5,200 five-gallon water jugs to Candarave. During the evaluation, water bladders were seen installed and in use in Quilahuani and Yucamani; • Counterparts indicated that there was an adequate supply of chlorine already in place in the Tacna and Ayacucho intervention zones.
Regarding the aim to support those who were worst affected and receiving least support, there is no question that the locations chosen were and remain very needful of the support offered by the project. The decision to prioritise poor, rural areas including some very isolated areas and communities, meant that Save the Children’s assistance was often provided in areas where there was and still is relatively little intervention by other agencies. Some communities, for example Yucamani, are now receiving no support from any other agencies, governmental or private. However, it is worth noting that there are almost certainly some communities that have received absolutely no support. Poor national information systems make this very difficult to determine with certainty or to identify which these communities might be.
4 The PREDES advisor for Paucar de Sara Sara reported that the whole area was covered by a cloud of dust like that produced by a helicopter.
10 1.2. Achievement of specific objectives5.
1.2.1. Specific objective 1: Permit the continuance of the productive cycle and reduce the incidence of diarrhoeas and skin diseases, particularly among children from 0 to 9. Productive cycle: Early project documents suggested that there would be considerable damage to crops if canals were not repaired quickly. For example, the fifth draft of the general project states “The destruction of the irrigation canals is particularly serious as the sowing season has begun and if the canals are not repaired within 15 to 20 days the majority of the crops will be lost and livestock will be put at risk”. In the event, although damage to canals did cause some losses, those losses were not generally serious as, in most locations, food crops had already been harvested or were close to their harvest date. There were important losses to cash crops in some locations (e.g. garlic and oregano) but immediate actions taken by local communities, both repairs and water rationing, reduced such losses below disastrous levels. All this is fortunate, as canal rehabilitation work under the project did not begin until August or later, more than one month after the earthquake.
However, canal work has largely fulfilled the objective as far as spring sowing of food crops is concerned. Repairs conducted by farmers without outside assistance generally were not sufficient to stop losses of water from canals due to extensive cracking and were somewhat makeshift when other types of irrigation infrastructure had been damaged, e.g. sluices and aqueducts in Quegual and Santa Maria and reservoirs in Toncio. To repair these types of damage the cement provided through the project was essential. Project support was also important in terms of the provision of tools, coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture to obtain heavy machinery (Samegua) and guidance on where repair should not be attempted because of risks of landslides or subsidence. Without project assistance, sowing of subsistence crops would have been delayed and / or yields would have been reduced. For example, farmers in Quilahuani indicated that repairs had been finished in time for sowing corn. Greater delays in canal work in Paucar de Sara Sara meant that sowing of corn, potatoes and broad beans in Rauripa has been delayed and crops in Toncio were being affected but in this area, as elsewhere, the repairs will have benefits during the present season and will continue to have positive impacts long afterwards.
Diarrhoeas and skin diseases: See the discussion of this issue under point 1.1.
Indicators agreed in the Moquegua workshop with counterparts held in early July include 7,200 metres of canals rehabilitated and 10,000 chlorine tablets distributed. According to reports from the counterparts, by the end of September: • In Ayacucho, canal rehabilitation had not yet begun (but was under weigh at the time of the evaluation) and the distribution of chlorine tablets had been suspended as existing supplies in the zone were judged sufficient. • In Arequipa, 2,088 metres of canals had been rehabilitated, an unplanned 4,480 metres of canal clearing had been conducted and work was progressing on the rehabilitation of three sluices. 3,840 chlorine tablets had been purchased and areas for distribution identified.
5 The formulations of the objectives varied somewhat between different documents while the grouping of diverse elements within specific objectives was not as clear as could have been wished. The indicators chosen are similarly mixed. This does not affect the possibilities of evaluating the project but explains some repetitions in the descriptions of the specific objectives and the analysis of six specific objectives (rather than the four contained in most formulations of the overall project). These factors may need some explaining to DFID when reporting to that agency as it will not be reasonable to stick rigidly to the log frame included in the project proposal.
11 • In Moquegua, 400 out of the planned 1,200 metres of canal rehabilitation had been completed (more had been conducted by the time of the evaluation) and 500 chlorine tablets had been obtained and given to the Samegua health centre for distribution. • In Tacna, canal work was 25% advanced (541 metres). Chlorine distribution had been suspended as existing supplies in the zone were judged sufficient and a request made to Save the Children for them to authorise their replacement by water testing kits.
1.2.2. Specific objective 2: Contribute to rapid reconstruction of rural communities. In one sense, this objective will only be fulfilled in Arequipa, where permanent, anti-seismic houses are being built with a combination of Save the Children funding and additional funding obtained by PREDES. Nevertheless, temporary modules built or in the process of construction in other areas, though not perhaps quite fulfilling the concept of reconstruction, have provided decent, safe housing for a significant number of families. In Moquegua and Tacna, the type of constructions being made are particularly good, should last for several years and have been built using materials that can be recycled in the construction of permanent homes as and when their occupants are able. Partial recycling of the modules built in Ayacucho is possible as wooden posts and beams and corrugated aluminium roofing will be reusable.
It is more difficult to judge the rapidity of reconstruction but comparisons with other agencies and observations in communities visited during the evaluation suggest that the speed of progress has been reasonable. Given their inclusion in the first phase of the project, temporary modules in Ayacucho were among the first to be constructed anywhere in the areas affected by the earthquake. Difficulties in obtaining construction materials and, in the case of Tacna, the limited availability of transport to the Candarave area caused construction of modules to begin later than hoped in these departments but it was under weigh in Tacna by late September and during October in Moquegua. Most of the modules in Tacna and Moquegua are now completed6. Anti-seismic houses being built in Arequipa did not begin construction until November but are expected to be finished by the end of the year.
According to the PREDES advisor for Tacna and Moquegua, as of September, similar modules to those provided by Save the Children in Ayacucho were beginning to be provided by INDECI7 and the UNDP in Tacna while the Banco de Materiales8, Caritas and the Salvation Army were providing wooden modules with aluminium roofing in Moquegua. However, during evaluation visits, no other medium-term modules or houses were seen to have been built or in construction except for those being rebuilt by local residents without external assistance and the plastic- sided modules provided by INDECI and the UNDP in Tacna, which are not appropriate in highland areas such as Candarave due to the low night temperatures. Materials from Caritas for the construction of houses were being stockpiled in Toncio but construction had yet to begin. Other major interventions are developing more slowly. Red Cross modules require the construction of a concrete platform which costs approximately S/.3009 before modules are built. Such platforms were seen in some communities of Candarave but delivery of wooden panels was only just commencing at the time of our visit. Promised support from the Banco de Materiales for permanent home construction (with loan conditions that do not fit those of many very poor) or FONCODES had yet to materialize in the areas visited.
6 The completion of some modules in Tacna may be delayed as changes in design agreed with the beneficiaries – double-pitched instead of single-pitched roofs – have led to a shortage of corrugated roofing sheets which Save the Children counterpart Mallku is attempting to resolve through negotiations with local government. 7 The National Institute for Civil Defense, the Peruvian government agency charged with disaster prevention and relief. 8 National lending institution specialised in building materials for poor homeowners. 9 Approximately $90.
12 Two important points to add are that: • The prioritisation of poor families and the type of design used by Save the Children and its counterparts have enabled many families who are least able to finance reconstruction to gain access to decent housing. • The slowness and / or lack of support from other organisations mean that many families are and will continue to live in inadequate and often dangerous housing for some time to come.
Indicators agreed in the Moquegua workshop include 410 temporary shelters providing shelter for the same number of families (and 1,640 children) and 40 sets of community tools being used in canal and housing work. According to reports from the counterparts, by the end of September: • In Ayacucho, 30 families had benefited from temporary housing modules and another 20 had received corrugated aluminium sheets for roofing. 5 tool kits had been purchased. 45% of tools acquired had been distributed but the majority had been given to schools (15) and only 4 communities as such had received tools. • In Arequipa, no housing had yet been built, but at the time of evaluation work was in progress in La Haciendita, Santa Maria and Quegual. 12 tool kits had been purchased, 7 having been distributed to four local irrigation commissions. • In Moquegua, 34 modules had been terminated and more were finished or in construction by the time of the evaluation. 12 tool kits had been purchased, it is not clear how they had been distributed. • In Tacna, 72 modules had been completed and more were finished or under construction by the time of the evaluation. 6 tool kits had been obtained and used in canal and housing work.
1.2.3. Specific objective 3: Permit education to recommence as soon as possible and in better conditions than before. This objective was basically dropped which, given the provision of temporary classrooms by education authorities and through the improvisation of local residents, seems appropriate. In all locations visited, classes had been suspended – for between one week and one and a half months – but the physical condition of schools was not one of the principal factors conditioning the resumption of classes. The most important factor was the decision of local and regional educational authorities which was completely beyond the control of the project. In individual cases, family and personal situations limited the recommencement of education in the sense that there were some increases in desertion. Teachers and educational authorities in Paucar de Sara Sara, Ilo and Ciudad Nueva cited a series of factors including parents withdrawing small children from pre-school, some families moving to other parts of the country, increases in the felt need (including by children themselves) for older children to support their parents by participating more in field work, children’s fears and the feeling of responsibility of older children for their younger siblings making them want to be where they are. Nevertheless, the increases in desertion are not great. A member of the Pausa education authorities estimated that rates desertion had increased by 10 to 15%.
The question of the quality of education should, however, still be of concern and is in fact being addressed by the project. It may not be possible or appropriate for Save the Children to contribute to improvements in physical infrastructure but work to address the fears and uncertainties affecting teachers and children – which is part of the project - is important as those fears have led to some reductions in academic performance and, as noted above, some abandonment of school.
13 1.2.4. Specific objective 4: Provide basic home equipment to allow the communities to rapidly return to a normal situation and to recover their human dignity. This objective was addressed through the provision of kitchen kits in Arequipa, Moquegua and Tacna and children’s crockery and cutlery in Ayacucho. However, distribution proceeded surprisingly slowly compared to what might be expected in this rather simple intervention. 510 kitchen kits and 1,500 sets of crockery and cutlery were to be distributed but, by the end of September, only 170 kitchen kits had been distributed; another 170 kitchen kits had been purchased in Arequipa but not distributed at that date. 1,036 sets of crockery and cutlery had been distributed. The worst case detected was that of Dean Valdivia where kits were only due to be received during the week of November 19th. There were some good reasons for the delays, including Mallku’s practice in Tacna of providing kits after some nutritional training of beneficiaries and the general decision of Save the Children and the counterparts to prioritise canal repair and construction of housing modules. Nevertheless, it is clear that the intention to contribute to a rapid return to a normal situation was not really fulfilled through this component.
1.2.5. Specific objective 5: Protect children from respiratory illness. This objective was addressed through the provision of bedding (blankets and mattresses), shelter (tents and temporary housing modules) and clothing (sweat shirts and pants in Ayacucho, more complete clothing kits elsewhere). The degree to which the objective was met through these measures has been discussed under point 1.1. • By late August, 2,577 children from 810 families in Ayacucho had received sweat shirts and pants. • By the end of September, 950 sets of children’s clothes had been purchased or ordered in the other three departments but distribution did not begin until October. There have been some further delays subsequently, e.g. they had only been received in Dean Valdivia in the last few weeks before the evaluation visit (18th November). • During the first phase, in Ayacucho, 468 mattresses and 3,008 blankets were distributed benefiting approximately 600 families including 1,324 children under 17. In Arequipa, 4,155 families including 7,883 children received 590 mattresses, 4,407 blankets and 100 tents. In Moquegua, 577 mattresses, 3,040 blankets and 199 tents benefited 1,222 families including 1,991 children. In Tacna, the relevant numbers were 5,116 families, 7,211 children, 5,791 blankets and 100 tents.
1.2.6. Specific objective 6: Reduce symptoms of stress or tension. Defend and strengthen the observance of children’s rights. Increase the value of children and young people’s contribution to the community in the eyes of adults. This complex objective has been and is being addressed principally through a set of activities collectively referred to as Area 4 (or component 4). The fact that Area 4 activities did not begin to be implemented until September means that it is too early to make any firm judgements on the effectiveness of the project in relation to this objective but some progress has already been made.
Stress and tension: The importance of addressing this factor was underlined by the fact that both children and adults frequently cited fear as a major problem or the major problem caused to children by the earthquake. Area 4 activities that have begun to address this have clearly helped as children in some meetings observed that education about the causes of earthquakes, disaster prevention techniques etc. have been helpful. However, in many locations this work is yet to begin and is much needed. For example, none of the children questioned in Otococha knew what causes earthquakes.
14 Save the Children counterparts have not been the only organisations working with children in this area. A number of examples of psychological or emotional support were encountered including US Operation, a Canadian volunteer through the parish of Pausa, and some university students in Islay. Such work complemented and was complemented by that of Save the Children in that it addressed the emotional effects on children more directly and/or more rapidly but was limited in coverage and duration.
Observance of rights: It should be recognised that children’s rights have been observed and promoted through the whole project in the sense that the immediate assistance offered and the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure addressed the practical rights of children (rights to shelter, clothing and health) and included elements that were especially important and / or directly aimed at children. In addition to facilitating the observance of these practical rights, these types of assistance have opened space and given Save the Children and its counterparts credibility from which basis they can work more effectively on the strategic rights of children.
