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WILLIAM OF OCKEfAM' S THEORY OF CONSCIENCE Sharon Marie Kaye A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirernents for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto O Copyright by Sharon Marie Kaye 1997 National Library Bibliothéque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. rue Wellington OttawaON K1AON4 Omwa ON KIA ON4 Canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence ailowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sen reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microfom, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la fome de rnicrofiche/nlm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otheMrise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. WILLIAM CONSCIENCE Sharon Marie Kaye Doctor of Philosophy 1997 Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto This work is designed to show that there is an implicit connection between Ockham's academic and political careers in his theory of conscience. Thomas Aquinas offers a theory of moral responsibility according to which the conscientious individual has knowledge of the rightness of her act which does not preclude her doing otherwise. His account of the will, however, proves that this state of affairs never obtains. Ockham's alternative presupposes that we freely choose our own ends. He is therefore entitled to assert that conscience is the knowledge of one's own acts as right or wrong. The libertarian metaphysics underlying Ockham's ethics is tested by the problem of unfulfilled prophecy. Thomas Bradwardine argues that the Antichrist is free not to corne because it is possible for God to undo the past. Thomas Buckingham argues for the possibility that the prophecy never meant that the Antichrist was going to corne. Meanwhile, Ockham is left with the possibility that God lied, Ockhamist John of Mirecourt shows why this 'hereticalf solution is the only way to Save the faith. Ockham's theory of conscience provides a sound basis for interpreting his treatise on heresy. Heresy is disobedience, not to authority, but to the truth. Since the condemation of heresy is itself a paradigm instance of this kind of pervexsity, freedom of speech prevails by default . Ockham' s conception of a comrnunity united by this realization provides an answer to twentieth-century speech-regulation advocates. Ockham thought that it is through our obedience to the truth that Jesus's promise to be with his disciples 'always, to the end of the age' will be fulfilled. According to Walter Burley, '1 promise you a Christian' converts with 'A Christian is promised to you by me.' According to Ockham, in contrast, it is an opaque construction. This account of the logic of indefinite promises implies that no individual can daim to be one of the disciples to whom Jesus was referring. 1 hope to leave the reader in a better position to appreciate the sense in which the claim that Ockhamfs two careers are united by his nominalisrn may be considered correct. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am deeply grateful to many individuals for helping me to complete this work in many ways. 1 received a great deal of financial assistance throughout the years, largely traceable to the generous taxpayers of the province of Ontario, 1 would like to express individual thanks to Steve Nadler for suggesting that 1 do my graduate studies at the University of Toronto, where 1 found what I was looking for; to Robert Imlay for being interested and reading my earliest drafts; to Melanie Plenter for helping me with the German literature 1 needed to read; to William Courtenay, Marilyn McCord Adams, Martin Tweedale, John Kilcullen, and Ian Murdoch, for their pioneering work in the fourteenth century and personal encouragement; to Massirno Parodi and Eugenio Randy, may he rest in peace, for providing me with their unpublished transcription of part of Mirecourt's Sentences Commentary; to my nonbiological parents, Calvin Normore and Bernard Katz, sine quibus non; to my dear family, and especially my husband John, for their self-transcendent love, TABLE OF CONTENTS PRE FACE CHAPTER 1: THE ETHICAL DIMENSION 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Normative Necessity According to Thomas Aquinas 1.3 Normative Necessity According to Ockham 1.4 Difficulties With Divine Commands? 1.5 Conclusion CHAPTER II: THE METAPHYSICAL DIMENSION Introduction The Thesis that God Can Undo the Past The Thesis that God Can Lie The Thesis of the Contingenc y of Meaning Conclusion CKAPTER III: THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Ockham' s Theory of Heresy 3.3 Ockhamrs Reductio of Institutional Authority 3.4 Ockham's Legacy 3.5 Conclusion CHAPTER IV: THE LOGICAL DIMENSION 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Supposition Theory 4.3 The Case of the Promised Horse 4.4 The Case of the Promised Christian 4.5 Conclusion EPILOGUE BIBLIOGRAPHY PREFACE William of Ockham (ce1285-1347) cuts a fascinating figure in che history of Western culture. His Summa Logicae, which elaborates a systematic foundation for norninalist philosophy, is generally recognized to be one of the most important intellectual contributions of the Middle Ages. At the same time, however, Ockham was much more than a logician. He not only advanced seminal arguments in other areas of philosophy, but also lived his philosophy in a truly heroic way, Like Socrates, Ockharn was arrested and tried for corrupting young minds with dangerous ideas. Unlike Socrates, he escaped alive and devoted the rest of his life to fighting the tyrannical forces which continue to haunt free thinkers everywhere. Most studies of Ockham's thought focus either on his speculative philosophy or on his political involvement while ignoring the connection between them. Such compartmentalizing is particularly tempting in the case of Ockham because his life was quite conveniently divided into two separate careers. As A. S. McGrade observes, Ockham himself gives us little excuse to theorize connections: It is natural when dealing with a medieval theologian and philosopher to atternpt to explain his political thought by deducing it from his more general speculative world view. There are, however, at least three difficulties with such a plan in Ockham's case: the intrinsic difficulty of correctly interpreting norninalist theology and philosophy, the nearly total absence of explicitly political passages in the speculative works, and a corresponding paucity of specifically nominalist passages in the political works .' It is cornmonly taken for granted that, if there is a connection between Ockham's speculative and political thought, it is to be found in nominalism, where this doctrine is variously characterized in terms of skepticism, positivism, fideism, or radical ernpiricism. The present work constitutes an effort to clarify the issue by focussing on a much more specific theme. My thesis is that the connection between Ockham' s two careers lies in his theory of conscience. The irnpetus behind the present work was the desire to understand Ockham holistically, and to communicate his philosophy in a way which would be maximally accessible to non-specialists. I have therefore organized my research into four free-standing essays. Each features one of the defining 'The Political Thought of William of Ockham: Persona1 and Institutional Principles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, l974), 28. dimensions of Ockhamrs thought - ethics, metaphysics, politics, and logic - in so far as it relates to the therne of conscience. From the inception of rny plan 1 have striven always, not necessarily to be exhaustive, but rather to present the lesser known aspects of Ockham accurately, and to show how he can provide valuable insight into enduring philosophical issues. Ockham began his academic career as a monk, and remained throughout his life a deeply religious man. On rny view, his first prerogative in generating a philosophical world view was to account for his own Franciscan understanding of the relationship between God and human beings. From the very beginning we find him committed to a theocentric ethics which carries immediate implications concerning the nature of human agency. To act morally is to love God in the sdme way that he loves us: radically freely. In the first chapter of the present work 1 examine this foundational elernent of Ockhamfs philosophy, and defend it on ethical grounds. Ockham' s conception of human freedom also gives rise to a metaphysical problem, however. If there can be no antecedent condition sufficient to guarantee that the future will turn out exactly as it does, then how is divine foreknowledge possible? Ockham answers that God possesses a transcendent kind of knowledge which is consistent with radical contingency. This answer would have solved the 4 problem if it were not for the fact that God can reveal the future to prophets. Ockham is forced to maintain that the future could turn out differently than even a true prophet says, and that this would mean that God had lied. In chapter two we will explore the fourteenth-century debate over the problem of unfulfilled prophecy in detail. Given this single example of how Ockhamist metaphysics produces unorthodox conclusions, it is hardly surprising that Ockham soon found himself at the center of a full-blown political controversy. This inspired him to write a treatise on the subject of heresy. Only a God who is able to lie is able to make promises, and Ockhamfs whole understanding of church authority is based on Jesus' promise to be with his disciples \always, to the end of the age.