The Works in Logic by Bosniac Authors in Arabic 2008066

2008066. (Brill: 15335). Ljubovic. Prelims. Proef 3. 13-8-2008:11.43, page -1.

The Works in Logic by Bosniac Authors in Arabic 2008066. (Brill: 15335). Ljubovic. Prelims. Proef 3. 13-8-2008:11.43, page -2.

Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science

Texts and Studies

Edited by H. Daiber

VOLUME LXXVII 2008066. (Brill: 15335). Ljubovic. Prelims. Proef 3. 13-8-2008:11.43, page -3.

The Works in Logic by Bosniac Authors in Arabic

By Amir Ljubovic´

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2008 2008066. (Brill: 15335). Ljubovic. Prelims. Proef 3. 13-8-2008:11.43, page -4.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ljubovic, Amir, 1945- The works in logic by Bosniac authors in Arabic / by Amir Ljubovic. p. cm. -- (Islamic philosophy, theology and science ; v. 77) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-16856-5 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Logic--Bosnia and Hercegovina--History. 2. Aristotle. I. Title. BC39.5.B54L58 2008 160.949742--dc22 2008029639

ISSN: 0169-8729 ISBN: 978 90 04 16856 5

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

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CONTENTS

Transcription Table...... vii ListofAbbreviations...... ix

Introduction...... 1

Chapter I. Development of Arabic Logic by the 16thCentury ..... 9

ChapterII.BosniacAuthorsandTheirWorks ...... 25 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı...... 27 Kaf¯ ¯ı’s Compendium of Logic ...... 28 A Commentary on the “Kaf¯ ¯ı’s Compendium of Logic” ...... 30 Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı as-Saray¯ı...... 31 A Commentaryon“TheSunTreatise” ...... 35 Mustafab.Y¯ usuf¯ b. Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ıaˇs-Sayˇ hYuy¯ o¯ ...... 36 .. ¯ A Commentary on “At¯ır¯ı’sTreatiseinLogic”...... 38 ¯ A Useful Marginalia to “Al-Fanar¯ ¯ı’sRemarks”...... 39 TheNewCommentaryon“TheSunTreatise”...... 40 A Commentary on “The Training in Logic and Apologetics” 45 Muhammad. b. Mus.taf. aal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı(Cajniˇ canin)...... ˇ 48 Otherauthors...... 50 Ibrah¯ ¯ım b. Ramad.an¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı (Boˇsnjak)...... 50 Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı(Uziˇ canin)ˇ ...... 53 Muhammad. b. Yusuf¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı (Boˇsnjak)...... 54

Chapter III. Characteristics of Works in the Field of Logic—IssuesintheFieldofLogic ...... 57 Subject,MethodandObjectiveofLogic...... 57 TeachingofNotion...... 67 Deﬁnition and Description ...... 82 On Judgment...... 86 Theory of Judgment and Judging ...... 86 Relations Among Judgments ...... 96 On Concluding ...... 99 2008062. Ljubovic. 00_Prelims. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page -6.

vi contents

General Notion and Issue of Concluding...... 99 Syllogism ...... 100 InductionandAnalogy ...... 113 Argumentation...... 116 Demonstration ...... 117 OtherTypesofArgumentation...... 122 Sophistic...... 129 ScientiﬁcQuestioning ...... 132 Terminological Characteristics ...... 135

Chapter IV. Comparison: Bosniac Logicians and Logicians of Western Europe...... 143

ChapterV.LogicintheClassicalSystemofIslamicSciences...... 169

Conclusion...... 193

Glossary of Logical Terminology ...... 203

SourcesandLiterature ...... 217

IndexofPersonalNames...... 229 IndexofEnglishLogicalTerms...... 237 Index of Arabic Logical Terms ...... 247 2008062. Ljubovic. 00_Prelims. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page -7.

TRANSCRIPTION TABLE

I. Consonants

= " =z =q =b =s =k =t = ˇs =l = t = s =m ¯ . = gˇ = d. =n = h. U = t. =h = h = z =w ¯ . =d = # =y = d = g˙ =a(t) ¯ =r =f =bb

II. Vowels

– =a – = a¯ –=u –= u¯ – =i – = ¯ı

III. Diphthongs

– =aw – =ay 2008062. Ljubovic. 00_Prelims. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page -8. 2008062. Ljubovic. 00_Prelims. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page -9.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AHM Arhiv Hercegovine. Mostar ANUBIH Akademija nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine. Sarajevo. Bratislava, UK Univerzitetna kniznicaˇ v Bratislave. Bratislava. EI Encyclopaedia of Islam (Encyclopédie de l’Islam). Leiden. New edition. 1, 1960ff. Suppl. 1980ff. GAL Geschichte der arabischen Litterature (Carl Brockelmann). GIVZ Glasnik Islamske vjerske zajednice. Sarajevo. GHB Gazi Husrev-begova biblioteka. Sarajevo. GVIS Glasnik Vrhovnog islamskog starjeˇsinstva. Sarajevo. HAZU Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti. Zagreb. OIS Orijentalni institut u Sarajevu. Sarajevo. OZ HAZU Orijentalna zbirka Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti. Zagreb. POF Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju (i istoriju jugoslovenskih naroda pod turskom vladavinom). Sarajevo. Prilozi… Prilozi za izucavanjeˇ hrvatske filozofske baˇstine. Zagreb. TSMK AYK Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi Arapça Yazmaları Kataloguˇ ZDMG Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft. Weisbaden. 2008062. Ljubovic. 00_Prelims. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page -10. 2008062. Ljubovic. 00b_Introduction. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 1.

INTRODUCTION

In the distant year of 1910, Safvet-beg Baˇsagic,´ the first Bosniac doctor of philosophy, published his doctoral thesis Die Bosniaken und Hercegov- cen auf dem Gebiete der islamischen Literatur, later translated into Bosnian as Bosnjaciˇ i Hercegovci u islamskoj knjizevnostiˇ [Bosniacs and Herzegov- inans in Islamic Literature], Sarajevo, 1912). His thesis points out the general ignorance of Bosnian heritage in Oriental languages, and that “the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina have forgotten their glorious forefathers whose names were celebrated in the Islamic world through scholarly and poetic works”. This Baˇsagic’s´ paper lays the foundation and sets the objectives for future research in the cultural heritage of Bosniacs in Oriental languages. Sincethattimealotofeffort has been invested into bringing round this aspect of cultural life and mode of creativity, but this effort has certainly not been sufficient. Primarily, most of the research work completed and findings published so far are of bibliographical character, which can be classified as primary research, collecting material, com- piling records and processing data about individual authors and their writings, first readings of the text, etc. However, modern researchers are increasingly faced with the task of producing a study on individual cultural issues of the past, individual authors or areas of their creativity, all creating preconditions for a complete historical and cultural evaluation of the heritage and give a precise portrayal of the profu- sion and complexity of the cultural history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hence the determination to present previously unresearched thoughts of our Predecessors who were active in the field of philosophy, or to be more exact, logic that was influenced by the Arabic-Islamic spiritual and cultural tradition in this region. These works deserve special attention and draw interest, even from the scientific circles outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, as they offer reliable proof of presence and function of Aristotelianism in this region in a certain period of time. Therefore, we present this field of logic for its significance, its range and its role within the specific concept of the world, science and philosophy, but also within its own context that has always promoted rational thinking. 2008062. Ljubovic. 00b_Introduction. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 2.

2 introduction

It was our desire that this book achieves the same task, to fill at least one of the gaps in the obscure area of the cultural and scientific past of Bosnia and Herzegovina.1 The so called “Arabic period” is relatively well known in the history of logic. For the most part it is the period from the translation of Aris- totle’s writings into Arabic, to the end of the 13th century, to the introduction of the writings of Ibn S¯ına¯ (Avicenna), al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı and Ibn Ruˇsd (Averroes), and the exposing of thus far unknown works by Aristotle and the “new logic”, to European logicians and philosophers, can be tracked accurately.—The period between the late 13th and early 14th century is often denoted as the “final stage of evolution” and the “stage of decay” of Arabic logic.2 Such evaluations are the result of insuffi- cient research on this issue, and lack of interest for this period among researchers of the history of European logic. Their primary goal was to retrace the path that logic took to reach the universities in Europe, and attempt to “revive Aristotle” using the writings of Ibn S¯ına,¯ al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı and Ibn Ruˇsd, who, among other things, wrote detailed commentaries accompanying Aristotle’s works. On the other hand, the research in Oriental literature from the early 19th century, presented in the catalogues of Oriental manuscripts by H.O. Fleischer (Dresden, 1831 and Leipzig, 1838), Krafft (Vienna, 1842), Rieu (London, 1888), Ahlwardt (Berlin, 1889) and others, and in Brockelmann’s Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur (Weimar–Berlin, 1898–1902), offer proof, though insufficiently organized and evaluated, on the continuous presence of works in the field of logic in Arabic by the 19th century, and even later. As a part of more comprehensive research topics, the researchers of Bosnian cultural heritage in Oriental languages registered a number of authors and their works in the field of logic. The most comprehensive data on the overall heritage, including the field that this book deals with, was

1 This book is based on somewhat modified doctoral thesis defended at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Sarajevo in 1988. The author, members of the Commission and the Archive of the Faculty keep copies of this paper and Annexes to the paper, that contain photocopies of manuscripts that were object of the research. Manuscripts, some of which handwritten by the authors, from the collection of the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, other sources and literature used for this work, were definitely destroyed in the fire set to the Institute on May 17, 1992, together with some of the author’s notes and card-files. The Annexes are quoted by this book as one of the sources, as the only testimony of the existence of these today inexisting manuscripts. It is the author’s intention to make these manuscripts available in digital on the Internet. 2 See e.g. Historija logike [History of Logic], edited by A.N. Prior, “Naprijed”, Za- greb, 1970,p.55. 2008062. Ljubovic. 00b_Introduction. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 3.

introduction 3

offered by H. Sabanoviˇ cinhisbook´ Knjizevnostˇ Muslimana BiH na orijentalnim jezicima—Biobibliografija [The Literature of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Oriental Languages—Biobibliography] (Sarajevo, 1973) that outlines previous studies and results of the author’s research work. This is a collection of basic bibliographical data on individual authors—titles of their writings, and where the manuscript can be found, under which reference number, depending on the accessibility of the relevant information. As this paper has remained unfinished (published posthumously), a part of bibliographical data remained uncon- firmed and without necessary references. Understandably, conceived as it is, such a complex bibliographical paper, not unlike the preceding ones, due to the abundance and versatility of the material presented, could not afford to exclude any attempt of appraisal or even a rough note on the contents of the writings included. Nevertheless, we used this paper as good research grounds and a basic source of information. The data that could be found in these sources, in the aforementioned catalogues on writings in Oriental languages, in the works of Bosniac researchers, in recent catalogues of Oriental manuscripts, inventory books, and in the results of preliminary research, clearly show that the current evaluations of the history of Arabic logic from the 14th century on, can not stand. It was evident that logic survived in the following ages even on a new terrain. It was in the 16th-century Balkans that it met the Latin version of the Aristotelian logic through Croatian Latinists, and it was there that it continued its life in two variants, until the appearance of works in South Slavic languages. The data proves that the way of writing commentaries on the works in the field of logic was almost the same among the local authors: one within the Latin framework of West-European culture and theological tradition, and the other within the Arabic Islamic culture and tradition. The chief objective of this book is to provide a historical and comparative study of logic in Arabic in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as thor- oughly as possible, from the first texts (16th century) to the end of the 19th century, using authentic, completely unknown and unpublished manuscripts in the field of logic in Arabic (over 1,000 pages in manuscript) that has not yet been a subject of separate research, and other sources, including general and specialized literature. While working on this topic, given the complexity of the topic and level of research completed in the field, we planned a range of immediate objectives that can be classified into four groups. 2008062. Ljubovic. 00b_Introduction. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 4.

4 introduction

The first group includes the activities related to collecting, critical evaluations, analysis and the systematization of two classes of material: one, related to bibliographical data on the authors that were the subject of research (primary and secondary sources and literature), and the other, consisted of texts in the field of logic written by Bosniac authors (autographs or transcripts) and those to which Bosniac authors wrote commentaries or marginalia. The objective of this part of the research was historical identification of certain authors, and certify- ing the authenticity and originality of the selected texts, and presenting their internal structure. As a necessary precondition of understanding the form, contents, domain and importance of these writings, we have tried to give a concise history of the development of Arabic logic thinking and its transference through the Turks to Bosnia and offer an understanding of the connection that Bosniac authors had with the great names of Arabic philosophy and logic, and, through them, with the writings of Aristotle. These remarks are based on the literature and data available in the writings of local authors. The results of this part of research are given in Chapters I and II of this book. The second group consists of the very issues discussed in the writings in the field of logic written by Bosniac authors. It is based on critical reading, topical systematization of material from the selected texts, analysis of the standpoints of significant authors on the crucial issues in the field of logic and their interpretation. The only possible and right way to represent this substantial matter divided into eleven selected texts (without affecting the authenticity of the sources) was to let the sources lead from one topic to another, respecting the dominating structure of the works included in the research. This would mean moving from the definition of the subject, methods and tasks of logic, through teachings on notion and judgment, to acquiring conclusions. There was also an attempt to present the crucial issues in the field of logic, either through the text itself or in the annexes, in light of its historical and philological role. We moved backwards, from the texts that were the immediate concern of our attention, through direct and indirect sources of these texts, to the final outcome. Hence, it was necessary to point out the origin of Arabic vocabulary in the field of logic and to link and compare the most important terms with their Greek counterparts. This part of research is presented in Chapter III, along with a dictionary of relevant Arabic vocabulary. The third task comprises of a comparative study of the form and contents of the works in the field of logic written in Arabic by Bosniacs 2008062. Ljubovic. 00b_Introduction. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 5.

introduction 5

with the works in the same field originating from the same or somewhat earlier period in the West (with special attention to Croatian Latinists), observing them as works originating in a unique post-Hellenic philosophical thinking, especially regarding the sense of unity of the overall scholastic philosophy and logic. This part of research is presented in Chapter IV. And, finally, the fourth direct task was to shed light on the relations between logic and philosophy, between logic and language, and between logic and theology, as these aspects are essential for better understanding the place and the role that logic played in the Arabic Islamic system of disciplines, as presented in Chapter V and partially Chapter IV The priority task of the book is to refute the thesis generally accepted in former Yugoslavia and abroad that Bosnia and Herzegovina is some sort of a black hole, emptiness in space and time, devoid of any kind of creativity, especially in the field of philosophy. The book points to a continuous and very stabile intellectual Aristotelian tradition in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and continuous “warming up” of Avicenna and his fundamental pieces in logic, despite the fact that it all happens in an “antiphilosophical” environment and “antiphilosophical” time. Therefore, this book, especially when one has in mind the solidness of the foundations laid by previous research activities, the lack of some essential documents (especially those on reception) and the impossibility to verify all of them, and more than modest variety of useful writings on Arabic logic in general, especially topical or synthesized studies in this area, it was inevitable for this work to be in part strictly linked to primary and rudimentary research; the author is aware of these self-evident weaknesses. For that reason the research direction is of a purely historical and logical content, avoiding too liberal theoretical or historical discourses and conclusions that could have been made. Now that this research (predominantly of empirical nature) is completed and its results accepted, the future researchers have a new win- dow open for their research: from critical publishing and integral translations of works, to subtle analysis of different logical issues, different comparisons, and some new judgments. Furthermore, here are some other deliberations. This book includes neither those authors for whom the data that would verify their identity could not be found, nor those works in the field of logic whose authors could not be identified without certainty. Inspite of our rather detailed insight in the collections of Oriental 2008062. Ljubovic. 00b_Introduction. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 6.

6 introduction

manuscripts in the country and abroad, it is not impossible that ongo- ing research of heritage, especially recent increasingly intensive work on the categorization of manuscripts, discloses other Bosniac authors or their writings in the field of logic that we have not yet recognized. Inevitably, this would be a contribution to a more complete approach of heritage in Oriental languages in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as completing bibliographical data on it. It is certain that the writings that may be found would not, in sense of subject and contents, offer anything that the ones presented in the book do not offer. The included material is sufficient for making the conclusions that we’ve made. This is confirmed by dozens of manuscripts and printed issues in the field of logic in Arabic that were reviewed. And, eventually, before presenting the achieved results, it may be useful to give a short explanation of the term “Arabic logic” as it is frequently used in this book in different contexts. The term “Arabic” in this book denotes the linguistic and not eth- nical phenomenon. Although Arabs did play an important role in the birth, development and spreading of this discipline, enormous contri- butions were made by people of different ethnic backgrounds. On the other hand, the Arabic language in the Oriental Islamic world played a similar role to that played by Latin in the medieval Europe. Conse- quently, almost all writings in traditional disciplines were composed in Arabic as a rule. As for the writings in the field of logic, the exemptions came even more seldom. In this sense, the most adequate term seems to be the one used by Russian Orientalists: “арабоязычная логика”, or Arab-language logic.

Note on transcription

The very nature of this book enforced the necessity of using a large number of Arabic names, often repeatedly. Besides, the sources used for this book give the names of a large number of Bosniac authors with names of Arabic origin in their original Arabic form. As the consistent use of scientific transcription carries a range of difficulties, from those of technical nature to the fact that non-Orientalists might find it difficult to read, if not unintelligible, the author of this book uses a simplified phonetic transcription. However, every Arabic name in those parts of book that are accessory to the main text (in notes, bibliography, literature, sources, in brackets in the very text, etc.) are also given in 2008062. Ljubovic. 00b_Introduction. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 7.

introduction 7

the scientiﬁc transcription, DMG or ZDMG system (source: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft—German Oriental Association, i.e. the newsletter of the Association, Zeitschrift…). This system transcribes the titles of the writings in Arabic, as well as the terminology. 2008062. Ljubovic. 01_Chapter1. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 8. 2008062. Ljubovic. 01_Chapter1. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 9.

chapter one

DEVELOPMENT OF ARABIC LOGIC BY THE 16TH CENTURY

Logic in Arabic, first mentioned in the writings of Bosniac authors in the second half of the 16th century, is an outcome of several centuries of development, the beginning of which is linked to a period of vividly intense activity in the 8th century of collecting works from Greek heritage and their translation into Arabic. The most prominent results in the research of Arabic logic were achieved by Nicholas Rescher, who published his findings in The Devel- opment of Arabic Logic (Pittsburg, 1964), to be followed by the summary of the findings in the 4th volume of The Encyclopedia of Philosophy1 and the Soviet academician M.M. Hairulaev, who published a number of significant papers on the history of Arabic logic.2 Besides these two authors who dealt with a broader time span in their work, a range of researchers, such as A. Badawi, D.M. Dunlop, B.G. Gafurov, A.M. Goi- chon, I. Madkour, M. Meyerhof, E. Renan, A.K. Zakuev, R. Walzer, A.I. Sabra, K. Gyekye, M. Marmura, D. Gutas, D.I. Black, J. Lameer and others,3 focused their work on narrower topics and certain periods of history of Arabic logic, or on individual logicians, thus they contribute significantly to its clarification. There are also writings of the encyclopedic character that can be treated as sources, such as the works by an-Nad¯ım (10th century) and al-Qift.¯ı(13th century), especially

1 Eight-volume encyclopedia, New York–London, 1967, Editor in Chief Paul Ed- wards, vol. 4,pp.169–181 and 513–571. The same text was published in translation in Croatian in the book Historija logike [History of Logic], edited by A.N. Prior, “Naprijed”, Zagreb, 1970,p.254. Also see: N. Rescher, Studies in the History of Arabic Logic, Pittsburg, 1963. 2 Bibliography of works by M.M. Hairulaev (М.М. Хайруллаев) on the history of Arabic logic is very profuse. He paid special attention to al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı (see: “Ал-Фараби в СССР—Библиография”, compiled by S. D. Miliband in: ал-Фараби—Научное Творче- ство, АН СССР, Институт Востоковедения, Москва, 1975,pp.159–181), and among the books that give a good review of Arabic logic, special attention should be paid to: Мировоззрение Фараби и его значение в истории философии, Ташкент, 1967,p.355, and Логико-гносеологическиеидеимыслителейсреднейАзии, Ташкент, 1981,p.200. 3 For bibliography of individual authors see the last pages. 2008062. Ljubovic. 01_Chapter1. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 10.

10 chapter one

the monumental work by C. Brockelmann Geschichte der arabischen Lit- eratur that gives a survey of the most important bibliographical data on a number of authors who wrote in Arabic, including some Bosniac authors, whom most of the above mentioned researchers used as a starting point for their work. Besides these works, among the newer literature, exceptionally valuable is the bibliography by Prof. Hans Daiber, PhD, in two volumes containing over 9,500 titles of primary and secondary sources on Is- lamic philosophy originating from the period between 15th and 20th century (vol. 1) and a very useful Index (vol. 2).4 These writings are good grounds to claim that history of Arabic logic is relatively well known, especially from its beginning to the end of the 13th century, when European philosophers and logicians got to know the works of Arabic authors and their commentaries on Aristotle’s writings. However, there are no primary sources that could better deﬁne the earliest period. This short review of the development of Arabic logic aims simply to present the main ﬂows, directions and names important for the development of logic in the Arabic Islamic world based on the listed literature. Focus is on primary sources (authors and their writings) that Bosniac authors quote and on the presentation of the link that the Bosniac authors had with the great names of Arabic logic, and, through them, the writings of Aristotle.

The ﬁrst stage of Arabic logic, or its “ﬁrst century”, as named by N. Rescher, is characteristic for intensive translation activities that were of critical importance for the development, not only of logic, but also of philosophy in general and other classical disciplines.5 It had a history

4 See: Hans Daiber, Bibliography of Islamic philosophy,Vol.1 (Alphabetical List of Publications); Vol. 2 (Index of names, terms and topics), Brill, Leiden–Boston–Köln, 1999. 5 Regarding translation works, please note old sources: an-Nad¯ım, Kit¯ab al-ﬁhrist, Leipzig, 1881, (for works and translators); al-Qift¯ı, T¯ar¯ıhal-#ulam¯a" bi ahb¯ar al-hukm¯a" . ¯ ¯ . (Ahb¯ar…), Leipzig, 1903;aˇs-Sahristˇ an¯ ¯ı, al-Milal wa an-nihal. , and newer sources: Ibrahim Madkour,¯ L’Organon d’Aristote dans le monde arabe,Paris,1969,pp.25–47; N. Rescher, The Development…, pp. 15–32; A. Badawi, “La transmission…”, pp. 14–31; Filip Hiti [Philip K. Hitti], Istorija Arapa—od najstarijih vremena do danas [History of Arabs from the Earliest Times to the Present], Sarajevo, 1976,pp.286–292,A.I.Sabra,“Naucniˇ poduhvati”, Svijet islama…, pp. 185–196, and “The appropriation and Subsequent Naturalization of Greek Science in Medieval Islam: a preliminary statement”, History of Science, 25 (1987): pp. 223–243. 2008062. Ljubovic. 01_Chapter1. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 11.

development of arabic logic by the 16th century 11

far more comprehensive than the scope we are interested in, especially in Alexandria, Jundishapur and Harran, where members of Syriac- Persian Christian church, Nestorians and Jacobites played an important role in translations; and even later, during the rule of Har¯ un¯ ar- Raˇs¯ıd (786–803). Systematic activities in this field that had direct consequences on the reception of Greek heritage, and especially of Aristotle’s writings in the field of logic, took place at the beginning of the 19th century. Organizing activities of a broader scope and greater intensity started under the direct influence of caliph al-Ma"mun¯ (813–833) through the establishment of a library-academy called “Bayt al-hikma”. (House of Wisdom), whose objective was translation from Syriac, Per- sian and Greek into the Arabic language.6 The appearance of the first translation of Aristotle’s writings and Porphyry’s Isagoge (Εισαγωγ ), that already played an important role in the approach to logic, were usually placed in the first half of the 9th century.7 However, based on a different set of sources, a number of authors state that the famous Ibn al-Muqaffa# (died in 757 or 759), the translator of the famous Kalila and Dimna, was the first to translate Aristotle’s Categories (al-Maqul¯ at),¯ On Interpretation (al-#Ibara)¯ and Analytics (al-Qiyas),¯ 8 while the others claim that those translations were done by his son, Muhammad. ibn Muqaffa# (app. 750 – app. 815).9 Besides these two translators, the sources and literature mention other translators of Aristotle’s and other writings, such as: Yahy. a¯ ibn al- Bitr. ¯ıq (app. 770 – app. 830), al-Barmak¯ı (app. 780 – app. 840), Theodor (Tadhar¯ ¯ı, app. 790 – app. 850), Ibn Na¯#ima (died app. 840), Ayyub¯ ibn al-Qasim¯ ar-Raqq¯ı (app. 780 – app. 840) and other, for the very development of logic, less significant translators. However, neither the number nor the value of the sources that historians have in their hands today, nor the level of research completed are sufficient to verify the exact chronology of the appearance of individual translations.

6 For more details see: Dimitri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture. The Graeco-Arabic translation movement in Baghdad and early #Abbasid society (2nd–4th/8th–10th centuries),New York–Routledge, 1998, 350 pp. 7 See e.g.: N. Rescher, The Development…, pp. 25–31 and: Historija logike…, p. 49. 8 C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,158;al-Qift¯ı, Ahb¯ar…, p. 149. Also see Ibn al-Muqaf- . ¯ fa#, Al-Man.tiq—Ibn Bihr¯ız, Hud. ¯ud al-man.tiq, Teheran, 1357, éd. et introd. par M.T. Da- neˇs-Pazuh,ˇ especially pages 62–69. 9 See e.g.: I. Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote…, pp. 31–32. 2008062. Ljubovic. 01_Chapter1. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 12.

12 chapter one

Both the sources and the literature show the special role of Hunayn. ibn Ish.aq¯ (Joanitius, 809–877)10 and his students, “Hunayn’s school of translation”, in the history of Arabic logic. Hunayn. ibn Ishaq,. as a supervisor in the “House of Wisdom”, revolutionized, according to N. Rescher, Arabic translation work introducing novelties such as: in- sisting on translations from Greek and offering references of the original text wherever possible, comparing different versions of manuscripts in order to define reliable Greek or Syriac sources, proofreading texts previously translated from Syriac to Arabic and comparison with Greek originals, frequent translations of the sense of phrases instead of literal translation, etc.11 After Hunayn,. his son, Ish.aq¯ ibn Hunayn. (app. 845–910/911), Qust.a¯ ibn Luq¯ a¯ (app. 820–912), Hubayˇs ibn al-Hasan (app. 830–890), Tabit¯ . . ¯ ibn Qurra (834–901), #Isa¯ ibn Yahy. a¯ (app. 850 – app. 910)andAbu¯ #Utman¯ ad-Dimaˇsq¯ı (app. 860–920) were influential.12 At the end of the ¯ mass translation movement 23 translators were active (more than a half of them worked with Greek) who translated or edited already translated works by Aristotle, and gave about 88 versions for twenty of Aristotle’s writings.13 In the midst of the translation activities, several scholars, who were not only translators, but also teachers and commentators in the field of logic, became active. Among the most important of them were Abu¯ Biˇsr Matta¯ ibn Yunus¯ (died 939/940) who translated Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and Poetics14 and Yahy. a¯ ibn #Ad¯ı(893–974), the archbishop, a personal friend and a student of al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı, whose translation and transcription activities were exceptional, and who was also an author of the commentaries on Aristotle’s works.15

10 For more on his life and translation work, see: an-Nad¯ım, Kit¯ab al-ﬁhrist…, p. 294; al-Qift.¯ı, T¯ar¯ıh…, p. 171; C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,224–227 (205–207); I. Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote¯ …, pp. 32–33 (pay special attention to note nr. 6 that gives information on this translator); N. Rescher, The Development…, pp. 27–31 and F. Hiti [Philip K. Hitti], Istorija Arapa…, pp. 288–290. 11 N. Rescher, The Development…, p. 28. 12 See footnote 10 on these translators. 13 I. Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote…, p. 40. 14 C. Brockelmann, GAL GI,pp.228–229 (207); N. Rescher, The Development…, pp. 31, 34–35 and 38 and as well in: Historija logike…, p. 50. 15 Ibid. 2008062. Ljubovic. 01_Chapter1. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 13.

development of arabic logic by the 16th century 13

A unique monument of translation activities is the manuscript of the translation into Arabic of the complete Organon that is today kept in the National Library in Paris.16 Such impressive activities of Christian scholars in the field of logic soon created conditions for the birth of one of the most prominent logicians among Arabs. Historians of Arabic philosophy consider al-Kind¯ı (796–873) to be the first among Arabic logicians.17 It is well known that al-Kind¯ı was a great promoter of Greek scientific and philosophical thinking. This is what al-Kind¯ı himself said about his relationship with this tradition: “We should not be ashamed to admit the truth and accept it from whichever source it came, even if it is brought by the preceding generations or foreign nations… My principle is to register all the details of what the classic authors said, and then to fill in all that they have not said, in accordance to the rules of the Arabic language, with the traditions of our time and our abilities.”18 Unfortunately, among his works that have been preserved, or that have been of interest to researchers, there are none of clearly logical contents. In his evaluation of al-Kind¯ı’s works, N. Rescher says that his writings on logic were much more than merely a resume of someone else’s works on Aristotle’s writings.19 However, based on older sources, we can be certain, as concluded also by A.I. Sabra, that he “played a critical role in the process of linguistic and intellectual adoption of classical disciplines.”20 The first great and one of the most important Arabic logicians was certainly al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı(873–950).21 In his comments on Aristotle’s Organon,

16 Manuscrit arabe, Nº2346 (Anc. fond, 822). 17 AbuY¯ usuf¯ Ya#qub¯ ibn Ish.aq¯ al-Kind¯ı. See: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,230–231 (200)andSI,372–374; N. Rescher, The Development…, p. 24 and F. Hiti [Philip K. Hitti], Istorija Arapa…, p. 337. 18 A.I. Sabra, “Naucniˇ poduhvati”, in: Svijet islama [The World of Islam], Vjera- Narodi-Kultura. Priredio: Bernard Lewis; Jugoslavenska revija—Vuk Karadziˇ c,´ Beo- grad, 1979,p.185. 19 N. Rescher, “Arapska logika”, in: Historija logike…, p. 49. 20 A.I. Sabra, “Naucniˇ poduhvati”…, p. 188. 21 AbuNa¯ sr. ibn Muhammad. al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı. For basic bibliographical data see: C. Brock- elmann, GAL,GI,232–236 (210–213), S I, 375–377 and Nicholas Rescher, Al-F¯ar¯ab¯ı. An annotated bibliography. Pittsburgh, 1962. The literature on al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı is very profuse, especially the Soviet (see footnote 2). Besides the already quoted writings, attention should be paid to the Russian translation of al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı’s writings in the ﬁeld of logic, published as Аль-Фараби, Логические трактаты, Алма-Ата, 1975, issue of his work Ih.s.¯a" al- #ul¯um,al-Qahira,¯ 1350 (1931), issues of a number of his works and translations to English done by D.M. Dunlop in The Islamic quarterly (vol. II, 1955, 264–282;vol.III,1956,Nº2; 2008062. Ljubovic. 01_Chapter1. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 14.

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of which only a small part has been preserved, he pointed out the importance of logic studies and awareness of its principles. Finding foundations for his work in the abundant Antic heritage, especially in the works of Aristotle, whom the Arabs consider their “first teacher” (al- mu#allim al-awwal), al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı had great influence on the future development of Arabic logic. In his Book on Logic (Kitab¯ f¯ıal-mantiq. or Kitab¯ gamˇ ¯ı# al-kutub al-mantiqiyya). 22 al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı followed the contents and the topics of Aristotle, and the framework was closely designed based on Aristotle’s Organon which was believed to be authentic. The main difference was that after the general introduction he placed the Isagogue as a special introduction (al-madhal), based on the Porphyry’s Isagogue.Also, ¯ as the last two volumes he added Retorics and Poetics treating them as compound parts (kitab)¯ of logic. Let us take a look at the structure of this work, having in mind that it, along with a number of other works that will be presented later, will have a crucial influence on the stan- dardization of the structural form of the writings of Arabic logicians. Following the Introduction (fol. 1b–11a) topics are divided in nine “volumes” (kitab):¯ Kitab¯ al-Is¯ a¯g˙u¯gˇ¯ı(fol.11a–18b) Isagogue, Kitab¯ al-qa¯t.a¯g˙uriy¯ as¯ (fol. 19a–44b) Categories, Kitab¯ al-#ibar¯ at¯ (Bar¯ ¯ıarm¯ıniyas,¯ 44b–63b) Hermeneutics, Kitab¯ al-qiyas¯ wa at-tahl. ¯ıl (63b–116a) Prior Analytics, Kitab¯ al-amkina al-magli˙ ta. (116a–136b) Sophistic, Kitab¯ al-burhan¯ (136b–187b) Posterior Analytics, Kitab¯ al-gadalˇ (187b–248b) Topi cs, Kitab¯ al-hit.aba¯ (248b–271b) Rhetoric, Kitab¯ aˇs-ˇsi¯ #r(271b–273b) Poetics.

vol. IV, 1957–1958,Nº304;vol.V,1959,Nº1–2), and the following texts: I. Madkour, La place d’al Farâbî dans l’école philosophique musulmane,Paris,1934; same author, “al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı” in: Historija islamske filozofije [A History of Muslim Philosophy], ed. M.M. Sharif, t. I, Zagreb, 1990,pp.445–471,N.Rescher,Al-F¯ar¯ab¯ı’s Short Commentary on Aristotle’s “Prior Analytics”, Pittsburgh, 1963 and F.W. Zimmermann, (trans.), Al-F¯ar¯ab¯ı’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione (trans. and Introduction Notes), Oxford, 1991 (reprint). See: H. Daiber, Bibliography of Islamic Philosophy…, Vol. I, pp. 285–299 and Vol. II, pp. 124–156. 22 This work by al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı, as the most complete work in the field of logic, has not been yet published in the form conceived by the author. It was published in its original form or in translation, partially or in combination with other works. Most of them were published in Russian. The manuscript of this work, which was once part of the private library of Safvet-beg Baˇsagic,´ can now be found in the Library of the University of Bratislava (inv. nr. TF 41). Description and contents of the manuscript are given in: Jozef Blaˇskovic,ˇ and others., Arabische, türkische und persische Handschriften der Universitätsbibliothek in Bratislava,Bratislava,1961 (further: Bratislava, UK), pp. 181–188. 2008062. Ljubovic. 01_Chapter1. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 15.

development of arabic logic by the 16th century 15

These and other writings in the ﬁeld of logic by al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı served as a great stimulus for further studying logic in the Arabic world. With them al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı succeeded to clarify Aristotle’s logic and to explain it in Arabic, what gave him the reputation as the “second teacher” (al-mu#allim at-tan¯ ¯ı).23 His extraordinary interpretation of Aristotle’s ¯ ¯ writings will have a deep impact on all Arabic logicians, including those who were to oppose him later. “Among the points of great interest in al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı’s comments are: (1) strong emphasis on ékthesis (notion deﬁnition) as a principle of reduction of syllogism, (2) increased focus on noncategorical types of syllogism (e.g. hypothetical and disjunctive), (3) detailed processing of inductive use of syllogic conclusion, and application of categorical syllogism in reasoning by analogy, and (4) detailed explanation of future contingency…”24

Another fact important for the history of Arabic logic is that al- Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı was one of the representatives of so called “Baghdad” or “West- ern” school of logic, whose core was made of Nestorian Christians, such as AbuBi¯ ˇsr Mattab.Y¯ unus,¯ and his and al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı’s student Yahy. a¯ ibn #Ad¯ı. N. Rescher points out the three main achievements of this school: “(1) Completion of Arabic translations of Greek works in logic, (2) proficient commentaries by al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı on Aristotle’s works in the field of logic, and (3) comprehensive research of some non-Aristotelian concepts done by AbuBi¯ ˇsr Matta¯ and al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı e.g. the theory on the “conditional” or hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms, in a direction used by Boeti, and syllogic reduction of inductive principles of conclusions).”25 Along with the mentioned contribution of the “Baghdad” school, and especially al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı’s, for the development of Arabic logic, this school played a significant role in the definition of Arabic logical vocabulary. The 11th century in the history of Arabic logic, and not logic alone, meant a new and confident step forward thanks to Ibn S¯ına(¯ 980– 1037)anhisworks.26 His large opus with 276 compositions according

23 Esp. see: Joep Lameer, Al-F¯ar¯ab¯ı and Aristotelian Syllogistics—Greek Theory and Islamic Pratcice, Brill, Leiden, New York, Köln, 1994, 216 pp. 24 N. Rescher, “Arapska logika”, in: Historija logike…, p. 50. 25 Ibid, p. 51. 26 Abu¯ #Al¯ı Husayn. ibn #Abdallah¯ Ibn S¯ına—Avicenna.¯ For main bibliographical data see: Jules Janssen, An Annotated Bibliography on Ibn S¯ın¯a(1970–1989) including Arabic 2008062. Ljubovic. 01_Chapter1. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 16.

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to G.C. Anawati27 had a great influence, not only on the Orient, but on the West as well. He wrote several articles in logic, but it is interesting that the works that had great importance for the development of this discipline, and that were quoted and used by his followers, were the introductions to his monumental books Kit¯ab as-ˇ sifˇ ¯a" (Book of Healing), Kit¯ab an-nagˇ¯at (Book of Safety) and, understandably, his masterpiece according to the historians of Arabic philosophy, Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at wa at- tanb¯ıh¯at (Book of Remarks and Admonitions). As presented in this book, these works will also be used by Bosniac authors as basic sources. His notebook titled Man.tiq al-masriqiyyˇ ¯ın (Logic of the Easterners), of which only a part of was preserved, was probably written as an introduction to the lost work known in literature as al-Hikma. al-masriqiyyaˇ (Eastern Philosophy).28 Although Ibn S¯ına¯ formally divided each of his works into different chapters (maqal¯ at),¯ volumes (fus.ul),¯ etc., all his works deal with issues in the field of logic observing a strictly defined order that is elaborated on in the text that he titled Tis# ras¯a"il f¯ıal-hikma. wa a.t-.tab¯ı#iyy¯at (Nine Dis- courses on Philosophy and Physics).29 The starting point here is the elementary structure of Organon that is accompanied by an introduction— a discussion based on Porphyry’s Isagogue, and chapters eight and nine are Rhetoric and Poetics. However, there are some significant differences among these works. In as-ˇ Sifˇ ¯a" logic is treated primarily as a commentary on Aristotle’s Organon, and later as a compilation of certain definitions given in previous commentaries and his own analysis, and as such it is strictly linked to Aristotle’s arguments.30 Therefore, if Aristotle treats the same issue two or more times, as is done on the issue of definition (“Posterior Analytics”, volume 2 and “Topics”, volume 4), the same is done by Ibn S¯ına,¯ while it does not happen in an-Nagˇ¯at and Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at… The last two works could be results of a different orientation of the author. Though it will be explained in more detail later, it

and Persian publications and Turkish and Russian References.Leuven,1991 and An Annotated Bibliography on Ibn S¯ın¯a. First supplement (1990–1994), Louvain–La Neuve, 1999.; Hans Daiber, Bibliography of Islamic philosophy.Vol.1, 468–485 and Vol. 2,pp.263–296; Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna and The Aristotelian Tradition. Introduction to Reading Avicenna’s Philosophical Works. Brill, Leiden, 1998. 27 G.C. Anawati, Mu"allaf¯at Ibn S¯ın¯a (Essai de bibliographie avicennienne), al-Qahira,¯ 1950. 28 See: Ibn S¯ına,¯ Livre des directives…, “Introduction” (A.-M. Goichon), p. 4. 29 Ibn S¯ına,¯ Tis# ras¯a"il f¯ıal-hikma. wa a.t-.tab¯ı#iyy¯at,al-Qahira,¯ 1908,pp.116–118.A fragment was translated to French by I. Madkour in L’Organon d’Aristote…, pp. 10–11. 30 See: I. Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote…, p. 21. 2008062. Ljubovic. 01_Chapter1. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 17.

development of arabic logic by the 16th century 17

is worth saying that these last two works by Ibn S¯ına¯ do not include the discussion on categories. Even though he was educated with, besides sources in Arabic, the works of al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı and his commentaries on Aristotle’s works that were largely used for writing as-ˇ Sifˇ ¯a", after completion of his book Ibn S¯ına¯ became irately opposed to such an approach to logic (that he himself had had before), in which the attention is directed to Aristotle’s texts instead of to the very issue of logic. At the same time it was a require- ment that a book on logic, respecting the generally accepted logical and systematical order of the elementary subjects, should be either a discourse or a handbook dealing with the matters in its own self-sufficient way. His readiness to step off of the path paved by Aristotle is seen by the new elements he introduced in his work, mainly originating from Galenus and the Stoics, and his own work (discussed in more details in the chapter “The Issues of Logic”), but not that much in the issues of graver significance.31 He calls his work and approach to logic “Eastern”, contrasting it with the “Western” (or Baghdad school) that he often severely criticizes, sometimes without an apparent reason.32 This will lead to frequent confrontations between the two schools in the several following centuries, and the diviside between the authors—followers of the two schools will become rather evident. It will be impossible to give even a short presentation of the range of followers of the “Baghdad school” without mentioning a number of authors whose works left a deep impact on history of Arabic, and even European logic. This primarily includes Ibn Ruˇsd (1126–1198).33 One segment of his work in the field of logic that is in accordance with the tradition of this school includes the excellent commentaries on

31 See: N. Rescher, “Arapska logika”, in: Historija logike…, pp. 51–52. 32 For more on the disputes between the “Eastern” and the “Western” school, see: S. Pines, “La ‘Philosophie orientale’ d’Avicenne et sa polemique contre les Bagdadi- ens”, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge,vol.19, 1952,pp.5–37,andtexts: N. Rescher, The Development…, pp. 52 and 65–67 (same in: “Arapska logika”, in: His- torija logike…, pp. 51–52 and 54)andDmitriGutas,Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition. Introduction to reading Avicenna’s philosophical works. Leiden, New York, Kbenhavn, Köln, 1988. 33 Abual-Wal¯ ¯ıd Muhammad. ibn Ahmad. ibn Ruˇsd—Averroes. For main bibliographical data, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,604–606 (461–462)andSI,833–836. For a detailed data on works of Ibn Ruˇsd, see: H. Daiber, Bibliography of Islamic philosophy …, Vol. 1,pp.449–468 and Vol. 2,pp.231–262; Majid Fakhry, Averroes (Ibn Rushd): His Life, Work and Inﬂuence,Oxford.2001. 2008062. Ljubovic. 01_Chapter1. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 18.

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the works of Aristotle and al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı. From the numerous commentaries recorded by his biographers, only a small portion is preserved in Ara- bic, and a larger part in Latin and Hebrew. According to E. Renan, the most important commentaries on Aristotle’s works were: Gˇ¯ami# (short commentary, extract), Talh¯ıs (summary, medium length commentary) ¯ and Sarˇ h. (long commentary). There is also a very popular commentary on Aristotle’s Categories titled Talh¯ıs Kit¯ab al-maq¯ul¯at.Oneofthe ¯ most significant works among the ones translated into Latin is the ten-volume work, containing the commentaries on The Organon, titled Opera cum Averrois commentariis, published in Venice 1562–1574.34 And, finally, it should be said that all logicians from Andalusia mentioned by C. Brockelmann and N. Rescher were followers of the “Western school”. There are two logicians from this school whose works were often used by Bosniac authors: Fahrudd¯ın ar-Raz¯ ¯ı(1149–1209)35 and Sira¯gud-ˇ ¯ d¯ın al-Urmaw¯ı(1198–1283),36 and manuscripts of their works can still be found in collections of Oriental manuscripts in Bosnia and Herzegov- ina. The “Eastern school” also brought a range of important logicians who had their role model in the works by Avicenna. One of them was al-Gaz˙ al¯ ¯ı(1058–1111)37 who, although not important as a logician, made a great contribution through his texts to the field of logic. His authority, and especially his affirmative relations towards logic as propaedeutics, which at a critical moment lead to the acceptance of logic first by educational institutions, then to its integration in the theological education system,38 was devoted to logic. Ibn Haldun¯ (1332–1406)inhisMuqad- ¯ dima states that in his age, as a result of support that was given to logic by al-Gaz˙ al¯ ¯ıandFahrudd¯ın ar-Raz¯ ¯ı, it was difficult to draw a clear line ¯ between the works in logic and speculative theology.39

34 For more on publication of Ibn Ruˇsd’s works in Latin, see: H. Daiber, op. cit. 35 See: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,666–669 (506–508)andSI,920–924. 36 See: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,614–615 (467)andSI,848–849. 37 Abu¯ H. amid¯ al-Gaz˙ al¯ ¯ı, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,535–546 (420–426)and SI,744–756. 38 For more on al-Gaz˙ al¯ ¯ı’s relations towards logic in his works, see: Maq¯asid. al-fal¯asifa, al-Qahira,¯ 1331 (1913), especially chapter 3 and Mi#y¯ar al-#ilm,al-Qahira,¯ 1927, especially 26 27 pages – .HisworkMihakk. an-nazar. ,al-Qahira,¯ s.a. 39 Ibn Haldun,¯ Muqaddima,Misr. (Kairo), s.a., pp. 466–467. On relations¯ between theology and logic, and importance of al-Gaz˙ al¯ ¯ıandFahrud- d¯ın ar-Raz¯ ¯ı in this context see: Ulrich Rudolph, “Die Neubewertung der Logik durch¯ 2008062. Ljubovic. 01_Chapter1. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 19.

development of arabic logic by the 16th century 19

Besides al-Gaz˙ al¯ ¯ı, other members of this school who had great inﬂu- ence were: Kamaludd¯ ¯ın ibn Yunus¯ (1156–1242),40 and his students al- Abhar¯ı(1200–1264)41 and Nas.¯ırudd¯ın at-. T. us¯ ¯ı(1201–1274),42 as well as at-. T. us¯ ¯ı’s students al-Qazw¯ın¯ıal-Katib¯ ¯ı (app. 1220–1270 or 1292)43 and Qutbudd. ¯ın aˇs-Sˇ¯ıraz¯ ¯ı(1236–1311).44 Al-Abhar¯ı, at-. T. us¯ ¯ı and al-Qazw¯ın¯ı are the authors who, along with Ibn S¯ına¯ and other above mentioned logicians of the “western school”, left a deep impact on the works by Bosniac logicians, who often mentioned their names in the introductions or in the margins of their manuscripts.45 The works by al-Abhar¯ı and al-Qazw¯ın¯ı also are often commented on by Bosniac authors. Though the number of followers of the “Eastern school” could indicate that it took over the dominant role, the texts originating from this period show that disputes and polemics never ended until mid- 14th century, when at-Tustar¯ ¯ı (app. 1270 – app. 1330)inhisworkal- Muh.¯akama bayna Nas.¯ırudd¯ın wa ar-R¯az¯ı (Dispute between Nas.¯ırudd¯ın and ar-Raz¯ ¯ı)46 and his student Qutbudd. ¯ın ar-Raz¯ ¯ıat-Taht. an¯ ¯ı(1290–1365)in his work Kit¯ab al-muh.¯akam¯at bayna al-Im¯am wa an-Nas.¯ır (Book of Disputes between the Imam (ar-Raz¯ ¯ı) and an-Nasir (at-. T. us¯ ¯ı))47 tried to play the role of arbitraries between the two confronting schools and, according to N. Rescher, succeeded in their task.48 In their works they use ﬁndings and texts of both schools, and pass the positive experience on to their students. Such orientation has become accepted since then all through the period that is the subject of this book. The works of at-Taftaz¯ an¯ ¯ı

al-Gaz˙ al¯ ¯ı” in: Logik und Theologie. Das Organon im arabischen und im lateinischen Mittelalter. Ed. Dominik Perler, Ulrich Rudolph, Leiden, 2005,pp.73–97. 40 Kamaludd¯ ¯ın Mus¯ a¯ ibn Yunus,¯ see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,SI,859. 41 At¯ırudd¯ın Mufad.dal. b. #Umar al-Abhar¯ı, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,608–611 (464–465¯ )andSI,839–844 42 Abu¯ Gaˇ #far Nas.¯ırudd¯ın at-. T. us¯ ¯ı, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,670–676 (508– 512)andSI,924–933. 43 Nagmuddˇ ¯ın al-Qazw¯ın¯ıal-Katib¯ ¯ı, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,612–614 (466– 467)andSI,845–848. 44 Qutbudd. ¯ın Mahm. ud¯ ibn Mas#ud¯ aˇs-Sˇ¯ıraz¯ ¯ı, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,SI,817, 824, 929; G II, 274–275 (211) and S II, 296–297. 45 The collection at the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo holds dozens of manuscripts or commentaries on these works. (The situation is similar in other collections in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Gazi Husrev-bey’s Library, Archive of Herzegovina in Mostar, His- torical Archive in Sarajevo, etc.) See inventory books of these institutions. 46 Muhammad. b. Sa#¯ıd al-Yaman¯ ¯ıat-Tustar¯ ¯ı, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,454 (597), S I, 816. 47 Qutbudd. ¯ın ar-Raz¯ ¯ıat-Taht. an¯ ¯ı, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G II, 271 (209–210), SI,816. and S II, 293–294. 48 “Arapska logika”, in: Historija logike…, p. 55. 2008062. Ljubovic. 01_Chapter1. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 20.

20 chapter one

(1322–1390),49 Al-Gurˇ gˇan¯ ¯ı(1340–1413),50 al-Fanar¯ ¯ı(1350–1431)51 and other authors written in accordance with this orientation definitely pro- mote it, and the order of master-disciple (silsila) in the sense of former confrontations loses its importance.52 The main feature of the large number of works in the field of logic written after the reconciliation of the “Eastern” and the “Western” school was the determination to discuss the complete issue of logic, as seen, or as demanded by Ibn S¯ına.¯ Nevertheless the tradition of writing commentaries survived, becoming even more intensive than before. However, these commentaries were not focused on Aristotle’s texts (neither as a whole nor in parts), but on the texts of Arabic logicians, mainly the one who treated the complete issue of logic. Positive and negative consequences of such determination will be discussed later in this book, as the texts of Bosniac authors are a good illustration of this orientation. Not even such a short review of the history of Arabic logic by the end of the 16th century would be complete without pointing out the fact that logical research, and logic in general, in Arabic, and later in the Islamic world, were the subjects of different types of resistance, from pure negation, to open assaults. This resistance came from different sources, from general intolerance towards “foreign science”, to the fear of damaging religious discipline through the application of logical methods. In some periods of time, this intolerance grew to the level to draw the line between logic and heresy, and logicians were

49 Sa#dudd¯ın Mas#ud¯ at-Taftaz¯ an¯ ¯ı, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G II, 278–280 (215– 216), S I, 514–516, 531, 683 and S II, 301–304. 50 Al-Gurˇ gˇan¯ ¯ı as-Sayyid aˇs-Sarˇ ¯ıf, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, on several places, especially G II, 280–281 (216–217)andSII305–306. 51 Samsuddˇ ¯ın ibn Hamza. al-Fanar¯ ¯ı, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, 303–304 (233–234), SI,647 and S II, 328–329. 52 This “silsila” at Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı(HasanKafijaPruˇscak)ˇ can be completely reconstructed, both from the notes in his works, and based on the autobiographical # " part of his work Niz.¯am al- ulam¯a … (see: Hasan Kafija Pruˇscak,ˇ Izabrani spisi…, “Niz ucenjaka…”,ˇ pp. 125–154) where he mentions his teachers and his teachers’ teachers. A prominent logician whom he mentions as his teacher’s teacher is Ibn Kamal-pa¯ ˇsa (see: N. Rescher, The Development…, p. 79 and C. Brockelmann, GAL, G II, 597–602 (449– 453); S II, 668–673, and the sixth among the above mentioned, al-Fanar¯ ¯ı (see footnote 51). On the front page of his work Muntagabˇ …Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ ob.Y¯ usuf¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı (Mustafa Ejubovic)´ mentions the order of his teachers linking to al-Gurˇ gˇan¯ ¯ı (see footnote 50), see manuscript Muntagabˇ …, GHB br. 3858,fol.4a. It is possible to define the “chain” of the most important logicians in the works of Muhammad. b. Mus¯ aal-Bosnaw¯ ¯ı #Allamak¯ (Muhamed Music)´ as well. 2008062. Ljubovic. 01_Chapter1. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 21.

development of arabic logic by the 16th century 21

criticized: “Man tamantaqa. tazandaqa” (He who practices logic falls into heresy).53 However, the broader circle of intellectuals with great authority, such as al-Kind¯ı, al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı, Ibn S¯ına,¯ and later—even more importantly—theologians like al-Gaz˙ al¯ ¯ı, Fahrudd¯ın ar-Raz¯ ¯ıandinthe ¯ far West Ibn Hazm. from Cordoba (944–1064)54 continued to have a growing interest and support for logic. Thanks to this, and to the very nature of logic and the methodology it offered that is necessary to all disciplines, it managed to find “mainstream Islam” and was accepted. In the period when other nations within Ottoman Empire inherited the classical Arabic culture and science, including logic and philosophy, these sciences found themselves pressured by “mainstream” theology on one side, and growing mysticism and agnosticism on the other. This is especially the case at the beginning of the 16th century, when the first Bosniac authors started writing. As an illustration we will cite Ta¸sköprüzade¯ (1495–1533), a famous Ottoman encyclopaedist. Accord- ing to him, the early 16th century was the beginning of a folding into a single system of thought. This will result in a “triumph of fanaticism” opposing the so called “novelties” (bid#a) that were the issue, directly or indirectly, relevant to the entire Ottoman culture and society (though they above all were related to religious theory and practice).55 This became a strong obstacle in the development of science and resulted in a mounting of scorn towards any independent thought that would pose a threat to the mainstream theological thinking, so the very discussion on dogmas itself signified great progress. However, logic managed to maintain a place in the educational system,56 which was of a great importance for its future and autonomy, and for a number of scholars, it became a subject of special interest

53 See: N. Rescher, The Development…, pp. 59–63, especially page 61. For more on the confrontations between the logicians and conservative theologians, see: I. Goldziher, “Stellung der alten islamischer Ortodoxie zu den antiken Wissenschaften” in: Abhand- lungen der Königlichen Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Jahrgang, 1915 (Berlin, 1916). This text is often quoted in literature when this issue is discussed. Unfortunately the author of this book could not consult it. Also see: I. Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote…, pp. 240–241,andА.К. Закуев, Из истории арабо- язычной логики…, pp. 34–35. 54 See: C. Brockelmann, GAL GI,505–506 (399–400)andSI,692–697.Formore on his relation towards logic see: Roger Arnaldez, Grammaire et théologie chez Ibn Hazm. de Cordoue,Paris,1956, especially pages 101–248;I.Madkour,L’Organon d’Aristote…, pp. 255–256 and 260 and A.I. Sabra, “Naucniˇ poduhvati”, in: Svijet islama…, p. 187. 55 See: H. Inaldzik,ˇ Osmansko Carstvo. Klasicnoˇ doba 1300–1600,Beograd,1974,pp.254– 255. 56 Ibid, pp. 235–245 and 246–253. 2008062. Ljubovic. 01_Chapter1. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 22.

22 chapter one

and study. The fact that its contents remained on the level of research completed by the great figures of Arabic philosophy and logic, such as al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı, Ibn S¯ına¯ and their students, and that the only forms of creation were textbooks, compilations, commentaries and marginalia, doesn’t diminish its importance, neither does it suggest “complete death”. That was the main characteristic not only of the history of Ara- bic logic, but history of European logic, from the Middle Ages, the era of humanism and renaissance, until modern logic. Domination of the above-mentioned forms of writing (textbooks, compilations, commentaries and marginalia (glossariums)) that is characteristic throughout all of the Middle Ages and later, especially of the Arabic Islamic world and of the period that is the subject of this book, is a phenomenon by far more complex than has been assumed until now. These forms of expression are the result of a whole range of factors, primarily socio- historical and other conditions from which they emerged, as did the Oriental Islamic view of the human being and the surrounding world. Conditions and limitations well portrayed by Taˇsköprüzade,¯ and some Bosniac authors, such as Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı #Allamak¯ and Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı57 lead to the situation in which no form of philosophy, logic included, could prevail without religious contents or direct links with religious contents. These conditions, on the other hand, directed the authors towards the mentioned forms of writing, especially towards commentaries, that, at least at first sight, guaranteed to be in harmony with the tradition and “within it”. As a consequence a number of works in different spiritual disciplines remained on the level of endless futile repetitions and inde- cisive argumentation over some insignificant or unimportant issues in certain fields. However, the human instinct to learn, reflect and con- template, knew how to render opinions, explanations, interpretations and polemics, as this book later presents. Logic, not unlike other disciplines in the Ottoman Empire, could not “creatively revitalize”,— as pointed out by prof. Nedim Filipovic´58—because adequate scientific

57 A very interesting view of the conditions in the Ottoman Empire is given by Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ıinhisTemelji mudrosti o uredenju¯ svijeta [Foundations of Wisdom on Organization of the World] (see: Hasan Kaﬁja Pruˇscak,ˇ Izabrani spisi…, pp. 91–117), and a similar standpoint on the situation in the early 17th century is given by Muhammad. b. Mus¯ aal-Bosnaw¯ ¯ı in his introductions to certain writings (see: H. Sabanoviˇ c,´ Knjizevnostˇ …, pp. 134–137). 58 Nedim Filipovic,´ “Uticaj islama na bosanskohercegovackoˇ tlo”, Radio-Sarajevo— treci´ program,nr.9, (Sarajevo) 1975,p.79. 2008062. Ljubovic. 01_Chapter1. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 23.

development of arabic logic by the 16th century 23

institutions did not exist, but it was reduced to quite a narrow framework of education. It is within these frameworks that it will be interpreted in Bosnia and Herzegovina until late 19th and early 20th century. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 24. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 25.

chapter two

BOSNIAC AUTHORS AND THEIR WORKS

Results of the research on Bosniac cultural heritage, especially in the field of bibliography, served as a starting point for registrating, collecting and processing data on authors and their works that will be the subject of this book. But before presenting them, there are some short remarks on creativity of the Bosniac in Arabic, since that is the language in which the works in the field of logic were written. This is, certainly, not purely formal differentiation. It is well-known that Arabic was kept in the Ottoman Empire as the “second language”, primarily as the language of the Qur"an; then as the language of a whole range of disciplines linked to the Qur"an and Islam in general; and, eventually, as the language of almost all sciences, from natural and exact sciences to social; and thus, the ones that entered the education system. That is where the most significant features of creativity in Arabic in Bosnia came from. The following are some of the most significant characteristics: – Writings by Bosniacs in Arabic (in individual disciplines), directly or indirectly leaned on the findings and achievement of classical Arabic or Islamic science, culture and tradition, in a sometimes changed, adapted or developed form; – these writings were usually composed to meet the requirements of the education system (in its broadest sense), and they follow the program and development of the Ottoman education and society in general; – for this reason, these works are usually textbooks, compendia, commentaries on some famous works or marginalia, and seldom original and independent works;1

1 Such classification by form can be found in catalogues of oriental writings and other textbooks, but it can be only conditionally taken into consideration. There were some very different ways of commenting, and different forms of commentaries: from those that comment only on some words (those are usually elementary notions or terms), to those that are very comprehensive and detailed, that take certain standpoints only as ideas for writing of very original works. For more details on this classification, 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 26.

26 chapter two

– although this heritage is mostly linked to the medieval ambiance, based on the multitude of manuscripts (in general, and the number of preserved copies) and notes by authors on themselves and their works, it can be said that they were present among various classes of society, especially in urban population; – despite the fact that today there are very little data on the audi- ence’s response to the works, it can be said that works in those disciplines not bordering with religion and dogma reached their readers very slowly, mainly because they were written in a foreign language and had a very difficult and complicated vocabulary. Also, printing was adopted relatively late, in addition to the fact that there were no developed institutions apart from education that would help their faster and easier spreading and development; – finally, most of these works were written by scholars, usually educated in all parts of the Empire, who were teachers or officials of the legal system. Chronologically speaking, surveys and histories of literature and the arts in the Oriental languages in Bosnia and Herzegovina first appeared when the first Bosniacs converted to Islam. For some of them convert- ing meant an opportunity to get higher education, which implied their participation in the process, either directly, as teachers, or to contribute in another way to the elaboration and development of the Arabic- Islamic classical arts and culture inherited by the Ottoman society. One of the first names recorded in the old Ottoman chronicles and other sources, which was later described by Joseph von Ham- mer in his History of the Ottoman Empire,isMawla¯ #Abdulkar¯ım (died in 1493),2 originating from the area inhabited by South Slavic peoples. According to these sources, he was the author of a marginalia (glossarium) accompanying a work very famous in the East, Sources of Light in

see: A. Ljubovic,´ “Neke karakteristike proznog stvaralaˇstva na orijentalnim jezicima kod nas”, POF, 40/1990, Sarajevo 1991,pp.63–78. 2 H. a¯gˇgˇ¯ı Hal¯ıfa (Katib¯ Çalab¯ı), Fezleke-i Tarih, Istanbul, 1286/87 (1869/70), I, 497; C. Brockelmann,¯ GAL,GI,467; Hammer—Purgstall, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches, I–X, Pesth, 1834–1836, see II, 586;S.Baˇsagic,´ Bosnjaciˇ i Hercegovci u islamskoj knjizevnostiˇ [Bosnians and Herzegovinians in Islamic Literature], Sarajevo, 1912, 19;H.Sabanoviˇ c,´ Knjizevnostˇ Muslimana BiH na orijentalnim jezicima [Literature of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Oriental Languages], Sarajevo, 1973,pp.44–46. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 27.

bosniac authors and their works 27

Logic by Sira¯gudinˇ al-Urmaw¯ı (died in 1283).3 Our research—verifying the sources and literature, as well as surveys of major collections of Oriental manuscripts in the country and abroad (directly or through catalogues)—have not oﬀered us any new information that would disclose more on this marginalia. Therefore, this survey of authors and their works starts with one of the most prominent writers coming from the Oriental-Islamic component of the culture of Bosnia and Herzegov- ina, whose writing in the ﬁeld of logic (manuscripts) has been preserved; these works are of the Bosniac named Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı.

Hasan. K¯af¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.¯ar¯ı

As there are a lot of writings and resources available on Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ı al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı (Hasan Kafija Pruˇscak)ˇ and his life and opus,4 this book will contain only the most important elements of his biography. His full name, the one he used to sign his works, was: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ı b. Turhan¯ b. Daw¯ ud¯ b. Ya#qub¯ az-Z¯ıb¯ıal-Aq¯ hisar¯ ¯ı al-Bosnaw¯ı. K¯af¯ı ¯ . . is his artistic alias (mahlas) that he first used in 1580 in his K¯af¯ı’s ¯ . Compendium of Logic,andthewordaz-Z¯ıb¯ı (Z¯ıb—locality close to today’s Bugojno), al-Aq¯ hi. s.¯ar¯ı (Aq-¯ hi. s.ar¯ = Biograd = Prusac) and al-Bosnaw¯ı denote his regional origin, place of birth and nationality by which he was recognized. The names of other Bosniac authors contain similar information. He was born in 1544in Prusac, a small town near Donji Vakuf. As he says in his biography, he got his elementary education in his hometown, and then he went to Istanbul, where he studied for nine years. Among his teachers of that period were Qara Yilan¯ and Mawla¯ Ahmad. Ansar. ¯ı, and he also mentions “the teachers of his teachers”, which helps trace his role-models he depended on for his work. He spent most of the period between his return from Istanbul and his first appointment as judge of the Prusac district (1583) in Prusac, where he “gathered students and started giving lectures”. Besides Prusac, he performed judicial duties in Srem County, then “a place near to my

3 Sira¯guddˇ ¯ın al-Urmaw¯ı, Ma.t¯ali# al-anw¯ar f¯ıal-man.tiq, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,I, 467 (614). 4 Detailed list of sources and literature is given in Hasan Kaﬁja Pruˇscak,ˇ Izabrani spisi. [Introduction, translation and notes: Amir Ljubovic´ and Fehim Nametak]. “Vese- lin Masleˇsa”, Sarajevo, 1983,p.189. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 28.

28 chapter two

Prusac”, to be eventually reappointed judge (qa¯d.¯ı) of Prusac, a position which he received as a life-time pension.5 There were some endowments that he left to his hometown, but data on this are incomplete. In addition to performing his duties as judge (according to some sources he became mufti—the supreme court judge later in his life), Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ı gave lectures at a school he founded himself. He died on October 9, 1615, in his hometown of Prusac, where he was buried. According to the data discovered so far, Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ıcom- posed seventeen works on various scientific and religious disciplines, and the subjects of his particular interests were politics, philology, law, speculative theology and logic.6 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı wrote two works in the field of logic. The first one is K¯af¯ı’s Compendium of Logic (Muhtasar al-Kaf¯ ¯ı min al-mantiq), ¯ . . and the second is the commentary on it, titled A Commentary on “K¯af¯ı’s Compendium of Logic” (Sarˇ hMuhtasar al-Kaf¯ ¯ı min al-mantiq). . ¯ . .

K¯af¯ı’s Compendium of Logic One of the ﬁrst works that Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ıeverwrotewas K¯af¯ı’s Compendium of Logic, composed in 1580. The reasons for writing this treatise were primarily practical. “As I noticed”, Pruˇscakˇ says, “that today’s students who are immersing themselves in logic are not getting from it what they are looking for, due to an abundance of discrepancies in the texts on logic and as it is hard to give exact interpretations in sciences, I chose a clear compendium based on the books by old authorities and their followers, and thus analyzed for those eager to know more, and simpliﬁed for those who research, elaborating on the basis of my modest understanding and aware of my limited capabilities …”7 Today there are three preserved manuscript copies kept in public libraries, i.e. the collections of Oriental manuscripts,8 and for this book

5 Ibid., pp. 151–153. 6 Bibliography of the works by Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ıwiththedataonmanu- scripts, printed editions and translations, is given in Hasan Kaﬁja Pruˇscak,ˇ Izabrani spisi …, pp. 159–179. 7 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Izabrani spisi…, p. 61. 8 One manuscript copy is preserved at the Oriental collection of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb, Nº173,fol.1b–20b, sized 12,5×17,5.This copy, however, is incomplete, as the transcriber did not include most of the logical 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 29.

bosniac authors and their works 29

the one kept at the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo was used and quoted from. It was also used for the translation to Bosnian in Izabrani spisi …9 As the quoted fragment shows, this work is a discourse on logic and contains commentaries by al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı’s predecessors with all essential elements, collected and combined in the form of a textbook. Therefore, its contents and form imply its nature of a textbook in this ﬁeld, typical of the Oriental-Islamic world, giving very concise deﬁnitions and answers to the most important logical issues. Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı selected the issues that he wants to treat with the help of reference material, and chose the composition and organization of the material, which is rather original. The work is based on two, in his opinion, fundamental issues of logic: conceptions (tasawwur. at)¯ and assertions (tasd. ¯ıqat),¯ each having its origins and objectives. Based on this division, and following the introductory part (fol. 1a– 3b), all logical issues were divided into the following chapters: 1. On Words (f¯ı al-alfa¯z),. fol. 4a–7b, 2. On Origins of Conceptions—Five Universal Terms (f¯ımabadi¯ " at-tasaw-. wurat—al-kulliyy¯ at),¯ fol. 7a–12a, 3. On Goals of Conceptions—Interpretative Speech (f¯ımaqa¯sid. at-tasaw-. wurat—al-qawl¯ aˇs-ˇsari¯ h),. fol. 12a–13a, 4. On Origins of Assertions—Judgments (f¯ımabadi¯ " at-tasd. ¯ıqat—al-qa¯ diy-. ya), fol. 13a–19a, 5. On Objectives of Assertions—Syllogism (f¯ımaqa¯sid. at-tasd. ¯ıqat—al-qi-¯ yas),¯ fol. 19a–25a, a) Apodictic (al-burhan),¯ fol. 25a–25band26b–28b, b) Dialectic (al-gadal),ˇ fol. 25b, c) Rhetoric (al-hitaba),¯ fol. 25b, ¯ . d) Poetic (aˇs-ˇsi#r), fol. 25b–26a, e) Sophistic (al-mug˙ala¯ ta),. fol. 26a–26b.

terms, chapter titles, and some other elements but instead left space to add them in red ink, which was never done. The second copy is kept at the Gazi Husrev-bey’s Library in Sarajevo (hereinafter: GHB), R 3407;sized19,5×13cm. The third copy is at the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo (hereinafter OIS), R 591 (old ref. MT 878). The description of this manuscript is given in Izabrani spisi…, 27. 9 Pp. 61–85. The same translation was published by Dijalog (A. Ljubovic),´ 1–2, Sarajevo, 1985, pp. 134–168. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 30.

30 chapter two

In the context of the presented plan and distribution of material in this treatise of al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, it should be said that it has a very solid, natural and logical composition that contains a variety of classiﬁcations. They ﬂow smoothly, springing out of each other, thus keeping their functional value.

A Commentary on the“K¯af¯ı’s Compendium of Logic” Al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı’s work A Commentary on “K¯af¯ı’s Compendium of Logic” is mentioned in reference books merely by title, and the data were used from al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı’s autobiography, where it is listed among his ﬁrst works. Fol- lowing this source, the trace lead to the University Library of Cam- bridge.10 This work was composed in 1583 and it is a commentary on the previous writing, covering all material, according to al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı (Pruˇscak)ˇ himself “by the end of the chapter on conceptions”,,11 i.e. to the end of the third chapter of K¯af¯ı’s Compendium of Logic. Motives for creating this workwerethesameasforthepreviousone—tohelpstudentsunder- stand issues of logic. After an extensive Introduction (fol. 1b–9a) the Com- mentary was divided into three chapters, according to the source: 1. On Words (f¯ı al-alfa¯z),. fol. 9a–18a, 2. On Origins of Conceptions—Five Universal Terms (f¯ımabadi¯ " at-tasaw-. wurat),¯ fol. 7a–12a, and 3. On Goals of Conceptions—Interpretative Speech (f¯ımaqa¯sid. at-tasaw-. wurat—al-qawl¯ aˇs-ˇsari¯ h),. fol. 30b–33b. The structure of the Commentary was conditioned by the structure of the original text, which was literally incorporated into the Commen- tary. However, unlike the basic text, Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı often loses compositional restraints in the Commentary, oﬀering not only deeper but also wider analysis of some of the issues in the Commentary. In this way he anticipates some of the problems that exceed the framework of the issues of relation, such as some issues in the theory on judgments, syllogistic, direct conclusions, etc., that will not be discussed until later, if at all in this work. In spite of this, the work represents a coherent and harmonic unit, with excurses always in the explanatory function. Spe- cial value lies on those in which Pruˇscakˇ refers to texts and authors he

10 Ms. Or. 541 (8). 11 Hasan Kaﬁja Puˇscak,ˇ Izabrani spisi…, p. 151. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 31.

bosniac authors and their works 31

used to support his own positions, thereby indicating his own sources. Those works include the texts by Ibn S¯ına¯ Book of Healing (Kitab¯ aˇs-ˇsifa¯") and Book of Remarks and Admonitions (Kitab¯ al-iˇsar¯ at¯ wa at-tanb¯ıhat),¯ 12 as well as al-Fanar¯ ¯ı13 and al-Urmaw¯ı.14

Muhammad. b. M¯us¯a #All¯amak al-Bosnaw¯ı as-Saray¯ı

One of the most prominent writers of Bosniac origin who wrote in Arabic was Muhammad. ibn Mus¯ a,¯ in sources and older references known as #Allamak¯ (Know-it-all). More recent reference works often use the patronymic, Music,´ as well as al-Bosnaw¯ı and as-Saray¯ı. Husein Abdel Latif es-Sayyid wrote his doctoral dissertation on this author and defended it at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Sarajevo, in 1965.15 The elementary subject of this dissertation was Music’s´ opus in the field of language. However, as the research has advanced significantly since then, and as this dissertation has never been published, this book will offer a more detailed biography of #Allamak,¯ based on more recent research and authentic documents. Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı as-Saray¯ı was born in 1595 in Sarajevo, where he completed primary and secondary educa-

12 See, e.g. fol. 21b–22a, 26a, 30betc. 13 Samsuddˇ ¯ın b. Hamza. al-Fanar¯ ¯ı, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,303–304 (233– 234), S I, 647 and S II, 328–329. 14 See footnote 3. Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı often mentions him as S.a¯hib. al-Mat.ali¯ #,or al-Ma.t¯ali#… after his work, see fol. 17a. 15 Husein Abdel Latif es-Sayyid, Muhamed Musa “Allamek”—Bosanac, arapski jezikoslovac iz prve polovine XVII stoljeca´ [Muhamed Musa “Allamek”—the Bosnian, Arabic Linguist of the Early 17th Century], doctoral dissertation defended at the Faculty of Philosophy in Sarajevo, Sarajevo, 1965. Besides this, other signiﬁcant sources and literature for the studies of the opus and life Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ are: Muhibb. ¯ı, Hul¯asat. al-¯at¯ar,Misr. (Kairo), 1284 (1867/68), t. IV, 302; Dahab¯ı, A#l¯am an-nubal¯a"…, t.¯ VI, 246;al-Ba¯ gd˙ ad¯ ¯ı, Hadiyya al- ¯ #¯arif¯ın. Asm¯a" al-mu"allif¯ın wa ¯at¯ar al-musannif. ¯ın, t. II, 278; C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,417 and 466,SI,516, 534 and 740¯ ;S.Baˇsagic,´ Bosnjaciˇ …, 72–73;M.Handziˇ c,´ Knjizevniˇ rad bosansko-hercegovackihˇ muslimana, Sarajevo, 1934, 6, 14 and 69–70;J.Blaˇskovicˇ and others, Arabische, türkische und persische Handschriften der Universitätsbibliothek in Bratislava,Bratislava, 1961, 15, 41–42 and 242;H.Sabanoviˇ c,´ Knjizevnostˇ …, pp. 131–151;S.Grozdanic,´ “Neke opaske o knjizevnostiˇ Muslimana Bosne i Hercegovine na arapskom jeziku” [Some Comments on the Literature of Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Arabic Lan- guage] in: Knjizevnostˇ Bosne i Hercegovine u svjetlu dosadasnjihˇ istrazivanjaˇ [The Literature of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Light of Contemporary Research], ANUBiH, Posebna izdanja, knj. XXXV/5, Sarajevo, 1977,p.71 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 32.