One example of addressing practical rights in a strategic manner came from Paucar de Sara Sara where blankets and mattresses were distributed directly to individual children (rather than to community leaders or to parents). This had a practical effect in that some of the children have been vocal in their families in asserting their ownership of these items. Another example, is that the new housing areas being developed with the support of PREDES in the communities of Valle Arriba, Cocachacra will include spaces for children’s recreation. Other early indications of impact on the observance of children’s rights include: • Local authorities interviewed in Pausa are interested in establishing a DEMUNA10 and cooperating directly with CIDRA in the organisation of some Area 4 workshops for teachers and children. • Radio programmes in Cocachacra and Candarave are contributing to making children’s rights better known. Members of school’s councils in Cocachacra expressed their desire to continue producing their programme and identified its value as “raising the awareness of adults”. In the case of Candarave, the programme is broadcast at a strategic time when young people tend to listen to the radio (4-5pm on Saturdays when young people and adults are returning from work in their fields). • Proyeccion indicated that they are working to integrate human, child and vulnerability issues into the provincial development plan which is currently in consultation phase. Similarly, in Ilo, Labor are working to try and get issues related to children’s rights integrated into local development processes., specifically working with education authorities on diversification of the curriculum and a proposal to include a resource centre for teachers in the Ilo Sustainable Development Plan. • In Dean Valdivia, the mayor explained how a canal at the side of busy road on a route used by school children and which has been rehabilitated through the project is to be covered to make a pavement to increase child safety. • Proyeccion reported that some new schools councils have been created in Valle Arriba. For this to happen, Proyeccion needed to convince local education director that schools with polidocencio (fewer teachers than grades) should be included in the schools councils plan. They also report that they have influenced the local Red Cross to incorporate children’s rights into its human rights approach and to consult with children on housing module design.
Children’s contributions valued: One way in which the project was supposed to achieve this goal was through the active participation of children and youth in the implementation and monitoring of the project but, in practice, this has happened very little. Even in Tacna, where
10 Municipal Children’s Rights Protection Offices.
15 examples of active participation are clearest, this participation has tended to develop with the implementation of Area 4. Given the limited experience of the counterparts in child-focused approaches (in most cases) and in emergencies (in general), clear guidelines on how to work with the active participation of children were needed if this was to be achieved.
This does not mean to say that children have not been involved in the rehabilitation of their communities. On the contrary, children and youth have actively contributed to the recovery and rehabilitation of their families, schools and communities in many ways but work is needed to make plain the value of these contributions to adults. Adults in Samegua were quoted by Labor staff as complaining that children got in the way and spent more time playing than helping during construction of housing modules. Types of activities reported by children and adolescents in meetings during the evaluation included: • Helped remove rubble and search for family belongings. Even children as young as 5 years old helped in this. • Took care of younger siblings and elderly relatives, including rescuing them in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. • Helped people injured in the earthquake. • Rescued animals. • Helped demolish dangerous buildings. • Older children participated as equals in communal work days. • Smaller children helped carry materials such as stones and water. During our visit to Otococha children were moving building materials for a new school classroom. • Carried food to their fathers or older siblings involved in communal work. • Cooking, cleaning, collecting water and firewood, making beds and doing shopping. • Agricultural work. • Adolescents in Ilo reported having helped the church in the collection of resources including food and school supplies for rural children. • Children did not mention participating in house / module construction but both Mallku and the health worker in Quilahuani cited this, the latter in the context of mentioning minor injuries suffered by some children in the process.
The mayor of Cocachacra provides an encouraging example, of public recognition of the value of children and their opinions by the support he has given to actions conducted through the project. He has funded the radio programme produced by young people, inaugurated an event on children’s rights and participated in a children’s march for their rights – together with the local governor and some mothers. However, in general it is difficult for children to be heard. Preschoolers (5 year olds) in Quilahuani said that some of them went with their parents to meetings but that they are not allowed to express their opinions. Others expressed sadness because adults had laughed when they showed that they were upset about the loss of their “own” guinea pigs11.
With the implementation of Area 4, opportunities have opened up for children to make their voice heard and to contribute in new ways to rehabilitation and preparation for future emergencies: radio programmes in Candarave and Cocachacra (the adolescents involved seemed very enthusiastic), children’s demonstrations in Cocachacra and Ilo and regional meetings of schools councils (Arequipa and Moquegua). Leadership training received by some children from Candarave and Ciudad Nueva in Tacna (linking with events provided by other
11 Guinea pigs are raised as domestic animals for consumption but small children sometimes become attached to particular animals as with pets.
16 organisations) and participation in training events provided directly through the project in all areas (except Pausa where this was in preparation at the time of the evaluation) have increased the confidence of participants and provided them with more tools to make their voices heard (e.g. poetry). A teacher in Yarabamba, commented that the creativity workshops had given children an opportunity to express what they felt on the day of the earthquake. Children from Ciudad Nueva who had participated in these workshops were very enthusiastic and demonstrated knowledge on disaster prevention. The publication of a poem by one of these children in the regional newspaper undoubtedly contributes to children’s voices being heard12.
Indicators agreed in the Moquegua workshop with counterparts held in early July included unspecified numbers of: • Teachers and DEMUNAs trained in management of emergencies with children and adolescents. • Children’s and adolescents’ organisations involved in recovery process of their communities • Children’s and adolescents’ organisations within schools distributed in 4 committees (education, recreation and defence, health and environment).
Given that Area 4 activities did not begin to be implemented until September it is premature to try and measure these indicators but training of teachers and DEMUNAs has begun as has work with schools councils and individual children which should impact on the activities of children’s and adolescents’ organisations. Teachers interviewed who had seen Area 4 materials or participated in workshops (Ilo, Yarabamba and Ciudad Nueva) rated both as useful and easily applied in the classroom. Ilo preschool teachers reported that they are already implementing learning from training with children and some parents (mostly mothers, many single, especially mothers of the youngest children from 1 year old up). All reported finding the methods useful, even seeing positive results with 2 year olds. One teacher specifically mentioned the benefits of relaxation techniques with 4 year olds. These same teachers pointed to the barrier which other adults may represent to progress as, although much work has been done previously with children on their rights13, it was obvious during workshops with parents that most adults had little awareness of children’s rights.
It is important to understand the factors that may limit impact with teachers. In the areas of intervention, as in Peru in general, they face a series of structural problems that limit their ability and motivation to adopt new approaches such as those proposed through the project. Those problems include low wages, instability – very many are hired on short term contracts - , isolation from their families when working in rural areas and traditional models of working. Nevertheless, the earthquake seems to have raised the awareness of many teachers and made them more open to change.
1.3. Other impacts
1.3.1. Abuse and violence This area was not among the objectives of the project and it has not been possible to judge the effect of the project interventions in this area. However, the priority given to this problem by many respondents and the statements by some to the effect that abuse and violence against children and women have been aggravated by the effects of the earthquake suggest that, to the degree those effects are reduced by project activities, some reductions in abuse and violence
12 See Annex 4. 13 In this school they have used Radda Barnen materials.
17 may occur. It is to be hoped that the more direct activities in the area of children’s rights may be particularly helpful.
1.3.2. Development of a culture of disaster prevention Although not a specific objective of the project, this is implicit in the approach adopted and is an explicit part of Save the Children’s general approach to emergency work.
One of the ways in which it has been sought is in the decision to contract PREDES advisors to the project and in the terms of the contract between Save the Children and that organisation. Through PREDES’ support, training and awareness-raising of Save the Children, counterparts, teachers, children and many beneficiaries in general has been possible. In concrete terms, disaster prevention advice: is permitting the construction of anti-seismic houses in Arequipa; improved the design of temporary modules in Tacna and Moquegua; permitted the location of houses and modules in safer locations than originally contemplated and, when changes could not be made in Samegua, led to the formation of a neighbourhood emergency committee; and avoided the reconstruction of canals in dangerous locations. It is very important that all this advice has been provided in a transparent fashion so that the lessons which it contains can be assumed by the project participants and beneficiaries.
The general impact of the emergency has combined with the actions of Save the Children’s counterparts to raise the awareness of many people regarding the deficiencies of past preparation and the need for better preventative measures: • Adults in Otococha, schools councillors in Cocachacra and teachers in Yarabamba all expressed their wish to receive more training in themes around disaster prevention. Children and adults alike tend not to know the causes of earthquakes. Schools councillors in Cocachacra indicated that they want to continue working in their schools in this area. Similarly, adolescents from Ilo reported that disaster prevention committees have been created in their schools and also expressed the desire for more training in this area. • The weakness of earthquake simulations was identified by participants in several meetings: teachers and project beneficiaries in Otococha; local authorities in Pausa; the mayor of Dean Valdivia; and local authorities in Samegua. Simulations were considered to be inappropriately designed for rural locations, had always been weakly implemented (except in schools) and their lessons were not put in practice. For example, local authorities in Dean Valdivia all went to see their homes and families rather than meeting to coordinate action. Equally, knowledge of safe places and procedures in case of tsunamis was almost completely absent in the adult population of Ilo where a false alarm of an impending tsunami created collective panic. • Teachers in Ilo and Yarabamba reported beginning to incorporate material on disaster prevention into their classes. The teachers from Ilo reported that a workshop with parents of preschoolers provided an opportunity to work on emergency procedures which are little known by adults. • During the meeting with local authorities in Pausa, it was encouraging that many of the themes which came up in discussion were essentially concerned with or promote disaster prevention including: greater awareness of the need for good inter-institutional and inter- sectorial coordination and information sharing; the improvements that have occurred in local organisation and greater levels of solidarity; the need to spread anti-seismic building
18 techniques; the need to improve earthquake simulations; and interest in creating a local Mesa de Concertación14). • Unsought impacts of canal rehabilitation in Dean Valdivia included improved safety. Reconstruction work took into account the need to protect electric light poles next to canals to avoid electrocution and coverage of a roadside canal to provide school children with a pavement on a dangerous road between their homes and school.
There are, however, limitations on impact in this area which also should be noted: • Children in Toncio and the Cocachacra area were in agreement with the relocation of their communities (in some annexes they positively want to relocate as they are frightened of landslides) but adults in these and other locations (e.g. Huancara) tend to be less keen and there are divisions in the communities over the issue. • In Samegua, Labor had committed itself to the construction of modules in the same locations as the original houses before receiving PREDES advice on the vulnerability of parts of this neighbourhood to a potential mudslide. Module construction is going ahead but beneficiaries have organised an emergency committee and are working to present a project for a relatively cheap option of infrastructure to protect their zone. However, they seem to have no other ideas on what to do until such time as this bears fruit (e.g. evacuation plans, local early warning systems, etc.). • The representative of Paucar de Sara Sara catholic parish observed that people no longer trust adobe but don’t know about alternative construction techniques. This was borne out during visits to Otococha (in this area), Mullini (Candarave) and Pampa Alambrada (Ilo) where houses were observed being reconstructed with traditional adobe, cracks being repaired cosmetically and repairs on cement block houses being conducted in worryingly piecemeal fashion. Evidently, the lack of support for new home construction or temporary modules and limited availability of funds for repairs contribute to this situation.
1.3.3. Strengthening of local organisations The growth and strengthening of local organisations and cooperative ways of working is a positive tendency which has been fostered by the project and which should enable communities to be better prepared for future disasters. In part this is related to the positive effect of the emergency in increasing solidarity in the affected areas. Such processes were commented on by counterparts, beneficiaries and local authorities in Pausa, Otococha, Cocachacra, Quegual, Dean Valdivia, Samegua, El Molino, Quilahuani, Cala Cala and Candarave in general. The positive effects of working in groups were specifically mentioned in Samegua and in the Candarave area. Mallku staff reported that people in Candarave are now more apt to seek each other out for work rather than hire labourers15.
Greater solidarity has been seen among people and communities affected by the earthquake in various ways: • In general, the organisation of ollas comunes in very many affected communities. • In Cocachacra the irrigation board has begun to include the poorer Valle Arriba in its plans and projects (this is the area where Proyeccion have been working on canals and rehousing).
14 Following the inauguration of the new national government in July 2001, a nationwide process has been implemented for inter-institutional dialogue to confront poverty Mesas de Concertación de Lucha contra la Pobreza (anti-poverty round tables). 15 One downside to communal working is that there is so much that needs doing following the earthquake. A comment from one resident of Rauripa demonstrated this “we don’t know when the communal work days are going to finish, we’ve been at it for 4 or 5 months already”.
19 • Greater family solidarity was reported by members of schools councils in Cocachacra who said that their families feel the need to be more united. • The mayor of Dean Valdivia reported that the residents of Ensenada are helping each other so that the majority can get loans from the Banco de Materiales.
1.3.4. Promotion of the dignity of the affected population The project’s objectives address this issue in relation to the distribution of household kits but there are other important impacts in this area: • Working through and strengthening local organisations bolsters dignity as does the self- construction of canals and housing. • Save the Children tents appear more conducive to dignity than the USAID / ADRA plastic shelters which make the villages of Candarave look as though their residents have been put into packets. • The beneficiaries of new homes in Villa El Carmen (Arequipa) will for the first time have ownership of the land on which their homes are built. • Clothing distributed to children was of good quality. In contrast, some children in evaluation meetings complained about the very poor old shoes they had received through some other organisations.
An important point for consideration in this area is that there is a fine line between building institutional profile and the potential stigmatisation of beneficiaries and / or negative effects on their self esteem by placing logos on clothing and tents. No objections were expressed by beneficiaries who tend to be well used to using foreign logos on their clothing (especially baseball caps and t-shirts) but neither were their opinions probed during the evaluation. In some cases, the placing of logos on materials is a demand made by the donor (e.g. on tents bought with ECHO funds) but in other cases the decision has been in the hands of Save the Children and its counterparts. In those cases, other types of markings or colour schemes could have been used to permit the identification of items while reducing the risk of stigmatisation etc. An example from the first Belaunde government (1960s) is worth consideration, plaques placed on some new buildings simply stated “El pueblo lo hizo” (the people did it).
