The Influence of Interest Groups in the European Parliament: Does Policy Shape Politics?
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The Influence of Interest Groups in the European Parliament: Does Policy Shape Politics? Maja Kluger Rasmussen A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, August 2012. Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work. The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 98,183 words. Abstract For a long time, the European Parliament (EP) was viewed as a lobbying sideshow mainly to be targeted if interest groups were unsuccessful at getting their demands included in the European Commission’s proposal. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have a reputation for being particularly open to diffuse interests who, due to their limited resources, use ‘friendly’ MEPs to put pressure on the European Commission and the Council. The notion of the EP representing diffuse interests conflicts with the broader political science literature on interest groups, which dwells on business bias. There are, however, good reasons to doubt the EP’s reputation as a defender of diffuse interests. Much of our current knowledge about the EP’s interest group politics stems from a time when the EP’s legislative powers were more limited. Within the last twenty years, the EP has evolved from a ‘multilingual talking shop’ to a genuine co-legislator with the Council. The increased powers of the EP raise the question of whether EP interest group politics has normalised, whereby the assumptions of the interest group literature would seem to reflect the reality of the EP. A common assumption in the interest group literature is that diffuse interests carry limited weight in decision-making because their resources and interests remain subordinate to that of business. However, business influence differs across policy fields depending on how the costs and benefits related to policies are distributed. The aim of my thesis is to investigate how the distribution of costs and benefits of legislative proposals influence interest groups’ likelihood of winning particular conflicts in the EP. This is done by examining four legislative dossiers in the areas of employment, consumer, and environmental policies. The thesis draws on the process-tracing of EU documents, and 144 interviews with MEPs, EP officials, and interest groups. Table of Contents Acknowledgements ....................................................................... 9 Abbreviations: .......................................................................... 12 Introduction: Interest Group influence in the European Parliament .............. 1 Chapter 1: Theoretical Expectations about Interest Group Influence ............ 9 1.1 Common assumptions in the interest group literature .................... 9 1.1.1 The EU as an élite pluralist system ..................................... 11 1.1.2 Policy determines politics ................................................ 14 1.2 Wilson’s policy of politics framework applied to the EP ................ 24 1.2.1 The nature of EU policies ................................................. 25 1.2.2 The nature of EU interest groups and their capacity to provide information ........................................................................ 28 1.2.3 The EP as a unique lobbying venue ................................... 33 1.3 Parliamentary pressure points: where does lobbying take place? ..... 43 1.3.1 The EP’s policy process ................................................... 43 1.3.2 Differences between decision-making procedures .................... 48 1.3.3 Key power-holders in the EP ............................................. 50 1.3.4 Influencing committee members ........................................ 53 1.4 Conclusion ........................................................................ 56 Chapter 2: Interest Group Influence – a Framework for Analysis ................ 59 2.1 Case selection ................................................................... 60 2.1.1 Assessment of the distribution of costs and benefits ................ 64 2.2 Analytical framework for analysing interest group influence ............ 65 2.2.1 Information type ........................................................... 71 2.2.2 Information source ........................................................ 77 2.2.3 Methodological approach ................................................. 85 2.3 Conclusion ........................................................................ 90 Chapter 3: Regulating CO2 Emissions for vans. Is the European Parliament Still a Defender of Environmental Interests? ............................................. 92 3.1 The European Commission’s proposal ........................................ 93 3.1.1 The cost/benefit profile of the proposal .............................. 98 3.2 Interest groups’ positions ..................................................... 100 3.3 The lobbying strategies in the EP ............................................ 107 3.4 The EP policy process ......................................................... 110 3.4.1 The rapporteur’s draft report .......................................... 113 3.4.2 The committee report ................................................... 116 3.4.3 The final policy outcome ................................................ 119 3.5 Discussion: what factors explain why the EP watered down the European Commission’s proposal? ............................................................ 124 3.6 Conclusion ....................................................................... 128 Chapter 4: Food Information to Consumers ....................................... 132 4.1. The European Commission’s proposal ...................................... 133 4.1.1 The cost/benefit profile of the proposal ............................. 135 4.2 Interest group positions and strategies ..................................... 141 4.2.1 The position of the food industry versus consumer and health groups .............................................................................. 143 4.2.2 The strategies used by the food industry, and consumer and health groups .............................................................................. 146 4.3 The EP policy process and outcome ......................................... 149 4.3.1 The EP’s first reading .................................................... 150 4.3.2 The EP’s second reading and final outcome .......................... 154 4.4 Role and influence of interest groups on key provisions ................. 158 4.4.1 Entrepreneurial politics: the traffic lights versus Guideline Daily Amounts ........................................................................... 158 4.4.2 Client politics: derogations ............................................. 163 4.4.3 Interest group politics: the definition of a natural sausage casing ...................................................................................... 169 4.4.4 Majoritarian politics: the morality of meat: halal and kosher .... 172 4.5 Conclusion ....................................................................... 180 Chapter 5: Regulating Working time for Self-employed Trucker Drivers ...... 184 5.1 Background of the road transport working time directive ............... 185 5.1.1 The European Commission’s proposal ................................. 189 5.1.2 The cost/benefit profile of the proposal ............................. 191 5.2 The interest group arena...................................................... 196 5.3 The EP policy process and outcome ......................................... 200 5.4 What factors explain the outcome? ......................................... 208 5.4.1 The employers were divided ............................................ 210 5.4.2 The ETF managed to set the discourse in Parliament ............... 213 5.4.3 The trade unions had a more successful lobbying approach ....... 214 5.4.4 Contextual factors: MEPs are more favourable to the views of employees than employers ..................................................... 220 5.5 Conclusion ....................................................................... 223 Chapter 6: The Maternity Leave Directive: Who Pays for Equality? ............ 228 6.1. The European Commission’s proposal ...................................... 229 6.1.1 The cost/benefit profile of the proposal ............................. 232 6.2. The interest group arena..................................................... 239 6.3 The EP policy process ......................................................... 246 6.3.1 The committee deliberations ........................................... 248 6.3.2 The bumpy road to the EP’s plenary vote ............................ 251 6.3.3 The EP’s first reading outcome ......................................... 257 6.4 The role and influence of lobbying .......................................... 261 6.4.1 Contextual factors: FEMM is an ideological committee ............ 263 6.4.2 Proactive versus reactive lobbying strategies ........................ 266 6.4.3 The type of change sought: technical or directional