32 chapter two

tion (Gazi Husrev-bey’s Madrasa). From 1611/12 he continued his education in Istanbul at one of the highest-ranking educational institutions in the Empire, Sahn-i seman,16 where he graduated no later than in 1616. Since then, the development of Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak’s¯ life and work can be divided into three directions: as a teacher at several schools, as a judge, and as a writer. There are not precise data on his life and work before 1626, the year he wrote a commentary on the ar-Ris¯ala as-ˇ samsiyyaˇ , and soon after, in the summer of the same year, marginalia (glossarium) in grammar. The work of his student, Ibrah¯ ¯ım b. Ramad.an¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı, discussed later, shows that Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ had already been giving lectures in logic based on his own work at some of the schools. In September 1627, after a period of joblessness and relative poverty, he started working on a marginalia (glossarium) that would accompany a commentary on one chapter of the Qur"an, which he used in the same year as habilitation for a professorship at the Hasanbey-zade’s¯ Madrasa in Instanbul. From May 1629 he taught at two schools, and in March 1633 he was appointed to a professorship at one of the schools belonging to the Sahn-i seman. The works he wrote over this period were mainly in the ﬁeld of Ara- bic language (syntax, stylistic and rhetoric), which indicates that Arabic language was the main subject that Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ was teaching. In 1634/35 he was appointed as supreme court judge (qa¯d.¯ı al-qud.at)¯ in Aleppo (Syria) where he, in addition to his judicial duties, took on a class in Arabic syntax. He spent the last days of his life in iso- lation, in Rumela Hissar (a fortress in the vicinity of Istanbul), under the order of Mus.taf. a-pa¯ saˇ Sila¯hd. ar,¯ who feared that #Allamak¯ would report to the Port on the crime and violence he exercised in Aleppo and its suburbs. It was there that in 1636 he found out that he was appointed kadi of Istanbul, which was a sign of exceptional recognition. Several days later, exhausted by severe rheumatism and arthritis, Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ died, most probably in Rumeli Hissar, where he was buried. All his works were written in Arabic. One of them, Marginalia (Glos- sarium) to Mulla Gˇ¯am¯ı’s Commentary on Arabic Grammar “al-K¯af¯ı”,was printed in Istanbul in 1890, while the others are preserved only in

16 For more on the organization of the educational system in the Ottoman Empire, and especially the place and the role of Sahn-i seman, see: H. Inaldzik,ˇ Osmansko Carstvo, pp. 238–239 and further. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 33.

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manuscript copies.17 In addition to the mentioned fields, he wrote on logic, law, exegesis of the Qur"an and dogmatics. Except for one translation from Arabic to Turkish, all his works are commentaries or super- commentaries. They are specific for their independent approach to the issues they treat and exceptionally bold criticism, either of the authors of the main work, or other commentaries, regardless of the authority and reputation they had at the time. His starting argument was that the review of any of the scientific issues, including dogmatics, should not imply indisputable acceptance of a solution only because it was offered by an authority, whoever the authority may have been.18 Such explicit methodical skepticism of Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ and the critical outlook on the heritage are the main values of his works which, due to these aspects, are opposed to the greatest part of creativity in the Ottoman Empire that were often burdened by traditionalism and authority. As for the work of Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ in the field of logic, sources offer different data. Well-known Ottoman historians, Muhibb. ¯ı19 and Isma¯#¯ıl-paˇsa Bagd˙ ad¯ ¯ı20 wrote that #Allamak¯ was the author of a comprehensive Marginalia (Glossarium) Accompanying Qu.tbudd¯ın’s “Commen- tary on as-ˇ Samsiyya”ˇ ,21 and Uˇsˇsaq¯ı added that this work was “known and in use”.22 One of the first Ottoman encyclopedists and a contemporary of Muhammad b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Katib¯ Çalab¯ı(Ha¯gˇgˇ¯ı Hal¯ıfa), claimed . . ¯ that Muhammad. #Allamak¯ wrote Commentary on “as-ˇ Samsiyya”ˇ , referring to the famous work ar-Ris¯ala as-ˇ samsiyyaˇ by Nagmuddˇ ¯ın al-Qazw¯ın¯ıal- Katib¯ ¯ı, and that it was “combined” (mamzu¯g).ˇ 23 This research paper succeeded in recording four manuscripts of Mus¯ a-z¯ ade’s¯ work, always titled The Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” (Sarˇ har-Ris. ala¯ aˇs-ˇsamsiyya), in the collections of Topkapi Museum in

17 See: H. Sabanoviˇ c,´ Knjizevnostˇ …, pp. 131–151. 18 SeequotedfragmentfromMuhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak’s¯ H. ¯asiyaˇ #al¯a Sarˇ hal-. Maw¯aqif in: H. Sabanoviˇ c,´ 19Muhibb. ¯ı,o.c.,vol.IV,p.302.Knjizevnostˇ …, pp. 149–150. 19 Muhibb. ¯ı, o.c., vol. IV, p. 302. 20 Bagd˙ ad¯ ¯ı, o.c., vol. II, p. 278. 21 The author of the basic work ar-Ris¯ala as-ˇ Samsiyyaˇ is Nagmuddˇ ¯ın #Al¯ıb.#Umar al-Qazw¯ın¯ıal-Katib¯ ¯ı (died in 1293 or 1295, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,466 and SI,845). The Arabic title of the work that #Allamak¯ allegedly wrote was supposed to be H. ¯asiyaˇ #al¯a Sarˇ hal-Qu. .tb #al¯aas-ˇ Samsiyyaˇ , i.e. the marginalia accompanying Sarˇ h. ar-Ris¯ala as-ˇ samsiyyaˇ by Qutbudd. ¯ın Muhammad. ar-Raz¯ ¯ıat-Taht. an¯ ¯ı (died in 1365, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,466 and S and 845). 22 See: H. Sabanoviˇ c,´ Knjizevnostˇ …, p. 148. 23 Ha¯gˇgˇ¯ı Hal¯ıfa, II, 1064. . ¯ 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 34.

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Istanbul, Library of the National Museum in Algiers, in the collection of manuscripts of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb and at the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo.24 A careful reading of this work and its comparison with the basis work by al-Qazw¯ın¯ı and the previously mentioned commentary by Qutbudd. ¯ın ar-Raz¯ ¯ı revealed that this was actually not a marginalia (glossarium), but a commentary on the original text. In this text as well, Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ skillfully uses the commentaries by Sa#dudd¯ın at-Taftaz¯ an¯ ¯ı,25 Nas.¯ırudd¯ın at-. T. us¯ ¯ı,26 al-Gurˇ gˇan¯ ¯ı,27 and especially Qutbudd. ¯ın ar-Raz¯ ¯ı, whose names are often written in the margins (thence Katib¯ Çalab¯ı calls this commentary “combined”). Most probably the fact that the works of Qutbudd. ¯ın ar-Raz¯ ¯ı are often quoted prompted these biographers to say that this marginalia accompanies Qutbudd. ¯ın’s commentary, which cannot be accepted unless another work by #Allamak¯ is discovered.

24 The manuscript from Istanbul is kept at the Foundation of Emanet Hazinesi kitaplgı,ˇ Nº1970.Ithas223 sheets, sized 18,5×11,5cm. It was copied in 1035 (1620). See: Karatay, TSMK-AYK, C III, Nº6845. Xerox copy of the manuscript from Bibliothèque d’Alger (Nº522)iskeptatthe Oriental Institute in Sarajevo (copy nr. 1). The manuscript has 80 sheets (fol. 1b–80b), sized 13×19,5cm, with 25 rows each. The copy was made based on the autograph on May 27, 1626 by Mustaf. ab.¯ Hidr al-Adirnaw¯ı(fromEdrina). The manuscript from the¯ oriental¯ collection of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb holds number 1511;ithas124 sheets (fol. 4b–127a), sized 13,5×21cm. The manuscript at the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, R 698, is incomplete, it only contains the first ten sheets (fol. 1b–10a), sized 13,5×21cm. The collection of the oriental manuscripts of the National and University Library “Kliment Ohridski” in Skopje, under number MSA II 209/2 holds the manuscript titled Sarˇ hdib. ¯agaˇ ar-Ris¯ala as-ˇ samsiyyaˇ al-manq¯ul min Sarˇ hMu. hammad. M¯us¯a al-Bosnaw¯ı.This manuscript has seven sheets, sized 13,8×20cm. After inspection of this manuscript (microfilm was obtained for the needs of the Oriental Institute), and its comparison with the Algiers manuscript, the author of this book concluded that it is the copy of the commentary on the introductory part that the transcriber named at his own will. According to some data, that unfortunately could not be verified, several copies of this work by #Allamak¯ are kept at the Sulaymaniyya Library in Istanbul (Fatih 3355, Hamidiye 819,Laleli2658 and 2661,andSehidˇ Ali Paˇsa 1791). 25 Sa#dudd¯ın Mas#ud¯ at-Taftaz¯ an¯ ¯ı, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G II, pp. 278–280 (215–216), S I, pp. 514–516, 531, 683 and S II, pp. 301–304. 26 Abu¯ Gaˇ #far Nas.¯ırudd¯ın at-. T. us¯ ¯ı, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,pp.670–676 (508–512)andSI,pp.924–933. 27 Al-Gurˇ gˇan¯ ¯ı as-Sayyid aˇs-Sarˇ ¯ıf, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, in a few places, and especially G II, pp. 280–281 (216–217) and S II, pp. 305–306. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 35.

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A Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” As said above, there are four manuscript copies of this work by Mu- hammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak.¯ The copy kept at the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo is incomplete, so this book uses the copy from Algiers, actually its photocopy that is kept at the Oriental Institute28 which is, besides the fact that most of the text does not contain diacritic signs, ortho- graphically and grammatically very correct, and most importantly, the transcriber did not omit a single word (as far as could be seen based on comparisons with other copies). It was copied from the autograph, immediately after the completion of the work, on May 27, 1626.29 According to a note at the end of the manuscript,30 the work was completed on February 2, 1626, and it contains 160 dense manuscript pages. Following the main text that it comments on, after the general introduction (fol. 1b–5a) this work is divided in the following way: 1. Introduction (al-muqaddima), fol. 6a–13a, consists of two discussions (bahtan):¯ (1) One the essence of logic and (2) On the subject of logic; .¯ 2. Article One (maqala):¯ On Individual Terms,fol.13a–35a, with four sections (fasl):. (1) On words,(2) On significations,(3) On the universal and the particular and (4) On definitions; 3. Article Two,fol.35a–63b, with Introduction (On the definition of judgment and its segments) and three sections: (1) On categorical judgment,(2) On conditional judgment and (3) On the rules for judging (immediate forms of reasoning); 4. Article Three, On syllogism,fol.63b–77a, with five sections: (1) Defini- tion, its parts and figures,(2) On mixed syllogisms (modal), (3) On connected syllogism,(4) On separate (separated) syllogism and (5) Supplements on syllogism; 5. Conclusion (hatima),¯ fol. 77a–80a, with two discussions: (1) On the ¯ contents of syllogisms and (2) On segments of science.31 This work of Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ belongs to the class of semi-extensive commentaries of The Sun Treatise, one of the most important works in the field of logic in Arabic, written by al-Qazw¯ın¯ıal- Katib¯ ¯ı, a student of the great name of Arabic philosophy, Nas¯ırudd¯ın

28 Photocopies, nr. 92. 29 Sarˇ har-Ris. ¯ala as-ˇ samsiyyaˇ ,fol.80b. 30 Ibid. 31 For Arabic titles of certain chapters and sections, see in the chapter on The New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” by Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 36.

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at-. T. us¯ ¯ı. It is evident from the notes by #Allamak’s¯ student Ibrah¯ ¯ım b. Ramad.an,¯ from other manuscripts that are preserved in a relatively large number considering the period they are from (it is interesting that two of the preserved manuscripts were copied only several months after the completion of the work), and from the style of presentation, that this work was used as a textbook in logic. Unfortunately, there are no data that would conﬁrm the level of education for which #Allamak¯ used this work in his teaching, but the scope of the work and the included logical issues suggest that it could have been a higher-level religious school. Besides all that has already been said on this work, it should be pointed out that it was written in exceptionally clear language32 and there is a senseof“suﬃciency” in its interpretation.

Mustaf¯ab.Y¯usuf b. Ayy¯ub¯ı-z¯ade al-M¯ost¯ar¯ı—as-ˇ Sayˇ hY¯uy¯o .. ¯ Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ (Ejubovic)´ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı was among the most prominent writers in Bosnia and Herzegovina who wrote in Arabic. Thanks to the biographies carefully assembled by his student Ibrah¯ ¯ım Opiya¯cˇ33 and Mustafa¯ Hurram¯ı, a poet from Mostar,34 it is now possible to .. ¯ reconstruct the life of Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı and the development of his work. The researchers were also helped by the notes, which Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ added to his writings and some of the manuscripts he copied with the dates of completion, as well as the bibliography of his writings that he left behind in several places.35

32 Overall Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak’s¯ opus is specific for its lucid language and style, which was pointed out by Kamel el-Buhi in Arapski radovi jugoslovenskih pisaca [Arabic Works by Yugoslavian Writers], unpublished doctoral dissertation defended at theUniversityofBelgradein1963,p.104, and Husein Abdel Latif es-Sayyid (o.c., pp. 176). 33 Ibrah¯ ¯ım Opiyac,ˇ Ris¯ala fi man¯aqib as-ˇ Sayˇ hY¯uy¯oibnY¯usuf al-M¯ost¯ar¯ı, autograph: GHB, nr. 3585. Edition: O. Muˇsic,´ “Ibrahim¯ OpijacMostarac”,ˇ POF, X–XI/1960– 1961, Sarajevo, 1961,pp.31–53. Translation to Bosnian: M. Mujic,´ “Biografija Mustafe Ejubovica´ (Sejhˇ Juje)”, GVIS, VII/1–3 (Sarajevo), 1956,pp.1–22. 34 # " Mus.taf. a¯ ibn al-h.a¯gˇgAˇ hmad. ibn Hurram al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, Niz.¯am al- ulam¯a , manuscript: Oriental collection of the Croatian Academy¯ of Arts and Sciences (OZ HAZU), Nº86. 35 Besides the two quoted sources related to the life and work of Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı- zade,¯ other relevant references are: C. Brockelmann, GAL,SI,842 and S II, 317; S. Baˇsagic,´ Bosnjaciˇ …, pp. 118–123;isti,Znameniti…, p. 55;M.Handziˇ c,´ Knjizevniˇ rad …, pp. 9, 22–24, 71, 74 and 105; M. Mujic,´ “Sejhˇ Jujo (1650–1707)usvjetluknjizevno-ˇ istorijskog materijala”, Zora (pocasniˇ broj), Mostar, 1968/69,pp.291–301;H.Saba-ˇ novic,´ Knjizevnostˇ …, pp. 390–410;S.Grozdanic,´ “O knjizevnosti…”,ˇ pp. 541–542 and 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 37.

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The full name of Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ the one he used to sign his work, and mentioned by others in quotations, in Arabic (here in transcription) was: Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o(Y¯ uy¯ ¯ı) b. Yusuf¯ b. Murad¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı- zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı al-Bosnaw¯ı. He was born in 1651 in Mostar, where his father Yusuf,¯ son of Murad,¯ worked as a lecturer at one of the Mostar schools. He got his primary education in his home town, left for Istanbul in 1677, where he spent four years at, most probably, Sahn- i seman. After his studies and apprenticeship, he worked for a while at a school in Istanbul. It is interesting to notice that his biographers say that “Sayˇ h Yuyo understood the weaknesses, narrow-mindedness ¯ and weight of the old scholastic methods used by madrasas, so he tried to have his lecturing methods and textbooks blaze new trails in the methods of teaching”.36 During his stay in Istanbul, he wrote a dozen works, and in order to create a library for himself, he copied a number of texts in almost all areas of spiritual creativity of that time. The number of manuscripts preserved till today (most of which are kept at the Oriental collection of the University Library in Bratislava) indicates that he copied over 60 works. From 1692 on, Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ performed the duty of the mufti (supreme court judge) in Mostar. The last fifteen years of his life, that he spent in Mostar, are characterized by his full engagement in education (lectures and writing textbooks) and in some fields of science to which he was particularly drawn. He died in Mostar on July 16, 1707. Mus.taf. ab.Y¯ usuf¯ b. Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ıwrote27 short and long discourses. Most of them were written in the field of logic and disputation (13), laws (6), Arabic language, syntax and stylistics. In addition to that, he wrote a paper on Persian lexicography and metrics, two on dogmatics and compiled a collection of sermons (f¯ıal-wa#z).. As previously stated, a number of these works are in form of textbooks that he used in his teaching, and others are a result of certain personal interests, such as works in logic and dialectics. So, in the foreword to A Commentary on “The Training in Logic and Apologetics” (Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb al- . ¯ mantiq. wa al-kalam),¯ which was his last work, Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ısays: “I have long been involved in these two disciplines, and in these fields I have written a number of useful, more or less extensive, papers. My

A. Ljubovic,´ “Na marginama rukopisnih djela Mustafe Ejubovica´ (1651–1707)”, Herce- govina,IV,Mostar,1985,pp.225–238. 36 See: H. Sabanoviˇ c,´ Knjizevnostˇ …, p. 394. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 38.

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heart would often miss a beat when I thought of clarifying the writers thoughts and of commenting on the part related to logic and the part related to disputation.”37 Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı was, therefore, particularly preoc- cupied with issues in logic that were necessarily linked to dialectics, so called science on terms, then to syntax, stylistics and rhetoric.

ACommentaryon“At¯ır¯ı’s Treatise in Logic” ¯ ThefirstworkbyMus.taf. ab.Y¯ usuf¯ b. Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ıinthe field of logic was A Commentary on “At¯ır¯ı’s Treatise in Logic” (Sarˇ har-. ¯ Risala¯ al-At¯ıriyya f¯ıal-mantiq) or, as it is sometimes titled, A commentary ¯ . on “Isagogue” (Sarˇ h. Is¯ a¯g˙u¯gˇ¯ı), which was completed in August 1682. Along with the autograph and a number of manuscript copies that have been preserved till today,38 this work has a printed version, which makes it unique among Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade’s¯ writings.39 This is a commentary on a work in logic, very well known in the East, Isagogue (Is¯ a¯g˙u¯gˇ¯ı) by At¯ırudd¯ın al-Abhar¯ı (died in 1256).40 It need be said that ¯ this is not merely an adaptation of well-known Porphyry’s Isagogue or its commentary, as some of the works on al-Abhar¯ı’s compendium states, but this is a work that took over Porphyry’s title, and the basic elements of his work form only part of the introduction to the reflections on logical issues.41

37 Autographs: OIS, R 4668,fol.1b. Also see: M. Mujic,´ “Sejhˇ Jujo (1650–1707)u svjetlu…”, p. 298. 38 A large number of manuscript is preserved, and the autograph is kept at the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, R 2379. It is leather-bound with 27 sheets (fol. 1b–27b) of unusual size, 9×25 cm. 39 Istanbul, 1316 (1898/99), 78 pp. 40 At¯ırudd¯ın Mufad.dal. b. #Umar al-Abhar¯ı, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,608–611 (464–465¯ )andSI,839–844. 41 The main contents of Porphyry’s Isagogue (Eisagogé or An Introduction to Aristotle’s Categories) is a discussion on five basic terms (quinque voces):¯ ¯ genus, species, difference, property and accidence. This is the issue that will be the object of attention of only the first chapter of al-Abhari¯ı’s Isagogue that kept the title. For more, see: A. Ljubovic,´ “Da li je al-Abhar¯ıjevo djelo Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı adaptacija Porfirijevog djela Eisagogé?” [Is Al-Abhar¯ı’s Paper “Is¯ a¯g˙u¯gˇ¯ı” Adaptation of Porphyry’s “Eisagogé”?], POF, 38/1988, Sarajevo, 1989, pp. 217–223. Also see: Kwame Gyekye, Arabic logic. Ibn al-Tayyib’s Commentary on Porphyry’s Eisagoge, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1979. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 39.

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TheworkbyMus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, besides the Foreword (pp. 2–6),42 has nine chapters (bab):¯ 1. Isagogue,pp.6–24, that includes short discussions on words, meanings of words, relations between words and ideas, then on terms, and, especially, on five universalia (species, genus, difference, property and accident), 2. On interpretative speech (al-qawl aˇs-ˇsari¯ h),. pp. 24–27, is on the rules of definition and description forming, 3. On judgments (al-qad.ay¯ a),¯ pp. 27–49, 4. On syllogism (al-qiyas),¯ pp. 49–73, 5. Apodictic (al-burhan),¯ pp. 73–75, 6. Dialectic (al-gadal),ˇ p. 75, 7. Rhetoric (al-hitaba),¯ pp. 75–76, ¯ . 8. Poetic (aˇs-ˇsi#r), p. 76, 9. Sophistic (al-mug˙ala¯ ta),. pp. 76–77. The work has a structure that is essentially along the same line as the one given in Isagogue by At¯ırudd¯ın al-Abhar¯ı. As the given structure ¯ indicates, this piece of writings by Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, which belongs to the group of semi-extensive commentaries, summa- rizes the central logical issues treated by standard textbooks of that time. And, finally, it should be said that Mus.taf. ab.Ayy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ often used the works by ar-Raz¯ ¯ıandal-Gurˇ gˇan¯ ¯ı, and The Sources of Light on Logic43 and the related commentaries.

A Useful Marginalia to “Al-Fan¯ar¯ı’s Remarks” Mus.taf. ab.Y¯ usuf¯ b. Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı made another referral to Isagogue by At¯ırudd¯ın al-Abhar¯ı ten years later, in 1692, when he noticed ¯ that the commentary on Isagogue titled Al-Fan¯ar¯ı’s Remarks (al-Fawa¯"id al- Fanariyya)¯ written by al-Fanar¯ ¯ı(1350–1431)44 is very useful for clarifying a range of issues in logic, and that logic was used for “…a man’s mind to enjoy and for souls to connect in order to diﬀerentiate the correct from the incorrect, to measure the truth and to select indisputable facts.”45 The full title of this work is A Useful Marginalia on “Al-Fan¯ar¯ı’s

42 Quotations here correspond to the printed version compared with the autograph. 43 See footnote 3 in this chapter. 44 Samsuddˇ ¯ın b. Hamza. al-Fanar¯ ¯ı, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,303–304 (233– 234), S I, 647 and S II, 328–329. 45 See: M. Zdraloviˇ c,´ “Prilog poznavanju…”, p. 128. Manuscript: Oriental collection 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 40.

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Remarks” on At¯ırudd¯ın’s Treatise on Logic (H. a¯ˇsiya muf¯ıdalial-Fawa¯"id al- ¯ Fanariyya¯ #alaar-Ris¯ ala¯ f¯ıal-mantiq),. 46 which contains 80 pages in manuscript. It was completed on May 17, 1692. As a h.¯asiyaˇ ,47 this is a marginalia (glossarium) that had originally been written in the form of margin notes, and were later edited by the author and presented as an integral text. Given that this is a collection of individual notes, clariﬁcations, interpretations or commentaries on certain words or statements, there is no evident internal structure and organization of material, as it is assumed that the reader reads the commented text at the same time. However, Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı tried to connect the margin notes and to give discrete indication on where the issues treated in separate chapters of the original text begin and where they end.48 Thus, the material is organized according to the text that the notes referred to, Al-Fan¯ar¯ı’s Remarks. Al-Fan¯ar¯ı’s Remarks in turn follow the basic text, al-Abhar¯ı’s Isagogue whose main structure can be seen from the previously discussed work of Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade’s¯ Commentary on Isagogue. The volume of the commentaries within certain chapters depends on the extent of “vague and unclear places” that the author found.

The New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” Besides Isagogue, one of the best known and most frequently commented writings in the ﬁeld of logic in Arabic from the later period is a work titled The Sun Treatise (ar-Risala¯ aˇs-ˇsamsiyya) by Nagmuddˇ ¯ın al-Qazv¯ın¯ı al-Katib¯ ¯ı(diedin1295).49 As this work was very concise, and contained a number of unclear and incomplete parts, and since it was commented on very often, the commentaries give interpretations that diﬀer greatly. In order to remove vagueness and obscurity, in 1690 Mus.taf. a¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ wrote The New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” (aˇs-Sarˇ hal-.

of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Nº198,fol.2b. 46 The only known copy of this work is kept at the Oriental collection of the Croa- tian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb, Nº198,fol.2b–42a, sized 14,5×19,5cm with 21 rows per page. The manuscript was bound in hard cardboard bindings with a leather ridge, which was completed by linen bindings at a more recent date. A note in the manuscript (fol. 2a) proves that this is the autograph on the endowment in Karadoz-¯ bey’s library in Mostar 1117 (1705). 47 The word h.¯asiyaˇ comes from the verb ha. sˇ¯a—yah.sˇ¯ı, and means: seam, lining, hedge; margin note; post scriptum, etc. 48 See, e.g: fol. 22a, 26b, 37b. 49 See footnote 21. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 41.

bosniac authors and their works 41

gadˇ ¯ıd #alaa¯ ˇs-Samsiyyaˇ f¯ıal-mantiq). 50 refuting incorrect interpretation of reputed authorities of the age. Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ comments on this in a typically oriental style: “The Sun Treatise written by a scientist and a great scholar, the Sun of the nation and faith, al-Katib¯ ¯ı…, is the most exalted and the most excellent work that has ever been written in this ﬁeld (logic, rem. A.L.), since it contains the most illuminated statements and encompasses the pearls of meaning. Although small in volume, it is very useful, and although its necklace is very short, its beads are very precious rules. Since the secrets of its truths are cloaked by conciseness, and the inno- cence of its details, veiled by a curtain of briefness, many scholars have tried to explain the unclear statements of The Sun Treatise and have written commentaries and marginalia to make its usefulness accessi- ble. However, disputes arose among them and contradictions among their words. Therefore I have decided to write The New Commentary on the Sun Treatise thus unveiling and uncloaking it and revealing its secrets.”51 This work by Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı contains 286 pages, and the main structure reﬂects the structure of the basic text: an Intro- duction, three articles and a Conclusion.Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ had the goal to address not only the problems addressed in the basic text, but to include as many problems as possible, almost encompassing the overall issue of logic that had ever been included in literature in Arabic at that time, despite his modestly saying that he just wished to supplement the “short necklace”. The abundance of material he collected is skillfully and logically added to the basic structure, opening new chapters, new sections and new divisions. His exceptional pedantry, characteristic of his opus in general, is present in its full extent in this work. This was possible thanks to the very nature of logic. The work starts with a Foreword (fol. 1b–5a), followed by:

50 There are two manuscript copies of this work. The autograph is kept at the Gazi Husrev-bey’s library in Sarajevo, nr. 793,fol.1a– 142b, it is sized 13×20cm with 23 rows per page. The autograph was used for the needs of this book, and the quotations given here are taken from it. A manuscript copy is kept in the Oriental collection of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb, Nº1407/II, fol. 7b–146a, sized 13×20cm. It is a transcript made in 1781,byAhmad,. son of Husain,. from Ljubuˇski. 51 Authograph: GHB, br. 793,fol.1b–2a. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 42.

42 chapter two

Introduction (al-muqaddima), fol. 5a–13a: (1) Discussion on the essence of logic (bahtf¯ıbayan¯ mahiyyat¯ al-mantiq), .¯ . fol. 5a–10b, (2) Discussion on the subject of logic (f¯ımawd.u¯# li al-mantiq),. fol. 10b–13a. Article One—On Particular Terms (al-maqala¯ al-"ul¯ a—f¯ ¯ı al-mufradat),¯ fol. 13b–54b: 1. Section on words (al-fasl. f¯ı al-alfa¯z),. fol. 14a–25b, 2. Section on simple ideas (f¯ıal-ma#an¯ ¯ı al-mufrada), fol. 25a–38b, 3. Section on expression of the universal and the particular (f¯ımaba¯hit al-kull¯ı . ¯ wa al-guzˇ "¯ı), fol. 38b–54b: a. Research on the universal term (mabhatf¯ı al-kull¯ı), fol. 38b–39a, . ¯ b. Research on the nature of the universal term,fol.39a–40a, c. Research on the opposition of terms,fol.40a–45a, d. Research of particular terms,fol.45a–46b, e. Research of universal terms,fol.46b–50b, f. Section on deﬁnitions (al-fasl. f¯ı at-ta#r¯ıfat)¯ fol. 50b–54b). Article Two—On Judgments (f¯ı al-qad.ay¯ a),¯ fol. 54b–106b: Introduction,fol.54b–57b, 1. Section on categorical judgments (f¯ıal-hamliyya),. fol. 57b–80a: a. Research on its parts and divisions (f¯ıagzˇ a¯"iha¯ wa aqsamih¯ a),¯ fol. 57b–62b, b. Research on determination of the quantity of judgments (f¯ıtahq. ¯ıq al- mah.s.ur¯ at),¯ fol. 62b–65a, c. Research on determination of the scope of judgments (f¯ıal-#udul¯ wa at-tah.s.¯ıl), fol. 65a–69a, d. Research on modal judgments (f¯ı al-qad.ay¯ aal-muwa¯ gˇgaha),ˇ fol. 69b–80a, 2. Research on the division of conditional judgments (f¯ı aqsam¯ aˇs-ˇsartiyya),. fol. 80a–87b, 3. Section on direct reasoning (f¯ıahk. am¯ al-qad.ay¯ a),¯ fol. 87b–106b: a. Research on the opposition of judgments (contradictoriness and contrariness) (f¯ı at-tanaqu¯ d),. fol. 87b–93a, b. Research on conversion—equipollence (f¯ıal-#aks al-mustawa),¯ fol. 93a–101a, c. Research of contraposition (f¯ı #aks an-naq¯ıd),. fol. 101a–106a, d. Research on conditional judgments (f¯ılawazim¯ aˇs-ˇsartiyy. at),¯ fol. 106a–106b. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 43.

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Article Three—On Syllogism (f¯ı al-qiyas),¯ fol. 106b–137b: 1. Section on definition of syllogism and its parts (f¯ıta#r¯ıf al-qiyas¯ wa aqsa-¯ mihi), fol. 106b–120a: (a) First figure (aˇs-ˇsakl al-awwal), fol. 109a–111a, (b) Second figure,fol.111a–113a, (c) Third figure,fol.113a–115b, (d) Fourth figure,fol.115b–120a, 2. Section on conditions for reasoning in sense of modality in mixed syllogisms (f¯ı ˇsara¯"it li al-inta¯gbiˇ hasb al-gihaˇ f¯ıal-muhtalitat)¯ fol. 120a–127b: . . ¯ . (a) First figure,fol.120a–122a, (b) Second figure,fol.122a–124b, (c) Third figure,fol.124b–125b, (d) Fourth figure,fol.125b–127b, 3. Section on connected syllogism in conditional judgments (f¯ı al-iqtiraniyy¯ at¯ al-ka¯"inat¯ min aˇs-ˇsartiyy. at),¯ fol. 127b–131b: (a) Conjunctive judgments (al-muttasil. at),¯ fol. 128a–129a, (b) Disjunctive judgments (al-munfasil. at),¯ fol. 129a–129b, (c) Categorical and conjunctive (al-hamliyya. wa al-muttasila),. fol. 129b–130a, (d) Categorical and disjunctive,fol.130a–131a, (e) Conjunctive and disjunctive,fol.131a–131b, 4. Section on separated syllogism (f¯ı al-qiyas¯ al-istitna¯"¯ı), fol. 131b–134b, ¯ 5. Section on supplements to syllogism (f¯ılawa¯hiq. al-qiyas),¯ fol. 134b–137b: a. Complex syllogism (al-qiyas¯ al-murakkab), fol. 134b–135a, b. Syllogism of absurd (al-qiyas¯ al-hulf), fol. 135a–136b, ¯ c. Induction (al-istiqra¯"), fol. 136b–137a, d. Analogy (at-tamt¯ıl), fol. 137a–137b. ¯ Conclusion,fol.137b–143a: 1. Research on the integral parts of syllogism (f¯ımawadd¯ al-aqyisa), fol. 137b–142a, (a) indisputably safe knowledge (yaq¯ıniyyat),¯ fol. 137b–139a, – initial knowledge—axioms,fol.138a, – experience based knowledge,fol.138b, – experiment based knowledge,fol.138b, – intuitive knowledge,fol.138b–139a, – transferred knowledge,fol.139a, – syllogism based proposition,fol.139a–139b, – apodictic (burhan),¯ fol. 139b–140b, 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 44.

44 chapter two

(b) unsafe knowledge (gayr˙ yaq¯ıniyyat),¯ fol. 140b–142a, – dialectic (gadal),ˇ fol. 140b, – rhetoric (hitaba),¯ fol. 140b–141a, ¯ . – poetic (ˇsi#r), fol. 141a–141b, – sophistic (safsata),. fol. 141b–142a, 2. Research on segments of science (f¯ıagzˇ a¯" al-#ulum),¯ fol. 142a–143b, (1) subjects of science (mawd.u¯#at¯ al-#ulum),¯ fol. 142a–142b, (2) principles of science (al-mabadi¯ "), fol. 142b, – axioms (al-bayyina bi nafsiha),¯ – postulates (gayr˙ al-bayyina bi nafsiha),¯ – hypotheses (al-wad.#), (3) issue of science—theses (al-masa¯"il), fol. 142b–143a. Although the presentation of the structure of this work by Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ does not include the divisions within sections, research, etc., it shows that the author had great mastery in the ﬁeld of logic, and that he succeeded in noticing characteristics that helped him classify all the areas he wanted to tackle, thus giving extraordinary insight into their very nature. The foreword of this work (fol. 4b–5a) gives the author’s opinion on the importance of good composition, and the work itself shows that it is possible to turn very voluminous material into a logical and harmonic unit, and that it is possible to apply the logical method of classi- ﬁcation that he theoretically discusses. In the foreword Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı- zade¯ underlines that he used a number of texts by a great many reputed Arabic logicians, pointing out primarily Ibn S¯ına¯ and al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı, as well as a dozen of other authors and their works. Thanks to the fact that this work is preserved in autograph and that it contains numerous margin and interlinear notes, it can be said that Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ took into account almost all important and known works in logic in Arabic. He mentions three works by Ibn S¯ına,¯ 52 and commentaries on Ibn S¯ına’s¯ The Book of Instructions…byFahrudd¯ın ar-Raz¯ ¯ı,53 Nas¯ırudd¯ın at-Tus¯ ¯ı,54 ¯ . . .

52 Besides the two already mentioned works by Ibn S¯ına,¯ Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at wa at-tanb¯ıh¯at and Kit¯ab as-ˇ sifˇ ¯a", Mustafa Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ mentions an-Nagˇ¯at. 53 Fahrudd¯ın ar-Raz¯ ¯ı (died 606/1209) wrote two commentaries on this work: Lub¯ab ¯ al-isˇ¯ar¯at, that had several editions later on (Cairo, 1882, 1907, 1916 and 1936)andSarˇ h. al-isˇ¯ar¯at f¯ı at-tab¯ı#iyy¯a.t. see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,454 and S I, 816. 54 Nas.¯ırudd¯ın at-. T. us¯ ¯ı (died in 672/1273) wrote a work that is actually a criticism of ar-Raz¯ ¯ı’s commentary (see footnote 53) titled Hall. muskilˇ ¯at al-Isˇ¯ar¯at. see: C. Brockel- mann, GAL,GI,454 and S I, 816. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 45.

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al-Isfahan¯ ¯ı55 and others, also independently written works by Afdalud-. d¯ın al-Huna¯ gˇ¯ı(1194–1249), Kamaludd¯ ¯ın ibn Yunus¯ (1156–1242), Nag-ˇ ¯ mudd¯ın al-Katib¯ ¯ı, al-Urmaw¯ı, Samsuddˇ ¯ın as-Samarqand¯ı, at-Taftaz¯ a-¯ n¯ı, al-Gurˇ gˇan¯ ¯ı, al-Fanar¯ ¯ı and others.56 And ﬁnally, when writing on the literature, presentation methods and structures of his works, it need be said that Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ very skillfully connected the basic text, the literature used, and his own thoughts and views, combining them into a mosaic of terms, logical issuesandknowledge.ThisworkbyAyyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ is not only his most important work in logic, but also one of the most valuable, if not the most valuable in this ﬁeld in Bosnian heritage. However, based on the number of preserved copies, it seems that A Commentary on “Isagogue” was more popular.

A Commentary on “The Training in Logic and Apologetics” The last work written by Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ıthatwas completed on September 13, 1706, was also, in one part, devoted to logic. That was A Commentary on “The Training in Logic and Apologetics” (Sarˇ h #alaTah¯ d¯ıb al-mantiq wa al-kalam).¯ 57 This is a commentary writ- . ¯ . ten by Sa#dudd¯ın at-Taftazan¯ ¯ı.58 The ﬁrst 84 pages of the autograph are dedicated to logic, and page 85 to 285 to apologetics, or, more precisely, the application of dialectical methods in theology.59 Explaining

55 Mahm. ud¯ ibn #Abdurrahm. an¯ al-Isfahan¯ ¯ı(14th century), see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 418; G II, 47;SI,537, 628, 742, 926 and S II, 137. Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade’s¯ text does not give precise indication which work by al-Isfahan¯ ¯ıwas referred to here. It was most probably al-Muh.¯akama bayna Nas¯ırudd¯ın wa ar-R¯az¯ı, see: A.-M. Goichon, Introduction to Ibn S¯ına¯ (Avicenne), Livre des directives et remarques, Beyrouth–Paris, 1951,p.73. 56 For details on individual authors see: C. Brockelmann, GAL. 57 We have so far registered two manuscript copies of this work. The autograph was kept at the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, Nº4668 (fol. 1b–242b), sized 13,5×20,3cm, with 23 per page. It is cardboard bound with leather ridge and lining. Besides the author’s notes, and the note on endowment and conditions for using the book, the protective page contains the original Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade’s¯ seal. This book relies on the autograph which was used for quotations. The other copy is kept at the Oriental collection of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences, under nr. 412 (fol. 4b–253b), sized 13×21,2cm, with 23 o each page. It was copied by Ahmad,. son of Husayn,. from Mostar, Du¯ al-qa#da 19, 1151 (April 1, 1739). ¯ 58 Sa#dudd¯ın Mas#ud¯ b. #Umar at-Taftazan¯ ¯ı, died in. 791/1389. See: C. Brockel- mann, GAL, G II, 278–280 (215–216), S I, 514–516, 531, 683 and S II, 301–304. 59 The arabic expression kal¯am means speech, word, discussion, but in the construc- 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 46.

46 chapter two

his motivations for creation of the commentary on this work, Mus.taf. a¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ said in the Introduction: “Many works have been written in the domain of logic and apologetics, whose importance is known to those who know things. Some of those works are more concise, while others are more comprehensive. However, Tahd¯ıb al-mantiq wa al-kal¯am, written by the cream of scholars ¯ . and great names, the role model of the respected and learned, the modern scholar and the great capacity Sa#dudd¯ın at-Taftazan¯ ¯ı…, is a highly esteemed work, a row of pearls in brilliant words. Its greatness exceeded all of the great. If I were to spend all my life praising and commending it, my words would be inept for describing all the good sides of that work. It is diﬃcult to understand it due to its conciseness, not everyone shooting hits the blank, only the strong ones can come to its water, and what it wishes to say can be grasped only by the talented. I have never seen a complete commentary on this piece of writing. All that I saw were the comments by some esteemed scholars on the part related to logic. Moreover, I have never heard of a complete commentary…”60 In the text of The Training in Logic and Apologetic, that Mustafa Ayyub¯ ¯ı- zade¯ comments on, the topics of logic are not as systematically or neatly presented as was the case with the previously listed works. The author of the original text, Sa#dudd¯ın at-Taftazan¯ ¯ı, chooses the division based on two fundamental terms: conceptions (tasawwur. at)¯ and assertions (tasd. ¯ıqat),¯ i.e. two chapters, and an Introduction (muqaddima) and Conclusion (hatima).¯ A similar starting point was taken by Hasan Kaf¯ ¯ı ¯ . al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ıinhisK¯af¯ı’s Compendium of Logic, but al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı naturally and logically built upon it. Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ develops at-Taftazan¯ ¯ı’s division, trying to make it as neat as possible, giving the contents of the work with chapter titles and page numbers on the ﬁrst page of the autograph,61 which was very rare at the time. After a general introduction (fol. 1b–5a), the part dedicated to logic is divided as follows:

tion kal¯am Allah, it often means God’s speech. Thence #Ilm al-kal¯am denotes a discipline that will treat thinking about “words” said to men in the Qur"an. Ibn Haldun,inhis¯ ¯ Muqaddima,deﬁnedkal¯am in the following words: “This is a science that contains arguments based on rational proofs for defending religious dogma against innovators that step out of the principles of belief in comparison to their predecessors and traditional- ists (followers of the tradition).” (Muqaddima, Cairo, s.a., 458). Western literature usually refers to this discipline as dialectical or speculative theology and scholastic philosophy. Its relations towards logic will be the subject of the 5th chapter. 60 See: autograph, OIS, nr. 4668,fol.1b–2a. Translation: M. Mujic,´ “Sejhˇ Jujo u svjetlu…”, pp. 297–298. 61 These two sheets were inserted into the code later (the handwriting is evidently 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 47.

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Introduction (muqaddima), fol. 5a, (1) On the meaning of words (dalala¯ al-lafz):. fol. 6b, (2) Comprehension (al-mafhum),¯ fol. 8b. Conceptions (tasawwur. at),¯ fol. 10b, (1) Five universal terms (al-kulliyyat¯ al-hams), fol. 10b, ¯ (2) On genii (al-agnˇ as),¯ fol. 12a, (3) Predicament on the Thing (al-maqul¯ #alaa¯ ˇs-ˇsay"), fol. 13a, (4) Factor for the “higher” is factor for the “lower” (al-muqawwim li al-#al¯ ¯ı muqawwim as-saﬁl),¯ fol. 13b, (5) Conclusion on research of the universal (hatima¯ li maba¯hit al-kulliyyat),¯ ¯ . ¯ fol. 14b, (6) Section on the deﬁners (mu#arrif aˇs-ˇsay"), fol. 15a, Assertions—categorical judgments (tasd. ¯ıqat),¯ fol. 16b, (1) Conditional judgments (aˇs-ˇsartiyy. at),¯ fol. 23b, (2) On opposition (at-tanaqu¯ d),. fol. 26a, (3) On conversion (al-#aks al-mustawa),¯ fol. 28b, (4) On contraposition (al-#aks al-munqid),. fol. 30b, (5) On syllogism (al-qiyas),¯ fol. 31b, (6) On conditional connected syllogism (al-qiyas¯ aˇs-ˇsart.¯ı al-iqtiran¯ ¯ı), fol. 36b, (7) On separate (disconnected) syllogism (al-qiyas¯ al-istitna¯"¯ı), fol. 37b, ¯ (8) On induction (al-istiqra¯"), fol. 39a, (9) Syllogism is either apodictic… (al-qiyas¯ imma¯ burhan¯ ¯ı…), fol. 39b, Conclusion—parts of science (hatima—¯ "agzˇ a¯" al-#ulum),¯ fol. 40b–42a. ¯ Although relatively small by volume, this work by Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ attempts to include as many logical issues as possible. What remains is the fact that it is not so systematical and well-organized as his previous work, which is certainly a consequence of the lack of system of the basic text. Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ seems to have sensed this, as he repeatedly directs the readers to his The New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise”.62 It is evident from the previously quoted fragment that his goal was to comment on and establish links between the logical theory and implementation of its methods in apologetics. Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-

Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade’s)¯ so they do not have the original numerical order of folios, and are placed between the protective sheet and the first folio, also copied and inserted later. This is evident because the type of paper that was used for the first four pages is different. 62 See e.g. fol. 12a–13b. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 48.

48 chapter two

Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı used numerous works in logic (mostly those already used in The New Commentary) for his writings, and some notes show that he was familiar with the works of Aristotle (fol. 42a), understandably indirectly, through the works of classical Arabic authors.

Muhammad. b. Mus..taf¯aal-Caynawˇ ¯ı

Reference books and other sources contain very little data on Muham-. mad b. Mus.taf. aal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı (Muhamed, son of Mustafa, Cajniˇ canin).ˇ 63 It can all be summarized in just a few sentences. He was born in Cajniˇ ceˇ in 1731. He acquired his primary education in Sarajevo, and higher in Istanbul. From 1781 to 1783 he taught at Dumi¯ ˇsic’s´ Madrasa in Sarajevo, and twice in 1783 and 1785, he was appointed as the mufti (supreme court judge) of Sarajevo. He died in Sarajevo, on March 20, 1792. The only still known work of his from the time he taught at the madrasa, is the one in logic, called Revelation of Secrets in Commenting on “Isagogue” (Fath. al-asrar¯ f¯ı ˇsarhal-. Is¯ a¯g˙u¯gˇ¯ı) that was preserved in several manuscript copies.64 This is a semi-extensive commentary on al-Abhar¯ı’s Isagogue written on about 120 pages. After the foreword (fol. 1b–11a), the text is divided into nine chapters:

63 Transcripts of these works were used in: Baˇseskija, Ljetopis, Sarajevo, 1968,pp.247 and 391;S.Kemura,Sarajevske muftije, Sarajevo, 1916,pp.17–19;M.Handziˇ c,´ Knjizevniˇ rad…, pp. 105; Kamel el-Buhi, Arapski radovi…, pp. 398–399; H. Hasandedic,´ “Djela i kraci´ sastavi…”, Anali GHB,vol.4, Sarajevo, 1976,pp.117–118;A.Bejtic,´ “Jedno videnje¯ sarajevskih evlija i njihovih grobova kao kultnih mjesta”, POF, XXXI/1981, Sarajevo, 1982,pp.116. 64 There are ﬁve manuscript copies that were reviewed and collated for this purpose: OIS, R 933;GHB,br.219 and 3439; Oriental collection of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Nº1243 (with about 10 sheets of manuscript missing) and the manuscript from the Archives of Herzegovina in Mostar, nr. 138. As the author of this book deemed the manuscript from the Archives of Herzegovina very correct (with very few orthographical and other mistakes) and very intelligible, he decided to use it as grounds for this book. This manuscript has 86 sheets (fol. 1b–86b), sized 17×11cm, with 15 rows per page. It is bound in linen, and copied by a student at Bentbaˇsa Madrasa in Sarajevo, named Yusuf¯ (see fol. 86). See: H. Hasandedic,´ Katalog arapskih, turskih i perzijskih rukopisa,Mostar,1977,p.21. By the time this book was completed, the author of this book got the information from a colleague, Salih Trako, that the National and University Library “Petar Kociˇ c”´ in Banja Luka holds one more manuscript copy of this work (sign. III-548–1), which is probably the autograph. (See: S. Trako, “Tragovi minulih stoljeca”,´ Nedeljni Glas,Banja Luka, September 20 and 21, 1986, 8). 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 49.

bosniac authors and their works 49

1. Isagogue,fol.11a–37a, 2. On interpretative speech (f¯ı al-qawl aˇs-ˇsari¯ h),. fol. 37a–40b, 3. On judgment (f¯ı al-qad.ay¯ a),¯ fol. 40b–62a, 4. On syllogism (f¯ı al-qiyas),¯ fol. 62a–82a, 5. Apodictic (al-burhan),¯ fol. 82a–84b, 6. Dialectic (al-gadal),ˇ fol. 84b–85a, 7. Rhetoric (al-hitaba),¯ fol. 85a–85b, ¯ . 8. Poetic (aˇs-ˇsi#r), fol. 85b, 9. Sophistic (al-mug˙ala¯ ta),. 85b–86a. A comparison of this work with A Commentary on “Isagogue” by Mus.taf. a¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı shows that about three quarters of the commentary by Muhammad. al-Caynawˇ ¯ı are exactly the same as the ones of the work by Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ in other words, a large part of hisworkwastakenasitis.Theattentiontothisfactisdrawnbya sentence in which Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ speaking about one way of conversion, says: “The lines in our commentary added to the marginalia (glossariums) on The Disputation by Mas#ud¯ (Rum¯ ¯ı) verify this, and we have explained it to a sufficient extent.”65 and indeed, Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ commented on this work twice.66 Five years before A Commentary on “Isa- gogue” was written, at the time when Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ intensively worked on disputation and dialectics, he completed an immensely comprehensive collection of twelve, according to him, significant texts in this field, which are today kept in the University Library in Bratislava.67 The same sentence was aopted by Muhammad. al-Caynawˇ ¯ı.68 As the autograph of al-Caynawˇ ¯ı’s work is still unavailable, it cannot be confirmed whether he noted that he used Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade’s¯ A Commentary on “Isagogue”, but the text itself proves that indisputably. The first part of its title, Revelation of Secrets…, is frequently used in the Orient in many fields, and it indicates that the texts bearing it are additions or super- commentaries. Although it can be said that the overall heritage in Arabic in the field of logic of a later date was in the spirit of idea and form of their great

65 Mus.taf. ab.Y¯ usuf¯ b. Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı…, p. 49. 66 See: A. Ljubovic,´ “Na marginama rukopisnih djela Mustafe Ejubovica´ (1651– 1707)”, Hercegovina,br.4,Mostar,1985,pp.231–233. 67 J. Blaˇskovicˇ and others, Arabische, türkische und persische Handschriften der Universitäts- bibliothek in Bratislava,Bratislava,1961,Nº249–260 and Nº193–202. 68 Muhammad. b. Mus.taf. aal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 61b. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 50.

50 chapter two

predecessors, the opus of Muhammad. b. Mus.taf. aal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı clearly has the character of an epigone.

Other authors

Besides these four authors whose biographies can be traced from reliable sources and literature, and whose work in the ﬁeld of logic left a visible mark, the research on the collections of oriental manuscripts disclosed a number of authors, teachers and transcribers who worked in the ﬁeld of logic. However, there are no reliable sources that would make the reconstruction of their biographies possible and verify their identity. This book will address three more authors with comprehensive works in logic, whose name contains at least some notes disclosing either their place of birth or the place where they lived, and the works contain at least the approximate time period when they worked.

Ibr¯ah¯ım b. Ramad.¯an al-Bosnaw¯ı(Bosnjak)ˇ Mehmed Handziˇ c´ was the ﬁrst one to make note of this author in his text “Several Precious Manuscripts in Karadozbey’s¯ Library in Mostar”,69 when he came across the work titled Ta #l¯ıq¯at #al¯a Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ Samsiyyaˇ (Notes Accompanying “The Commentary on the Sun Trea- tise”). M. Handziˇ c´ drew attention to the introductory words that, among other things, say: “…Ibrah¯ ¯ım b. Ramad.an¯ al-Bosnaw¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı (Pruˇscak),ˇ al-Nawa- badi says: These words that I have written are in connection with The Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” by a distinguished scholar, a Bosniac…, from when I had the honor to study it under his guidance.”70 Based on these words, he concluded that “a distinguished scholar, a Bosniac” refers to Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, that Ibrah¯ ¯ım b. Ramad.an¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı was his student, and that this work is a marginalia (glossarium) to accompany Mus.taf. a’s¯ commentary.

69 M. Handziˇ c,´ “Nekoliko dragocjenih rukopisa u Karadozbegovoj¯ biblioteci u Mos- taru”, GIVZ, II/12, 1934,pp.633–639. 70 Ibrah¯ ¯ım b. Ramad.an¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı, Ta #l¯ıq¯at…, fol. 1b. In his work, M. Handziˇ c,´ quotes this sentence both in the original and in translation, although he skips the words “al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ıal-Nawab¯ ad¯ ¯ı” for no apparent reason. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 51.

bosniac authors and their works 51

In his doctoral dissertation, criticizing, in his opinion, this careless conclusion, Kamel el-Buhi assumed that the reference was to Muham-. mad b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ and the margin notes accompanying his work, and that Ibrah¯ ¯ım was his student.71 All subsequent researchers of Bosnian heritage in Oriental languages who wrote on this author and his opus, gave preference to one or the other theory without studying the contents of the work. This was most probably partly due to the fact that the paper by M. Handziˇ cdoes´ not give the number of the manuscript code or any other data on the manuscript at the time he reviewed it. Following the information that this manuscript was once kept at the manuscript fund of the Karadozbey’s¯ Library, we found the manuscript at Gazi Husrev-bey’s Library.72 Here are some conclusions on this author and his work: – the full name of the author, given in transcription, is: Ibrah¯ ¯ım b. Ramad.an¯ al-Bosnaw¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı an-Nawab¯ ad¯ ¯ı;73 – there is no original title in the manuscript, but, having in mind the formulation given by the author, the title as given by M. Handziˇ c´ can be accepted: Ta #l¯ıq¯at #al¯a Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ Samsiyyaˇ (Notes Accompany- ing “The Commentary on the Sun Treatise”);74 – detailed analysis shows that he made margin notes date in con- tinuo, with the work by Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ The Com- mentary on “The Sun Treatise”; – the work was not completed (unless another, complete, copy is found), but commentary is present until the end of the ﬁrst section (fasl). of the ﬁrst article (maqala).¯ 75 In other words, it contains marginalia accompanying:

71 Kamel el-Buhi, Arapski radovi jugoslovenskih pisaca,Beograd,1963,pp.394–395.Buhi made this conclusion based on the assumption that Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ was more famous as “al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı”, and that Ibrah¯ ¯ım b. Ramad.an,¯ if he had referred to him, would have used this name, rather than “al-Bosnaw¯ı”. According to the quotation that he adopted from Handziˇ c’s´ work (with the mistake that Handziˇ c´ made accidentally), we can assume that Buhi did not have contact with the manuscript itself. 72 GHB, R 4043 (ref. nr. of Karadozbey’s¯ Library, K 718). The manuscript has 55 sheets (fol. 1a–55a), sized 19×12cm, with 17 rows per page. 73 Fol. 1b. 74 See: M. Handziˇ c,´ “Nekoliko…”, pp. 635. 75 The basic text and the text of Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak’s¯ commentary are divided into: an Introduction (with two discourses), three articles and a Conclusion. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 52.

52 chapter two

1. Foreword, 2. Introduction, a) Discussion on the essence of logic, b) Discussion on the subject of logic, 3. On particular terms, a) Section on words.76 Today it is very difficult to state who Ibrah¯ ¯ım b. Ramad.an¯ was. How- ever, based on the scarce data found in the introduction to his work, it can be stated that he lived in the mid-17th century, that he was a student of Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ (therefore he wrote his work before 1636), that he was originally from Prusac, i.e. that he is linked to the location of Nawab¯ ad,¯ a settlement close to Prusac, founded by Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı (Pruˇscak).ˇ 77 Based on some indications such as the name Ibrah¯ ¯ım, the denotation al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı (Pruˇscak),ˇ the time period in which he was active, the field of his interests, etc. it is possible that he is the same person as an author mentioned by G. Flügel in his Catalogue.Flügelsaysthatheistheauthorofashorttextinthefieldof logic (two pages) that deals with four syllogistic figures.78 However, the data that would validate this assumption are scarce. As for the Notes Accompanying “The Commentary on the Sun Treatise”,it can be said that it is not only a collection of marginal notes (h.a¯ˇsiya) to Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak’s¯ work, but that its contents also underline its nature of an epigone. In most of the notes (ta#l¯ıqat),¯ Ibrah¯ ¯ım b. Ramad.an¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı, only tried to clarify what #Allamak¯ already said, but in a shorter and simpler way, and very rarely refers to additional literature in places where the original author did not, and, when he does, primarily to the works by Ibn S¯ına.¯

76 For Arabic titles of chapters, see the part on The Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” by Muhammadb.M. us¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ and The New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” by Mus.taf. ab.Y¯ usuf¯ b. Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı. 77 See: H. Sabanoviˇ c,´ Knjizevnostˇ …, p. 176 and A. Handziˇ c,´ “O formiranju nekih gradskih naselja u Bosni u XVI vijeku”, POF, XXV/1975, Sarajevo, 1976,pp.148– 152. 78 The title of this short discourse is ar-Ris¯ala al-muta#alliqa bi al-askˇ ¯al al-arba#a (A Treatise on the Four Figures), written (sic!, or copied?) in 1695/96 (1107), which is kept today at the National Library in Vienna, Mixt. 1327,3 (fol. 122v–123r). Compare: H. Sabanoviˇ c,´ Knjizevnostˇ …, p. 663 and S. Trako, “Ibrahim Munib Akhisari i njegov #Pravni zbornik"”, POF, 28–29/1978–1979, Sarajevo, 1980,pp.215. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 53.

bosniac authors and their works 53

F¯adil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı(Uziˇ canin)ˇ This author is not included in any of the major works of bibliographical character (either in the Ottoman chronicles, or in the works of more recent times). Collecting Oriental manuscripts in Bosnia and Herze- govina for the needs of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb, Aleksej Olesnicki came across a manuscript in the ﬁeld of logic, written by a certain Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, ﬁled it in the Oriental Col- lection of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences, and catalogued it for internal use. This catalogue note on Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı and his work is referred to by M. Zdraloviˇ c´ in one of the notes accompanying his “A Contribution to the Knowledge of the Work of Sejhˇ Jujo” (Mus.taf. a¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı).79 A detailed review of the manuscript copy of the work titled Sarˇ hmatn. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ıliMawl¯aal-F¯adil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı (A Com- mentary on “Isagogue” by Mawlaal-F¯ a¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı), which is today kept in the manuscript collection of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences,80 lead to the following conclusions: – the authors name given is “MawlaF¯ a¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı”; – the text has the above given title, used by A. Olesnicki, and it shows that it belongs to the group of semi-extensive commentaries of Isagogue by At¯ırudd¯ın al-Abhar¯ı; ¯ – the contents are divided in accordance with the basic text, into:

1. Foreword,fol.1b–3a, 2. Isagogue (inclusive of a discourse on words and a discourse on the ﬁve universal terms), fol. 3a–9a, 3. On interpretative speech (rules of deﬁnition and description forming), fol. 9a–10b, 4. On judgments,fol.10b–20a, 5. On syllogism,fol.20a–26b, 6. Apodictic,fol.26b–28a, 7. Dialectic,fol.28a–28b,

79 M. Zdraloviˇ c,´ “Prilog poznavanju…”, Hercegovina,nr.1,Mostar,1981,p.136,note nr. 33. 80 Oriental Collection of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Nº728.The manuscript has 29 sheets (fol. 1a–29a), sized 18×12cm, with 25 rows per page. Leather bound. Possibly autograph. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 54.

54 chapter two

8. Rhetoric,fol.28b, 9. Poetic,fol.28bi 10. Sophistic,fol.28b–29a.81 The work was completed in the summer (precisely between July 23 and August 2)of1657.82 Based on the sources and literature that is available today, it cannot be determined who Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ıwas— even the denotation “Fa¯dil”,. that is accepted as his proper name, is not necessarily his real name. Some Oriental manuscripts practiced replacing the name of an author with the word “fa¯dil”,. which means excellent, exquisite; prominent; learned, etc.83 The work itself, by its internal structure and contents, is very similar to The Commentary on “Isagogue” by Mus.taf. ab.Y¯ usuf¯ b. Ayyub¯ ¯ı- zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ıandThe Revelation of Secrets by Muhammad. b. Mus.taf. a¯ al-Caynawˇ ¯ı. The difference in structure between this and previously discussed works is that Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı did not include any introduction to his commentary, not even an invocation, but instead immediately started commenting on the basic work, and that its first page (fol. 1a) contains a short table of contents in Turkish. More significant differences are that Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, in the chapter On Syllo- gism (qiyas),¯ pays special attention to the first syllogistic figure and its modes, whereas for other figures he only gives the rules of deduction.84

Muhammad. b. Y¯usuf al-Bosnaw¯ı(Bosnjak)ˇ Just like the prvious work, the work titled Fath. al-asr¯ar f¯ı sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ıf¯ı #ilm al-man.tiq (Revelation of Secrets in Commenting on “Isagogue” in the Science of Logic), written by Muhammadb.Y. usuf,¯ “al-Bosnaw¯ı”, was discovered and catalogued for the needs of the Yugoslav (Croatian)

81 For Arabic titles of chapters, see the chapter on A Commentary on “Isagogue” by Mus.taf. ab.Y¯ usuf¯ b. Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı. 82 Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Sarˇ hmatn. …, fol. 29a. 83 A typical example of such use of this word was in the work by Ibrah¯ ¯ım b. Ramad.an¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı, who replaces the full name of Muhammadb.M. us¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ with the words: “al-fa¯dil. an-nihr. ¯ır al-Bosnaw¯ ¯ı”, which was, at the time and the place where he lived, suﬃcient to recognize who it was about. 84 See fol. 22b–23a. 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 55.

bosniac authors and their works 55

Academy of Arts and Sciences, by A. Olesnicki,85 and is later mentioned by M. Zdraloviˇ cinoneofhisnotes.´ 86 This work, just like the others presented here, is a commentary on Isagogue by At¯ırudd¯ın al-Abhar¯ı, and has the same structure: ¯ 1. Foreword,fol.107b–112b, 2. Isagogue,fol.112a–117b, 3. On interpretative speech,fol.117b–119a, 4. On judgments,fol.119a–125b, 5. On syllogism,fol.125b–130a, 6. Apodictic,fol.130a–131a, 7. Dialectic,fol.131a–131b, 8. Rhetoric,fol.131b, 9. Poetic,fol.131bi 10. Sophistic,fol.131b–132a.87

As the presented shows, this work belongs among shorter (sa. g˙¯ır) commentaries, and by contents it is similar to the previously presented commentaries on Isagogue. Similar to the work by Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, the chapter On syllogism (F¯ı al-qiyas)¯ gives a detailed analysis of the first syllogistic figure, while the other three are presented only through the rules of deduction and a number of modes per figure.88 This work originates from before 1841 (the date when it was copied), approximately from late 18th century. Although reliable data isn’t available, we can assume that the author of this work was the same person as Muhammad. b. Yusuf¯ (died in 1770), the librarian of Osman Sehdi’sˇ Library in Sarajevo, and the mufti of Sarajevo (1758–1763). This Muhammad. b. Yusuf¯ was mentioned by S. Kemura89 and H. Sabanoviˇ c,´ 90 and he wrote two works in Arabic syntax.91

85 Oriental collection of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Nº797/III. The work has 26 sheets (fol. 107a–132b), sized 11×16,8cm, with 15 rows per page. Lehter bound. Whole codex, this work included, was copied by a certain #Umer (Omer) Pilav, son of S.ali¯ h,. in 1841 (1257). 86 M. Zdraloviˇ c,´ “Prilog poznavanju…”, Hercegovina,br.1,Mostar1981,p.130,note nr. 34. 87 For Arabic titles of chapters, see the chapter on The Commentary on “Isagogue” by Mus.taf. ab.Y¯ usuf¯ b. Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı. 88 Vidjeti: fol. 127a. 89 S. Kemura, Sarajevske muftije od 926–1519.do1334–1916, Sarajevo, 1916, 14–15 and 15–16. 90 H. Sabanoviˇ c,´ Knjizevnostˇ …, 490–491. 91 The ﬁrst, Tab¯ıb al-mubtadi#¯ın, was completed in 1748 (1161), and it was written in ¯ 2008062. Ljubovic. 02_Chapter2. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 56.

56 chapter two

This exhausts the list of authors who have one or more works in the field of logic in their opuses. Still, there remains a number of names for whom it was impossible to catch the threads that would lead to solid facts on authors and classification of their work. Nevertheless, we can say that this material mainly presents fragments of commentaries on the Isagogue by At¯ırudd¯ın al-Abhar¯ı (usually syllogistic or presentations ¯ of the four syllogistic figures) and various mnemotechnic compositions, such as logical rules composed to verse, or charts of different division. And, eventually, that material contains nothing new or significantly different compared to the works presented here.

This summary of the contents of works by Bosniac writers in the field of logic shows that, despite differences in structure and types of works, specifically the differences in linking issues discussed in certain chapters, volumes or folios (apart from the marginalia that are a special kind of writing), they all exercise common general topics and have a clear focus on the elementary issues. Another characteristic of these works that they share with the rest of the heritage influenced by Ibn S¯ına,¯ is that all issues treated, regardless of different divisions, make up only parts of the unique entity of the Arabic organon. Therefore, these are not separate branches of logic that rest on their own canon, as logic was seen in the first centuries of Arabic logic, instead its parts create a complex but concrete entity. Its center lies in syllogism, and everything else either precedes it as a necessary precondition for understanding, or follows from it as its application. So, among the works by Bosniac authors there is no division of “books in logic” (kitab)¯ that existed in the preceding period.

Turkish, on Arabic syntax (manuscript: OIS, R 1128). The other, al-Yaq¯ın,isacom- mentary on an Arabic grammar for beginners, also in Turkish (manuscript: OIS, R 2584). 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 57.

chapter three

CHARACTERISTICS OF WORKS IN THE FIELD OF LOGIC—ISSUES IN THE FIELD OF LOGIC

Besides the fact that writings in the field of logic, as evident from the previous chapter, are classified differently, that they treat different issues in the field of logic differently, and that they vary in what they encompass, all these writings have unique general structure that springs out of the elementary concept of logic as a whole, as seen by Arabic Aristotelians. However, before the presentation of elementary issues in the field of logic, and before pointing out the assumptions, teachings and theories that logic is grounded in, it should be said that this text is presented in the order of the texts that are used as references for this book, and that this will be divided in four units, a division evident in the referential texts. First, subject, method, and objective of logic (from introduction and foreword), second, teaching of notions (assumptions and objectives), third, teaching on judgment and fourth, teaching on conclusion.

Subject, Method and Objective of Logic

One of the characteristics of valuable writings in the field of spiritual creativity in Oriental languages, and writings in the field of logic as well, is that the very beginning, besides the usual preamble—invocation and procedure (sometimes written with artistic pretensions) gives a very instructive and useful introduction or foreword. The length and quality of an introduction is different for each piece of writing, and it is often in proportion with the size of the work itself. The analysis of the writings of Bosniac authors shows that the data given in introductions can be classified into two groups: – information that help identify the author and the work (titles, in the modern sense of word, are rarely found); – information that help the reader understand the presentation that follows. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 58.

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Introductions from this second group often contain some very valuable information: – the area to which the work belongs, – the subject of logic and its definition, – the relation between logic and other disciplines, and in this context, the relation of a human being with the world, – the definition of thinking and logical contents of thinking, – the definition of cognition and how it is acquired, – the definition of science, what is the truth and how it is reached, – the definition of the starting points of logic, where it comes from and where it is going, – identification of sources and literature that the work lies upon, and – structure of the work, division to volumes, chapters, etc. Such well-organized introductions help the readers reconstruct the answers that the authors give to the elementary questions, such as: – What is logic? – What is its subject constituted of ? – What are its methods and what is its objective? Arabic logicians also adopted polemics originating as early as the time of stoics and the first Greek commentaries on Aristotle’s writings on the place and role of logic and its definitions, which are usually presented in the form of questions such as: is logic part of philosophy or not?, or is it a discipline or a skill, i.e. an instrument of science? Some traces of these polemics are also evident in the writings of Bosniac authors. But, first it would be useful to point out its roots and its main features. The classification of disciplines defined by Aristotle, especially definition of philosophy as “begging for principal questions” and its division had great influence on Arabic philosophers, bcause of the authority that the “first teacher” had in the minds of Arabic logicians. In his Metaphysics1 Aristotle said that any spiritual activity is either theoretical, practical or poetical. The task of theoretical philosophy is to study the problem of existence and being, practical philosophy studies human actions, and poetical philosophy, in a narrow sense, is related to technical and artistic actions. It was clear to the Arabic logicians, al- Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı and the Ibn S¯ına,¯ that logic (or analytics) does not fit into such a division, as it is a necessary precondition for any form of thinking,

1 Aristotel, Metaﬁzika [Metaphysics], Belgrade, 1960, VI, I, 1025b25. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 59.

characteristics of works in the field of logic 59

philosophical thinking included. In several places in his works, Ibn S¯ına¯ points out the essential character of logic,2 and two of his standpoints are reflected in the works of almost all Bosniac authors, either as quotations or as references. The first comes from his Book of Healing (Kitab¯ aˇs-ˇsifa¯") where he says: “If the term philosophy denotes only the science of beings, whether real or unreal, logic is a part of it, and if the term philosophy applies to all speculative research of whatever kind, logic, for sure is an integral part that plays the role of an instrument in other disciplines.”3 The other reference used by Bosniac authors to define logic is the first sentence from Ibn S¯ına’s¯ Book of Remarks and Admonitions (Kitab¯ al- iˇsar¯ at¯ wa at-tanb¯ıhat)¯ saying: “Logic offers a kind of instrument, that, if well used, can protect the human being from error in the process of thinking.”4 In all writings that followed, regardless of whether logic is treated as part of philosophy or not, it is at least at the “entrance into philosophy” maintaining the feature of “instrument” (ala).¯ 5 So Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ı al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ıinhisfirstworkK¯af¯ı’s Compendium of Logic, avoiding more detailed explanations, says that logic is a discipline, a science (#ilm), and that it is an “… instrument that has the characteristics of laws that prevent error of the mind (dihn) while thinking (fikr).”6 ¯ In the Commentary on his own piece of writing (fol. 6a–7a) he does not divert from the polemic. First (fol. 6a), he defines logic as a science, as it has its own subject of research and as “its essence is in research” (kawnuhu ba¯hit). Then, its important characteristic is that it is at the . ¯ same time a “tool” (ala)¯ or “instrument” (wasi¯ ta). of science, which has the nature of “law” (al-qanuniyya).¯ It is evident that the word “ala”¯ (tool) is a literary translation of the word “organon”, and that the word “qanuniyya”¯ clearly points out the peripatetic name for logic “canonic”. There is also the fact that al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ıinhisCommentary is critical of the above stated definitions, as its last part turns into a

2 See e.g.: Ibn S¯ına¯ (Avicenne), Livre des directives et remarques (Kitab¯ al-iˇsar¯ at¯ wa at- tanb¯ıhat),¯ traduction avec introduction et notes par A.-M. Goichon, Beyrouth–Paris, 1951,pp.79–81 and Kit¯ab as-ˇ sifˇ ¯a",al-Qahira,¯ 1952,pp.13–14 (fol. 4a, b). 3 Kit¯ab as-ˇ sifˇ ¯a",p.13. 4 Livre des directives…, p. 79. 5 The word ¯ala, pl. ¯al¯at literally means tools, device, instrument. That is where the name for logic comes from #ilm ¯alat¯ı, instrumental discipline. For more see: A.- M. Goichon, Vocabulaires comparés…, p. 2. 6 Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı min al-mantiq,OIS,R591,fol.29, also see: Izabrani spisi…, p. 62. ¯ . . 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 60.