1.4. Diverse factors facilitating effectiveness and impact
• Although there have been some delays, many components were implemented rapidly. First phase Save the Children help began to arrive in affected communities between one and three weeks after the earthquake and counterparts were often among the first organisations to arrive in given locations. In at least one case, Save the Children help was the first to arrive, beneficiaries from Rauripa reported that CIDRA – on June 28th – was the first organisation to arrive with help, before INDECI and Caritas. Temporary housing modules in Ayacucho were among the first implemented anywhere and have been mostly completed in Tacna and Moquegua before other major organisations. Many canals have been rehabilitated in good time for the major spring sowing of subsistence crops. • The willingness and interest of counterparts to incorporate disaster prevention and child- centred approaches into their work has facilitated the achievement of objectives. Similarly, the attitudes of authorities in Pausa and Cocachacra to children’s rights has been helpful. • The growth and strengthening of local organisations and cooperative ways of working fostered by the project have facilitated rapid and just execution of activities. Construction of housing modules in groups, rather than by individual families, has speeded up construction as well as promoting better community relations and organisation. Mallku report that the Red Cross are partially adopting this group approach to module construction (though only in
20 support roles as they will also being using paid construction workers). Additionally, they report that INDECI has contracted some of the people that acquired carpentry skills through module building. • PREDES support allowed introduction of risk analysis possibly avoiding grave difficulties. For example, Oxfam UK were forced to withdraw from canal construction in Moquegua after canal construction (without risk analysis) led to an accident in which 2 people died and 5 or 6 were injured. Labor had originally planned to rehabilitate canals in Torata but PREDES advice led to the work being transferred to Samegua. • The appointment of a new agronomist in Paucar de Sara Sara at the end of October is extremely helpful, not only because this addresses the need for a continuous CIDRA presence in the area (which had been lacking for over two months) but also due to his particular suitability for ensuring the correct and speedy implementation of the canal component. • PREDES staff report that the image of the Alliance members working together to assist the affected populations was helpful in convincing people of the need to work together. • Some cases of positive inter-institutional coordination have facilitated impact, e.g.: Tarea and US Operation in relation to Area 4; between Proyeccion and the DEMUNAs in their areas of intervention; small amounts of materials provided by the Ministry of Agriculture for canals in Quilahuani; and diverse types of material support from that ministry, Caritas and INDECI for canal work in Samegua.
1.5. Diverse factors limiting effectiveness and impact
• Disorganisation, sectorialism, centralism and inefficiency of many State organisations have blocked information flows and limited effective inter-agency coordination. Coordination with INDECI was frequently difficult. In addition to being affected by the generalised problems of centralism and sectorial jealousies, INDECI’s military hierarchy and structure seem to conspire to produce an excessive desire for protaganism and control which the agency justifies on the basis of its legally mandated role as the lead agency in responding to emergencies16. • Coordination with non-governmental organisations was not much better and was largely limited to the avoidance of duplication of assistance. There was an attempt to institute coordination of organisations funded by ECHO (International Red Cross, Oxfam, Save the Children and one other) but this did not work out. Initially, Save the Children in Lima attempted to coordinate with Red Cross (International and Peru) on module design but it was not possible as approaches and rhythms were different. • Coordination between agencies offering support at local level was more significant than at national level, for example coordination with the Red Cross helped avoid duplication of housing provision by the two agencies. Nevertheless, the general panorama of coordination at local level still left much to be desired: o Local authorities in the Paucar de Sara Sara area confirmed that coordination had been weak and complained about the sectorial divisions which blocked information flows. District level commissions were created to work together but in practice each organisation worked alone. CIDRA was able to coordinate with the Red Cross but couldn’t coordinate with other organisations bringing temporary housing. Their president reported that a number of organisations explained what actions they proposed to take in
16 This is a long standing complaint of Peruvian NGOs which was aired during the Nazca earthquake emergency of 1996 and the preparations for and response to the 1997/98 El Niño. The recent reassignment of responsibility for INDECI from the army to the navy may produce some softening of attitudes due to their different institutional cultures but does not address the central incoherence of charging a civil activity to the military.
21 a joint meeting but then many changed plans without informing others causing some duplication of efforts. Conversely, the representative of the Catholic parish of Pausa who participated in the meeting with local authorities, reported that in some cases the coincidence of 2 or 3 agencies in one community led to all withdrawing leaving the community without any support. o Proyeccion reported that the Cocachacra civil defence committee experienced some difficulties. o Labor reported that the Red Cross committed itself to providing cement for the floors of temporary housing but did not fulfil this commitment (fortunately the regional authority – CTAR – did provide this support). o Mallku reported difficulties with the Red Cross. In meetings their representatives said that they had distributed blankets but these proved really more like shawls (small and thin). Later the same organisation seemed to change their minds on which annexes of Candarave they would support. o Different styles of support for rehabilitation work, e.g. some with, some without food aid, sometimes led to conflicts. o Low budgets of local (official) organisations hampers their ability to act and, given that each has its own commitments and priorities this did not always facilitate coordination with the project. • Official agencies were not always able to provide accurate information. An extreme case was that of the Ministry of Agriculture in Candarave. Mallku approached the ministry for information on damage to canals but ended up accepting transport support (pick-up truck and motorbike) in exchange for examining canals and providing the information they gathered to the ministry. At the same time, some local authorities provided distorted information in attempts to benefit their areas. • Poor levels of community organisation were cited by CIDRA’s president Sara as hampering efficient distribution of first phase assistance in Paucar de Sara. For example, in some cases various people came from the same communities to request aid without coordination. In general, “natural” organisation appears to have been weak in all project areas before the emergency, although with some clear exceptions such as irrigation councils and committees. • Transport difficulties negatively affected work in Ayacucho and Tacna. CIDRA wanted to support more distant communities but the need to respond quickly went against this - although the dispatch of aid to two distant communities in La Union, Arequipa, as well as to some Paucar communities only reachable on foot or by pack animal indicates that CIDRA made real efforts to overcome these difficulties. Mallku indicated that shortages of transport caused some delays in the construction of housing modules in Candarave. • PREDES staff reported that the lack of experience of counterparts in emergencies led to some tensions through clash of approaches. Counterparts’ style tended to be slower and they were not used to deciding who to support on the basis of institutional ability to respond rather than prioritising solely on the basis of need. Such difficulties caused considerable friction with Proyeccion staff but seem to have been overcome. A review of reports by the advisor for Moquegua and Tacna shows that the relationship was much easier between PREDES and Mallku than with Labor. Labor seem to have advanced quickly with the processes to design modules and select areas for module construction and canal work and been subsequently reluctant to take into account PREDES advice which would require changes. • Mallku indicated that they would have appreciated more exchanges with the other counterparts (two have been held).
22 • Implementation of Area 4 activities was delayed until September. Subsequently, training materials were prepared slowly by the contracted organisation which appeared unable to adapt its procedures to the rhythm of an emergency project. As a result, the materials were only ready little more than 1 month before the official end of the school year. Fortunately, extensions of the school year to compensate for the suspension of classes following the earthquake and the continuing implementation of Area 4 during next year will help ameliorate the effect. • Action is necessary to tackle questions of children’s rights and disaster prevention with parents, not only children and teachers. Several examples from this and previous earthquakes in Peru show that the lack of understanding of parents and other adults often undermines the benefits of training given to teachers and children. • Although much stress was made on the improvements in community level unity and organisation the picture is not invariably rosy. Women from Samegua reported that the emergency sometimes worsened conflicts, e.g. women fought over the distribution of food aid. Similarly, the mayor of Dean Valdivia reported that in some ways the situation improved when aid agencies stopped bringing support as the people calmed down. • The limited response of other NGOs and international agencies and the slow implementation of official national rehabilitation (ODESUR17) makes painfully clear the partial nature of Save the Children’s response. This is especially so in communities where Save the Children is the only agency currently active.
2. ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENCY OF INTERVENTION
2.1. Coverage of affected population
Comparison of first phase distribution lists with information provided by the counterparts in July on the numbers of people affected by the disaster shows that: • CIDRA provided assistance to around 75% of the affected families in the communities it supported. • Proyeccion assisted around 20% of affected families in the provinces where it distributed aid, including 100% of the affected families in Islay. • Labor assisted about 17% of affected families in the provinces it attended, with the highest coverage in Torata where it reached 56% of affected households. • Mallku assisted around 30% of the affected families in the department. Details on families attended by province were not available but, based on the number of blankets and tents distributed, it would seem that they reached most or all of the affected families in Candarave, Tarata and Jorge Basadre.
Inevitably, some of these beneficiaries only received one type of assistance (most commonly blankets) but that assistance was focused on the key need to protect children from the cold so that the numbers of families do give a fair picture of the importance of the aid delivered. Given that none of the counterparts had experience of this kind of work, the relatively modest scale of
17 An autonomous regional development authority for the South of Peru created by central government following the earthquake with the mandate to fulfil a principal role in reconstruction and rehabilitation. This agency has been assigned control over funding from the Inter American Development Bank. Local authorities interviewed during the evaluation complained that: somewhat contradictorily, the management of ODESUR was overly centralised; staff did not trust local authorities, especially at district level, to design and implement projects; and that the process was advancing excessively slowly - no local projects had yet been approved or funded even though the budget was due to be spent by June 2002.
23 the budget and the distances travelled in all four departments during this phase, the coverage is impressive. It seems likely that some beneficiaries of first phase assistance may not have actually needed bedding or clothing implying that efficiency could have been improved18. However, the severe effects of the earthquake in the communities visited and the widespread damage throughout the intervention areas suggest that this did not significantly distort the levels of attention.
It is important to stress that we can be fairly confident that there was little duplication of aid with other agencies due to the selection of the types of aid to be delivered and the areas of intervention and because of the coordination of distribution with local authorities and community leaders and, to a lesser extent, with other agencies. In particular, by prioritising rural areas where there was much less support than in the cities, Save the Children support tended not to duplicate that of other agencies, for example Mallku was the only NGO based in Tacna which supported communities in highland locations. Subsequently, as became clear during the evaluation, active support from other national or international NGOs has been limited in all of the intervention zones visited.
Following distribution of initial aid, the programme reduced its coverage in line with the resources available. Counterparts worked diligently19 to ensure that families receiving housing assistance were among the poorest in their communities, included young children, did not have access to other homes and were not included in the lists of those due to receive housing support from other agencies (specifically the Red Cross). Comparison of information obtained through a mapping exercise conducted with beneficiaries of Committee 9 in Samegua with Labor distribution records showed good correlation between the families receiving shelter, kitchen kits, blankets, mattresses and children’s clothes and the incidence of several priority factors: severe damage to homes, number of children and households headed by single mothers. Apparently there were a few cases of small differences between the numbers of children and those receiving clothes (1 more or less) but only one case was detected of a large difference (6 children but only 3 kits). A similar exercise in Toncio revealed that the two families still using temporary refuges were elderly people without dependent children but this does not seem to be due to any failure to prioritise children.
In several locations, the greater problem was how to decide which families should not receive support. In El Molino, Yucamani and Mullini numerous families were seen to be still living in tents (from Save the Children or plastic tents donated by other organisations) and cooking outdoors with no immediate prospects of receiving any housing assistance. For example, in Yucamani 15 families are building modules with Mallku but 30 or 40 more families require similar assistance and no other organisations were currently supporting or committed to supporting the community. Even in locations where Save the Children is not the only agency providing housing support the need often is greater than that which is being provided. For example, in Cala Cala, in addition to the 12 modules built with Mallku, the Red Cross are going to provide 11 more but a further 20 families will remain in need.
18 For example, during a children’s meeting in Toncio, the question was asked if the aid had been enough. A young child, who was quickly “corrected” by an older child, responded “yes, more than enough, everybody received clothes and mattresses, even children who already had their own beds”. 19 There was some feeling (particularly expressed by the PREDES advisor for Tacna and Moquegua) that Labor had been over zealous in this respect, making selection of beneficiaries very slow. Nevertheless, this does not seem to have resulted in significant delays in construction compared with Tacna or Arequipa.
24 Although a minority of families have received housing assistance, support for other families was not limited to first phase actions. Canal rebuilding in particular has helped very many more families than those reached with housing.
2.2. Costs of interventions.
No cost-benefit analysis has been conducted but it is important to note that flexible implementation permitted by Save the Children and adopted by counterparts allowed the project to make efficient use of financial, human and time resources and to adapt interventions to local circumstances. • Canals have been rehabilitated in line with local circumstances rather than following some kind of blueprint. For example, the canal in Samegua has been repaired in a much more polished fashion and with a much larger investment in materials than the canal inspected in Quilahuani. However, the differences appropriately reflect the number of beneficiaries, volume of water and pre-existing canal design, both canals have been improved compared to their original condition and are both doing their job well. • Housing module design has been adapted according to available resources and advice from PREDES. Consequently, permanent houses are being built in Arequipa instead of the temporary modules planned. The design of the temporary modules being built in Moquegua and Tacna seems to strike a reasonable balance between quality and ease / cost of construction. The substitution of wooden walls instead of reinforced plastic gives a more solid appearance to the homes (although some beneficiaries considered it to be very fragile), has the advantage of being re-usable (for construction of permanent homes) and seems to have better thermal characteristics (they felt comfortable during inspections while residents of Otococha complained that modules with plastic walls constructed there were was very hot in the daytime and cold at night). • A change in design of modules in Candarave based on consultation with beneficiaries (double pitched roofs instead of single pitch) will probably prove correct but has increased the requirement for roofing materials beyond that included in the budget. Mallku is working to obtain counterpart funding (for example through the district council) to cover the shortfall in materials which is delaying completion of construction in some communities (e.g. Mullini). • Kitchen kits were improved without increasing the budget.
In addition, it should be noted that transport costs were kept down by purchasing materials locally or within Peru whenever possible (e.g. blankets and clothes). As well as reducing transport costs and time, these local purchases had important, if small-scale, benefits for the local economies when they were passing through an extremely difficult moment. The benefits for small, clothing companies seem particularly clear.
2.3. Factors facilitating or limiting efficiency.
2.3.1. Counterpart funding and staffing. Human resources: Greater funding within the project for personnel of the four implementing counterparts would probably have improved effectiveness in an efficient fashion. Although, the ECHO phase 1 budget includes 20,000 Euros for staff costs (not broken down), the CIDA budget for Pausa only provided $1,500 for staff costs while the DFID budget contains no direct provision for counterpart staff. The actual budgets approved for each counterpart during the second phase (excluding Area 4) reflect this situation: • CIDRA’s budget makes no specific provision for staff, apparently this is included within $2,150 for administration, communication and services.
