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Ahmadinejad Versus Khamenei

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Ahmadinejad Versus Khamenei No. 3 • May 2011 Ahmadinejad versus Khamenei: IRGC Wins, Civilians Lose By Ali Alfoneh Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad risks impeachment following his failed attempt to wrest con- trol over the Intelligence Ministry from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Khamenei correctly considered Ahmadinejad’s dismissal of Intelligence Minister Hojjat al-Eslam Heydar Moslehi a direct attack against him and mobilized the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to restrict Ahmadinejad’s power. Should Ahmadinejad survive parliamentary attempts at impeachment, the conflict between the supreme leader and the president is likely to continue. However, the IRGC may be the main beneficiary of the continual battles between the two civilian leaders of the Islamic Republic. On April 17, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahma- leave, which he called “distance working” from dinejad sparked a new political crisis in Iran by home,7 Ahmadinejad provided a coded explana- dismissing Hojjat al-Eslam Heydar Moslehi, the tion: “I am convinced that a strong and powerful influential minister of intelligence and a close ally president would lead to dignity of the Leadership of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.1 Less than an and especially the nation. A strong president can hour after Ahmadinejad’s decree appeared in the stand firm as a defensive shield, advance affairs of media, Fars News Agency reported that Khamenei the state, and bring dignity upon it. All leaders and had reinstated Moslehi2—a move that infuriated executives are in need of strong arms.”8 In other Ahmadinejad, who refused to attend cabinet meetings for two weeks. Khamenei’s unconstitu- Outlook Eastern Middle Key points in this Outlook: tional overruling of the president in the fight over the strategically important ministry was meant to • President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad risks reassert his authority in the struggle for power impeachment following his failed attempt with Ahmadinejad. to wrest control over the Intelligence On April 20, Moslehi triumphantly returned to Ministry from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. the Intelligence Ministry, where employees greeted 3 him with chants of “God is great!” But Ahmadi- • The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps nejad did not invite Moslehi to the cabinet meet- (IRGC) supported Khamenei to reinstate ing that day.4 On April 25, Ahmadinejad met the intelligence minister and restrict Khamenei5 and threatened to resign if Moslehi Ahmadinejad’s power. remained in the cabinet. “Do if you so desire,”6 • Whether Ahmadinejad is impeached or Khamenei replied, giving Ahmadinejad a week not, the latest conflict among the civilian to make up his mind. Ahmadinejad likely assumed leaders has made the IRGC the most Khamenei was bluffing. Returning from his two-week important arbiter of power in the Ali Alfoneh ([email protected]) is a resident fellow Islamic Republic. at AEI. 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 202.862.5800 www.aei.org - 2 - words, Ahmadinejad’s power grab was not based on per- forced on him by others, dismissing an unprecedented sonal ambition but was for the sake of the regime. The eleven cabinet ministers.17 same day, to demonstrate presidential strength, Ahmadi- Ahmadinejad’s April 17 dismissal of Moslehi was the nejad refused Moslehi access to the cabinet meeting.9 culmination of his attempts to gain control over the Moslehi was also absent from the May 4 cabinet meeting.10 Intelligence Ministry. Khamenei, however, was likely Ahmadinejad soon realized he had overplayed his aware of Ahmadinejad’s efforts. Ahmadinejad had previ- hand, as attacks against him and his supporters increased ously attempted to restrain the supreme leader’s control thereafter. The Intelligence Ministry began filtering pro- over the Intelligence Ministry. On July 26, 2009, Ahmadi- Ahmadinejad websites.11 As many as twenty-nine nejad dismissed then–intelligence minister Hojjat al-Eslam Ahmadinejad confidantes—including Hojjat al-Eslam Mohseni Ezhehi, accusing him of “incompetence” in deal- Abbas Amiri-Far, Ahmadinejad’s candidate for the Intelli- ing with the popular unrest that engulfed Iran after the gence Ministry—were arrested.12 Calls of “death to the June 12, 2009, presidential election.18 Some reports sug- opponent of the guardian jurist,” a slogan open to inter- gested that Ahmadinejad dismissed Ezhehi because his pretation,13 dominated even the Tehran Friday prayers. ministry had prepared a report to the supreme leader argu- All this activity energized Ahmadinejad’s political rivals, ing that the protest movement was not a foreign plot or a who viewed the rift as an opportunity to get rid of their velvet revolution.19 Ahmadinejad, with a team of