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description (Arabic: rasm), “as it is defined in terms of the goal…, and as the goal of something is without itself, the definition becomes an external description”. However, as al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı later says, it was done to provide a clear and comprehensive presentation of the most important features of logic.7 He also adds that logic is called #ilm al-m¯ız¯an.8 Here the word that is usually used for chemistry stands figuratively, and although it is not to be found in standard dictionaries of Arabic, it is known in this meaning in the classical Arabic literature. Other Bosniac authors approach these issues in the same way. One of the authors who devoted most space and attention to this issue was Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ in his New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise”. Therefore, one of the chapters (baht) in the Introduction to his work is .¯ titled “Discourse on the Essence of Logic” (fol. 5a–10b). He gives a very precise and well-organized list of works that he used while researching this issue, pointing out primarily Ibn S¯ına’s¯ Book of Healing, Book of Remarks and Admonitions and Book of Safety, as well as Disclosure of Secrets and Explanations (Kaˇsf al-asrar¯ wa al-bayan),¯ 9 Shine of Illumination (Mat.ali¯ # al-anwar),¯ 10 Glitter of the Hidden Thoughts (Lawami¯ # al-asrar)¯ 11 and Gath- ered finesses (Gˇ ami¯ # ad-daqa¯"iq).12 He then presents different views of these issues, emphasizing al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı, who, according to Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ saw logic as a “tool” and Ibn S¯ına,¯ who treated it as “science” (#ilm), and his followers who considered logic to be “speculative philosophy” (al-hikma. an-nazariyya).. 13 Deducing his discussion on this issue, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ reaches a conclusion similar to that of Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, that “logic is science”, but is also the “instru-

7 Sarˇ hMuhtasar al-K¯af¯ı min al-mantiq,fol.7a. . ¯ . . 8 Sarˇ hMu. htasar. …, fol. 7a–b. This name¯ can be found in other writings of Bosniac authors, and it literally means: the science of order, scales, balance. Besides this name for logic, other terms are used, such as: mi#y¯ar al-#ul¯um, which literally means: measure, criteria of science (See e.g.: Muhammad. b. Mustafaal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr¯ar…, fol. 10a), then h¯adim al-#ul¯um, .. . ¯ literally: servant to science and ra"¯ıs al-hikma. (al-#ul¯um), literally: the head, the elder of wisdom (science). This use, according to Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, originates from Ibn S¯ınaandal-F¯ ar¯ ab¯ ¯ı (See: as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 3b). 9 Author: Afdaludd¯ın al-Huna¯ gˇ¯ı(1194–1249), see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,463. . ¯ 10 Author: Sira¯guddˇ ¯ın al-Urmaw¯ı (died 1283), see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,467; SI588. 11 This is the commentary on the previous work by Qutbudd. ¯ın at-Taht. an¯ ¯ıar-Raz¯ ¯ı, died 1346, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,467;GII209;SI848 and S II, 293. 12 Author Nagmuddˇ ¯ın al-Qazw¯ın¯ıal-Katib¯ ¯ı, student of the aforementioned Nas.¯ırud- d¯ın at-. Tus. ¯ı(13th century), see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,466–467 and S I, 845–848. 13 As-ˇ sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 1b–3b, especially fol. 1a and notes on the margins. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 61.

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ment of science”. It is a “part of philosophy”, but is also an “introduction into philosophy”. Muhammad. #Allamak¯ treats this issue in the same way, underlining that “logic is more of a science than can be assumed”, and that the attributes of “instrumentality” and “canonic” are general accident (#arad. #amm¯ li al-mantiq).. 14 The issue of logic is explained in detail in Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı- zade’s¯ work New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise”, similar to that of Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı #Allamak,¯ and unlike al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı’s work K¯af¯ı’s Compendium of Logic,Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade’s¯ own work, Commentary on the Isagogue and other works where logic is given in the contents of the work.15 The second part of the Introduction is titled “Discussion on the Subject of Logic” (Bahtf¯ımawdu¯# al-mantiq).16 Considerable space is .¯ . . devotedtothisissueinMus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade’s¯ Commentary on the “Training in Logic and Apologetics”, but even there he directs the reader to the New Commentary… (“…if you want to learn more, go back to our commentary on The Sun Treatise…”).17 Consequently, this paper will search for answers on the subject of logic according to the logicians of this circle in this Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade’s¯ piece of writing. As we have seen, logic is defined, with minor variations, as teaching the forms of correct and truthful thinking, but not all kinds of thinking, rather thinking that is scientific or in harmony with the scientific. Its goal is cognition (ma#lum¯ at).¯ Two basic elements with which to research and reach (tah.s.¯ıl) the unknown are tasawwur. ¯at and tasd. ¯ıq¯at,andare,at the same time, two basic elements of cognition. The term tasawwur. (pl. tasawwur. ¯at) denotes the elementary form of thinking and cognition on an actual or imaginary object, or, in Arabic vocabulary, cognition of the simple—the individual (idrak¯ al- mufrad), where cognition (idrak)¯ means perception—either through the senses (mahs. us¯ at),¯ or through mind (ma#qul¯ at)—and¯ intuition. In the conclusion, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ says: “Perception (idrak)¯ of a

14 Sarˇ har-Ris. ¯ala as-ˇ samsiyyaˇ ,fol.10b. 15 Usually the contents of a discipline is presented in very short form, in two-three sentences that present the contents of the work by chapters. So, for example, Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı says: “Logic has two (main) areas: tasawwur. ¯at and tasd. ¯ıq¯at.Eachofthe two has its objective and its goals. Its objectives tasawwur. ¯at are the five universalia (the five predicables), and the goal is definitions. Objectives tasd. ¯ıq¯at are judgments, and goal is syllogism and its forms. That makes four chapters, but I extended it to five, including (a chapter on) words.” (Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı min al-man.tiq,fol.2b–3a, also: Izabrani spisi…, 62). ¯ 16 As-ˇ sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 10b–11b. 17 Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 6a–6b. . ¯ . 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 62.

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simple thing is called tasawwur. .”18 This book will frequently translate the word tasawwur. as conception. However, this term has a different meaning in the common philosophical vocabulary, especially psychology. The term tasd. ¯ıq (pl. tasd. ¯ıqat),¯ according to Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ means “cognition of relations (idrak¯ an-nisba) between two notions, through acceptance (tasd. ¯ıq) of this relation, regardless of whether this cognition is a result of thinking or merely spontaneous acceptance, or whether this relation is truthful or not”. It therefore stands for a kind of judgment or assertion, so this book will often translate tasd. ¯ıq as assertion. Having in mind that the creation of conception can be subjected to error, such as taking accidence for essence and other, and multiple error in deduction of assertions, it is necessary to pose elementary rules that the spirit (dihn)19 should act upon. ¯ The perfect form of conception is the explicative discourse (qawl ˇsari¯ h),. that can be either definition (hadd). or description (rasm), and the perfect assertion is reached through argument (hugˇga),ˇ that can be either syllogism ¯ (qiyas),¯ induction (istiqra¯")orexample, i.e. analogy, (tamt¯ıl). Therefore, the ¯ main issue that logicians are interested in is starting from the known to reach the unknown (maghˇ ul—¯ at),¯ keeping in mind the laws of correct thinking.20 Moreover, Arabic logicians feel that there is no thinking without speech and vice versa, they define logic as a tool for correct thinking and a precondition for truthful speech (qawl). They focus on “study of words”, which they always place at the beginning of works in the field of logic as a precondition of successful understanding of the issues introduced later. Such a definition of the elementary subject of logic resulted in the elementary division of the problems treated by different works, including those written in form of compendia, and those that present very comprehensive discussions. And, eventually, with the definition and the subject of logic, it is necessary to present the theory of cognition, or to be more precise, the theory of intelligence, not only because its main assumptions are mentioned in the introductory parts of all works in the field of logic by

18 As-ˇ sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 11a–b. 19 Dihn—spirit, mind, intellect. As a notion it denotes the part of spiritual life manifested¯ as thinking, i.e. mind or intellect. In the ﬁrst translations of the Greek texts and in their interpretations, it was used to describe the Greek terms, nous and pneuma. See: A.-M. Goichon, Vocabulaires comparés…, “dihn”. ¯ 20 As-sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 11b. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 63.

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Bosniac authors among all, but also because it is treated as integral and inseparable part of logic. Understandably, because of the time and the conditions in which Bosniac authors lived, they tried to formulate the issue of cognition in their works in a severe formal logical framework, different from those in which these issues were discussed in the works that they used as references. So Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı’s K¯af¯ı’s Compendium of Logic presents only one assertion directed to the theory of cognition; it says: “The human cognition of abilities which accept the carving of the pictures of all things accepted through the senses (sensible) and through intellect (intelligible) is called the spirit, and that carving is called knowledge.”21 This assertion gives a mere hint that Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı thinks from al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı’s standpoint, according to which “the cognition can be compared with setting a seal”, who, in the attempt to clarify the process of cognition, uses Aristotelian tendency to link form to matter, the power to the act, and in this sense, the Aristotelian notion of a seal pressed in wax.22 Another important and distinguished element in al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı’s concept, that he will develop further in his Commentary…(fol.18b–19a) is his belief that the way to knowledge goes either through the senses (mahs. us¯ at)¯ or through intellect (ma#qul¯ at),¯ together leading to the particular or the universal. Later, in his (Compendium,fol.17bandCommen- tary,fol.21b), Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ı will develop on the basic operations of the intellect: abstraction (the creation of conception or ideas abstracted from matter), forming definitions or descriptions, i.e. the operation of combination, and, eventually, the formation of judgment. One of the works by Bosniac authors with the most comprehensive study on cognition was Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade’s¯ New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise”, and some very valuable notes were written in the margins of the first seven pages of the autograph. The theory of cognition is one of the most complex theories in Arabic philosophy, so its detailed presentation, especially having in mind the sources, conditions, genesis, etc. would go beyond the subject of this book.23 Therefore this

21 Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 7aandIzabrani spisi…, 66. 22 See:¯ C.ˇ Veljaciˇ c,´ Filozoﬁja istocnihˇ naroda, vol. II, Zagreb, 1979,pp.63 and 238 (selected texts). 23 Apart from the works that give over reviews of Arabic or Islamic philosophy and their main contents, which are given in the list of literature used, attention should 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 64.

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book will focus on the elements of this theory, as interpreted by Mus.taf. a¯ Yuy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ that are necessary for better understanding of certain problems of logic. It need be said that the classical Arabic theory of cognition focuses on the teachings of al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı and Ibn S¯ına,¯ so the European literature calls it “al-farabian—avicennian”. The basic ideas and solutions to the problem of intelligence was offered by al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı,24 and further developed by Ibn S¯ına.¯ 25 In the presentation these study elements, Mus.taf. a¯ Yuy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ starts with the teachings of al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı, connecting them to his theory of the “Ten Intelligences”. He gives a brief description of the types of intelligence, from the first to the tenth that manages sub-lunar world (tahta. falak al-qamar) and that is the source of human souls (nafs—nufus)¯ and the four elements (#unsur—. #ana¯sir,. fol. 2b–3a). The tenth intelligence is called the active intellect (al-#aql al-fa##al).¯ It cre- ates the matter (hay¯ ula)¯ that is necessary for the creation of the whole sub-lunar world, and it is at the same time the giver of form (wahib¯ as-. suwar,. Lat. dator formarum) and soul to the body when it is ready to accept it. The human soul tends to move in the way opposite of emanation, from the lowest level, upwards, to the ultimate, which starts its spiritual journey towards the original source, through different levels. The part of the human soul that it uses to know and think is called the intellect (#aql).

be paid to the following texts: Filozofija istocnihˇ naroda [Philosophy of Eastern Nations], volume 2, especially page. 62–100 and selected fragments from Ibn S¯ına’s¯ (240–256), al- Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı’s (238), Ibn Ruˇsd’s (271–273)andT. us¯ ¯ı’s (276) works, and the texts by M.M. Sharif translated in the Klasicnaˇ kultura islama, [Classical Culture of Islam] vol. 1,Zagreb,1973: on al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı (especially 348–353), on Ibn S¯ına(¯ 375–384)andIbnRuˇsd (398–407). As for the texts in Arabic, especially valuable for the studies on this topic are Gamˇ ¯ıl Sal. ¯ıba,¯ “Ma#an¯ ¯ıal-#aql f¯ı al-falsafa al-#arabiyya”, Magallaˇ (Revue de l’Académie Arabe de Damas), vol. XXIX, Nº4,pp.496–511,Dimaˇsq (Damas), 1954. 24 As much as it is possible to find sources for the theory on Ten Intelligences within the Greek philosophical tradition (Aristotelian definition of the movement of sphere, Plotin’s theory of emanation, etc.) this theory, according to M.M. Sharif, completely belongs to al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı. It was “formulated based on his desire to show unity and his methods of grouping and synthesis”. See: M.M. Sharif, A History of Muslim Philosophy,t. I, 460,or:Klasicnaˇ kultura islama,vol.1, 350. 25 This issue was treated by Ibn S¯ına¯ in several of his works. It is very clearly presented in his work Kit¯ab al-hud. ¯ud,inchapters“Hadd. al-#aql” and “Hadd. an-nafs” (11–16 and translated to French, pp. 13–23). It is probable that Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı- zade¯ did in fact use this work either directly or indirectly. Ibn S¯ına¯ directly quoted two of Aristotle’s writings: Posterior Analytics (Kitab¯ al-burhan)¯ and On the Soul (Kitab¯ an-nafs). 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 65.

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Further on, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ in accordance with the teaching developed by Ibn S¯ına,¯ 26 points out the existence of the potential intellect (al-#aql bi al-quwwa)27 that belongs to the human being, and that can become actual only through the constantly active intellect (al- #aql al-fa##al)¯ 28 which is, as we said, outside of it. It is evident that this elementary division presented by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ has its roots in the teachings of Aristotle on the flow of intellectual activity, and the interpretations of Alexander of Aphrodisias on nus (nus¯ poietikós i ¯ nus¯ dinamai or nus¯ pathetikós, which will, in the time of the medieval ¯ reception, acquire Latin names intellectus agens and intellectus possibilis).29 Not entering deeper into discussions on this very complex issue that caused a lot of controversy, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ concisely presents a sequence of human intellectual activities. The cognition ability belongs to the human soul (nafs) that has four levels. The first level, the material intellect (al-#aql al-hayul¯ an¯ ¯ı, Lat. intellectus materialis),30 is the ability that every individual human being possesses from the day of birth. Given this fact, the first intellect, before anything is accomplished in it, is an absolute potential. The first phase of its realization, or the second level, is constituted by the intellect with ability (al-#aql bi al-malaka, Lat. intellectus in habitu)31 that reaches axiomatic truth, primary intelligibilia (al-ma#qul¯ at¯ al-ul¯ a)¯ or, according to Ibn S¯ına,¯ “…the soul is ready to accept secondary intelligibilia, either through reflection or through intellectual intuition.”32 The third level, according to Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, is the intellect in effect or the actual intellect (al-#aql bi al-fi#l, Lat. intellectus in effectu),33 the level on which the mind understands secondary

26 Ibn S¯ına¯ (op. cit.), according to Aristotle’s On the Soul (III, 9) originally divides the intellect into the speculative (nazar. ¯ı) and practical (#amal¯ı). The focal point is still the speculative intellect. 27 Aristotle, On the Soul, III, 5. 28 Aristotle, On the Soul, III, 5. 29 Aristotle’s writings that describe the active intellect as the “general and eternal” caused diﬀerent interpretations, controversy and polemics among the philosophers on the “immortality of the active intellect.” 30 Aristotle, On the Soul, III, 5. 31 Compare: Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, II, 19 (Understanding of principles). The Arabic word al-malaka literally means: property, feature, characteristic, ability, etc. The meaning of this word is equal to the meaning of the Greek word héksis that Aristotle uses to mark the intellect that is aware of the ﬁrst principles. 32 Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at wa at-tanb¯ıh¯at, 325. 33 Compare: Aristotle, On the Soul, III 4. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 66.

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intelligibilia based on the primary intelligibilia and axioms (al-ma#qul¯ at¯ at-taniya).¯ ¯ ¯ And, finally, there is the fourth level, the level of perfection, the acquired intellect (al-#aql al-mustafad,¯ Lat. intellectus acquisitus).34 Therefore, intellect is able to move gradually and to develop from the material or potential to the acquired intellect, the level that can be reached only by few of the “chosen ones”. However, this gradual rising is not spontaneous; it is possible only through active intelligence that is transcendent and that gives higher forms of knowledge to a sensible and “prepared” human mind (isti#dad).¯ “Active intelligence is to the potential intellect what the sun is to the eye, whose abilities remain potential as long as we are in the dark”.35 On the other hand, intelligibilia potentially exists in the senses, and when abstracted from the senses, they actually exist in thinking. That clarifies two elementary operations of thinking: perception and abstraction, through which the intelligibilia moves from the potential to the actual, i.e. when the intellect transforms from the potential to the actual, and, eventually, acquired intellect, when it is capable of understanding abstract forms without any connection to the material contents. According to Ibn S¯ına,¯ the highest level of this ability is exceptionally strong intuition, when a person can gain knowledge from within. Ibn S¯ına¯ says: “A proof for that is the evident fact that the intelligibilia of the truth is gained when we find the middle member of the syllogism… If those differences (possessing higher or lower number of ‘middle members’ and speed in which it can be found, remark A.L.) are unlimited, and if they are always different in their level and their strength, and if the lowest point is within people who lack intuition whatsoever, then the highest point is within people who have intuition for all or most problems, or people whose intuition appears within the shortest timeframe. So, there could be a person whose soul is so thor- oughly clean and so tightly linked with rational principles that it burns from intuition, e.g. adaptability for inspiration coming from active intelligence. In this way forms of all things consisted in the active intelli-

34 A.-M. Goichon in Vocabulaires comparés (#aql mustafad)¯ shows that this term can be found in the commentary on Aristotle’s writings by Alexander of Aphrodisias: n¯us epíktetos. However, H. Corbin (Historija islamske filozofije, 179) underlines that, despite its name, acquired intellect should not be confused with n¯us epíktetos that Alexander of Aprodisias defined, as it presents state between the potential and the actual intellect. 35 H. Corbin, Historija islamske filozofije,p.179. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 67.

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gence leave their imprint on that person’s soul immediately, or almost immediately, and are not accepted by authority, but are based on their logical order that accepts all ‘middle members’.”36 Even such a short presentation of the theory of intelligence as explained in short by Bosniac authors—whether given as quotations or as definitions giving conclusions—makes it possible to summarize and conclude that cognition is observed as abstraction with different levels depending on the power of abstraction. Two operations of intellect are of importance for logic. In the first case, notions (tasawwur). are extracted from individual objects, and the second establishes relations among the terms and connections among the ideas (tasd. ¯ıq). The first operation is perception and intuition, and the second judgment.

Teaching of Notion

As pointed out earlier, notion and conclusion, definition and syllogism, are the elementary subjects that Arabic logicians were interested in. However, they treated teaching on notion with greater attention than the “first teacher” in Organon. This broadly presented problem, and the studying of notion, introduced a number of questions that entered the field of linguistics, logic, psychology, and even metaphysics, giving a certain contribution to the beginning of the Arabic theory on meaning.37 Although this book has an entire chapter dedicated to the relations of logic and philosophy and other disciplines, it should be pointed out here that Arabic scholars paid special attention to the studies of language in general, and logicians—as they follow the example of Aristotle and build Arabic logic through the medium of language, believing that the analysis of thinking as understanding of the objective reality can be done only through the analysis of language,38 pay special attention to this very subject. As speech and thinking form a very intricate unity in which language is especially complex and, from the aspect of multiplied meanings, often unconfident and insecure, Arabic logicians understood that

36 C.ˇ Veljaciˇ c,´ Filozoﬁja istocnihˇ naroda, II, pp. 242–243. 37 See e.g.: A. Elamrani—Jamal, Logique Aristotélicienne et grammaire arabe,Paris,1983. 38 See B. Seˇ ˇsic,´ “Aristotelov Organon” (Foreword to the edition of Organon,Belgrade, 1965), XII. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 68.

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the preconditions of studying overall logical issues were analysis, classification and evaluation of meaning, both the constitutive elements of language that show the rational form of meanings, and the ones that do not show it. Therefore, Bosniac authors, in accordance with the widely accepted tradition, began their writings in the field of logic with a so called “Study on Words.”39 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ısays: “The final point of the conceptions (tasawwur. at)¯ are the five universalia (the five predicables) whose goal is the definition. The final points of the assertions (tasd. ¯ıqat)¯ are judgments, and their goal is the syllogism and its forms. That makes four chapters, that I have extended to five, adding a chapter on words (f¯ı al-alfa¯z).”. 40 It was expected that the chapter on words should contain at least elementary theory on the meaning of words, the relation between terms and ideas. “The meaning (dalala),¯ is the existence of something in such a way that the knowledge of it is a source of knowledge about something else. The first is called the significator (dall)¯ and sign (dal¯ıl), and the other is the significated (madlul).”¯ 41 Although this definition that al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ıoffered is short, it clearly points out two elements. The first is that the meaning is the quality that makes something be not only what it is, but something else as well, and that in the process of semiosis an object is neither the nominator nor the nominated in itself, but only in relation to other objects. And the second is that he makes a very clear distinction between the significated, the sign and the significator. The meaning is further classified by two elementary principles: (1) whether the sign is spoken (lafz.¯ı) or not (gayr˙ lafz.¯ı), i.e. whether we in the process of semiosis have a verbal or another sign, and (2)bythe nature of the sign. These two elementary principles give the following classification:

39 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı min al-mantiq,fol.4a–7b, Sarˇ hMuhtasar al- . ¯ . . . ¯ . K¯af¯ı…, fol. 9a–18a; Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ har-Ris. ¯ala as-ˇ samsiyyaˇ ,fol.13a– 27b; Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı, page 6, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 14a–25b, Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 6b–8a; Muhammad. b. Mustafaal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, . ¯ . .. Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 11a; Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Sarˇ hmatn. …, fol. 3a–6a; Muhammad. b. Yusuf¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 112a–114a. 40 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 3a, translation into Bosnian: Iza- brani spisi…, p. 62. ¯ 41 See, fol. 3b, or: Izabrani spisi…, p. 63. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 69.

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1. Conventional meaning (wad.#iyya)42 assigned by choice and agreement with a meaning, that, according to the ﬁrst principle, can be: a) spoken (wad.#iyya lafziyya). and b) unspoken (wad.#iyya gayr˙ lafziyya).. 2. Intellectual meaning (#aqliyya) with which the mind helps the inter- preter understand the sign, that can also be: a) spoken (#aqliyya lafziyya). and b) unspoken (#aqliyya gayr˙ lafziyya).. 3. Natural meaning (tab. #iyya) with which the signs “naturally”, conditionally, or by similarity, etc. suggest what they mean. It can also be: a) spoken (tab. #iyya lafziyya). and b) unspoken (tab. #iyya gayr˙ lafziyya).. Al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ıinhisCompendium says: “It (meaning) is divided into three types: conventional, intellectual and natural. Each of them can be either: (1) spoken, such as ‘Zayd’, meaning someone’s name;43 the word heard behind the wall pointing out the existence of its speaker;44 word ‘ah’ indicating chest pain,45 or (2) unspoken, such as symbols that point out the meaning that they are used in;46 or when the produced indicates the producer,47 the redness of the face suggests shame, and paleness, fear.”48,49 The focus of logic will remain on the conventional spoken sign. Feeling that the term “unspoken sign” could remain unclear to the reader, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ gives a somewhat broader explanation of this term, giving examples for all three forms:

42 Word wad. #¯ı is derived from wad. #, literally meaning: putting; position; composition; establishment; signing contracts; and, eventually, convention.Al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı defines convention as “…the special definition of something by something, so that once the first one is shown or comprehended, the other is understood therein” (Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 3b, translated to Bosnian in: Izabrani spisi…, 63) and he also points out¯ that the convention is a special kind of agreement that guarantees acceptance of certain notions as means of communication, which do not have a value on their own. Aristotle, in On Interpretation, says: “We have already said that a noun signifies this or that by convention.Nosoundis by nature a noun: it becomes one, becoming a symbol.” (On interpretation, 2). 43 Example for the conventional meaning of a spoken sign. 44 Example for the intellectual meaning of a spoken sign. 45 Example for the natural meaning of a spoken sign. 46 Example for the conventional meaning of an unspoken sign. 47 Example for the intellectual meaning of an unspoken sign. 48 Example for the natural meaning of an unspoken sign. 49 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 3b–4a, translation to Bosnian: Izabrani spisi…, 63. ¯ 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 70.

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“If based on convention, unspoken meaning is conventional, for example degrees, knots, symbols or signs have the meaning that they were meant for. The intellectual (unspoken meaning) is the meaning with which a clue points to the one who left it… and the natural (unspoken meaning) is, for example, change in the face of a lover when he sees a loved one showing love.”50 Further division focuses on the conventional spoken meaning. This is the context in which the relation of terms and ideas is also discussed. The ﬁrst analysis shows that one word (term) can cover all meaning to which it is applied, that it can cover a part of that meaning, or some other meaning that springs out of its etymological meaning. Mus.taf. a¯ Yuy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ uses the word “man” to illustrate this division: a) If the word “man” denotes “reasonable animal”, then it is harmonic meaning (al-mut.abiqa),¯ 51 b) If the word “man” denotes only “reasonable” or only “animal”, then it is partial meaning, (tadammun). 52 and c) If the word “man” denotes “capable to learn”, then it is the consequential meaning (iltizam¯ ¯ı).53 The rest of the presentation of our authors focuses on the meaning that covers the contents of the word to the full (al-mut.abiqa),¯ considering the exactness required by logic.

50 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı, 8. 51 Mu.t¯abiqa (mu.t¯abaqa)basedon.t¯abaqa = to harmonize, to agree with, to be in accord with. Therefore, the adequate meaning or the meaning of complete harmony (adequacy) is when one word directly means the essence of the subject in terms of connecting and equalizing terms and objects. 52 Tadammun. based on tadammana. = to contain, to encompass, to consist. A more literal translation of this term would be included or implicit meaning. A. Soheil states that Arabic philosophical terminology uses this word in the sense of implication (see: Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian, Leiden, 1964, 28). However, the author of this book insists that, besides being contained, the meaning expresses, above all, only the part of the essence of the subject it stands for, whether expressing the genus or the specific difference. Therefore it will be translated as partial. 53 Iltiz¯am = necessity, necessary causal connection. For more on this classification, see: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, . ¯ . fol. 4a–b (Izabrani spisi…, 64)andSarˇ hMuhtasar…, fol. 10b–14a; Muhammadb.M. us¯ a¯ . ¯ . #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ har-Ris. ¯ala as-ˇ samsiyyaˇ ,fol.13b–17b; Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, Sarˇ h Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı, page 8–10, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 14b–18b, Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb…, fol. 6b–7b; Mu- . . . ¯ hammad. b. Mus.taf. aal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 13b–17b. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 71.

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Another division classifies meaning as simple (mufrad) and complex (mu"allaf or murakkab).54 In this division, starting from the logical criteria, the authors observe the word (lafz). in a broader context, keeping in mind whether a word has parts, at least phonetic units, and what are the relations of those units to any meaning, and what is their relation to the meaning that one wants to achieve. So, for example, the Arabic question word “a” has no parts, and as such, has no meaning in itself, while the same or other unit, e.g. letter “k”, has no parts either, but if in function of a symbol or abbreviation it can have a meaning. The word “man” has parts, but none of those parts in themselves have meaning,55 while the word “#abdullah”¯ 56 has parts and each of them has certain meaning, but that meaning is not the meaning achieved in the case that the word is functioning as a given name. The complex word (murakkab) can be completely complex (tamm)¯ or incompletely complex (gayr˙ tamm).¯ The first group, interesting to logic, can be judgments or phrases (a. command or prohibition, b. asking, c. plea, d. diversion of attention, etc.).57 Although complex words will be discussed in more detail in the chapter “On Judgment”, it needs to be pointed out that Arabic logicians used the terms “completely complex word” or “discourse” regarding a sentence as a contemplation or discourse unit, and “incompletely complex word” as a group of syntactically connected words. Understandably, these classifications, linked to the elements of categorical proposition, judgment and categorical syllogism, make a distinction between names (ism), words that, based on the previous divi-

54 The Arabic logicians found source for this classification in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Aristotle’s On interpretation. 55 Aristotle says: “Let me explain. The word ‘human’ has meaning, but does not constitute a proposition, either positive or negative. It is only when other words are added that the whole will form an affirmation or denial. But if we separate one syllable of the word ‘human’ from the other, it has no meaning; similarly in the word ‘mouse’, the part ‘ouse’ has no meaning in itself, but is merely a sound. In composite words, indeed, the parts contribute to the meaning of the whole; yet, as has been pointed out, they have not an independent meaning…” (On interpretation, 4). Compare: Hasan Kafija Pruˇscak,ˇ Izabrani spisi…, 64. 56 I.e. status constructus #abdull¯ah (slave of God) can be in function of the literal meaning or in function of the given name #Abdullah.¯ Although, formally, this word is complex, made of two words, from the aspect of meaning it is simple. Compare: Hasan Kafija Pruˇscak,ˇ Izabrani spisi…, 64. 57 This classification is presented very systematically in al-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı’s Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı . ¯ . …, fol. 4b–7a(Izabrani spisi…, 64–66) and in his commentaries on his own works Sarˇ h. Muhtasar…, fol. 13a–17a. ¯ . 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 72.

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sions, “have conventional spoken meaning but its parts do not have the desired meaning”, i.e. clear meaning, and that “do not indicate to the time”,58 verbs (kalima)59 “that have certain meaning, but at the same time indicate the time” and particles (ada)¯ 60 “that have no meaning standing alone, but when added to a name or a verb, they acquire it.”61 All these considerations at the same time create preconditions for better understanding the process opposite to denoting, the process of understanding, interpreting and defining the precise meaning of terms, words, symbols and expressions in general. Because, as pointed out by Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, in logic, as well as in scientific thinking in general, the ambiguity and arbitrariness of words and terms should be avoided at all cost.62 Arabic logicians based their solution for this issue on Aristotle’s Organon, from its first chapter “Categories”, where he discusses homonyms, synonyms and paronyms. However, they pay more attention to this issue, discuss the details of it and, understandably, base their research on the Arabic language, abundant in synonyms and homonyms, as well as other specificities. Considering the importance Bosniac logicians gave to this issue, and the fact that it resulted in the development of a separate discipline within philological research (#ilm al-wad.#) and contributed to the development of exegesis (more to be discussed in a special chapter), this book gives a summary of the elements of this teaching based on the texts of Bosniac authors. Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, in his New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” (fol. 20a–20b), points out that in language and thinking, the relation between the terms and the notions they denote can be expressed not only by one term denoting one notion, but that there are relations such as one-many and many-one. The first and the “clean-

58 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, l.c. Aristotle says: “By a noun we mean a sound signiﬁcant by convention, which has no reference to time, and of which no part is signiﬁcant apart from the rest….” (On interpretation…, 2). 59 Kalima literally means: word, discourse, but in the logical terminology it means verb. Compare the meaning of Aristotle’s term hr¯ema in On Interpretation, 3 and 4. Also see: A.M. Goichon, Vocabulaires comparés…, 30. 60 Ad¯a pl. adaw¯at literally means tools, instruments, and in logical terminology it means particles. Grammatical particles are usually described by harf—. hur. ¯uf. 61 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 5a(Izabrani spisi…, 64). Also see: . ¯ . Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Sarˇ h al-Muhtasar…, fol. 14b–15b. . . ¯ . 62 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, listed works, fol. 12b (page 70)and32b–33a. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 73.

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est” relation is given name (ism), and then the univocal or the word of the same meaning, i.e. harmonic word (mutawa¯ti. "),63 meaning the word that marks one idea, and is used for more units. Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal- Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı gives the example of the word “man” that means “reasonable animal”, but it at the same time denotes Zayd and #Amr and Bakr and other units of the human kind. Monosemism, therefore, stands for the unity of term and meaning in relation to the units, or, in al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı’s terminology, the unity of what is formed in the mind (dihniyya) and ¯ what is outside which is objective (hari¯ giyya).ˇ 64 Accordingly, the words ¯ that denote genus, species, characteristics and other universalia are univocal. Contrary to this, it is equivocal (muˇsakkik)65 if it does not relate equally to all units; it can provoke suspicion. Al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı adds that it “does not relate equally to units formed in one’s mind and external units, whether their realization (hu. s.ul)¯ through some units is stronger than their realization through the others, such as ‘whiteness’ in relation to ‘snow’ and ‘ivory’, as it is stronger in ‘snow’ than in ‘ivory’, or that their realization is older (more primary) or more complete in some units than in the other, such as ‘existence’ in relation to ‘necessary’ and ‘possible’ …”66 Another among the mentioned relations between words and their meanings is the situation when a word has several meanings and it is common (muˇstarak)67 to a number of diﬀerent notions. And, eventually, when talking about a number of terms, they can denote an equal

63 Mutaw¯a.ti" based on taw¯a.ta"a =toharmonize,toagreewith,tobeinaccordwith;it means univocal, unambiguous. The Latin word that has the same meaning is univocus. 64 See: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 5a. (Izabrani spisi…, 65). Latin terminology, according to W. Occam,¯ offers the following terms esse objective (contents of the mind, internal reality) and esse formaliter or subjective (external reality). See: W. Windelband, Povijest filozofije…, t. I, 375. 65 Musakkikˇ based on verb sakkakaˇ = to provoke suspicion. Some texts use the form mutasakkikˇ for one that provokes suspicion. Latin logical terminology has an adequate translation, aequivocus (of the same sound) since such a word, despite it being grammatically and linguistically identical, “provokes suspicion” in the sense of meaning, i.e. it can have different meanings, therefore different logical and cognitive values. 66 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 5b(translation:Izabrani spisi…, 65). ¯ 67 Mustarakˇ = common, Latin nomen commune or according to Aristotle homonim: “Things are said to be named ‘equivocally’ (in Greek: μω"νυμα, A.L.) when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each.” (The Categories,I,chapterI,5.) 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 74.

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number of different notions in the sense of difference (ihtilaf),¯ i.e. the ¯ terms may be different (muhtalif),68 or a number of different words ¯ denoting the same notion, e.g. synonyms (mutaradif).¯ 69 Along with these elements on relations that words have with what they mean or could mean, and the relations between terms and ideas, some of the authors immaculately and systematically research he actual meaning (haq. ¯ıqa),,70 transferred (manqul)¯ meaning (customary, terminological, etc.)71 and figurative meaning (magˇaz).¯ Among the Bosniac authors it is most evident in the works of Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı. This is what in short the general starting points of the theory of meaning studied by Arabic, and consequently Bosniac logicians, looked like. The theory of meaning was not just put at the beginning of the logical discussions, as a mere introduction to Porphyry’s Introduction (Eis- agogé); it also had a great role in the development of Arabic philosophy, theexegesisofTheQur"an, and exegesis in general.72 The interpretation of The Qur"an, and traditional codes (had¯ıt) that were strongly . ¯ supported by the theory of meaning, will have long-ranged effects on the birth and development of a number of disciplines, from speculative theology (kalam)¯ to Islamic law (fiqh and ˇsar¯ı#a). Therefore, a large number of texts, including those written by Bosniac writers, classified according to their title, as theological, grammatical, syntactical, or commentaries on poetry etc., would be very interesting to analyse through the aspect of the theory of meaning and technique and the methodology of interpretation. These elements of the theory of mean-

68 Some texts in the field of logic offer the term mutaz¯ayil with the same meaning. 69 Mutar¯adif, active participle of tar¯adafa = to follow; to have the same meaning; to be synonymous (words). Compare: Aristotle, The Categories,I,chapterI,5. 70 The term haq. ¯ıqa (literally: truth; reality; fact; truthfulness; etc.) in Arabic philosophy has several meanings. In logic it denotes logical essence, and the word that means empirical truth and truthfulness is made based on the root word s. dq. (see: A.-M. Goi- chon, Vocabulaires comparés…andC.ˇ Veljaciˇ c,´ Filozofija istocnihˇ naroda, vol. II, 70). The term that is used in the meaning opposite to haqq. is usually b¯a.til, and opposite to sidq. is kidb (ka¯dib). ¯ ¯ 71 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, like many other authors, points out three types of transferred meaning (manqul):¯ “Those are: habitual (#urf¯ı), if they are transferred by some general habit, like: ‘four- legged’; transferred through Sheria (ˇsar#¯ı), if transferred by religious code, words such as ‘fasting’ or ‘prayer’ and terminologically transfered (is.til. a¯h.¯ı) if transferred through special convention, such as ‘al-fi#l’ (verb) in the terminology of linguists”. (See: Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı …, fol. 6a, translation: Izabrani spisi…, 65.) ¯ 72 See: Miklós Maróth, Die Araber und die antike Wissenschaftstheorie, Leiden, New York, Köln, 1994 and “Die Eisagoge bei den Arabern” in: Zivaˇ antika (Antiquité vivant), XXV, Skopje, 1975,pp.457–460. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 75.

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ing, presented within texts in the field of logic, made good grounds for the development of a separate discipline which had a lot of followers among scholars—the so-called “science on notions” (#ilm al-wad.#).73 Among Bosniac authors who were active in the field of logic and who rendered their services in the development of this discipline is Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, who wrote Marginalia on the Commentary on the #Adududd. ¯ın’s Treatise on Notions by #Is.¯amudd¯ın (H. a¯ˇsiya #ala¯ ˇsarhar-Ris. ala¯ al-#Adudiyyaf. ¯ıal-wad.# li #Is.amudd¯ ¯ın) in 1691.74 The autograph of this marginalia has 184 pages. #Adududd. ¯ın’s Treatise,one of the fundamental works by #Adududd. ¯ın al-I¯gˇ¯ı75 and commentary on this work by #Is.amudd¯ ¯ın al-Isfara¯"in¯ı76 are at the very core of this work. The goal that Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ had in mind while writing his Marginalia was to make al-I¯gˇ¯ı’s work understandable and to oppose some interpretations given in the commentaries on #Is.amudd¯ ¯ın’s writing. From the aspect of interpretation, also interesting and very valuable are the commentaries by Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı whose abilities, broad education, knowledge of Arabic, and immaculate methodology, are emphasized by Husein Abdel Latif and Kamel el- Buhi.77 The issue of generality, individuality and uniqueness of objects and notions, and, linked to that, the issue of universalia—general notions, their definitions and different classification, take up a special place in the writings by Bosniac authors. However, the history of Arabic logic does not treat this issue the way it is treated in the West, meaning having a clear division and disputes among realists, nominalists and con- ceptualists.78 Therefore, it is not possible to find discussion treating this

73 On status and importance of this discipline, see: Bernard G. Weiss, “#Ilm al-wad. #: An introductory account of a later Muslim philological science”, Arabica—Revue d’études arabes, T. XXXIV, fasc. 3, Brill, Leiden, 1987,pp.339–356. 74 The autograph of this work is kept at the Gazi Husrev-bey’s Library in Sarajevo, nr. 3957. 75 "Adududd. ¯ın al-I¯gˇ¯ı, died in 1355; see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G II, 208 and S II, 287. 76 See: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,305;GII,208 and S I, 533. 77 Husein Abdel Latif es-Sayyid, Muhamed Musa “Allamek”…, 176 and Kamel el-Buhi, Arabic Writings by Yugoslavian Writers (doctoral thesis defended on the Faculty of Philology of the University of Belgrade), Belgrade, 1963, 104. 78 See: Gyula Klima, “The Medieval Problem of Universals”, in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Internet: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/universals-medieval/ (last visit May 5, 2006) 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 76.

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issue separately in the history of Arabic philosophy and creative work in general.79 This, of course, does not mean that Arabic logicians did not have different views on this issue. In order to get a clearer picture of their views, and to be able to define them more precisely, this book will use generally accepted Latin terminology. However, before the presentation of these views and classifications, here are some introductory remarks. Although Aristotle offers some elements on teaching of the universal, especially in the 4th and the 5th chapter of Topics, early Arabic logicians relied on Porphyry’s Introduction to Aristotle’s categories, or popular Isagogue, that became a part of the textbooks of Aristotle’s philosophy. The subject of Porphyry’s discussion was predicabilia—marks that can be predicated, or five possible predicates (Latin: genus, species, differentia, proprium and accidens)—research and understanding of which is, according to Porphyry, necessary for interpreting Aristotle’s Categories, forming definitions, understanding division (divisio) and deduction of proofs.80 As Arabic logicians generally never worked on the categories feeling that they did not belong to the field of logic,81 the analysis of the general notions, as can be seen from the quoted fragment of al- Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı’s work,82 is taken as an assumption for the successful creation of definition and description, and then the deduction of proofs. There- fore, the works by Bosniac authors, as evident from their structures, have discourses on universalia at the very beginning, either in the first chapter, or in an introduction to the “Discussion on Words”, but always before the text on definitions and descriptions, i.e. before the logical procedure that defines the contents and the scope of a notion. There-

79 See, e.g. the very comprehensive work Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur by C. Brockelmann. 80 Histoire de la Philosophie, t. l, “Encyclopédie de la pleiade”, éd. Gallimard, 1969, pp. 905–908 and pp. 1267–1269. Also see: A.N. Prior, Historija logike, especially 5th chapter, “Srednjovjekovna logika”, pp. 57–77 by Ernest A. Moody. The foundation of logical work in scholastics from the 12th century on, was so called “Corpus Logicum” composed of “Logica Vetus” preceded by Boety’s translation of Porphyry’s Eisagogé,thenAristotle’sCategories and On Interpretation and, in the end, Boety’s commentary on Eisagogé. Only so called “Logica Nova” gives Aristotle’s Topics, both Analytics and On Sophistical Refutation. 81 Discussions on categories by these authors are marginal. If deﬁned, they are usually deﬁned as the highest notions. See.: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Sarˇ hMuhtasar…, . . ¯ . fol. 28bandMus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı,pp.19. 82 See footnote 15 in this chapter. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 77.

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fore, this issue is often approached from the aspect of division of notions and words. The analyzed texts show that the objects, and notions that they are expressed by, can be of dual nature: (1) particular (guzˇ "¯ı) or (2) universal (kull¯ı),83 both in different degrees. The particular notions can be those that mark (a) one person (personal—ˇsahs¯ı);84 (b) the notions that mark one individual thing that is an ¯ . entity in itself, that does not exist in more than one unit; such notions are called absolutely particular or true (guzˇ "¯ı haq. ¯ıq¯ı); or (c) the notions that are relatively particular (guzˇ "¯ıid.af¯ ¯ı) that can be either individual or general, depending on the context. “It is sometimes said for each of the two (above mentioned notions. A.L.) that they are relatively particular: ‘Zayd’ in relation to ‘man’, and ‘man’ in relation to ‘animal’. It (‘man’) is relatively individual, although it is general if in relation to what precedes it. Each true individual (notion) is relative, but each relative is not a true individual.”85 Universal notion (kull¯ı) can be: either (1) essential (dat¯ ¯ı) or (2) accidental ¯ (#arad.¯ı). The first group are: (a) genus (gins),ˇ (b) species (naw#)and(c)difference (fasl), and the second (a) property (ha¯ssa) and (b) general accidence (#arad . ¯ .. . #amm)¯ that can be either separable accidence (#aradmuf. ariq)¯ or inseparable accidence (#aradl. azim).¯ 86 It is clear that this division was based on relation towards what something is (mahiyya),¯ 87 therefore towards the essence. The issue of

83 Compare: Aristotle, On Interpretation, II, chapter 7 and Posteior Analytics,I,chapter 17. 84 Compare: Aristotle, Categories, 5th chapter. 85 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 7b–8a(Izabrani spisi…, 66). Also see his commentary on the same work,¯ fol. 23a–24a. 86 The division of accidence to separable and inseparable is not used by the “first teacher”, Aristotle. This distinction probably comes from Porphyry. See: I. Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote dans le monde arabe,Paris,1969,p.69 and pp. 232–233. As for the general notions, it should be mentioned that the community of scholars Ihwan¯ as-safainthe¯ Encyclopaedia (ar-Rasa¯"il), in the tenth treatise titled “Risala¯ f¯ı ¯ . . Is¯ a¯g˙u¯gˇ¯ı”, believed that person (ˇsahs). should be added as the sixth universalia to the five defined ones. Also see: I. Madkour,¯ L’Organon d’Aristote…, 74. 87 M¯ahiyya is a neologism that some authors define as consisting of the relative pronoun m¯a and the third person singular personal pronoun huwa. Other authors treat it as a relative noun (nomen relativum) based on ma where “hamza” transformed into “h” (see: al-Gurˇ gˇan¯ ¯ı, Ta #r¯ıf¯at,“mahiyya”).¯ This word marks the essence of things, and corresponds with Aristotle’s term “tó ti én éinai” (what something is) or the scholastic term “quidditas”. See: A.-M. Goichon, Vocabulaires comparés…, “mahiyya”.¯ 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 78.

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the universalia is usually linked with the issue of the relation of notions, e.g. on relation of genus to the species, and the logical relativity of the notion of genus is pointed out. Here is what Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı wrote on this issue: “It is possible that a logical essence—reality (haq. ¯ıqa) has more than one genuses, e.g. ‘animal’, is a genus for man”, then there is the ‘developing body’, then ‘absolute body’, then ‘substance’. The genus that can take in all participating notions is called genus proximum (ginsˇ qar¯ıb), e.g. ‘animal’, takes in ‘man’ and all the notions that participate in ‘animal’, while the notion that cannot take in all participating notions is called distant genus (ginsˇ ba#¯ıd). If there are two groups of notions participating in one genus, then it is distant by one level, as for example, ‘developing body’, since it takes in both ‘man’ and ‘plant’ and other animals. If there are three groups of notions, then it is distant by two levels, as e.g. ‘absolute body’. Therefore, whenever genus is widened, the distance is increased by one level, and the participating group of notions has more primary properties.88 The highest genus is called summum genus (ginsˇ al-agnˇ as),¯ as is ‘substance’ in the mentioned example, and the genus minor—lower (ginsˇ safil)¯ is ‘animal’. The levels between the lowest and the highest are called the middle genus (ginsˇ mutawassit),. and in this case they are ‘developing body’ and ‘absolute body’.”89 In order to indicate the relativity of relations between genus and species, a classification of three species is given (naw##al¯ ¯ı—higher species; naw# mutawassit—. middle species;naw# safil—¯ lower species and naw# al- anwa¯#—the species of species)90 and it is shown which of these species can be genus and under which conditions.91 It is also shown that the highest notions are categories and the lowest notions are notions of individual

88 This standpoint, together with the previous presentation, implies the relations between the contents and the scope of notions that are in reversed proportion, i.e. the notions that are in mutual relation of genus and species—the bigger the contents, the smaller the scope, and vice versa. 89 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 9b–10b(Izabrani spisi…, 68). Also see Komentar Kompendijuma…, fol. 27¯ b–28b. 90 This classiﬁcation, and especially examples given in the texts, show that it is a reproduction of a pattern known as Porphyry’s tree. 91 “Porphirus’s tree” can be reconstructed based on all the works that are the subject of this book, except for those written in form of marginalia (See, e.g.: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal- Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 9b–11a, translation: Izabrani spisi…, 86), these issues . ¯ . are discussed in detail by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ in his as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 30b– 36a, and thus Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ himself directs the readers to this work in his Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb . ¯ al-man.tiq…, fol. 12b–13a. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 79.

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objects.92 However, as pointed out above, Arabic logicians, especially the ones from the later period, did not pay attention to categories in their works, because, ever since the time of Avicenna, it was believed that categories are a subject of metaphysics or ontology, and not of logic. Bosniac authors, in the extreme cases, merely mention categories and cite works where more can be found on the topic. The discussion of the nature of the universalia has not been present among Arabic logicians, especially in the later period, to the extent it was in Medieval Europe. Although different views on this issue can be found, from clear nominalism to extreme realism, Arabic philosophy will be dominated by moderate nominalism or moderate conceptualism, where individual objects are considered to exist realistically, that they are the first, while notions and ideas are the second, created in the reason as a result of abstracting the concrete.93 Hence, the universalia are based on objects on the one hand, and on the other, they are the creation of reason.94 This point of view is explicitly or implicitly present in all the works by Bosniac authors, although it was not reached through discussion but taken as is. The only author who treats this issue in more detail is Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ in his New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise”95 and Commentary on the “Education in Logic and Apologetic”.96 The fact that the works of other Bosniac authors, and most of the authors from the later period in general, do not offer detailed discussions on this issue, can be understood as a consequence of a dominant understanding of that time. Put simply, it was assumed that a general notion exists, but the discussion of its nature or whether

92 See: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 28a–28bandMustafaY¯ uy¯ o¯ . ¯ . .. Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı, 19. 93 See: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 7b(translation:Izabrani spisi . ¯ . …, 66), Sarˇ hMuhtasar…, fol. 22b–23a; Muhammadb.M. us¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ har-Ris¯ala . ¯ . . as-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 21a–21band27b–28b; Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı, page 11–12, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 25b–26band38b–39a; Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, . . ¯ . fol. 8b–9a; Muhammad. b. Mus.taf. aal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 19b–23b; Muham-. madb.Yusuf¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 114a; Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Sarˇ hmatn. …, fol. 5a– 5b. 94 Moderate nominalism of Arabic logicians is directly linked to the realism of cognition theory, which, as explained before, stands on the assumption that there is the reality, that there is the outside world independent of the human consciousness and that the human consciousness, in the process of cognition, seizes this reality as it is. 95 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ devotes one whole chapter (fasl). with ﬁve researches (mabha. t) to the relations between the universal and the particular issues, see: as-ˇ Sarˇ h. al-gadˇ ¯ıd…,¯ fol. 38b–50b. 96 Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 14b–15a. . ¯ . 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 80.

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it has an adequate correlant notion etc. was not considered an issue of formal logic, as it is not limited to forms of thinking. The discussion on the universalia in the West also became more fierce, and, according to B. Boˇsnjak, “the contemplative area started to be defined in sense of ontological categories.”97 Furthermore, there is the objective difficulty of the problem that required the author to be accutely aware of the cognition methods and other assumptions that would enable to understand a realistic link between the general and the individual, without damaging the theological discipline and tradition.98 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, who evidently was under the strong influence of Ibn S¯ına¯ and the commentary writers who followed him, besides the above mentioned divisions and standpoints, accepted and passed on Avicenna’s theory on the nature of ideas99 that resulted in a dissection of the general notions into three dimensions: natural (tab. #¯ı), intellectual (#aql¯ı) and logical (mantiq. ¯ı), and then he placed focus on their existence before the plurality or things (qabla katra, Latin: ante res), ¯ in plurality (ma#akatra or f¯ıkatra, Latin: in rebus) and after plurality (ba#da ¯ ¯ katra, Latin: post res). Here is what MustafaY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ said on ¯ .. this issue: “General (notion) is either (1) before things, and then that is the form100 of a being (that exists) in the first active principle before the existence of individual thing—similar to how the soul of a carpenter carries the form of a bed before he makes the individual beds—or (2)itiswith things or within things, which is a general notion existing in the context of its individual objects, without its actual existence… or (3)itisafter things, and that is the one (general notion) that the soul abstracts from the individual and separates it101 discarding the individual.”102

97 See: B. Boˇsnjak, Filozofija od Aristotela…, 102,aswellas:I.Madkour,L’Organon d’Aristote…, 137–140. 98 Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ for example, emphasizes that these fit better in metaphysics and theology. See his work, fol. 28b. 99 See: I. Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote…, 151 and 154, and text “Teaching on Being” in: Klasicnaˇ kultura islama…, pp. 363–368. 100 S. ¯ura, literally means form, shape, in sense of external plastic shape. Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ uses this word in the same meaning used by Ibn S¯ına,¯ substantial form. It covers the meaning of Plato’s notion archetype. See: A.-M. Goichon, La philosophie d’Avicenne et son influence en Europe Mediévale,Paris,1979,pp.67–68. 101 Intaza#a—yantazi#u literally means to be separated, removed from something, and with prepositions #an it means to put aside, to separate something, to abstract something. Ibn S¯ınausesthiswordtodenote¯ abstraction; see: A.-M. Goichon, Vocabulaires comparés…, “naz#”. 102 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 39. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 81.

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These standpoints that Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ passed on in the shortened version from Ibn S¯ına’s¯ Kit¯ab as-ˇ sifˇ ¯a"—the triple existence of ideas and universalia (ante res, in rebus, post res, then genus naturale, genus mentale and genus logicum)—can also be found among the Latinist philosophers from the early 12th century on. W. Windelband shows that this formula was first taken over from Ibn S¯ınabyPierre¯ Abélard (1079–1142), to be later accepted by Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus.103 Unlike other authors, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ in his New Commen- tary…andMuhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı #Allamak¯ in the Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” discuss the issue of relations between notions given their contents and scope, in the context of general notions.104 Both these authors divide this issue in two categories. The first category is the notions that are mutually congruent (mutasawiy¯ an),¯ and the other are incongruent or opposite (mutabayin¯ an)¯ notions. Regarding congruent notions, both authors point out three elementary relations, although they do not offer specific terminology for each. The first relation is those notions that are completely adequate to one another, or have the same scope (equivalent); the second relation is the one where one notion is “more general” (a#amm) and “inclusive” (ˇsamil)¯ at the same time, while the other is more “special” (ahas.s). and “included” (maˇsmul),¯ which can be interpreted as relations of subordination and super-ordination; and the third relation is the one of notions that are partially overlapping, that partially share their scope or contents (interfering). It is evident that this classification, compared to modern textbooks in formal logic, lacks the so-called relation of identity and the relation of coordination. Actually, in the first case it is not really a relation of two notions, but two words—synonyms (mutaradif)¯ that have the same contents and the same scope, while in the second case it is a relation of two notions of the same level of generality (#umum)¯ that are subordinate to the same notion, but are not even partially overlapping in their scope, and thus cannot be considered congruent (mutasawiy¯ an).¯ The remaining relations are compared by pairs and classified under incongruent or opposite notions (mutabayin¯ an),¯ including the above men-

103 See: W. Windelband, Povijest ﬁlozoﬁje…, t. I, 344 and on, as well as I. Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote…, 154. 104 Muhammad. b. Mus¯ aal-Bosnaw¯ ¯ı #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ Samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 28b–30b; Mus-. taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 40a–45a. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 82.

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tioned relation of coordination (“man”—“horse”), as well as the relation of contrariness (didd),. contradiction (tanaqu¯ d). and complete difference (ihtilaf)¯ when notions cannot be compared e.g. when they are in disparity ¯ (muhtalifan).¯ ¯ Finally, it should be said that the part dealing with the relations between notions, specifically the part where the issue of opposition of notions is mentioned, is presented quite poorly in both works. It lacks the system and organization that the rest of the work is characterized with. Maybe that is a consequence of the nebulous parts in the refer- enced basic texts, but comparing these works to the others, including the works of Ibn S¯ına,¯ we can conclude that this issue was not treated on an adequate level. This is shown by the fact that most of the works in the field of logic in Arabic do not even mention this issue, as is the case with other Bosniac authors. Furthermore, Aristotle treats the issue of the opposition of notions together with categories (Categories,volume10 and 11), and this book has already given the views of Arabic logicians towards categories. Bosniac authors too have presented the theory of opposition in a clearer and a more systematic way in chapters on judgment and opposition of judgments.

Definition and Description The issue of definition and description is also one of the subjects to which Arabic logicians devoted great attention and treated as one of the fundamental issues of logic. The problem was defined and solved by Ibn S¯ına.¯ In his works on logic he treated issues of definition and description systematically and in great detail.105 His solutions to the given problems were adopted literally by other logicians. In his works Ibn S¯ına¯ based his explanations on three sources. For the definition of definition he took Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (especially volume 2, chapter 13)andTopics (especially volume 1, chapter 5, and volume 6) and for the definition of description, he used the works by Galenus.106 Works by Galenus affected the most significant elements of the view of Arabic philosophers and logicians on description (rasm). Miklós

105 See, e.g: Nagˇ¯at,pp.120–125, 129, 133–134 and 137–140; Kit¯ab al-hud. ¯ud…, introduction, 1–10, especially pages 10–11; Kit¯ab al-is¯ar¯at…, pp. 103–111. 106 Besides these writings, reference books mention the works by Socrates and Plato. See more: I. Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote…, 119–120 and 133–137;IbnS¯ına,¯ Kit¯ab al- hud. ¯ud…, 6 (Introduction A.-M. Goichon), note 1. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 83.

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Maróth rightfully concludes that: “Die Stoiker wandten dort eine Be- schreibung (hypographe) an, wo die Peripatetiker difinierten, und eine hypographe hat einen ganz anderen Aufbau als unser Beispiel. Die Über- legung liegt nahe, daß wir es hier nicht mit einer stoischen Ansicht zu tun haben. Dies scheinen auch Galens Worte zu bestätigen, der behauptete: ‘Es ist die Angewohnheit der Hellenen, ihre allgemeingülti- gen Aussagen in ‘Dreiecken’ order in der Form ‘des Dreiecks’ auszu- drücken. Im ersten Fall bezieht sich der Ausdruck auf alle Einzel- wesen, im zweiten Fall auf den diese zusammenfassenden Artenbe- griff.’”107 In his works Aristotle mentions the two elementary types of definition: definition that explains the essence of things, and definition that explains the meaning of words. Later Latin terminology offered the terms definitions quid rei and definitiones quid nominis. Ibn S¯ına¯ remained primarily interested in the first type of definition, the actual definition (al- hadd. al-haq. ¯ıq¯ı), while he felt that the other, nominal definition (al-hadd. al-lafz.¯ı), has no logical value, as it is based on the mere explanation of one word by the other, and therefore cannot serve as a realistic premiss.108 In the later period of the development of logic in Arabic this issue takes up a chapter, usually titled “al-Qawl aˇs-ˇsari¯ h”—Interpretative. discourse, or “F¯ı at-ta#r¯ıfat”—On¯ Explications.109 This is also the case among Bosniac authors, as shown by the quoted structures of the texts in the field of logic. Most of these texts exclusively discuss realistic definition in Ibn S¯ına’s¯ meaning, while the texts by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ New Commentary…, and Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı #Allamak¯ Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” explain in short the nominal definition as well (at-ta#r¯ıf al-lafz.¯ı).110 Bosniac authors often use the following completely identical definition of definition:

107 See: Miklós Maróth, Ibn S¯ın¯a und die peripatetische “Aussagenlogik”, E.J. Brill, Leiden, New York, Kbenhavn, Köln, 1989,p.82. 108 Ibid, note 105. 109 Although the syntagm qawl sˇ¯arih. and the word ta#r¯ıf¯at are used in the very broad sense of the meaning, in texts in logic they denote the deﬁnition in a broader sense (deﬁnition and description), or are used in the translation of Aristotle’s On Interpretation. 110 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 53b; Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ ,fol.37b. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 84.

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“Definition is the discourse that marks the essence of things (Al-hadd. qawl dall¯ #alam¯ ahiyya¯ aˇs-ˇsay")”.111 It is clear that this is the literally translated definition of Aristotle taken over by Bosniac authors from Kit¯ab al-hud. ¯ud by Ibn S¯ına,¯ where he says: “Definition, according to the Philosopher (Aristotle, A.L.) in his Topics, is the discourse that marks the essence of things, i.e. the perfection of their essential being.”112 Further on, texts distinguish between the complete (al-hadd. at-tamm)¯ and incomplete definition (al-hadd. an-naqi¯ s).. Hasan al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ısays: “Firstly, the complete definition, and it is comprised of closer genus (genus proximum) and closer difference (differentia specifica), such as e.g. ‘reasonable animal’ in the definition of ‘man’.113 Secondly, the incomplete definition, and it is comprised of distant genus and closer difference, such as ‘reasonable developing body’ or ‘reasonable substance’ in its (of ‘man’, A.L.) definition.”114 Therefore, the distinction is made on the basis of whether the definition uses the genus proximum (ginsˇ qar¯ıb) or the distant genus (ginsˇ ba#¯ıd) of the defined notion. In contrast to the definition which aims at defining the essence of things (mahiyya¯ aˇs-ˇsay"), according to Ibn S¯ına,¯ when a thing is cognized following the description based on accidence and properties, then that thing is cognized in accordance with its description (rasm).115 Analogously to the division of definitions into complete and incomplete, there is the division of description (rasm). This division will be illustrated by an example from al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı’s Compendium: “Thirdly, the complete description (ar-rasm at-tamm),¯ is made of genus proximum and properties, such as e.g. ‘laughing animal’ in the definition of ‘man’. Fourthly, the incomplete description (ar-rasm an-naqi¯ s),. is made of distant genus and properties, such as e.g. ‘laughing body’ or ‘laughing substance’ in its definition (of a ‘man’). It (the incomplete description) can

111 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 12a–12b; Sarˇ hMuhtasar…, 31b; . ¯ . . ¯ . Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ Samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 33b; Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 35; Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı, 25 etc. 112 Kit¯ab al-hud. ¯ud…, 10 (11–12). Aristotle: “Deﬁnition is a discourse that marks the essence of things.” (Topics,I,V). 113 Compare: Aristotle, Topics,vol.V,IV. 114 See: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 12a–12b(Izabrani spisi…, 69– 70). ¯ 115 Ibn S¯ına,¯ Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…, p. 106. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 85.

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consist of general accidence and properties: ‘The laughing thing that is here’ in description of ‘man’.”116 Besides this classification, all works offer instructions and regulations for creating a definition, with special emphasis on the following: – that a definition expresses the essence of the defined, – that a definition is applicable to all that it refers to and nothing else, – that a definition is not circular, – that a definition is not expressed in negative terms if the defined is positive and vice versa, – that a definition is not expressed in foreign and unclear words, figures of speech, etc.117 And, it is important for the logic of judgments and emphasized by authors, that a definition can serve as a premiss or a part of a premiss in the conclusion process. The theory of definition in Arabic philosophy and science in general has a very important place. It should be pointed out that practical application of the theory of definition in Arabic scholastic reached its full in almost all classical Islamic disciplines, from speculative theol- ogy118 to writing specialized dictionaries of philosophical, philological and legal vocabulary.119 Some works from the later period (usually comments on writings in law and philology) had an exclusive goal in the analysis of the given works, focusing on how each author defines a term and whether the regulations of definition were applied or not.

116 See: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 12b(Izabrani spisi…, 70). In . ¯ . his Commentary al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı presents some other possibilities for the creation of incmplete description (see fol. 32a–32b). 117 See, e.g.: Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 54a–54b. 118 A typical example of the application of the theory of definition is a fragment from Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı’s work Gardens of Eden on the Principles of Science of Kalam (Rawd.at¯ al-gannˇ at¯ f¯ıus.ul¯ al-i#tiqad¯ at¯ min #ilm al-kalam)¯ that has abundance of such examples: “As for the rational deduction of proofs, it is something that cannot exist if a part of it does not exist. A man is a believer at all times, and neither deeds nor assertions exist at all times. Believing, as well, has a definition, and it is defined and only when all parts of the defined are present. If one part is missing, then it (the definition) cannot be relevant to the rest. If believing were comprised of convictions, deeds and assertions, then the committer of a severe, or even insignificant sin, is an infidel, since from the inexistence of one part of it (definition) we could conclude that the entity as a whole does not exist…”. Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Izabrani spisi…, 120–121. 119 Bosnia and Herzegovina knew a number of dictionaries of that kind (see quoted catalogues of Oriental manuscripts kept in Bosnia and Herzegovina), and the dictio- 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 86.

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On Judgment

Theory of Judgment and Judging Arabic logicians found elements of the theory on judgment and judging in Aristotle’s On Interpretation (Peri Herméneias) in which Aristotle built ¯ upon Plato’s teaching on simple affirmation and simple negation, to reach the definition of judgment, classification of judgments, and the theory of opposition.120 Aristotle saw judgment as a type of discourse expressing existence or the attribution of something to something, or the lack of attribution or inexistence of the subject of the judgment in question. Following in Aristotle’s footsteps, Arabic logicians and their Bosniac successors define judgment in the same way.121 Another point that should be raised before the presentation of the elements of this theory is the fact that these works use four terms for judgment: al-qawl al-gˇ¯azim, al-habar, al-hukm and al-qadiyya. ¯ . . Al-qawl al-gˇ¯azim is the literal translation of Aristotle’s term lógos apo- fantikós,122 therefore, expresses the discourse that declares or judges something.

nary that was used most often is the one composed by al-Gurˇ gˇan¯ ¯ı and titled Ta #r¯ıf¯at.It contains linguistical, legal and philosophical terms. 120 The theory of conversion is presented in the “Prior Analytics”, vol. I, chapter II and III, as well as in other chapters of the same work. 121 Aristotle: “As there are in the mind thoughts which do not involve truth or falsity, and also those which must be either true or false, so it is in speech.” (On Interpretation, IV) “An affirmation is a positive assertion of something about something, and denial is a negative assertion.” (Ibid, VI.) Compare: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 13a–13b(Izabrani spisi…, 70) where he gives almost exactly the same¯ definition of judgment and its structure. Something similar is done in the works by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı…, page 27–28 and Muhammad. b. Mus.taf. aal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 40b etc. The same issue is discussed in a bit more detail in the works by: Muhammad. #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 35a–36aandMus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 54b–55b, as well as Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 16b–17a, also by . . ¯ . Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ where the author offers references of his New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” (aˇs-Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…). 122 Greek lógos means discourse, the same as Arabic qawl, while apofáino means I declare, I claim, the same as gazamaˇ , especially with the preposition bi, that denotes decisiveness of the declaration. Compare: Aristotle, On Interpretation, (chapter V), that says that the: “First type of declarative discourse (lógos apofantikós) is affirmation…” 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 87.

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Al-habar means assertion, declaration, and taking into consideration ¯ the original meaning of the Arabic root word hbr,123 it also carries the ¯ elements of assertion. These two terms are rarely used by Bosniac logicians, and when used, their purpose is to have a more precise definition of more frequent al-hukm. and al-qadiyya. . Al-hukm. denotes judgment and judging, while al-qadiyya. in addidtion to meaning judgement, is also used as a proposition, which is not the case with hukm. . The authors insist on a strict distinction between judgment of any kind and any other assertion. This leads to the definition of the judgment that says that it is the act of affirmation or negation “so it can be defined whether the one stating it is speaking the truth (s.adiq)¯ or telling lies (ka¯dib).”124 ¯ Therefore, in order for one statement, or in the words of Arabic logicians, one “complex word” (lafz. murakkab), to be a judgment,ithas to state or deny something and it may be either true or untrue (truth: untruth—sidq: kidb). . ¯ Thus, truthfulness is the quality of a judgment, and, according to Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, “truth is the correspondence (mut.abaqa)¯ of a judgment’s relation (an-nisba al-hukmiyya). to reality, and untruth is the lack of correspondence.”125 This shows that Mus.taf. a¯ Yuy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ defines truth by accepting the theory of adequacy or correspondence that originates from Aristotle, and according to which the truthfulness of a judgment is based on the “adequacy of thoughts and things” (Latin “adaequatio intellectus et rei”), or the adequacy of judgment to its subject. Noticing that feature of truth—that it is not internal to a judgment but the quality that the judgment contains in relation to reality—Arabic logicians, and Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ as well, speak of judgment’s relation (an-nisba al-hukmiyya).. This observation left its trace in the analysis of judgment structure by Arabic logicians. Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, for example, states that a judgment, in the logical sense of the word, is a four-part unit, that, besides being the subject and predicate, it contains “judgment’s relation” and copula pointing out that relation.126 The very definition of

123 Basic meaning of habara is to be well informed, to know something well. 124 See note 121 and places¯ in the listed works. 125 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, Sarˇ hTah. d¯ıb al-man.tiqwaal-kal¯am,fol.17a, ﬁrst marginal note. ¯ 126 Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 13aand14a. Also see: Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ h ¯ . . 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 88.

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judgment shows that judging is not understood from the aspect of speech, but that it is spoken affirmation or the denial of existence or the inexistence of the entity that is the subject of the judgment, and that there is an unbreakable link between thinking and speaking Logical discussions pay special attention to analysis and classification of judgments by relation, quality, quantity and modality. The following is a short survey of the classification of judgments presented in the works by Bosniac authors:127

I Regarding relation, judgments are classiﬁed in the following way: a. Categorical or attributive judgments (al-qadiyya. al-hamliyya). 128 that conﬁrm or deny that a certain attribute belongs or does not belong to a subject, as e.g., “man is a reasonable being”, i.e. “man is not a reasonable being”, and b. Conditional judgment (al-qadiyya. aˇs-ˇsartiyya). 129 which can be either: 1) Conjunctive (muttasila),. as in the example: “If the sun has risen, the day has started” or

ar-Ris¯ala as-ˇ samsiyyaˇ ,fol.37a–37bandMus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, as-ˇ sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 57b–58a. 127 See: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 13b–17a(Izabrani spisi…, 71– . ¯ . 74); Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 37a–52a; Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı,str.28–37, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 57b–87b, Sarˇ h. Tahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 17a–26a; Muhammad. b. Mustafaal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr¯ar…, ¯ . .. . fol. 40–51a; Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Sarˇ hmatn. …, fol. 11a–15b; Muhammad. b. Yusuf¯ al-Bos- naw¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 119a–122b. 128 From the root hml. that in a verb group (hamala—ya. hmilu—. haml). means to carry, to move, to transfer, etc. and its form with the preposition #al¯a = to attribute, to nomi- nate, etc. Verb forms that were constructed for the needs of logic, in accordance with the regulations of Arabic morphology, are haml. = attribution in the sense of Aristotle’s words: “Every premiss states that something either is or must be or may be the attribute of something else; of premisses of these three kinds some are affirmative, others negative, in respect of each of the three modes of attribution; again some affirmative and negative premisses are universal, others particular, others indefinite.” (Prior Analytics,I, 2). Further on, mahm. ¯ul = attribute and predicate,andh.¯amil as opposite to mahm. ¯ul meaning subject and, evenutally, haml. ¯ı meaning attributive. (Compare translation by A.M. Goichon: Ibn S¯ına-a,¯ Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at… (Livre des directives et remarques), 133 and A.-M. Goichon, Vocabulaires comparés…whereterm“mahm. ul”¯ is translated exclusively as “attribute” or “predicate”. The syntagm al-qadiyya. al-hamliyya. can be literally translated as attributive judgment, however, there is also categorical considering the fact that this classification of judgment completely covers those judgments that logic classifies as categorical, and the fact that the literature on Arabic logic uses it more frequently. 129 saraˇ .ta—yasruˇ .tu—sarˇ .t (#ala,¯ f¯ı) = to set as a condition, to condition. Al-qadiyya. as-ˇ sarˇ .tiyya, therefore conditional judgment. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 89.

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2) Disjunctive (munfasila),. as in the example: “This number is even or odd.”130 Before we move on to further discourse, it is necessary to give some details on this classification. In scientific literature there are differences in translating the Arabic terminology related to conditional judgments. Latin scholastic, followed by modern logic, treats conditional-conjunctive judgment as conditional or hypothetical, and conditional-disjunctive judgment as disjunctive. This terminology affected researchers of Arabic logic as well. However, it cannot be applied to the texts of Ara- bic logicians and their followers. In terms of this classification, they insist on two issues. Firstly, that categorical and conditional court are different in the following way “if the subject and the predicate of a judgment stand alone, or if the words that are in the judgment besides them belong to them, then it is categorical judgment… and if they do not stand alone, and if the words that are in the judgment besides them do not belong to them, then it is conditional judgment.”131 A characteristic of conditional judgments is the fact that—besides the elements that each categorical judgment can contain—they necessarily contain one of hypothetical conjunctions, e.g. they are characterized by a condition (ˇsart).. That condition can be of dual character: conjunctive (muttasil),. “if…then”, or disjunctive (munfasil),. “either…or”. Conditional-disjunctive judgment, as we have seen, is comprised of two predicates, two judgments. The relation between those two predicates or judgments, according to Arabic logicians can be: a) If one predicate is true, the other is necessarily untrue, b) If one predicate is true, the other is untrue, but it is possible that they are both untrue, and a third one should be added, c) One predicate is necessarily true, but both may be true. This classification can be clearer if a fragment from the work by Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı is quoted: “Disjunctive judgment is either:

130 Both examples given for the conjunctive and the disjunctive judgment are typical and can be found in almost all works by Bosniac authors. See note 127. 131 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 13b(Izabrani spisi…, 71). . ¯ . 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 90.