25 • Proyeccion’s budget only covers one person full time for the whole period plus a professional for rehabilitation work full time during 3 months, and an administrator half time during the whole period. • Labor’s budget is similar to that of Proyeccion with the important difference that it only covers staff costs during 3 months. • Mallku’s budget covers the person charged with organisation and coordination for five months but an irrigation engineer for only 2 months and a contribution ($1,000) for the administrator.
Not all aspects of these budgets are unreasonable and might even be considered correct in % terms (approximately 5%) given that the project is heavy in infrastructure and other physical resources. However, this underestimates the time spent by each counterpart in travelling between multiple and dispersed locations (which in Ayacucho and Tacna are also distant from counterpart headquarters) and in dealing with multiple components and numerous beneficiaries. Similarly, while cooperation with PREDES has been key to the success of the project for very little investment, a larger investment to allow the employment of one or two more advisors would have improved effectiveness for relatively little cost. This was felt particularly keenly by Mallku. Save the Children UK’s South America Programme Director believes that comparison of Save the Children budgets with those of Oxfam UK in this emergency suggests that greater spending on human resources would probably not have blocked funding from ECHO or DFID.
Transport: Greater funding for transport would have been particularly useful for CIDRA and Mallku whose areas of operation were wholly or principally distant from their bases in Huamanga and Tacna and very little served by public (or private) transport, either from other locations or internally. It does not seem to make any sense that the budget for transport to August 31st was the same for Mallku as for Labor (which had a much smaller operational area after phase 1 finished) nor that no funding was originally assigned and only $500 agreed for internal transport in Ayacucho20.
Area 4: This complex component which is central to Save the Children’s mission, has only been assigned $20,000 to date divided almost equally between the counterparts. In particular this has been damaging in not permitting strengthening of staffing. Only Labor’s budget includes significant staff or consultant funding (presumably to cover the inclusion of Ilo not included in the original plan). Yet greater staffing was clearly necessary for Area 4 both due to the general workload falling on all staff and the lack of specialisation in this type of work of all the counterparts except Proyeccion.
Proyeccion and Mallku have been better able to overcome these budgetary restraints than the other counterparts due, respectively, to their existing specialisation and contacts in the area of child rights or their reassignment of staff with other sources of funding and tapping of volunteer resources. In the third phase, these budgetary constraints may make it appropriate to reduce implementation to only two or three counterparts / areas21.
20 According to Richard Hartill, when transport budgets “were drawn up Mallku had a semi-firm promise that the local municipalities would provide transport and drivers in Tacna if they covered the cost of fuel”. It is not clear whether or to what degree those promises were honoured but both Mallku themselves and PREDES indicated that transport shortages delayed some of the housing construction work. 21 Save the Children staff that participated in the evaluation team seemed to be leaning towards Proyeccion and Mallku in Arequipa and Tacna.
26 2.3.2. Counterpart ways of working. • The decision of all counterparts to work through local and community authorities, which is part of their usual institutional approaches, avoided much potential duplication of aid. The mayors of Cocachacra and Dean Valdivia specifically mentioned how they appreciated the coordination with Proyeccion which contrasted notably with many other agencies that did not appear to be interested in working with local authorities. • Mallku noted that distributing blankets before tents was useful as it facilitated contact with communities and identification of real needs without the logistical problems associated with transporting bulky tents. • CIDRA and PREDES were aware of the limitations of initial information regarding the need for canal work in Paucar de Sara Sara so took the time to conduct more detailed inspections, first by PREDES then, during October and early November, by the new CIDRA agronomist. For example, a proposed canal for Renco was not built after it became clear that the request was for the construction of a new canal, not the repair of a damaged one. In Toncio, with PREDES advice, the repair of another canal was changed to repair and improvement of small irrigation reservoirs which would benefit the community directly while the canal would mainly benefit water users in other communities downstream. Similarly, Mallku hired an agronomist who travelled around their intervention area with a staff member to verify and identify in detail the need for canal work. • Mallku obtained voluntary support from a local association of poets for the creativity workshops. This has improved the quality of the workshops for almost no additional investment. • A strength of both Labor and Mallku is that they worked on all components of this project in an integrated, team approach rather than portioning out highly specific, individual responsibilities. Proyeccion seem to have worked less in this way but both they and Mallku sought to combine their regular programmes and emergency work so that they complemented each other e.g. in the regional encounter of schools’ mayors organised by Proyeccion in November. CIDRA had greater difficulty operating in these ways, perhaps due to its nature as a network rather than as a single operating organisation. Nevertheless, the president of CIDRA was assigned to oversee and coordinate implementation of the emergency work and some recent actions combined their regular and emergency work: a round table on the education of rural girls was held in Pausa in September and 6 girls from the province attended an event on this theme held in Huamanga during October. • Mallku also took the decision to prioritise the emergency over all regular work during the first month and so was able to mobilise all staff. Internal committees were organised to efficiently share out different functions and where possible staff were assigned to geographical areas with which they were most familiar. • Mallku and Labor (at least) organised their own information systems to overcome information deficiencies. However, the counterparts appear to have been slow to adopt the emergency resources information system, SUMA, which was recommended by PREDES.
2.3.3. Logistics and communication. • Provision of cell phones to PREDES advisors facilitated communication from the field. Conversely, the mobile phone which Richard Hartill attempted to use during the initial evaluation stage was a failure. • The immediate communication between Save the Children and PREDES facilitated by the cell phones was not reflected in the general flow of information between the two organisations. Field reports do not appear to have been shared between the two agencies and some important knowledge of PREDES advisors was only learnt by Save the Children staff during the evaluation, e.g. the potential of the Catholic parish of Pausa. In short, there
27 was an unmet need to organise an information system which could ensure timely communication between the two organisations. • The legal restriction of the import of emergency supplies without payment of customs duties to only 3 organisations (INDECI, Caritas and Red Cross) temporarily complicated import of 1st phase supplies. Although Caritas offered and provided its services as an intermediary this is a clearly unsatisfactory system that only formally fulfils its legal purpose.
3. ANALYSIS OF SUSTAINABILITY OF RESULTS AND IMPACTS
A series of factors have been identified which will contribute to or limit the sustainability of project impacts and the processes which have been put into motion.
3.1. Factors affecting the target population.
3.1.1. Motivation of the target population • Canals and housing are key real and felt long-term needs of all target beneficiaries. Consequently, it can be expected that most of the canals rehabilitated and housing built will continue to be used and maintained in the medium and long term. • Many children are highly motivated in relation to child rights and disaster prevention. They have expressed the clear desire to receive more training and continue the activities which they have begun to implement. Nevertheless, for this to continue beyond the end of the project some key types of support must be secured, e.g. funding for radio programmes and institutional backing from educational authorities for schools councils. • Teachers appear to have become more open to change than previously but their motivation is limited by structural factors which may negatively affect the continued reproduction of training received, their use of materials provided on children’s rights and disaster prevention of disasters and their support for children’s organisations and activities. • For Area 4 impacts to be sustainable, it will be important to work on the awareness of parents as well as children and teachers. If not, there is a danger that children will lose confidence and become disillusioned by adults failure to respect their rights. It will also be difficult for children to implement their increased knowledge in disaster prevention and response if adults have not been provided with similar information.
3.1.2. Strength and attitudes of local / community organisations • The growth and strengthening of local organisations and cooperative ways of working fostered by the project should enable communities to be better prepared for future disasters. In addition to the creation of ollas comunes in many locations in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, new community organisations have been created in two communities visited (Otococha and Quegual) and an emergency committee was formed in Samegua. In the case of Samegua, local authorities also pointed to improved relations between local residents and the municipal government. • The attitudes of authorities in Pausa and Cocachacra to children’s rights provide a good opportunity to build medium term processes to improve disaster prevention and preparedness and the respect for children’s rights; in Pausa this includes their interest in creating a DEMUNA. However, in that area, difficult relations between those local authorities met during evaluation and the district and provincial mayors may limit the sustainability of those processes once the project has ended.
28 3.2. Factors related to the quality of work carried out.
3.2.1. Canals Irrigation infrastructure has not only been repaired but have been improved in the process. This will increase their durability in normal circumstances and their ability to resist earth movements (seismic or landslides).
3.2.2. Housing The ability of PREDES to obtain extra resources has permitted the implementation of permanent housing in Arequipa. These houses are being accompanied by suggested designs (with alternatives) to facilitate the expansion of living space as and when individual families are able. In the other zones, the temporary modules being constructed have been built using materials that can be of use in more permanent constructions. In Tacna and Moquegua, an improvement has been made on the original design by substituting wooden walls for the original reinforced plastic. This considerably improves the thermal characteristics of the houses and makes them more aesthetically appealing thus increasing the possibilities that beneficiaries will use these homes for a significant period of time.
The rebuilding of homes / new modules in dangerous locations (e.g. parts of Samegua and Mullini) puts at risk the permanence of this aspect of rehabilitation but it must be understood that the alternatives are frequently difficult or, effectively, non-existent. In some communities, e.g. Rauripa, relocation has been proposed and modules constructed in places without water. Such locations may be unsustainable without outside assistance to provide a water supply. Positively, new housing in Arequipa is being constructed in new and safer locations but within or very close to the original community.
3.2.3. Area 4 Positive comments from teachers on quality of training received and of educational materials suggest that this should facilitate their continued application / use.
3.3. Factors related to the counterparts
3.3.1. Profile In general, the counterparts (including PREDES) have grown in terms of public recognition which should facilitate their future work in target areas and elsewhere. A possible exception to this is CIDRA. Save the Children Canada’s regional coordinator commented that several newspaper reports have been published on their work which should improve their profile in the capital of Ayacucho, Huamanga. However, in Paucar de Sara Sara, CIDRA’s president and staff have not made clear which organisation they work for, with the result that beneficiaries know them as representatives of “Children” not of CIDRA.
3.3.2. Capacity to work in emergencies All the counterparts have clearly grown in their ability to deal with emergencies, even PREDES in the sense that it has gained experience in the implementation of child-centred approaches. Two specific ways in which counterpart capacity has been increased are: • The incorporation into the practice of the counterparts (through PREDES support) of the emergency resources information system (SUMA) - which is extensively used by major players including INDECI, Red Cross and Caritas - will facilitate emergency work by the counterparts in future. • The return of tents to counterparts to form a stock for future emergencies provides them with some capacity to respond rapidly to disasters.
29
3.3.3. Commitment and ability of counterparts to continue working in target areas and on similar lines of action. The good relations which all counterparts have developed or strengthened with local authorities and community organisations should facilitate any future work they conduct in the target areas. Equally, the willingness and interest of all counterparts to incorporate disaster prevention and a child-centred approach into their project work suggest that they will seek to incorporate these issues into all their work, in target areas or elsewhere. Nevertheless, there are important differences in the circumstances of each organisation which will affect the sustainability of their presence in the intervention areas and of their work on the major themes of disaster prevention and children’s rights. • CIDRA have taken an internal decision to seek funding for work in Pausa but no projects have yet been developed. Meantime, Save the Children Canada have decided to cease working with CIDRA in regular programmes. Positively, the president of CIDRA indicated that the experience of this project had strengthened their understanding of and commitment to work on children’s rights as a central theme in development. • Proyeccion is firmly committed to and experienced in work on children’s rights and will maintain an indirect presence in Islay through their regular work with DEMUNAs and school councils. Nevertheless, they have no current plans for other forms of engagement with the project area and the spread of their regular work suggests that it would be difficult for them to implement work specific to this area. • Labor have a permanent presence in Ilo and Moquegua. Their commitment to urban, agricultural and environmental management should facilitate some continued involvement in issues of disaster prevention and the Moquegua office will probably continue in the short term to work to rehabilitate infrastructure with funding from other sources. Labor Ilo have a good understanding of the type of work included in Area 4 and seem committed to these themes which, depending on funding, could give a degree of sustainability to the processes begun with children and teachers. • Mallku have made a very significant human investment in the Candarave area and seem committed to continue to work with the population of this area. Until now, it has not been an area covered by their regular programme which might put sustainability in doubt but they are currently negotiating, with good prospects, a project for the area with Spanish Agency, Manos Unidos. In addition, Mallku was recently congratulated by another Spanish agency currently funding their regular work, MPDL, for the way in which they adjusted the implementation of that funding to help them support Candarave. In general terms, the approach of Mallku to consider different sources of funding as support for one, general Mallku project rather than as discrete projects should help them to distribute resources among geographical areas according to current priorities. Their ability to continue specific work on disaster prevention and children’s rights will depend on funding but there is no question as to their intention to incorporate these issues in their general work.
There are also differences in the likely permanence of counterpart personnel after the project finishes and this will have important effects on the sustainability of application of their new capacities and understanding. In all cases, some personnel have been specifically hired for effects of the emergency (and some have already left employment) but the use of more permanent staff varies considerably. The least sustainable case appears to be that of CIDRA as, with the exception of its president, it has only used two persons, both employed in temporary capacities. The best case is that of Mallku which has chiefly used existing personnel and has integrated the work of the project into the work of all existing personnel. Proyeccion and Labor fall somewhere in-between the two extremes in that there is a closer numerical balance
30 between temporary and “permanent” staff than in CIDRA but lower levels of integration of existing staff and lower total numbers of staff involved than in Mallku.
PREDES has a long and illustrious history but is a tiny organisation which depends heavily on the frequent services of regular consultants, including the project advisors. These advisors have learnt much through the project (particularly regarding child-centred approaches) but institutional learning is likely to be limited and fragile given their unstable situation. At the same time, without funding from Save the Children, there is little chance that the organisation will be able to maintain more than a very occasional presence in the intervention areas. Given these considerations, Save the Children should definitely make concerted efforts to ensure the transference of their experience with PREDES to the other counterparts and, institutionally, to the core of PREDES itself. Further, consideration should be given to the development of a permanent relationship with PREDES given the great importance and potential of the organisation and its demonstrated openness to and aptitude for the adoption of child-centred approaches.