intelli- old foe. Parliamentarians, led by parliamentary speaker gence analysts from the IRGC, reportedly told the Intelli- Ali Larijani, threatened to impeach Ahmadinejad on sev- gence Ministry that the political activists arrested by the eral occasions,14 and Tehran mayor Mohammad-Bagher IRGC had already confessed to being foreign agents.20 Qalibaf started a relentless campaign against Ahmadine- In addition to the minister, Ahmadinejad also replaced a jad and Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei through his news outlet number of senior ministry officials with IRGC officers.21 Shafaf News.15 Mashaei, the president’s confidante and To counter Ahmadinejad’s schemes, Khamenei, during former chief of staff, is also his choice for a presidential his much-publicized visit to the Intelligence Ministry on successor when his second term ends in 2013. March 5, 2011, told ministry employees: “Although the The presence of both Ahmadinejad and Moslehi at government appoints the directors of the Intelligence the May 8 cabinet meeting indicated that Ahmadinejad Ministry, intelligence and actions of this ministry are had submitted to Khamenei’s authority—for a time at related to the affairs of the entire country. Therefore, it least.16 That being said, the conflict is likely to continue [the Intelligence Ministry] should not lean toward move- through the remainder of Ahmadinejad’s presidency—if ments, [political] parties, and political individuals, but Ahmadinejad survives parliamentary attempts at impeach- should always move in the direction of guardianship [the ing him—and will doubtless escalate as Ahmadinejad supreme leader] and the Islamic revolution.”22 On April 17, supporters rally for the upcoming parliamentary elections 2011, Moslehi followed Khamenei’s advice by dismissing in 2011 and the following year’s presidential election. Hossein Abdollahian, Intelligence Ministry legal and par- liamentary affairs deputy, who owed his position to Ahmadinejad’s Purge Ahmadinejad and Mashaei.23 Immediately after Moslehi fired Abdollahian, Mashaei criticized the Intelligence The failed attempt to dismiss Moslehi is part of Ahmadi- Ministry’s alleged “intelligence and communications nejad’s wider campaign to cleanse his cabinet of senior weaknesses concerning regional affairs,”24 after which officials imposed on him by other power circles in the Moslehi resigned. Islamic Republic—essentially, to be the master of his own house. Entering the presidential palace in 2005, Ahmadi- Ahmadinejad’s Counter Ideology nejad faced the same challenge encountered by all his predecessors: though the president has the constitutional Ahmadinejad’s challenge to Khamenei’s authority is not prerogative to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers, fac- limited to the issue of control over the Intelligence Min- tions in the regime challenge this authority. More often istry. Ahmadinejad also poses an ideological challenge to than not, these appointments are imposed on the presi- the regime, reflected in Mashaei. Ahmadinejad and dent by the supreme leader, former president Ayatollah Mashaei’s friendship dates back to when Ahmadinejad Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, or Larijani. Since 2005, served as an “adviser” (intelligence officer) to the gover- Ahmadinejad has systematically purged cabinet ministers nor of West Azerbaijan Province in 1979. Mashaei - 3 - founded the IRGC intelligence unit in neighboring Kur- course, be directed against Ahmadinejad. In the second distan Province during the same period,25 and their chil- part of the interview, Jafari warned against “a deviant cur- dren are married. rent” that has “infiltrated the regime,” but also said that There is a long history of enmity between Mashaei the deviant current was “hiding behind a popular figure and Khamenei. After his contested reelection in 2009, [Ahmadinejad].”34 On April 24, Jafari used equally Ahmadinejad appointed his old comrade first vice presi- nuanced tactics, praising Ahmadinejad and his cabinet’s dent.26 However, due to Mashaei’s history of making con- performance while simultaneously attacking “a deviant troversial statements—such as “the era of sovereignty of current” within the government.35 religion is over” and “the people of Israel are our friends”27— Within the IRGC, the harshest attacks against Khamenei wrote a handwritten note to Ahmadinejad Ahmadinejad were launched by the political-ideological demanding Mashaei’s dismissal.28 Ahmadinejad ignored commissars: Hojjat al-Eslam Ali Saidi, the supreme Khamenei’s order for an entire week but in the end leader’s representative to the IRGC, and his deputy, appointed Mashaei his chief of staff.29 Since then, Hojjat al-Eslam Mojtaba Zolnour. “Disobeying the Mashaei has used every possible opportunity to undermine command of the Guardian Jurist equals disobeying the the authority of Khamenei, the clerical class, and the commandment of God and the Imam
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