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a) actual (haq. ¯ıqiyya)—if disjunction is in existence or inexistence: ‘The number is either even or odd’, meaning that the two of them (predicates) cannot be attributed or denied at the same time, or it is b) not inclusive (mani¯ #aal-gamˇ #)132—if disjunction is only in existence, for example: ‘That thing is either stone or wood’. It means that the two of them (predicates) cannot be attributed at the same time, but they can both be denied, or it is c) denying inexistence (mani¯ #aal-huluww). 133—if disjunction is in inexistence: ‘Zayd is either in the sea, or he hasn’t drowned’. It means that the two of them do not exclude each other, but their connection is possible.”134 Such classification of judgments by relation corresponds to Kant’s. Kant classifies judgments by relation as: categorical (S is P), hypotheti- 135 cal (If P1 then P2) and disjunctive (S is either P1 or P2). However, one significant difference between this and other classifications is that Ara- bic logicians don’t divide judgments by relation directly, as is common, but first they divide judgments into categorical and non-categorical or conditional judgments, then they further divide them on. Such classification seems more natural. Relating to classification by relation, Bosniac authors analyze judgment structure and point out the parts of a categorical judgment: subject (mawd.u¯#),136 predicate or attribute (mahm. ul),¯ 137 relation between them

132 Compare: Ibn S¯ına,¯ Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…, 130. 133 Ibidem. 134 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 16b–17a(Izabrani spisi…, 73). 135 See: B. Seˇ ˇsic,´ Osnovi logike,p.¯ 220. 136 Mawd.¯u# literally means that which is positioned, placed, put, and in philosophical terminology it may have more meanings (see: A.-M. Goichon, Vocabulaires comparés…, pp. 27–28). Writings in the field of logic use this word in two different meanings: logical subject (not grammatical), which is the literal translation of Aristotle’s hipokéimenon (that which lies here, subject) and object of a discipline (that will be discussed in¯ more depth later). The writings that this book is based on usually define subject as “that on whom (which) something is said by categorical judgement” (al-mahk. um¯ #alayhi). See, e.g: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 13band14b(Izabrani spisi…, 70 and . ¯ . 71); Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ Samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 37a; Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı- zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 57b, Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 17a and other. . . ¯ . 137 Ter m mahm. ¯ul meaning attribute or predicate is used exclusively in logic and never in grammar. The expression “that with which something is stated” (al-mahk. um¯ bihi) has the same purpose. See notes 126 and 127. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 91.

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(nisba) that is expressed by copula (rabi¯ ta). and parts of conditional judgments: antecedence (muqaddam), consequence (talin)¯ and condition (ˇsart).. The issue of copula, with insight into Arabic language, is treated in Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade’s¯ New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise”.138 He points out that in Arabic, given the diﬀerent syntax from Greek (al-luga˙ al-yun¯ aniyya),¯ the copula is not necessary in a categorical judgment, for example in “Zayd alim”¯ (Zayd (is) educated). Therefore this kind of judgment can be called bipartite (tuna¯"iyya) rather than tripartite ¯ (tula¯tiyya).139 When the copula is given explicitly, it is expressed either ¯ ¯ by a pronoun, e.g. “huwa” (hi), when it, de facto, plays the role of pronoun separating subject and predicate (dam. ¯ır al-fasl. wa al-#imad);¯ or it is expressed by some forms of he verb “kana”¯ (to be) when it is the time copula (ar-rabi¯ ta. az-zamaniyya).¯ The negative copula is “laysa” (is not).140 He points out that conditional conjunctive judgment in Arabic has to be expressed by the copula. Also interestingly, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ speaking on this issue compares Arabic with Persian.141

II Regarding quality, Bosniac authors classify judgments in the following way: 1. affirmative (al-mu¯giba)ˇ and 2. negative (as-saliba).¯ 142 As stated before, categorical judgment confirms that an attribute belongs or does not belong to a subject; conditional conjunctive judgment confirms or denies implications between antecedence and consequence, e.g. “If the sun is up, it is day” and “If the sun is not up, it is not day”, while conditional disjunctive judgment confirms either or denies both.

138 as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 58a–59b. 139 Noun clauses in Arabic indeed have no copula, as it is possible in Arabic syntax. The name “bipartite judgment” (tuna¯"iyya) reﬂects the formal sense. Latin terminology calls judgments without explicit¯ copula, or when copula is not separated from attributes, de secondo adjacente (“(A) man stands”), and judgments with an explicit subject, predicate and copula de tertio adjacente. 140 See: as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 58a–59b. 141 Ibid. 142 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, 13b–14a(Izabrani spisi…, 71); Muham-. . ¯ . mad b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 37a–38b; Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ Sarˇ h Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı…, 29–30, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 58a–59b, Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 23b– . . . ¯ . 26a; Muhammad. b. Mus.taf. aal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 43a–44a; Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Sarˇ hmatn. …, 12aandMuhammad. b. Yusuf¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 210a. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 92.

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Arabic logicians, and their Bosniac followers, recognize the expression that is al-ma#d¯ul,143 a word that contains the negation “la”¯ or “gayr”,˙ from the expression that uses the negative copula “laysa”. They state that such a notion used in a judgment makes that judgment aﬃr- mative in form, but negative in essence. As its predicate is negative in meaning, it is equivalent to a negative judgment.144

III There are a number of different classifications of judgment based on quantity, but they can all be reduced to the general division, which is most often done:145 1. individual (ˇsahsiyya) or proper (mahsu¯sa) judgments, such as: “Zayd ¯ . ¯ . . is a clerk” or “Zayd is not a clerk” and “This man is good” or “This man is not good”, 2. Indefinite (muhmala)146 as, for example: “A man is a clerk” or “A man is not a clerk”, 3. definite or quantified (al-musawwara. or al-mah.s.ura)¯ that can be:

143 Ma#d¯ul is passive participle of #adila that means to correct, to equalize, and with the preposition bayna (between) it means not to differentiate. Therefore, it is an expression ofthesamevalue,equivalent. So judgments: “Zayd is illiterate” and “Zayd is not literate” are equivalent. See e.g.: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 15a(Izabrani . ¯ . spisi…, 72); Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı,p.49 and other texts in the chapter. 144 A.-M. Goichon in the translation of Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…(p.121,note3) rightfully states that this expression should not be mixed with ˙gayr muha. s.sal. (undefined noun) in Aristotle’s meaning of ónoma aóriston (see: “On Interpretation”, chapter X, 64, example “not man”), as done by I. Madkour in L’Organon d’Aristote…, pp. 169–170. 145 See: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 14b–15a(Izabrani spisi…, . ¯ . str. 71–72); Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 38b–42a; Mus.taf. a¯ Yuy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı…, str. 30–33, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 59b– 65a, Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 18a; Muhammad. b. Mustafaal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr¯ar . ¯ . .. . …, fol. 44a–47b; Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Sarˇ hmatn. …, fol. 12a–13a; Muhammad. b. Yusuf¯ al- Bosnaw¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 120a–121a. 146 Although the division of definite and indefinite (and further to universal and particular) is given by Aristotle, his works, especially the first two chapters of Prior Analytics,give the exact definition of indefinite proposition. In one of his classifications, Aristotle says: “I use the term /universal/ for attribution or non-attribution to a subject, that is taken generally /universally/. The individual /particular/ is attribution or non-attribution to a subject taken individually, and indefinite is attribution or non-attribution if individuality or universality is not explicit.” (Prior Analytics I, 1). Among the indefinite propositions (muhmala),. Arabic logicians make the distinction between definite (mah.s.¯ura based on ha. sara. = to encircle, to divide, to limit) or quantified (musawwara,basedonsawwara =toshape,tofence,toform),i.e.propositionsthat contain quantifiers (sur),¯ such as “all” or “some”, which will be foundation for further division. See e.g. Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 15a(Izabrani spisi…, p. 72). ¯ 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 93.

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a) universal (kulliyya) as for example: “All men are clerks” and “No men are clerks,” or b) particular (al-guzˇ "iyya) as for example: “Some men are clerks” and “Some men are not clerks.” Writings also give examples showing that conditional judgments can be classified by quantity. This classification is given following the example of Ibn S¯ınaand¯ his Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…,147 and it must be commended for its consequential- ity. Bosniac logicians point out the fact that an indefinite judgment is equalized with the meaning of a corresponding particular judgment.148 As for singular judgments, they are discussed in the way determined by the stoics, as mentioned by N. Rescher speaking about Ibn S¯ına,¯ 149 and given that these judgments refer to a number of subjects or subject as a whole, they are observed as a class of universal judgments. Almost all Arabic logicians pay special attention to quantifiers as such; they mention words that can be used in the function of quantifiers or “determiners” in conditional and time judgments (if, when, whenever, always, never, at a certain time, etc.). These judgements are also treated as quantifiers (medieval logic will call these elements, including copula, syncategorematic signs), thus they don’t distinguish them terminologically.150 Ibn S¯ına¯ implements the four-part division of judgments with regards to quantity (individual, indefinite, universal and particular) on the conditional (hypothetical) judgements as well. In his book Ibn S¯ın¯a und die peripatetische “Aussagenlogik”, Miklós Maróth compared and analysed in detail the work by Ibn S¯ına¯ Kit¯ab as-ˇ sifˇ ¯a", Boethius’s De syllogisme hypotetico and other Greek sources and concluded that the views on this problematic by Ibn S¯ına¯ and Boethius differ significantly, even though they might have used the same sources, and that these views resulted in two diverging schools. The issue here is not just the number of hypothetical links that can be deduced (twenty for Boethius or sixteen affirmative and negative links for Ibn S¯ına),¯ but above all the fact that for Boethius the quantification means quantifying parts of a statement,

147 Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…, pp. 118–124. 148 See e.g.: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 15a(Izabrani spisi…, 72) . ¯ . and Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, Sarˇ hTah. d¯ıb al-man.tiq…, fol. 18b. 149 “Arapska logika” in: Historija logike,p.52. ¯ 150 See, e.g.: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 17a(Izabrani spisi…, pp. 73–74). ¯ 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 94.

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while for Ibn S¯ına¯ quantifiers “always”, “sometimes”, “never” and “sometimes not” denote quantification of a statements’ link, while the words-quantifiers “all”, “some” etc. have no importance for quantifying hypothetical statements.151 Eventually, regarding the division of judgments by quantity, it needs to be said that some authors, such as Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al- Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, suggest the possibility of quantification of predicates in categorical judgments.152 It is known that Ibn S¯ına,¯ in his Kit¯ab as-ˇ sifˇ ¯a", offers a detailed analysis of judgments with quantified predicates.153 The same issue will be treated eight centuries later, by Sir William Hamil- ton (1788–1856). Presenting consequent quantification of predicates, Ibn S¯ına¯ gives a list of eight such judgments (four affirmative and four negative), that modern literature calls “Hamilton’s types” (“although they are”, according to P.L. Heath in History of Logics,“farfrombeing his invention”), which he does not consider important, but preten- tious. This standpoint on quantified predicate judgments is understandable, having in mind that Ibn S¯ına¯ adopts Aristotle’s theory on judgment, i.e. the theory of subsumtion by volume, submission of subject volume to the predicate volume, so that the subject is always treated as lower and narrower and the predicate as a higher and broader class. The value will only be recognized by the syllogism of equality, including so called mathematical judgments (A = B). The general evaluation of the value of judgments with quantified predicates, given by Ibn S¯ına,¯ was taken over by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, who used the same name that Ibn S¯ına¯ had used: crooked, abnormal (munharifa)..

151 “Viel wichtiger ist der Umstand, daß bei Boethius die Quantifizierung die Quan- tifikation der Aussagenteile bedeutet, während bei Ibn S¯ına¯ die am Anfang der Aussage stehenden Worte ‘immer’, ‘manchmal’, ‘nie’, ‘manchmal nicht’ die Quantifizierung der Aussagenverknüpfung bedeuten. Die in den Aussagen stehenden Worte ‘alle’, ‘manche’ usw. spielen für die Quantifizierung der hypothetischen Aussage keine Rolle, sie sind nur aus der Sicht des an sich als kategorische Aussage einstufbaren Aussagenteiles inter- essant.” Miklós Maróth, Ibn S¯ın¯a und die peripatetische “Aussagenlogik”, E.J. Brill, Leiden, New York, Kbenhavn, Köln, 1989, especially: “Operationen mit den hypothetischen Aussagen. Der hypothetische Zweifel” (Quantoren in den hypothetischen Aussagen), p. 115. 152 See: as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 60band63bandSarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı,p.31. 153 See: I. Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote dans le monde arabe,pp.189–190. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 95.

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IV The elementary division of judgments by modality154 is not done directly, but the judgments are ﬁrst divided into those in which something is simply or absolutely declared (mutlaqa). 155 and which have no time distinction—what would correspond to assertoric judgment as classiﬁed by later Western scholars—and to modal judgments (dawat¯ al-giha).ˇ 156 ¯ Modal judgments are further divided to:

1. necessary (dar. uriyya),¯ 157 2. possible (mumkina)158 that can be: a) properly possible (al-qadiyyaal-mumkinaal-ha¯ssa) and . ¯ .. b) generally possible (al-mumkina al-#amma);¯ and 3. impossible (al-qadiyya. al-mumtani#a). This classiﬁcation, which is commonly found in the works in the ﬁeld of logic in Arabic, apparently misses contingency as one of modalities. Con- tingency as coincidence, something that can but does not have to be,

154 See: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 15b–17a(Izabrani spisi…, 72– . ¯ . 73;Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 43a–48a; Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 69a–80a, Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 20a–23b. . . ¯ . Writings commenting on al-Abhar¯ı’s Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı,suchas:Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı; Fathal-asr. ¯ar by Muhammadb.Mu. s.taf. aal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Sarˇ hmatn. …byFa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ıandFathal-asr. ¯ar…byMuhammad. b. Yusuf¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı, pay very little attention to the classification of judgments by modality in context of conditional judgments. 155 Mu.tlaq, literally: free, unlimited, unconditioned. 156 Gihaˇ literally: direction; side; path or way in which something happens or exists. It is evident that this word corresponds to the term modality. However, regarding logic, modal judgment (which is the word usually used to translate this construction) in European terminology includes assertoric judgment (S is P), which is considered as one of the modal judgments or, in other words, each judgment belongs to one of the modality types. On the other hand, Arabic logicians differentiate between so called absolute judgment (mutlaqa),. and modality usually means: necessity, probability, impossibility and, according to some authors, contingency. 157 Texts by the authors who are the subject of this book give a definition according to which qadiyya. dar. ¯uriyya (necessary judgment) is the one expressing the relation between the subject and the predicate with total certainty, e.g. the unconditional relation. For example, Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ı says: “The relation of a predicate to a subject, whether with affirmation or with negation, in which it is impossible to separate (coincidence of the subject-predicate link, A.L.), is called the necessary judgment. For example: ‘Every men is an animal in a necessary way…’.” (Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 15b). ¯ . 158 Texts by Bosniac authors define Qadiyya. mumkina (possible judgment) as opposition or negation of the necessary judgment. This leads to generally possible or properly possible judgment. See: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, relevant piece of text, and compare with Aristotle’s, On Interpretation, 13 and Prior Analytics,I,13 and Ibn S¯ına,¯ Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…, pp. 134–142 and 148–152. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 96.

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is omitted by Theofrastes, and among Arabic logicians its importance was denied by Ibn S¯ına.¯ It did not fit into his philosophy that polar- ized around the relation of “necessary and possible being”.159 Contrary to that, most of the authors that are the subject of this book, mention contingency (ittifaq¯ or imkan),¯ 160 partly including its meaning into possible judgments, so this division can be compared with quattuor modi of Aristotle’s and scholastic logic. Discussing modal judgments, Bosniac authors partly adopted Ibn S¯ına’s¯ temporal interpretation of judgments. Of course this is not an already established “time-related logic” or the attempts to formulate its axioms, which is a result of more recent research, but it is important that there is at least a general understanding of judgments as time- defined. There are notions that carry a certain definition of time, such as “all the time” or “permanently” (da¯"ima)—such a proposition is al- qadiyya. ad-d¯a"ima—it is opposed by time-defined proposition (al-qadiyya. al- waqtiyya) that is valid for the past, present and future time.161

Relations Among Judgments The chapter that focused on judgments usually discussed the issues of opposition and conversion of judgments,162 although these are forms of direct conclusion, and so they could be classiﬁed in the following chapter. Such topics remain formally linked to the classiﬁcation of judgments, since they discuss the relations among the judgments within those divisions. Although Arabic logicians and their Bosniac successors recognized the notions of the opposition and the conversion of judgments, the issues that this topic tackles in Latin scholastics, are discussed by Arabic

159 See: Ibn S¯ına,¯ Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…, p. 138 and from Introduction, pp. 53–54;I.Madk- our, L’Organon d’Aristote…, pp. 172–175 and C.ˇ Veljaciˇ c,´ Filozoﬁja istocnihˇ naroda…, p. 68. 160 The issue of contingent judgment (qadiyya. ittifaqiyya)¯ is discussed by e.g. Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ı al-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı. See: Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 16a–16b(Izabrani spisi…, p. 73). . ¯ . 161 Temporal interpretation is also discussed by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ in his as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 77a–77bandSarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 20band22a, and . . ¯ . Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ in Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 46b–47a. 162 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 18a–19a(Izabrani spisi, 74–75); . ¯ . Muhammadb.M. us¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 52b–63b; Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı- zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı…, pp. 37–49 (with chapter “On Judgment”), as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 87b–106b, Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 26a–31b; Muhammadb.Mu. stafa¯ . ¯ . .. al-Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 51b–62a; Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Sarˇ hmatn. …, fol. 15b–20band Muhammad. b. Jusuf,¯ Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 122b–125b. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 97.

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logicians within the discussions on two elementary notions: tan¯aqud. 163 and #aks.164 Other terms discussed along with tan¯aqud., in a broader meaning, are: contradiction (tanaqu¯ d—in. a narrow meaning), contrariness (tad.add),¯ 165 judgments that are sub-contrary (da¯hilatani¯ tahta at-tadadd)¯ 166 and judg- ¯ . . ments that are sub-altered (al-mutada¯hila).167 ¯ It should be said that most works by Bosniac authors point out all four relations, sometimes without Arabic terms for sub-contrariness and sub-alteration, but using very illustrative examples instead. Sub-alteration is generally less present, and some texts omit it completely.168 Conclusions are immaculately made through conversion (#aks), which is a kind of conclusion made based on one judgment, without signiﬁcantly changing its contents, but only transforming the judgment. Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ı al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı describes this issue as follows:

163 The basic meaning of the word tan¯aqud. is incompatibility, incongruity, disharmony. In logic it can also mean both contradiction and contrariness, although it is more frequently used to signify contradiction. This can be concluded based on the texts by authors who are the subject of this book, but also based on the texts by Ibn S¯ına¯ (see: Kit¯ab al-isarˇ ¯at …, p. 156 and note nr. 3). Therefore, the conclusion is that this term marks the same thing which the Greek terminology defines as antithesis (antíthesis), contrariness of two notions or two judgments, that can be contrary or contradictory. 164 The basic meaning of the word #aks is rotation, turning, revolting. It, therefore, completely corresponds to Aristotle’s antistréfon (see: Prior Analytics,vol.I,chapter1 and 3), or to Latin conversion. 165 Derived from the verb tad.¯adda (to oppose each another, to be contrary) are the terms for relations between judgments that Latin terminology calls contrariness and subcontrariness. Examples that illustrate it (when talking about notions it is the relation within coordinate notions, and concerning judgments it is the relation between the universal-affirmative and universal-negative judgment) clearly show that it is exactly contrariness. Some texts in the field of logic, such as Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı’s Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 18b, use the word ihtil¯af (difference, contrariness) to denote contrariness¯ . ¯ 166 Al-qadiyyat. ¯ani ad-d¯ahilat¯ani tahta. at-tad.¯add = two judgments that can be classified as sub-contrary. Examples¯ illustrating relations between particularly-affirmative and particularly-negative judgment, clearly points to the relation of sub-contrariness. 167 The researched texts present the relation between universal and particular judgments of the same quality, i.e. the relation of subordination, or in Latin terminology sub-alteration, strictly through examples, pointing out the fact that if a sub-altering judgment is true, the judgment that is sub-altered under it is also true. There is no terminological differentiation in the texts, but literature uses the term al-qadiyya. al- mutad¯ahila. ¯ 168 See e.g.: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, (Izabrani spisi,pp.71–85). . ¯ . 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 98.

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“Conversion of a judgment consists of changing the predicate or predicative word into the subject, and the subject or subjective word into predicate, keeping its affirmation or negation as well as truthfulness or untruthfulness. Universal-affirmative and particular are converted into particularaffirmative. For example: when ‘All men are animals’ is true, it implies that ‘Some animals are men’ is also true,169 and if ‘Some animals are men’ is true, it implies that ‘Some men are animals’ is true as well.170 The two of them (universal-affirmative and particular) cannot be converted into universal judgment because it is possible that the predicate is more general than the subject.”171 This is the way, depending on whether the judgment changes its quality or not, to deduce all types of complete or pure conversion, and incomplete or impure conversion, to show the possibility of a conversion, and to evaluate its cognitive theoretical and practical value. Most works by Bosniac authors,172 besides two elementary types of direct conclusion through opposition and conversion, deal with equipollence (al-#aks al-mustawa)¯ 173 and contraposition (#aks an-naq¯ıd).. 174 These relations and th epossibility of direct deduction, all speak on conditional judgments and the possibilities for opposition, conversion, equipollence and contraposition. At the end of this short presentation on judgment, there are several general standpoints that Bosniac authors took on this issue that need to be presented. This is one of the topics for which the works by Ibn S¯ına¯ were treated as obligatory reading, whether they were used directly, or through

169 This is incomplete conversion (#aks naqis).¯ 170 Complete conversion (#aks tamm).¯ 171 See: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 17bandon(Izabrani spisi…, p. 74). ¯ 172 See: Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 55b–60band60b– 63b, and Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 93a–101aand 101a–106aandSarˇ hTah. d¯ıb al-man.tiq…, fol. 28b–30band30b–31b. Other works on this issue treat conversion along¯ with opposition. 173 Al-#aks al-mustaw¯a, literally, equal reversion. Equipollent (of the same meaning) judgments are those that state the same in different forms and in different ways. 174 #Aks al-naq¯ıd., literally: reversed contradiction. Contraposition, as a way to deduce a new judgment from an existing one, actually is just that. Contraposition is opposing and reversing of a judgment in which the subject and the predicate change places, changing the predicate with a contradictory term (mortal → immortal), and changing the quality of the whole judgment (affirmative → negative). 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 99.

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successful commentaries and compilations of his works, as well as the writings by Raz¯ ¯ı175 and Taftaz¯ an¯ ¯ı.176 Consequently, works by Bosniac authors preserved all values of this part of Ibn S¯ına’s¯ logic, as well as his contribution to the development of this discipline.177 Systematic value of his writings is especially prominent in the Book of Remarks and Admonitions (Kitab¯ al-iˇsar¯ at¯ wa at-tanb¯ıhat)¯ and successful commentaries of this work are reﬂected in the works of Bosniac authors on judgment and judging which were presented in a systematic way.

On Concluding

General Notion and Issue of Concluding The structure of the works presented in this book shows that the ultimate objective or goal (maqsad). of logic, which is evident from its definition as well, is to achieve logically correct thinking which presumes connecting (tark¯ıb) judgments, in a way to reach a new judgment based on the previous one—to reach a conclusion (nat¯ıga)ˇ and acquire new safe knowledge. The elementary issue of concluding is to research the form of such a conclusion, its shapes, deduction procedures and rules. As traditional logic considered syllogism as the only valid form of conclusion (the two notions—syllogism and conclusion—were often mixed up), it takes the central place in all the works of Bosniac authors, with a chapter called On Syllogism (f¯ı al-qiyas).¯ As the title states, this chapter presents the elementary issue of syllogistics, teachings on syllogistic or deductive procedures, its regulations, forming, forms and application. This topic is usually followed by discussions of varying depth on the other two types of concluding: example or analogy and induction. Therefore, Arabic logic recognizes all three forms of concluding. However, it sees the ideal type of concluding, i.e. deduction based on the logical sequence called syllogism (qiyas)¯ that leads to conviction

175 See footnote 35 in the ﬁrst chapter. 176 See footnote 49 in the ﬁrst chapter. 177 See more on Avicenna’s contribution to the development of logic: A.N. Prior, Historija logike,pp.51–52 and 55. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 100.

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(yaq¯ın), i.e. actual scientific and undisputable knowledge.178 The other two forms of concluding, analogy (tamt¯ıl) and induction (istiqra¯"), lead to ¯ opinion (zann). which has lesser value than conviction making it, more or less, probable knowledge.179 This is in short the view on the evaluation of different concluding forms. As for the direct forms of concluding (concluding by opposition, conversion, etc.), Arabic logicians traditionally felt that those forms are but a transformation of a given judgment, with the only difference being in the form of expression; therefore these forms were closer to the teachings on judgment than on concluding.

Syllogism Following in the footsteps of Ibn S¯ına,¯ reproducing the definition given by Aristotle, Bosniac authors often used the following definition: “Syllogism (qiyas)¯ 180 is speech (qawl) made of a several judgments (qad.ay¯ a)¯ which when posed (accepted) leads to another discourse different in essence.”181 As this definition (identical in almost all works in the field of logic that we had the chance to look at) is rather amniguous, in comprehensive works and works in the form of commentaries, such as those by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ and Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ authors gave more detailed explanations of this definition and amend- ments to it. Emphasis is on the following elements:

178 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯afı…, fol. 19a–19b(Izabrani spisi…, pp. 75– 76). ¯ 179 Ibid. 180 The term qiy¯as is “masdar”. from the verb q¯asa—yaq. ¯ısu. that means to measure, and with prepositions #al¯a and bi = to compare, to judge by. In logical terminology it means syllogism (general literature often uses qiy¯as man.tiq¯ı = logical syllogism), and legal terminology uses it to define a conclusion made based on analogy. 181 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 19b(Izabrani spisi,p.76). Almost the same definition,¯ with minor variations, is offered in other works by Bosniac authors: Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ Samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 64a–64b; Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı…, page 49, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 106b–107a, Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 32a; Muhammad. b. Mustafaal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr¯ar…, . ¯ . .. . fol. 62a–62b; Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Sarˇ hmatn. …, fol. 20b–21a; Muhammad. b. Yusuf¯ al- Bosnaw¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 125b–126a. Defining syllogism, Aristotle says: “A syllogism is discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so”. (Prior Analytics,I,1). 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 101.

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– That a syllogism is a combination (murakkab) of at least two judgments that, given that they precede the conclusion (nat¯ıga),ˇ 182 are called premisses (muqaddima);183 – That a syllogism, if based on more than two premisses, can be reduced to one based on two premisses and a conclusion; – That a syllogism can be deducted only if both premisses contain one common element, called the middle term (al-hadd. al-awsat),. that links the notions that are different (from different premisses) that make the subject (mawd.u¯#) of the conclusion or minor term (al- hadd. al-as.gar)˙ and predicate (mahmul)¯ of the conclusion or major term (al-hadd. al-akbar) and eventually, – In order to form a syllogism that will result in the inevitable or possible conclusion, it is necessary to respect the rules or conditions (ˇsart—. ˇsuru¯t). of forming a syllogism and pay attention to the contents (madda)¯ of premisses.184 A premiss can be called major (al-kubra)¯ or minor (as-. su. gr˙ a)¯ depending on whether the term it contains is major or minor. This presentation points to the elements of Aristotle’s syllogism, its structure and the most important features of the structure: the logical function of the middle notion or term. The works that this paper discusses, treat its very role, position and relations with other two terms separately. The principal issue raised by Arabic logicians is the classification of syllogisms. This classification is somewhat different from the one given in the works by Aristotle. Although this division is evidently affected by Teofrastus and the stoics, Ibn S¯ınainhis¯ Book of Remarks and Admonitions points out that it is his view of the classification.185 This division is to be later taken over by Bosnian logicians. According to this classification, syllogisms are divided into two elementary groups: connected (iqtiran¯ ¯ı) and separated or separate (istitna¯"¯ı). ¯

182 Nat¯ıgaˇ , literally: result, consequence, fruit. A word also used in the meaning of conclusion, although less frequently, is ma.tl¯ub (literally: looked for, sought). 183 Muqaddima, literally: going before something, preceding. Logical terminology uses this word to denote premiss, or judgment as a part of syllogism. Therefore, each muqaddima is at the same time qadiyya. (the expression sometimes used is al-qadiyya. al- muqaddima), and understandably not vice versa. 184 The issue of contents (madda)¯ of premisses, i.e. syllogism, will be dealt with in the chapter on the fallacy of syllogistic conclusions or sophistic syllogisms. 185 Ibn S¯ına¯ says: “According to our assumptions, syllogism is divided…”, see: Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…, p. 194. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 102.

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This is a distinction between the two elementary types of syllogisms, and between the two terms, literally translated, that are not common in European logic. As these terms, differently translated and interpreted, caused polemics and discussions in literature, it is useful to explain their meaning. The term iqtir¯an¯ı is derived as a relative from the infinitive iqtir¯an meaning: to link, to be connected, to interact, and the term istitn¯a"¯ı is ¯ derived in the same way from istatn¯a meaning: to exclude, to separate, ¯ to take out. Speaking about the mechanism of syllogisms in Avicenna, I. Mad- kour translates these terms as conjunctive (iqtiran¯ ¯ı) and hypothetical or exceptive (istitna¯"¯ı).186 In the translation of Ibn S¯ına’s¯ Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at wa ¯ at-tanb¯ıh¯at, A.-M. Goichon translates these terms as categorical and hypothetical, stating that I. Madkour’s translation is wrong.187 The problem emerged from the fact that both authors (translators) tried to fit one very original division into the scheme and the terminology of the medieval scholastics. It is evident that I. Madkour’s distinction conjunctive: hypothetical, is not valid, as stated by A.-M. Goichon, but, as proved by the following text, the distinction categorical: hypothetical is also dubious.188 Therefore this elementary classification keeps the original terms, i.e. their literal translation. Let’s see now how and what this division performed by Mus.taf. a¯ Yuy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ who refers to Ibn S¯ına’s¯ texts and relevant commentaries, was based on. “Connected syllogism (iqtiran¯ ¯ı) is the one that does not actually contain (bi al-fi#l) the conclusion or its opposite…, but it is potentially contained (bi al-quwwa).” Therefore, the conclusion is not explicitly expressed, but it is contained implicitly in both premisses, “…and it is called ‘linked’ due to the link between the terms of the syllogism— minor, major and middle within it—and it is said (to be called that, A.L.) because the two premisses within are linked with a particle that expresses the connection between the two premisses in realization, i.e. linker particle ‘wa’…”189

186 Ibrahim Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote…, p. 203. 187 Ibn S¯ına,¯ Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…, p. 194,esp.notenr.6. 188 The inconsistency of such classiﬁcation because traditional logic sees categorical syllogism as exclusively categorical judgments for premiss, while in the classiﬁcation given by Arabic logicians, the iqtir¯an¯ı syllogism can be based on categorical judgments, and also on a categorical and a hypothetical judgment, etc., as we will soon see. 189 As-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 107b. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 103.

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As the quoted fragment shows, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ points out a logical-syntactical element of syllogism forming. Following one of Ibn S¯ına’s¯ commentators, he shows that the minor and the major premiss, regardless of whether there are words or symbols used (A, B, G),ˇ are inevitably linked either by a connective conjunction (harf. al-#atf). or an exception or separation particle (harf al-istitna¯"), which is the case . ¯ in the second type of syllogisms. In this light Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı- zade¯ adds: “Separated syllogism is the one which actually quotes the conclusion or its opposite…, and it is called separated as it uses the exclusion particle ‘bat’. For example: ‘If the sun is up, the day has started’. ‘But the sun is up.’ Conclusion: ‘The day has started.’” This shows190 that the issue here is that of linkage between two premisses within one syllogism, and not a classification based on the relations of judgments (categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive, etc.); therefore the classification of syllogisms on these grounds is inappropriate. Before the presentation of further division, it need be said that the texts of Bosniac authors explain the so-called syllogism of equality (qiyas¯ al-musaw¯ at).¯ 191 However, according to Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ the deduction of conclusions here is not a result of the essence of premisses, or the link between the general and the specific, but of the principle of the equation: “…as in, for example: ‘A equals B’. ‘B equals G’.ˇ therefore ‘A equals G’.ˇ However, this is not because of the essence of the two premisses, but because of the premiss (axiom) that two things that are equal to the third, are at the same time equal to each other.”

Similar explanations can be found in other works that are included in this paper, e.g.: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 20a(Izabrani spisi…, p. 76); Mustafa¯ . ¯ . .. Yuy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı…, p. 52;Muhammad. b. Mus.taf. aal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-. asr¯ar…, fol. 64a–65a; Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 64b–65a. 190 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 107b. 191 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı…, pp. 50–51; as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 107a; Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 32a. . ¯ . 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 104.

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However, as Arabic logicians, following Aristotle’s example, paid little attention to the logic of relation, this type of syllogism was left without further studying. Further division shows that connected syllogism can be made of exclusively categorical judgments, when it is called categorical syllogism (al-qiyas¯ al-haml. ¯ı)192 or of conditional, or categorical and conditional, when it is called non-categorical syllogism (gayr˙ haml. ¯ı).193 Separated syllogism can be either conditional-disjunctive (qiyas¯ ˇsart.¯ı infis.al¯ ¯ı) or conditional-conjunctive (qiyas¯ ˇsart.¯ı ittis.al¯ ¯ı).194 As for the first group, attention is paid to categorical syllogism. This is an example of how Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ speaks about the elements of syllogism and the forming of syllogistic figures (ˇsakl—aˇskal):¯ “The notion contained in both premisses is called the middle term (hadd. awsat),. 195 as it acts as a mediator between two unknown elements … The subject of the conclusion is called the minor term (hadd. as.gar),˙ as it is more specific, therefore poorer in volume and thus minor. The predicate of the conclusion is called the major term (hadd. akbar), as it is more general and more comprehensive. The premiss containing the minor term is called the minor premiss (su. gr˙ a)¯ as, containing the minor term, it has the features of the minor term, and the premiss containing the major term is called the major premiss (kubra),¯ as, containing the major term, it has the features of the major term, which is its meaning… The form derived from linking the major and the minor premiss is called the figure (ˇsakl)… There are four figures. If the middle term is the predicate of the minor and the subject of the major premiss, it is called the first figure (aˇs-ˇsakl al-awwal). For example:

192 The verb hamala. , which is the basis for this word, means: to carry, to transport, to move, to show, etc. and with the preposition #al¯a it means: to attribute, to connect, to award, etc. Therefore, haml. means attribution, and mahm. ¯ul attribute or predicate (see note nr. 128). As for the syllogism, the texts refer to categorical syllogism (v.: A. Wahrmund, Handwörterbuch…“haml. ¯ı”). 193 This division into categorical and non-categorical syllogisms (or attributive and non- attributive) that are a form of iqtir¯an¯ı syllogisms, clearly shows that the translation iqtir¯an¯ı = categorical, used by A.-M. Goichon, is not suitable. 194 See the chapter on judgments and division by relation. 195 The basic meaning of hadd. (pl. hud. ud)¯ is cutting edge, boundary, etc. It is used in the meaning of deﬁnition. It can also mean a ﬁxed word or term in syllogism. It would be interesting to mention that Greek hóros,Latinterminus and Arabic hadd. originally meant boundary, border. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 105.

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‘All men are animals.’ ‘All animals are bodies.’ Conclusion: ‘All men are bodies.’ If it is the other way around, i.e. if the middle term is the subject of the minor and the predicate of the major premiss, it is called the fourth figure (aˇs-ˇsakl ar-rabi¯ #). For example: ‘All men are animals.’ ‘All reasonable beings are men.’ Conclusion: ‘Some animals are reasonable.’ If the middle term is the subject of both premisses, it is called the third figure (aˇs-ˇsakl at-tali¯ t). ¯ ¯ ¯ For example: ‘All men are animals.’ ‘All men are reasonable.’ Conclusion: ‘Some animals are reasonable.’ If the middle term is the predicate of both premisses, it is called the second figure (aˇs-ˇsakl at-tan¯ ¯ı). ¯ ¯ For example: ‘All men are animals.’ ‘Anything that is made of stone is not an animal.’ Conclusion: ‘No men are made of stone.’” Before presenting the special forms of each of the figures, modes, here is a short explanation of the structure of the given figures.196 The connoisseurs of syllogistics will notice that the order of premisses that leads to conclusions is the opposite to the one that prevails in traditional west-European logic. It first gives the minor premiss, then the major one. Although this order does not change anything significant in the sense of the consequent deduction of all modes, it is characteristic of Arabic logic, even in modern times. The texts that were used in research for this book offer no explanation why the classical Arabic authors, first al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı and Ibn S¯ına¯ and then their followers, decided to use this order, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as well as other authors, further develops the issue of modes (darb,. pl. dur. ub)¯ of each of the above figures, showing that each premiss in these figures, considering the division

196 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı…, p. 54. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 106.

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presented in the chapter on judgments, can be universally-affirmative,or universally-negative,orparticularly-affirmative,orparticularly-negative,thus,the conclusion is defined according to the quality and quantity of premisses. It also shows that it would be theoretically possible to deduce each figure based on 16 modes.197 However, all theoretically deducible modes are not necessarily possible in logic. Therefore, all works on this topic point out the general rules of syllogisms that exclude some of the combinations (e.g.: if both premisses are negative, conclusion is impossible, etc.), and deduction rules before deducing any of the figures. An example showing the way it is presented in is from Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade’s¯ New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise”. “The Second figure… Its condition, or the condition for its deduction, regarding quality (kayfiyya), is the opposition of two premisses by quality, i.e. one should be affirmative and the other negative, and regarding quantity (kamiyya) that the major should be universal… There are four deducible modes, just like in the first figure, having in mind the two conditions given… The first mode (ad-. darb. al-awwal)198 consists of two universal premisses, where the major premiss is negative, i.e. of the universally-affirmative minor premiss and universally-negative major premiss. The conclusion is universally-negative. For example:199 ‘Every GisB.’ˇ ‘No A is B.’ Conclusion: ‘No GisA.’ˇ The second mode (ad-darb at-tan¯ ¯ı)200 consists of two universal premisses, . . ¯ ¯ where the minor premiss is negative, i.e. of the universally-negative minor premiss and universally-affirmative major premiss. The conclusion is universally negative. For example. ‘No GisB.’ˇ ‘Every A is B.’ Conclusion: ‘No GisA.’ˇ

197 Ibid, pp. 60–61. 198 This is the mode that scholastic terminology calls “Cesare”, but the quoted examples have a reverse order of premisses. 199 Symbols used by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as well as other Arabic logicians, are Arabic letters alif, b¯a" and gimˇ , the ﬁrst three letters in the old Arabic alphabet, from the so-called abgadˇ system, that we translated to Latin symbols A, B and G.ˇ 200 Modus “Camestres”. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 107.

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The third modus (ad-darb at-tali¯ t) consists…”201 . . ¯ ¯ ¯ As the examples show, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ not unlike other Bosniac authors following the path of the Arabic school of logic, aban- doned Aristotle’s figure forming methods to some extent. Aristotle’s principle of differentiation among figures was the width or the volume of the middle term in comparison to the other two.202 On these grounds it was possible to form only three figures.203 Accepting the principle that the difference among figures is made based on the position of the middle term, Arabic logicians saw the opportunity for the analysis and presentation of the fourth figure, whose introduction is often attributed to Theophrastus and Galenus.204 However, remaining faithful to the Aristotelian tradition, the first and the most significant Arabic logicians, including al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı and Ibn S¯ına,¯ discarded the fourth figure, denying its importance.205 Later authors, including the Bosniac ones, do however treat the fourth figure and its modes. Truthfully, there are some differences in the number of modes that can be formed and the value of the fourth figure in general. So, for example, Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal- Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı treats only four modes of the fourth figure,206 and qualifies it

201 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 111a–112b. On forming syllogistic figures in the works of Bosniac authors, see: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ı al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 21a–24a; Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 65¯ a–73b; MustafaY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ Sarˇ h Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı…, 52–65; Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb .. . . ¯ al-man.tiq…, 32b–37b; Muhammadb.Mu. s.taf. aal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 66a–77b; Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Sarˇ hmatn. …, fol. 22b–25aiMuhammad. b. Yusuf¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı, Fathal-. asr¯ar…, fol. 127a–128a. 202 Aristotle: “Whenever three terms are so related to one another that the last is contained in the middle as in a whole, and the middle is either contained in, or excluded from, the first as in or from a whole… etc.” (Prior Analytics,I,4). 203 As the middle term can be broader than one, and narrower than the other, broader than both or narrower than both, there are three figures possible. For more detail, see: M. Koen and E. Nejgel, Uvod u logiku i naucniˇ metod [An Introduction to Logic and The Scientific Method], Beograd, 1965,pp.106–107. 204 There are no reliable sources on the origin of the fourth figure. Its discovery is often attributed to Galenus or Theophrastus, but some researchers deny the accuracy of these claims. See: A.N. Prior, Historija logike,pp.29–30. 205 This left a trace on the works by Bosniac authors. For example, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ in his Commentary on Isagogue (Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı), says: “the fourth figure, among these figures, is very unnatural, and it was not considered by either al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ıoraˇs-Sayˇ h ¯ (Ibn S¯ına)…”¯ (55). Similar evaluation was given by Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı(Muhtasar. al- K¯af¯ı,fol.24a). ¯ Compare: аль-Фараби, Логические трактаты…, pp. 267 and 270–287 and Ibn S¯ına,¯ Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…, pp. 198–199,aswellasI.Madkour,L’Organon d’Aristote…, pp. 206–208. 206 Out of these four modes, the first, the second and the fourth correspond to the 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 108.

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as “very unnatural and we mention it only as an illustration for the reasonable.”207 Other authors deal with eight modes, and also point out certain “artificiality in comparison to the first figure”. It is interesting to note that Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zadeinhis¯ New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” shows that the fourth figure can be observed as the “reversed first”, which corresponds to the opinion of the majority of modern logicians. He also shows, passing on the standpoints of at-Taftaz¯ an¯ ¯ı, that eight modes of this figure can be observed in two groups, as 5+3 modes, where the first five correspond with the classical division into five modes.208 Additional three modes are: (6)‘SomeBareG.’ˇ ‘Every A is B.’ Conclusion: ‘Some GarenotA.’ˇ (7)‘EveryBisG.’ˇ ‘Some A are not B.’ Conclusion: ‘Some GarenotA.’ˇ (8)‘NoBisG.’ˇ ‘Some A are B.’ Conclusion: ‘Some GarenotA.’ˇ Forming the three last modes is a consequence of somewhat differently presented conditions (theorems) for deduction of this figure, as follows: “…(1) that both premisses are affirmative, given that the minor is particular, or (2)thattheyaredifferent in quality (affirmation or negation) with one having universality.”209

modes known in the Latin terminology as Bramantip (or Bamalip), Dimatis and Fesapo, and the third is, the so-called, weakened mode. 207 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 23a–24a(Izabrani spisi…, pp. 80– 81). ¯ 208 Modes that the scholastic calls: Bramantip (Bamalip), Calemes, Dimatis, Fesapo and Fresison. 209 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 125b–127b, also: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ı al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 23b(Izabrani spisi…, 80). A similar claim, that the earlier authors¯ (al-mutaqaddimun)¯ treated five modes, and later (al-muta"ahhirun)¯ ¯ ¯ eight, is also presented by Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 127a. Logic textbooks, besides the general rules for deduction of the fourth figure, usually present the following special rules: (1) if the major premiss is affirmative, the smaller has to be universal, or (2) if one of the premisses is negative, the major has to be universal. See: B. Petronijevic,´ Osnovi logike. Formalna logika i opca´ metodologija [Basics of Logic. Formal Logic and the General Methodology], Beograd 1932,p.108. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 109.

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However, besides the fact that the fourth figure is treated with due attention, Bosniac logicians saw the first as “the most perfect” and “the most natural” or, according to Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, “the first figure is the one that became the measure of nature.”210 Bosniac authors point out the possibilities and rules of reduction (radd) of the second, third and fourth figure into the first.211 The second subgroup of linked syllogism is made of non-categorical syllogisms, which can be based on the judgments of different modality, provided that the conclusion is not explicitly quoted in the premisses.212 Most works by Bosniac authors give the classification in the five following combinations:213

1. Syllogism made of two conditional-conjunctive judgments (min mut- tasilatayn):. “If the sun is up, it is day.” “If it is day, the land is in light.” Conclusion: “If the sun is up, the land is in light.” 2. Syllogism made of two conditional-disjunctive judgments (min mun- fasilatayn):. “Every number is either even or odd.” “Every even number is either even of the even or even of the odd number.” Conclusion: “Every number is either odd or even of the even or even of the odd number.”

210 Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 24a(Izabrani spisi…, p. 81). 211 Radda¯ = to return, to send back, to bring back to the original state. With preposition il¯a = to reduce to. The regularity of deduction of other figures through the reduction of their modes to the modes of the first figure was treated in details and proved first by Aristotle, (see: Aristotle, Prior Analytics,chapter44 and 45), and then by the scholastics. However, Ara- bic logicians did not give great importance to this possibility. Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı says: “One with common sense and normal character has no need for reduction…” (see previous note). 212 Teaching on modal syllogism among the Arabic logicians deserves special attention. See: Nicholas Rescher, “The Theory of Modal Syllogistic in Medieval Ara- bic Philosophy” in: Nicolas Rescher et al., Studies in Modality (American Philosophi- cal Quarterly Monograph Series, 8), Oxford: Blackwell, 1974,pp.17–56.Asforthe Bosniac authors, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ (as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…) and Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ (Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ Samsiyyaˇ …) pays special attention to modal syllogism. 213 Examples from: Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı…, pp. 66–70. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 110.

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3. Syllogism made of categorical and conjunctive judgments: “If this is a man, this is an animal.” “Every animal is a body.” Conclusion: “If this is a man, this is a body.” 4. Syllogism made of categorical and disjunctive judgment: “Every number is either even or odd.” “Every even number is divisible in two equal parts.” Conclusion: “Every number is either odd or divisible in two equal parts.” 5. Syllogism made of conjunctive and disjunctive judgment: “If this is a man, this is an animal.” “Every animal is either white or non-white.” Conclusion: “If this is a man, he is either white or non-white.” These non-categorical syllogisms are said to have the same figures, with a somewhat lower number of modes. The second group of syllogisms are so-called separated or separate syllogisms (al-qiyas¯ al-istitna¯"¯ı), “…syllogisms in which the conclusion or ¯ its opposite are actually (bi al-fi#l) mentioned”,214 i.e. in which one of the premisses offers the conclusion. The second premiss is a conditional judgment, either conjunctive (first subgroup), or disjunctive (second subgroup). The presentation of the rules of consequence and examples illustratively shows what kind of syllogism this is about.215 This is how Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ıpresentsit: “A s f o r t h e conjunctive, it either:

(1) Consists of a necessarily conjunctive judgment where acceptance of antecedence (muqaddim) and its aﬃrmation, makes the conclusion— acceptance of consequence (talin),¯ as in: ‘If this body is a man, it is an animal.’ ‘But it is a man.’ Therefore: ‘It is an animal.’

214 Seenotenr.189. 215 See: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 24a–25a; Muhammad. b. . ¯ . Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 73b–76a; Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı …, 65–73, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 128a–134b, Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 37b–39a; Mu- . . ¯ . hammad. b. Mus.taf. aal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 77b–82a; Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Sarˇ h. matn…, fol. 25a–26b; Muhammad. b. Yusuf¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 128a–130a. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 111.

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(2) Or consists of these two premisses without a consequence and its negation, the conclusion is non-acceptance of antecedence, as in the previous example: ‘But it is not an animal.’ Therefore: ‘It is not a man.’” As shown by these examples,216 these are two modes that Latin terminology calls modus ponendo ponens and modus tollendo tollens, where conclusion is categorical. Modes ponendo tollens and tollendo ponens are treated in the same way, but with syllogisms made of conditional-disjunctive and categorical judgment.217 Discussion on these issues generally covers the elements related directly to syllogistics. This is how it is in most works by Bosniac authors, and especially those that referred to Isagogue by At¯ırudd¯ın al-Abhar¯ı. ¯ This is the case with the works of Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, commentaries of Isagoge by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ Muhammad. b. Mus.taf. a¯ al-Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Muhammad. b. Yusuf¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı, and others. However, in the works by Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ Com- mentary on “The Sun Treatise” and Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ New Com- mentary on “The Sun Treatise” the discussion on syllogistics does not end there. That is partly the case because the author of the basic work, al-Qazw¯ın¯ı, in the chapter called “Additions to Syllogism”, emphasizes some other questions that these two Bosniac authors aim to discuss and therefore contribute to the reader’s more complete knowledge of deduction and syllogistics and their potentials. This opportunity is used by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ who explains all the details of polysyllogism and “deductio ad absurdum”, while Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ remains within the boundaries of the basic work.218 At the beginning of this chapter, commenting on one of the standpoints of al-Qazw¯ın¯ı, the author of The Sun Treatise,Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ emphasized that deduction of one conclusion is possible within a syllogism consisting of more than two judgments, so-called complex syllogism (al-qiyas¯ al-murakkab) or polysyllogism. According to this author, these complex syllogisms can be divided into two groups:

216 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 24a–24b(Izabrani spisi…, p. 81). 217 Seenotenr.216. ¯ 218 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 134bandMuhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 76a. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 112.

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1. Complex syllogism with linked conclusions (maws.ul¯ an-nata¯"ig),ˇ i.e. with conclusions included in the syllogism. The syllogistic chain consists of a number of syllogisms so that the conclusion of the first syllogism is one of the premisses of the second, the conclusion of the second is one of the premisses of the third, etc. Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ gives an example of this type of syllogism:219 “‘Every GisB.’ˇ ‘Every B is V.’ Conclusion: ‘Every GisV.’ˇ Then: ‘Every GisV.’ˇ ‘Every V is A.’ Conclusion: ‘Every GisA.’ˇ Then: ‘Every GisA.’ˇ ‘Every A is H.’ Conclusion: ‘Every GisH.’”ˇ 2. Complex syllogism in which,differently from the first type, the conclusions of each individual syllogism are not mentioned (mafs.ul¯ an-nata¯"ig),ˇ 220 but are understood, and polysyllogism is contracted. Latin terminology calls such polysyllogism sorites.Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ 221 gives the following example: “‘Every GisB.’ˇ ‘Every B is V.’ ‘Every V is A.’ ‘Every A is H.’ Conclusion: ‘Every GisH.’”ˇ Another important issue discussed by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ and Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ is conclusion based on the absurd,222 or, in literal translation, the syllogism of contradiction (qiyas¯ al-hulf).223 Taking ¯

219 As-sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 134b. 220 The terminological diﬀerence between these two polysyllogisms is derived from the opposite meaning of verbs wasala. and fasala. = to link, to connect, and, on the other hand: to separate, to disconnect. 221 Ibid, note nr. 220,fol.134b–135a. As the example shows, the subject of the premiss is the subject of the conclusion, and the predicate of the last premiss is the predicate of the conclusion. That is so called Aristotle’s sorit. 222 Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 76a–76bandMustafa Ejubovic,´ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 135a–136b. 223 Hulf =diﬀerence, opposition. Some texts use the expression bi al-hulf. ¯ ¯ 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 113.

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over Avicenna’s standpoints from his Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…,224 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ says that “the syllogism of contradiction is proving what you want (the conclusion) by denying its opposite”,225 and describes the way in which this procedure can be performed.

Induction and Analogy The followers of the traditional logic developed by Aristotle, including Arabic logicians, considered deductive conclusions to be basic and perfect, and syllogism to be the elementary, and sometimes, the only form of deductive conclusions.226 That is the reason why most of the works in the field of logic in Arabic mention induction and analogy only marginally if at all. These two forms of conclusion are treated by Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ and Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ especially the later in his chapter “Additions to Syllogism” in his New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise”.227 Starting with the definition that “induction (istiqra¯")228 is a conclusion in general based on its existence in a number of individuals”,229 Mus.taf. a¯ Yuy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ shows that there are two forms of induction: complete induction (al-istiqra¯" at-tamm)¯ and incomplete induction (al-istiqra¯" an-naqi¯ s).. Reaching indisputable knowledge, which is the “ideal of conclusion”, is only possible through complete induction, i.e. the complete list of all individual cases. It is only then that induction can be one of the “scientific skills” (ˇsay" min as-. sin. a¯#at¯ al-#ilmiyya). Incomplete induction, done through listing a number or a majority of individual cases, still leads only to an opinion (az-. zann),. 230 and not

224 See: Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…, pp. 221–222. 225 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 135a–135b. 226 See, e.g.: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 19a–19b. . ¯ . 227 Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 76bandMus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 136b. 228 Istiqr¯a", basic meaning of this word is following, research, study. This very meaning suggests the procedures of induction: following the general in a number of individuals. Besides this expression, to denote induction some texts use ta"diya (ta"adda¯ = to bring) that has exactly the same meaning as Aristotle’s epagogé (leading, cognitive inductive procedure that leads the thinking from the individual and special to the general), see: Aristotle, Topics, vol. I, chapter XII and Prior Analytics, II, 13. 229 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 136b. 230 Strict and very clear distinction between opinion (zann). and certain knowledge (yaq¯ıniyyat),¯ i.e. science, that can be found in all the works by Bosniac authors, has its grounds in the 33rd chapter of volume I of Posterior Analytics where Aristotle says: 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 114.

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to a safe conclusion in general, as opposing experience is possible (muhalif,¯ Latin: instantia negativa). He warns us about mistakes possible ¯ when induction is done not treating all cases: “…as if we were to say: ‘All animals move their lower jaw when chewing’, based on the fact that the same is done by human beings, quadrupeds, birds and other animals we have seen. It (the incomplete induction) does not result in knowledge, as it is possible that all of those do not satisfy the condition, as, for example, the crocodile, which moves its upper jaw when chewing.”231 Those logicians who pay somewhat more attention to induction, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ among them, claim that complete induction is but a type of syllogism, namely so called divided syllogism (qiyas¯ muqassam). An example proving it is an inductive conclusion that has one premiss quoting, treating and classifying all objects of a certain type or group (usually the notion of genus and all subordinate notions of the kind), and then, using two or more premisses with all mentioned individual items for subjects, deducting a general conclusion on that class and group of items. The following is a scheme of the examples used by Arabic logicians to illustrate complete induction, i.e. divided syllogism:

“Scientific knowledge and its object differ from opinion and the object of opinion in that scientific knowledge is commensurately universal and proceeds by necessary connexions, and that which is necessary cannot be otherwise. So though there are things which are true and real and yet can be otherwise, scientific knowledge clearly does not concern them: if it did, things which can be otherwise would be incapable of being otherwise. Nor are they any concern of rational intuition-by rational intuition I mean an originative source of scientific knowledge-nor of indemonstrable knowledge, which is the grasping of the immediate premiss. Since then rational intuition, science, and opinion, and what is revealed by these terms, are the only things that can be ‘true’, it follows that it is opinion that is concerned with that which may be true or false, and can be otherwise: opinion in fact is the grasp of a premiss which is immediate but not necessary. This view also fits the observed facts, for opinion is unstable, and so is the kind of being we have described as its object… Knowledge is the apprehension of, e.g. the attribute ‘animal’ as incapable of being otherwise, opinion the apprehension of ‘animal’ as capable of being otherwise—e.g. the apprehension that animal is an element in the essential nature of man is knowledge; the apprehension of animal as predicable of man but not as an element in man’s essential nature is opinion: man is the subject in both judgements, but the mode of inherence differs…”. Bosniac authors used almost the same way to differ between knowledge and opinion and between their methods (more about this in the next chapter, “Argumentation”). 231 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 137. The same example is used by Ibn S¯ınainhis¯ Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…, p. 192. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 115.

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Every S is S1 or S2 or S3…orSn. (I.e.: S1,S2,S3…Sn all make S) S1 is P. S2 is P. S3 is P. ……… Sn is P. Every S is P.

S1,S2,S3…Sn, by their interpretation, are nothing but the middle term “divided” into more premisses. This interpretation brings the complete induction down to the first mode of the syllogistic figure (“Barbara”). On the other hand, the incomplete induction, both in the way it is performed (without a key premiss) and in the degree of certainty of the conclusion, is seen by logicians of this circle as “opposing” (f¯ıal- muqabala)¯ syllogism. Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ defines the example or analogy in the following way: “Example (tamt¯ıl)232 is adduction of a judgment on the individual as it ¯ exists in the other individual, based on the features they share.”233 This definition, as well as the examples given by Mustafa Ejubovic,´ show that Arabic logicians do not stray much from the path set by Aris- totle,234 not even in the use of terminology for this type of conclusion (Ar. tamt¯ıl = Gr. parádeigma), nor in its evaluation. ¯ Writing on analogy, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ describes the fallacies that can happen, emphasizing the fallacy that results in the deduction of proofs going in circles (ad-dawran,¯ Latin: circulus vitiosus)orwith the thesis being proved occurring as an argument used for the conclusion, placing it in the context of an analogical conclusion based on

232 The word tamt¯ıl is the infinitive form (masdar). of the second type of verbs and means to give examples,¯ to compare, to bring down to, to equalize, etc. Several terms that are used to denote analogy in texts in the field of logic are derived from the same root (mtl). The most frequently used terms are mit¯al (sample, pattern) and mum¯atala (similarity,¯ equality, same value). ¯ ¯ 233 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ o.c., fol. 137a. 234 Aristotle: “We have an ‘example’ (parádeigma) when the major term is proved to belong to the middle by means of a term which resembles the third. It ought to be known both that the middle belongs to the third term, and that the first belongs to that which resembles the third… Clearly then to argue by example is neither like reasoning from part to whole, nor like reasoning from whole to part, but rather reasoning from part to part, when both particulars are subordinate to the same term, and one of them is known.” (Prior Analytics, II, 24.) 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 116.

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causality (#illiyya). In the context of causality, he also mentions the mistake that occurs when one disjunctive premiss (A is B, or G,ˇ or V), through the absurd (bi al-hulf) of the two causes, leads to the necessary ¯ acceptance of the third, which is unconvincing. It is evident that the fallacy here occurs in the reasoning process (circulus vitiosus and fallacia disjunctionis—incomplete disjunction fallacy) which is later discussed in more detail by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade.¯ However, the fact that fallacy, especially the fallacy of unfounded reason, is discussed within the discourse on induction and analogy, points out certain scepticism to these two types of reasoning. Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ states that legislators (fuqaha¯")callanal- ogy qiy¯as, what, in logical terminology, exclusively denotes syllogism, and some theologians, istidl¯al, which denotes adducing proofs and conclusion in general.

Argumentation As a reasonable conclusion of the argument in the field of logic where the elementary aim of all previous logical research needs to be realized: the scientific method of reasoning and indisputable knowledge, the last chapter is on argumentation (hu. gˇga).ˇ It is dedicated to adducing proofs and classifying the premisses that the safety of the procedure is based on. According to Arabic logicians, human knowledge, as conviction with objective grounds in the truthfulness of a conclusion based on syllogism, depends not only on respecting the rules of the deduction of syllogism and its form (s.ura),¯ but also on its contents (madda),¯ 235 i.e. on the truthfulness of judgments forming the syllogism, or, as they say, “the way in which they provoke conviction (tasd. ¯ıq)”. Such observationa led to the so-called quintal division of syllogistics into five skills (as-. sin. a¯#at¯ al- hams), different by the degree of likelihood of the premisses within a ¯ syllogism. Such views on syllogism by Arabic logicians were grounded in the assertions of the “first teacher”, among which the most quoted is the statement from the “Prior Analytic”, that says: “We must now state that not only dialectical and demonstrative syllogisms are formed by means of the aforesaid figures, but also rhetorical

235 See: Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 137bandMuhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 77a. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 117.

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syllogisms and in general any form of persuasion, however it may be presented.”236 Those ﬁve skills, as seen in the previously presented discussion structures, are: apodictic or demonstration (al-burhan),¯ dialectics or, as it is sometimes called—after Aristotle’s work, which shows that each issue can result in probable, but not scientiﬁc conclusions—topics (al-gadal),ˇ then rhetoric (al-hitaba),¯ poetics (aˇs-ˇsi#r) and sophistic (safsata or mug˙ala¯ ta).237 ¯ . . .

Demonstration Apodictic or demonstration (burhan)¯ 238 as a skill, or a scientific method, according to Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ “the path to theoretical and practical truth”239 is a subject of a number of discussions. A precondition for defining apodictic, in the definition of scientific knowledge as differentia specifica is that knowledge is acquired in a scientific way, deduced from true causes, by method of syllogistic deduction. “To know”—as Aristotle said—“means to know through evidence…, to know through scientific syllogism.”240 Following this and similar standpoints that Aristotle suggested in his Posterior Analytics, Bosniac logicians defined apodictic in the following way:241 “Apodictic is a syllogism consisting of absolutely safe premisses that result in indisputable knowledge.”242

236 Aristotle, Prior Analytics, III, 23. 237 See chapter “Bosniac Authors and their Works”. 238 Burh¯an literally means proof, clear sign, argument. As it can be seen, especially in the texts in the field of logic, this word is adequate to Aristotle’s apodeiksis. It, therefore, signifies the scientific, “… the premisses of demonstrated knowledge must be true, primary, immediate, better known than and prior to the conclusion, which is further relatedtothemaseffect to cause…” (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics,I,2). It encompasses thesamecontentscoveredbydemonstration in Latin terminology. Moreover, texts in Arabic in the field of logic use al-Burh¯an or Kit¯ab al-burh¯an to denote Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics that presents teaching on scientific reasoning (see, e.g.: al-Far¯ abi,¯ Maq¯al¯at f¯ıma#¯an¯ıal-#aql,item3, 47 and Ibn S¯ına,¯ Kit¯ab al-hud. ¯ud,p.12). 239 Sarˇ hTah. d¯ıb al-man.tiq…, fol. 42a. 240 Aristotle,¯ Posterior Analytics,I,2. 241 See: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 25a–25b; Muhammad. b. . ¯ . Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 77b; Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı…, 73, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 137b, Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 39b; Muhammad. b. Mustafa¯ . . ¯ . .. al-Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 82a; Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Sarˇ hmatn. …, fol. 26b; Muhammad. b. Yusuf¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 13a. 242 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 25b. The differences in interpretation¯ given by other Bosniac authors are minor. These 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 118.

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The first question that authors face after this is: which premisses can be considered absolutely safe? Although the works that are the subject of this paper give clear reviews of all “indisputable knowledge” (yaq¯ıniyyat)¯ in the same order,243 they will be presented according to the review given by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ in his New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise”, as he included some additional explanations.244 1.Asapodictic is presented as a foundation of scientific knowledge, the question that is inevitable is whether the search for indisputably true premisses can last in infinitum or are there some elementary premisses of scientific knowledge? That is why the first place is reserved for first knowledge or axioms (al-awwaliyyat)¯ 245 “… which are”, according to Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı- zade,¯ “judgments that the very perception of the two parties (subject and predicate) is sufficient for a conclusion on the relation between the two, i.e. the judgment that you need common sense (al-#aql as-sar¯ıh). to perceive its parts, without any admonitions from outside”.246 As an example of such knowledge, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ gives Euclids eighth axiom: “The whole is bigger than its part”.247 2. The second group is perception-based knowledge (al-muˇsahad¯ at),¯ 248 i.e. the indisputable knowledge acquired either through:

definitions can be compared with the following statements of Aristotle: “By demonstration (apódeiksis, A.L.) I mean a syllogism which produces scientific knowledge, in other words one which enables us to know by the mere fact that we grasp it.” (Posterior Analytics,I,2) “… Reasoning is demonstration (apódeiksis, A.L.) when it proceeds from premises which are true and primary or of such a kind that we have derived our original knowledge of them through premises which are primary and true.” (Topics, I, 1). 243 Seenotenr.242. 244 As-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 137bandon. 245 Awwaliyy¯at from awwal = first, earlier, preceding. Compare Aristotle’s arhái (archái; Posterior Analytics,vol.I,chapter12 and 13). 246 As-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 138a. Aristotle says: “Things are ‘true’ and ‘primary’ which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves.” (Topics,I,1.) 247 As-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 138a. 248 Musˇ¯ahad¯at from musˇ¯ahada = observation, watching, seeing. Aristotle: “Therefore we must possess a capacity of some sort, but not such as to rank higher in accuracy than these developed states. And this at least is an obvious characteristic of all animals, for they possess a congenital discriminative capacity which is called sense-perception. But though sense-perception is innate in all animals, in some (higher animals) the sense-impression comes to persist, in others (lower animals) it does not.” (Posterior Analytics, vol. II, chapter 19.) 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 119.

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(a) external senses (al-haw. ass¯ az-. z.ahira)¯ concerning the outside world, also called sense-based knowledge (al-mahs. us¯ at),¯ “… as, for example, the judgment that the sun shines”,249 or (b) through internal senses (al-haw. ass¯ al-ba¯tina). concerning internal feelings, also called emotional perception (al-wigdˇ aniyy¯ at),¯ “… as, for example, the judgment that we are afraid or angry.”250 As this short presentation by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ shows, knowledge here is acquired based on direct perception through the senses, which in part corresponds to the notion of intuition.251 Arabic logicians clearly diﬀerentiate sensual intuition and intellectual intuition; more detail is given in chapter 4. 3. Experiment-based knowledge (mugarrabˇ at),¯ 252 “…and those are judgments achieved based on comprehensive observation useful for conviction… as for example the judgment that the use of scammonia causes purgation.”253

249 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 138b. 250 Ibid. 251 Philosophical terminology presents the meaning of intuition in several variations: direct perception of a complex situation whose elements or aspects can be perceived by senses; direct perception of an object or an event by one experience; direct perception of essences that are principally inapproachable (untouchable, ungraspable) and sense- perception and rational thinking. Compare: intuition (from intuor = I look at)—musˇ¯ahada (from ˇsahada¯ = to look, to see). 252 Mugarrabˇ ¯at from garrabaˇ = to test, to try; to experience. This expression points out two elements of its meaning: it is based on experience in the broadest sense of the word, and this experience is repeated (which is clear from the context and the meaning of this term because 2nd class verbs, such as this one, express intensity and frequency among else). From the quote that follows, as well as the examples given in texts in logic, we can notice that this term concerns observation of certain consciously provoked events, and disclosure of their causal connection. Therefore, the adequate word here would be experiment (tagrˇ ¯ıb), although we are aware that, if we were to follow the sources, we would reach a term more adequately translated as “experience”, “experience-based knowledge or judgment” (see e.g.: Ibn S¯ına,¯ Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…, pp. 176–177). This kind of knowledge is described by Aristotle at the end of his Posterior Analytics: “…and when such persistence is frequently repeated a further distinction at once arises between those which out of the persistence of such sense-impressions develop a power of systematizing them and those which do not. So out of sense-perception comes to be what we call memory, and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing develops experience; for a number of memories constitute a single experience.” (II, 19) 253 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 138b. Compare: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ı al-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 27a(Izabrani spisi…, p. 84). . ¯ . 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 120.

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4. Intuition-based knowledge (or knowledge acquired based on intuition) (hadsiyy. at),¯ 254 “… and those are judgments made based on very strong intuition (hads. qawiyy)… as the judgment that the light of the moon is borrowed from the sun… And intuition is the quick shift from elementary notions to conclusions.”255 This very “quick shift”, or “identification of the middle term”, and the example given, shows that the ability described here is equivalent to Aristotle’s quick wit.256 5. The fifth group is so called transferred knowledge (mutawatir¯ at),¯ 257 or propositions based on several identical testimonies by persons of authority in certain areas, “whose”, according Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, “consent in lies is discarded by reason.”258 6. And, eventually, syllogism based propositions (qad.ay¯ a¯ qiyas¯ atuh¯ ama-¯ #aha),¯ 259 “is the one in which the judgment is based on mediator that is founded in reason, where the notion of its final terms (tarf. an)¯ alone is sufficient… such as the judgment that four is an even number, because it is divisible into two equal parts.”260 In this case it’s necessary to observe the final terms, and, this time, to reveal the “mediator” that is syllogism. In this example the mediator is the “divisibility into two equal parts without a remainder, and reason instantly connects that number four is divisible into two equal parts.

254 Hadsiyy. ¯at from hads. = opinion, guessing, premonition; quick understanding. Intu- ition, intuitive cognition etc. are derived from this basic meaning, as well as the meaning attributed to this term by I. Madkour “hypotheses bien fondées” (L’Organon d’Aristote…, p. 224). 255 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 138a–139b. 256 “Quick wit is a faculty of hitting upon the middle term instantaneously. It would be exemplified by a man who saw that the moon has her bright side always turned towards the sun, and quickly grasped the cause of this, namely that she borrows her light from him… In all these instances he has seen the major and minor terms and then grasped the causes, the middle terms.” (Posterior Analytics,I,chapter34.) 257 Mutaw¯atir¯at from taw¯atara, literally: to be repeated, to arrive constantly. 258 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 27a–27b(Izabrani spisi…, p. 85). This type of proposition is also¯ grounded in Aristotle’s writings. Regarding the rules for selection of proposition, he says: “…thus one may first take in hand the opinions held by all or by most men or by the philosophers, i.e. by all, or most, or the most notable of them… for any one might assent to the saying of some generally accepted authority.” (Topics,I,14.) Transferred or traded knowledge as indisputable truth will have its place in the hadis (tradition corpse), i.e. in authentication and unbroken chain of transmitters. 259 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ adds that propositions of this kind are also called qad.¯ay¯a fitriyya f¯ıal-qiy¯as, see: as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 139a. 260 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 139a–139b. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 121.

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Everything divisible in this way is even, therefore four is an even number.”261 Therefore, these four types of proposition can form apodictic or demonstrative syllogism. However, such a demonstration (in the sense of al-burh¯an for Arabic logicians—proof through syllogism with indisputably safe premisses) means to prove, i.e. to claim that something is a reason for certain statement. According to Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ (Muhammadb.M. us¯ a¯ #Al- lamak¯ has a similar approach to the same issue, if somewhat more brief),262 the middle term (al-hadd. al-awsat). of such syllogism can point out the causality (#illa) between the minor and the major term (al-as.gar—˙ al-akbar). That is where the differentiation between the two types of demonstration comes from, or, in this case, argumentation (al-burhan).¯ The first type of demonstration consists of causal argumentation (burhan¯ limi(yy)) or argumentation “why”, “…and that is the one with the middle term as the cause of the relation of the major towards the minor term, in reason and reality”, and the second consists of conditional argumentation (burhan¯ ini(yy)),263 “… and that is the one with the middle term as the cause of relation only in reason.”264 Based on this, and also on the explanations and examples that follow, we can see that there are two kinds of argumentations: the first one, in which syllogism is deducted so that the middle term is the cause, both logical, as it implies a conclusion, and actual, as it is in practice the cause of a consequence; and second, where causality is purely logical. Terms used as distinction: lima and in very clearly show that these are the two kinds of Aristotelian argumentation that are in Latin terminology similarly called argumentation quia and argumentation si. Lima

261 Vidjeti: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 27b(Izabrani spisi,p.85). 262 MustafaY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-¯ gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 139bandSarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq .. . . ¯ . …, fol. 40aandMuhammad. b. Mus¯ aal-Bosnaw¯ ¯ı #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 77b. 263 Ter ms burh¯an limiyy (or limayy)andburh¯an iniyy areformedonanunusualbut “regular” way. The word burh¯an is clear (see note nr. 239), but the second part of the first compound word consists of the interrogative particle lima (why) and suffix iyy for relative noun formation (ism mansub—nomen¯ relativum), and the second part of the second term of the conditional particle in (if) and the same suffix. That is why it is translated as “conditional argumentation”. Also see: A.-M. Goichon, Vocabulaires comparés…, pp. 1–2. 264 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 139b. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 122.

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(why) corresponds to the Aristotelian term dióti (why), and in (inna) to hóti265 which Aristotle sees as knowledge of facts and causes.266

Other Types of Argumentation Unlike demonstration, other “skills” are treated in far less detail. Most works just give definitions, explained by several examples. The exclu- sions here were dialectics (gadal),ˇ which had a special place and role in the development of kal¯ama—speculative and dialectical theology—and sophistic (safsata. or mug˙ali¯ ta).. 1. Arabic logicians, following Aristotle’s views, believed that dialectics (gadal)ˇ 267 has far lesser importance for science than demonstration. For the needs of their writings in the field of logic, they significantly reduced the very comprehensive study of dialectics, presented in the fifth part of Organon, “Topics”. They found justification for that in Aristotle’s findings that dialectic syllogism (that is the very subject here), as it derives not from true principles and absolutely safe premisses but from probable ones which

265 Hóti in Greek: 1. introduces subject and object clauses and 2. cause; as, because, since. It is interesting to note that the Arabic particle, which is the subject here, when written without vowels (as in practice) can be inna (anna) which also introduces subject clauses and in when it is conditional conjunction. These alternatives in reading and understanding caused Arabic researchers dilemma (see: Ibn S¯ına,¯ Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…, 231 and on, especially note nr. 2). We found it easier to read the text using Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade’s¯ vocalization. 266 Aristotle says: “Knowledge of the fact /hóti/ differs from knowledge of the reasoned fact /dióti/. To begin with, they differ within the same science and in two ways: (1) when the premisses of the syllogism are not immediate (for then the proximate cause is not contained in them-a necessary condition of knowledge of the reasoned fact): (2) when the premisses are immediate, but instead of the cause the better known of the two reciprocals is taken as the middle; for of two reciprocally predicable terms the one which is not the cause may quite easily be the better known and so become the middle term of the demonstration…” (Posterior Analytics,I,13.) 267 Gadalˇ , literally means dispute, row; discussion skill. This word is the Arabic equivalent for Greek dialectic (dialektiké téhne) in its meaning used by Aristotle in ¯ Metaphysics,G,2 and Topics.Thiswordisusedtoderiveqiy¯as gadalˇ ¯ı (dialectic syllogism) as the equivalent for Greek sillogismós dialektikós.Thewordgadalˇ is also used as the translation for the title of Aristotle’s¯ book Topics that shows how probable (non-scientific) conclusions can be deducted (see: A.N. Prior, Historija logike,p.49), even though some older texts give the original title in Arabic transcription T. ¯ub¯ıq¯a (see: Ibn S¯ına,¯ Kit¯ab al-hud. ¯ud…, pp. 7, 18 etc.). And, finally, the expression gadalˇ ¯ı (gadaliyyˇ un)¯ also means dialectician, and it is used to denote mu#tazila (followers of a school of speculative theological thinking, see: H. Corbin, Historija…, pp. 121–128). 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 123.