3.4. Factors affecting Save the Children
The ability of the Alliance members involved in this work to support the implementation of similar projects in the future has clearly grown. Individuals in key positions with the three agencies in Peru, especially Nelly Claux, Andrea Ortiz and Blanca Normura, have gained considerable experience and understanding of the demands of emergency work and how it is affected by the particularities of the Peruvian context, as well as in relation to the benefits and potential pitfalls involved in working together in such a situation.
Nevertheless, there is a danger that the short term nature of the contracts under which other key personnel are employed will reduce the ability of these experiences and lessons to be absorbed institutionally and the efficiency and effectiveness with which the Alliance can respond to future emergencies in South America. It is perhaps unavoidable that project coordination staff be employed on such contracts but the limited number and permanency of other staff specialised in emergencies seems less than ideal. The regional Save the Children UK office in Bogotá only has one person responsible for emergency work, the Emergencies Coordinator Maritza Pinzon, who is currently due to terminate employment in March 2002. A good deal of experience, knowledge and good relationships (not only in Peru but also in relation to Bolivia and Venezuela and in wider institutional contacts) has been concentrated in this one person. The author of this report is not in a position to make specific recommendations regarding Ms. Pinzon’s employment (although a good impression was gained of her abilities and commitment and of the regard in which she is held by Save the Children personnel) however, the desirability of greater stability in employment of emergency personnel seems clear. Based on the information available to this consultant, other Alliance members involved in this project also have only limited staff with responsibility for emergencies. Blanca Normura is Save the Children Sweden’s emergencies expert in Peru, but also works on the prevention of ill treatment and sexual exploitation while Martin Villaroel with Save the Children Canada and UK in Bolivia appears to work in similar circumstances to Maritza, being employed in relation to the recent Bolivian emergency not as a permanent member of staff.
This analysis is not only the consultant’s opinion but appears to have institutional backing. Save the Children UK’s “Emergencies Unit Policy Paper No.1” (in the third draft seen by this consultant) recommends the continuation and expansion of preparedness activities in all Save
31 the Children country programmes and that the human resources22, technical support requirements and material supplies needed for a humanitarian response programme should be considered.
Even if greater stability of personnel is achieved and all the more if it is not, there is a clear need for mechanisms to be instituted to ensure institutional learning. This evaluation is a step in the right direction and the author is aware that other types of evaluation have been conducted in relation to other Latin American emergency programmes. This should become a firm policy of the Alliance. However, it is not enough to commission evaluations. The results of such evaluations must be circulated and read and Alliance staff in general, not only emergency personnel, should take the time to participate in the systematisation and discussion of emergency projects, so that the lessons are learnt by all those who will have to participate in future emergency work and so that the experience gained enters the institutional memory.
3.5. External factors
At local, regional and national level the Mesas de Concertacion, consultations on diversification of the school curriculum and, to a lesser extent, decentralisation processes provide opportunities for insertion of children’s rights and disaster prevention in the development agendas of governmental and non-governmental organisations. Unfortunately, not everyone seems ready to grasp such opportunities. Among project counterparts, Labor Moquegua was taking part in the departmental Mesa de Concertacion but had so far failed to attempt to incorporate children’s rights into the agenda. Among local authorities, those interviewed in Pausa, complained that the provincial mayor does not attend meetings of ODESUR. At the same time, although they expressed interest in creating a local mesa de concertacion and developing a provincial analysis and development plan, they felt that it would be necessary for an outside agency such as Save the Children or CIDRA to promote and facilitate such a process.
Despite the limitations of support received in the intervention areas, some informants noted that the earthquake had put ignored parts of the country “on the map”; this was stated by the president CIDRA with reference to Paucar de Sara Sara and by the mayor of Dean Valdivia. This represents a political opportunity for these areas to gain more development assistance which, if capitalised upon, will lend some greater sustainability to some of the actions taken through this project.
Negatively, the limited response of other NGOs and international agencies and the slow implementation of official national rehabilitation activities (ODESUR) increase the negative impacts of this disaster on affected populations, including Save the Children beneficiaries, and their vulnerability to the effects of future disasters which may occur.
4. ANALYSIS OF APPROPRIATENESS OF ALLIANCE REPSONSE
According to the definition made in the Terms of Reference for the evaluation, “appropriateness is a combination of the definitions for efficiency, effectiveness and consistency. Effectively – were the projects we (in this case the Alliance) carried out the correct projects to tackle the problem at the time?”. However clear this may seem, this is probably the most difficult part of the analysis. In part this is because whether an action can be considered appropriate depends
22 My emphasis.
32 very much on the point of view of individual observers (few beneficiaries are likely to suggest that the assistance they have received was inappropriate). More importantly, the evaluation of appropriateness calls into question the decisions of individual people and organisations yet it is being made with the benefit of hindsight. Consequently, it is important to stress that the opinions expressed here are directed at helping to improve decision-making in the future and are not intended as judgements of the wisdom of the actions that were taken.
4.1. Definition and design of the project.
4.1.1. Decision to intervene. Given that Alliance members and counterparts had only limited emergency experience, operational capacity and presence in the affected areas, the question arises as to why resources were not channelled through agencies which did have such experience, capacity and presence? In the first instance, it seems that Save the Children personnel felt a moral obligation to take an active part in addressing the emergency based on their ability to anticipate the scale and geographical spread of the disaster before good information was available and the likely shortfalls in capacity to respond of other agencies, especially in rural areas with high levels of poverty. In both respects, they were proved right.
In addition, from an institutional perspective, it was appropriate to become directly involved to ensure that aid obtained by the Alliance was implemented with specific attention to children’s rights. There were very few possibilities of other agencies with the capacity to absorb Save the Children assistance and which could be expected to in some way work with such a focus. Caritas del Peru could have been a possibility but their general approach is of attending children rather than of promoting children’s rights as such. In addition, severe reductions of personnel, especially from October, would have made it difficult for that organisation’s staff to dedicate the time necessary for active promotion of children’s rights.
With regard to the lack of emergency experience of the counterparts, the role played by PREDES has been invaluable in overcoming this limitation.
4.1.2. Selection of intervention zones. There is no question that the locations chosen were and remain very needful of the support offered by the project. The decision to prioritise poor, rural areas including some very isolated areas and communities, has meant that Save the Children’s assistance was often provided in areas where there was / is relatively little intervention by other agencies. As well as being good in and of itself, this also seems to have limited the negative effects of frequently poor interagency coordination. However, it is worth noting that there are almost certainly many communities that have received absolutely no support. Poor national information systems make this very difficult to determine with certainty or to identify which these communities might be.
During the evaluation, there was some discussion concerning the wisdom of covering so many areas, especially given the limited funds and limited experience. The strongest argument in favour of having had wide coverage at least in the first phase is that this allowed Save the Children to reach many children in many remote locations with shelter, bedding and warm clothing which were very much needed and helped protect them against acute respiratory infections. Subsequently, it might have been more efficient to reduce the number of zones from the 4 which continue to date to 2 or 3. However, given the overlap of the phases and the need to define intervention zones to potential funders within two weeks of the earthquake it was too early to have a clear basis on which to decide which zones to cut. The number and geographical dispersion of communities attended was considerably reduced in the second
33 phase but this was as much a case of force majeure as conscious decision given that the activities of this phase required much higher investment of human and financial resources.
4.1.3. Choice of counterparts The basis on which counterparts were chosen varied considerably and the effects of those choices have impacted on the effectiveness of the project.
CIDRA. This counterpart was selected on the basis of their location in the Ayacucho department where Paucar de Sara Sara is located and because of their established working relationship with Save the Children Canada, with funding from which they have been working on themes including children’s rights since 1998. Unfortunately, the fact that they did not have a presence in the area appears not to have been given sufficient weight and the very long travelling time from the capital of Ayacucho, Huamanga, to the provincial capital, Pausa, - 30 hours by public transport – was not appreciated. These difficulties combined with internal decisions of CIDRA and the low budget for personnel and transport which affected all counterparts (see point 2.3.1) to prevent CIDRA from dedicating sufficient human resources to the work or maintaining a continuous presence in the area. The unexpected resignation of the project coordinator in August further complicated the situation23, especially as CIDRA was slow to replace him. This delayed implementation of various components, especially canal rehabilitation. It should be noted that the contribution of all three CIDRA staff that have been involved in the project has been very positive and led to some important impacts noted in section 1 of this document. Nevertheless, with hindsight, the selection of CIDRA must be called into question. Alternative counterparts with presence and capacity in the area (Catholic Parish of Pausa) or at least located much closer to the area (Proyeccion – out of their Caraveli office - , and some NGOs based in Ica) could have been considered, but they were unknown to Save the Children at the time and so they were not assessed.
Proyeccion. The historic relation between Proyeccion and Save the Children Sweden which motivated its selection has facilitated project implementation as have the prior integration of child-focused approaches; existing contacts with municipal authorities, DEMUNAs, school councils, educational authorities and police (including in the intervention area); and the organisation’s good internal systems. It would be wrong to suggest that all has been perfect but this has proven to be one of the more fortunate choices of counterparts.
Labor. This NGO was chosen partly due to contact via PREDES and because of the widespread recognition of the quality of its work. None of the Alliance members had existing partners in Moquegua and the number of NGOs from which to choose was somewhat limited: Labor was in a sense the local NGO in Moquegua. This led to it managing aid programmes from Diakonia, Oxfam UK and Lutheran World Relief as well as Save the Children, but it did not take on sufficient staff (again the Save the Children budget was insufficient in this sense even though the problem was clear during the initial assessment) and implementation of the project has sometimes seemed to suffer as a consequence. Additionally, the lack of a historical relationship between Save the Children and Labor Moquegua or experience in work on children’s rights has limited this counterpart’s understanding of and ability to implement Save the Children’s approach. In particular, this has affected Area 4. Nevertheless, Labor Ilo is much stronger in this respect and was incorporated into the project after the first phase since when it has been acting as the leader for Area 4 activities: Ilo coordinated and hosted a meeting of members of 7
23 The reasons were beyond CIDRA’s control. The coordinator was in the final stages of studies for a masters degree and had been due to present his thesis by June 2002. Unfortunately, his university brought forward the deadline to December 2001 which forced him to resign so as to be able to complete his thesis in time.
34 schools councils from Ilo and Samegua “Collection of Experiences in the Reconstruction Process of their Cities” and facilitated a workshop with teachers from Samegua on “Proposals to Incorporate Educational Activities to Work with Children and Adolescents in emergencies”.
Mallku. In this case, there has proven to be a good match of vision with Save the Children despite this being the first time that any of the Alliance members have worked with it and the first time that Mallku have worked on children’s rights. This organisation also has very good local knowledge of the areas of intervention and has shown a predisposition to a disaster prevention approach including prior to the disaster: they had requested and held a meeting with PREDES shortly before the earthquake as they were concerned by the “seismic silence” at that time. A number of Mallku staff had experience in emergencies (the Nazca earthquake, the 1997/98 El Niño and flooding in Puno) which was beneficial. Additional criteria used at the time of the selection of this counterpart – their ability to provide information on damages in the area and existing support from other international agencies – proved to be reliable. They may also have been fortunate in comparison to Labor as the facts that Mallku was less well known and the lower amounts of aid received in Tacna meant that they did not become overstretched with assistance from many donors.
PREDES. This NGO which is dedicated to prevention of disasters was the first organisation approached by Save the Children24 and the confidence this showed has been amply repaid. The relationship with Save the Children is distinct from that with the other counterparts as their services have been contracted as advisors to the project but in fact they have played a critical role in many areas including: participation in initial evaluations; advice and training for the other counterparts; inspection of canal and housing sites to evaluate risks; leverage of additional funds in Arequipa; direct involvement in house design and construction in Arequipa and in the implementation of training workshops within Area 4; and logistical support to and active participation in the evaluation.
4.1.4. Identification of project components The major intervention sectors (canals/water; tents and temporary housing; blankets, mattresses and children’s clothes; children’s rights and prevention of disasters) met and meet real priority needs expressed by beneficiaries and other local informants. In particular, housing, canals/water and emotional impacts (fear) were mentioned in all locations visited and by all types of informants as principal areas of need.
Measures to control disease. Priorisation of shelter and warm clothing over hygiene measures and water purification responded well to the major disease threat constituted by increases in acute respiratory infections. In this sense, the inclusion of children’s clothing in Save the Children Canada’s immediate application to CIDA was well judged. Increases in the occurrence of diarrhoea, skin diseases and conjunctivitis were significant but these tend to be more easily treatable without expensive medicines and/or non-life threatening.
With regard to the control of diarrhoea, distribution of chlorine tablets was probably useful in improving health where it was conducted (Arequipa and Moquegua) but its effect was probably more as a general public health measure than as emergency relief and the design and implementation of this component requires some analysis:
24 Due to contacts with Richard and Nani from when they were employed by Oxfam UK in Peru as well as the facts that their ex-director now works for Save the Children UK in Cuba and that PREDES had produced some leaflets for Save the Children Sweden.
35 • Distribution was slow meaning that it coincided with a reduction in its necessity (see section 1.1). • Use of chlorine without DPD tablets and equipment for checking chlorine levels is something of a hit or miss process. On the one hand, water that required chlorine treatment may have gone untreated while, on the other chlorine may have been wasted on water that did not need treating, sometimes leading to over treatment and rejection on the basis of taste. Positively, In Tacna, when it was discovered that local chlorine supplies were adequate, DPD and testing kits were bought, training has been given in their use and distribution has begun. • Simple non-chemical methods of water treatment could have been considered (information from Omar Delfin, Save the Children Canada, Bolivia). • In addition, there is room for some doubt over how far the earthquake actually led to contamination of water supplies in the areas of intervention given that many rural communities did not have drinking water systems, using untreated water from irrigation canals and natural springs.
In summary: this minor component may have been included on the basis of general assumptions rather than real need; if needed it should have been a first phase intervention (i.e. rapid response); and consideration should have been given to simple technical alternatives.
The wider decision to not include a general health component seems to have been appropriate given the facts that: neither Alliance members in Peru nor their counterparts had experience in this area; human resources were already stretched by the range of interventions included in the project; and other agencies provided support in this area (e.g. Medecins sin Frontiers).
Housing and tents. The scale of destruction of houses and/or the risks of remaining in damaged houses or in locations made more vulnerable due to the earthquake mean that the provision of temporary shelter and help for reconstruction has been and continues to be a priority in most if not all project locations.
The decision to provide temporary modules during the first phase in Ayacucho rather than tents as in the other areas merits some consideration. There seem to be pros and cons in both cases: tents could be provided in larger numbers and more quickly than the modules and probably had better thermal characteristics but modules were more spacious and will be superior to tents now that night temperatures have risen and the rainy season is beginning in the highlands. The combination of tent provision for a few months followed by the construction of temporary modules in Moquegua and Tacna or houses in Arequipa may clinch the case for the strategy adopted in those areas; although it increased costs, the retrieval of tents will enable the counterparts from those areas to have a stock available in case of future emergencies.
Household equipment. There is some doubt as to the necessity for kitchen kits and “school crockery and cutlery” (which replaced kitchen kits in Pausa due to the distribution by other organisations of saucepans etc.) The small numbers of kitchen kits and their distribution to families receiving housing modules suggests that there is a good chance that most of the beneficiaries of these items had in fact lost household equipment due to the partial or complete collapse of their homes. However, in Pausa children’s crockery and cutlery has been distributed to over 1,000 children through schools irrespective of the condition of their homes. In one community visited (Otococha) all school children received crockery and cutlery but only 8 out of 40 homes had suffered collapse.
36 Canals. Work on irrigation canals may not have avoided immediate losses in agricultural production but is of great importance for the longer term rehabilitation of the target communities. In some cases, there is a rather unclear division between rehabilitation and improvement of irrigation infrastructure but almost always this responds more to the need to do a good, lasting job and / or the greater vulnerability of weakened canals to landslides (caused by earthquakes or otherwise) than to any understandable tendency to take advantage of the circumstances.
Emotional impacts. Work to address the fears of children through Area 4 is of great importance and should be strengthened. The most frequently mentioned problem caused by the earthquake to children (by themselves and adults) is fear. Among many problems listed, children also prioritised, in rough order, mistreatment (physical and emotional) and lack of love in the way they are treated in their families, the destruction and damage of houses and the need for work and income for their parents. When imagining their communities in the future common denominators included recreational spaces, new and improved houses and greater modernity (TV, telephone, good roads and other elements). Drawings made during the evaluation depicting their communities after the earthquake and in an imagined future also included clear signs of increased happiness and of living in less vulnerable locations25. Pre-school and primary teachers in Ilo independently reported that children’s drawing at school demonstrated emotional effects as their drawing became more clumsy and used dark colours. Teachers in several locations cited examples of changes of conduct and generalised reductions in academic performance. In the case of Ilo preschool, a psychologist has evaluated children and judges that most are not affected by true trauma but full emotional recovery will take time26. However, those children who are severely affected will have difficulty obtaining psychological support. There is little availability of such services and they are not covered by State health insurance for school children.
Area 4. The components included under Area 4 respond more to the vision of Save the Children than to the needs identified by the beneficiaries (with the important exception of dealing with children’s fears). Nevertheless, it is clear that they respond to real needs in the affected areas and can contribute much to the empowerment of children and young people. This is, in a sense, an opportunistic use of the emergency but by including work on prevention and mitigation of disasters it responds appropriately to the emergency itself and gains legitimacy in the eyes of children and adults alike.
Further reconstruction work in Tacna. Specific information was not sought on the need for the interventions planned under the proposal presented to ECHO for a second phase of their support in the Candarave and Jorge Basadre provinces27. However, the great need of the population of Candarave for assistance with rehousing was evident, clearly justifying that aspect of the proposal. Information in July field evaluations made by Mallku also tend to support the inclusion of the other components. Recent information indicates that the government social
25 A common factor to a number of drawings was that children pictured themselves as standing on the ground outside the houses but on top of their houses in their vision of the future. Consultations by Maritza Pinzon with a psychologist on the significance of this factor confirmed the team’s initial interpretation. Being on the ground (low) probably signifies the children’s feelings of loss of control over their lives due to the sensation of being physically and psychologically crushed. Being on the roof of their houses suggest the regaining of control and being definitively out of danger which nothing over their heads which could crush them. 26 Cases of greater emotional impact reported by these teachers included: a girl who is frightened of the ground, so tries to make her mother carry her instead of walking, a girl who “asks to go to the bathroom every 5 minutes” and a boy who has developed a stutter. The last of these was among children who were alone at home during the earthquake, some of whom were locked in; these children in general have been the most frequently affected by changes in conduct. 27 The proposal was rejected late in November.
37 works agency, FONCODES, will be providing support for the reconstruction of housing in areas above 3,000 metres above sea level and the education ministry has a programme of school repair and reconstruction but these will clearly take some time to implement and it remains to be seen whether remote communities will benefit.
Other priority needs. Needs mentioned by residents of affected communities included food shortages (due to factors including losses in damaged homes, peasant farmers not collecting harvests for a few days due to frequent landslides, crops in fields destroyed by landslides - e.g. CIDRA’s agronomist believes at least 25% of the cultivated area was affected in Rauripa - , unemployment and price speculation), road blockages (Proyeccion were unable to enter Valle Arriba for some time and Mullini in Candarave was cut off for two weeks or more), unemployment and reduced income (e.g. many women in Samegua produce and / or commercialise food items informally but sales have dropped considerably due to the effects of the earthquake on the general population of Moquegua.
These additional needs are either out with the competence of Save the Children and / or better dealt with by other organisations. However one area of need mentioned in response to specific questioning that could have been addressed is the question of abuse and violence against children and women. A number of informants were of the opinion that there had been significant increases in violence against women and children including the PRONAA representative in Paucar de Sara Sara, the DEMUNA representative for Cocachacra, Labor staff and, perhaps most importantly, women beneficiaries in Samegua. The women in Samegua reported that men tend to complain violently when they go out, even though they know that they are going for food, and they admitted that increased tension (affecting both themselves and children) led them to punish their children physically more often. These women were clearly very concerned about this, using a large part of the evaluation meeting to talk about their experiences and ask for advice on how to correct children and adolescents. Labor staff also mentioned that there were more cases of abandonment by men since the earthquake, although some had returned to families receiving housing modules. Some other informants did not agree that there had been increases in such problems following the earthquake (women in Cocachacra, pre-school teachers in Ilo and a small group of men in Quilahuani) but women and teachers did agree that violence and alcoholism in men were important long-term problems.
Balance between project components Given the shortage of resources available to Save the Children and to aid and relief agencies in general, the relative prioritisation of investment by sector is an important consideration. In this sense, the high proportion of resources requested from ECHO, DFID and CIDA for shelter, bedding and clothing seems appropriate given both the immediate importance of this support in protecting children’s health and the continuing shortfall in housing assistance in a number of the communities visited. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that a greater proportion of resources could have been dedicated to these areas. On the one hand, the elimination of support for components questioned in this report (water purification and household kits) would not have significantly increased the ability of the Alliance to address these needs. On the other, reductions in funding for canal rehabilitation or Area 4 activities would have run counter to the real and felt needs of the affected populations, to the promotion of children’s rights and to the development of a culture of disaster prevention.
38 4.2. Coherence with Alliance mission, values and approaches.
4.2.1. Focus on development and rights in emergencies. Save the Children guidelines emphasise the need to balance short and long term work. The rights of children listed in documents as being clearly relevant during emergency work include state protection, information, participation, inclusion, diversity, gender perspective, self- management, priority, continuity of the processes, rights related to the media (including privacy), interaction with nature and disaster prevention.
Development focus. This was achieved from the beginning by working on the identification of needs and beneficiaries and distributing aid through local counterparts, local authorities and community organisations thus contributing to their strengthening and promoting coordination between them. The rehabilitation and reconstruction of physical infrastructure, canals and housing, has been conducted with a view to meeting needs well beyond the immediate crisis caused by the earthquake and introducing improvements over pre-existing infrastructure whenever possible without unnecessarily limiting the number of beneficiaries and locations attended (for example through cement lining of canal sections and anti-seismic house design).
Children’s rights. It is important that we recognise that, although first phase assistance and the physical components of phase two do not at first glance respond to a child rights approach, in fact they included elements that were especially important and / or directly aimed at children. For example, shelter, blankets and clothing addressed children’s vulnerability to respiratory diseases and all the interventions addressed practical rights of children (rights to shelter, clothing, health and food). At the same time, the prioritisation of these needs and of families with young children in distribution of assistance responded to children’s right to priority within plans and projects.
Nevertheless, the rights of children only began to be clearly and specifically addressed through Area 4 and the delays in initiating actions in this area until September may have had the appearance of downgrading their importance and so contributed to some weakness in the application of chid-centred approaches. Proyeccion, probably the strongest counterpart in this respect, admitted that the disorganisation caused by the emergency meant that they lost some of their child-focus during the first phase.
Amongst the rights listed in Save the Children documents, those that have most clearly been addressed are information (e.g. on the causes of earthquakes), self-management (e.g. by strengthening and promoting schools councils), priority (e.g. by the prioritisation as beneficiaries of families with young children), continuity of the processes (especially through the continuation of Area 4 during much of 2002) and disaster prevention (e.g. through the application of prevention criteria in infrastructure work and through training on prevention under Area 4). The right to participation seems not to have always been pursued with appropriate vigour. Although, this is very much promoted through Area 4, little attention appears to have been given to promoting the active participation of children during the first two or three months after the earthquake. Gender and diversity issues have rarely been directly addressed (see point 4.2.8).
4.2.2. Collaboration and consultation with the Alliance, governments, the UN and civil society. • By being treated as an Alliance programme the first criteria has clearly been fulfilled. • Collaboration and consultation with government was effective at the local level but limited nationally due to the attitudes of the government agency, INDECI. Save the Children did participate in meetings between INDECI and NGOs at a national level.
39 • The programme has been implemented respecting and promoting community organisations. • There appears to have been no direct contact with UN agencies.
4.2.3. Attention to the immediate needs of children and their families. • Both in the objectives of first and second phase action and the implementation of the programme these needs have been given priority.
4.2.4. Development of capacity and competence. • The implementing counterparts have been strengthened in their ability to deal with emergencies and the incorporation of risk and disaster prevention criteria into their work. All counterparts, including PREDES, have gained abilities in relation to the promotion of children’s rights.
4.2.5. Work with key actors who can play a key role in psycho-social reconstruction (community mothers or carers, teachers and youth leaders). • Teachers have been included as key actors and beneficiaries under Area 4. • Some mothers have participated in marches (demonstrations) by school children and have been included reached through replication of training by pre-school teachers in Ilo. There is a need for greater work with adults to ensure impact and sustainability.
4.2.6. Address underlying causes. • Physical – support by PREDES has facilitated better design and implementation of housing reconstruction and canal rehabilitation, avoidance of reconstruction of houses or rehabilitation of canals in risky locations, and the integration of disaster prevention criteria into training of teachers and children and into the approaches of counterparts and, to some extent, local authorities. • Economic – the rehabilitation of canals will enable peasant families, which make up the majority of the beneficiaries, to recover income levels however there are no other measures in the project designed to address other causes of reduced income, much less to increase the income of beneficiaries above prior levels. • Structural – these causes are addressed in the intention, and some attempts to date, to promote the integration of disaster prevention and children’s right into the agendas of the Mesas de Concertación, curriculum diversification and other national processes.
4.2.7. Development of systems of preparation for disasters, the monitoring of the impact and effectiveness of the interventions. • Diverse actions in relation to disaster prevention respond to the need to develop systems of preparation for disasters. • Monitoring of impact and effectiveness of the interventions has been addressed in limited fashion. The organisation of this evaluation is an important step but internal monitoring systems have not been developed and indicators are limited (see Section 5).
4.2.8. Inclusion – gender, culture and disability: Save the Children staff claim to have pursued the integration of gender and cultural perspectives in its coordination with the counterparts but are clear that this was not done in any systematic sense and that questions related to disability were not addressed at all. The failure to adequately deal with these issues arises from the start of the project in that neither project proposals nor documents produced during the Moquegua planning workshop of early July contain any specific measures or guidance in relation to differences flowing from the diversity of
40 roles, needs, priorities and possibilities of women / men, girls / boys, disabled / able-bodied or different cultural groups. This has affected planning, budgets and implementation procedures.
Gender. All the counterparts have an ideological commitment to the integration of gender in their work however few concrete examples were found of how this has been implemented in the emergency project. The clearest examples of success in actively integrating women into project activities came from the Candarave area of Tacna where a local young woman (19) is assisting Mallku in project implementation, several adolescent girls are producing a local radio programme and where an older woman (Rafaela) was prominent in organising activities and facilitating our meetings during the visit to Quilahuani. Opportunities have been used by Labor and by the Save the Children emergency project coordinator, Raúl Luna, to raise gender issues in the course of project activities but only with indirect relevance to the project itself.
An interesting point raised by Mallku director, Juan Pari, was that women have frequently been more active than male members of the communities in working to overcome the emergency in their communities. Consequently, the important questions in relation to gender have to do with the power relations between men and women, e.g. what role do women have in decision- making and to what extent do men and women participate equally in emergency and rehabilitation activities?