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can result only in probable conclusion, belongs to the field of probable thinking and not scientific knowledge. Thus, the definition of dialectics given by Bosniac logicians springs out of these standpoints. Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ı al-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı very shortly says: “Dialectics (gadal)ˇ is syllogism that consists of premisses known or accepted.”268 The same definition, with minor differences can be found in the works of other Bosniac logicians.269 With his well-known pedantry and liking of systematization and classification, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ speaks about six kinds of “non-absolutely safe judgments” (gayr˙ yaq¯ı- niyyat),¯ in parallel to the presented six “absolutely safe judgements”.270 The first two out of these non-absolutely safe kinds of judgments, that are such the least, belong to dialectics, and the others to rhetoric and poetics. Those are: a) Well-known judgments (maˇshur¯ at),¯ “…premisses known to all, to the majority, or to a group, but of educated people”.271 The gap between them and “the first” truths is still large. Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ points out that judgments of this kind are true in most cases and lead to true conclusions. However, this is not always true, as there are premisses “very well-known”, yet untrue. An example that those judgments cannot participate in formation of apodictic or scientific syllogisms is the relativity of judgment on the sacrifice of animals for religious purposes, which is a bad deed for Hindus. He especially points out that all these judgments are used in the field of laws, moral, education and tradition, and that they are relative.272 b) Accepted judgments (musallamat),¯ “…premisses accepted from opponents, and used (regardless of whether they are true or false) to build discussion refuting their arguments.”273

268 Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 25b(Izabrani spisi…, p. 82). ¯ . 269 Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 78a; Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı- zade,¯ Sarˇ h Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı, 75, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 140b, Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 40a; . . . ¯ . Muhammadb.Mu. s.taf. aal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 84a; Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Sarˇ hmatn. …, fol. 131aandMuhammad. b. Yusuf¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 28a. 270 See: Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 140b. Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ treats this issue in a similar way but in less detail. (see: l.c.). 271 Ibid. 272 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 140a. 273 Ibid, fol. 140a–140b. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 124.

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In conclusion on the meaning of dialectics, and in accordance with Aristotle’s evaluation,274 it is emphasized that it is useful for practice and discussion, and disciplines such as law, ethics, speculative theology, education, etc. At the beginning of the dialectics presentation, it was said that Ara- bic logicians, especially later ones, minimized this issue in comparison to Aristotle’s Topics in their writings that deal with logic in a narrow sense. However, it need be pointed out that, in the circle of Arabic- Islamic culture and science, a special discipline developed, dedicated to the research and definition of rules for debating skills, called #ilm ¯ad¯ab al-bahtwaal-mun¯azara.275 .¯ . Special stimulus for the development of this discipline was given by as-Samarqand¯ı276 with his work Ad¯ ¯ab al-baht. Disputation, as an idea .¯ and in practice, was familiar to the Arabs even before they learnt about Aristotle’s Topics and before as-Samarqand¯ı,277 however, unlike earlier authors, in certain fields limited to disputation exclusively, “as- Samarqand¯ı presented the first treatise applicable to any subject area… and thus the first attempt at a universal theory of disputation, referred to by his successors as simply the ¯ad¯ab al-baht.”278 .¯ This work was, even in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period treated here, very popular, often copied and commented on. This indicates the need to pay special attention to the research on this matter within the studies of the cultural history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ himself wrote nine texts on this issue. As those works are directly linked to the topic that is the subject of this paper, they will not be treated specifically, but we shall instead give a short

274 Compare l.c. and vol. I, chapter 2 of Aristotle’s Topics. 275 Titles of works in this field bear different alternatives of this title, such as: #ilm al-baht, #ilm al-bahtwaal-mun¯azara, ¯ad¯ab al-bahtwaal-mun¯azara etc., but it is always men- .¯ .¯ . .¯ . tioned that it is a separate discipline on dialogue and debating skills (bah.twamuna¯zara).. There is a number of works in this field written in the 13th century¯ and later both in West Europe and the Orient, almost at the same time. See: Histoire de la philosophie,Enc. de la Pléiade, t. I, pp. 1457–1462. 276 Samsuddˇ ¯ın Muhammad. as-Samarqand¯ı, 15th century, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G II, 194. 277 See: George Makdisi, The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and Christian West: With Special Reference to Scholasticism, Edinburgh 1990, especially: Part five, Chapter II, “Mud- hakara” and Chapter III, “Munazara”, pp. 208–212,andE.Wagner,“Muna¯zara”,. in: Encyclopaedia of Islam, CD-ROM Edition, Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. 278 L.B. Miller, “Al-Samarkand. ¯ı, Shams al-d¯ın”, in: Encyclopaedia of Islam… 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 125.

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presentation of the works by Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ who contributed enormously in this field. He wrote nine texts in this field, mostly commentaries and super- commentaries on well-known works. One of them is very short, only two pages, and it is called The Essence of Disputation (Hula¯sat al-ad¯ ab),¯ ¯ . and it is mentioned as the Treatise on Disputation (Risala¯ f¯ı ad¯ ab¯ al- baht).279 It gives a brief outline of the issues in the field of disputation. .¯ Later, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ commented on this text on two occasions: firstly, in the form of a short compendium called Brief Commentary on “The Essence of Disputation” (aˇs-Sarˇ hal-muhtasar #ala¯ Hula¯sat al-ad¯ ab)¯ . ¯ . ¯ . and secondly, in detail in the work called Comprehensive Commentary on “The Essence of Disputation” (aˇs-Sarˇ hal-mutawwal #ala¯ Hula¯sat al-ad¯ ab).¯ . . ¯ . However, manuscripts of these two commentaries have yet to be found, and they are known only on the basis of the notes left by the author and his biographers. The object of attention of Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade’s¯ other commentaries was the first significant piece of writing in this area, the above mentioned Samarqand¯ı’s work, for its popularity called Samarqand¯ı’s Treatise (ar- Risala¯ as-Samarqandiyya).280 The first among Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade’s¯ commentaries on this work was written in Istanbul, no later than 1677 or 1678. It is called Com- mentary on Samarqand¯ı’s Treatise on Disputation (Sarˇ h. #alaar-Ris¯ ala¯ as-Sa- marqandiyya).281 In his Introduction, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ says: “The highest and the most glorious aspiration and the most important and the most sublime desire is to decorate one’s self with various sciences and knowledges, and to comprehend what is witty and shrewd in them. One of those sciences is disputation that possesses the winning tools and contains the rules for progress, and its goal is to preserve us from fallacy in debate and ambiguity in discussion. There are a lot of papers written on this issue and a lot of treatises completed. The best among them is a treatise, popular among scholars, written by the most excellent among later scholars and the most perfect among the educated ones, the sun of the people and faith, Samarqand¯ı…, it contains shrewd rules and brings benefit. I parted not from it for a long time, I devoted myself to reading, and my heart often led me to comment on

279 Manuscript:OIS,R4726/II; GHB, br. 1766;OZHAZU,No1525/II; Bratislava UK, TC 8,cat.nr.269. 280 Seenotenr:277. 281 Manuscript: Bratislava UK, TF 119,cat.nr.261. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 126.

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it with a commentary that would surmount all its elusions, take the veil off the face of its pearls, encompass its unsolved secrets and explain the finesses under the shroud. I studied, reading the books written in the science of disputation, especially the commentary on assumption and truth criterion in this field…”282 In the following two cases, Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ used a number of commentaries, especially the commentaries by Kamaludd¯ ¯ın Mas#ud¯ aˇs- Sirwˇ an¯ ¯ı (died 1355)283 and accompanying marginalia, completing super- commentaries or new marginalia. That is how the two works were written: Commentary on the “Marginalia on the Commentary on Mas#¯ud¯ı’s disputation…” (Sarˇ h. #ala¯ H. a¯ˇsiya ˇsarhal-. ad¯ ab¯ al-Mas#ud¯ ¯ı li al-Mostar¯ ¯ı)284 and Marginalia on Marginalia on the Commentary on Disputation (Haw. a¯ˇs¯ı #ala¯ haw. a¯ˇs¯ı ˇsarhal-. ad¯ ab).¯ 285 In both these works, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ shows comprehensive knowledge of the issue and the literature in the field. That is confirmed by two more works—marginalia on another very famous work, Disputation (Ad¯ ab¯ al-baht), written by #Adududd¯ın al-I¯gˇ¯ı (died in .¯ . 1355),286 and commentary on it and accompanying marginalia written by Muhammad. at-Tibr¯ız¯ıal-Hanaf. ¯ı (died in 1494).287 The first work was written in April 1684 titled Useful Marginalia…(H. a¯ˇsiya muf¯ıda…)288 and it contains about 150 pages, while the second was written in Febru- ary 1691, and titled Marginalia Accompanying al-Hanaf. ¯ı’sWorkbyal-M¯ost¯ar¯ı (H. a¯ˇsiya #alaal-¯ Hanafiyya. li al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı).289 Besides these works, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ wrote another, very short commentary called Commentary on the Writings of as-ˇ Sarˇ ¯ıf al-Gurˇ gˇ¯an¯ı on Disputation (Sarˇ h. #alam¯ a¯ katabahu aˇs-Sarˇ ¯ıf f¯ıal-ad¯ ab).¯ 290

282 This fragment in original and in translation in Bosnian can be found in: S. Baˇsa- gic,´ Bosnjaciˇ …, pp. 122–123. 283 Kamaludd¯ ¯ın Mas#ud¯ aˇs-Sirwˇ an¯ ¯ıar-Rum¯ ¯ı, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,G,I,468 andS,I,849. 284 Autograph: GHB, br. 3974. 285 Autograph: GHB, br. 3855. 286 #Adududd. ¯ın al-I¯gˇ¯ı, see.: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G, II, 208 andS,II,287. 287 See: C. Brockelmann, GAL,G,II,208 iS,II,289. 288 The title is given in short form. There are several titles of this paper (see: H. Sabanoviˇ c,´ Knjizevnostˇ …, p. 407 and M. Zdraloviˇ c,´ “Prilog poznavanju djela Sejhaˇ Juje”, Hercegovina,br.1,Mostar,1981,pp.121–124), and we give here the beginning of the title in autograph. Autograph: GHB, br. 3987. 289 Manuscripts: GHB, br. 3915/I and OIS, R 3529. 290 There have been no known manuscript copies of this work found to date. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 127.

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Although some of these works focus on rules adapted to legal issues, all of them have the characteristic presentation of rules applicable in all disciplines. All the issues could be roughly divided in three groups: a. Definition and closed identification of the elementary issues of this discipline, such as: debate (muna¯zara),. proof, premiss, cause, consequences, vicious circle (ad-dawr), contradiction, accidence, etc., b. Definition of dialogue and instruction on how to lead a dialogue, to set and to refute a thesis, and c. Application of this knowledge in theology, philosophy and jurisprudence. Lastly, let’s remember that there are a number of discourses and treatises written on this topic in Western Europe from the 13th century on, with almost the same goal, that were titled De disputatione.291 2. The following two disciplines or “skills”: rhetoric (al-hitaba)¯ and ¯ . poetics (aˇs-ˇsi#r), are treated with even lesser attention in the writings in the field of logic,292 which is understandable, given the cognitive value of syllogisms of this kind.293 Reasoning based on rhetoric and poetic syllogisms is treated by some of Arabic logicians as a type of conclusion through dialectic syllogism, but with a less severe premisses selection on rhetoric, and the least severe on poetic conclusion. The definition of rhetorical syllogism (al-qiyas¯ al-hitab¯ ¯ı)294 is very close ¯ . to the definition of dialectic syllogism. It is defined as a syllogism con-

291 Seenotenr.276. 292 See: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 25b–26a; Muhammad. b. . ¯ . Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 78a–78b; Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a- ˙g¯ugˇ¯ı, 75–76, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 140b–141b, Sarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 40a; Muham-. . . ¯ . madb.Mus.taf. aal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 85a–85b; Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Sarˇ hmatn. …, fol. 28bandMuhammad. b. Yusuf¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 131b. Diﬀerently from these authors and most other logicians of this school, even Ibn S¯ına,¯ al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı speaks on rhetoric and poetics in more detail and bases his argument on other works, not only Organon. See: al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı, Logiceskieˇ traktati…, pp. 439–555. 293 See more: Deborah L. Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy, Brill, Leiden, 1990. 294 The word hi.t¯aba means rhetoric, speaking skills; preaching, speech. It is a translation of Greek¯rhetoriké, as well as the translation of the title of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, although in older texts, similar to Topics, the original title in Arabic transcription Ra.t¯ur¯ıq¯a can be found (see note nr. 268). The expression qiy¯as hi.t¯ab¯ı = rhetorical syllogism, found in some of the works, derives from the same base word.¯ 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 128.

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sisting of acceptable (maqbul¯ at)¯ 295 premisses, the ones that are “…taken over from those who are convinced about them”, or probable (al-mazn. u-¯ nat)¯ 296 premisses, “…and those are premisses that judge on something based on assumption… as in: ‘Someone wanders around at night, and he is a thief ’. The usage (of this syllogism) is to entice the listener to something that can be useful to them in education and religious issues”.297 Poetics (ˇsi#r)298 was not treated as a separate discipline in a considerable number of works by Arabic logicians, but as a kind of rhetoric, or a versiﬁed rhetorical conclusion. However, the practice to treat it as the fourth “skill” was evidently introduced long before Bosniac authors became active,299 as they treated it as separate one, pointing out its main characteristics. According to these texts it can be concluded that poetic syllogism characteristically consists of suggestive premisses (muhayyilat)¯ 300 “…which, ¯

295 Maqb¯ul, passive participle of qabila = to accept, to take in; to believe; to take over; to give consent. Adifference should be made between accepted premisses (musallamat)¯ mentioned in dialectics, which are accepted in a debate with an opponent (regardless of whether they are true or false) and an argument to refute his thesis, and these are translated as acceptable premisses. 296 Mazn. ¯un, passive participle from zanna. =tothink,tobelieve;toassume,toantici- pate. 297 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 140b.Almostthesamedefini- tion was given by other Bosniac authors (see: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı …, fol. 25b(Izabrani spisi…, 83). ¯ Aristotle in Organon says: “We must now state that not only dialectical and demonstrative syllogisms are formed by means of the aforesaid figures, but also rhetorical syllogisms and in general any form of persuasion, however it may be presented… Again, the persuasion exerted by rhetorical arguments is in principle the same, since they use either example, a kind of induction, or enthymeme, a form of syllogism.” (Prior Analytics, II, 23 and Posterior Analytics,I,1.) 298 Siˇ #r = poem; verse; poetry; poetics; feeling, etc. Translators and writers of commentaries on the works of Aristotle, as well as Arabic logicians, use this word to translate Aristotle’s term poietiké (see: On Interpretation,chapter4). Another term that is also used is qiy¯as siˇ #r¯ı = poetic syllogism. On poetics by Bosniac authors see: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, . ¯ . fol. 26a; Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 78a–78b; Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı …, fol. 40a; Muhammad. b. Mus.taf. aal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-. asr¯ar…, fol. 85b; Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Sarˇ hmatn. …, fol. 28bandMuhammadb.Y. usuf¯ al- Bosnaw¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar…, fol. 131b. 299 See: A.N. Prior, Historija logike…, p. 49. 300 Muhayyil, active participle of hayyala that has a very wide scope of meanings, with the preposition¯ il¯a it means to convince;¯ to awaken feelings. The context clearly shows that these are premisses that provoke certain feelings. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 129.

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when told to a person, affect that person with an unusually strong impression of either confinement (qabd),. 301 or openness (bast). 302 …as when they say: ‘Wine is a liquid ruby’, the man opens and wants to drink it …”303 In commentaries that are somewhat more comprehensive, such as New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise”, besides these elementary remarks, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ points out the basic values of poetics as well as its deficiencies, and that it can be used as a tool for practicing, in the same way as dialectics and rhetoric.

Sophistic Arabic logicians did not pay the same level of attention to sophistic, or to be more accurate, the refuting of sophistic proofs, as Aristotle did in his eighth book Topics and in his book On Sophistic Refutation. More importantly, their place and importance among Arabs is much lesser than the one it had in the medieval scholastics. A more detailed and comprehensive explanation is given by al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı304 and Ibn S¯ına,¯ 305 the forefathers of Arabic logic, while later logicians generally reduce this issue down to a reference of the basic types of sophistic argumentation. On the other hand, a number of issues related to sophistics, as well as the ones related to dialectics, were included in #ilm ¯ad¯ab al-baht,the .¯ discipline whose goal is to develop dialogue and debating skills, which means avoiding sophisms. However, the tradition to treat sophistics as one of the reasoning skills was maintained by all Bosniac authors, although in some cases very minimally and only within its elementary

Thesamebasewordisusedtoderivethepsychologicaltermtahayyul (imagination), hay¯al¯ı (imaginative) and others (see: A.-M. Goichon, Vocabulaires…,¯ /hyl/ and Psychologie ¯ ¯d’Ibn S¯ın¯a (Avicenne) d’après son oeuvre as-ˇ Sifˇ ¯a",éd.JanBakoˇs, Prague, 1959). 301 Qabd. = conﬁnement; contraction, tightening; repulsion, repugnance. 302 Bas.t = spreading; dissemination; exhilaration, joy. By this statement, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ wishes to say that poetic syllogism, consisting of suggestive premisses, gives a conclusion that is also suggestive, and that can provoke a feeling of repulsion (qabd). or, opposite, the feeling of full joy for the recipient. Compare: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 26a. . ¯ . 303 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 241a. 304 See: аль-Фараби, Логические трактаты [see: Kitab¯ al-amkina al-magli˙ ta],. Алма -Ата, 1975,pp.361–438. Translation into Russian was composed directly from the manuscript in the Bratislava collection. See in this book, Chapter I, footnote 22. 305 Ibn S¯ına,¯ an-Nagˇ¯at,al-Qahira,¯ 1321 (1903), 141–148 and Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…, p. 214. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 130.

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framework.306 Two basic issues in this field are the definition of sophism and classification of sophisms. Leading into delusion or sophistic argumentation (al-mug˙ala¯ ta). 307 is defined as syllogism consisting of untrue premisses (ka¯diba), or of apparently true ¯ (ˇsab¯ıhabial-haqq). premisses, or of apparently known (ˇsab¯ıhabial-maˇshu-¯ ra)308 ones. If a syllogism is formed and used in a way that apparently true premisses express the necessity of conclusion, it is called sophism (safsata),. 309 and when it uses an apparently known premiss it is called dispute (muˇsa-¯ gaba)˙ or in Aristotle’s terminology, eristic proof.310 Sophism stands opposed to apodictic, i.e. knowledge, and dispute, i.e. eristic, opposed to dialectic. As for the classification of sophism, before Ibn S¯ınawrote¯ Kit¯ab al- isˇ¯ar¯at wa at-tanb¯ıh¯at, and even in his Nagˇ¯at, it was formed in analogy to

306 As the analysis of the structure of works in the field of logic by Bosniac authors (2nd chapter) shows, those works that used al-Abhar¯ı’s Isagogue as the paradigm of structure or directly depended on this piece of writing (in form of commentary or super-commentary), payed, let’s say, symbolic attention to the “skills” in general, giving only a definition followed by one example, while other texts treat them in more detail. Notable exception is the apodictic which is the source of scientific knowledge. For more on sophistic see: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 26b . ¯ . (Izabrani spisi…, 83); Muhammadb.M. us¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 78b; Mus.ta-. faY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı…, pp. 76–77, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 141a–141b, Sarˇ h. Tahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 40;Muhammad. b. Mustafaal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr¯ar…, fol. 85b– ¯ . .. . 86a: Fa¯dil. U¯ ziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Sarˇ hmatn. …, fol. 28bandMuhammad. b. Yusuf¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı, Fath. al-asr¯ar…, fol. 131. 307 Mu˙g¯ala.ta from ˙g¯ala.ta = to lead to delusion; to lead to fallacy; to cause error; to cheat, to delude, to befool. These meanings, and the following text show that term mu˙g¯ala.ta denotes any invalid conclusion (logical fallacy in narrow and broad sense), intentional logical fallacy (sophism) and unintentional (paralogism). 308 Seenotenr.307. 309 Safsa.ta (sophism) is the Arabic form of the Greek sofismós, and it denotes both sophism (cunning thought, apparent evident and delusion aimed conclusion) and sophistic (skill to abuse language expression abilities and logical forms). Besides this expression, there is qiy¯as s¯ufis.t¯a"¯ı = sophistic syllogism. 310 Musˇ¯a˙gaba, infinitive (masdar). of sˇ¯a˙gaba, means rebellion, riots…; intrigue; raw, dispute, argument. This type of syllogism corresponds to eristic proof in Aristotle’s classification: “So, then, any merely apparent reasoning about these things is a contentious argument, and any reasoning that merely appears to conform to the subject in hand, even though it be genuine reasoning, is a contentious argument: for it is merely apparent in its conformity to the subject-matter, so that it is deceptive and plays foul… Hence everybody, including even amateurs, makes use in a way of dialectic and the practice of examining: for all undertake to some extent a rough trial of those who profess to know things…” (On Sophistic Refutation, 11.) 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 131.

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the classification given by Aristotle,311 i.e. it was divided into speech- based (Latin: in dictum) with six types of fallacy, and those out of speech (Latin: extra dictionem) with seven types of fallacy.312 In Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at … Ibn S¯ına¯ gave another classification taken over by later logicians, including Bosniac ones, as a whole.313 This classification is based on the place where fallacy occurs: (1) Fallacy in syllogism form (min gihaˇ as-. s.ura),¯ (2) Material fallacy in contents (min gihaˇ al-madda)¯ and (3) Fallacy in both contents and form (min gihatihimˇ a¯ gamˇ ¯ı#an). The first group are fallacies of formal nature that are a result of, according to Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ the disrespect of the figure forming conditions, disrespect of the quantity condition (kamiyya), quality condition (kayfiyya) or modality condition (giha).ˇ The second group consists of those fallacies that can occur in reasoning despite meeting all syllogism forming conditions. Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ mentions so called petitio principii (principle anticipation) and says: “If one premiss and the conclusion are one (the same) thing, then the fallacy is called mus.¯adara #al¯aal-ma.tl¯ub…”,314 or when a conclusion that is yet to be proved is taken as grounds for reasoning.

311 See: Aristotle, On Sophistic Refutation,chapter1 and 5. 312 See e.g.: аль-Фараби, Логические трактаты…(Kitab¯ al-amkina al-magli˙ ta),. pp. 361–438, especially 366 and 379. For classification by Ibn S¯ına¯ see: I. Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote…, pp. 237–239. 313 Ibn S¯ına,¯ Livre des directives et remarques (Kitab¯ al-iˇsar¯ at¯ wa al-tanb¯ıhat)…,¯ pp. 239– 245. Among the authors in the field of logic who are the object of this book this classification is completely taken over in the following works: Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ Samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 78a; Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı,pp.76– 77, as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 141b–142a; Muhammad. b. Mus.taf. aal-¯ Caynawˇ ¯ı, Fathal-asr. ¯ar …, fol. 85b–86a. 314 Mus.¯adara #al¯aal-ma.tl¯ub = begging for principal questions, petitio principii. See: Y. K a r a m , al-Mu#gamˇ al-falsaf¯ı…, p. 159 and D. Reig, Dictionnaire Arabe—Français…, 3066/III, as well as I. Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote…, pp. 238–239. As an example of such fallacy (petitio principii), Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ (o.c., fol. 141b) uses syllogism based on synonyms: “‘Every basarˇ (man) is ins¯an (man).’ ‘Every basarˇ (man) can laugh.’ Conclusion: ‘Every ins¯an (man) can laugh.’” The very same type of seeking principles or “begging original question” was described by Aristotle in his “Topics”, VIII, chapter 13: “People appear to beg their original question in five ways: the first and most obvious being if any one begs the actual point 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 132.

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Then there are other sophisms classified in those originating from the aspect of words (min gihaˇ al-lafz). and those originating from the aspect of meaning (min gihaˇ al-ma#na).¯ This type of classification includes those fallacies that occurred based on synonymy, homonymy, amphiboly, word order, “…when one does not pay attention to the predicate”, “when the accidental is taken for the essential”, “when genus is attributed with the attributes of class”, “when the abstract is mistaken for the concrete and the other way round” etc.315 The third group consists of sophisms and material fallacy in the very premisses. However new and original for the time this classification of sophism appeared, when we observe more comprehensive works in the field of logic that form all, or at least most of sophisms (especially commentaries on Ibn S¯ına’s¯ works), it appears that they do not mention then unknown types of sophisms.

Scientiﬁc Questioning

Sophistic is usually the issue that ends treatises in the field of logic. However, a number of logicians—apparently under the strong, direct or indirect influence of Ibn S¯ına’s¯ work—deal with the relation between demonstration and science, its contents, principles and questions. Hav- ing in mind that Arabic logicians see demonstration as equal to deductive conclusion, or that syllogisms (provided that their premisses are true and that they are formed in the right way) are the only form in which reasoning reaches conclusions, which are the highest form of theoretically available truth as coordination between reasoning and being, and how scientific knowledge is reached, it was necessary to give answers to some methodological questions that, based on the definition of scientific knowledge and syllogism, Aristotle asked himself. Primarily, the question is which and what kind of the initial assumptions human cognition starts with, if its only reliable method is pure deduction, and

requiring to be shown: this is easily detected when put in so many words; but it is more apt to escape detection in the case of diﬀerent terms, or a term and an expression, that means the same thing.” (Also see: Prior Analytics,vol.II,chapter16,“BeggingOriginal Question”). 315 Seenotenr.314. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 133.

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whether the search for those premisses can infinitely suggest syllogisms and elementary premisses of scientific knowledge. As we know, Aristotle gave most of the answers to these questions in the volume 1 of his “Posterior Analytics”, and Arabic logicians gave partial answers along with the chapter on the demonstration of apodictic. Among the authors whose works are the object of this study, the ones who treated this issue separately following the example of Ibn S¯ına,¯ are Muhammadb.M. us¯ a¯ #Allamak—very¯ shortly, and Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ somewhat more comprehensively, in his New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” and Commentary on “The Training in Logic and Apologetic”. Both these authors do it at the end of their books, in the Conclusion.316 Here is a presentation how extensively Aristotle’s solutions were taken as paradigm for writings of this kind. This matter is catalogued around three elementary questions: subject of the discipline (mawd.u¯#), principles of the discipline (mabda"—mabadi¯ ")and questions—issues of the discipline (mas"ala—masa¯"il). The subject of the discipline (mawd.u¯#,pl.mawd.u¯#at)¯ 317 can consist of one or more questions that define the respective discipline, whose phenomena (giha)ˇ are researched. In order to be able to prove and use principles within a discipline that has more than one subject, the subjects have to be of the same kind. On the other hand, one subject can be treated by more than one discipline. Therefore there are different relations between different disciplines: equal relation in which two or more disciplines treat the same issue, but from different angles; relation in which one discipline is a part of another, and the third relation—the relation of subordination. Identification of the subject of the discipline and definition of these relations are necessary to define the exact role of different principles, those that are generally valid and those applicable only within one discipline, because, according to Aristotle, “… Of the basic truths used in the demonstrative sciences some are peculiar to each science, and some are common, but common only in the sense of analogous, being of use only in so far as they fall within the genus constituting the province of the science in question.”318

316 Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ Sarˇ ha. s-ˇ samsiyyaˇ …, fol. 79a–80a; Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 142a–143bandSarˇ hTahd¯ıb al-mantiq…, fol. 40b–42a. . . ¯ . 317 Logic uses the word mawd.¯u# in the meaning of subject. However, here it is used in the meaning of objective, problem or contents of science. 318 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics,I,10. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 134.

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The term mab¯adi" is used by Arabic logicians to denote those very principles, the principles of science in its broadest sense, its standards and starting points. Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ and Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ 319 following in the footsteps of Ibn S¯ına’s¯ Kit¯ab as-ˇ sifˇ ¯a" quoted by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ 320 divided the principles into two main groups:

1. Before stating, proving or concluding, it is necessary to define the exact contents of the terms that will be used, to define their definition (hadd). originating from conception (tasawwur. at).¯ And that is the first type of principle.

2.Theassertions (tasd. ¯ıqat)¯ are used to form premisses (muqaddimat)¯ that can have the function of principles, and that appear in two forms: a) “The ones clear as such (al-bayyina bi nafsiha)¯ also called generally accepted knowledge (#ulum¯ muta#arifa),¯ as in: ‘Sizes equal to a size are equal to one another’.”321 Therefore, this is about axioms, the truths that cannot be proved but are so evident that they need not be proved and it is impossible even to imagine something opposite to them. b) “The ones unclear as such (gayr˙ al-bayyina bi (f¯ı) nafsiha)…¯ also called postulates (mus.adar¯ at),¯ according to Euclid: ‘If there is a line intersecting two other lines, and if the two internal corners on the (smaller) side are more acute than two right angles, (those) two lines, if continued to that side, will intersect with each other.’”322 Postulates, therefore, are not immediately evident truths as axioms are, but we accept them because we can prove some other truths using them. The very definition of principles and their division, show that those solutions are literally taken over from Aristotle. Aristotle noticed that the beginning and the foundation of cognition, as well as the origin of proof, are some principal judgments (archái) which can be: definitions (horismós) that cannot be proved as they simply define or identify

319 Seenotenr.315. 320 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 142b. 321 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 142b. Here he uses the ﬁrst Euclid’s axiom. 322 Ibid. Example given is the ﬁfth Euclid’s postulate. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 135.

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contents of a term, or, according to Aristotle, “existence and meaning (definition) of those issues are assumed immediately without proof ”; axioms that are evident as such and “necessarily exist as such and should be necessarily believed in”; or postulates (áitema) that are “assumed ¯ without proof and used.”323 The term mas¯a"il means scientific questioning and issues that yet need to be proved—theses. The issue emphasized here is that the solving of certain problems should be done within the discipline that questioned them, as, besides the fact that there are questions answered by the first principles (awwaliyyat)¯ as the elementary truth of all disciplines, the final and the medium terms in one definition need to belong to the same contents.324

Terminological Characteristics

As the previous presentations show, as well as the notes accompanying the text, Arabic logical terminology used in the texts of Bosniac authors is characteristic for its stability and causality in use, and the way it is formed and its etymology show certain specificities. It can be said that Arabic logical terminology was formed over two and a half centuries; from the first translations of Aristotle’s writings (directly from Greek or indirectly from Syrian) into Arabic; to the works of al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ıand his contemporaries, in whose works it was already developed; to the texts of Ibn S¯ına¯ where it was fixed and more or less stabile. Truthfully, there were some later attempts to innovate, the most significant efforts ˙ 325 weretheonesofal-Gazal¯ ¯ıinhisMihakk. al-nazar. . However, those attempts to change some of the terms into new ones, despite having been accepted by some of the logicians, had no significant success, and in the texts by Bosniac authors they can only be found in the function of explaining some terms. They caused confusion and severe criticisms,

323 See: Aristotle, Posterior Analytics,chapter10 (different principles). 324 Aristotle: “… If a syllogistic question is equivalent to a proposition embodying one of the two sides of a contradiction, and if each science has its peculiar propositions from which its peculiar conclusion is developed, then there is such a thing as a distinctively scientific question, and it is the interrogative form of the premisses from which the ‘appropriate’ conclusion of each science is developed… There is a limit, then, to the questions which we may put to each man of science; nor is each man of science bound to answer all inquiries on each several subject, but only such as fall within the defined field of his own science.” (Posterior Analytics,I,12.) 325 ˙ 30 Abu¯ H. amid¯ al-Gazal¯ ¯ı, Mihakk. an-nazar. ,al-Qahira,¯ s.a., especially p. . 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 136.

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such as the ones by Ibn Haldun.¯ 326 Therefore, logical terminology was ¯ completely stabile by the time Bosniac authors started being active, until the end of the 19th century. As for the specificities in its forming, it should be said that the Arabic language, from the time of the first written documents to the translation of Greek texts, was primarily the language of poetry as the only “creative activity of human beings worth attention”, then the language of The Qur"an, and eventually, the language of a very modest corpus of prose.327 That is why the specific Arabic logical terminology was “created”, since the overall Arabic dictionary from the mentioned corpus of written language, along with what the spoken language had to offer, could not satisfy the new needs or cover the new meanings that some philosophical terms carried, especially the ones that entered Arabic as an already finalized result of the Antic philosophical thought. The later development of Arabic philosophical thinking resulted in the development of the new terminology springing out of the very philosophical thought. On the other hand, Arabic, as one of the Semitic languages or as the type of language that has root inflexion, with its structure and possibilities to use consonant groups and form new words, was an inex- haustible source.328 That is why Arabic terminology has always drawn the greatest attention, almost from the time when it was formed (which is evident in Ibn S¯ına’s¯ Kit¯ab al-hud. ¯ud) until today. It is certain that it is impossible to shed light on such a complex process as the formulation of terminology that is comprised of the most versatile influences, especially the formulation of philosophical and logical terminology. This is why we shall use the original texts of Bosniac authors in Arabic, as well as their resources and literature—to point out the elementary ways and characteristics of forming Arabic logic terminology.

326 See previously quoted fragment, Ibn Haldun,¯ Muqaddima…, p. 489. ¯ 327 Also see: Charles Pellat, “Draguljari rijeci”ˇ [Jewelers with words], in: Svijet islama …, pp. 145–146 andF.Hiti[P.Hitti],Istorija Arapa…, especially pp. 97–102. 328 Theoretically the number of consonants could form over 20,000 tri-consonant roots that would further be used to derive noun and verb forms. Understandably, it would not be possible to apply all out of this number of theoretical roots due to some acoustic and physiological reasons, but it is still true that the today’s Arabic has only one third realized. See more: Teufik Muftic,´ Infinitivi trilitera u arapskom jeziku [Infinitives of Triliteral Roots in Arabic], Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, Special Edition V, Sarajevo, 1966, especially pp. 12–16. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 137.

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A. Before starting with the pure Arabic terminology, it must be mentioned that in the early period of Arabic logic, philosophical terminology was penetrated by a certain number of Greek terms in Arabic transcription.329 And if their later development is followed, they can be classiﬁed as follows:

1. Greek terms in Arabic transcription, which as early as al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı’s texts, had their Arabic equivalent, continued existing concurrently with them, and then extinguished. Among these terms that can be found in al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı’s works, there is an example of q¯a.t¯a˙guriy¯as with its Ara- bic equivalent al-maq¯ul¯at,andsil¯ugismˇ ¯us with the Arabic equivalent, al- qiy¯as.330 Most of these terms, after their Arabic equivalent had been established, could not survive in Arabic language, also because those words did not easily ﬁt in Arabic morphology and orthography (there was a possibility of diﬀerent and wrong reading and pronunciation due to unmarked short vowels, etc.).

2. A limited number of Greek terms, besides their Arabic equivalent, survived in the texts in the ﬁeld of logic, as for example: us.tuqs: #unsur. (element); hay¯ul¯a: m¯adda (matter); falsafa: hikma. (philosophy); s¯uf¯ıs.tiqa (or safsa.ta): mu˙g¯ala.ta (sophistic) etc. These terms, in contrast to those of the ﬁrst group, can be found in derivative forms, such as: s¯uf¯ıs.t¯a"¯ı (sophistical, sophist), hay¯ul¯an¯ı (material) and others.

B. The main source for forming Arabic logic terminology was in the Arabic language itself, in the abundance of the existing consonant (mainly tri-consonant) roots that carried certain ideas, and in the existing vocabulary. Arabic logic, and other philosophical terminology, shows several main methods of their formation:

329 There are very few original texts from that period that could be used to identify the terms and their number. This lack is especially evident in the case of al-Kind¯ı’s texts that could be very illustrative. It can be followed in later texts, especially the ones by al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı, though the number of terms is signiﬁcantly lower in them as well. See: аль-Фараби, Логические трактаты…, especially: “Примечания”, pp. 603–620,and: Б.Я. Ошерович,“Стиль и язик сочинений аль-Фараби”in:аль-Фараби—Научное творчество, Сборник статей, АН СССР, Москва, 1975,pp.83–90. 330 Ibid. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 138.

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1. Terms formed out of the existing word fund (from diﬀerent sources) whose meaning was adequate (mut.abiqa)¯ to the meaning of these terms. Such words are: zam¯an (time), nafs (soul—anima), s.¯ura (form), sidq. (truth), kidb (untruth, lie), and even ﬁne distinctions such as: sidq = truth ¯ . (and other therein derived forms) in sense of accuracy and correctness vs. haq. ¯ıqa =truthinsenseoftheessenceofthings.331 Most of these words can be found in The Qur"an, where they have quite a precise meaning, and then found in the disciplines that developed concurrently and a bit before logic, such as grammar and speculative theology.

2. Terms formed by the literal translation of Greek terms, for example the name of logic as a discipline: man.tiq derived from n.tq that bears the idea of articulated speech and reason. The terms literally translated from Greek include those that had previously existed with a concrete meaning in Arabic, but were given a new meaning and function (semantic switch). There is a whole range of these terms, for example hadd. whose basic meaning is boundary, border, limit, and in logic it means deﬁnition and term within a premiss (medium, minor or major) and the corresponding Greek term hóros (or horismós) that has the same basic and terminological meaning. The situation is the same with s¯ur which literally means fence, wall, and in logic it means quantiﬁer; muqaddima which literally means the front part, forerunner, and in logic it means premiss etc. Notes accompanying previous chapters give examples for such formation.

3. Arabic roots, whose main meaning was used to derive new words for the needs of logical and philosophical terminology, oﬀered many opportunities. The most frequent, so called, morphological-syntactical formation went in two directions. Firstly, (a) through the use of ex- panded verbal form, which resulted in new meanings, and secondly (b), their transformation into nouns, adjectives and participles. a) Analyzing philosophical terms and their forms in the texts by Ibn S¯ına¯ and comparing them with forms used in literature, A.- M. Goichon found that most of the philosophical terms belonged to the second and the ﬁfth verbal form with fa##ala and tafa##ala, or that they were derived from them. Fewer verbs belonged to

331 Seenotenr.70 in the 3rd chapter. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 139.

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the fourth, seventh and tenth form, and it is very rare situation that the term belongs to the sixth verbal form. There are no terms registered in the eighth group, while the absence of terms from the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth group is understandable, considering their very small scope in general.332 An example of this process is the transformation of the root swr. which bears the idea of form, in sawwara. (2nd form) when it means to give form to something and tasawwara. (5thform)whenitmeanstogiveform to something within. b) Another direction the morphological-syntactical formation took was forming noun forms from verb forms or verb themes using known paradigms, and then affixation (adding suffixes) to noun forms. That is how the following terms were formed from the above given example: tasw. ¯ır, tasawwur. , tasawwur. ¯at, mutasawwir. . Adding suffixes to noun forms or already made terms resulted in the creation of new forms. The most frequently used suffixwasiyy(un) for formation of the relative word, which resulted in the formation of the following terms kull¯ı(yyun), guzˇ "¯ı(yyun), sarˇ .t¯ı(yyun),etc. In order to form some of the abstract notions (according to the known Arabic word formation procedure), the characteristic “female t” (in transcription a,oriyya(tun)) was added to the words created in the above described way. That is how terms such as #aqliyya, naw#iyya, ins¯aniyya and others were formed, as well as the “unusual” ones, such as kammiyya, kayfiyya, huwiyya, laysiyya, derived from the interrogative pronouns kam and kayfa, the personal pronoun huwa, auxiliary verb laysa,etc. Although as a rule, in the formation of new words, Arabic does not accept so called lexical-syntactical formation, where the new word is formed by joining two words, philosophical and logical terminology still have several terms formed in this way. Besides the frequently used m¯ahiyya (essence) whose structure and origin was a cause of numerous

332 And indeed, when we take a look at a dictionary of logical terms, we can see that most of the logical terms belong to the second and the fifth verb group. A.- M. Goichon feels that this comes out of their meaning, and above all, their causality, and on the other hand, their reflexivity that has certain elements of passivity, so called reflexive-passive verbs, which opened the opportunity for formation of a number of philosophical terms. See: A.-M. Goichon, La philosophie d’Avicenne…, pp. 73–75. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 140.

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discourses,333 logic has several compound words for terms such as l¯a- wugˇ¯ud, l¯a-kawn and l¯a-nih¯aya, and in the context of discussion on negative form, terms as l¯a-ins¯an etc. In the context of logical terminology and its specificities, there is another language phenomenon that should be addressed, even if it has already been mentioned in brief. As a rule, the Arabic noun phrase does not have a copula. Juxtapo- sition of a defined subject and a non-defined predicate is sufficient to express desired predication. However, when it was necessary to point out the copula in e.g. judgment analysis, logicians used a personal pronoun corresponding by gender and number to the subject, e.g.: “Zayd huwa #alim”¯ (Zayd he (is a) scholar); or they used some of the forms of k¯ana (to be), but also keeping the subject at the beginning of the sentence, followed by the verb to be and then by the predicate: “Zayd ka¯"in #alim”¯ (Zayd is educated). The function of negative copula is played by the antipode of verb k¯ana—laysa (is not, not to be) in the same way. And, eventually, more as a curiosity than as a serious attempt to translate Arabic terms to Bosnian, it should be said that some of the manuscripts and prints that were kept at the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, held marginal or inter-linear notes attempting to translate or paraphrase certain definitions to Bosnian, using Arabic alphabet.334 We say “attempting” as those efforts stopped at the translation of words from everyday spoken language, while relevant terms, among all, remained in Arabic. These notes could date back to the late 19th and early 20th century.

To conclude this presentation, in which I have attempted to analyze the elementary logical issues in writings by Bosniac authors, observing it from the aspect of its development and history, and from the language standpoint, it is necessary to present certain observations and, in a way, to anticipate the conclusion in order to give the clearest possible picture of this matter. Primarily, a joint characteristic of all works in the ﬁeld of logic that were included in this study is that all of them (except the two marginalia

333 See: Ibn S¯ına¯ (Avicenne), Livre des directives et remarques…, p. 307 (see note A.- M. Goichon that starts on page 304, and ends on page 307). 334 Here we should point out the codices, catalogued in the library of printed editions of the Oriental Institute under number III 2094. There is a large corpus of texts in Bosnian from Ottoman period, that were written using Arabic alphabet (the so-called Alhamiado literature). 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 141.

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mentioned earlier), besides evident differences in the scope, depth and understanding of logical matter, were written in an attempt to encompass the elementary teachings in the field of logic as seen by Arabic logicians succeeding Ibn S¯ına.¯ In the Arabic system of philosophy and sciences, logic had the task to define the method of acquiring completely safe and indisputable, i.e. scientific knowledge. Taking not only this objective of logic from Aristotle, but also his elements of the logical system regarding topics and contents (the theory of meaning and the understanding of truth, the teaching of logical forms of thinking, the teaching of scientific thinking methods, of scientific and non-scientific reasoning, and other), the earliest Arabic logicians, especially al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı and Ibn S¯ına,¯ played a very important role in establishing research in the field of logic within Arabic philosophy and in the later development of Islamic scholastics. Therefore, the history of logic, in its, so called, “Arabic period” (including the “Ottoman period” as well) can be rightfully seen as its post-Hellenistic development. As the presented material shows, it survived in its basic elements and continued its life in Bosnia, which is evident from the works such as Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” by Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı #Allamak¯ and New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ having all those positive features that decorated Arabic logic in the period which ended the dispute between, so called, “Western or Baghdad school” and “Eastern school”, from the period that synthesizes the achievements of the most important Arabic logicians: al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı and his followers, and Ibn S¯ına¯ and his students.335 This resulted in a situation where, at the time when Bosniac logicians were active, there were no texts formally linked to those by Aristotle (in the sense of commentaries or marginalia), which is a consequence of Ibn S¯ına’s¯ influence, however Aristotelian they remained in the sense of their contents. All these writings focus on the teaching of syllogism, a form of deductive concluding that offers a “reliable method” in reaching scientific, safe and indisputable knowledge. All other logical matters treated in these works, are given either as a precondition for better understanding syllogism, its structure, absoluteness, necessity and generality, or as its application in apodictic, opposed to other forms of reasoning and knowledge that is more or less probable, apparent, wrong or false. Certain extra-Aristotelian topics that were treated in

335 Seemoreinchapter1. 2008062. Ljubovic. 03_Chapter3. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 142.

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more or less detail—the treatment of singular judgments as used by the stoics, the development of conditional (conjunctive and disjunctive) judgments, the development of the fourth figure, the syllogistic theory of inductive reasoning, attempts of temporal interpretation of modal judgments, teaching on future contingency, the presentation of some laws of judgment logic, predicate qualification, and others (some of which were initiated by the philosophers of Megara and stoic school)— are only a confirmation of continuity. Arabic logicians from the later period, who are later followed by Bosniac logicians, firmly believed in the firmness and perfection of thus formed logical system and its strength as an efficient instrument for acquiring the truth. They felt that its development can only be achieved by interpreting already defined discoveries (either through interpretation of works by classical authors, or through the production of textbooks and guidebooks based on those works), through efforts to systematize issues and develope different classification systems. The analysis of the researched works and presented data leads us to the conclusion that Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ especially in his New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise”, followed by Muhammad. b. Mus¯ aal-¯ Bosnaw¯ı #Allamak,¯ who used the same piece of writing for his commentary, were the most successful in their effort. As for the textbooks and other smaller works, K¯af¯ı’s Compendium of Logic by Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal- Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, which goes beyond most of the works of that nature, even outside its time and space, is especially prominent. Having in mind that logic in medieval Europe developed within the same framework, with consideration of the specificities of place and role of logic in philosophy and the system of disciplines, the following chapter presents Bosnian logic in the context of that of medieval Europe, and a comparison between Bosniac and European logicians of that time. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 143.

chapter four

COMPARISON: BOSNIAC LOGICIANS AND LOGICIANS OF WESTERN EUROPE

Shifts in thinking, an important characteristic of history of philosophy, is one of the salient features of logic. Like other disciplines, logic has its own contents and relative independence. However, on the other hand, it has always been immediately linked to the concrete historic conditions and levels of social development, and the development of other philosophical disciplines and to science and culture in general. “Permanence in thinking shifts springs out of the dynamism of social action, and progress in certain solutions means having an adequate grasp on the objectively existing and acting. In thinking, this process is expressed through the principles of formal logic, as they show the essence of the continuous flow, which is its own definition. As soon as it is indeed expressed it becomes something else within the possible and so on to infinity. Therefore, everlasting changes and differences, basis and process are a unity, that find their reasons and sense exactly in the dialectic expression.”1 However, the history of logic, regardless of how the relation between philosophy and theory of logic is defined, has its specificities, so the standard periodization does not apply completely. The nucleus of the theory of logic and its history, the element that lasted and was identical, was within Aristotle’s logic, and the process was made of the infinite efforts to reach a better and more complete interpretation, methodological perfecting, and the adequate and fruitful application of logic that will, eventually result in the development of modern symbolist logic and logistic. Twenty centuries after Aristotle, Leibniz will discover new possibilities for interpretation and directions of further development, pointing out that Aristotle was actually the first to write mathe- matically outside of mathematics.2

1 Branko Boˇsnjak, Filozoﬁja od Aristotela do renesanse, 3rd edition, Zagreb, 1982,p.7. 2 Ivo Thomas, “Preteceˇ suvremene logike”, in: Historija logike, edited by A.N. Prior, Zagreb, 1970,p.90. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 144.

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That is why this comparison is based on the period that is usually called “medieval logic”. This term refers to those teachings that were interpreted and developed at the universities and schools between the 11th and 15th century, and that were home to scholastic systems. It also includes the period in cultural history called humanism and renaissance. This period in the history of logic was “interregnum”, until modern logic came onto the scene. In European logical tradition this period was dominated by Aristotle’s formal logic, which was the basic and majority content of writings in the field of logic. Since the earliest times, logic established in this way was the object of different, and even radical criticisms, especially regarding syllogisms (whose weaknesses, according to some historians, were something that Aristotle himself was aware of). Nevertheless, the contents of the majority of books on logic in this period followed the standard structure of Aristotle’s Organon,andthey took over the elements and the order taught in schools around Europe.3 In comparison between the writings of Bosniac authors in the field of logic, and the writings of the same character originating from Western Europe, this chapter will focus on the elements that could be identical but also different in the context of their relation towards Aristotle’s Organon.

As the last representative of antic culture in Roman society and the mediator between the antic times and the Middle Ages, according to history of philosophy, A.M. Boethius (470 or 480–525)4 left the heritage of his works in the ﬁeld of logic. Besides his own writings (two works on categorical and two on hypothetical syllogisms and short writings on division and “diﬀerent places” in rhetoric), his comments and translation of Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation (De interpretatione),

3 Moris Cohen and Ernest Nagel, Uvodulogikuinaucniˇ metod [An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method], Beograd, 1965,p.28. 4 Among the works of general character, this study used the following: Historija logike [History of logic], edited by A.N. Prior, “Naprijed”, Zagreb, 1970; Histoire de la Philosophie 1, Encyclopédie de la pléiade, (Paris) 1969;BrankoBoˇsnjak, Filozofija od Aristotela do renesanse (and selected texts by philosophers), 3rd edition, Zagreb, 1982; Vladimir Filipovic,´ Filozofija renesanse, 3rd edition, Zagreb, 1982; I.M. Bochenski, Formale Logik, Freiburg–München, 1956. and W. Windelband, Povijest filozofije,vol.I,Zagreb, 1956. Bibliographical data are given according to this list of works. For more on Anicius Manlius Boethius see: Historija logike…, p. 58; Histoire de la Philosophie…, pp. 1226–1231;B.Boˇsnjak, Filozofija od Aristotela…, pp. 82–86 and selected texts, pp. 202–207. Especially Miklós Maróth, Die Araber und die antike Wissenschaftstheorie, E.J. Brill, London, New York, Köln, 1994, 274 p. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 145.

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as well as Porphyry’s Eisagogé (Introduction of Categories) were very significant for the development of logic. However, it will take six centuries for his heritage to reach fertile grounds with the first significant medieval logician, Pierre Abélard (1079–1142).5 Working almost exclusively on Boethius’ works in the field of logic, and using some results of the stoic logical syntax taken over from Priscian’s (5th–6th century)6 Institutiones Gramaticae, “Abélard gave a critical reconstruction of Boethius’ heritage in which the linguistic approach is characteristic of the stoic-megara extention of Aristotle’s logic over metaphysical interpretations that originate from Porphyry and neo-Platonic tradition”.7 There is also the fact that the issue on the nature of universal terms (Roscelin, Anselm and others) was also very prominent in the age of early scholastics, as, according to W. Windelband, “formal logical education of the nations entering the scientific movement at the beginning of the Middle Ages was developed upon the issue of the logical and the metaphysical meaning of notions (universalia).”8 Logical discussions between the followers of nominalism and realism spread into the field of ontology, giving it a special dimension.9 However, in the history of European logic, the overall reception of Aristotle’s work in the field of logic, can be discussed only for the time when the remaining volumes of Aristotle’s Organon were available in translation from Greek and Arabic, in addition to translation of works by Arabic philosophers and logicians—primarily, al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı, Ibn S¯ına¯ and Ibn Ruˇsd—and their commentaries on Aristotle’s writings.10 An especially significant fact for the issue we speak of here is that Ibn S¯ına’s¯ writings in logic (al-Man.tiq and Kit¯ab as-ˇ sifˇ ¯a") were translated relatively early (between 1130 and 1150) by translators identified as Dominicus Gundissalinus (Gondisalvi) and Johannes Hispalensis, and

5 See: Historija logike…, pp. 59–60; Histoire de la Philosophie…, pp. 1295–1308 and B. Boˇsnjak, Filozofija od Aristotela…, pp. 100–103, and selected texts, pp. 222–228. 6 Besides the above mentioned references, see: Milka Ivic,´ Pravci u lingvistici, Ljubl- jana, 1978,p.20. 7 Ernest A. Moody, “Srednjovjekovna logika” [Medieval Logics], in: Historija logike …, p. 59. 8 W. Windelband, Povijest filozofije,knj.I,Zagreb,1956,p.334. 9 Vidjeti: B. Boˇsnjak, Filozofija od Aristotela…, pp. 97–103. 10 On translations to Latin, see more: Hans Daiber, “Lateinische Übersetzungen arabischer Texte zur Philosophie und ihre Bedeutung für die Scholastik des Mittelal- ters. Stand und Aufgaben der Forschung.” In: Recontres de cultures dans la philosophie médié- vale. Traductions et traducteure de l’antiquité tardive au XIVe siécle. Louvain-la-Neuve–Cassino, 1990,pp.203–250. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 146.

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were followed by translations by Gérard de Crémon (from Cremona, died in 1187) of other relevant texts by al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı and Ibn Ruˇsd.11 This is how the larger part of Organon was accepted as “Logica nova” (Ars Nova—The New Logic), differently from the previously known part called “Logica vetus” (Ars Vetus—The Old Logic). In his Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie W. Windelband accentuates the importance of the encounter of the Orient with philosophy as the Parisian educated circles got to know not only the complete works by Aristotle, but all actual parts of his system. “It was through the ‘new logic’”, says W. Windelband, “that dialectics, numbed within, came to life again, and as the objective of rational elucidation on the religious outlook was undertaken with a new momentum and a developed technique of thinking, concurrently an almost infinite matter of knowledge was included into the metaphysical- religious cluster… Reception of Aristotle… belonging to the period from 1150 to 1250. It started with, the previously unknown, more valuable part of Organon (Logica vetus: Logica nova) and advanced towards the writings in metaphysics, physics and ethics, usually accompanied by an introduction by the Arabic commentators…”12 The strong influence of Arabic philosophers, Islamic philosophical reflextion in general and Arabic interpretation of Aristotle’s logic in particular, will become a general feature of scholastics, based on the works by Albertus Magnus, (1206–1280) who himself paid great attention to studying Arabic-Islamic and Hebrew philosophy, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Petrus Hispanus (about 1246–1277) about whom Jean Jolivet in his “La philosophie médiévale en Occident” specifically says that he was under the influence of “augustinism and avicennism”, Duns Scotus (1266–1308) and others.13 Special emphasis should be placed on Summulae logicales by Petrus Hispanus, which was one of the most frequently used textbooks in logic in the 16th century and later, and had great influence on a number of logicians of European Latinism. There were also efforts to get to know the works by Arabic philosophers in the Renaissance. G. Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494)says:

11 See chapter “Les traductions” in: Histoire de la Philosophie 1…, pp. 1351–1367;F.Hiti [Hitti], Istorija Arapa…, pp. 530–531;CarlPrantl,Gescichte der Logik im Abendlande,Bd.I– IV, Leipzig, 1855–1870 (reprint: Hildesheim, 1997), see especially: Bd. II, “Einflus der Araber” pp. 297–496 and Bd. III, pp. 1–178. 12 W. Windelband, Povijest filozofije…, pp. 360–361. 13 In: Histoire de la Philosophie 1…, p. 1462. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 147.

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“Among the Arabians, there is in Averroës something solid and unshaken, in Avempace, as in Al-Farabi, something serious and deeply meditated; in Avicenna, something divine and platonic… What should have been our plight had only the philosophical thought of the Latin authors, that is, Albert, Thomas, Scotus, Egidius, Francis and Henry, been discussed, while that of the Greeks and the Arabs was passed over …”14 A follower of these and similar ideas of Mirandola was Juraj Dragiˇsic´ (1448 or 1450–1520), a prominent Croatian scholar, a “refugee from Bogomil Bosnia”, who was also familiar with the writings, and who quoted them in his teachings on intelligence and the cognition of future contingencies.15 In the midst of the Renaissance, besides severe disagreements, de- nials of the main Aristotelian trends and criticisms of Aristotle’s logic by the Church, the works by Arabic philosophers, and above all Ibn S¯ına¯ and Ibn Ruˇsd, will get their full validation at important universities and schools, among philosophers and scientists, as well as terms “avicennism” and “averroesism”,16 that will be put on the same level with “Platonism”, “Aristotelianism” and, to an extent, “Augustinism”, and “Thomasism” and “Scotusism”. Writing on the life and works of Marko Marulic(´ 1450–1524), person- alities that were “either formants or ferments of Marulic’s´ spiritual world”, Tomislav Ladan mentions Averroes (Ibn Ruˇsd), emphasizing that “for a long time, Padova was a center of Averroist Aristotelianism”, and that “…about one hundred editions of his writings, actually commentaries on the works by Aristotle, were published between 1480 and 1580 in Latin.”17

14 From: De dignitate hominis (Oration on the Dignity of Man), tr. by A.R. Caponigri, Chicago, 1956,p.45 and 47. Retrieved from: http://www. cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/ Mirandola on April 14th, 2008. 15 Literature on the life and work of Juraj Dragiˇsic´ is abundant. Relevant here are: J. Jelinic,´ Kultura bosanskih franjevaca [Culture of Bosnian Franciscans], Sarajevo, 1912, and texts by Kruno Krsticin´ Enciklopedija Jugoslavije [Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia] (second edition), vol. III, pp. 543–544;Z.Sojat,ˇ “Dragiˇsiceva´ teorija o volji” [Dragiˇsic’s´ Theory of Will], Prilozi za izucavanjehrvatskefilozofskebaˇ stineˇ (hereinafter Prilozi…), Za- greb, 1976, issue 3–4,pp.29–66, and: Cesare Vasoli, Profezia e ragione, Napoli, 1974. 16 See, e.g.: “L’averroïsme latin au XIIIe siècle”, “L’averroïsme au XIVe siècle” and “Les averoïstes” in: Histoire de la Philosophie 1…, pp. 1442–1447, 1524–1529 and 1540– 1541, as well as A.-M. Goichon, La philosophie d’Avicenne et son influence en Europe médiévale, Paris, 1979. 17 Tomislav Ladan, “Marulicev´ Syllabus”, Prilozi…, Zagreb, 1975,nr.1–2,p.206. The influence of Averroes on the Padova peripatetic school is explained in Marija 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 148.

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Ibn S¯ına’s¯ and Ibn Ruˇsd’s inﬂuence on Croatian Latinists, their way of elaboration and understanding of certain philosophical and especially logical issues, is evident in almost all Croatian authors who were educated in the West (as we will show later when discussing the problematics of logic). The most signiﬁcant among them were Benko Benkovic(oko´ 1460–1523)18 who promoted the philosophy of Duns Scotus and wrote a textbook in scholastic philosophy (and the standpoint of Duns Scotus with regards to the writings of Ibn S¯ına¯ is well- known);19 then Antun Medo from Dubrovnik (1530–1600),20 who wrote a very interesting paper titled Quaedam animadversiones in Praedicabilia Porphyrii… (Some observations on Porphyry’s praedicabilia); Andrija Kaciˇ c—Mio´ ˇsic(´ 1704–1760), primarily a poet, but in his Elementa peripathetica iuxta mentem Joannis Duns Scoti,21 printed in 1751–1752,heproves to be a loyal follower of Scotus; and, eventually, Nikola Gucetiˇ c(´ 1549– 1610), also from Dubrovnik, whose works Commentaria in sermanem Aver- rois de substantia orbis (Commentary on Averroes’s Work on the Sub- stance of Consciousness) and De immortalitate intellectus possibilis written in the spirit of Averroes’s Aristotelianism. His contemporary Cvi- jeta (Flora) Zuzoric´ says that he studied Averroes with special attention.22

Brida’s text “Spor Jurja Dubrovcaninaˇ i Cesara Cremoninija o formama elemenata” [Dispute of Juraj of Dubrovnik and Cesar of Cremona on the Forms of Elements], Prilozi…, Zagreb, 1978,nr.7–8,pp.39–83, and Damir Barbaric,´ “Znacajˇ sveuciliˇ ˇsta u Padovi za obrazovanje naˇsih humanista” [Importance of the University of Padova for Education of Croatian Humanists], Prilozi…, Zagreb, 1983,nr.1–2 (17–18), pp. 151–160. 18 See: Marija Brida, Benedikt Benkovic´,Zagreb,1967. 19 See, e.g.: A.-M. Goichon, La philosophie d’Avicenne…, pp. 24–25, 117 and 122–126 and É. Gilson, “Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot”, pp. 100–117. 20 See: Erna Pajnic,´ “Antun Medo (Antonius Medus Calossiua). Neki rezultati istra- zivanjaˇ zivotaˇ i rada dubrovackogˇ filozofa XVI stoljeca”´ [Some results of the research on life and work of Antonius Medus Calossiua, a 16th century philosopher from Dubrovnik], Prilozi…, Zagreb, 1976,nr.3–4,pp.67–85. 21 On Kaciˇ c´ as a logician, a folower of Duns Scotus, and some influences of Avicenna’s philosophy, logic and psychology, see: Albert Bazala, “Kaciˇ ceva´ ‘Elementa peripathetica’”, Prilozi…, Zagreb, 1976,nr.3–4,pp.191–220. 22 See inauguration speech by Prof. Franjo Markovic,´ PhD, rector of Zagreb Uni- versity, 1881/82, called “Filozofijske struke pisci s onkraj Velebita u stoljecih´ XV. do XVIII” [Writers in the field of philosophy originating from the foothills of Mt. Velebit, 15th to 18th century], published in: Prilozi…, Zagreb, 1975,nr.1–2,p.269. This presentation contains some bibliographical data esentially valid for the history of Croatian philosophical heritage, as well as some data on Croatian logicians in Latin language. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 149.

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European logic, therefore, started its historical movements as a developed philosophical discipline, with Aristotle in Ancient Greece, through its “Arabic period” and European logic, to modern contemporary logic. Analyzing the nature of formal and general logic, and explaining its essence, Kant points out that “That logic has advanced in this sure course, even from the earliest times, is apparent from the fact that, since Aristotle, it has been unable to advance a step and, thus, to all appearance has reached its completion. For, if some of the moderns have thought to enlarge its domain by introducing psychological discussions on the mental faculties, such as imagination and wit, metaphysical discussions on the origin of knowledge and the different kinds of certitude, according to the difference of the objects (idealism, scepticism, and so on), or anthropological discussions on prejudices, their causes and remedies: this attempt, on the part of these authors, only shows their ignorance of the peculiar nature of logical science.”23 The statement that Kant presents as a characteristic of the history of European formal logic, brings to our minds that logic cannot be expected to have abundant and original development before the mathematical logic and authors that were “modern in spirit”, as even those authors, who were estimated as the most original, considered their work as an attempt to reconstruct the “original Aristotle” and the attempt of successful interpretation of his writings. This introduction is a reminder of some generally known data from the history of European logic that should give at least a rough guideline to the historical and philosophical framework for observing the relation of Bosniac authors and authors of somewhat earlier or the same period from West-European logical tradition, and to the origin of influences, interrelations and potentials for a comparative approach. More attention will be paid to Croatian “Latinists”, if for no other reason, then because they acted at the same time and in the same space as Bosniac “Arabists”. The best examples for observing this relation are the results of logical studies at the University of Paris dating mid 13th century, textbooks originating from the vicinity of the Oxford University, then Padova that was closely linked with the universities of north-eastern Italy, such as Bologna, Ferrara and Venice, and, eventually, the works written under the influence of Vienna and Budim universities.

23 Immanuel Kant, Kritika cistogˇ uma [Critique of Pure Reason], “Kultura”, Belgrade, 1958,p.63. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 150.

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Besides the above mentioned work by Peter of Spain (Petrus His- panus), Summulae Logicales, which was popular as a standard textbook, among “summulae”, i.e. comprehensive courses in logic, based on syllabi of the universities, manuscripts and libraries, biographies and research with results published in reference books that we used, evidently significant were Summa totius logicae by William Ockham (or of Ockham, app. 1285–1349), Perutilis Logica (or Summa Logicae)byhisfol- lower Albert of Sachs (Albert von Sachen, app. 1316–1390), then Sum- mulae Logicales by Jean Buridan (14th century),24 De Puritate Artis Logicae by Walter Burleigh (or Burley, 14th century), works by Jean Mair (died app. 1531) and his students, Commentaria in universam Aristotelis logicam by Francisco of Toledo (1532–1596), which was, according to the syllabus of 1598, the main textbook in Aristotle’s logic in Rome.25 Besides the writings listed here, there is a whole range of works written in the form of compendia of similar or the same contents, usually called “logica parva” or “minor”, as well as numerous disputations “in organon Aris- totelis”, interpretations “cum passibus…” or “iuxta mentem…” The later texts usually use interpretations by Duns Scotus (“iuxta mentem Joannis Duns Scoti…”).26 There is also a significant number of works that deal in some of the logical issues or some parts of Aristotle’s Organon, usually written in the form of treatises. As a conclusion on the form of writings in the field of logic, we can say that the ones written in the Orient and the ones by Bosniac authors are identical to the works written in the West. Those are primarily, so called, independent works, different in size, but similar in contents, as they include all traditional issues, whether in form of compendium: muhtasar; summa (summula): gˇ¯ami# or simply logica ¯ . (ars logica): man.tiq (#ilm al-mantiq),. then commentarius: sarˇ h.; glosse (nota seu glossa marginalis): h.¯asiyaˇ and, eventually, tractatus: ris¯ala,whetherit relates to narrowly defined logical issues or general logic, but usually shorter in form.

24 Among his works in the field of logic are also Summulae de Dialectica, Consequentiae and Sophismata. See: Ernest A. Moody, “Srednjovjekovna logika”…, pp. 57–77 and adequate literature. 25 Besides the literature listed above, a very comprehensive bibliography of medieval editions in the field of logic with selection of original texts from different periods is given by I.M. Bochenski, in Formale Logik, Freiburg–München, 1956. (In English, History of Formal Logic, Notre Dame, Ind., 1961.) 26 A typical work of this type is the one by Andrija Kaciˇ c—Mio´ ˇsic´ (see footnote 20). 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 151.

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As a result of comprehensive insight into the overall creative work in the field of logic in Arabic springing out of a broad geographic area, and over a long period in time—based on direct or indirect analysis of important pieces of oriental manuscripts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and abroad, or through works of bibliographical character included in the list of sources and literature—there is an interesting feature in Arabic logic. Different from the inventory of the logical heritage in the West, proportionate to the complete number of works in logic, this significantly smaller number of treatises is related to any specific logical issue, such as discussions on universal terms, or categories, separate texts on so called “syllogistic skills”, on “places” (loci communes), and texts in rhetoric, poetic and sophistic—somewhat excluding dialectics.27 Based on the knowledge of trends in the history of Arabic logic, it could be concluded that this phenomenon is a consequence of two main events. Firstly, the acceptance of Ibn S¯ına’s¯ orientation and his recommen- dation that the book written for the needs of logic “should be a self- sufficient discussion or handbook”,28 i.e. the one that would include all logical issues. Anticipating possible negative consequences that such orientation could bring to logic, Ibn Haldun¯ saw the fault of his con- ¯ temporary logicians in observing logic in this way, and in discarding “books and methods of old authors as if they were never there, and they are full of results and useful remarks.”29 Secondly, there is the historical fact that the Ottoman Empire accepted printing later than the West (18th century) and the main issue was supplying for the demand of textbooks and adequate commentaries, since schools were the main front where logic was studied. This issue can be more clear through the comparison of data from Summulae Logicales by Peter of Spain who had more than 150 editions only in the 15th and 16th century,30 while A Commentary on Isagogue by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı (Mustafa Ejubovic)´ was printed more than 200 years after it was written, in 1898 in Istanbul. Or an even better illustration is the work by al-Abhar¯ı, Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı, with its translation into Latin

27 See chapter 3. 28 Nicholas Rescher, “Arapska logika”, in: Historija logike,p.51. 29 Ibn Haldun,¯ Muqaddima,pp.491–492. 30 Historija¯ logike,p.62. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 152.

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printed in 1625,31 while its Arabic original was printed more than two centuries later, and more than six centuries after it was originally written. Understandably, a large number of manuscripts in logic were used as textbooks in many schools, and a smaller number of still preserved writings, such as The New Commentary on the Sun Treatise by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ o¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ offer a subtle analysis of logical issues and open a range of interesting and important issues. As for the internal structure of works written in the West, it varies in different types of works, and there are certain differences among works of the same type, even those that treat the whole issue of logic in the form of a textbook. Truly, deviations from the “standard” order are usually a result of the commitment of authors to treat one issue while anticipating the other, and giving more details on it than in the place where it logically belongs (e.g. universalia or predicabilia), to treat it once more by separate disputatio or dissertatio after having treated all other issues. However, most of these works have the uniform organization of issues treated. Works dating from an earlier period, such as Introductiones in Logicam by William Sherwood (13th century), are usually divided into six chapters: “On predicabilia”, “On judgment”, “On syllogism”, “On dialectical topics”, “On logical fallacy” and “On features of terms”.32 Summulae Logicales by Peter of Spain has almost the same contents as Sherwood’s work, it only includes an additional chapter “On categories”, and the last chapter, “On features of terms”, is given separately, as an item also consisting of six chapters.33 In the period that follows it becomes common practice to divide works of logic into three parts (liber, caput, pars) after the introduction (incipit, praeludium, prologus) that discusses the issue of the nature of logic (De natura Logices), and answers the following questions: Num Logica sit scientia: practica—speculativa; Quodnam sit Logices obiec- tum; and other issues relevant for the definition of logic. Depending on the answers to given questions, the division principle is derived from the “threefold way in which the intellect works” (de triplici mentis opera- tione). So the first book On terms (De terminis) is related to all those log-

31 The Latin title of this work is Isagoga i.e. breve introductorium arab. in scientiam logices, cum vers. lat. ed. R.P. Fr. Thomas Novariensis (Roma, 1625). The data found in literature could not be checked. See: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI, 608–611 (464–465)andSI,839–844. 32 See: Historija logike,p.62. 33 Ibid. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 153.

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ical issues linked to perception of the intellect, the second On judging (De iudicio), to judging and the third On rationing (De ratiocinio or De rati- ocinatio) “when the intellect moves from the known to the unknown”, when it rations. Besides this, more comprehensive works, especially those written in the 18th century and later, include an addition titled Methodologia (or Logica est Methodologia). This elementary division into sections (sectio, disertatio), the number of which depended on the author’s vision of how far systematization should go for specific needs, treats the comprehensive issue of formal logic. An illustrative example of division can be found among works of Croatian Latinists: Kaciˇ c’s´ Elementa peripathetica and Traditiones in universam Aristotelico—Scoticam philosophiam by Filip Laˇstric(´ 1700–1783)from Ocevljeˇ near Breza, whose manuscript was preserved in the Francis- can Library of Kraljeva Sutjeska.34 In his work on logic, Laˇstric´ said about the first book: “Quid et quotuplex sit terminus seu prima mentis operatio”, on the second: “De hist quae ad secundum operationem intellectus specant” and on the third: “De his quae ad tertiam mentis specant”. In further discussion, Laˇstric,´ with evident sensibility to logic and systematization simply dissolves the logical problems he encoun- ters. This is one of the problems that we can use as an example. The first part that consists of ten disputations (disputatio), the seventh is devoted to species (De specie, secundo praedicabili), and divided into four sections: (1) An species bene definiatur a Porphirio, (2) Per quodnam constituatur species in esse universalis, (3) An individuum bene definiatur a Porphirio et (4) An ab omnibus individuis possit abstrahi aliqua ratio communis.35

34 Ms. 12B. See: Serafin Hrkac,´ “Filozofijski rukopisi na latinskom jeziku Franjevackeˇ biblioteke u Kraljevoj Sutjesci”, Prilozi…, Zagreb, 1978,nr.7–8,pp.257–288. Also see: Andrija Zirdum, “Laˇstricev´ rukopis ‘Universa aristotelico-scotica Philosophia’”, Jukic´, III, Sarajevo, 1973,pp.87–98. This collection holds other texts interesting for related studies. Also see S. Hrkac’s´ text titled “Fojnickiˇ filozofski rukopisi na latinskom jeziku” (Philosophical manuscripts in Latin from Fojnica), Prilozi…, Zagreb, 1982,nr.15– 16,pp.125–166, and especially Tractatus logicae totiusque philosophiae cursus (Ms. xxx), manuscript by Friar Andrija Kotorvaroˇsanin (Kotoranin). 35 S. Hrkac,´ “Filozofijski rukopisi…”, p. 265. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 154.