In this sense, women indicated that they have been involved in different activities at community and family level including the organisation of ollas comunes (communal cooking) in the aftermath of the earthquake, participation in communal work days, carrying materials to work sites, and construction of modules and houses. Nevertheless, the principal decisions affecting their communities continue to be taken by men as women only rarely participate in community assemblies. Normally, the heads of each household attend such meetings with women’s participation restricted to single mothers, widows and women whose male partners are absent. Fortunately, this does not seem to have led to differences in the fit between women’s and men’s priorities with the project components. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that during women only or women dominated meetings greater emphasis was given to the effects of the earthquake on food access, drinking water and children’s emotional status and health than during meetings with a significant presence of men28. Women (and children) in urban areas (Samegua and Cocachacra) also mentioned price speculation in items such as food, torches, batteries and candles after the earthquake and women were more likely than men to “exteriorise” the emotional effect that the earthquake still has for them.
Culture. Any concerns that culturally marginalized groups may not have been included in the project can be largely discounted given the prioritisation of rural highland areas with largely indigenous populations that are among the most marginalized in Peruvian society. Even in the coastal towns of Ilo and Tacna, the prioritisation of very poor neighbourhoods has had the effect of selecting these groups given that a large proportion of the residents of these areas are migrants from the highland department of Puno. All counterparts pointed to the strengthening of communal ways of working promoted by the project (in relation to housing and canals) which are a fundamental part of Aymara and Quechua culture but are being lost, particularly in urban areas such as Samegua. The ability of many Mallku staff to converse in Aymara and the space
28 A round of “story-telling” (i.e. people recounting their personal experiences of the earthquake) in Otococha and shorter versions in Quilahuani and other locations provided a means for men’s and women’s personal experience and appreciation of priorities to be explored with some openness in mixed meetings. This was not an original part of the evaluation methodology and was difficult to implement more widely because of the time required but proved valuable.
41 given in evaluation visits to native cultural expressions also are concrete means of revaluing indigenous culture.
Disability. This is the probably the weakest area of inclusion. Proyeccion claim that it forms part of their basic approach but were unable to point to any concrete examples in the project while Mallku admitted their weakness in this area. Positively, Labor Moquegua mentioned how they had worked with 4 families headed by people with disabilities in Samegua. Given the difficulty for these beneficiaries to attend meetings, Labor staff visited them in their homes to explain work on housing modules and seek their opinions.
4.2.9. Coherence with SPHERE. • The design and implementation of the project on the basis of human (children’s) rights and in ways which uphold the dignity of the beneficiaries (see section on impact) are in line with the humanitarian principles of SPHERE. • In relation to SPHERE’s technical aspects, the project has clearly been implemented with much attention to the quality of material support and its appropriateness to the circumstances (e.g. tents rather than plastic, good quality blankets and children’s clothes). The size of the housing modules (24 m2) is not large but is above the minimum standard stipulated in SPHERE.
5. ANALYSIS OF ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT
5.1. Initial evaluation.
Local knowledge and the ability and willingness to travel extensively and rapidly of the Save the Children UK South America Representative, Save the Children Sweden and Save the Children Canada staff and PREDES advisors permitted good quality and rapid evaluation of needs, areas of intervention etc. The coordination of the field evaluation work with teams / representatives from ECHO and DFID was very valuable from the point of view that it facilitated the approval of proposals made to those agencies.
5.2. Human Resources
The agreement of the three Alliance members to work together allowed fruitful reinforcement of their abilities and contacts. This was especially clear in the dedication of human resources to the emergency during the first month after the earthquake. The “invasion” of staff from other countries may have been a little difficult for Peru-based staff but it was of great importance both because of the lack of emergency experience of Alliance staff in Peru and because of the many temporary and short terms changes affecting the Save the Children UK / Canada office at the time29. The decisions on deployment of staff were taken quickly and allowed strengthening of initial actions (quick access to ERR funds, good quality needs evaluations, rapid proposal development) and of the technical committee. It is possible that even greater use could have been made of the experience of other Alliance members. For example, the services of Omar Delfin (Save the Children Canada, Bolivia) to provide training to the counterparts in direct work with children would have been very useful.
29 The Save the Children UK / Canada office was moving during the weekend of the earthquake. A new joint UK / Canada coordinator had been appointed but was yet to take up her post. Two staff members were about to take maternity leave and a third member needed an operation which required one month off work.
42 This level of support by international staff, understandably, could not be maintained subsequently but neither was it reflected in the numbers of local staff appointed to coordinate and administer the project from then onwards. Only two people (project coordinator and administrator) were appointed at the beginning of August. Provision for specialised support in relation to Area 4 was not made until October when Ana Maria Marquez was hired. These levels of hiring may have appeared reasonable in relation to the size of the budget and given the support of Save the Children UK in Bogotá and the other members of the Technical Committee and the advisory services of PREDES. However, it did not take into account the dispersion and complexity of the programme, nor the lack of experience of the counterparts in emergency work and children’s rights, nor the fact that PREDES advisors reported to their director rather than to Save the Children30.
5.3. Conformation and functioning of the technical committee.
The committee members interviewed believe that the committee has generally achieved a good level of coordination but not without difficulties. None of the members had experience of this type of situation and they lacked guidelines or definitions of the roles which the committee should fulfil. Factors beyond the control of Alliance members meant that the composition of the committee has changed three times, most radically around the end of July / beginning of August when Maritza and Neptaly left the committee and the new project coordinator and administrator (Raul and Lotti) joined.
The most difficult moment came very early in the process when different understandings of what had been agreed verbally led Save the Children Canada to develop an individual proposal to CIDA for Paucar de Sara Sara with CIDRA as the implementing counterpart when the other two Alliance members believed the agreement to be to develop one joint proposal for which each would fundraise. This led both to significant friction between Alliance staff and to differences in project components between Paucar and the other three zones that did not necessarily reflect differences in circumstances. Those differences worked both ways. On the one hand, Save the Children Canada were able to make their application to CIDA on the 25th June which was as fast as the Save the Children UK application to ECHO and considerably before the general project was finalised (30th June31) or the proposal went in to DFID (concept note 2nd July, full proposal 5th July). In addition, in Paucar children’s clothes were included from the start meaning that this important assistance was received earlier than in other areas. On the other hand, the decision to construct temporary housing modules rather than distribute tents slowed down the provision of shelter and benefited less people. Whatever the merits and demerits of the case, the friction caused by these confusions took some time to overcome. In this sense, the role of the new SC UK / Canada coordinator (Nani began full time work 15 days after the earthquake) was key in reducing the tensions and allowing the committee to focus on the job at hand.
These difficulties probably contributed to the slow development of the formal agreement between the Alliance members (the first draft is dated 24th June but the final version was not signed until September) and of the definition of the roles of the members of the technical committee, lead agency staff in Peru and Colombia and of the project coordination team; those definitions are still not finalised. Nevertheless, the final agreement and the most recent definition of roles both appear logical, well thought out and uncomplicated.
30 By way of comparison, it is perhaps worth noting that the Save the Children UK Hurricane Mitch team, albeit dealing with many more counterparts and locations and greater funding, had between 30 and 40 members. 31 The first draft was ready on 27th June.
43 5.4. Fundraising
Experience and contacts were well used to rapidly obtain significant funding from ECHO, CIDA, DFID and JOAC as well as Save the Children Norway for first and second phase work32. However, for a second time (the first time being after the El Salvador earthquake of January 2001) Save the Children UK failed to act quickly enough to obtain funding from Irish Aid only calling that agency on July 2nd when funds had already been assigned to other agencies.
Fundraising for third phase work and for Area 4 has been less successful. ECHO recently rejected a proposal for rehabilitation work in Tacna (which seemed to be strong as it focused on basic infrastructure – housing, irrigation canals and schools – in poor areas that had received relatively little support). It is important that Save the Children UK try to learn the full reason why this proposal was rejected33.
In relation to Area 4, the only funds obtained to date have been through Save the Children Sweden and are quite limited. Positively, project staff are currently investigating the possibility of obtaining additional funding to address the issues of violence and the insertion of child rights and disaster prevention in the agendas of the various local, national and regional consultation processes currently in train in Peru. Negatively, Save the Children Canada report that they estimate their chances of obtaining hoped for funds for Area 4 during the third phase are no better than 10%.
5.5. Coordination with and support from London
• It was very helpful that one emergency section person was always on duty. • Communication with and work done by the supplies unit was considered positive. • London responded very quickly to the need to produce new paperwork reassigning (on paper) donations to Caritas to get round customs restrictions while Richard was able to respond promptly to questions from DFID regarding some details of the proposal. • Negatively, ECHO reporting requirements were sent late to Peru making much of the work on the original report a wasted effort.
5.6. Financial Management
Save the Children UK attempted to make rapid, direct transfers of funds to Peru in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. Unfortunately, the lack of pre-existing banking channels made this difficult and lengthy, suggesting that it may have been better to direct funds through the sub-regional office as usual.
5.7. Monitoring, reporting procedures and field visits.
There have been a number of significant deficiencies in this aspect of the management of the project:
32 As noted earlier, fundraising with DFID and ECHO was doubtless helped by Save the Children Sweden and UK accompanying representatives of these agencies during the initial evaluation phase. 33 The reasons given by ECHO were that the project did not specify that the housing was anti-seismic, failed to address the problems of land-titling and included an education component. The third reason is part of an on-going problem with agencies which do not see education as a humanitarian need but the first two reasons could have been cleared up by a simple email. It would be useful to get behind these reasons as they seem to imply a bureaucratic rejection of imperfect applications (due to over subscription or downgrading of this particular emergency) and/or the automatic rejection of all proposals with an education component.
44 • No visits by any Save the Children staff were made to Paucar de Sara Sara until the visit by the new staff member in October while most of the visits by the project coordinator to other areas have tended to include little time visiting the field. • Reporting has been a little weak. On the one hand, some important aspects of the on-the- ground situation only came to the knowledge of Technical Committee members during the evaluation, e.g. the potential of Pausa Catholic parish as a counterpart and the important differences between Labor Moquegua and Labor Ilo. On the other, despite stipulation in the contract, regular written reports have not been shared with Save the Children Sweden and Canada except by distribution to Technical Committee members during meetings • There may have been some excess demands made on counterparts by each Alliance member wanting to visit. Without actually complaining, the project coordinator for Proyeccion said that they had received lots of visits. The evaluator is not in a position to judge whether this comment was reasonable, however it is worth suggesting that if working as an Alliance, the field visit of one member of the Alliance should be deemed equivalent to a visit by all the members. • Results and impact indicators included in the DFID logical framework or developed in the Moquegua workshop are either difficult to verify or do not address the specificities of Save the Children’s child-centred and children’s rights-based approach. Goal indicators in the DFID proposal only relate to health in general and require the use of statistics which relate to populations larger than the target populations while purpose and output indicators focus almost entirely on the distribution of physical inputs without any disaggregation in relation to age, sex or other factors of interest. Moquegua indicators follow a similar pattern, although the inclusion of some Area 4 indicators began to address the need to evaluate in terms of Save the Children’s particular approach.
These problems might have been avoided not only with greater staffing but also by clearer stipulation of the coordination team’s priorities and by the design of an appropriate monitoring and evaluation system including indicators which focused on Save the Children’s priorities and which were relatively easy to verify.
5.8. Media and communications.
• Media work in Peru was made difficult by the fact that attention was absorbed by the almost simultaneous arrest and return to Peru of Vladimiro Montesinos and by the upcoming change of government (following the recent election of Alejandro Toledo as president). This meant that Save the Children Sweden and UK communication staff needed to try to keep the situation in the press and provide journalists with accurate information. Given this, and the fact that it was also difficult to gain coverage by the international media, it could have been appropriate to take up Save the Children USA’s offer of a media officer, at least for the first week to ten days. Save the Children UK’s South America media officer did not arrive in Peru until July 4th when even the more responsible sections of the press had lost interest. • A sour note in Alliance cooperation was struck when, despite the fact that the importance of actions being identified as Alliance actions was flagged up by David Throp, literally hours after the earthquake, Save the Children communiqués released on the OCHA website went out under the Save the Children UK banner.
45 5.9. Coherence with Emergency Liaison Team (ELT) Major or Spike Emergency Procedures.
Contact between Alliance staff was initiated quickly despite the fact that the earthquake occurred on a Saturday (during the evening on European time and while key Save the Children UK staff were participating in a workshop in Honduras). Save the Children UK staff in London initiated contact with the Alliance (Simon Williamson) and sought contact with Save the Children Canada and Rudy von Bernuth (Save the Children USA) within 24hours after the earthquake and a teleconference was held during the day after that (June 25th). Participants were Rudy (Save the Children USA), Mike (Save the Children UK), Simon (Alliance) and Søren (Save the Children Norway and chair of the Alliance ELT). No Save the Children Canada person participated in the teleconference as contact had not yet been established but the matters on the agenda seem to have been treated in a logical and non-contentious fashion, including the designation of Save the Children UK as lead agency.
Minutes of the teleconference show that the fixed agenda was very largely covered with only two partial or complete omissions: • Discussion of deployment of Alliance dedicated personnel seems to have been dealt with only partially, but this does not appear to have negatively impacted on the actions taken. • More questionable is the fact that a date for the next conference call was not registered in the minutes. The author of this report has no knowledge as to whether such a conference took place but, if it did not, this would seem somewhat remiss, especially given the fact that Save the Children Canada had not been able to participate in the original call.
Subsequently, the role of the Alliances Emergencies Coordinator (AEC) appears to have been partially by-passed. Minutes of the teleconference were circulated by the ELT chairSave the Children Norway and it is not clear whether reports compiled by active members were sent to or circulated by the AEC.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1. Current project.
6.1.1. Area 4 • It is important that decisions be taken soon as to whether all four counterparts should be invited to participate in Area 4 activities during the third phase. Resources are limited and the end of the second phase is very close so this is an important issue. Proyeccion and Mallku seem clear choices to continue but doubts have been expressed regarding the ability of CIDRA and Labor to fulfil the requirements for this work. Between the latter two priority should probably be given to Labor given the motivation and capacity of the Ilo office for this area. CIDRA seems almost certain to experience difficulties in allocating staff for this work but, if resources are judged to be sufficient, it would be appropriate to explore alternative mechanisms for supporting the nascent work in Paucar de Sara Sara. Two possibilities could be considered: inviting the Catholic parish social ministry to take on this work or commissioning Proyeccion to work with teachers, local authorities and the new DEMUNA (if and when it is established). • Assuming Labor continue in the project, Save the Children should seek to clarify and, if necessary, formalise the position of Labor Ilo office as the leader for both offices in the implementation of Area 4 during the remainder of phase 2 and during phase 3.
46 • A third workshop to exchange experiences and ideas between the counterparts would be useful, especially if held soon and with emphasis on Area 4,. • Mechanisms should be sought to promote children’s rights and disaster prevention with parents, not only children and teachers. • Counterparts should seek to secure key types of support for children’s activities beyond the end of the project, for example funding for radio programmes and institutional backing from educational authorities for schools councils. • Alliance members should make renewed efforts to locate additional funding for this area.
6.1.2. Other issues. • To the extent that donor conditions permit, decisions on the use of any unspent funds should consider giving priority to the following: strengthening of human resources for Area 4; and construction of additional temporary housing modules in communities receiving little or no other outside assistance, e.g. Yucamani and Mullini in Candarave34. • Save the Children should make concerted efforts to ensure the transference of their experience with PREDES to the other counterparts and, institutionally, to the core of PREDES itself. Consideration should also be given to the development of a permanent relationship with PREDES given the great importance and potential of the organisation and its demonstrated openness to and aptitude for the adoption of child-centred approaches. • In the cases of communities supported through the project and which are in the process of relocation, Save the Children and its counterparts should seek to support their attempts to obtain assistance for the development of essential services such as drinking water.
6.2. Future emergency work.
6.2.1. Alliance cooperation. • The agreement between Alliance members and the definitions of roles of the different Alliance players should be used as the basis for any future agreements and shared with the Alliance in general for modification and use as and when appropriate. • All external communications should specify that the project is being implemented by the Alliance and specify which members are involved.
6.2.2. Human resources and budgets. • Careful consideration must be given to the staffing needs of emergency projects. As in all projects, they must take into account financial restrictions but the experience of this project suggests that small increases in staff numbers / funding above minimum levels – both for the Alliance and for counterparts – can make large differences in the quality of project implementation. Similarly, transport budgets must take into account the scarcity and slowness of public transport in remote locations such as Paucar de Sara Sara and Candarave. • Good secretarial support for Alliance meetings should be secured to avoid confusions by having everything in writing rapidly, especially in the very early stages of emergencies when everything and everyone is moving rapidly and confusion can easily occur. A very good secretary or a professional staff member acting as minute taker could even read back preliminary minutes at the end of meetings to facilitate the fastest possible clarification of any differences of understanding.
34 Subsequent to the presentation of preliminary findings to Save the Children staff in Lima, Save the Children UK, on behalf of the Alliance, has released nearly US$ 30,000 for work on housing in Tacna, for a final workshop for counterparts and for (limited) support to the 4th component.
47 6.2.3. Selection of intervention areas. • The concentration of support in rural areas, especially those remote from major population centres, is likely to be appropriate in other major emergencies in Peru as support by other agencies tends to be limited and slow compared to that offered in cities and towns.
6.2.4. Selection of counterparts. • As is shown by the experience with Proyeccion, existing counterparts can be a good choice in emergencies – even if they lack emergency experience – but careful consideration must be given to their real possibilities of dedicating staff and time to the project and the intervention area. Alternative counterparts should be considered when emergencies occur outside their normal operating areas. • The political geography of Peru is a poor guide as to where to look for potential counterparts if none are known in the exact location or close by. For example, Paucar de Sara Sara would be less difficult to attend from the capitals of neighbouring departments, Ica and Arequipa or important provincial towns such as Caraveli and Nazca than from its own departmental capital Huamanga (Ayacucho). • As this case has shown, it is not always possible to locate counterparts whose work already includes children’s rights. While this is rarely likely to be an insurmountable difficulty, attempts should be made to assess their openness and ability to integrate this area into their work. • When assessing potential counterparts it is also important to try to take into account their possibilities of maintaining some kind of active presence in the intervention area after emergency funding is ended. • The support of PREDES is one of the keys to the success of this project. Their support, or that of similar organisations where and when they exist, should always be considered. • It might be useful to develop a short checklist of these and other factors which should be taken into account, while being clear that no organisation is likely to meet all the criteria. Such a list could include: • existing presence and/or contacts in disaster area; • relatively good access to disaster area (i.e. travel times/costs and availability of transport compare well with other possible counterparts); • ability to assign staff to the work and to avoid overloading them by taking on too many commitments with other agencies; • development and rights focuses; • commitment to gender equity and the promotion of inclusion / empowerment of marginalized groups (women, ethnic groups, people with disabilities, others); • experience in child-centered approaches; • experience in emergency work; • understanding of disaster prevention; and • existing (good) relationship with Alliance member(s) and/or independent recognition of their approach and capacity.
6.2.5. Project components and implementation. • Plastic refuges should be avoided due to their tendency to be extremely cold at night and plastic walls are not appropriate for temporary housing for the same reason. This is especially important in cold locations and during winter when the need to protect children (and adults) against acute respiratory infections is a key part of emergency responses. For the same reason, blankets, warm clothing and mattresses are all very important forms of support in such circumstances.
48 • Consideration should be given to the types of measures that could be taken to reduce dust inhalation and their practicality in areas where dry conditions and frequent landslides caused by earthquakes and aftershocks produce large quantities of dust. • It should not be assumed that disruptions to water supplies will lead to an increased need for water treatment in rural areas. However, if it is considered that there are serious risks of increases in diarrhoea and other water-borne infections, support should be conceived and delivered as a first phase intervention and consideration given to the use of simple technical alternatives to chemical water treatment and to support for preventative health campaigns. • Means must be sought to speed-up the repair of irrigation canals. In the present case, the timing of the earthquake meant that few subsistence crops were put at risk but, if the earthquake had occurred later in the year, the interruption of the water supply and limited effectiveness of repairs that farmers were able to make without outside assistance could have led to serious losses and consequent food shortages in 2002. • Work to address the fears and uncertainties affecting children – and teachers – should be a component of projects dealing with rapid onset disasters both because of the great importance ascribed to these emotional impacts by both adults and children themselves as well as because of their effects on children’s academic performance. • Specific work to address questions of children’s rights should be implemented in the context of attention to urgent and priority practical needs. By working in this way in the current project, Save the Children and its counterparts have gained credibility and space to promote children’s rights effectively. • Work with teachers must take into account the structural problems that limit their ability and motivation to adopt new approaches. On the one hand, efforts should be made to identify key actors and work particularly closely with them, for example teachers who demonstrate greater levels of motivation and commitment, teachers with long term or permanent contracts, school directors and local educational authorities. On the other, Save the Children should consider including the theme of teachers employment and working conditions in its advocacy work. • The priority given by respondents to problems of abuse and violence against children and women, including abandonment of families by men, and the apparent increases in these problems caused by the emergency suggest that specific work in this area should be included in future emergency projects. As a first step, Alliance members should study the problem, including through meeting local and national women’s organisations in Peru and other countries (e.g. Honduras and Bolivia), with a view to developing an appropriate approach. • Emergencies increase children’s and adults’ awareness of the need to improve disaster prevention and preparedness and this opportunity should be grasped with training, organisation and advice as in this project. • Similarly, despite the conflicts that can arise around limited aid, individuals and communities have tended to become more open to cooperative ways of working and their level of organisation has been strengthened. Projects should be implemented in ways which build on and strengthen these processes. This includes working through local and community authorities. • In cases where the marking of infrastructure, clothes etc. is not mandated by the donor, consideration should be given to not marking such items or to using types of markings or colour schemes that permit the identification of items but reduce the risk of stigmatisation or negative impacts on the self esteem of beneficiaries. • Counterparts should be encouraged to make clear their identity with beneficiaries rather than stressing the role of Save the Children.
49 6.2.6. Monitoring, accompaniment and reporting. • Care must be taken to ensure adequate and timely information flows between Save the Children and the counterparts, include any acting in an advisory role such as PREDES. • Donor reporting requirements should be provided to project coordination staff at the same time as details on the funds and activities that have been approved. • Emergency projects must include appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems including simple indicators which focus on Save the Children’ priorities. The systems should not be devised principally with a view to ex-post evaluation or reporting to donors but as internal systems which will help staff to maintain an appropriate focus in their work including the advice which they provide to implementing counterparts. • Regular, written reports must be shared with national and regional representatives of all Alliance members involved in a project.
6.3. Institutional emergency preparedness.
6.3.1. Information. • It would be clearly useful for Save the Children to develop a bank of information on potential counterparts throughout the country, especially in areas of greatest vulnerability, to facilitate selection of future counterparts. This is not so easy given that there are very many NGOs in Peru and investigating even a fraction of them is a difficult and time-consuming process. Current information available from official sources is limited in scope and at least two years out of date. The National Association of Centres (ANC) holds basic information on its members. A possible future resource would be a database which PACT Peru hopes to develop which would be as close to comprehensive as possible and held on-line (similarly to the CEIBA database on Central American organisations maintained by the Centre for Organised Participation – CPO – of the Arias Foundation in Costa Rica) but which may not cover either emergency experience nor the position of the organisations in relation to children. • Other types of information which should be developed and maintained include: o Probable key sectors of intervention; o Prices and possible sources of basic supplies such as those used during the first phase of this project; o Possible short term staff including staff of Alliance members throughout the region that could provide strategic support.
6.3.2. Systems, materials and methodologies. • Clear guidelines for project design and implementation are needed in a number of areas: o Measures to promote the active participation of children in emergency and rehabilitation work. o Measures to ensure that children’s rights are kept in focus during the first phase of assistance and at times when rehabilitation of physical infrastructure needs to be prioritised. o Measures to ensure that interventions take into account the diversity of roles, needs, priorities and possibilities of women / men, girls / boys, disabled / able-bodied or different cultural groups. • Save the Children members should develop educational materials for children, teachers and other adults on disaster prevention and preparedness and on children’s rights in emergencies. Even although such materials may require some adaptation, the pre-prepared materials would allow definitive materials to be available more rapidly. Various such
50 materials already exist, e.g. materials produced by Tarea during this project and the booklet “Plan Familiar de Emergencia” recently produced by the Alliance in Bolivia. • Save the Children should thoroughly evaluate the emergency resources information system, SUMA, and consider the convenience of incorporating it into the Alliance’s standard systems in Peru.
6.3.3. Personnel. • It would be very beneficial if Alliance members in the region could count on at least a small number of “permanent” emergencies staff both to be available to support new emergency projects as and when they occur and to develop the preparedness of country offices and counterparts, including the information, systems, materials and methodologies listed above.
6.3.4. Fundraising. • Save the Children UK should investigate the reasons behind ECHO’s rejection of the recent funding proposal for Candarave to facilitate future applications to that agency. • The difficulties experienced in raising funds for specific work on children’s rights and disaster prevention within the present project suggests that Save the Children need to work hard to “sell” their particular vision to the major donor agencies.
6.4. Advocacy and coordination with other agencies.
• Save the Children members in Peru should consider how to work to promote reforms in INDECI 35. This should probably be seen as a long term aim but it would address a real need which has been noted by Peruvian NGOs for some time. Similarly, lobbying to ease restrictions on the duty free import of emergency supplies would be appropriate. • Counterparts in the present project should be encouraged to participate in local, regional and national consultation processes including the Mesas de Concertacion, consultations on diversification of the school curriculum and the decentralisation process and Save the Children should seek to influence these same processes. In particular, Save the Children and its counterparts should promote the integration of children’s rights and disaster prevention in the agendas of these spaces and of the other organisations that participate. • Save the Children members should develop relationships with other agencies that are normally involved in emergency work in Peru so as to facilitate coordination in future emergencies.
6.5. Future evaluations.
• Mechanisms should be instituted to ensure institutional learning with evaluations being one component. The results of evaluations must be circulated and read and Alliance staff in general, not only emergency personnel, should take the time to participate in the systematisation and discussion of emergency projects. • Evaluation management arrangements – identification of the manager, procedures, and the identity, roles and responsibilities of other personnel - should be defined from the time in which the need for an evaluation is agreed. • More care should be taken when defining the duration of the evaluation. Consultants (like normal human beings) are used to working with unrealistic deadlines and, if wise, pay more attention to the bottom line than to the daily rate for the job. Nevertheless, the quality of the
35 Richard Hartill made some suggestions for action including the need to lobby for the reestablishment of the roles, and budgets, of the local civil defence committees.
51 evaluation will be affected if too little time is allotted but the possibility of taking longer is restricted by other time pressures affecting Save the Children or the consultant. Three concrete measures are suggested: the period between the start of work and the date by which the final report is required should be significantly longer than the number of days work specified in the terms of reference; more time should be allotted to preparation; and more time should be considered for preparation of the draft report. • The implementation of the evaluation by a team of Save the Children personnel and some others with the consultant acting as a coordinator, facilitator and reporter proved very fruitful. Nevertheless, the experience of this evaluation points to the need for such a team and the dates of their participation to be defined and confirmed by all involved in advance of the beginning of the evaluation process. This assumes that Alliance members equally value the evaluation process and are prepared to give it some priority. • It is also important that, if members of one or some but not all counterparts are invited to participate in the evaluation as in this case, their role be clearly explained to the other counterparts to avoid any feeling that they may be acting as “juez y parte” (judge and plaintiff).
6.6. Dissemination of the report.
• The evaluation report should be shared with other Alliance members and with project counterparts. The final written version should be circulated and discussed with each counterpart organisation individually. Discussion of the evaluation could also be included in the proposed workshop to exchange experiences (see point 6.1.1).
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