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After a careful insight into these works, it can be seen that the subject of the first book is the contents of Porphyry’s Eisagogé and Aristotle’s Categories, while the second book treats Aristotle’s On Interpretation.The two volumes together make so called Logica vetus, and the third volume is Logica nova, Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, Topics and On Sophis- tic Refutations. When the form and contents of these works are compared with works such as New Commentary…byMus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ i and Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” by Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı #Allamak¯ (Muhamed Music),´ especially comparing their tables of contents, it can be said that the construction of logical works, organization, sequence, and, mostly, comprehensiveness of the issues treated, is very similar among the authors whose works are treated here, and that some of the works are almost identical with the ones written in the corresponding period in Western Europe. The logical material organization principle that is the axes of the logical system, the system that has its foundations, its internal order linking different issues, and its goal, was one of the main factors that made the logical body of writings keep its firmness and coherence, and to keep Aristotle’s logic as “the main logical system of human knowledge”36 and to preserve its scientific and practical value, regardless of the new, “non-Aristotelian” systems of logic. Defining the logic and identification of its place in philosophy and system of disciplines was significantly affected by the definition of philosophy and the philosophical system. As the systems differ from one another—and “the system of philosophy is the generality of disciplines and disciplines are specificities and individualities of the system”37— there are differences in understanding individual disciplines. Depen- dence on the definition of logic on the definition of philosophy, as seen by Arabic-Islamic philosophers, was very precisely explained by Ibn S¯ına¯ in the fragment we quoted before.38 It is evident that Ara- bic logicians define logic as, above all, an instrument (ala),¯ canonic (al- qan¯ uniyya),¯ a measurement of science (mi#yar¯ al-#ulum—word¯ kanun primarily means a straight cane that can be used to measure everything else),39

36 B. Seˇ ˇsic,´ “Aristotelov Organon” (foreword to: Aristotel, Organon, “Kultura”, Bel- grade, 1965), XVII. 37 Branko Boˇsnjak, Sistematika ﬁlozoﬁje, “Naprijed”, Zagreb, 1977,p.12. 38 See chapter 3. 39 “Kanon (Greek: κανν), originally, reed, cane, or any device used for measuring 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 155.

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as universal propaedeutics, but they do not deny that it is a part of philosophy. Thus, the solution to this issue, that was a subject of century long discussions, is used by logicians of the Arabic school as a foundation for a form of syncretism that unites the teaching and division of philosophy in Plato’s Academy and Aristotle’s systematization, views of stoics and peripateticians. This syncretism is not based on non-critically linking the definitions of logic from two different systems but on the efforts to reserve space for logic in any kind of classification of disciplines, even those classifications that implied limitations and promoted disdain towards disciplines, such as logic, that through their origin or instruments belonged to so-called “foreign disciplines”. The lack of unity in the definition of place in the system of disciplines and the systematization of philosophy will be one of the features in the history of European logic, from early scholastics and one of the first attempts to systematize philosophy done by Hugo of St. Victor (1096– 1141),40 until modern philosophy. Most of the modern interpretations of Aristotle define the relation between philosophy and logic as the “relation of tools to the material on which the tools are used, regardless of the fact that they are the very tools derived from the definition of the thing that is the object of thinking”.41 The period treated here is specific for defining logic as a part of philosophy, whether it was clasified within philosophy as theoretical, practical or instrumental,42 while another important characteristic is that logic was considered “conditio sine qua non” of philosophy and science in general. This presentation shows that the subjects that logic is concerned with are conception and judging and that its final goal is rationing.Sothevery essence of logic is the term that caused disputes, especially evident in scholastics that influenced the further development of logic and philosophy in general, such as the dispute on the nature of universal terms, and the issues whether general terms really exist, in themselves and before reality, or are they subjective constructions that exist only in words and thoughts. This temptation resulted in the development of realism (the extreme, that sees the general as existing before and

in general; later, rule, law, norm.” Enciklopedija leksikografskog zavoda FNRJ [Encyclopae- dia of the Lexicographic institute of Yugoslavia], Vol. 4,p.106. 40 See: B. Boˇsnjak, Sistematika…, pp. 55–57. 41 Ibid, p. 72. 42 Ibid, 43. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 156.

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independent of the individual things, and the moderate, which sees it existing in things) and nominalism, that states that only the individual exists, while the general is given only in terms (moderate nominalism or conceptualism) or that it is but a word—empty sound (flatus vocis— extreme conceptualism). Although these disputes among Arabic logicians did not reach the momentum and extent that they had in the West, Arabic logicians and interpreters of Aristotle’s works, especially Ibn S¯ına,¯ with his moderate realism, being not far away from moderate nominalism,43 made great influence on a number of philosophers, among them the ones very important for the future development of this issue, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, as well as Pierre Abélard and William Occam.44 A. Bazala gave very illustrative examples of the influence of Arabic logicians and “Arabic psychology leaning towards the empiric” on Duns Scotus, that was passed on to other philosophers and logicians from the later period, especially onto Andrija Kaciˇ c.´ 45 The importance of this influence is more evident when we know that the Franciscans, and not only them, used the works of Duns Scotus, whom they called “doctor subtilis”, as a model. This influence can be seen through the presentation of Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ who paid a lot of attention to this issue, and who was (similar to other Bosniac authors) under a great influence of Ibn S¯ına.¯ As it is evident from the third chapter, he first posed the issue of terms and things, and the question of their relation and existence, and based his answers on Ibn S¯ına’s¯ theory of ideas. Ideas have their “pre- empirical” existence in active intelligence, the potential existence in individual objects, and the psychological existence in spirit. As long as it exists in active intelligence, the idea is neither universal nor individual, as both are accidents that happen. The relation of ideas to individual objects is defined by their extension (applicability) that is defined by genus (gins),ˇ conditioning forming ideas in our minds. This leads to the conclusion that the general term (genus—gins)ˇ can be: natural (tab. #¯ı), intellectual or psychological (#aql¯ı) and logical (mantiq. ¯ı). The first exists before

43 Cedomilˇ Veljaciˇ c,´ Filozofija istocnihˇ naroda [Philosophy of Eastern peoples], II, Za- greb, 1979,p.67. 44 See: B. Boˇsnjak, Filozofija od Aristotela do renesanse [Philosophy from Aristotle to the Renaissance], pp. 107–111 and 114–115, and: W. Windelband, Povijest filozofije [History of philosophy], I, pp. 334–347, 351, 374–375, 390–392. 45 A. Bazala, “Kaciˇ ceva´ ‘Elementa periphatetica’”, Prilozi…, Zagreb, 1976,br.3–4, pp. 191–220. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 157.

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things (qabla), the second within things (f¯ıorma#a) and the third after things (ba#da). Things, parallel to this, also exist in three ways: actual existence, spiritual or intentional existence (primary or secondary) and existence in words. In the interpretation of this issue given by Duns Scotus and followed by a number of Croatian Latinists, there is the general term ante rem (before things), in re (within things) and post rem (after things), and the existence of things can be threefold: essendi, intelligendi (primae intentionis et secundae intentionis—terms established by Ibn S¯ına)¯ and signifi- candi. Albert Bazala shows the extent to which Andrija Kaciˇ c´ follows Sco- tus’s solutions in his work, and giving a summary of Kaciˇ c’s´ presentation, says: “The universal, therefore, is not non entia, but it is, on the one hand, based on things, and on the other, a creation of mind: Intellectus facit universalitatem in re, ergo est illa in re non in intellectu. They are therefore effective ab intelectu,butmaterialiter, originaliter or occasionaliter a proprietate rei, and never figmenta.” Further on, A. Bazala shows that the presentation of this issue and its solution was based on the theory of cognition in which D. Scotus was also under the influence of Arabic thinkers.46 The similarity of these teachings, understood in the context of moderate realism, is best seen from the fact that the basic difference in solving this issue is in terminology: the Arabic and the Latin one, as can be seen from the examples given above. Similarity (or identicalness) continues in the part that discusses the different divisions of terms and words, from elementary division (by Arabic logicians to “spoken” and “unspoken” words, and by Latinists to “vocal words”—verbum vocale and those that “flow in thoughts”— verbum mentale); division into simple and complex, general and special; division into univocal, equivoque and analogous, to division into verbs and nouns, and other divisions. In the context of these divisions, it should be said that Bosniac logicians who wrote in Arabic, write about “words that can stand within judgments as subjects and predicates, and those that cannot”, not making terminological difference between so called categorematic and

46 Ibid, pp. 195–196. Also see: B. Boˇsnjak, Filozoﬁja od Aristotela…, p. 114. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 158.

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syncategorematic signs, while this issue is not discussed so elaborately as it is done in the West. Along with this discussion, and linked to the teaching on meaning (significatio), the West developed the theory of the supposition of terms. Analyzing texts of Bosniac authors in Arabic and paying attention to those standpoints that could be related to the supposition of terms along with the established teaching on meaning (dalala),¯ we paid special attention to those standpoints that are related to the use of terms on different semantic levels, and the necessity to differentiate among them. In logical terminology it means that a term (having in mind the division of categorematic terms to terms of the “first”andthe“second intention”) of the first intention can be used as the subject on one judgment whose predicate is the term of the second intention. Examples of these judgements are: “man is genus” and “man is a reasonable being”, that use predicate in logical meaning (logical supposition) in the first, and in actual meaning (real supposition) in the second case. Bosniac authors often point out the type of sophistic syllogism that is made by using premisses of different forms or suppositions.47 Along with a number of statements related to this issue, and presented in the context of discussions on judgments or rationing (on the quantification of subject and predicate, tense interpretation, etc.), this would be an element given by Bosniac logicians in the teaching on supposition of terms. Evidently, this is not systematized, and this issue was not treated with the same attention as in Europe and as by Croatian Latinists. This is understandable, as this was a theory established in mid-18th century, in the teachings of Peter of Spain and his followers, whose results Arabic logicians were not aware of. This confirms the correctness of N. Rescher’s statement that “many of famous ‘novelties’ of medieval Latin logic, are, actually, borrowed or are a development of borrowed Arabic ideas (e.g. the differentiation of different modes of suppositio and the differentiation of modalities de dicto and de re).”48 Directly linked to the teaching on terms that are used to state something in a judgment, and on general terms, is the teaching on the most general marks of beings or categories. As the structure of works in the field of logic in Arabic by Bosniac authors shows (we already emphasized that in the third chapter), they, as well as other later logicians

47 See, e.g.: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Izabrani spisi…, p. 83.andMus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ u-¯ b¯ı-zade,¯ Sarˇ h. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı,p.77. 48 Nicholas Rescher, “Arapska logika” in: Historija logike…, p. 55. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 159.

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of this school pay little attention to discussion on categories. This was influenced by Ibn S¯ına’s¯ attitudes, whose Kit¯ab as-ˇ sifˇ ¯a" presents a short but interesting thesis (“several centuries before Hamilton and Zeller”— as pointed out by I. Madkour),49 that the subject of Aristotle’s Cate- gories “is essentially of metaphysical character”, that Aristotle discusses it under the influence of the metaphysical term of being and its features, and that categories as such belong primarily to Metaphysics with which they make a unity, in the way that Porphyry’s Isagogue makes a unity with Organon. This certainly does not mean that logicians should study categories, but that their place is not in the books of logic “…as, in order to fully comprehend this issue, it is necessary to research it by an inductive method within metaphysics.”50 In his second work, Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…, that had great influence on Bosniac authors as well, Ibn S¯ına¯ supports his thesis from as-ˇ sifˇ ¯a",and does not work with categories. Therefore, the whole theory on categories as interpreted by Bosniac authors, in somewhat more comprehensive works and commentaries, gives only the definition of categories that is the same in the works of all the authors (that categories are the highest terms—genus with no higher genus, that cannot be defined in accordance with the definition, and that there are ten of them)51 in the context of discussion on general terms: genus and species. However, even the small amount that was said shows two dependent spots and connection between logic and metaphysics (ontology), and logic and language, which will be the subject of the next chapter. The treatment of categories as a logical issue is significantly different in the West in the period that interests us. Although there were disputes on whether categories should be treated by logic or metaphysics, i.e. ontology, and although a number of authorities, from the 13th century logicians, such as W. Sherwood,52 to modern logicians, denied the need for their existence as a direct subject of logical research (even their authenticity was denied), the generally prevailing determination was to treat categories as a part of logic. These texts, as well, regardless of the different number and types of categories that certain authors presented or decided upon, criticisms of certain categories, whether justi-

49 I. Madkour, L’Organon…, p. 79. 50 Kit¯ab as-ˇ sifˇ ¯a"… Some interesting chapters from this work in French translation were taken over by I. Madkour in: L’Organon…, pp. 79–81. 51 See chapter 3, footnote nr. 78. 52 Ernest A. Moody, “Srednjovjekovna logika” [Medieval logic], in: Historija logike…, p. 62, especially bibliography accompanying this text on page 192. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 160.

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fied or unjustified, Aristotle’s teaching on the elementary determinants of reasoning and being, his lingual-logical-metaphysical approach to the issue, will remain an important feature of logic, from his direct followers, through Arabic logicians, to modern researches. According to the logicians of the Arabic school, the most important part and the objective of the part of logic linked to the research of terms, was the theory of definition, which was the starting point of the theory of science and the method of cognition. The previous chapter showed how to define definition and description, and how Bosniac logicians classified definition and description, and the kinds of definition that are treated specially (given its capabilities in scientific research and reasoning). An important feature of this theory, in relation to the theory of definition and division in the West, is that Arabic logicians were fully consistent followers of Aristotle’s teaching on definition, adding to it Galenus’s definition of description, a procedure that can be used in the case when it is impossible to construct a definition in accordance with the rules. Aristotle’s research of definition (horismós) was based on the criticism of Socrates’ induction and Plato’s division53 and the analysis of the ways in which a predicate can be connected with a subject. Bosnian logicians literally took over Aristotle’s definition of definition and gave it utmost importance because it can be used as a premiss or as a part of a premiss in reasoning. Therefore, the definition is given more space than division in contrast to those from other texts written in Europe in the corresponding period. More accurately, the works of Bosniac authors in Arabic, as well as the works of other authors of the same school, do not contain chapters devoted to division as a logical procedure and its possibilities, but the elements of division can be seen in chapters analyzing universal terms, such as genus, species and difference. The previous chapter on the elements of teaching on judgment by Bosniac logicians shows the most important similarities and differences between the teachings of the Arabic school and the teaching developed in Europe in the Middle Ages and later. This chapter will disclose only some of the issues that attracted attention in the later development of logic in the West and played an important role in establishing developed logic of judgments and mathematical logic (logistics). One of the issues that form the backbone of logic is the issue of implication, or the combination of two judgments in one hypotheti-

53 See: Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, vol. II, especially chapters 5 and 6. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 161.

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cal judgment, where the truthfulness of one implies the truthfulness of the other. The works of Bosniac authors do not contain chapters that would systematically discuss this complete issue, so we cannot speak of a developed theory of implication, or separate discussions that comprehensively treat this issue, as the ones led in the West that were usually titled De Consequentiis.54 However, the main conditions of truthfulness or the “rules of consequence”, influenced by Ibn S¯ına’s¯ texts are formulated in chapters related to disputes on judgment and syllogism. Following Ibn S¯ına’s¯ example, in the part treating non-categorical syllogisms, i.e. syllogisms where at least one premiss is a conditional judgment (depending on the conjunction in the sentence: disjunctive or conjunctive), special attention is paid to implication, conjunction and disjunction. The texts by Ibn S¯ına¯ are based on some statements (several of them) presented by Aristotle,55 as well as on some statements by his students, Theophrastes and Eudemus,56 and on some developed definitions from the logic of judgments in the teachings of Megaric and Stoic schools whose results, according to A.-M. Goichon, he used through the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias.57 Detailed discussion on non-categorical judgments by some Bosniac authors, especially in the New Commentary…byMus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ i,58 prove that, despite the strong and indisputable influence of the “first teacher”, they were aware of the significance of complex judgments and they paid evident attention to the logic of judgments. This should be accompanied by other teachings that logic of judgments directly depends on, such as the logic of modalities (aswellasthe modalities of judgments and the modalities of syllogisms), whose development in the West, Ernest A. Moody claims, was a consequence of the fact that 13th century philosophers and theologians “had special interest in modal arguments, partly because those arguments were often used by Avicenna and Averroes”.59 We should also mention teachings on the

54 Ernest A. Moody, “Srednjovjekovna logika…”, p. 72. 55 The most frequent quotation in this context is: “When two events are interrelated so that if one is true, the other is necessarily true, if the other does not exist, the ﬁrst does not exist either.” (Aristotle, Organon, Introduction, p. XXII.) 56 Compare: Czeslav Lejewski, “Antickaˇ logika”, in: Historija logike…, pp. 24–25. 57 Ibn S¯ına,¯ Livre des directives et remarques (Kitab¯ al-iˇsar¯ at¯ wa al-tanb¯ıhat),¯ trad. A.- M. Goichon, Beyrouth–Paris, 1951,pp.215–217, esp. page 251, footnote 4. 58 See chapter 2. 59 Ernest A. Moody, “Srednjovjekovna logika…”, p. 73. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 162.

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negative term (ma#dul)¯ and its function in affirmative and negative judgment, quantification of predicates of categorical judgments, etc. The third chapter shows that the logicians whose texts are the focus of this paper, leaning on the Arabic tradition, point out three types of indirect reasoning: deduction, induction and analogy. Understandably, they used the term deduction to denote syllogism that is, for them as well as for Aristotle, the ideal form of reasoning. This chapter also discloses basic similarities and differences in the interpretation of this matter, guided only by the issue itself. The presentation shows how much trust in the force of syllogism and faith in its perfection logicians of this school had. What they were able to do themselves in the field of syllogistics were certain simplifications, by accepting the practice to illustrate syllogisms not only through examples but through schemes and attempts to express them as naturally as possible. This was the main characteristic of the efforts in the field of syllogistics in the West. In comparison to the teachings in the West, a prominent feature of the later Arabic school’s logicians was that the fourth figure was legit- imized and that almost all texts treat it in the full, with all modes, although most of them point out its “unnaturalness”, and even its “needlessness”. The fact that Ibn S¯ına’s¯ works, including the most frequently quoted one, Kit¯ab al-isˇ¯ar¯at…, did not recognize the validity of the fourth figure, and did not mention it, even if Ibn S¯ına¯ was aware of its possibilities. As a starting point of differentiation among figures, Aristotle used the volume of the middle term in comparison to the other two, that resulted in the three figures with the middle term that can be: (1) broader than one and narrower than the other, (2) broader than both terms, and (3) narrower than both terms.60 However, if the difference between the figures is made on the basis of the position of the middle term in the premisses, which is accepted as a starting point by Ibn S¯ına¯ and other logicians of the Arabic school,61 consequently four figures may be formed: 1. the middle term as the subject of the

60 “By ‘middle term’ I mean that which both is contained in another and contains another in itself, and which is the middle by its position also; and by the ‘extremes’ (a) that which is contained in another, and (b) that in which another is contained.” Prior Analytics,I,4 and further. Also see: M. Cohen and E. Nagel, Uvod u logiku i naucniˇ metod, p. 107. 61 See: Ibn S¯ına,¯ Livre des directives…, p. 197. Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı(HasanKafijaPruˇscak)ˇ says: “The form that is created by combination of two premisses is called a figure, and there are four of them. If the middle term is the predicate of the minor premiss, and subject of the major, then it is the first figure, and if… etc.”. See: Hasan Kafija Pruˇscak,ˇ Izabrani spisi…, p. 77. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 163.

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major premiss and the predicate of the minor, 2. the predicate in both premisses, 3. the subject of both premisses, and 4. the predicate of the major and subject of the minor premiss. By defining the ways of figure formation this way, Arabic logicians were completely consistent. It was impossible to identify the exact moment when the fourth figure became the object of special interest of Arabic logicians and when it started to be discussed in their texts, but it was certainly so since the second half of the 13th century, when al-Qazw¯ın¯ı’s work as-ˇ Samsiyyaˇ that had strong and evident influence on all later logicians, Bosniacs included, was published. In contrast to such a consistent relation, one of the characteristics of the history of logic in the West, especially in the period between the medieval scholastic logic and modern logic, according to I. Thomas, is the “well-spread incompetence for classification by figures”, which was a consequence of different definitions of terms (middle, major and minor) and different starting points in the differentiation of figures.62 As for the fourth figure the situation was similar in terms of evaluation and place in the texts in the field of logic. The only difference was that its definite acceptance and full presentation was carried out more slowly.63 The authors who treated fourth figure syllogisms regularly characterized them as badly sequenced, imperfect and unnatural, which was “the name of fourth figure syllogisms first used by Averroes, and supported by Giacomo Zabaralla (1533–1589).”64 And, finally, in the context of this issue, it should be said that the studies in the compared period in the West led to a number of attempts—more or less successful—of criticisms of Aristotle’s syllogism,65 while there is almost no criticism among the followers of the Arabic schools, except some individual attempts, not of constructive criticism of syllogism as such, but of criticism of rational cognition and logic in general.66 The chapter that focuses on syllogism, the third chapter, where, according to medieval western logicians, the mind works “de argumen- tatione”, gives analysis of syllogisms and premisses that participate in its formation, taking into account the certainty of the premisses, and,

62 Ivo Thomas, “Interregnum”, in: Historija logike…, pp. 78–86, esp. pages 83–84. 63 Ibid, p. 84. Also see: A. Bazala, “Kaciˇ ceva´ ‘Elementa peripathetica’…”, p. 210. 64 I. Thomas, “Interregnum…”, p. 84. 65 See previously quoted texts by Ernest A. Moody and Ivo Thomas. 66 Especially severe criticism is given in Ar-radd #al¯aal-man.tiqiyy¯ın (Refutation of Logicians) by Ibn Taymiya (died 1328), see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G II, pp. 125–127 and S II, pp. 119–126. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 164.

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therefore, their conclusion. In the case of Arabic logicians, this resulted in a fivefold division of syllogistics into the “five skills” (as-. sin. a¯#at¯ al- hams): apodictic or demonstration (al-burhan),¯ dialectic (al-gadal),ˇ rhetoric (al- ¯ hitaba),¯ poetic (aˇs-ˇsi#r) and sophistic (safsata—mug˙ala¯ ta). The texts in the ¯ . . . field of logic that were the object of our analysis pay less attention to syllogistic skills, except, understandably, to apodictic (they mostly give only definitions, main characteristics and examples), as Arabic school logicians see them as skills that do not necessarily lead to scientific knowledge, but only probable knowledge, opinion, or completely wrong ideas. Therefore, apodictic belongs to logic, philosophy and science, while dialectic, rhetoric and poetic do not—they are, in terms of science, inferior in comparison to demonstration, and can be in function of theology, laws, morals…, or as tools for practicing adducing proofs or disputation.67 West-European philosophical and logical tradition has a similar way of evaluating apodictic proof (demonstration) in comparison to the dialectic one in its original Aristotelian meaning. It must be mentioned that European tradition, under the influence of scholastic tradition, understood dialectic as formal logic.68 Therefore, this relation (of apodictic and dialectic) can be observed within textbooks on logic, especially in those parts that treat the “proof by the evident” and in those that treat “the probable”, dialectic proofs. Such parts are usually called “Topics” according to Aristotle’s work (or teaching on “loci communes”), and according to works in rhetoric as a separate discipline. Apodictic syllogism which certainly expresses some irreplaceable link, usually has the same status as in the works by Arabic logicians, while there were some different standpoints regarding dialectic, rhetoric and poetic syllogism, their potentials and rhetoric in general and its philosophical legitimacy. Scholastic was dominated by the standpoint that is almost the same as the standpoint of Arabic logicians on validation, while in the mid- 15th century, in the writings by Lorenzo Valle (1407–1457), P.S. Me- lanchton (1497–1560) and, especially, Pierre de la Ramée (Peter Ramus, 1515–1572), the tendency of the third particle of “trivium”, rhetoric, to take over some of the functions of logic and generally different validation of philosophical function or rhetorical thinking and speech was

67 See chapter 3. 68 See: B. Boˇsnjak, Sistematika ﬁlozoﬁje…, p. 57 and further. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 165.

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more present.69 These tendencies that were a part of general humanis- tic trends, led to the development of rhetoric in the direction initiated by Cicero and Quintilian. However, criticisms of these standpoints on “pure logic” and syllogistics became evident at the same time, so that their contemporaries “brought rhetorical thinking and speech back in the area of opinion, while its task is limited to conviction. Based on such interpretation of the function of rhetoric, the new age of thinking, such as German idealism and English philosophy, following the example of Descartes, will exclude rhetoric from the field of philosophy.”70 This will additionally strengthen the standpoint that rhetoric belongs to the field of conviction and opinion, and that it can be used as tools to accept facts rationally proved and based in demonstration. In the context of “syllogistic skills”, it should be said that Arabic school logicians were not particularly attracted to sophistic, in contrast to the medieval logicians, some of whom were practically obsessed with what Aristotle’s De Sophisticis elenchis offered as a part of “the new logic”. All that the Arabic school logicians believed should be said on this topic was presented in their writings in the field of logic, especially in the more comprehensive works, such as New Commentary… by Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ (Mustafa Ejubovic),´ and in the writings on disputation skills (#ilm ad¯ ab¯ al-bahtwaal-muna¯zara). As a result .¯ . there is almost no separate discussion in sophistic, apart from the preserved fragments from more comprehensive works. And, eventually, another issue that all texts in the field of logic treat (at least by one sentence in short texts), which is interesting to compare, is the issue directly linked to syllogism as a scientific method, i.e. the result of that method, scientific knowledge. The third chapter shows how, in accordance with Ibn S¯ına’s¯ texts, logicians defined scientific knowledge and solved problems such as: how to always find adequate syllogism, i.e. the middle term, whether there are elementary premisses of scientific knowledge or not, etc. We could also see that those solutions are but summarized statements from Aristotle’s works in the field of logic and other fields in which the “first teacher” established the basic general principle, “to be the one” (unity

69 See: I. Thomas, o.c., as well as Ernesto Grassi, “Filozofija i retorika. Pripada li Frane Petricspecifi´ cnojˇ humanistickojˇ tradiciji”, Prilozi…, Zagreb, 1983,nr.1–2 (17– 18), pp. 39–61,esp.46. Also see: Damir Barbaric,´ “Znacenjeˇ Sveuciliˇ ˇsta u Padovi za obrazovanje naˇsih humanista”, Prilozi…, Zagreb, 1983,nr.1–2 (17–18), pp. 151–160, esp. 152. 70 E. Grassi, “Filozofija i retorika…”, p. 56. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 166.

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of plurality), i.e. the principle of identity when it is said that “there has to be ‘unique’ and ‘identical’ in plurality”.71 Therefore, according to Aristotle, in order to deduct a syllogism, or in order to acquire scientific knowledge, it is necessary to have the unity or identity of the plurality of things. Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı (Hasan Kafija Pruˇscak),ˇ for example, at the very beginning of his text in logic says: “Each discipline has the unity that defines the aspect of plurality…”72 Similar attitude is evident in the writings of other authors as well. This understanding of science, logic and its laws, or bivalent logic as theory of scientific thinking—despite the fact that Aristotle himself revealed a different perspective (in relation to “possibility”) that was also present in the Arabic school of logic—remained the foundations of West-European logical thinking until the year 1920,when Jan Lukasiewicz discovered the principles of trivalent logic.73 Therefore, it is easy to understand why the European logical tradition had the same approach, whether the subject is treated within some texts in the field of logic (usually in separate chapters called “De modo sciendi” or something similar) or it is treated in some writings of general character. The fact that authors from Bosnia, both the ones who wrote in Arabic and those who were educated at the universities of Western Europe, dealt with the same problems, and that their answers to these questions were similar, can be illustrated by extracts from writings by Juraj of Dubrovnik Peripateticae disputationes and New Commentary…byMus.taf. a¯ Yuy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade.¯ In the first disputation, Juraj of Dubrovnik treats the issue of defining the term subjectum scientiae (in Ejubovic’s´ work, mawd.¯u# al-#ilm has the same meaning). Juraj of Dubrovnik pointed out that the subject of science should be defined as one, “otherwise science would not draw its uniqueness from it”, and that it should be “univocal”. The subject of science should denote “that it is and what it is; it has to exist in the nature of things, or at least there should be no opposition that it would eventually exist” (the issue here is “de naturalis philosophiae subjecto”, A.L.). Eventually, a science should, through its subject, differentiate from other sciences. He concludes: “The subject of science is the primary intention of science; its causes, action and types are dis-

71 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics,I,11. 72 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Muhtasar. al-K¯af¯ı…, fol. 2a(Izabrani spisi…, p. 61). 73 Bogdan Seˇ ˇsic,´ Osnovi logike, 4¯th edition, Belgrade, 1974,p.370. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 167.

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cussed by the science and it is where the science gets its uniqueness and distinction.”74 As shown in the previous chapter, Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ in his New Commentary… treats the subject of science in a similar way. A science should be defined, and that means that its subject should be defined precisely, e.g. different from others by a “specific difference” (fasl. al-qar¯ıb—differentia specifica), and that it should be defined uniquely (amr wa¯hid).. The example taken here is the science of nature (#ilm tab¯ı#¯ı) where the subject is absolutely unique, and that it is, according to Ibn S¯ına’s¯ definition, a changeable body (gismˇ qabil¯ li at-tagy˙ ¯ır).75 Juraj of Dubrovnik treats the science of nature in the same way, and among res sensibiles (sensible things), ens mobile (changeable being) and corpus mobile (changeable body), chooses changeable body as the adequate subject of science of nature. According to M. Brida, this idea was taken over from the teachings of Avicenna and al-Gaz. al¯ ¯ı, through Albertus Magnus, Aegidius, and others.76

This chapter presented some general views on the important issues that can help us asses relations, similarities and differences among the works by Bosniac authors and the ones by writers that belong to Aristotelian tradition in Western Europe. Examples similar to, or even more typical than the ones given here, especially the definitions of certain logical issues, classifications, and other, are numerous, and would go beyond the framework of this paper. The examples given here, together with the previous chapter, are sufficient to conclude that, besides some differences, such as the different level of readiness to leave Aristotle’s footsteps, the history of logic is unique and it goes in two different paths, two languages and two cultural and civilization circles, but in the same direction. The path that follows the traditions of West European thinking is mainly written in Latin; only later did they begin writing in local languages, and to a much lesser extent. The other, based on Arabic-Islamic cultural and historical heritage, even despite the exceptional results offered by the great names of Arabic philosophy and logic, such as al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı, Ibn Ruˇsd, especially Ibn S¯ına¯ and others, of good predispositions such as the clarity of thought and

74 Marija Brida, “Problemi djela Peripateticae disputationes Jurja Dalmatinca”, Prilozi…, Zagreb, 1975,nr.1–2,pp.154–155. 75 Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ as-ˇ Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd…, fol. 142 b. 76 M. Brida, “Problemi djela…”, p. 155. 2008062. Ljubovic. 04_Chapter4. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 168.

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expression evident in the works by authors of indisputable speculative and researching talent, such as Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade,¯ still remained strictly within the framework of a “completed and perfect” logical system. The history of logic in Bosnia, observed from that aspect, the aspect of the same (the subjects treated and solutions offered) and the different (mediation, language, etc.) is an exceptional indicator of uniqueness of the science of this region. It is unique in Europe by the specificities of its development, the diversity of sources and experiences, the direct meeting of political, social, philosophical and theological doctrines and tradition and their coexistence. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 169.

chapter five

LOGIC IN THE CLASSICAL SYSTEM OF ISLAMIC SCIENCES

On several occasions this paper, especially its first and fourth chapter, indirectly pointed to the place and significance that logic had within Arabic-Islamic system of disciplines, and to its possible relations with and influence on other disciplines, as well as the influence that these disciplines made on logic itself. However, the specific subject of logic, a clear definition of its objectives and main concepts, that had to have an impact on other branches of philosophy, and then on other disciplines, deserves a more detailed treatment.1 It is certain that a book of this volume cannot take into account all aspects of this issue, so the author decided to give a brief presentation showing some possible ways for its interpretation and chose to present it from two different angles: firstly, by identifying the place that logic has in the system of disciplines and education system with reference to the most important classifications, and secondly, by defining logic and its articulation as a system and general methodology in relation to other disciplines and sciences.

1. From philosophy as a universal discipline and a unified understanding of world in which philosophy and science were mixed, different disciplines with specific subjects gradually separated, at first classified according to their cosmological or anthropological concerns in Ancient Greece, as the consequence of a special encounter of man with the world and his understanding of totality and its parts. Through this differentiation and specification, philosophy itself developed. At the time of the development of the sciences in the Arabic world, when most of the Hellenic heritage was available in the Arabic language, Ara- bic scholars faced the issue of the classification of disciplines. Under- standably, this issue was not only of a formal character, although it was sometimes approached from a purely formalist standpoint. As seen by Arabic philosophers and scholars, who were inspired by Hellenic

1 See a very instructive work: Miklós Maróth, Die Araber und die antike Wissenschafts- theorie, E.J. Brill, London, New York, Köln, 1994, 274 p. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 170.

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heritage and faced with ready-made solutions offered especially in the Aristotelian system, which was supposed to be adapted and developed to satisfy the needs of a significantly different social and scientific situation, this issue was even more complex. On the one hand there was the issue of integrating Aristotle within a system that emerged from the conflict between Muslim scholars and Aristotle’s teachings, and on the other, there was the issue of integrating certain elements of Platonism into Aristoteliansm.2 Troughout the history of Islam, and especially in Arab history, a lot of attention was paid to the classification of disciplines. This was the topic of numerous studies done by Orientalists and apparently the best results were achieved by G.C. Anawati in his Introduction à la théologie musulmane.3 These classifications were done on the basis of very different criteria, such as: domestic—foreign; theoretical—practical; religious— nonreligious; traditional—rational; appreciative—damaging, etc. This work deals only with those classifications that were present by the mid-16th century, left the deepest impact, and were present in various writings preceding the works by Bosniac logicians, and only with those parts of classifications that point out the place, role and relation that logic had to other disciplines, as observed from within the system itself. The first significantly comprehensive classifications in the Arabic system were done by al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı. Several of his works reveal his standpoint in this context.4 We are interested in two of his classifications. The first one, presented in Kit¯ab at-tanb¯ıh #al¯a sab¯ıl as-sa#¯ada (The Book of Advice on the Way to Happiness),5 divides philosophy into ‘theoretical’ philosophy—including mathematics, physics and metaphysics, and ‘practical’ philosophy—including ethics and politics. As these basic elements show, al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı, according to Aristotle’s vision, did not include logic, but gave it the place of a discipline that is a prerequisite for

2 See: A.-M. Goichon, La philosophie d’Avicenne…, pp. 7–53 and: C.ˇ Veljaciˇ c,´ Filozofija istocnihˇ naroda…, p. 56 and further. For a more detailed study of this issue, see works by Abdelhamid I. Sabre, professor emeritus of the history of Arabic science, Department of the History of Science, Harvard University, given in the bibliography. 3 Also see: G.C. Anawati, “Classification des sciences et structure des Summae chez les auteurs Musulmans”, Revue des études islamiques, XLIV, (Paris) 1976,pp.61–70. 4 See: М.М. Хайруллаев, Мировоззрение Фараби…, especially “Опредметеи классификации наук” [On topics and classification of sciences], pp. 215–239. 5 Haydar. ab¯ ad,¯ 1345/1926–1927. Another classification that is presented in Ris¯ala f¯ıtah.s.¯ıl as-sa#¯ada, Haydarabad, I 1345/1926–1927. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 171.

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approaching philosophy. In his Ihs. ¯a" al-#ul¯um (Discussion on Sciences)6 al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı gives another, very comprehensive classification of sciences, dividing them into five categories: 1. the science of language (with seven disciplines), 2. logic, 3. mathematics (with seven independent disciplines), 4. natural sciences or physics (with eight disciplines) and divine science, or metaphysics (with three disciplines) and 5. science of man- aging towns (politics), jurisprudence and speculative theology (kalam).¯ It is interesting to mention that al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı sees the science of language and logic as “pedagogical sciences”, suggesting the links between them and, in the context of the relationship between logic and other disciplines, says that logical skills (fann) are necessary for all other spheres of knowledge, especially those requiring punctuality, clarity, consistency and reasoned thinking.7 Ibn S¯ına’s¯ Ris¯ala f¯ı taqs¯ım al-#ul¯um al-#aqliyya (Treatise on the Division of the Rational Sciences),8 besides elaborating previous classifications (Aristotle’s, al-Kind¯ı’s and al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı’s), gives a very intriguing classification of “rational sciences” (intellectual), i.e. without religious disciplines,9 where he divides hikma. (term denoting wisdom, knowledge and philosophy) according to the classical division into theoretical or speculative, where the objective is the truth, and practical, where the objective is well-being. The theoretical group includes physics, mathematics and, as the third discipline, metaphysics and the science of the divine, while the practical is divided depending on whether it addresses the individual, his way of living and his behavior (in terms of morals) or his family (in terms of family morals) or it addresses the position of the individual in a society and the management of state in terms of politics. Clearly it is grounded in Aristotle’s division of philosophy presented in his Meta- physics that lacks only poetical philosophy (poietiké). From these grounds Ibn S¯ına¯ derives the architecture of his system, defining the relations between the main and sub-altered sciences. For example, he classifies

6 Ihs. ¯a" al-#ul¯um,al-Qahira,¯ 1367/1948. 7 See: М. М. Ьайруллаев, Мировоззрение Фараби…, p. 238,and:S.H.Nasr,Sciences et savoir en Islam,Paris,1979,pp.59–61. 8 Treatise published within Tis# ras¯a"il f¯ıal-hikmawaat-tab. ¯ı#iyy¯at,al-Qahira,¯ in 1326 (1908), pp. 104–118. 9 Some literature states that Ibn S¯ına¯ did not treat religious disciplines because his approach to theology was deﬁned by problems, and not by areas (See e.g., N. Smailagic,´ Klasicnaˇ kultura islama [Classical Culture of Islam], Zagreb, 1973,p.113). However, it’s a fact that the term al-#ul¯um al-#aqliyya (rational sciences) at that time was opposed to al-#ul¯um an-naqliyya (traditional sciences) which included religious disciplines. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 172.

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physics into eight elementary disciplines with sub-disciplines. Mathe- matics has four: arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music, geometry is further divided into seven sub-disciplines (topography, mechan- ics, optics, hydraulics, etc.) and so on. Again logic is not included in the division, as Ibn S¯ına¯ saw it as a prerequisite both to truth and to well-being, i.e. it belongs both to theoretical and practical philosophy, although some of his texts treat it as a part of theoretical philosophy since its ultimate goal is truth.10 Ibn S¯ına’s¯ classification can be seen later in various texts with minor adjustments, and most frequently his order of rational sciences (al-#ulum¯ al-#aqliyya) is faced with the order of traditional sciences (al-#ulum¯ an- naqliyya): jurisprudence, speculative theology, grammar, skill in writing, poetics and prosody, and history. Such classification was usually treated as a part of the main division to religious and non-religious disciplines, although poetics and history were treated differently by different authors. One of the older classifications that should be mentioned here is Ibn Haldun’s,¯ which gives logic a different place. As the main starting point, ¯ Ibn Haldun¯ took the intellectual and traditional sciences. The intel- ¯ lectual or philosophical disciplines included logic, physics or natural science (medicine and agriculture), metaphysics and science on mea- sures (geometry and its disciplines, arithmetic, music and astronomy), while traditional included The Qur"an and its interpretations, tradition (had¯ıt), jurisprudence (fiqh) and religious laws (ˇsar¯ı#a), theology, sufism . ¯ and language sciences (grammar, lexicography and literature).11 In the context of the period that is the subject of this book, along with the classifications given here, it is interesting to note the observations of Ta¸sköprü-zade¯ (1495–1553), an Ottoman encyclopaedist,12 as they reflect the systematization of disciplines in the Ottoman Empire in the early 16th century. It is interesting that this classification is accompanied by a very realistic picture of the state of disciplines, and that it does not reflect the author’s own view of an ideal classification (he saw the classification of disciplines as a discipline in itself)13 but the actual situation and the prevailing standpoint.

10 See: I. Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote…, p. 50. 11 S.H. Nasr, Sciences et savoir…, pp. 62–63. Also see: Ibn Haldun, Muqaddima, Sara- jevo, 1982, selection, translation and afterword by Hasan Suˇsic,´ pp. 112–113 and 115–117. 12 See: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G II, 425–426 (559–562) and S II, 633–634. 13 Ahmed Ta¸sköprü-zade,¯ Mawd.¯u#¯at al-#ul¯um (translated to Turkish by Kamaludd¯ ¯ın Muhammad),. t. I and II, (Istanbul) 1313/1895–1896.Ta¸sköprü-zade¯ saw the division of 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 173.

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The essence of this very extensive classification can be reduced into the following division: (1) calligraphic science, comprised of: the alphabet, orthography, writing styles, etc.; (2) oral science which includes about thirty disciplines, including Arabic language, phonetics, lexicography, etymology, grammar and syntax, rhetoric, prosody, poetry, stylistics, history, literature, etc.; (3) rational science, such as, primarily logic (pedagogy), disputation and dialectics, and, finally, (4) spiritual sciences which include by far the largest number of disciplines, divided into four subgroups: (a) theoretical—rational disciplines (metaphysics, mathematics and natural sciences); (b) practical—rational disciplines (ethics and political sciences); (c) theoretical—religious disciplines (studying and exegesis of The Qur"an and traditional laws, speculative theology, jurisprudence, etc.) and (d) practical—religious disciplines. This classification, especially the text of Mawd.¯u#¯at al-#ul¯um (Subjects of Disciplines), discloses some traces of the previous classifications, but it also shows that the number of disciplines, especially natural sciences, was considerably lower in the Ottoman Empire, therefore their importance was also reduced. On the other hand, the status of sciences was given to some disciplines that the previous classifications did not consider scientific, such as different forms of fortune-telling and predicting the future. It is also evident that the axis is pointed in two directions: on the one hand towards theological disciplines, and on the other, towards language studies. As philosophy had already seen certain branches separated and established as individual disciplines (such as physics), “it could only keep logic, methodology and general instructions or orientation of thinking, i.e. its criticism”.14 Such a situation lead to the transformation of philosophy into ancilla theologiae, similarly as it happened in the West in the Middle Ages, and the use of its results, reasoning and proving in function of speculative theology, and language studies and interpretation, primarily of the exegesis of The Qur"an, and then interpretation skills in general. Another issue important for a better understanding of relations between logic and other disciplines is the issue of place and the role of

disciplines as a separate discipline and therefore devoted a whole separate chapter to it, t. I, 348. For more on this classification, see: H. Inaldzik,ˇ Osmansko Carstvo…, pp. 235–236. 14 M. Filipovic,´ “Jezik i filozofija”, Radio-Sarajevo—treci´ program, XIV, (Sarajevo) 1986, nr. 51,p.33. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 174.

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logic in the educational system. It has already been said that logic as an instrumental science had the role of a regular educational subject and was a precondition for studying of any other science as early as 9th and 10th century.15 Even then the practice was to view logic, together with the Arabic language, mathematics and some disciplines of The Qur"an, as an elementary educational subject of propaedeutical character. In the period dealt with here, from the 16th century on, logic was taught in elementary religious schools as “ibtida-i harig”ˇ together with basic Arabic grammar, speculative or scholastic theology (kalam),¯ astronomy, geometry and rhetoric.16 One of the most frequently used elementary textbooks was Isagogue (Is¯ a¯g˙u¯gˇ¯ı) by al-Abhar¯ı. Alternatively, some other piece of writing was used, for example K¯af¯ı’s Compendium of Logic by Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı that he prepared for his students, as well as some “short” commentaries. Secondary schools (dahil-madresa, tatimma, etc.),17 treated logic as a compulsory subject, and it was taught using more comprehensive works, such as al-Katib¯ ¯ı’s The Sun Treatise (ar-Risala¯ aˇs-ˇsamsiyya) and some of the commentaries on this work. The highest level of education (sahn madrasa’s) did not treat logic as an independent subject, but it was studied as a part of speculative theology—apologetic.18 An especially interesting and important issue is the use of logic for the methodology of learning, as well as inquiring into the role of logic in the educational system, although it indeed has kept the status of an “unavoidable” subject on the curriculum, and its results could have been oﬀered to the educational system. This issue was treated by numerous authors, among them especially Carl Prantl, Adam Mez, G.E. Von Grunebaum, Josef Van Ess, Hans Daiber, C.H.M. Versteegh, Dmitri Gutas, Oliver Leaman and others, who have conveyed and interpreted diﬀerent historical testimonies. The most frequently quoted sources on this matter are the works of George Makdisi, especially The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and Christian West: With Special Reference to Scholasticism. To summarize the interesting and important results for the needs of this paper, it can be said that . teaching—tadr¯ıs, in the didactical context,

15 S.H. Nasr, Sciences et savoir…, pp. 70–73. 16 See: H. Inaldzik,ˇ Osmansko Carstvo…, pp. 239–240, and A. Ljubovic,´ “Neke karakteristike proznog stvaralaˇstva na orijentalnim jezicima” [Some characteristic of the prose literature in Oriental languages], POF, (Sarajevo), 40/1990,pp.63–78. 17 See: ibid, pp. 240–245, and I.H. Uzunçar¸sılı, Osmanlı tarihi…, t. II, pp. 583–588. 18 Ibid. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 175.

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leaned upon memory. “Memory”, Makdisi says, “played a crucial role in the process of learning. It was a tool in the service of humanism, as well as in that of scholasticism. Memorization involved great quantities of materials, their understanding, and their retention through frequent repetition at close intervals of time. When limited to mere transmission, memorization was simply the attribute of the common man among the men of learning, e.g. the hadith scholars, the lexicographers. Above this rudimentary level, the humanist, like the scholastic, aimed at the higher level of emulation. The road to creativity called for progression from authoritative reception and transmission, riw¯aya, to understanding the materials transmitted, dir¯aya, and finally, with personal effort pushed to its limit, itjtih¯ad, to creating one’s personal ideas, in one’s own words and, in an elegant style, expressed with eloquence.” The Arabic sources used by G. Makdisi and quoted literature give detailed deliberations on the role of memory and learning by heart # (talq¯ın or hif. z.) when studying The Qur an and hadith and in legal studies. However, as G. Makdisi rightfully concludes, the sources say that this method, since the time before the “flourishing of the madrasa”, was recommended and used in other fields of creative thinking, from poetry to different traditional religious disciplines and fields of science. In his Muqaddima, Ibn Haldun¯ criticizes the insistance on memoriz- ¯ ing and giving it priority over disputation, which was the practice back then. He says: “L’entraî nement convenable le plus simple, c’est sans doute l’exercice de la parole dans les conversations et les débats sci- entifiques. C’est ainsi qu’on se rapproche du but et qu’on parvient á l’atteindre. Il y a des étudiants qui passent leur vie á suivre des réunions savantes, mais qui se tiennent cois et ne prennent aucune part active aux discusions. Leure affaire, c’est d’apprendre par cur—beaucoup plus qu’il est néccessaire. Mais ainsi, ils n’ont aucune pratique scientifique ou pédagogique. Aprés leure études, ils sont incapables de converser, de controverser et d’enseigner, faut de formation pédagogique convenable. Ils peuvent bien en savoir plus long que d’autre, á force de s’en remet- tre á leure mémoire, mais l’entraî nement scientifique est tout autre chose.”19 Nonetheless, such practices in teaching have remained—even in the Ottoman Empire and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the period treated

19 Ibn Khaldun, Discours sur l’histoire universelle—Al-Muqaddima. Traduction nouvelle, préface et notes par Vincent Monteil. Seconde édition revue. Paris (1978), tome 2, p. 892. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 176.

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here—late 16th through late 19th century. This is illustrated by the fact that lower level education used compendia (Ar. muhtasar)astext- ¯ . books. Numerous handwritten copies of compendia kept in archives and libraries today are a direct result of dictations (Ar. iml¯a#), for example Isagogue by At¯ırudd¯ın al-Abhar¯ı and short commentaries of this work ¯ (e.g. in Bosniac tradition Sarˇ hal-. Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı by Mus.taf. ab.Y¯ usuf¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı- zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı or compendia such as Muhtasar al-K¯af¯ı min al-mantiq by ¯ . . Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı and others. Higher levels of education often used the same elementary textbooks, with the addition of subtle commentaries (Sarˇ h. "ala…),¯ super-commentaries (Sarˇ h. "ala¯ Sarˇ h…). or glossaries (H. a¯ˇsiya "ala…).¯ These commentaries and glossaries were in line with the levels of education and anticipated the students’ abilities to have disputations (Ar. muna¯zara).. In the context of logic, the concrete example of such work in the Bosniac tradition is the aforementioned H. ¯asiyaˇ muf¯ıda li al-Faw¯a"id al-Fan¯ar¯ıyya "al¯aar-Ris¯ala f¯ıal-man.tiq the work “glossarizing” al-Fanar¯ ¯ı’s commentary to al-Abhar¯ı’s Isagogue. One proof of the fact that memorization played an important role in studying certain matters in the Islamic education (which was also the case in pre-modern education in general) are numerous manuscripts, documents and authentic testimonies, some of which the author of this text witnessed. Numerous works intended for education, especially textbooks, were often written in rhymed prose or verse. In order to make memorizing more successful, various mnemo-technical tools were designed, such as charts of chapters and paragraphs and different (often “artificial” and “unnatural”) divisions within chapters. Oftentimes in manuscripts we can find ideally symmetrical divisions that make little logical and scientific sense—the symmetry here was intended for the sole purpose of easy memorization. When we speak about logic, it is interesting to mention that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, judging by the number of copies preserved in the collections of manuscripts and libraries, a very popular work was al-Sullam by "Abdurrahm. an¯ al-Ah.dar. ¯ı,20 a 16th century author, active in the far east of Islam, Maghrib. It is interesting to notice that this work has only 143 verses and that it was written in ragazˇ , a meter considered simple and easy to remember.

20 For example: Ms. Archive of Herzegovina in Mostar (Arhiv Hercegovine u Mos- taru), No 14/2. Cf.: Abderrahman el-Akhdhari (sic!), Le Soullam. Tratié de logique. Traduit de l’arabe par J.-D. Luciani, Alger, 1921., 78 p. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 177.

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When the texts belonging to the tradition of Bosnia and Herzegov- ina written in oriental languages (biographies, memoirs, etc.) describe prominent features of significant scholars, special focus is put on their ability to remember and to dictate. For example, Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi-. sar¯ ¯ıinhisNiz¯am al "ulam¯a# il¯a h¯atam al-anbiy¯a" (Row of scholars to the last . . ¯ prophet), on one of his masters’ masters, a well-known Hanafi jurist, al-Sarahs¯ıMuhammad b. Ahmad b. AbuBakr¯ Samsˇ al-A"imma, says: ¯ . . “Without looking at a book or note, he dictated by heart (bolded by A.L.) Al-Mabs¯u.t, a work of fifteen volumes.”21 Also Ibrah¯ ¯ım Opiya¯c,ˇ a student of Mus.taf. ab.Y¯ usuf¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, writing about his master, points out one of his especially valuable qualities, saying “… he had such a good remembrance,thathis honorable memory never lost a thing he heard thirty or more years ago from a teacher or read from a book, so he could quote it when necessary and give the precise place where that quote could be found. The scholars would say: ‘You need to learn knowledge from the living word (bolded by A.L.), because a man can best remember what he heard and best say what he remembers.’”22 Capable teachers (sing. mudarris),whowillberememberedinthe tradition and whose names will be put on different diplomas (sing. igˇ¯aza), indicating the qualifications of the students and permitting them to teach in a certain field, will be those who memorized an enormous quantity of different information and, in addition, were able to research and interpret fine details of certain disciplines, especially Islamic laws. Besides this, the diplomas contained the name of the book that was written on dictation and that the candidate mastered—sometimes the diploma would be written on the book itself. What an individual class (dars,pl.dur¯us) looked like can be reconstructed based on the sources and literature.23 After compulsory innovation (Ar. basmala and hamdala. ) and roll call, it contained lectures—dictation (Ar. iml¯a#), complemented by the teacher’s deliberations on the exegesis of the text and emphasis on the issues that

21 141 " # Hasan Kaﬁja Pruˇscak,ˇ Izabrani spisi…, page. or Niz.¯am al ulam¯a …, manuscript, …, fol. 76 b. 22 Muhamed Mujic,´ “Biograﬁja Mustafe Ejubovica´ (Sejhˇ Juje)” [Biography of Mus- tafa Ejubovic(´ Sejhˇ Jujo)], Glasnik Vrhovnog islamskog starjesinstvaˇ [Gazette of High Islamic Committee], Sarajevo, January–March 1956,p.13. 23 Esp. see: G. Makdisi, The Rise of Humanism…, Chapter IV “Tools of the humanist” and Chapter V “The method of dictation”, pp. 213–216, as well as “Madrasa” and “Tadr¯ıs” in: Encyclopaedia of Islam… 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 178.

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can and should be discussed, followed by the memorization (Ar. talq¯ın or hif. z.) process, dependent on the students’ abilities. The complete process ended with disputation (Ar. mun¯azara. ). Depending on the education level, from elementary to advanced, the focus shifted towards disputation. The classes of the advanced level focused on disputation, giving the teacher an opportunity to discuss fine details of the studies with his students (it was especially so in the field of the Islamic laws) and verify their understanding of the matter and problem-solving skills. Logic was an important methodological tool for disputation, argumentation and deducing a conclusion, together with a specially developed discipline among Arabic-Islamic sciences, named “disputation skills”—¯ad¯ab al-baht (wa al-mun¯azara).24 Logic, in the sense of master- .¯ . ing the elementary principles of logical thinking and conclusion, and the disputation skills, in the sense of mastering disputation principles described here.25 A detailed analysis of a number of works, especially commentaries and glossaries in different fields (from dogmatics, through various disciplines of the laws, to natural sciences and mathematics), concerning the aspect of using the principles of logic and rules of disputation, could offer a realistic picture on how much influence these disciplines had in education and scientific disputations. This research (limited for objective reasons) suggests only these interesting phenomena and problems of the educational system in the Ottoman Empire, and especially the issues related to the methodology of teaching, the role of logic, and dialogue and disputation skills (¯ad¯ab al-baht wa al-mun¯azara) in the teaching .¯ . process and the academic dialogue in general. The researchers can easily recognize the form of these texts and disputations by distinctive “Fa in qala¯ qa¯#il… wa qulna(naq¯ ulu,¯ wa qultu)…”, but seldom enter the very analysis of interpretation and comments: phonological, morphological, syntactical, geographical, hagiographical, historical, semantic, etc. analysis of what follows after “wa naqul¯ (wa aqulu)…”¯ and evaluation of the methodology of interpretation, ways of giving comments and having dialogues, regardless of the topic treated in the respective work. This issue, especially as we speak of the Arabic-Islamic tradition

24 See more: G. Makdisi in Chapter II–V. 25 Besides quoted work by G. Makdisi, also see: Logic in classical Islamic culture, Edited by G.E. von Grunebaum, Otto Harrassowitz—Wiesbaden, 1970, especially Robert Brunschvig, “Logic and Law in Classical Islam” and Josef van Ess, “The logical structure of Islamic theology” in: pp. 22–50. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 179.

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in Bosnia and Herzegovina, remains open for further research. Special attention should be paid to the abundance of so far unused historical sources and manuscripts. Consequences of such treatment of logic and its stabile place in the educational system are seen in a considerable percentage that writings on logic have in the overall heritage of oriental manuscripts. For example, the collection of manuscripts of the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo contains 5,263 codices26 out of which 307 manuscripts are in the ﬁeld of logic. As seen in catalogues, the situation is similar with other collections of Oriental manuscripts.

2. All Arabic interpretations of Aristotle, especially the definitions of logic, explain the relation between logical theory and philosophy (later other disciplines that developed within) as the relation between tools and the object that tools are applied on. Therefore, logic had an instrumental, propaedeutical and preparatory character. On the other hand, philosophy, or science in general, offered its experiences and results for logic to build upon. As the main task of logic (analytics), according to Aristotle, was to “perform analysis of thought as knowledge of objective reality through analysis of language”,27 and reach the scientific method of cognition, relations between logic and philosophy or other disciplines can be observed through two significant points: language and the demonstrative method (deduction); language, because logical research of fundamental issues such as term, category, standpoint, judgment, conclusion, etc. is based upon analysis of language; demonstrative method, primarily because it puts syllogism in the place of the only form in which thinking reaches scientific knowledge that has features of necessity and absoluteness, as well as harmony between thinking and being. Accepting Aristotle’s logic, which is a logic of syntax in its methodological approach, a logic of thinking in its contents, forms and laws, and an ontologically grounded logic in its foundation,28 Arabic philosophers and logicians had to accept a range of consequences originating from Aristotle’s approach, contents and foundations, as well as relations between logic and other disciplines in the two points given above. That

26 5,263 codices contain about 8,000 titles. Data from December 1991. 27 B. Seˇ ˇsic,´ “Aristotelov Organon”—Foreword: Aristotel, Organon,Beograd,1965, p. XII. 28 Ibid. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 180.

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is how some of the significant features of the Greek spirit in general are recognizable in Arabic philosophy. For example, Aristotle’s definition of man as living being that has reason and speech (zoon logon ehon) points out the important role of speech and its relation to reason. Sens- ing this link between reason and speech, and their identicalness with the essence of man, Arabic philosophers accepted this definition and translated these essential terms as n¯a.tiq (al-insan¯ hayaw. an¯ na¯tiq).. The immediate link between words and beings or things, which is specific and clearly defined in Aristotle’s “On Categories”, especially in the definitions of categories, had its influence in Arabic logic, and expressed a strong link between philosophy and logic. An important feature to be underlined here is that Aristotle’s works and their transfer to the Arabic world build a strong relationship within the language—thought—object of thought complex, while the examination of language forms and logical forms has always been a feature of both Arabic and European logic. The issue of language was primarily a philosophical issue, however, it had great importance for logic and linguistics, especially the issue of relationship between speech and thought. This aspect was the object of attention of Arabic logicians, who, according to Aristotelian tradition, defined it as an unbreakable connection, where language is a “picture” of objects, notions and terms, a presentation in which thinking and speaking are concurrent actions. Although this relation was already described in the works by al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı and Ibn S¯ına,¯ 29 together with the elements of logical concepts and concepts of philosophy and science in general, it can be said that it wasn’t until later that the issue of language in the context of logic was discussed to its full extent, especially in the writings by al-Gurˇ gˇan¯ ¯ı,30 an author of the later period with great influence on Bosniac logicians, especially on Mus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı- zade,¯ who considered al-Gurˇ gˇan¯ ¯ı as one of his teachers.31 His influence was evident in the works by Bosniac authors. The definition of language here implies that “speech does not exist without thinking, and vice versa”, that the language complies to the same rules as nature and life, and that each word and each sentence

29 See: Логико-гносеологические идеи мыслителей Средней Азии, редактор М.М. Ьайруллаев, Ташкент, 1981,pp.127–128;andМ.Н. Болтаев, Вопросы гносеологии и логики в произведенияь Ибн Сины и его школы, Душанбе, 1965,p.50 and on. 30 See: Логико-гносеологические…, especially chapter: “Логико-гносеологические идеи Мир Сайида Шарифа Джурджани”, pp. 127–191. 31 See footnote 49, 1st chapter. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 181.

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must be defined according to their meaning, their form, and the place they have. This answered a number of questions and presented a number of problems, to philosophers and logicians, and Arabic grammarians, especially at the Basra Grammar School, which accepted such an elementary conception of language,32 and to philosophers inspired by Hellenic traditions. As for the Arabic logicians, especially those from a later period, succeeding Ibn S¯ına,¯ they saw this issue and its clear solution as a necessary preposition for approaching logic in general. As much as logic was a preparation for approaching any other discipline, “Essay on Words”, as an introduction to logic, had the same role in the approach to logical theory. Therefore, it is not possible to find a single piece of writing on logic (unless it is a fragment of another text) that does not have this chapter as an introduction.33 How much attention was paid to this issue is shown by the fact that the 14th century was the time of the development of a special discipline called #ilm al-wad. # (science on terms) that aimed at defining the relation between form and language signs, especially general terms (species, genus, etc.) and their concrete syntactical functions.34 Even bal¯a˙ga (eloquence), as a philological discipline in the Oriental-Islamic concept, had sub-discipline ma#¯an¯ı whose main task was to “grant logicalness of speech.”35 The “Essay on Words” implied these fundamental conceptual assumptions, some of which were implicated and others explicated. Here are some of them: 1. Language is a system of signs which has not only a communicative function, but as it is the picture of reality which plays an active role in forming of our cognition of this reality, it also has a cognitive function. 2. Language and thought form unbreakable unity, therefore logical research can be based solely on the analysis of language that is a manifestation of thinking. Thinking is defined as unex- pressed speech, speech that flows within “mental words” (alfa¯z.

32 Compare: H. Corbin, Historija islamske filozofije…, p. 159 and on. 33 Compare the contents of writings in the field of logic by Bosniac authors presented in the 2nd chapter. 34 See: W. Ahlwardt, Verzeichniss der arabischen…, Bd. IV, pp. 534–538 and Ta¸sköprü- zade,¯ Mawd.¯u#¯at al-#ul¯um…, t. I, p. 169. 35 See: M. Kaya Bilgegil, Edebiyat bilgi ve teorileri, 1 Belâgat, Ankara, 1980,p.42. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 182.

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mutahayyila or gayr˙ lafz¯ı—verbum mentale), and speech, as ex- ¯ . pressed thought that flows within spoken, vocal words (lafz.¯ı— verbum vocale).36 3. Moreover, there is a resilient link between words and beings, which is seen from the approach to the issue of categories and its solution, that is linguistical-logical-ontological (“the utmost expressions on being”, “each word taken without link with other words means either substance or”).37 4. This generally presented relation of the resilient link between the object of thinking, thought and language (that sees the object of thinking and thought universal, and language (speech) as concrete, separate, therefore different), led Arabic logicians, as well as Aris- totle and his Greek followers, to the issue of meaning and the sense of words and sentences, leading to the following: a) Meaning is fixed to the word (in broader sense), organically connected as a sign and a bearer of meaning. b) In order for a word to be a sign, it has to be a sign of something, in other words there is no sign without meaning. c) A sign does not have to be an articulated voice, as man can speak in symbols or gestures and understand the “signs of nature” and the “signs understood by the intellect”, but the main subject of logical research that should result in a scientific method is only the “conventional spoken meaning” and the sign that belongs to it, i.e. conventional verbal sign. d) Having in mind all the deficiencies of language expressed above all in the manifold of relations between meaning and sense as the necessary assumption for research and expression of logical operations and science in general, there is the need to define the precise meaning of words and, especially, terms, which is the immediate task of the discipline “#ilm al- wad.#”. e) Every term of judgment is expressed by a word or a complex word—sentence (lafz. murakkab), but not every word or sentence has to express a term or judgment. Logic studies those words and sentences that express terms and judgments.

36 See: Логико-гносеологические…, especially chapter “Язык и логическое позна- ние”, pp. 178–191. 37 Aristotle, Categories…, 4. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 183.

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f) Truthfulness and falseness are characteristics of speech and thought, therefore the truthfulness of judgments and other logical forms can be confirmed by equalizing it with material reality, in existence or nonexistence of things of certain features. Yet another issue that should be mentioned in this context38 is the relation of Aristotelian logic and Arabic grammar and their mutual influences. Modern-age literature offers solutions to this problem that can be reduced into two theories. Firstly, leaning on the thesis that there are two mentalities, two cultures, two concepts of the world, and, eventually, two languages: Arabic—the language of The Qur"an, primarily linked to theology, and then to poetry, and Greek—the language of philosophy and logic, there was the theory that Greek logic and Arabic grammar are incompatible, and therefore could not possibly influence one another. A. Elamrani- Jamal offers an exceptional analysis of this issue, quoting E. Renan and his theory in Histoire générale et système comparé des langues sémitiques and Averroès et l’averroïsme39 as a typical representative of the “dogmatic” standpoint, that a priori discards the possibility of Greek influence. The negation of all influence whatsoever is also present in the writings of Arabic researchers, but they are, according to A. Elamrani—Jamal, based on the false definition of the problem or the confusion of the epistemological level of the problem with ideological and other levels.40 The other theory is based on the general standpoint that Greek science not only made great influence on the development of all disciplines in Arabic culture, but that Arabic philosophy consisted of nothing but the further development of Greek thought, and that, based on the lexical equivalence of Greek and Arabic grammar, that the first Arabic grammarians were indisputably influenced by Greek texts in logic and grammar. One of the supporters of this theory was A. Merx,

38 Literature that treats this issue, given in bibliography: I. Madkour (L’Organon d’Aristote…, and Man.tiq Aris.t¯uwaan-nahw. …); E. Renan (both texts); A. Merx, al-Ibra¯ˇs¯ı— at-. Taw. anis¯ ¯ı; A. Waf¯ ¯ı; R. Arnaldez (Grammaire…) and, especially, A. Elamrani—Jamal, Logique aristotélicienne et grammaire arabe, besides oﬀering an exceptional analysis of this issue and review of literature, it gives a number of related classical Arabic texts. Also interesting is the unpublished doctoral thesis by Husein Abdel Latif es-Seyyid, Muhamed Music´ “Allamek”…, especially pp. 9–23. 39 See: A. Elamrani—Jamal, Logique…, p. 9. 40 Ibid. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 184.

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the author of L’origine de la grammaire arabe and Historia artis grammaticae arabe apud Syros.41 Some authors developed this hypothesis further, to a degree which denied any aspect of originality and independence to Arabic grammar. Worth mentioning in this context is an interesting text by C.H.M. Versteegh titled Greek elements in Arabic linguistic thinking,42 where the author outlines a very precise historical boundaries, dividing the matter into two categories: calques and adaptations resulting from earlier “pre- Aristotelian” contact with the “living tradition” of Greek grammar and rhetoric and to calques and adaptations derived directly from the translations of the Aristotle’s works. A detailed analysis of this problem, or a dialogue with certain authors and their works, is not the intention here as it, and especially its scientific elaboration, goes beyond the topic set here. However, it is surprising how much this matter is affected by ideological bias or prejudice of any other nature (even in late 20th century literature). These texts may lead to a conclusion that a science, to be worthy the attention, has to necessarily be “purely Arab” or “purely Islamic”. Otherwise, if they are a product of acculturation, they are of no or very little value. J. Wansbrough, in the review of C.H.M. Versteegh’s book rightfully says: “Why any one of these (referring to: fiqh, tafs¯ır, falsafa, and kalam,¯ A.L.) must manifest a “purely Arab” science is, in the light of the social and intellectual history of the early Islamic community, quite beyond me, as is, indeed, the view that “borrowing” must be a symptom of cultural inferiority.”.43 In the end, it has to be noted that the standpoints of grammar schools of Basra and Kufa are often given among the arguments offered in the treatment of this matter, as standpoints that reflect two different outlooks and two opposing philosophical and linguistic concepts. Although the differences between them are often exceedingly accen- tuated, those interpretations rightfully point out that the Basra school defines the language as “a mirror that gives faithful reflection of objects,

41 Ibid. 42 See: C.H.M. Versteegh, Greek elements in Arabic linguistic thinking, Leiden, 1977, XI+243 pp. 43 Cf.: J. Wansbrough, “C.H.M. Versteegh: Greek elements in Arabic linguistic thinking. (Studies in Semitic Languages and Lingustics, VII) xi, 243 pp.+errata slip.” Leiden, 1977,in:Buletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,Vol.41,No2 (1978), pp. 372– 373. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 185.

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events and terms.”44 Proving the direct link between language and intellect, strengthened by antagonism to the Kufa School, grammarians in Basra tried to induct all the laws of language, and to bring them down to rational and logical categories and laws, and prove that there were no anomalies in language, but only rationally motivated aberrations.45 With these principals in mind, the grammarians of this school sometimes went to the extreme on some issues, such as searching for base words (asl). and defining severe paradigms for deduction. They labored to discard those forms from the spoken language that would not fit their structures. The question of consequences of this extreme severity, as it is not in the nature of language to remain closed within previously defined frames and paradigms, but to be eternally revitalized and refreshed as a part of life in general, remains open. Such an outlook on language was formed very early, even before the texts in logic by Arabic authors, so it is difficult to speak about the direct influence of these texts on Arabic grammarians. However, the influence of Aristotle’s On Interpretation (Peri Hermenéias, or, in ¯ Arabic, al-#Ibara)¯ on the creation of Arabic grammatical system, at least as inspiration for the first Arabic grammarians, is indisputable, especially its first four chapters.46 The importance of the roles played by Ibn al-Muqaffa# (died 757 or 759), a famous grammarian and convert from Zoroastrianism (Mazdaism), Hal¯ıl (died 791),47 and his student ¯ Sibawayh (died 786),48 in whose works Arabic grammar was given a form of completed system, is indisputable. The influence of logic on grammar became even more clear and evident in the later period. There was close cooperation between al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı and Ibn as-Sarra¯g,ˇ a grammarian.49 However, it does not mean that Arabic logicians did not comprehend the differences between logic and grammar. Al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı said: “Logic has a lot in common with grammar. However, they are different at the same time, as grammar gives the

44 H. Corbin, Historija islamske filozofije…, p. 160. 45 Ibid. 46 I. Madkour Bayyumi in his Man.tiq Arist¯u wa an-nahw. al-#arab¯ı gave an excellent analysis of this problem through a historical-comparative method and arguments proving the undeniable influence of Aristotle’s logic on Arabic grammar. 47 See: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,98–99 (100)andSI,159–160. 48 See: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,99–100 (101)andSI,160, 495. 49 See: H. Corbin, Historija islamske filozofije…, pp. 163–164. and C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,114 (112)andSI,174. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 186.

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rules of language expressions specific of one nation, while logic presents rules of expression in all languages.”50 Very vivid and developed language research activities in the first and the second century of Islam were brought on by immediate and practical motives linked to the studying the language of The Qur"an and its interpretation, therefore studying the language that was not only a communication instrument but an instrument of comprehension for the Book and addressing God. In other words, it was necessary to approach interpreting The Qur"an, to discover its “true sense”. Although interpretation of The Qur"an was at first seen as a dangerous activity one should avoid, objective ideological and political circumstances influenced the development of tafs¯ır (exegesis of The Qur"an) whose development and different lines of interpretation can be closely monitored.51 The development from the so called “mythological tafs¯ır”, whose object of attention were meaning and contents of stories and legends, often added on by interpreters’ imagination, through interpretation based in the so called “competent knowledge source” went through the lines of competent re-tellers, achieving developed philological method, as one of the most important methods of interpretation of The Qur"an. Ibn al-#Abbas¯ (died app. 686)52 is often seen as one of the founders of the philological method in tafs¯ır (exegesis of The Qur"an). He saw and used his knowledge of language and poetic skills, especially that of pre- Islamic Arabic poets, as very important elements of exegesis. However, this method reaches its full affirmation in at-. Tabar. ¯ı’s (838–923) Tafs¯ır al- Qur"¯an (Commentary of The Qur"an).53 His philological research, along with other methods used, offered not only exceptional grammatical discussions and invaluable lexical research sources, but also the development of a critical method, helped solve the phenomenon of understanding applicable in interpreting and comprehending texts in general.

50 Quoted from al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı’s Ihs. ¯a" al-#ul¯um,p.18; also see: М.М. Хайруллаев, Мировоз- зрение Фараби…, p. 281 and: H. Corbin, Historija islamske filozofije…, p. 164. 51 See: I. Goldziher, Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung, Leiden, 1952,pp.155– 289. Parts of this book relating to the development of exegesis and different interpretations are given in translation to Bosnian in: N. Smailagic,´ Uvod u Kur"an,Zagreb,1975, pp. 135–183. 52 #Abdullah¯ b. al-#Abbas,¯ see: Encyclopaedia of Islam…, and I. Goldziher, Die Richtungen …, p. 160 and on. 53 Muhammad. b. Garˇ ¯ır at-. Tabar. ¯ı, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,GI,142, 184, 189 and S I, 789, as well as: I. Goldziher, Die Richtungen…,in:N.Smailagic,´ Uvod u Kur"an …, pp. 141–143. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 187.

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In a later stage of development, along with two developed methods: one based on the traditional chain of re-tellers leading to the earliest reliable sources (people), and the other, philological (that included phonetic, grammatical-morphological, syntactical-lexical, as well as semantic analysis), interpreting and commenting on The Qur"an would be done with auxiliary disciplines. One of such disciplines was logic, as a number of texts required fulfilling the condition of “reasonableness”. This would result in a flood of commentaries (ˇsarh),. super-commentaries and marginalia (h.a¯ˇsiya). Muhammad. b. Mus¯ a¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı #Allamak¯ was one of the Bosniac authors active in writing commentaries and the application of philological method.54 Having in mind the facts presented, especially the chronological dimension of this issue, it could be said that grammar had more influence on theology than philosophy, or even logic, have had, in terms of its corpus and its research. Another point that can help us comprehend the relations between the logical concept and philosophy and other disciplines, is deductivism. Philosophy and other disciplines benefited from logic’s demonstrative method grounded in two significant facts: position of premisses and deduction of conclusions, and clear formal conditions that granted demonstrative and scientific cognition. Applying this general cognitive methodological theory in the Arabic world relatively quickly led to religious doctrinaire disciplines, such as speculative theology (kalam),¯ whose main task was to defend the Islamic beliefs from “negations”, proving dogmas through rational argumentation, and jurisprudence (fiqh), which systematized the principles of religious, moral and social life, its foundation (us.ul¯ al-fiqh) and legal practice (furu¯# al-fiqh). Understandably, their development was conditioned and accelerated by political disputes that were often manifested in religious expressions. This historical context is very important for comprehending basic standpoints and theses of both disciplines. However, here we shall discuss only methodological characteristics of these disciplines, leaving out the historical contexts.55

54 A large part of the opus of Muhammad. b. Mus¯ aal-Bosnaw¯ ¯ı #Allamak¯ was devoted to exegesis of The Qur"an. He wrote six longer and shorter texts, commentaries, super- commentaries and marginalia, and used his exceptional methodology in the ﬁeld of syntax, rhetoric, speculative theology and logic. See: Husein Abdel Latif es-Sayyid, Muhamed Music´ “Allamek”…, and footnote nr. 15 in the 2nd chapter. 55 For more on socio-historical conditions and theoretical grounds of kal¯am see: L. Gardet et G.C. Anawati, Introduction à la théologie musulmane. Essai de théologie comparée. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 188.

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As early as the beginning of the 10th century, the works by Abu¯ Hasan. al-Aˇs#ar¯ı56 presented kal¯am in a form of systems and methods that caused a breach between the simple credo and its scientific grounds. This does not mean that acceptance of this new discipline, and especially its method originating from a dispute with a similar method Mu#tazilites,57 went by without arguments with old opinions, and later rigid conser- vativism. Clashes and heated discussions would be more or less prominent, but always present, in the whole history of this discipline. How- ever, religious pragmatism and official theological dogmas found more support in the discipline that used dialectical methods, however “foreign” they might be, than theological liberalism or theological viewpoints or irrationalistic schools. In addition to this, al-Aˇs#ar¯ı, showing understanding for principles supported by the schools established at that time, succeeded to, according to L. Gardet and G.C. Anawati, “preserve some form of autonomy in relation to the various contemporary legal schools in order to make all of those schools believe that he actually belonged to them.”58 As al-Aˇs#ar¯ı is considered the father of the method of speculative theology, and as his work al-Ib¯ana #an us.¯ul ad-diy¯ana (Unraveling the Founda- tions of Religion)59 presented foundations for all succeeding discussions in this discipline, including those written by Bosniac authors, we shall briefly discuss methodological characteristics of this work. Al-Aˇs#ar¯ı built his argument in the way which later became one of the scholastic methods, offering his opponents (above all Mu#tazilites) a chance to ask him questions in order to get a position of legitimate defense (it should be kept in mind that kal¯am is primarily apologetic in character). Then, he briefly presented the viewpoints of his opponents on certain issues, eventually, to refute them and present his own proofs, using different argumentation procedures (division, classification, definition, syllogism, referring to religious authorities—argumentum ad

IIème éd., Paris, 1970, especially pp. 21–78. Translated into Bosnian in: N. Smailagic,´ Klasicnaˇ kultura…, pp. 134–176. 56 Ibid, pp. 155–161. 57 Followers of the school of speculative theology Mu#tazila who were the first to deal with speculative issues and connected the dogma of Islam with dialectical methods. For more see footnote nr. 48,pp.150–155,and:H.Corbin,Historija islamske filozofije…, pp. 121–128. 58 Ibid, p. 157. 59 Al-Aˇs#ar¯ı(Abual-¯ Hasan),. al-Ib¯ana #an us.¯ul ad-diy¯ana,al-Qahira¯ (Masr),. 1348/1929– 1930. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 189.

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verecundiam etc.). His apologetics are characterized by a very successful analysis of words and their meanings and the frequent presentation of a large number of proofs (up to ten) for some of the theses. Interest- ingly, he introduced the expression: “If it is said…, then we say…” (fa in q¯ıla…, qultu (qulna)…),¯ which later became a form through which Islamic scholastic diffused and refuted all possible consequences of previously posed questions and their answers. Josef van Ess identified this method as originally Greek, as well as the term kal¯am. In his previously quoted text, “The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology”, he says: “Muslim theology; as a matter of fact, those stereotype phrases mentioned above as common to nearly all kalam¯ literature, have been retraced to Greek origin… as the word kalam¯ itself indubitably is derived from the Greek δια"λεις by the Church Fathers.”60 Later theologians, especially al-Gaz˙ al¯ ¯ı and ar-Raz¯ ¯ı, further developed this technique. Al-Gaz˙ al¯ ¯ı is considered the greatest dialectician of the overall Arabic tradition,61 while ar-Raz¯ ¯ı’s theological writings contain multiple arguments introduced by al-Aˇs#ar¯ı.62 The writings by these two and some of the later authors, taking over previous positive experiences, increased the number of proofs reached by methods of logic and other disciplines, and a number of logical terms, and even some logical laws, became their inseparable part. Ibn Haldun¯ (1332–1406)in ¯ his Muqaddima stated that at that time it was sometimes difficult to separate writings in speculative theology from those in logic, and to decide whichfieldtheybelongedto.63 These are important features of the writings in this field and were burning issues at the time when the authors who are the subject of this paper were active, and when works, such as al-Maw¯aqif f¯ı #ilm al-kal¯am by al-I¯gˇ¯ıandTahd¯ıb al-mantiqwaal-kal¯am by ¯ . at-Taftaz¯ an¯ ¯ı were being written.64 Logic did not have strong influence only on Ash#arite theological schools, but on others as well. Its influence is evident in the teachings of Mu#tazilites, although their method focused more on grammatical analysis, while dialectics, especially during the 8th and early 9th century,

60 In: Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, Edited by G.E. von Grunebaum, Otto Harras- sowitz, Wiesbaden, 1970,p.24. 61 See: I. Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote…, p. 254 and pp. 262–263. 62 Ibid, pp. 254–255. Also see: ar-Raz¯ ¯ı(Fahrudd¯ın), Muhassal afk¯ar al-mutaqaddim¯ın wa ¯ . .. al-muta"ahhir¯ın min al-fal¯asifa wa al-mutakallam¯ın,al-Qahira,¯ 1323/1905. 63 Ibn¯¯Haldun,¯ Muqaddima,Misr (Kairo), s.a., pp. 466–467. ¯ . 64 H. Inaldzik,ˇ Osmansko Carstvo…, p. 240. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 190.

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had more oratorical and rhetorical character.65 In his texts of religious polemical character, Ibn Hazm. (994–1064), a poly-historian, theologian and lawyer of Cordoba, regularly used already formulated logical rules that he accepted as an exceptional dialectical method.66 Law (fiqh) was another field under the indisputable influence of logic. Truthfully, theology and law were so deeply interwoven in Islam that they were not treated as separate disciplines. However, the dynamic development of the Arabic society necessitated the faster development of law: both in terms of theory and judicial practice. It is hard even to list all purely logical elements (from the theory of the universal to the use of syllogism and other forms of indirect and direct reasoning) applied in legal theory and practice.67 This can be illustrated by two ˙ treatises by al-Gazal¯ ¯ı: Mihakk. an-nazar. (Stone of Temptation for Spec- ulation) and Mi#y¯ar al-#ilm (The Measurement of Science), where he, presenting the rules of logic, gave examples in laws and tried to present to what degree it was possible to apply logic in laws.68 This is why the introduction of his work in law, al-Mustasf. ¯a (Selection) has a compendium of logic as a foreword. Eventually, it should be pointed out that later works in law focused on the syllogistic method (qiyas)—in¯ its short form, lawyers saw syllogism as analogy—and searching and finding the “cause” (#illa). Logic offered its results to other disciplines as well, but those disciplines that were not closely linked to the elementary goals and interests of the society, especially in the period we have focused on here, the time when the Ottoman Empire was threatened militarily, politicaly and ide- ologicaly, thus falling into a severe crisis.69 These disciplines were being neglected, and the scholars focused more on the didactical needs that required collecting, processing and commenting on resources, than on research in new directions. This was further contributed to by the edu-

65 See footnote nr. 50. 66 See: R. Arnaldez, Grammaire et théologie chez Ibn Hazm. de Cordoue…, especially chapter poglavlje “La logique…”, pp. 105–194 and “La dialectique…”, pp. 195–216. 67 See: J. Schacht, “Fikh”,. in: Encyclopaedia of Islam… 68 See: I. Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote…, p. 263. 69 The crisis that the Ottoman Empire was under was the subject of the writings of some Bosniac authors, especially Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, who wrote on stagnation of science and technology (see: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, Izabrani spisi…, pp. 41–43 and 91–112). This was also pointed out by Muhammad. b. Mus¯ aal-Bosnaw¯ ¯ı "Allamak¯ (see: H. Sabanoviˇ c,´ Knjizevnostˇ …, pp. 136–137)andMus.taf. aY¯ uy¯ oAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ (see: Ibrahim Opijac,ˇ Ris¯ala f¯ıman¯aqib…, (based on the edition by O. Muˇsic)),´ pp. 42–43. 2008062. Ljubovic. 05_Chapter5. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 191.

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cational system that was focused explicitly on interpreting and teaching “readymade truths”, which reﬂected in petrifying of a range of disciplines in education, the only institution where science found some modest space. 2008062. Ljubovic. 06_Conclusion. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 192. 2008062. Ljubovic. 06_Conclusion. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 193.

CONCLUSION

From its beginning to the era of modern logic, the history of logic has always been the best indicator of the eternal scientific value and significance of Aristotle’s Organon, a “tool” without which today it is impossible to imagine the further development of philosophy, science and civilization in general. On the other hand, it is also an indicator of how firm the foundations of Organon are, despite its evident deficiencies that Aristotle himself was aware of. In spite of all the criticism by the new non-Aristotelian system of logic, Aristotle’s “analytic” has not lost its basic practical and scientific value. The reception of Aristotle’s Organon among Arabs was an impetus for the development of philosophy and science, but, as Windelband says, this meant that “the Greek culture came out from its national closure and stepped into the great collective movement by which the peoples of the Old Age, inhabiting the coasts of the Mediterranean Sea, exchanging and uniforming their ideas, was transformed into a reciprocal spiritual life.” The history of logic acknowledges the main timeframe of its so called “Arabic period” from the first translations of Aristotle’s works into Ara- bic to when European philosophers and logicians (1150–1250) became familiar with the works of al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı, Ibn-S¯ına¯ (Avicenna) and Ibn-Ruˇsd (Averroës) and with, until then, unknown to Aristotle’s works—“Logica nova” (The New Logic). The contribution and the importance of Ara- bic logic is great, not only for its part in “keeping from sinking into oblivion” and its role as a “transmitter”, but also for its thought pro- voking commentaries and interpretations of Aristotle’s works and the works of other thinkers, as well as elaborating, completing and incor- porating into the logical opus a number of extra-Aristotelian topics, the creation of logical terminology, etc., which left a deep and lasting trace in the medieval Western European, Renaissance, and even later philosophy. On top of that, there are the works of the most important Ara- bic philosophers and logicians inspired by Hellenism, characterized by strong rationalistic tendencies in a broader sense. Their psychology was characterized by an inclination for the empiric (rational empiricism), in which the experiment, as one of the basic methods of research, plays 2008062. Ljubovic. 06_Conclusion. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 194.

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a special part. All that inspired R. Bacon (1214–1294), an admirer of empiricism, to say in his review of the history of philosophy (Opus Majus) that Avicenna was “dux et princeps philosophiae”;1 and the strong naturalistic and rationalistic traits inspired Engels to point out “… while among the Latins a cheerful spirit of free thought, taken over from the Arabs and nourished by the newly-discovered Greek philosophy, took root more and more and prepared the way for the materialism of the eighteenth century”2 in his Dialectics of Nature, seeing the 18th century as “the greatest progressive movement experienced by the mankind by then”. The period beginning from the late 13th or early 14th century is often seen by historians of Arabic philosophy as a period of decadence, when philosophy in general lost its value and the continuity of philosophical thinking began to weaken. In scientific literature, this evaluation of the state of philosophy is commonly referred to logic as well, which was allegedly in its final phase at that time, a phase of decay in which it faded away as a discipline. However, in spite of the fact that the Arabic Aristotelianism, “whose naturalistic consequences at the beginning seemed to try to strengthen the rationalistic spirit to a victorious unruliness”,3 did not fulfill its expectations, it came up with a form of survival within the realm of thought, within the science of shapes and the laws of reasoning and the method of scientific cognition. In addition to that, although belonging to the circle of so called “foreign sciences” which were seen as outside the scope of the “Islamic sciences” by their origin, subjects and methods and disciplines which were exposed to attacks from conservative circles that feared for the religious discipline, logic managed to keep its place within the system of oriental sciences and preserved its autonomy. Even at the time when the creativeness of the classical Arabic period was inherited by the nations of Ottoman Empire and on new territory, logic was in a similar situation. The beginning of the 16th century, when the first Bosniac authors came onto the scene, was a very difficult period, but the logicians still persisted in their attitude that it was a discipline which explained the skill of reasoning and

1 The “Opus Majus” of Roger Bacon, Vol. III: Fratris Rogeri Bacon, Ordinis mino- rom—Opus Majus. Pars prima—Capitulum VI, p. 14,Oxford,1900. (Reprint: Elibon Cllasic) 2 Fridrih Engels, Dialectics of Nature. Introduction [Friedrich Engels, Dialektik der Na- tur. Einleitung], Prosveta—BIGZ, Beograd, 1978,p.10. 3 Wilhelm Windelband, Povijest ﬁlozoﬁje,I,p.360. 2008062. Ljubovic. 06_Conclusion. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 195.

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research and provided techniques of scientific thinking to other fields of science and even theology, thus, was a tool of any scientific work and scientific thought in general. And this was the fact that awarded logic with a place as a universal educational subject. For a number of scholars, especially those who were inclined to rationalism, it became a subject of special interest and studies and almost the only area of activity. The period from the beginning of the 16th century, when the activity of the Bosniacs started in various spheres of spiritual creativity, till the end of the 19th century, was abundant in authors who left behind a vast number of texts in logic, with a variety of subjects and forms. This proves that logic was not a marginal discipline, and that it was, by no means, in “the phase of decay and fading away”, and demands an explanation of its existence, contents and sources. After having collected the general resources, such as the bibliographical data and the texts, as well as the works in logic that Bosniac authors had written commentaries and marginalia on, the first objective of the author of this book was to verify and select authors, followed by the historical identification of authors, authentication of selected texts and proving the connection that linked those logicians to the great names of the Arabic philosophy and logic, and through them, to Aristotle. The primary criteria for the selection of authors were reliable resources and literature for a complete historical identification of the authors and the authentication of the works. On the other hand, the selected authors should have left behind works with visible traces in textbooks or commentaries, available in more than one copy. This selection singled out four authors: Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar. ¯ı(Ha- san Kafija Pruˇscak,ˇ 1544–1615), the author of the extremely successful K¯af¯ı’s Compendium of Logic (Muhtasar al-Kaf¯ ¯ı min al-mantiq) and ACom- ¯ . . mentary on “K¯af¯ı’s Compendium of Logic” (Sarˇ hMuhtasar al-Kaf¯ ¯ı min al- . ¯. . mantiq);. Muhammad. ibn Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı (Muhamed son of Musa Boˇsnjak), in sources and literature known as #Allamak¯ and the patronymic Music(´ 1595–1636), the author of A Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” (Sarˇ har-Ris. ala¯ aˇs-ˇsamsiyya); Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı (Mustafa Ejubovic,´ 1651–1707), known as Sayˇ hYuy¯ o¯ in his hometown, ¯ Mostar, the author of four works in logic: widely popular Commentary on “Isagogue” (Sarˇ har-Risala¯ al-At¯ıriyya f¯ıal-mantiq—ˇsarh Is¯ a¯g˙u¯gˇ¯ı), The . ¯ . . Useful Marginalia to “Al-Fan¯ar¯ı’s Remarks” (H. a¯ˇsiya muf¯ıdalial-Fawa¯"id al- Fanariyya¯ #alaar-Ris¯ ala¯ f¯ıal-mantiq),. the exceptional New Commentary on “The Sun Treatise” (aˇs-Sarˇ hal-. gadˇ ¯ıd #alaa¯ ˇs-ˇsamsiyya f¯ıal-mantiq). and 2008062. Ljubovic. 06_Conclusion. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 196.

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A Commentary on “The Training in Logic and Apologetic” (Sarˇ h #alaTah¯ d¯ıb . ¯ al-mantiq. wa al-kalam),¯ and his later epigone, Muhammad. al-Caynawˇ ¯ı (Muhamed from Cajniˇ ce,ˇ Cajniˇ canin,ˇ 1731–1792), the author of Reve- lation of the Secrets for Commenting on “Isagogue” (Fath. al-asrar¯ f¯ı ˇsarhal-. Is¯ a¯g˙u¯gˇ¯ı). All these works can be found in manuscripts—some in autographs, and some in several copies. However, only one of them (A Commentary on “Isagogue”) was printed, as late as two hundred years after it was written. Researching the collections of Oriental manuscripts kept in Bosnia and Herzegovina and abroad, the author of this book discovered a number of authors of shorter papers, excerpts from individual works, mnemonic aids, etc., and a number of names of teachers and transcribers of numerous papers in the field of logic. Although it was impossible to find reliable information on most of them, in order to show to what extent these and other texts in logic were clearly profiled in both contents and form, three of them are included in this work: Ibra¯h.¯ım b. Ramad.an¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı (Ibrahim Boˇsnjak, son of Ramadan, 17th century), Fa¯dil. Uziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı (Fadil from Uzice,ˇ Uziˇ canin,ˇ 17th century) and Muhammad. b. Yusuf¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı (Muhamed Boˇsnjak, son of Jusuf, early 19th century). The examined material shows that the works of the authors worthy of our attention were written according to the tradition dating from early 14th century. The main characteristic of the papers from that tradition is that in them controversy was surmounted and the dis- agreement between “the Western” or the Baghdad school of logic, of al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı and his followers, and “the Eastern”, Ibn S¯ına’s¯ and his students, and the results from both the sources were freely used. In other words, this meant accepting Ibn S¯ına’s¯ demand to stop the practice of commenting on Aristotle’s texts and to draw attention to the very subject of logic, which was supposed to eventually result in a work in logic that encompasses the whole material of logic and that is as such self-sufficient. However, the tradition of commenting and interpreting cherished by the Baghdad school, continued to thrive, one would say even more intensely than before. The axis of those commentaries were no longer Aristotle’s texts (neither in parts nor as a whole), and the practice of writing texts dealing with the individual areas of logic or commenting on only one or only several of the key issues was aban- doned. Consequently, various parts of logic were not viewed as separate entities that are based on their own canons, but as parts that constituted a complex but a concrete unity within the architectonics of logic. 2008062. Ljubovic. 06_Conclusion. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 197.

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Reconstructing the main link of direct and indirect relations teacher— student was possible on the basis of data found in the biographies and autobiographies of some authors, as well as on the data found in their works in logic. This link connected the first Bosniac logicians to the most creative and the most authoritative Arabic logicians: al- Fanar¯ ¯ı(1350–1431), al-Gurˇ gˇan¯ ¯ı(1340–1431), ar-Raz¯ ¯ı(1149–1209), Ibn S¯ına(¯ 980–1037) and al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı(870–950). The form of the works in logic was that of textbooks, compendia, commentaries and marginalia, which were characteristic not only of Arabic but also of European logic throughout all the Middle Ages and even later. Such an orientation was conditioned by a range of factors, from the very characteristics of logic itself to the practical needs of educational nature. Besides, in comparison with the Western tradition, the belief of the Arabic authors in the solidness and the perfection of the logical system was by far deeper. Therefore, the logic texts in Arabic, especially those from later times, contain no attempts of serious criticism of Aristotelian logic, except for a few that are generally negative concerning logic itself and its validity. The textbooks and compendia were a result of the endeavors to present the basic material of logic in a coherent, methodical and acceptable way, both to students and for the needs of the author himself. The success was reflected just in the realization of such needs. On the other hand, the commentaries and marginalia aimed to improve the system through more successful interpretations of defined discoveries, the endeavor to systematize and classify the material. Besides the evident differences in comprehensiveness of their studies, both in width and depth, the texts in logic written by Bosniac authors (except for two marginalia (glossariums) which are of a so-called con- textual type and a specific character), had a common characteristic— they were written with the aim to include the main theories of logic or all parts of the logical organon, as observed by the classical Ara- bic Aristotelianism. In this tradition, Bosniac authors defined logic as an “instrument”, “canonic”, “criterion of science” and as a “universal propedeutics”, but they did not deny that it was a part of philosophy. Uniting the teachings and classification of philosophy offered by Plato’s Academy with Aristotelian systems and views of the Stoics and Peri- patetic, the logicians of the Arabic school created a kind of syncretism that is not a result of a non-critical linking of definite logic from various systems, but instead of the efforts to grant logic a place in any classification of disciplines. According to this classification, logic is, therefore, 2008062. Ljubovic. 06_Conclusion. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 198.

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a precondition of any kind of thinking, and its direct task is “to give an analysis of the knowledge of objective reality through the analysis of language”, achieving a scientific method of knowledge that will be fully reliable and irrefutable. Such an aim, whose continuity in the history of logic can be traced back to its founder, Aristotle, to the contemporary logicians, contradicted the growing gnoseological mysticism, nihilism and relativism. The research proved not only the acceptance of the basic aim of logic from the time of Aristotle till today, but also the acceptance of the elements of his system, his way of elaboration and his answers to the main logical issues (theory of basic subjective and reflective decrees, theories of meaning and understanding of the truth, the teaching of logical forms of thinking, the theory of the scientific method of thinking— syllogistics, of the scientific and nonscientific proving, etc.). It is difficult to present these works with a unique structure in the sense of composition, as these writings are of different types. Never- theless, it is evident that there is a unique, general subject matter and aim towards the solution of the elementary issues of logic. After an introduction, the issues are usually classified according to the following traditional logical questions: 1. On words—terms, 2. On the universal, 3. On definition and description, 4. On judgment and immediate forms of reasoning, 5. On syllogism (its figures and modes) and other forms of indirect reasoning (analogy and induction): a) apodictical syllogism, b) dialectical syllogism, c) rhetorical syllogism, d) poetical syllogism, e) sophistical syllogism. Therefore, the center of research is the theory of syllogism, a form of deductive reasoning, the only one of its kind that gives a “reliable method” in search for scientific, trustworthy and indisputable knowledge. All other issues studied in these papers are treated either as preconditions of a better understanding of a syllogism, its structure, absoluteness, unavoidability and generality, or as its application in apodictic that is opposed to other forms of thinking and knowledge that are, more or less, probable, illusory, wrong or false. 2008062. Ljubovic. 06_Conclusion. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 199.

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The study also showed that, in light of most issues treated here, most of the logicians are in agreement to a certain extent, although there were some initial differences in understanding and explanations of some logical issues in the very beginning of the development of logic in Arabs. Certain “extra-Aristotelian” topics, treated in a narrower or broader way, such as the elaboration of singular judgments in the man- ner of stoics, the development of conditional (conjunctive and disjunctive) judgments, the elaboration of the 4th syllogistic figure, the indication of a possibility of predicate quantification, the presentation of some laws of judgment, etc. Some of these, indicated by the Megara and stoic school philosophers, are only a confirmation of that continuity. All of this shows clearly that history of logic in its “Arab period” (including also the “Ottoman period”) or more exactly logic of the Arabic idiom, can righteously be regarded as its post-Hellenistic period. Although the presentation of some of the material in this book anticipates some of the conclusions regarding validating the texts by Bosniac authors, it need be said that, according to the analysis and comparison of the vast number of texts included in this study, that the work of Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. sar. ¯ı is the most prominent among the works of the textbook character. This is especially so in the case of K¯af¯ı’s Com- pendium of Logic, a typical textbook by form and contents, where interpretations, answers to the most important questions and basic definitions are given in a very condense, but logical and systematical way. There is also the textbook titled Commentary on “Isagogue” by Mus.taf. a¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı. Among the commentaries, The New Commen- tary on “The Sun Treatise” by Mus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ıisspecific for its comprehensiveness, its systems, its excellent linking of the basic text and literature with the author’s own opinions and views. However, as logic was reduced to the narrow frame of educational needs and, on the other hand, as philosophy itself was put within a narrow space— except for a few cases when some philosophers, although of limited capacities, turned themselves to actual social, economical, intellectual and moral problems, having thus a connection with a real social and political life—those texts in logic were similarly far from the milieu in which they appeared, from its problems which needed solving. Foreign vocabulary and terminology contributed even more to the discipline being understood only by highly educated individuals, and inaccessible to a broader public. This book also tries to show the evidence of influences that logic had on theology and laws, as well as on grammar and vice versa. 2008062. Ljubovic. 06_Conclusion. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 200.

200 conclusion

Because these influences were founded in an early period, the period of codification and creation of those disciplines, they cannot be considered new in the context of the period treated here. The analysis and comparison of those texts with the texts in logic written in Western Europe from the reception of the whole Aristotle’s Organon (1150–1250) till the occurrence of modern logic, or more precisely, that part of the European tradition in logic which was dominated by Aristotle’s formal logic and was a basic and dominating contents of the books of logic, realizing identity or similarity (of the problems dealt with and the solutions given) and differences (interventions, vocabulary, etc.) among them undoubtedly showed that it was a matter of a unique history of logic in two parallel courses or two idioms, two cultural and civilization circles. One was created in Arabic and within the Arabic Islamic spiritual and cultural tradition and the other, written mostly in Latin (later in national languages) and within the circles of the West European philosophical tradition. Both those languages, Latin and Arabic, were regarded as universal to their civilization circle for the scientific thinking of that period. To illustrate the above, there are writings of two Croat Latinists, Andrija Kaciˇ cMio´ ˇsic’s´ (1704–1760) Elementa Peripathetica Iuxta Mentem Joannis Duns Scotii and Filip Laˇstric’s´ (1700–1783—from Ocevljeˇ near Breza) Traditiones in Universum Aristotelico-Scoticam Philosophiam who lived and worked at the same time and on the same territory as the Bosniac authors discussed here. The construction of these works in logic, their organization, sequence and the scope of problems in those texts are very similar, and sometimes almost identical to the works by Bosniac authors. The passages in which the authors give definitions or answers to some crucial questions are incredibly similar, one in Arabic in Gazi Husrev-bey’s Medresa in Sarajevo, and the other, in Latin, in the Fran- ciscan Monastery in Kraljeva Sutjeska. Some essential differences in the development of those two schools began to take place only in the later phase. The one in Arabic, even besides the excellent results offered by the great Arabic philosophers and logicians, good predispositions such as clear thinking and expression and, finally, talents with undoubted speculative-research abilities which, from time to time appeared, such as Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ıandMus.taf. aAyy¯ ub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, forever stayed within the framework of a “completed and perfect” system of logic. In the West, logic, as well as the entire philosophy, helped by events such as Humanism and Renaissance, succeeded in getting out of the domain of religious pragmatism, and with the final 2008062. Ljubovic. 06_Conclusion. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 201.

conclusion 201

affirmation of nominalism and empiricism, the threshold that Arabic logicians had reached long ago, improving formal logic and methodology, found new ways of development of sciences. And finally, with an outlook of the goal of this book, which is to present the works by Bosniacs in the field of logic in Arabic, it is important to say that the history of logic is a perfect indicator of the quality and greatness of the contribution of Bosniacs in spreading and developing philosophical thinking. It also shows how much the territory of this country is unique in Europe for its development, are the diversity of sources and experiences. Therefore it is a point of meeting and coexistence of different social, philosophical and theological doctrines and traditions. 2008062. Ljubovic. 07_Glossary. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 202. 2008062. Ljubovic. 07_Glossary. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 203.

GLOSSARY OF LOGICAL TERMINOLOGY

The glossary of Arabic terminology in the field of logic given here includes all the terms encountered in the works by Bosniac authors and texts used as sources. As most of these terms are focused on in this book (in sense of their etymology, context, their exact place in manuscripts, etc., especially in Chapter 3), this glossary contains only their basic meanings. A significant number of included terms have different meanings, either in everyday speech, or in other disciplines, or even in other parts of philosophy. As the goal here was precise information and possible practical use, the glossary gives only their meanings related to the subject of the book, avoiding (wherever possible) the presentation of an array of different meanings, and the confusion that it may cause. The main objective of this dictionary is to offer translations of the logical vocabulary to Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian for future researchers and readers from the South-Slavic region. Translation of some of the words into the English language was aggravated by the fact that the numerous sources, especially from Anglo-Saxon coun- tries, offers different (sometimes contradictory) translations of the same terms, and try to squeeze them in the European scheme of terminology. Therefore, certain terms are translated literally, for the readers to interpret and understand them in the given context. The order in which they are listed is based on the principle of etymology and semantics (although the glossary itself is not), i.e. sorting Arabic base words in alphabetical order, to be further divided in several terms according to the level of their derivation. The terms that are of Greek origin are also placed alphabetically. This principle shows the base word and basic idea each term emerged from, especially when there are several terms based on the same idea. Besides the source texts, this glossary is based on dictionaries listed in the bibliography, and especially: A.-M. Goichon, Vocabulaires comparés d’Aristote et d’Ibn S¯ın¯a; the dictionary by a group of authors Al-Mu#gamˇ al- falsaf¯ı; Ibn S¯ına,¯ Kit¯ab al-hud. ¯ud (Book of Definitions); al-Gurˇ gˇan¯ ¯ı, Ta #r¯ıf¯at (Definitions) and for the Bosnian version, Filozofski rjecnikˇ (Dictionary of 2008062. Ljubovic. 07_Glossary. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 204.

204 glossary of logical terminology

Philosophical Terminology) by a group of authors edited by Vladimir Filipovic.´ Of course, some of the books and papers quoted in the bibliography oﬀer useful and instructive glossaries of terminology.1

" √ √"dw ad¯a(t),pl.adaw¯at,particle. √"dy ta"diya, induction. Often: istiqr¯a" (see). "hr muta"ahhir¯un,(1) subsequent scholars. The word that Ibn S¯ınauses¯ ¯ ¯¯ to denote Alexander of Aphrodisias (fa¯dil. al-muta"ahhir¯ın) ad their contemporaries. (2) In later texts this term denotes the¯ ¯ logicians who were active after Ibn S¯ına(af¯ dal al-muta"ahhir¯ın). . ¯ ¯ us√.tuquss, element (Greek term in Arabic transcription). Often: #unsur. (see). √"sl. asl. , principle; base; beginning (see mabda"). " " " √ lf mu allaf, complex. Alf¯azmu. allaf¯at, complex words (see murakkab). "n in, if (conditional). Burh¯an iniyy (or burh¯an al-in), conditional argumen- √ tation. "wl ¯ala, tools, instrument, organ. #Ilm al-¯ala (or #ilm ¯al¯ı), instrumental discipline, another name of logic (see man.tiq). – awwaliyy¯at, primary knowledge; ﬁrst principles; axioms. √Is¯ ¯a˙g¯ugˇ¯ı,(1) introduction; (2) “Isagogue” (Porphyry’s). "yn ayna, where?; place (category, also: mak¯an, see).

b √ bh.t baht, research; discussion. #Ilm ¯ad¯ab al-bahtwaal-mun¯azara, science on ¯ .¯ .¯ . √ the rules of research and discussion. √bd" mabda",pl.mab¯adi", principle; axiom; starting point. brhn burh¯an, proof, demonstration, argumentation; apodictic, scientiﬁc proof. Burh¯an iniyy (burh¯an al-in) conditional argumentation; burh¯an limiyy (burhan¯ al-lima), causal argumentation (in literature and sources often as inniyy and limmiyy). √– burh¯an¯ı, demonstrative; apodictic. √bst. bas¯ı.t, simple. Opposite: murakkab and mu"allaf (see), complex. btl. ib.t¯al, annulment, abrogation. In theology: reductio ad absurdum √ (reduction leading to absurd), in logic: qiy¯as al-hulf (see). ¯ b#d. ba#d.,part,several. √– ba#d.¯ı, partial, particular. Often: guzˇ "¯ı (see). byn mutab¯ayin,diﬀerent; opposite. – mutab¯ayin¯an, two unconformable, opposite (terms).

1 See here “Sources and Literature”. 2008062. Ljubovic. 07_Glossary. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 205.

glossary of logical terminology 205

t √ tly t¯al(in), consequence. Opposite: muqaddam (see), antecedence. t¯uf¯ıq¯a, “Topics” (Aristotle’s work).

t √ ¯ √tbt itb¯at,affirmation. Often: ¯ıg˘¯ab (see). ¯tlt tul¯ ¯at¯ı, triple, tripartite. Qadiyya tul¯atiyya, tripartite judgment (with ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯ √ subject, predicate and copula), see qadiyya. . tny tun¯a"¯ı, dual, bipartite. Qadiyya tun¯a"iyya, bipartite judgment, see ¯ ¯ . ¯ qadiyya. . – istitn¯a", exclusion, separation, partition. – isti¯tn¯a"¯ı: Qiy¯as istitn¯a"¯ı, separated syllogism, see qiy¯as. ¯ ¯ gˇ √ gdlˇ gadalˇ ,(1) dialectics; (2) “Topics” (Aristotle’s work). √– gadalˇ ¯ı, dialectical; qiy¯as gadalˇ ¯ı, rhetorical syllogism. grbˇ mugarrabˇ ¯at, experience based knowledge; experiment based √ conviction (type yaq¯ıniyy¯at, see). grdˇ tagrˇ ¯ıd, abstraction (action). – mugarradˇ , abstract (result of abstraction); abstract (not concrete); √ notion. gzˇ " guzˇ ", part, component. – guzˇ "¯ı, particular; individual. Qadiyya. guzˇ "iyya, particular judgment (proposition); qadiyya. guzˇ "iyya m¯ugibaˇ (s¯aliba),particularaffirmative √ (negative) judgment (proposition), see qadiyya. . √gzmˇ gˇ¯azim, decisive, final. Qawl gˇ¯azim, statement; judgment, proposition. √gsmˇ gismˇ , body, corpus. gnsˇ ginsˇ , genus. Ginsˇ al-agnˇ ¯as, summum genus; ginsˇ s¯afil, genus minor; ginsˇ .tab¯ı#¯ı, gender (genus naturale); ginsˇ #aql¯ı, intellectual, psychological genus (genus mentale); ginsˇ #¯al¯ı, genus major (higher); ginsˇ qar¯ıb,closer genus (genus proximum); ginsˇ man.tiq¯ı, logical genus; ginsˇ mutawassi.t, medium (middle) genus. √– ginsˇ ¯ı, of genus. √ghlˇ maghˇ ¯ul, unknown; the unknown. gwzˇ magˇ¯az, metaphorical, figurative (term, meaning); metaphor. √– magˇ¯az¯ı,metaphorical. gwhrˇ gawharˇ , substance. Al-gawharˇ al-awwal, primary substance; al-gawharˇ at-t¯an¯ı, secondary substance. ¯ ¯ 2008062. Ljubovic. 07_Glossary. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 206.

206 glossary of logical terminology

h. √ √h.gˇgˇ hu. gˇgaˇ , proof, argument; proving, argumentation. hdd. hadd. ,(1) definition. Hadd. haq. ¯ıq¯ı, actual definition (definitio quid rei); hadd. t¯amm, complete definition (seldom hadd. k¯amil, complete, perfect definition); hadd. lafz.¯ı, nominal definition; hadd. n¯aqis., incomplete definition. See qawl sˇ¯arih. and ta#r¯ıf.(2) Term, notion (of syllogism). Hadd. as.˙gar, minor term; hadd. mustarakˇ , common (medium) term; hadd. √ akbar, major term; hadd. awsa.t, middle term. (3) Limit. hds. hads. , intuition (meaning intellectual perception, fast revelation of the medium term, wit, contrary to musˇ¯ahada (see), immediate perception through senses). – hadsiyy. ¯at, intuition based knowledge (cognitio intuitiva), intuitive (see √ hads. ). √hrf. harf. , particle (in logic often as: ad¯at,see);letter. hss. h.¯assa,pl.haw. ¯ass,sense.Haw. ¯ass b¯a.tina, internal sense; haw. ¯ass z.¯ahira, external sense. – hiss. , sense, feeling; perception. Also: ihs. ¯as. Hiss. b¯a.tin, internal sense; hiss. z.¯ahir, external sense. – mahs. ¯us,sensible. – mahs. ¯us¯at, sense based knowledge (conviction) (type of yaq¯ıniyy¯at, see). –√ ihs. ¯as, sense, feeling; perception. Also: hiss. . h.sr. ha. sr. , limitation, determination of quantity; restriction. – mah.s.¯ura, defined, quantified proposition. √ Opposite: muhmala (see). h.sl. muha. s.sal. , negative term (ism) which implies negation, although in form it is positive, e.g. blind (implies the negation of seeing, though it is grammatically positive). Opposite: ˙gayr muha. s.sal. ,seema#d¯ul. √– muha. s.sala. , proposition whose predicate is muha. s.sal. (see). hqq. haq. ¯ıqa, truth; logical essence, reality. – haq. ¯ıq¯ı,actual,real;true.Dal¯ala haq. ¯ıqiyya, actual meaning (significa- √ tion), see dal¯ala. hkm. hukm. , judgment. – mahk. ¯um bihi, used to state something, predicate. See mahm. ¯ul. – mahk. ¯um #alayhi, on which something is stated, subject. See mawd.¯u#. – hikma. ,philosophy.Al-hikma. an-nazariyya. , speculative philosophy; √ al-hikma. al-#amaliyya, practical philosophy. √hll. tahl. ¯ıl,(1)analysis.(2) “Analytics” (Aristotle’s work) hml. haml. , attribution; predication. – h.¯amil, subject (as opposite to mahm. ¯ul). Often: mawd.¯u# (see). – haml. ¯ı, predicative, attributive; categorical. Qiy¯as haml. ¯ı, categorical syllogism; qiy¯as ˙gayr haml. ¯ı, non-categorical syllogism. Qadiyya. hamliyya. , categorical judgment. –√ mahm. ¯ul, predicate; attribute. hwl. h.¯al, state, position (category). 2008062. Ljubovic. 07_Glossary. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 207.

glossary of logical terminology 207

h √ ¯ √hbr habar, statement, declaration. hr¯ gˇ ¯h¯arigˇ, extern; exterior. ¯ ¯ –√ h¯arigˇ¯ı, external; objective. Opposite: dihn¯ı, (see). ¯ ¯ hs.s. h¯as.sa. , property; proper (proprium). – ¯ ¯h¯ass, special, particular (as synonym for more often used guzˇ "¯ı, see). ¯ .. – h¯as.s.¯ı,sameash¯as.s. (see). – ¯mahs¯us, individual,¯ personal. Qadiyya mahs¯usa, special, particular ¯ . . . ¯ . . √ judgment (premiss). See saˇ hsiyya. ¯ . htb. hi.t¯aba (hat.aba),¯ (1) rhetoric (n.), oratory. (2) “Rhetoric” (Aristotle’s ¯ ¯work). ¯ –√ hit¯ab¯ı, rhetoric (adj.). Qiy¯as hit¯ab¯ı, rhetoric syllogism. ¯ . ¯ . √hlt. muhtali.t, mixed, combined (syllogism). See qiy¯as. hlf¯ hulf¯,difference, opposition; absurd. Qiy¯as al-hulf, syllogism of ¯ ¯contradiction, syllogism per impossible, absurd¯ (deductio ad absurdum). Seldom: al-qiy¯as bi al-hulf. – ihtil¯af,difference, inequality (meaning¯ close to hulf, see). ¯ ¯ –√ muhtalif,different, inequal. Muhtalif¯an, two disparate (terms). hyl hay¯¯al, thinking; vision; image;¯ imagination. – ¯ ¯hayyala, to inspire feelings; to convince. – ¯muhayyil¯at, suggestive (imaginativa), which inspire visions. ¯ d √ drk idr¯ak, cognition (perception and intuition). Idr¯ak al-mufrad, cognition of the individual (same as tasawwur. , see); idr¯ak an-nisba, cognition of relations between two particular terms (same as tasd. ¯ıq, see). √– mudrak, percept (object of perception). dll dal¯ala, meaning, signification. Dal¯ala wad. #iyya, conventional sig- # nification; dal¯ala wad. iyya (˙gayr) lafziyya. , conventional (un)spoken # signification; dal¯ala aqliyya (lafziyya—. ˙gayr lafziyya. ), intellectual signi- # fication (spoken—unspoken); dal¯ala .tab iyya (lafziyya—. ˙gayr lafziyya. ), natural signification (spoken—unspoken); dal¯ala manq¯ula,figurative signification; dal¯ala bi al-mu.t¯abaqa, signification by harmony; dal¯ala bi at-tadammun. , signification by content (partial signification); dal¯ala bi al-iltiz¯am, signification by order, consequential. – d¯all, significator. – dal¯ıl, sign; proof; demonstration. √– madl¯ul,significated. dwr dawr, circle; vicious circle (circulus vitiosus). See qiy¯as ad-dawr. – dawr¯an, revolution, revolving; also: qiy¯as ad-dawr (see). 2008062. Ljubovic. 07_Glossary. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 208.

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d √ ¯ dhn dihn, spirit; mind, intellect; understanding. ¯ ¯ –√ dihn¯ı, spiritual; mental. Opposite: h¯arigˇ¯ı (see). ¯ ¯ dwy d¯at, essence. Qad.¯ay¯a daw¯at al-gihaˇ , modal judgment, see qad¯ay¯a and ¯ ¯gihaˇ . ¯ – d¯at¯ı, essential. ¯ r √ √rbt. r¯abi.ta, copula. √rdd radd, reduction. Radd al-qiy¯as, reduction of syllogism. rdf mur¯adif, synonym. Often: mutar¯adif (see). –√ mutar¯adif, synonym. rsm rasm, description. Rasm t¯amm, complete description; rasm n¯aqis., √ incomplete description. rkb tark¯ıb,synthesis. – murakkab, complex (word, syllogism); synthetic. Murakkab t¯amm, completely complex; murakkab ˙gayr t¯amm, incompletely complex. r¯ıt¯ur¯ıq¯a,rhetoric;seehit¯aba. Aristotle’s work “Rhetoric”. . ¯ . z √ zmn zam¯an, time; time (category), also: mat¯a (see).

s √ s"l mas"ala,pl.mas¯a"il, issue of science; thesis. safsa.ta, sophism, sophistic; Aristotle’s work “On Sophistical Refutation”. √– sufis.t¯a"¯ı, sophistical; Qiy¯as sufis.t¯a"¯ı, sophistical syllogism. slb salb, negation. Seldom: nafy (see). √– s¯alib,negative.Qadiyya. s¯aliba, negative judgment. slsl tasalsul, argumentation into infinity (argumentum ad infinitum); √ succession. slm musallam¯at, accepted propositions (opponent’s proposition accepted √ in a debate regardless of their truthfulness); presuppositions. smw ism, name; noun. Ism muha. s.sal. ,seemuha. s.sal. ; ism mustarakˇ , equivoque; homonym (see mustarakˇ ); ism musakkikˇ , equivocal (see musakkikˇ ); ism √ mutar¯adif (mur¯adif ), synonym. swr s¯ur, quantifier. – musawwara, quantified, determined judgment. Also: mah.s.¯ura (see). √s¯ufis.t¯ıq¯a, sophistic. Also: safsa.ta (see). swy mus¯aw¯ı, equal. Qiy¯as al-mus¯aw¯at (or al-qiy¯as al-mus¯aw¯ı), syllogism of equality (mathematical syllogism: A = B; B = G;ˇ A = G).ˇ – mutas¯awiy¯an, two concurring (corresponding) terms; congruent. 2008062. Ljubovic. 07_Glossary. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 209.

glossary of logical terminology 209

ˇs √ √ˇsbh tasbˇ ¯ıh, analogy. Often: tamt¯ıl (see). ¯ ˇshs. saˇ hs,person. ¯ ¯ . –√ saˇ hs¯ı, singular, individual. ¯ . ˇsrh. sarˇ h., interpretation, explanation; explication. – sˇ¯arih.,explicative.Qawl sˇ¯arih., explicative speech (speech that describes a term or a unit so that it decomposes it; in terminology it includes √ both deﬁnition (see hadd. ) and description (see rasm)). ˇsrt. sarˇ .t, condition. – sarˇ .t¯ı, conditional. Qadiyya. sarˇ .tiyya, conditional judgment (premiss). See √ qadiyya. . ˇsrk istirˇ ¯ak, equivocation; homonymy. –√ mustarakˇ , common, equivoque; homonym. Also: ism mustarakˇ (see). √ˇsgb˙ musˇ¯a˙gaba, confusion, dispute; sophistic (knowledge). ˇs#r siˇ #r, poem; poetry, poetics. √– siˇ #r¯ı,poetical.Qiy¯as siˇ #r¯ı, poetical syllogism. √ˇskk musakkikˇ , equivocal. Also: ism musakkikˇ (see). √ˇskl saklˇ , form, ﬁgure (of syllogism). ˇshd musˇ¯ahada, intuition (immediate cognition of a unit a complex situation through senses, as opposed to hads. (see), intuition closer to intellectual perception, fast revelation of the medium term). – musˇ¯ahad¯at, perception, intuition based cognition, see musˇ¯ahada; √ sensibilia. √ˇshr mashˇ ¯ur¯at, generally known judgments, statements; celebrata. ˇsyh sayˇ h, old man; leader; teacher, etc. The title that the texts in logic ¯ (and¯ philosophy) use to refer to Ibn S¯ına.¯

s. √ sdr. mus.¯adara, request, postulate. Mus.¯adara #al¯aal-ma.tl¯ub, petitio principii (logical error in argumentation; lack of, and need for argumentation √ grounds), petition of principle. sdq sidq, truth, veracity. Opposite: kidb (see). . . ¯ √– tasd. ¯ıq, assent, assessment; judgement. See idr¯ak. s.gr˙ su. ˙gr¯a, minor premise (of syllogism). See muqaddima. –√ as.˙gar, minor term (of syllogism). See hadd. (2). sl. h. is..til¯ah.,pl.is..til¯ah.¯at, convention; term, terminology. –√ is..til¯ah.¯ı, conventional; terminological. sn# sin¯a#a, skill; art. As-sin¯a#¯at al-hams, ﬁve logical skills (apodictic, . . . . ¯ √ dialectic, rhetoric, poetic and sophistic), scientia quinquenalis. swr. s.¯ura,form.S. ¯urat al-qiy¯as, syllogism form. Opposite: m¯addat al-qiy¯as (see), contents of syllogism. – tasawwur. ,pl.tasawwur. ¯at, notion, concept, image; idea. See idr¯ak. 2008062. Ljubovic. 07_Glossary. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 210.

210 glossary of logical terminology

d. √ ddd. didd. , contrary; contrast; contrariness. – tad.¯add, mutual opposition, contrariness. (Sometimes this term denotes the subcontrariness relations, but it is often described as: √ al-qadiyyat¯an ad-d¯ahilat¯an tahta at-tad¯add, two subcontrary judgments). . ¯ . . drb. darb. , mode, modus (of syllogism). Darb. mun.tigˇ, productive, conclusive modus; darb. #aq¯ım, unproductive modus (that does not lead to √ conclusion). Seldom: qar¯ına (see). drr. dar. ¯ur¯ı, necessary. Qadiyya. dar. ¯uriyya, necessary judgment (premiss). See √ w¯agibˇ . dmn. tadammana. ,tocontain,toinclude,tobeconsistedof. – tadammun. , contents; implication. Dal¯ala bi at-tadammun. , meaning by √ contents, see dal¯ala. dyf. id.¯afa, relation (category, also: mud.¯af, see); gr. genitive relation. – id.¯af¯ı, relative, conditioned (in relation to something). – mud.¯af, relation (category, also: id.¯afa); gr. noun deﬁned by another in genitive. – tad.¯ayuf, relativity; correlation. – mutad.¯ayif, correlative; correlate.

t. √ tb. # .tab#, nature. Also: .tab¯ı#a (see). – .tab¯ı#a,nature. – .tab#¯ı, natural. Dal¯ala .tab#iyya, natural signiﬁcation (meaning), see √ dal¯ala. tbq. mu.t¯abaqa (mu.t¯abiqa), adequacy, concordance, harmony, congruity. Dal¯ala bi al-mu.t¯abaqa, signiﬁcation by harmony (in sense of connecting and equalization of its subject). See dal¯ala. –√ mu.t¯abiq, adequate, corresponding. trf. .tarf (or .taraf ), extreme. Tarf. ¯an, extreme terms of syllogism (minor √ and major). See hadd. . tlb. ma.tlab, question. Ma.tlab hal, question whether (an est); ma.tlab m¯a, question what (quid est); ma.tlab lim¯a, question why, what for (propter quid); ma.tlab ayyu, question who, which (quia est). – ma.tl¯ub,(1) that is researched, issue; (2) conclusion (as a result of √ research). tlq. mu.tlaq, absolute; free, unlimited; unconditioned.

z. √ znn. zann. , opinion, thinking, believing, seeming, feeling. – mazn. ¯un¯at, judgments (premisses) based on thinking, believing; presumptions (type ˙gayr yaq¯ıniyy¯at, see). 2008062. Ljubovic. 07_Glossary. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 211.

glossary of logical terminology 211

# √ √#br #ib¯ara, interpretation, explanation; “Hermeneutics” (Aristotle’s work). #dl ma#d¯ul, derivative. (Negative term which implies negation, although in form it is positive, e.g. blind (implies the negation of seeing, though it is grammatically positive). See muha. s.sal. . – ma#d¯ula, derivative; equivalent to negative proposition (negation by √ meaning, although in form it is positive, with predicate ma#d¯ul, see). #rd. #arad., accident (oposite: substance). #Arad. #¯amm, general (common) accident; #aradl. ¯azim, inseparable accident; #aradmuf. ¯ariq, separable accident. Bi al-#arad., per accidence (per accidens). –√ #arad.¯ı, accidental. #rf ma#rifa, cognition, knowledge. – ta#r¯ıf,pl.ta#r¯ıf¯at, explanation, explication (also: qawl sˇ¯arih.,v.); definition (in broader sense includes both hadd. ,see,andrasm, see). √– mu#arrif, explanatory, explicative. #ql #aql, intellect; intelligence. #Aql fa##¯al, active intellect (intellectus agens), #aql bi al-fi#l, actual intellect (intellectus in efectu); #aql bi al- quwwa, potential intellect; #aql mustaf¯ad, acquired intellect (intellectus acquisitus); al-#aql bi al-malaka, intellects with potential (intellectus in habitu); #aql hay¯ul¯an¯ı, material intellect (intellectus materialis); #aql # # # amal¯ı, practical intellect; aql nazar. ¯ı, speculative intellect; aql z.¯ahir, expressed intellect. – #aql¯ı, related to intellect, intelligence; rational. Dal¯ala #aqliyya (lafziyya—. ˙gayr lafziyya. ), intellectual signification (spoken—unspoken). See dal¯ala. – ma#q¯ul,pl.ma#q¯ul¯at, intelligible, reachable only by intellect (opposite: mahs. ¯us¯at, (see), sensibilia). Al-ma#q¯ul¯at al-¯ul¯a, primary intelligibilia; √ al-ma#q¯ul¯at at-t¯aniya, secondary intelligibilia. ¯ ¯ #ks #aks, conversion, revolution. #Aks bas¯ı.t, simple conversion; al-#aks al-mustaw¯a, equipollence; #aks an-naq¯ıd., contraposition (see naq¯ıd.). √– mun#akis, that can be revolved; convertible (definition). #ll #illa,cause. –√ #illiyya,causality. #lm #ilm, knowledge, cognition; science. √– ma#l¯um¯at, knowledge; facts, cognition. # # ml amal, action, practice. Opposite: nazar. (see). # # √– amal¯ı, practical. Opposite: nazar. ¯ı (see). See: aql, hikma. . #mm #¯amm, general; universal (often: kull¯ı, see). √– #um¯um, generality. √#nsr. #unsur. ,pl.#an¯asir. , element. See ustuqs. . #ny ma#n¯a,pl.ma#¯an(in), idea (in broader sense); sense; meaning; √ signification. #yr mi#y¯ar,measure,norm.Mi#y¯ar al-#ul¯um, logic (measure of science). 2008062. Ljubovic. 07_Glossary. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 212.

212 glossary of logical terminology

g˙ √ gl˙ t. mu˙g¯ala.ta (mu˙g¯ali.ta), fallacy, sophism; sophistic knowledge; “Sophistic” (Aristotle’s work “On Sophistical Refutation”). – mu˙g¯ali.t¯ı, sophistical. Qiy¯as mu˙g¯ali.t¯ı, sophistical syllogism.

f √ frd mufrad, simple (word). Opposite: murakkab.Seelafz.. √– mufrad¯at, individual terms. √frd. fard., hypothesis. Often: wad. # (see). fsl fasl,difference. Fasl d¯at¯ı, essential difference; fasl qar¯ıb,nextdifference . . . ¯ . (differentia specifica); fasl. ba#¯ıd, further difference. – infis.¯al, disjunction, separation. – infis.¯al¯ı, disjunctive. Also: munfasil. (see). √– munfasil. , disjunctive. See qiy¯as. f#l fi#l,(1) verb (in logic often: kalima, see): (2) action, act, doing (category, also: yaf#al, see). – bi al-fi#l, actual. Opposite: bi al-quwwa. – yaf#al, acting, act, doing (category, see fi#l). – fa##¯al, very (constantly) active. See #aql fa##¯al. √– infi#¯al (or yanfa#il), passive (category); passivity. fkr fikr, thought, thinking, reflection (in sense of discursive thinking as successive logical process from one logical element towards the other, from parts towards the unit). √– fikra, notion, idea. fhm mafh¯um, understood, understandable; understanding, comprehen- √ sion. fyd mustaf¯ad, acquired. See #aql mustaf¯ad.

q √ qbl maqb¯ul, applicable, acceptable; maqb¯ul¯at, acceptable premisses, given. – taq¯abul, opposition. (This term denotes contrariness and contradiction, as subtypes, but, diﬀerently from the related term tan¯aqud. (see), often contrariness). – mutaq¯abil(¯an), opposite, opposed; two opposed, contradictors, and √ often contrary terms. qdm muqaddam, antecedence. Opposite: t¯al(in) (see). – muqaddima, premiss, assumption. Muqaddima su. ˙gr¯a, minor premiss; √ muqaddima kubr¯a, major premiss. See qadiyya. qr" istiqr¯a", induction; istiqr¯a" t¯amm, complete induction; istiqr¯a" n¯aqis., √ incomplete induction. √qsm qisma, division. qdy. qadiyya. , judgment, proposition, premiss. Qadiyya. bas¯ı.ta, simple judgment (proposition); qadiyya. ba#diyya. , particular judgment (often: guzˇ "iyya, see); qadiyya. guzˇ "iyya (m¯ugiba—sˇ ¯aliba), particular judgment 2008062. Ljubovic. 07_Glossary. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 213.

glossary of logical terminology 213

(affirmative—negative); qadiyya. mah.s.¯ura, determined (quantified) judgment (opposite: muhmala, see); qadiyya. tul¯atiyya, tripartite judgment (that has subject, predicate and¯ copula);¯ qadiyya tun¯a"iyya, . ¯ bipartite judgment (without copula); qadiyya. hamliyya. , categorical judgment; qadiyya. ˙gayr hamliyya. , noncategorical judgment; qadiyya. mah.s.¯usa. , individual (singular) judgment; qadiyya. s¯aliba,negative judgment; qadiyya. musawwara, quantified (determined) judgment (see s¯ur), also: qadiyya mahs¯ura (see); qadiyya saˇ hsiyya, individual judgment; . .. . ¯ . qadiyya. sarˇ .tiyya (muttasila—munfa. sila. ), conditional (conjunctive— disjunctive) judgment; qadiyya. su. ˙gr¯a, minor judgment, premiss (see muqaddima); qadiyya. dar. ¯uriyya, necessary judgment; qadiyya. kubr¯a, major premiss (see muqaddima); qadiyya. kulliyya (m¯ugiba—sˇ ¯aliba), universal (affirmative—negative) judgment; qadiyya. l¯azima, necessary judgment (see dar. ¯uriyya); qadiyya. m¯ugibaˇ ,affirmative judgment; qadiyya. mumtani#a, impossible judgment; qadiyya. mumkina, possible judgment; qadiyyat. ¯an mutaq¯abilat¯an bi at-tan¯aqud, two (mutually) opposed (contradictory) judgments; qadiyyat. ¯an mutaq¯abilat¯an, two (mutually) opposed judgments; al-qadiyyat. ¯an ad-d¯ahilat¯an tahta. at-tad.¯add,two subcontrary judgments; qad¯ay¯a daw¯at al-¯ gihaˇ (or muwagˇgahaˇ ), modal . ¯ judgments; al-qad.¯ay¯aqiy¯as¯atuh¯ama#ah¯a, judgments based on syllogisms (implied by some previous syllogisms); al-qadiyyat. ¯an al-mutad.¯addat¯an, √ two (mutually) contrary judgments. qwl qawl, speech, statement (dictum). Qawl sˇ¯arih., interpretative, explicative speech (see sˇ¯arih.); gawl gˇ¯azim, speech that claims something; judgment. – maq¯ul, stating; stated, speech; predicament. √– maq¯ul¯at, categories. qwy quwwa, strength, power, force; ability, potential. Bi al-quwwa, √ potential. Opposite: bi al-fi#l (see), actual. qys qiy¯as,(1) syllogism. Qiy¯as iniyy (qiy¯as al-in), see burh¯an; qiy¯as burh¯an¯ı, demonstrative syllogism; qiy¯as istitn¯a"¯ı, separate (separated) syllogism; ¯ qiy¯as gadalˇ ¯ı, dialectical syllogism; qiy¯as hi.t¯ab¯ı, rhetorical syllogism; qiy¯as al-hulf, syllogism per impossible, absurd¯ (deductio ad absurdum); qiy¯¯as ad-dawr, circular syllogism (circulus in probando—circle in argumentation); qiy¯as al-mus¯aw¯at, syllogism in equality (mathematical syllogism); qiy¯as muqassam, divided syllogism; qiy¯as murakkab,complex syllogism, polysyllogism; qiy¯as s¯ufis.t¯a"¯ı, sophistical syllogism; qiy¯as dam. ¯ır, shortened syllogism (entimem); qiy¯as mu˙g¯ali.t¯ı, sophistical syllogism (also: s¯ufis.t¯a"¯ı); qiy¯as iqtir¯an¯ı, connected syllogism; qiy¯as k¯amil, perfect syllogism; qiy¯as ˙gayr k¯amil, imperfect syllogism; qiy¯as man.tiq¯ı, logical, deductive syllogism; syllogistics; qiy¯as sarˇ .t¯ı, conditional syllogism. (2) Qiy¯as, title for Aristotle’s “Analytics” (analysis through syllogism). 2008062. Ljubovic. 07_Glossary. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 214.

214 glossary of logical terminology

k √ kbr kubr¯a, major premiss, see muqaddima. –√ akbar, major term (of syllogism). See hadd. . ktr katra, multiplicity, plurality; many; individual things. Qabla al-katra, ¯ before¯ things, before many (ante res); f¯ı(ma#a) al-katra, in things,¯ in ¯ √ many (in rebus); ba#da al-katra, after things, after many (post res). ¯ √kdb kidb, lie, untruth. Opposite: sidq. (see). kll¯ kull¯ , unity, wholeness. Opposite: guzˇ ", (see). – kull¯ı, universal, general. Qadiyya. kulliyya m¯ugibaˇ (s¯aliba),universal— affirmative (negative) judgment (proposition). – kulliyy¯at,universalia;al-kulliyy¯at al-hams, five universal terms (genus, ¯ √ species, difference, property and accidence). √klm kalima, verb; word. √km kam,howmuch? √kml k¯amil, complete, perfect. See qiy¯as. √kmm kamm (kammiyya), quantity (of judgment); quantity (category). √kwn mak¯an, place; place (category), also: ayna (see). kyf kayfa, how?; quality (category). – kayfiyya, quality (of judgment); quality (category).

l √ lzm l¯azim, necessary; inseparable; inherent. – luz¯um, necessary consequence, necessity. – iltiz¯am, necessity; necessary causal link (meaning close to luz¯um (see)). √ Dal¯ala bi al-iltiz¯am, consequential meaning (signiﬁcation). See dal¯ala. lfz. lafz., word; expression. Lafzmufrad. , individual, simple word (consisted " of one word); lafz. murakkab (mu allaf), complex word. ˙ –√ lafz.¯ı, spoken, phonetic. Gayr lafz.¯ı, unspoken. lm limiyy; burh¯an limiyy (burh¯an al-lima), causal argumentation (see burh¯an).

m √m¯ahiyya, essence; essential quality of something (quidditas); quiddity. √mty mat¯a, when?; tense (category), also: zam¯an (see). mtl mit¯al,example. – ¯ tam¯ t¯ıl, analogy, analogy based conclusion, reasoning by analogy. – mum¯ ¯atala, similarity, equality, analogy, also tamt¯ıl (see). ¯ ¯ √– mutam¯atil(¯un), mutually similar, analogue. ¯ mdd m¯adda, matter. Opposite: s.¯ura (see), contents (of syllogism). √– m¯add¯ı,material. mkn imk¯an, possibility. – mumkin, possible; ˙gayr mumkin, impossible. Qadiyya mumkina h¯assa, . ¯ .. specially possible judgment (premiss); qadiyya. mumkina #¯amma, √ generally possible judgment. mlk milk, property; possession(category); having. 2008062. Ljubovic. 07_Glossary. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 215.

glossary of logical terminology 215

– malaka, property, faculty; permanent ability (habitus). See #aql bi √ al-malaka. mn# imtin¯a#, impossibility. – mumtani#, impossible. Qadiyya. mumtani#a, impossible judgment.

n √ ntgˇ antagaˇ , to conclude; to give conclusion to syllogism. – int¯agˇ, concluding, making conclusions; deduction (seldom). – nat¯ıgaˇ , conclusion. –√ muntigˇ,whichgives(offers) conclusion (judgment or syllogism). nz# intiz¯a#, abstraction (meaning action or activity abstracting something from something else, different from (mugarradˇ , see) abstraction—the √ result of that action). Also: tagrˇ ¯ıd (see). nsb nisba, relation; relation between subject and predicate. Also: nisba √ hukmiyya. , judgmental relation. ntq. man.tiq, logic. – man.tiq¯ı, logician; logical. √– n¯a.tiq, reasonable, reasoning; able to speak. nzr. nazar. , speculation (theoretical way of thinking). # – nazar. ¯ı, speculative, theoretical; ilm nazar. ¯ı,speculativescience;hikma. nazariyya. , speculative philosophy. –√ mun¯azara, discussion, debate. See baht. . .¯ √nfs nafs,soul(Lat.anima). √nfy nafy, negation. Often: salb (see). nqd. naq¯ıd., opposition, contradiction (also tan¯aqud.,see);contradictory (notion, judgment). #Aks an-naq¯ıd., contraposition. – tan¯aqud., mutual contrariness, opposition; antithesis. (Close to taq¯abul (see); denotes both contradiction and contrariness, however, √ differently from taq¯abul, it is used primarily for contradiction.) √nql manq¯ul, taken; transferred (e.g. meaning, dal¯ala, see). nhy nih¯aya, end; extreme; extreme or final limit. –√ l¯anih¯aya, endlessness; infinity. nw# naw#, species. Naw# s¯afil, lower species; naw##¯al¯ı, higher species; naw# al-anw¯a#, species of the species; naw# mutawassi.t, middle species.

h √ hml muhmal, indefinite (by quantity); qadiyya. muhmala, indefinite (unquan- tified) judgment (proposition, premiss). Opposite: qadiyya. mah.s.¯ura, (see). hay¯ul¯a, matter; first matter; hyle. See m¯adda. – hay¯ul¯an¯ı,material.#Aql hay¯ul¯an¯ı, material intellect. 2008062. Ljubovic. 07_Glossary. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 216.

216 glossary of logical terminology

w √ wtr mutaw¯atir¯at, transferred, inherited knowledge (knowledge based on √ evidence of others). wgbˇ ¯ıgˇ¯ab,affirmation. Opposite: salb (see), negation. - m¯ugibˇ ,(1)affirmative. Qadiyya. m¯ugibaˇ ,affirmative judgment (proposition, premiss). Opposite s¯aliba (see). (2) necessary (also: dar. ¯ur¯ı,v.). √ Opposite: mumkin (see), possible and ˙gayr mumkin (see), impossible. √wgdˇ wigdˇ ¯aniyy¯at, emotional perceptions, feelings. wghˇ gihaˇ , modality; modus. Qad.¯ay¯a daw¯at al-gihaˇ , modal judgment (proposition, premiss). ¯ –√ muwagˇgahˇ ,modal.Qadiyya. muwagˇgahaˇ , modal judgment. √wzn m¯ız¯an, scales, balance. #Ilm al-m¯ız¯an, logic; chemistry. √wst. awsa.t, middle term (of syllogism). See hadd. (2). √wsf. sifa. , attribute. wsl. ittis.¯al, connection, conjunction. √– muttasil. , conjunctive. See qadiyya. . wd.# wad. #,(1) situation, position; position (category); (2) thesis, postulate; hypothesis (expressed in sense of postulate); (3) convention. – wad. #¯ı, conventional; dal¯ala wad. #iyya, conventional meaning. See dal¯ala. –√ mawd.¯u#,(1) subject; (2) object of science. √wt" mutaw¯a.ti", monosemic, univocal; univoque. wfq ittif¯aq, case, accidence; contingency. – ittif¯aq¯ı, accidental, contingent. Qadiyya. ittif¯aqiyya,contingent judgment.

y √ yqn yaq¯ın, conviction; strong belief; persuasion; certitude. – yaq¯ıniyy¯at, indisputable (non-refutable) truth, knowledge. Opposite: ˙gayr yaq¯ıniyy¯at. 2008062. Ljubovic. 08_Bibliography. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 217.

SOURCES AND LITERATURE

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Sources of Biographical and Bibliographical Nature · #At.a¯"¯ı(#At.a¯"ullah),¯ Naw#¯ı-zade,¯ Had. ¯a"iq al-haq. ¯a"iq f¯ıtakmilatas-ˇ saqˇ ¯a"iq, Istanbul, 1268/1851–1852. al-Bagd˙ ad¯ ¯ı, Isma¯#¯ıl-paˇsa, Hadiyyat al-#¯arif¯ın. Asm¯a" al-mu"allif¯ın wa ¯at¯ar al-musan-. nif¯ın, 2 vol., Istanbul,· 1951–1955. ¯ 2008062. Ljubovic. 08_Bibliography. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 218.

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INDEX OF PERSONAL NAMES

#Abdulkar¯ım, Mawla,¯ 26 112n221, 113, 113n228, 113n230, Abélard, Pierre, 81, 145, 156 115, 115n234, 117, 117n236, al-Abhar¯ı, At¯ırudd¯ın, 19, 19n41, 38, 117n238, 117n240, 118n242, 38n40, 38¯n41, 39, 40, 48, 53, 55, 118n245, 118n246, 118n248, 56, 95n154, 111, 130n306, 151, 174, 119n252, 120, 120n258, 122, 176 122n266, 122n267, 124, 124n274, AbuBi¯ ˇsr Matta¯ ibn Yunus,¯ 12, 15 127n294, 128n297, 128n298, Abu¯ #Utman¯ ad-Dimaˇsq¯ı, 12 129, 130, 130n310, 131, 131n311, Aegidius,¯ 167 131n314, 132, 133, 133n318, 134, al-Ah.dar. ¯ı (el-Akhdhari), #Abdurrah-. 135, 135n323, 135n324, 141, 143– man,¯ 176, 176n20 147, 149, 150, 154–156, 159, 160, Ahlwardt, W., 2, 181n34 160n53, 161, 161n55, 162–166, Ahmad. b. Husayn,. from Ljubuˇski, 166n71, 167, 170, 171, 179, 180, 41n50 182, 182n37, 184, 185, 185n46, Ahmad. b. Husayn,. from Mostar, 193, 195, 196, 198, 200, 205–208, 45n57 211–213 Albert von Sachsen, 150 Arnaldez, Roger, 21n54, 183n38, Albertus Magnus, 146, 147, 167 190n66 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 65, al-Aˇs#ar¯ı, Abual-¯ Hasan,. 188, 66n34, 161, 204 188n59, 189 Anawati, Georges C., 16, 16n27, 170, 170n3, 187n55, 188 Bacon, Roger, 194, 194n1 Andrija Kotorvaroˇsanin (Kotoranin), Badawi, Abdurrahman, 9, 10n5 153n34 Bagd˙ ad¯ ¯ı, Isma¯#¯ıl-ba¯ˇsa,¯ 31n15, 33, Ans.ar¯ ¯ı, MawlaA¯ hmad,. 27 33n20 Anselm, 145 Bakoˇs, Jan, 129n300 Antun Medo (Antonius Medus), 148, Barbaric,´ Damir, 148n17, 165n69 148n20 al-Barmak¯ı, 11 Aristoteles (Aristotle), 2, 4, 10–18, Baˇsagic,´ Safvet-beg, 1, 14n22, 26n2, 20, 48, 58, 58n1, 64n25, 65, 31n15, 36n35 65n26, 65n27, 65n28, 65n29, Baˇseskija, Mula Mustafa, 48n63 65n30, 65n31, 65n33, 66n34, 67, Bazala, Albert, 148n21, 156, 156n45, 69n42, 71n54, 71n55, 72, 72n58, 157, 163n63 72n59, 73n67, 74n69, 76, 76n80, Bejtic,´ Alija, 48n63 77n83, 77n84, 77n86, 77n87, 82, Benkovic,´ Benko, 148 83, 83n109, 84, 84n112, 84n113, Bilgegil, Kaya M., 181n35 86, 86n121, 86n122, 87, 88n128, Black, Deborah L., 127n293 90n136, 92n144, 92n146, 94, Blaˇskovic,ˇ Jozef, 14n22, 31n15, 49n67 95n158, 96, 97n164, 100, 100n181, Bochenski, I.M., 144n4, 150n25 101, 104, 107, 107n202, 109n211, Boethius, 93, 94n151, 144, 144n4, 145 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 230.

230 index of personal names

Boltaev, M.N., 180n29 Ejubovic,´ Mustafa – Sejhˇ Jujo, see Boˇsnjak, Branko, 80, 80n97, Mus.taf. ab.Y¯ usuf¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ 143n1, 144n4, 145n5, 145n9, al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı 154n37, 155n40, 156n44, 157n46, Elamrani-Jamal, A., 67n37, 138n38, 164n68 183, 183n39 Brida, Marija, 148n17, 148n18, 167, Engels, Friedrich, 194, 194n2 167n74, 167n76 Ess, Josef van, 174, 178n25, 189 Brockelmann, Carl, 2, 10, 11n8, Euclid, 118, 134, 134n321, 134n322 12n10, 12n14, 13n17, 13n21, Eudemus, 161 17n33, 18, 18n35, 18n36, 18n37, 19n40, 19n41, 19n42, 19n43, Fakhry, Majid, 17n33 19n44, 19n46, 19n47, 20n49, al-Fanar¯ ¯ı, Samsuddˇ ¯ın ibn Hamza,. 20n50, 20n51, 20n52, 21n54, 20, 20n51, 20n52, 31, 31n13, 39, 26n2, 27n3, 31n13, 31n15, 33n21, 39n44, 45, 176, 197 34n25, 34n26, 34n27, 36n35, al-Far¯ ab¯ ¯ı, 2, 9n2, 12, 13, 13n21, 38n40, 39n44, 44n53, 44n54, 14, 14n21, 14n22, 15, 17, 18, 21, 45n55, 45n56, 45n58, 60n9, 22, 44, 58, 60, 60n8, 63, 64, 60n10, 60n11, 60n12, 75n75, 64n23, 64n24, 105, 107, 107n205, 75n76, 76n79, 124n276, 126n283, 127n292, 129, 135, 137, 137n329, 126n286, 126n287, 152n31, 141, 145–147, 167, 170, 171, 180, 163n66, 172n12, 185n47, 185n48, 185, 186n50, 193, 196, 197 185n49, 186n53 Filipovic,´ Muhamed, 173n14 Brunschvig, Robert, 178n25 Filipovic,´ Nedim, 22, 22n58, 144n4 el-Buhi, Kamel, 36n32, 48n63, 51, Filipovic,´ Vladimir, 203 51n71, 75, 75n77 Fleischer, H.O., 2 Buridan, Jean, 150 Flügel, Gustav, 52 Burleigh, Walter, 150 Francisco of Toledo, 150

Caponigri, A.R., 147n14 Gafurov, B.G., 9 Cicero, 165 Galen (Galenus), 17, 82, 83, 107, Corbin, Henry, 66n34, 66n35, 107n204, 160 122n267, 181n32, 185n44, 185n49, Gˇ am¯ ¯ı, Mawla,¯ 32 186n50, 188n57 Gardet, Louis, 187n55, 188 al-Gaz˙ al¯ ¯ı, 18, 18n37, 18n38, 18n39, Daiber, Hans, 10, 10n4, 14n21, 19, 19n39, 21, 135, 135n325, 189, 16n26, 17n33, 18n34, 145n10, 174 190 Daneˇs-Pazuh,ˇ M.T., 11n8 Gerard de Crémon, 146 Descartes, René, 165 Gilson, Étienne, 148n19 Dominicus Gundissalinus (Gondis- Goichon, A.-M., 9, 16n28, 45n55, alvi), 145 59n2, 59n5, 62n19, 66n34, 72n59, Dragiˇsic,´ Juraj, 147, 147n15 74n70, 77n87, 80n100, 80n101, Dunlop, D.M., 9, 13n21 82n106, 88n128, 90n136, 92n144, Duns Scotus, 81, 146–148, 148n19, 102, 104n193, 121n263, 129n300, 148n21, 150, 156, 157 138, 139n332, 140n333, 147n16, 148n19, 161, 161n57, 170n2, 203 Edwards, 9n1 Goldziher, I., 21n53, 186n51, 186n52, Egidius, 147 186n53 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 231.

index of personal names 231

Grassi, Ernesto, 165n69, 165n70 158n47, 162n61, 166, 166n72, 174, Grozdanic,´ Sulejman, 31n15, 36n35 176, 190n69, 195, 200 Grunebaum, G.E. Von, 174, 178n25, Hasan Kafija Pruˇscak,ˇ see Hasan. 189n60 Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı Gucetiˇ c,´ Nikola, 148 Hasandedic,´ Hivzija, 48n63, 48n64 al-Gurˇ gˇan¯ ¯ı, as-Sayyid aˇs-Sarˇ ¯ıf, 20, Heath, P.L., 94 20n50, 20n52, 34, 34n27, 39, 45, Hiti, Filip (Hitti, Philip), 10n5, 77n87, 86n119, 180, 197 12n10, 13n17, 136n327, 146n11 Gutas, Dimitri, 9, 11n6, 16n26, Hrkac,´ Serafin, 153n34, 153n35 17n32, 174 Hubay. ˇs ibn al-Hasan,. 12 Gyekye, Kwame, 9, 38n41 Hugo of St. Victor, 155 al-Huna¯ gˇ¯ı, Afdaludd. ¯ın, 45, 60n9 Hagˇgˇ¯ı Halifa, Mustafa(K¯ atib¯ Hunayn¯ ibn Ishaq¯ (Joanitius), 12 . ¯ .. . . Çalab¯ı), 26n2, 33, 33n23 Hurram¯ı, Mus.taf. ab.al-¯ h.a¯gˇgb.ˇ Хайруллаев, М.М., 9, 9n2, 170n4, ¯ Hurram al-Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, 36, 36n34 186n50 Husein¯ Abdel Latif es-Sayyid, 31, Hal¯ıl, 185 31n15, 36n32, 75, 75n77, 183n38, Hamilton,¯ William, 94, 159 187n54 Hammer, Joseph von, 26, 26n2 al-Hanaf. ¯ı, Muhammad. at-Tibr¯ız¯ı, Ibn al-#Abbas,¯ #Abdullah,¯ 186, 126 186n52 Handziˇ c,´ Mehmed, 31n15, 36n35, Ibn Haldun,¯ 18, 18n39, 46n59, 136, 48n63, 50, 50n69, 50n70, 51, 136¯ n326, 151, 151n29, 172, 175, 51n71, 51n74, 52n77 189, 189n63 Har¯ un¯ ar-Raˇs¯ıd, 11 Ibn Hazm,. 21, 190 Hasan. Kaf¯ ¯ıal-Aq¯ hi. s.ar¯ ¯ı, 20n52, Ibn al-Muqaffa#, 11, 185, 186n105 22, 22n57, 27, 28, 28n6, 28n7, Ibn al-Qasim¯ ar-Raqq¯ı, 11 29, 30, 31n14, 46, 50, 52, 59, Ibn Bihr¯ız, 11n8 60, 61, 61n15, 63, 68, 68n39, Ibn Na¯#ima, 11 68n40, 69, 69n42, 69n49, 70n53, Ibn Ruˇsd (Averroes), 2, 17, 17n33, 71n57, 72, 72n58, 72n61, 72n62, 18n34, 64n23, 145–147, 147n17, 73, 73n64, 73n66, 74, 74n71, 148, 161, 163, 167, 193 76, 76n81, 77n85, 78, 78n89, Ibn S¯ına¯ (Avicenna), 2, 5, 15, 15n26, 78n91, 79n92, 79n93, 84, 84n111, 16, 16n28, 16n29, 17–22, 31, 44, 84n114, 85n116, 85n118, 86n121, 44n52, 45n55, 52, 56, 58, 59, 87, 88n127, 89, 89n131, 90n134, 59n2, 60, 60n8, 64, 64n23, 64n25, 90n136, 91n142, 92n143, 92n145, 65, 65n26, 66, 79, 80, 80n100, 92n146, 93n148, 93n150, 95n154, 80n101, 81, 82, 82n106, 83, 84, 95n158, 96n160, 96n162, 97, 84n115, 88n128, 90n132, 93, 97n165, 97n168, 98n171, 100n178, 94, 94n151, 95n158, 96, 96n159, 100n181, 103n189, 107, 107n201, 97n163, 98, 99, 99n177, 100, 107n205, 108n207, 108n209, 101, 101n185, 102, 102n187, 103, 109, 109n211, 110, 110n215, 105, 107, 107n205, 113, 114n231, 111, 111n216, 113n226, 117n241, 117n238, 119n252, 122n265, 117n242, 119n253, 120, 120n258, 122n267, 127n292, 129, 129n305, 121n261, 123, 127n292, 128n297, 130, 131, 131n312, 131n313, 132– 128n298, 129n302, 130n306, 142, 136, 138, 140n333, 141, 145, 147, 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 232.

232 index of personal names

148, 148n21, 151, 154, 156, 157, Lejewski, Czeslav, 161n56 159, 161, 161n57, 162, 162n61, 165, Ljubovic,´ Amir, 26n1, 27n4, 29n9, 167, 171, 171n9, 172, 180, 181, 193, 37n35, 38n41, 49n66, 174n16 194, 196, 197 Lukasiewicz, Jan, 166 Ibrah¯ ¯ım b. Ramad.an,¯ 32, 36, 50, 50n70, 51, 51n71, 52, 54n83, 196, al-Ma"mun,¯ 11 203, 204, 209 Madkour, Ibrahim, 9, 10n5, 11n9, al-Ibra¯ˇs¯ı, 183n38 12n10, 12n13, 14n21, 16n29, al-I¯gˇ¯ı, Adududd. ¯ın #Abdurrahm. an,¯ 16n30, 21n53, 21n54, 77n86, 75, 75n75, 126, 126n286, 189 80n97, 80n99, 81n103, 82n106, Inaldzik,ˇ Halil, 21n55, 32n16, 92n144, 94n153, 96n159, 102, 173n13, 174n16, 189n64 102n186, 107n205, 120n254, #IsaibnYa¯ hy. a,¯ 12, 15 131n312, 131n314, 159, 159n49, al-Isfahan¯ ¯ı, Mahm. ud¯ ibn #Abdur- 159n50, 172n10, 183n38, 185n46, rahman,¯ 45n55 189n61, 190n68 al-Isfara¯"in¯ı, #Is.amudd¯ ¯ın, 75 Makdisi, George, 124n277, 174, 175, Ish.aq¯ ibn Hunayn,. 12 177n23, 178n24, 178n25 Ivic,´ Milka, 145n6 Markovic,´ Franjo, 148n22 Marmura, Michael E., 9 Jelinic,´ Julijan, 147n15 Maróth, Miklós, 74n72, 83, 89n107, Johannes Hispalensis, 145 93, 94n151, 144n4, 169n1 Jolivet, Jean, 146 Marulic,´ Marko, 147 Juraj Dubrovcaninˇ (from Dubrov- Melanchton, Phillip Schwarzeret, nik), 148n17, 166, 167 164 Merx, A., 183, 183n38 Kaciˇ cMio´ ˇsic,´ Andrija, 148, 148n21, Meyerhof, M., 9 150n26, 153, 156, 157, 200 Mez, Adam, 174 Kamaludd¯ ¯ın b. Yunus,¯ 19, 19n40, Miliband, S.D., 9n2 45 Moody, Ernest A., 76n80, 145n7, Kant, Immanuel, 90, 149, 149n23 150n24, 159n52, 161, 161n54, Karam, Yusuf, 131n314 161n59, 163n65 Karatay, Fehmi Edhem, 34n24 Muftic,´ Teuﬁk, 136n328 al-Katib¯ ¯ı, Nagmuddˇ ¯ın al-Qazw¯ın¯ı, Muhammad. ibn Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak,¯ 19, 19n43, 33, 33n21, 34, 35, 40, 20n52, 22, 31, 31n15, 32, 33, 41, 45, 60n12, 111, 163, 174 33n18, 33n21, 34, 34n24, 35, Kemura, Sejfudin, 48n63, 55, 36, 36n32, 51, 51n75, 52, 52n76, 55n89 54n83, 61, 68n39, 70n53, 79n93, al-Kind¯ı, 13, 13n17, 21, 137n329, 171 80n98, 81, 81n104, 83, 83n110, Klima, Gyula, 75n78 84n111, 86n121, 87n126, 88n127, Kraﬀt, A., 2 90n136, 91n142, 92n145, 95n154, Krstic,´ Kruno, 147n15 96n161, 96n162, 98n172, 100, 100n181, 103n189, 107n201, Ladan, Tomislav, 147, 147n17 109n212, 110n215, 111, 111n218, Lameer, Joep, 9, 15n23 112, 112n222, 113, 113n227, Laˇstric,´ Filip, 153, 200 116n235, 117n241, 121, 121n262, Leaman, O.N.H., 174 123n269, 123n270, 127n292, Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 143 128n298, 130n306, 131n313, 133, 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 233.

index of personal names 233

133n316, 134, 141, 142, 154, 187, 120n259, 120n260, 121n262, 187n54, 190n69, 195 121n264, 122n265, 123, 123n269, Muhammad. ibn Mus.taf. aal-¯ 123n270, 123n272, 124–126, Caynawˇ ¯ı, 48, 49, 49n68, 50, 127n292, 128n297, 128n298, 54, 60n8, 68n39, 70n53, 75, 129, 129n302, 129n303, 131, 79n93, 86n121, 88n127, 91n142, 131n313, 131n314, 133, 133n316, 92n145, 95n154, 96n162, 100n181, 134, 134n320, 134n321, 141, 103n189, 107n201, 110n215, 111, 142, 151, 152, 154, 156, 158n47, 117n241, 123n269, 127n292, 161, 165–167, 167n75, 168, 176, 128n298, 130n306, 131n313, 196 177, 180, 190n69, 195, 199, Muhammad. ibn Yusuf¯ al-Bosnaw¯ı, 200 50, 51n71, 54, 68n39, 79n93, Muˇsic,´ Omer, 36n33, 190n69 88n127, 91n142, 92n145, 95n154, 100n181, 107n201, 110n215, 111, (Ibn) an-Nadim, 9, 10n5, 12n10 117n241, 123n269, 127n292, Nametak, Fehim, 27n4 128n298, 130n306, 196 Nasr, Seyyed Hosein, 171n7, 172n11, Muhibb. ¯ı, 31n15, 33, 33n18, 33n19 174n15 Mujic,´ Muhamed, 36n33, 36n35, 38n37, 46n60, 177n22 Ockham (Occam), William, 73n64, Music,´ Muhamed Allamek, see 150, 156 Muhammad. ibn Mus¯ a¯ #Allamak¯ Olesnicki, Aleksej, 53, 55 Mus.t.af¯ a-pa¯ ˇsa Sila¯hd. ar,¯ 32 Mustafab.¯ Hidr al-Adirnaw¯ı, 34n24 Pajnic,´ Erna, 148n20 .. ¯ . Mus.taf. ab.Y¯ usuf¯ Ayyub¯ ¯ı-zade¯ al- Pellat, Charles, 136n327 Most¯ ar¯ ¯ı, 20n52, 22, 35n31, 36, Perler, Dominik, 19n39 36n35, 37–41, 44, 44n52, 45, Petronijevic,´ Branislav, 108n209 45n55, 45n57, 46, 47, 47n61, 48, Petrus Hispanus, 146, 150, 152 49, 49n65, 50, 51n71, 52n76, Picco della Mirandola, G., 146, 147 53, 54, 54n81, 55n87, 60, 60n8, Pierre de la Ramée (Petar Ramus), 61–64, 64n25, 65, 68n39, 69, 164 70, 70n50, 70n53, 72, 75, 76n81, Pilav, Omer, sin Saliha, 55n85 78n91, 79, 79n92, 79n93, 79n95, Pines, S., 17n32 80, 80n100, 80n102, 81, 81n104, Plato, 80n100, 82n106, 86, 145, 147, 83, 83n110, 84n111, 85n117, 155, 160, 170, 197 86n121, 87, 87n125, 88n126, Plotin, 64n24 88n127, 90n136, 91, 91n142, Porphyry, 11, 14, 16, 38, 38n41, 74, 92n143, 92n145, 93n148, 94, 76, 76n80, 77n86, 78n90, 145, 95n154, 96n161, 96n162, 98n172, 148, 154, 159 100, 100n181, 102, 103, 103n189, Prantl, Carl, 146n11, 174 103n190, 103n191, 104, 105, Prior, A.N., 2n2, 9n1, 76n80, 99n177, 105n196, 106n199, 107, 107n201, 107n204, 122n267, 128n299, 107n205, 108, 108n209, 109n213, 143n2, 144n4 110n215, 111, 111n218, 112, 113, Priscian, 145 113n225, 113n227, 113n229, 114n231, 115, 115n233, 116, Qara Yilan,¯ 27 116n235, 117, 117n241, 118, 119, al-Qift.¯ı, Gamˇ aludd¯ ¯ın, 9, 10n5, 11n8, 119n249, 119n253, 120n255, 12n10 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 234.

234 index of personal names

Quintilian, 165 at-. Tabar. ¯ı, Muhammad. b. Garˇ ¯ır, Qust.a¯ ibn Luq¯ a,¯ 12 186, 186n53 Tabit¯ ibn Qurra, 12 ¯ ar-Raz¯ ¯ı, Fahrudd¯ın, 18, 18n39, 21, at-. Taw. anis¯ ¯ı, 183n38 39, 44, 44¯n53, 44n54, 189n62, 197 Theodor (Tadhar¯ ¯ı), 11 ar-Raz¯ ¯ı, Qutbudd. ¯ın at-Taht. an¯ ¯ı, 19, Theophrastus, 107, 107n204 19n47, 33n21, 34, 60n11 Thomas Aquinas, 81, 146, 156 Reig, Daniel, 131n314 Thomas, Ivo, 143n2, 163, 163n62, Renan, E., 9, 18, 183, 183n38 163n64, 163n65, 165n69 Rescher, Nicholas, 9, 9n1, 10, 10n5, Trako, Salih, 48n64, 52n78 11n7, 12, 12n10, 12n11, 12n14, at-Taftaz¯ an¯ ¯ı, Sa#dudd¯ın Mas#ud,¯ 19, 13, 13n17, 13n19, 13n21, 14n21, 20n49, 34, 34n25, 108, 189 15, 15n24, 17n31, 17n32, 18, at-. T. us¯ ¯ı, Nas.¯ırudd¯ın, 19, 19n42, 34, 19, 20n52, 21n53, 93, 109n212, 34n26, 36, 44, 44n54 151n28, 158, 158n48 at-Tustar¯ ¯ı, Sa#id al-Yaman¯ ¯ı, 19, Rieu, Ch., 2 19n46 Roscelin, 145 Rudolph, Urlich, 19n39 Urmaw¯ı, Sira¯guddˇ ¯ın, 18, 27, 27n3, ar-Rum¯ ¯ı, Mas#ud¯ aˇs-Sirwˇ an¯ ¯ı, 126, 31, 45, 60n10 126n283 Uˇsˇsaq¯ı(Uˇsˇsaq¯ı-zade),¯ 33 Uziˇ cawalˇ ¯ı, Fa¯dil,. 53, 54, 54n82, 55, Sabra, A.I., 9, 10n5, 13, 13n18, 68n39, 79n93, 88n127, 91n142, 13n20, 21n54 92n145, 95n154, 96n162, 100n181, Sal. ¯ıba,¯ Gamˇ ¯ıl, 64n23 107n201, 108n209, 110n215, as-Samarqand¯ı, Samsuddˇ ¯ın, 45, 124, 111, 117n241, 123n269, 127n292, 124n276, 125 128n298, 130n306, 196 al-Sarahs¯ı, Muhammad. b. Ahmad. b. Ab¯uBakr¯ Samsˇ al-A#imma, 177 Valla, Lorenzo (Lorenzo della Valle), Schacht, J., 190n67 164 Sharif, M.M., 14n21, 64n23, 64n24 Vasoli, Cesare, 147n15 Sherwood, William, 152, 159 Veljaciˇ c,´ Cedomil,ˇ 63n22, 67n36, Smailagic,´ Nerkez, 171n9, 186n51, 74n70, 96n159, 156n43, 170n2 186n53, 188n55 Versteegh, C.H.M., 174, 184, Socrates, 82n106, 160 184n42, 184n43 Soheil, A., 70n52 Suˇsic,´ Hasan, 172n11 Wahrmund, Adolf, 104n192 Sabanoviˇ c,´ Hazim, 3, 22n57, 26n2, Walzer, R., 9 31n15, 33n17, 33n18, 33n22, Wansbrough, J., 184, 184n43 36n35, 37n36, 52n77, 52n78, 55, Weiss, Bernard G., 75n73 55n90, 126n288, 190n69 Windelband, Wilhelm, 73n64, 81, Seˇ ˇsic,´ Bogdan, 67n38, 90n135, 81n103, 144n4, 145, 145n8, 146, 154n36, 166n73, 179n27 146n12, 156n44, 193, 194n3 aˇs-Sˇ¯ıraz¯ ¯ı, Qutbudd. ¯ın, 19, 19n44 Sojat,ˇ Z., 147n15 Yahy. aibn¯ #Ad¯ı, 12 Yahy. a¯ ibn al-Bitr. ¯ıq, 11 Ta¸sköprü-zade,¯ Ahmad,. 172, 172n13, Yusuf¯ b. Murad,¯ 37 181n34 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 235.

index of personal names 235

Zabaralla, Giacomo, 163 Zuzoric,´ Flora (Cvijeta), 148 Zakuev, A.K., 9, 21n53 Zdraloviˇ c,´ Muhamed, 39n45, 53, Zeller, Eduard, 159 53n79, 55, 55n86, 126n288 Zimmermann, F.W., 14n21 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 236. 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 237.

INDEX OF ENGLISH LOGICAL TERMS

Absolute (judgment), 95, 95n156, 115n232, 116, 162, 190, 198, 209, 117, 118, 122, 123 214 Absolutely particular, 77 Ante res, 80, 81, 214 Abstract, 66, 80n101, 132, 139, 205 Antecedence, 91, 110, 111, 205, 212 Abstraction, 63, 66, 67, 79, 80, Antistréfon, 97n164 80n101, 205, 215 Antí thesis, 97n163, 215 Acceptable premisses, 128, 128n295, Apodictic (apodeictic syllogisms), 29, 212 39, 43, 47, 49, 53, 55, 117, 118, 121, Accepted judgments, 100, 123, 128, 123, 130, 130n306, 133, 141, 164, 128n295, 208 198, 204, 209 Accidence, 38n41, 62, 77, 77n86, 84, Apparently known premiss, 130 85, 127, 211, 214, 216 Apparently true premiss, 130 Accident, 39, 61, 211 Archetype, 80n100 Accidental, 77, 132, 211, 216 Argument, 16, 33, 46n59, 62, 115, Acquired intellect, 66, 66n34, 211, 116, 117n238, 123, 127n292, 212 128n295, 128n297, 130n310, 161, Active intellect, 64, 65, 65n29, 66, 184, 185n46, 188, 189, 206, 208 211 Argumentation, 114n231, 116, 121, Active intelligence, 66, 156 121n263, 122, 129, 130, 163, 178, Actual (disjunctive judgment), 90 187, 188, 204, 206, 208, 209, 213, Actual definition, 83, 206 214 Actual existence, 80, 157 Ars Nova, 146 Actual intellect, 65, 66n34, 211 Ars Vetus, 146 Actual meaning (signification), 74, Assent (assessment), 209 158, 206 Assertions, 29, 46, 47, 62, 63, 68, Actually, 66, 102, 110 85n118, 86n121, 87, 116, 134 Adaequatio intellectus et rei, 87 Assertoric (judgment), 95, 95n156 Adequacy, 70, 87, 210 Attribute, 88, 88n128 Aequivocus, 73n65 Attribution, 86, 88n128, 92n146, Affirmation, 71n55, 86–88, 95n157, 104n192, 208 98, 108, 110, 205, 216 Attributive (judgment), 88, 88n128, Affirmative (judgment), 88n128, 91– 104n193, 206 94, 97n165, 97n166, 98, 98n174, Axiom, 43, 44, 66, 98, 103, 118, 124, 106, 108, 108n209, 162, 205, 213, 124n321, 135, 204 214, 216 After plurality (Lat. Post res), 80 Barbara (modus), 115 Amphiboly, 132 Before the plurality (things, Lat. Analogous, 133, 157 Ante res), 80, 166, 214 Analogy (reasoning by analogy), 15, Bipartite (judgment), 91, 91n139, 43, 62, 99, 100, 100n180, 113, 115, 205, 213 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 238.

238 index of english logical terms

Bramantip (modus), 108n206, Conception, 29, 30, 46, 47, 62, 63, 108n209 68, 134, 155, 181 Conceptualism, 79, 156 Calemes (modus), 108n208 Concluding, 99, 100, 134, 141, 215 Camestres (modus), 106n200 Conclusion, 4, 15, 30, 35, 41, 43, 46, Categorematic (sign), 93, 157, 158 47, 51, 53, 57, 85, 96–106, 108– Categorical (judgment, proposition, 118, 120–124, 127–133, 135n324, premiss), 35, 42, 43, 47, 71, 88–91, 140, 142, 150, 156, 164, 178, 179, 94, 102–104, 110, 111, 161, 162, 187, 210, 214, 215 208, 213 Conclusion based on the absurd, Categorical (syllogism), 15, 43, 71, 111, 112, 207, 219 102, 102n188, 104, 104n192, Condition, 15, 43, 78, 88n129, 89, 104n193, 109, 206 91, 106, 108, 114, 131, 209 Categories, 11, 14, 17, 18, 38n41, 72, Conditional (judgment, proposition, 73n67, 74n69, 76–82, 145, 151, premiss), 15, 35, 42, 43, 47, 88–91, 152, 154, 158, 159, 171, 180, 182, 93, 95n154, 98, 101, 104, 110, 142, 182n37, 184, 185, 213, 220 161, 204, 209 Causal argumentation, 119n252, 121, Conditional (syllogism), 47, 121, 204, 204, 214 209, 213 Causality, 116, 121, 135, 135n332, Conditional argumentation, 121, 211 121n263, 204 Cause, 66, 116–122, 127, 130n307, Conditional-conjunctive (judgment, 133, 134, 139, 149, 166, 190, 211 proposition, premiss), 15, 89, Cesare (modus), 106n198, 147n15 91, 104, 109, 122n265, 142, 199, Changeable being, 167 213 Changeable body, 167 Conditional-disjunctive (judgment, Circle, 92n116, 115, 127, 207, 213 proposition, premiss), 15, 89, 91, Circulus vitiosus, 115, 116, 207 104, 109, 111, 142, 199, 213 Closer difference, see: Differentia Congruent, 81, 208 specifica Connected (syllogism), 35, 43, 47, Closer genus, see: Genus proximum 101, 102, 104, 213 Cognition, 58, 61–65, 67, 79, 79n94, Consequence, 91, 101n182, 108, 110, 80, 120n254, 132, 134, 147, 157, 111, 127, 161, 205, 214 160, 163, 179, 181, 187, 194, 207, Consequential meaning (significa- 209, 211 tion), 70, 207, 214 Common, 73, 73n67, 101, 118, 206, Content (of premiss, syllogism), 35, 209, 211 101, 101n184, 116, 130n210, 131, Complete definition, 84, 206 134, 135, 209, 210, 214 Complete description, 84, 208 Contingency, 15, 95, 95n156, 96, 142, Complete induction, 113, 114, 115, 216 212 Contradiction, 82, 97, 97n163, Complex (syllogism), 43, 111, 112, 98n174, 112, 113, 127, 135n324, 119n251, 161, 208, 213 207, 212, 215 Complex (word), 71, 71n56, 87, 182, Contradictoriness (judgments, 204, 208, 214 propositions, premiss), 42 Comprehension, 47, 186, 212 Contraposition, 42, 47, 98, 98n174, Concept, 209 211, 215 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 239.

index of english logical terms 239

Contrariness (judgment, proposition, Demonstrative syllogism, 116, 121, premiss), 42, 82, 97, 97n163, 128n297, 179, 204, 213 97n165, 97n166, 210, 212, 215 Denominated, 207 Contrary (Contrariness), 73, 96, 97, Denominator, 207 97n163, 97n165, 97n166, 206, 210, Denying inexistence (judgment, 212, 213 proposition), 90, 107, 113 Convention, 70, 72n58, 74n71, 209, Description, 39, 53, 60, 62, 63, 76, 216 82, 83n109, 84, 85, 85n116, 160, Conventional (signification, 198, 208, 209 meaning), 69, 69n42, 69n43, Dialectic (dialectical syllogism), 29, 69n46, 70, 72, 182, 207, 209, 216 39, 44, 49, 53, 55, 116, 117, 122, Conversion, 42, 47, 49, 86n120, 122n267, 123, 124, 127–130, 151, 96–100, 211 152, 164, 198, 205, 209, 213 Conviction, 85n118, 99, 100, 116, Dialektiké téhne, 122n267 119, 165, 205, 206, 216 Difference, 38n41, 39, 70n52, 74, 77, Conjunction, 89, 103, 122n265, 161, 82, 84, 97n165, 112n223, 167, 207, 216 212, 214 Conjunctive (judgment, proposition, Different, 74, 76, 101, 204, 207, 212 premiss), 43, 88, 89, 89n130, 91, Differentia specifica, 70n52, 84, 117, 102, 104, 109, 110, 142, 161, 199, 167, 212 213, 216 Dimatis (modus), 108n206, 108n208 Coordination, 81, 82, 132 Direct reasoning, 42, 162, 190, 196 Copula, 87, 91, 91n139, 92, 93, 140, Disjunction, 90, 116, 161, 212 205, 208, 213 Disjunctive (proposition, premiss; Corpus mobile, 167 judgment, syllogism), 15, 43, 89, Correspondence, 87 89n130, 90, 91, 103, 104, 109–111, 116, 142, 161, 199, 212, 213 De dicto, 158 Disparity (disparate), 82, 207 De re, 158 Dispute, 122, 130, 130n310, 209 Deductio ad apsurdum, 111, 207, 213 Distant genus, 78, 84 Deduction, 54, 55, 62, 76, 85n118, Divide syllogism, 114, 213 98, 99, 103, 105, 106, 108, Division, 76, 212 108n209, 109n211, 111, 115–117, 132, 162, 179, 185, 187, 215 Ékthesis (notion definition), 15 Deductive conclusion, 113, 132, 141, Element, 64, 137, 204, 211 198 Emanation, 64, 64n24 Deductivism, 187 Emotional perceptions, 119, 216 Definite (judgment), 92, 92n146, 215 Empiricism, 193, 194, 201 Definition, 35, 39, 42, 53, 60, Ens mobile, 167 61n15, 62, 63, 67, 68, 76, 82– Epagogé, 113n228 85, 104n195, 134, 135, 138, 160, Equipollence, 42, 98, 211 188, 198, 206, 209, 211 Equivalent, 81, 92, 92n143, 211 Definitiones quid nominis, 83 Equivocal, 73, 73n67, 208, 209 Definitiones quid rei, 83, 206 Eristic proof, 130, 130n310 Demonstration, 117, 117n238, Esse formaliter, 73n64 118n242, 121, 122, 122n266, Esse objective, 73n64 132, 133, 164, 165, 204, 207 Essence, 74n70, 77, 77n87, 78, 83, 84, 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 240.

240 index of english logical terms

84n112, 85, 92, 100, 119n251, 138, Harmonic (congruent), 81, 208 139, 149, 155, 208, 214 Harmonic (word), 73 Essential, 77, 208, 212, 214 Harmonic meaning (signification), Example, 62, 99, 115, 115n232, 70 115n234, 214 Hermeneutics (al-#Ibara,¯ Bar¯ ¯ı Exceptive (judgment), 102 arm¯ıniyas),¯ 14, 211 Existence in words, 157 Higher species, 78, 215 Experience based knowledge, 43, Homonym, 72, 73n67, 132, 208, 209 119, 119n252, 205 Homonymy, 132, 209 Experiment based knowledge, 43, Horismós, 134, 138, 160 119, 205 Hóros, 104n195, 138 Explicative discourse (speech), 62, Hóti, 122, 122n265, 122n266 209, 213 Hypographe, 83 External senses, 119, 206, 207 Hypothesis, 184, 212, 216 Hypothetical (judgment), 89, 90, 93, Fallacia disjunctionis, 116 94 Fesapo (modus), 108n206, 108n208 Hypothetical (syllogism), 15, 102, Figurative (meaning, signification), 102n188, 103, 144, 182 74, 205, 207 Hypothetical conjunction, 89 Figure (figures of syllogism), 35, 43, 52, 52n78, 54, 56, 85, 104–110, Idea, 39, 42, 49, 63, 67, 68, 70, 73, 115, 116, 128n297, 131, 142, 162, 74, 79–81, 156, 209, 211, 212 162n61, 163, 198, 199, 209 Identity, 81, 166 First knowledge, 118 Implication, 70n52, 91, 160, 161, Five skills, 116, 117, 164 210 Five universal terms, 29, 30, 39, 47, Impossible (judgment), 95, 95n157, 53, 61n15, 68, 214 106, 207, 213–216 For m, 45, 58, 64, 80, 80n100, In plurality (Lat. In rebus), 80 92n146, 116, 131, 138, 139, 209 In rebus, 80, 81, 214 Fresison (modus), 108n208 Incomplete conversion, 98, 98n169 Incomplete definition, 84, 206 General accident (accidence), 61 Incomplete description, 84, 208 General notion(s), 75, 76, 77n86, Incomplete disjunction, 116 79–81, 99 Incomplete induction, 113–115, 212 Generally accepted knowledge, 134 Incompletely complex, 71 Generally known judgments, 209 Indefinite (judgment), 88n128, 92, Generally possible (judgment), 29, 92n146, 93, 215 95n158, 214 Indisputable (safe knowledge), 43, Genus, 38n41, 39, 70n52, 73, 76– 113, 113n230, 116–118, 120n258, 78, 78n88, 81, 84, 114, 132, 156, 141, 198, 216 158–160, 181, 205, 214 Individual, 35, 61, 77, 78, 80, 92, Genus logicum, 81 92n146, 93, 112, 113n228, 115, 156, Genus mentale, 81, 205 205, 207, 209, 213, 214 Genus minor (lower), 78, 205 Induction, 43, 47, 62, 99, 100, 113, Genus naturale, 81, 205 113n228, 114–116, 128n297, 160, Genus proximum, 78, 84, 205 162, 196, 204, 212 Given name, 71, 71n56, 73 Inductive, 15, 113n228, 114, 142, 159 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 241.

index of english logical terms 241

Inseparable accidence, 77, 77n86, Logic of judgments, 85, 160, 161 211, 214 Logica nova, 76n80, 146, 154, 193 Instantia negativa, 114 Logica vetus, 76n80, 146, 154 Intellect (intellectus), 62n19, 63–67, Logical fallacy, 130n307, 152 69, 69n44, 69n47, 70, 87, 119, Logical supposition, 158 148, 153, 156, 157, 171, 208, 211, Lógos apofantikós, 88, 88n122 215 Lower species, 78, 215 Intellect in effect, 65 Intellectual (signification, meaning), Major premiss, 101–106, 108n209, 80, 205–209, 211 162n61, 163, 212–214 Intellectus acquisitus, 66, 211 Major term, 101, 104, 115n234, Intellectus agens, 211 120n256, 121, 138, 163, 205, 206, Intellectus in effectu, 65 210, 214 Intellectus in habitu, 65, 211 Material intellect, 65, 211, 215 Intellectus materialis, 65, 211 Mathematical (judgment, syllogism), Intellectus possibilis, 65, 148 94, 208, 213 Intelligence, 62, 64, 64n24, 66, 67, Mathematical logic, 149, 160 147, 156, 211 Matter, 63, 64, 130n210, 137, 214, 215 Intelligibilia, 65, 66, 211 Meaning (signification), 39, 47, 67– Intelligible, 63, 211 74, 83, 138, 141, 158, 182, 198, Intentional existence, 128n307, 157 206, 207, 210, 211, 214–126 Interfering, 81 Meaning (signification) by harmony Internal (senses), 87, 119, 206 (congruity), 207 Interpretative speech, 29, 30, 39, 49, Middle genus, 78, 205 53, 55, 83, 213 Middle species, 78, 215 Intuition, 61, 65–67, 114n230, 119, Middle term, 101, 104, 105, 107, 119n251, 120, 120n254, 206, 207, 107n208, 115, 120, 120n256, 121, 209 122n266, 162, 162n60, 162n61, Intuitive knowledge (Intuition based 165, 206, 216 knowledge), 43, 120, 206, 209 Mind, 59, 61, 62, 62n19, 65, 66, 66n121, 69, 73, 73n64, 156–158, Judgment (Judging), 4, 5, 29, 30, 35, 185, 188, 205 39, 42, 43, 47, 53, 55, 57, 61n15, Minor premiss, 104–106, 162n61, 62, 67, 68, 71, 82, 85–104, 106, 163, 212 109–111, 115, 116, 118–120, 123, Minor term, 101, 104, 120n256, 121, 134, 140, 142, 152, 153, 155, 157, 206, 209 158, 160–162, 176, 179, 182, 183, Mixed (syllogism), 35, 43, 92n144, 198, 199, 205–210, 212–216 99, 207 Judgment’s relation, 87 Modal (judgment, proposition), 35, 42, 95, 95n156, 96, 109n212, 142, Knowledge, 43–45, 53, 63, 66, 68, 161, 208, 213, 216 75, 99, 100, 111, 113, 113n230, Modality, 43, 88, 95, 95n154, 114, 116–120, 122, 122n266, 123, 95n156, 109, 131, 216 125–127, 130–134, 141, 146, 149, Mode, 54, 58, 105–111, 115, 158, 198, 151, 154, 164–166, 171, 177, 179, 210 188, 193, 198, 204–206, 209, 211, Modus ponendo ponens, 111 212, 216 Modus ponendo tollens, 111 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 242.

242 index of english logical terms

Modus tollendo ponens, 111 Particle, 72, 72n60, 102, 103, Modus tollendo tollens, 111 121n263, 122n265, 204, 208 Particular (judgment, proposition, Name, 71–73, 208 premiss), 63, 88n128, 92n146, 93, Natural (signification, meaning), 69, 97n166, 97n167, 98, 106, 108, 146, 69n45, 69n48, 70, 80, 207, 210 204, 205, 207, 212 Natural, 81, 156, 205 Particular (notion, term), 35, 42, 77, Necessary (judgment), 95, 95n157, 204, 205, 207 95n158, 210, 213 Particular-affirmative (judgment, Necessary, 70, 70n53, 73, 96, premiss), 97n166, 106, 205, 213 113n230, 116, 122, 122n266, Particular-negative (judgment, 210, 214, 216 premiss), 97n166, 106, 205, 213 Necessity, 70n53, 95n156, 100n181, Perception, 61, 66, 67, 118–119, 153, 130, 214 206, 207, 209, 216 Negation, 86, 87, 92, 95n157, Perception based knowledge, 118 95n158, 98, 108, 111, 206, 208, Personal, 77, 77n87, 207 211, 215, 216 Petitio principii, 131, 131n314, 209 Negative (judgment), 86n121, Phrase, 71 88n128, 91, 92, 94, 97n165, Polysyllogism, 111, 112, 112n220, 213 97n166, 98n174, 106, 108n209, Possible, 73, 95, 95n158, 96, 106, 213, 162, 205, 208, 211, 213, 214 214, 216 Negative term, 51n55, 85, 140, 162, Post res, 80, 81, 214 206, 211 Postulate, 44, 134, 134n322, 135, 209, Nominal definition, 83, 206 216 Nominalism, 79, 79n94, 145, 156, Potential intellect, 65, 66, 66n34, 201 211, 213 Nominated, 68 Potentially, 66, 102 Nominator (significant), 68, 207 Practical truth, 117 Non-categorical, 90, 104, 104n193, Predicabilia, 76, 152 109, 110, 161, 206 Predicate, 76, 87–92, 94, 95n157, Not inclusive (judgment, proposi- 98, 98n174, 101, 104, 104n192, tion), 90 105, 112n221, 118, 132, 140, Notion, 4, 25n1, 57, 67, 72, 74–82, 142, 157, 158, 160, 162, 162n61, 84, 101, 104, 114, 145, 180, 205, 163, 199, 205, 206, 211, 213, 206, 209, 212, 215 215 Premiss, 83, 85, 88n128, 101–106, Opposite, 81, 113, 204, 212 108–112, 114–118, 121–123, 127– Opposition ( of judgments, 135, 138, 158, 160–163, 165, 187, propositions), 42, 47, 82, 86, 207, 209, 210, 212–216 95n158, 96, 98, 98n172, 100, 106, Principle, 44, 46n59, 65n31, 69, 80, 112, 207, 210, 212, 215 122, 131, 133–135, 204, 209 Opposition (terms, notions), 42, 82 Principle anticipation, 131 Principle of identity, 166 Parádeigma, 118, 118n234 Principle of reduction, 15 Paronym, 72 Probable premisses, 128 Partial meaning (signification), 70, Proof, 46n59, 66, 76, 85n118, 115, 70n52, 204, 207 116, 117n238, 121, 127, 129, 130, 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 243.

index of english logical terms 243

130n310, 134, 135, 164, 176, 188, Scientific knowledge, 114n230, 117, 189, 204, 206, 207 118, 118n242, 123, 130n306, 132, Proper (judgment), 92 133, 141, 164–166 Properly possible (judgment), 95, Second intention, 158 95n158 Sense, 61, 63, 66, 118n248, 119n251, Property (proper), 38n41, 39, 65n31, 119n252, 206, 211 77, 207, 214, 215 Sense based knowledge, 119, 206 Proposition, 43, 71, 71n55, 87, Sensible, 63, 167, 206 92n146, 96, 120, 120n258, Sensible things, 167 120n259, 121, 135n324, 205, Separable accidence, 77, 77n86, 211 206, 208, 211, 212, 214– Separate (separated, disconnected 216 syllogism), 35, 43, 47, 101, 103, Proprium, 76, 207 104, 110, 205, 213 Si (argumentation), 121 Quality (of judgment, proposition), Sign, 68–70, 93, 158, 181, 182, 207 87, 88, 91, 97n167, 98, 98n174, Significated, 68, 207 106, 108, 115n232, 131, 207, 208, Signification (meaning), 35, 206, 213, 214 207, 210, 211, 214 Quantification of predicate, 93, 94, Significator, 68, 207 158, 162, 199 Simple (idea, word, judgment), Quantified (judgment), 92, 92n145, 42, 61, 71, 71n56, 157, 204, 212, 208, 213, 215 214 Quantifier, 92n146, 93, 94, 138, Singular (judgment), 93, 142, 199, 208 209, 213 Quantity (of judgment, proposition), Sophism, 129, 130, 130n307, 42, 88, 92–94, 106, 131, 177, 206, 130n309, 132, 208, 212 214, 215 Sophistic (sophistical syllogism), 14, Quattuor modi, 96 29, 39, 44, 49, 54, 55, 101n184, Quia (argumentation; quia est), 121, 117, 122, 129, 130, 130n306, 210 130n309, 132, 137, 151, 158, 164, Quick wit, 120, 120n256 165, 198, 208, 209, 212, 213 Quidditas, 77n87, 214 Sorites, 112 Quinque voces, 38n41, 209 Soul, 64–67, 80, 138, 215 Species, 38n41, 39, 73, 76–78, 153, Rational thinking, 1, 119n254 159, 160, 181, 214, 215 Rationing, 153, 155, 158 Specific difference, 70n52, 84, 117, Real supposition, 158 167, 212 Realism, 79, 145, 155–157 Spirit, 49, 62, 62n19, 63, 156, 208 Reality, 67, 73n64, 74n76, 78, Spiritual existence, 157 79n94, 87, 121, 179, 181, 183, Spoken (sign, signification, 208 meaning), 69, 69n43, 69n44, Reduction, 109, 109n211, 204, 208 69n45, 70, 72, 157, 182, 207, 211, Reduction of syllogism, 15, 109n211, 214 208 Sub-altered (judgment), 97, 97n167 Reflection, 85, 184, 212 Sub-alternation, 97, 97n166 Relation, 87–90, 96–98, 103, Sub-contrariness, 97, 97n166 104n194, 133, 210, 215 Sub-contrary (judgment), 97, 97n166 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 244.

244 index of english logical terms

Subject, 70n51, 87–95, 98, 98n174, The first principles, 65n31, 69, 135, 101, 104, 105, 112n221, 118, 204 122n265, 140, 157, 158, 162, Theoretical truth, 117 162n61, 163, 205, 206, 210, 213, Thinking, 1, 4, 5, 13, 21, 58, 59, 61, 215, 216 62, 62n19, 66, 67, 72, 80, 88, 99, Subordination, 81, 97n167, 133 113n228, 119n251, 123, 136, 141, Substantial form, 80n100 143, 146, 155, 164–166, 171, 173, Subsumtion by volume, 94 175, 178–182, 194, 195, 198, 200, Suggestive premisses, 128, 129n302, 201, 207, 210, 212, 215 207 Time, 72, 72n58, 90, 91, 93, 95, 96, Summum genus, 78, 205 103, 120, 138, 208 Super-ordination, 81 Time-defined proposition, 96 Supposition of terms, 158, 208 Transferred (meaning, signification), Syllogism, 15, 29, 35, 39, 43, 47, 74, 74n71, 215 53–56, 61n15, 62, 66–68, 71, 94, Transferred knowledge, 43, 120, 99–104, 106, 109–123, 127–133, 120n258, 216 141, 144, 158, 161–166, 179, 188, Tripartite (judgment), 91, 205, 213 190, 198, 205–210, 212–216 Truth, 13, 39, 41, 58, 65, 66, 74n70, Syllogism based proposition 87, 98, 117, 120n258, 123, 126, (Proposition based on syllogisms), 132–135, 138, 141, 142, 171, 172, 43, 120 183, 191, 198, 206, 209, 214, Syllogism of absurd (per impossibile; 216 deductio ad absurdum), 43, 207, 213 Universal (judgment, premiss), Syllogism of contradiction, 112, 113, 88n128, 92n145, 93, 97n165, 207 97n167, 98, 106, 108, 108n209, Syllogism of equality, 94, 103, 208 114n230, 211, 213, 214 Syllogistic (figure, conclusion), 30, Universal (term, notion; universalia), 52, 54–56, 99, 101n184, 104, 29, 30, 35, 39, 42, 47, 53, 61n15, 105, 107n201, 111, 112, 115–117, 63, 69, 73, 75–81, 92n146, 145, 135n324, 142, 151, 162, 164, 165, 151–153, 155–157, 160, 198, 211, 190, 198, 199, 213 214 Syncategorematic, 93, 158 Universal-affirmative (judgment, Synonym, 72, 74, 74n69, 81, premiss), 97n165, 98, 98n174, 106, 131n314, 207, 208 162, 205, 213, 214 Synonymy, 132 Universal-negative (judgment, premiss), 97n165, 98n174, 106 Temporal interpretation of modal Univocal (univocus), 73, 73n63, 157, judgments, 96, 96n161, 142 166, 216 Ter m, 25n1, 29, 30, 35, 38, 38n41, Unsafe (non-absolutely safe; 39, 42, 45, 47, 52, 53, 68, 72–74, judgment, knowledge), 44, 123, 85, 101, 104, 105, 107, 107n208, 213 115, 115n234, 120, 120n256, 121, Unspoken (sign, signification, 138, 151, 156–163, 165, 179–181, meaning), 69, 69n46, 69n47, 184, 198, 204–212, 214, 216 69n48, 70, 157, 207, 211, 214 Terminus, 104n195, 153 Untrue premisses, 87, 123, 130 The first intention, 158 Untruth, 87, 98, 138, 214 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 245.

index of english logical terms 245

Verb, 40n47, 72, 72n59, 74n71, 157, Word, 29, 30, 35, 39, 42, 47, 52, 212, 214 53, 61n15, 62, 68–74, 76, 77, 81, Verbum mentale, 157, 182 83, 85, 87, 89, 92–94, 98, 103, Verbum vocale, 157, 182 104n195, 132, 155–157, 181, 182, Vicious circle, 127, 207 189, 198, 204, 208, 212, 214 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 246. 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 247.

INDEX OF ARABIC LOGICAL TERMS

Terms that are mentioned only in the Glossary of Logical Terms, are marked with an asterisk (*). ada(t),¯ pl. adawat,¯ 72, 72n60 awwaliyyat,¯ 118, 118n245, 135 akbar, 101, 104, 121 ayna* #aks, 42, 97, 97n164, 98, 98n169 #aks bas¯ıt*. ba#d*. al-#aks al-mustawa,¯ 42, 47, 98, ba#da al-katra, 80, 157 ¯ 98n173 ba#d.¯ı* #aks naqis,¯ 98n169 bah.t, 35, 42, 60, 61, 124, 124n275, #aks tamm,¯ 98n170 125¯ , 165, 178 #aks an-naq¯ıd,. 98, 98n174 Bar¯ ¯ıarm¯ıniyas,¯ 14 ala,¯ 59, 59n5, 154 bas¯ıt*. alfa¯zmu. "allafat,¯ 71 bi al-#arad*. #amal* bi al-ﬁ#l, 65, 102, 110 #amal¯ı, 65n26 bi al-hulf, 112n223, 116 #amm,¯ 81, 95 bi al-quwwa,¯ 65, 102 antaga*ˇ burhan,¯ 14, 29, 39, 43, 47, 49, 117, #aql, 64, 64n23, 64n25, 65, 66, 117n228, 121, 164 66n24, 118 burhan¯ iniyy (burhan¯ al-in), 121, #aql #amal¯ı, 65n26, 110 121n263 #aql bi al-ﬁ#l, 65, 102, 110, 116 burhan¯ limiyy (burhan¯ al-lima), 121, #aql bi al-malaka, 65 121n263 #aql bi al-quwwa, 65, 102, 162 burhan¯ ¯ı, 47 #aql fa##al,¯ 64, 65 #aql hayul¯ an¯ ¯ı, 65 dalala,¯ 47, 68, 158 #aql mustafad,¯ 66, 66n34 dalala¯ haq. ¯ıqiyya* #aql nazar. ¯ı* dalala¯ tab. #iyya gayr˙ lafziyya*. #aql sar¯ıh,. 118 dalala¯ tab. #iyya lafziyya*. #aql z.ahir*¯ dalala¯ #aqliyya gayr˙ lafziyya*. #aql¯ı(#aqliyya), 69, 80, 156, 171, dalala¯ #aqliyya lafziyya*. 171n9, 172 dalala¯ #aqliyya* #arad,. 77 dalala¯ bi al-iltizam*¯ #arad. #amm,¯ 61, 77 dalala¯ bi al-mut.abaqa*¯ #aradl. azim,¯ 77 dalala¯ bi at-tadammun*. #aradmuf. ariq,¯ 77 dalala¯ manqula*¯ #arad.¯ı, 77 dalala¯ wad.#iyya* as.gar,˙ 101, 104, 121 dalala¯ wad.#iyya gayr˙ lafziyya*. asl,. 185, 185 dalala¯ wad.#iyya lafziyya*. awsat,. 101, 104, 121 dal¯ıl, 68 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 248.

248 index of arabic logical terms

dall,¯ 68, 84 guzˇ "* darb,. 105–107 guzˇ "¯ı, 42, 77, 93, 139 darb. #aq¯ım* darb. munti. g*ˇ hayul¯ a,¯ 64, 137 dar. ur¯ ¯ı, 95 hayul¯ an¯ ¯ı, 137 dawr, 127 h.al*¯ dawran,¯ 115 h.amil,¯ 88n128 didd,. 82 hadd,. 62, 84, 104n195, 134, dat,¯ pl. dawat,¯ 95 138 d¯at¯ ¯ı, 77 ¯ hadd asgar,˙ 101, 104 ¯ . . dihn, 59, 62, 62n19 hadd. akbar, 101, 104 dihn¯ ¯ı(dihniyya), 73 hadd awsat, 101, 104, 121 ¯ ¯ . . hadd. haq. ¯ıq¯ı, 83 fa##al*¯ hadd. kamil*¯ fasl,. 35, 42, 51, 77, 78n95, 91 hadd. lafz.¯ı, 83 fasl. ba#¯ıd* hadd. muˇstarak* fasl dat¯ ¯ı* hadd naqi¯ s, 84 . ¯ . . fasl. qar¯ıb, 167 hadd. tamm,¯ 84 f¯ı(ma#a) al-katra, 157 hads, 120, 120n254 ¯ . fikr, 59 hadsiyy. at,¯ 120, 120n254 fi#l, 74n71 haml,. 88n128, 104n192 haml. ¯ı, 42, 88n128, 104n192 gayr˙ haml. ¯ı, 104 hamliyya. (hamliyy. at),¯ 42, 43, 80, 88 gayr˙ lafz.¯ı, 68, 69, 182 haq. ¯ıq¯ı, 77, 90 gayr˙ muha. s.sal,. 92n144 haq. ¯ıqa, 74, 74n70, 78, 138 gayr˙ mumkin* harf,. 72n60, 103 gayr˙ tamm, 71 h.assa,¯ pl. haw. ass*¯ gayr˙ yaq¯ıniyyat,¯ 44, 123 haw. ass¯ z.ahira,¯ 119 gadal,ˇ 24, 29, 39, 44, 49, 117, 122, haw. ass¯ ba¯tina,. 119 122n267, 123, 164 hikma,. 16, 16n29, 60n8, 137, 171 gadalˇ ¯ı, 122n267 hikma. #amaliyya* gˇazim*¯ hikma. nazariyya,. 60 gawhar*ˇ hiss*. al-gawharˇ at-tan¯ ¯ı* hiss ba¯tin* ¯ ¯ . . al-gawharˇ al-awwal* hiss. z.ahir*¯ giha,ˇ 43, 95, 95n156, 131–133 hu. gˇga,ˇ 62, 116, 206 gins,ˇ 77, 78, 84, 156 hukm,. 86, 87 ginsˇ al-agnˇ as*¯ habar,¯ 86, 87 ginsˇ #al¯ ¯ı* h¯ari¯ g*ˇ ginsˇ #aql¯ı* h¯ari¯ gˇ¯ı(hari¯ giyya),ˇ 73 ¯ ¯ ginsˇ mantiq. ¯ı* ha¯s.s*. ginsˇ mutawassit, 78 h¯a¯ssa, 77, 119 . ¯ .. ginsˇ qar¯ıb, 78, 84 ha¯s.s.¯ı* ginsˇ safil,¯ 78 hayyala,¯ 128n300 ¯ ginsˇ tab. ¯ı#¯ı* hit.aba¯ (hat.aba),¯ 24, 29, 39, 44, 49, ginsˇ ¯ı* ¯ 117, 127¯ , 127n294, 164 gism,ˇ 167 hulf, 112n223, 116 ¯ 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 249.

index of arabic logical terms 249

#Ibara¯ (al), 11, 14, 185 ittifaq¯ ¯ı* ibt.al,¯ 204 itbat*¯ idrak,¯ 61 ¯ idrak¯ al-mufrad, 61 kalima, 72, 72n59 idrak¯ an-nisba, 62 kam, 139 id.afa*¯ kamm* id.af¯ ¯ı, 77 kammiyya, 106, 131, 139 ¯ıgˇab*¯ katra* ¯ ihs. as*¯ kayfa, 139 ihtilaf,¯ 74, 82, 97n165 kayfiyya, 106, 131, 139 #illa,¯ 121, 190 kidb, 74n70, 87, 138 #illiyya, 116 kubr¯ a,¯ 101, 104 #ilm, 59, 60, 72, 74, 75n73, 113, 166, kull* 167, 181 kull¯ı, 42, 77, 93, 139 #ilm ad¯ ab¯ al-bah.twaal-muna¯zara,. kulliyyat,¯ 29, 47 124, 124n275, ¯129, 165 al-kulliyyat¯ al-hams, 47 #ilm al-ala*¯ ¯ #ilm al-mantiq,. 150 lanih¯ aya,¯ 140 #ilm al-m¯ızan,¯ 60 lafz(pl.alf. a¯z),. 29, 30, 42, 47, 72, 132, #ilm nazar. ¯ı* 181 #ilm al-wad.#, 72, 75, 181, 182 lafz. mufrad* iltizam,¯ 70, 70n53 lafz. murakkab (mu"allaf), 87, 182 imkan,¯ 96 lafz.¯ı (lafziyya),. 68, 69, 182 imtina¯#* lazim*¯ in, 121, 121n263, 122, 122n265, 204 limiyy, 121 infis.al*¯ luzum,¯ pl. lawazim,¯ 42 infis.al¯ ¯ı, 104 infi#al*¯ mabda" (pl. mabadi¯ "), 29, 30, 44, 133, inniyy, 121, 121n263 134 inta¯g,ˇ 43 madda,¯ 101, 116, 131, 137 intiza¯#* madd¯ ¯ı* Is¯ a¯g˙u¯gˇ¯ı, 151, 174, 176, 195, 196 maddat¯ al-qiyas,¯ 101, 101n84 ism, 72, 73 ma#dul,¯ 92, 92n143, 162 ism muha. s.sal*. ma#dula*¯ ism muˇsakkik* magˇaz,¯ 74 ism muˇstarak* magˇaz¯ ¯ı* ism mutaradif*¯ maghˇ ul,¯ 62 is.til. a¯h,. pl. is.til. a¯h.at*¯ mafhum,¯ 47 is.til. a¯h.¯ı, 74n71 mahiyya¯ (pl. mahiyy¯ at),¯ 42, 77, istitna¯", 103 77n87, 84, 139 istitn¯ a¯"¯ı, 43, 101, 102 mahkum¯ #alayhi, 90n136 ¯ . istiqra¯", 43, 47, 62, 100, 113, 113n228 mahk. um¯ bihi, 90n137 istiqra¯" naqi¯ s,. 113 mahm. ul,¯ 88n128, 90, 90n137, 101, istiqra¯" tamm,¯ 113 104n192 iˇstirak*¯ mah.s.ura,¯ 42, 92, 92n146 ittis.al*¯ mahs. us*¯ ittifaq,¯ 96 mahs. us¯ at,¯ 61, 63, 119 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 250.

250 index of arabic logical terms

mahs.u¯s,. 92 muhtalif, 74 mak¯an*¯ muhtalif¯ an,¯ 82 ¯ malaka, 65n31 muhtalit,. 43 ma#lum¯ at,¯ 61 mulk*¯ ma#na,¯ pl. ma#an(in),¯ 42, 64n23, 132, muma¯tala, 115n232 181 mumkin*¯ mantiq,. 11n8, 37, 38, 40–42, 45, 46, mumkina, 95, 95n158 54, 59n6, 61, 61n17, 68n39, 78n91, mumtani#* 86n121, 87n125, 138, 150 mumtani#a, 95 mantiq. ¯ı, 80, 156 mun#akis* ma#qul¯ (pl. ma#qul¯ at),¯ 11, 47, 61, 63, muna¯zara,. 124, 124n275, 127, 176, 137 178 al-ma#qul¯ at¯ at-taniya,¯ 66 munfasil,. 43, 89, 109 al-ma#qul¯ at¯ al-¯ ul¯ a,¯ 65 muntig*ˇ ma#rifa* muqaddam, 91 mas"ala, pl. masa¯"il, 44, 133, 135 muqaddima, 35, 42, 46, 46n59, 47, maˇshur¯ at,¯ 123 101, 101n183, 134 mata*¯ muqaddima kubra,¯ 101, 104 matlab*. muqaddima su. gr˙ a,¯ 101, 105 matlab. ayyu* muradif*¯ matlab. hal* murakkab, 43, 71, 87, 101, 111, matlab. lima*¯ 182 matlab. ma*¯ murakkab gayr˙ tamm,¯ 71 matl. ub,¯ 101n182, 131 murakkab tamm,¯ 71 mawd.u¯# (pl. mawd.u¯#at),¯ 42, 44, 61, musallamat,¯ 123, 128n295 90, 90n136, 101, 133 musawwara, 92n146 mazn. un¯ at,¯ 128, 128n296 musaw¯ ¯ı* mital,¯ 115n232 mustafad,¯ 66, 66n34 mi¯#yar¯ al-#ulum,¯ 60n8, 154, 190 mustawa,¯ 42, 47, 98, 98n173 mi#yar,¯ 18n38 mus.adara*¯ mu"allaf, 72 mus.adara¯ #alaal-ma¯ tl. ub,¯ 131, mu#arrif, 47 131n314 mud.af*¯ muˇsa¯gaba,˙ 130, 130n310 mudrak* muˇsahada,¯ 119n251 mufrad, 42, 61, 71 muˇsahad¯ at,¯ 118, 118n248 mufradat,¯ 42 muˇstarak, 73, 73n67 mug˙ala¯ ta. (magli˙ ta),. 14, 29, 39, 49, mut.abaqa¯ (mut.abiqa),¯ 70, 70n54, 87, 117, 122, 130, 130n307, 137, 164 138 mug˙ali¯ t.¯ı* mut.abiq*¯ mugarrad*ˇ mutlaq. (mutlaqa),. 95, 95n155 mugarrabˇ at,¯ 119, 119n252 muta"ahhirun,¯ 108n209, 189n62 mu¯gibˇ (mugiba),ˇ 91 mutabayin*¯¯ ¯ muhayyilat,¯ 128, 128n300 mutabayin¯ an,¯ 81 muhmal*¯ mutada¯hila, 97, 97n167 ¯ muhmala, 92, 92n146 mutad.ayif*¯ muhassal, 189n62 mutama¯til(un)*¯ . .. ¯ muha. s.sala*. mutaqabil(¯ an)*¯ 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 251.

index of arabic logical terms 251

mutaradif,¯ 74, 74n69, 81 qadiyya. muhmala, 92 mutasawiy¯ an,¯ 81 qadiyya. mumkina, 95, 95n158 mutawassit,. 78 qadiyya. mumkina #amma,¯ 95 mutawa¯ti", 73, 73n63 qadiyya mumkina ha¯ssa, 95 . . ¯ .. mutawatir¯ at,¯ 120, 120n257 qadiyya. mumtani#a, 95 muttasil, 43, 88, 89, 109 qadiyya mutada¯hila, 97n167 . . ¯ muwagˇgah*ˇ qadiyya. musawwara, 92n146 muwagˇgaha,ˇ 42 qadiyya. muwagˇgaha,ˇ 42 qadiyya. saliba,¯ 91 nafs, 64, 65, 138 qadiyya. su. gr˙ a,¯ 101, 104 naq¯ıd, 42, 98, 98n174 qadiyya ˇsahsiyya, 92 . . ¯ . nat¯ıga,ˇ 99, 101, 101n182 qadiyya. ˇsartiyya,. 88, 88n129 na¯tiq,. 180 qadiyya. ˇsartiyya. munfasila,. 43, 89, naw#, 77 109 naw# al-anwa¯#, 78 qadiyya. ˇsartiyya. muttasila,. 43, 88, naw##al¯ ¯ı, 78 89, 109 naw# saﬁl,¯ 78 qadiyya. tuna¯"iyya* nazar, 190 qadiyya tul¯ a¯tiyya* . . ¯ ¯ nazar. ¯ı, 65n26 qadiyya. waqtiyya, 96 nihaya*¯ al-qadiyyatan¯ ad-da¯hilatan¯ tahta . ¯ . nisba, 62, 91 at-tad.add,¯ 97n166 nisba hukmiyya,. 87 al-qadiyyat. an¯ al-mutad.addat¯ an*¯ qadiyyat. an¯ mutaqabilat¯ an*¯ qabla al-katra, 80, 157 qadiyyatan¯ mutaqabilat¯ an¯ bi at-ta- ¯ . al-qad.ay¯ aqiy¯ as¯ atuh¯ ama¯ #aha,¯ 120 naqud*¯ qad.ay¯ a¯ dawat¯ al-gihaˇ (muwagˇgaha),ˇ qawl, 62, 84, 100 42 ¯ qawl gˇazim,¯ 86 qadiyya,. 29, 39, 42, 48, 86, 87, 100, qawl ˇsari¯ h,. 29, 30, 39, 49, 62, 83, 101n183 83n109 qadiyya. ba#diyya*. qisma* qadiyya. bas¯ıta*. qiyas,¯ 11, 14, 29, 39, 43, 47, 49, 54, qadiyya. da"ima, 96 55, 62, 99, 100, 100n180, 103, 116, qadiyya. dar. uriyya,¯ 95, 95n157 137, 190 qadiyya gayr˙ hamliyya* al-qiyas¯ bi al-hulf, 112n223 . . ¯ qadiyya. guzˇ "iyya, 93 qiyas¯ burhan¯ ¯ı, 47 qadiyya. guzˇ "iyya mu¯giba,ˇ 91 qiyas¯ ad-dawr* qadiyya. guzˇ "iyya saliba,¯ 91 qiyas¯ dam. ¯ır* qadiyya. hamliyya,. 88, 88n128 qiyas¯ gayr˙ haml. ¯ı, 104 qadiyya. ittifaqiyya,¯ 96n160 qiyas¯ gayr˙ kamil*¯ qadiyya. kubra,¯ 101, 104 qiyas¯ gadalˇ ¯ı, 44, 49, 117, 122, qadiyya. kulliyya, 93 122n267, 123, 164 qadiyya. kulliyya mu¯giba,ˇ 91 qiyas¯ haml. ¯ı, 88n120, 104, 104n192 qadiyya. kulliyya saliba,¯ 91 qiyas¯ hit.ab¯ ¯ı, 127, 127n294 qadiyya lazima*¯ qiyas¯ al-¯ hulf, 43, 112 . ¯ qadiyya. mah.s.ura*¯ qiyas¯ iniyy (qiyas¯ al-in), 121 qadiyya. mah.s.u¯sa*. qiyas¯ iqtir. an¯ ¯ı, 47 qadiyya mu¯giba*ˇ qiyas¯ istitna¯"¯ı, 43, 47, 110 . ¯ 2008062. Ljubovic. 09_Indices. Proef 4. 18-8-2008:14.44, page 252.

252 index of arabic logical terms

qiyas¯ kamil*¯ tad.add,¯ 97 qiyas¯ mantiq. ¯ı, 100n180 ta"diya, 113n228 qiyas¯ mug˙ali¯ t.¯ı, see: mug˙ala¯ ta. tagrˇ ¯ıd* qiyas¯ muqassam, 114 tahl. ¯ıl, 14 qiyas¯ murakkab, 43, 101, 111 tal(in),¯ 91, 110 qiyas¯ al-musaw¯ at¯ (al-musaw¯ ¯ı), 103 tamt¯ıl, 43, 62, 100, 115, 115n232 ¯ qiyas¯ sufis¯ t.a¯"¯ı, 130n309 tanaqu¯ d,. 42, 47, 82, 97, 97n163 qiyas¯ ˇsart.¯ı, 104 taqabul*¯ qiyas¯ ˇsi#r¯ı, 128n298 tarf. an,¯ 120 quwwa, 65, 102 ta#r¯ıf, pl. ta#r¯ıfat,¯ 42, 43, 77n87, 83, 83n109, 86n119 rabi¯ ta,. 91 tark¯ıb, 99 radd, 109, 109n211, 163n66 tasalsul* radd al-qiyas*¯ tasawwur,. pl. tasawwur. at,¯ 29, 30, rasm, 60, 62, 82, 84 46, 47, 61, 61n15, 62, 67, 68, 134, R¯ıt.ur¯ ¯ıqa,¯ 127n294 139 tasd. ¯ıq, pl. tasd. ¯ıqat,¯ 29, 46, 61, 61n15, safsata,. 44, 117, 122, 130, 130n309, 62, 67, 68, 116, 134 137, 164 taˇsb¯ıh* salb* Tuf¯ ¯ıqa*¯ salib¯ (saliba),¯ 91 tab. #* sur,¯ 92n146, 138 tab. #¯ı(tab. #iyya), 69 sufis¯ t.a¯"¯ı, 137 tab. ¯ı#a* Sufis¯ t.¯ıqa¯ (safsata),. 137 tarf. (taraf),. 120 sidq, 74n70, 87, 138 tula¯t¯ı, 91 . ¯ ¯ sifa*. tuna¯"¯ı, 91, 91n139 as-sina¯#at¯ al-hams, 116, 164 ¯ . . ¯ su. gr˙ a,¯ 101, 104 #umum,¯ 81 s.ura,¯ 80n100, 116, 131, 138 #unsur,. 64, 137 s.ura¯ al-qiyas*¯ ustuquss,. 137 ˇsab¯ıha bi al-haqq,. 130 ˇsab¯ıha bi al-maˇshura,¯ 130 wad.#, 44, 69n42, 72, 74, 75, 75n73, ˇsahs,. 77n86 181, 182 ˇsah¯s¯ı, 77 wad#¯ı, 69n42 ¯ . . ˇsahsiyya,. 92 wigdˇ aniyy¯ at,¯ 119 ˇsakl,¯ 43, 104, 105 ˇsart,. pl. ˇsara¯"it, 43, 88n129, 89, 91, yaf#al* 101 yanfa#il* ˇsart.¯ı, 42, 43, 139 yaq¯ın, 56n91, 100 ˇsi#r, 14, 29, 39, 44, 49, 117, 127, 128, yaq¯ıniyyat,¯ 43, 44, 113n230, 118, 123 128n298, 164 ˇsi#r¯ı, 128n298 zaman,¯ 138 zamaniyya,¯ 91 tadammana,. 70, 70n52 zann,. 100, 113, 113n230 tadammun,. 70, 70n52 ipts-serie_2pp.qxp 20-8-2008 10:58 Page 1

ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE TEXTS AND STUDIES ISSN 0169-8729

44. Genequand, C. Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Cosmos. 2001. ISBN 90 04 11963 9 45. Calverley, E.E. and J.W. Pollock. Nature, Man and God in Medieval Islam. Volume one. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12381 4 Volume two. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12382 2 46. Swartz, M. A Medieval Critique of Anthropomorphism. Ibn al-Jawzº’s Kit¸b Akhb¸r aª-Õif¸t. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12376 8 47. Kusuba, T. and D. Pingree. Arabic Astronomy in Sanskrit. Al-Birjandº on Tadh- kira II, Chapter 11 and its Sanskrit Translation. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12475 6 48. ~skendero¯lu, M. Fakhr al-dºn al-R¸zº and Thomas Aquinas on the Question of the Eternity of the World. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12480 2 49. Reisman, D.C. The making of the Avicennan Tradition. The Transmission, Con- tents, and Structure of Ibn Sºn¸’s al-Mub¸¥at¸t (The Discussions). 2002. ISBN 90 04 12504 3 50. Behloul, S.M. Ibn Ýazms Evangelienkritik. Eine methodische Untersuchung. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12527 2 51. Charette, F. Mathematical Instrumentation in Fourteenth-Century Egypt and Syria. The Illustrated Treatise of Najm al-Dºn al-Mºªrº. 2003. ISBN 90 0413015 2 52. Reisman, D.C. (ed.). Before and After Avicenna. Proceedings of the First Confer- ence of the Avicenna Study Group. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12978 2 53. Kahl, O. S¸b¢r Ibn Sahl. The Small Dispensatory. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12996 0 54. Burnett, C., J.P. Hogendijk, K. Plofker and M. Yano. Studies in the History of the Exact Sciences in Honour of David Pingree. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13202 3 56. McGinnis, J. (ed.). Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam. Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Avicenna Study Group. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13960 5 57. Eschraghi, A. Frühe SEaiÒº- und B¸bº-Theologie. Die Darlegung der Beweise für Mu¥ammads besonderes Prophetentum (Ar-Ris¸la fº Itbat an-Nub¢wa al-Ù¸ªªa). 2004. ISBN 90 04 14034 4 58. Acar, R. Talking about God and Talking about Creation. Avicenna’s and Thomas Aquinas’ positions. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14477 3 59. Akasoy, A. Philosophie und Mystik in der späten Almohadenzeit. Die Siziliani- schen Fragen des Ibn Sab#Ên. 2006. ISBN 90 04 14522 2 60. Schöck, C. Koranexegese, Grammatik und Logik. Zum Verhältnis von arabischer und aristotelischer Urteils-, Konsequenz- und Schlußlehre. 2006. ISBN 90 04 14588 5 61. Endress, G. (ed.). Organizing Knowledge. Encyclopædic Activities in the Pre- Eighteenth Century Islamic World. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 14697 6 ipts-serie_2pp.qxp 20-8-2008 10:58 Page 2

62. Mourad, S.A. Early Islam between Myth and History. Al-Ýasan al-Baªrº (d. 110H/728CE) and the Formation of His Legacy in Classical Islamic Scholarship. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 14829 1 63. Bertolacci, A. The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Kit¸b al- S[ if¸}. A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 14899 4 64. Shihadeh, A. The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dºn al-R¸zº. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 14991 5 65. Pourjavady, R. and S. Schmidtke. A Jewish Philosopher of Baghdad. {Izz al- Dawla Ibn Kamm¢na (d. 683/1284) and His Writings. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 15139 0 66. Zakeri, M. (ed. and tr.). Persian Wisdom in Arabic Garb. {Alº b. {Ubayda al- Ray¥¸nº (D. 219/834) and his Jaw¸hir al-kilam wa-far¸}id al-¥ikam. 2007. ISBN 978 90 04 15168 0 67. Wakelnig, E. (Hrsg.). Feder, Tafel, Mensch. Al-{@mirºs Kit¸b al-Fuª¢l fº l- Ma{¸lim al-il¸hºya und die arabische Proklos-Rezeption im 10. Jh. 2006. ISBN 978 90 04 15255 7 68. Schmidl, P. Volkstümliche Astronomie im islamischen Mittelalter. Zur Bestim- mung der Gebetszeiten und der Qibla bei al-Aªba¥º, Ibn Ra¥ºq und al-F¸risº. 2007. ISBN 978 90 04 15390 5 69. Belo, C. Chance and Determinism in Avicenna and Averroes. 2007. ISBN 978 90 04 15587 9 70. Kahl, O. The Dispensatory of Ibn at-Tilmºd. Arabic Text, English Translation, Study and Glossaries. 2007. ISBN 978 90 04 15620 3 71. Hildebrandt, T. Neo-Mu{tazilismus? Intention und Kontext im modernen arabischen Umgang mit dem rationalistischen Erbe des Islam. 2007. ISBN 978 90 04 15099 7 72. Gleave, R. Scripturalist Islam. The History and Doctrines of the Akhb¸rº Shº{º School. 2007. ISBN 978 90 04 15728 6 73. Hoover, J. Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism. 2007. ISBN 978 90 04 15847 4 74. Vrolijk, A. and J. Hogendijk (eds.). O ye Gentlemen: Arabic Studies on Science and Literary Culture. In Honour of Remke Kruk. 2007. ISBN 978 90 04 15794 1 75. Raven, W. and A. Akasoy (eds.). Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages. Studies in Text, Transmission and Translation, in Honour of Hans Daiber. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16565 6 76. Vagelpohl, U. Aristotle’s Rhetoric in the East. The Syriac and Arabic translation and commentary tradition. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16681 3 77. Ljubovice, A. Works in Logic by Bosniac Authors in Arabic. 2008. ISBN 978 90 04 16856 5 78. Kahl, O. S¸b¢r ibn Sahl’s Dispensatory in the Recension of the {A¤udº Hospital. 2009. ISBN 978 90 04 17124 4 79. Koutzarova, T. Das Transzendentale bei Ibn Sina. Zur Metaphysik als Wissen- schaft erster Begriffs- und Urteilsprinzipien. 2009. ISBN 978 90 04 17123 7