Better Never to Have Been: the Harm of Coming Into Existence Free

FREE BETTER NEVER TO HAVE BEEN: THE HARM OF COMING INTO EXISTENCE PDF

He is best known for his advocacy of antinatalism. Here is a summary of his basic argument. It is commonly assumed that we do nothing wrong bringing future people into existence if their lives will, on balance, be good. This assumes that being brought into existence is generally beneficial. Here it is in matrix form:. The first is that: 1 while there is a duty not to bring people who will suffer into the world supports 3there is no duty to bring people who will be happy into the world supports 4. Thus a lack of suffering is always good, whether or not someone exists to enjoy this absence; whereas a lack of happiness is not always bad unless people exist to be denied it. His second argument is that though we think it strange to say we have children so they will benefit, we think it normal to say we should not have children because they will be harmed. His third argument to support the asymmetry is that while not having children may be bad or good for the living, not having been born is no deprivation for those who have never been born. This fundamental asymmetry—suffering is an intrinsic harm, but the absence of pleasure is not—allows Benatar to draw his nihilistic conclusions. In other words, the measure by which the absence of pain is better than its presence is itself greater than the measure by which the presence of pleasure is better than its absence. This means that not existing is either a lot better than existing, in the case of pain or a little worse, in the case of pleasure. Or to think of it another way, the absence of pain and the presence of pleasure are both good, but the presence of pain is much worse than the absence of pleasure. Here is my own thought experiment to help explain this. Suppose that before you were born the gods were trying to decide whether to create you. To further his argument, Benatar notes that most persons underestimate how much suffering they will endure. If their lives are going better than most, they count themselves lucky. Consider death. It is a tragedy at any age and only seems acceptable at ninety because of our expectations about lifespans. But is lamenting death inconsistent with his antinatalism? Benatar thinks not. While non-existence does not harm a possible person, death is another harm that will come to those in existence. Benatar grants that you may not be mistaken if you claim that you are Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence glad to have been born, but you could still be mistaken that it was better to have been born at all. You might now be glad you were Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence and then suffer so badly later that you change your mind. Does it follow that no one should have children? Benatar claims that to answer yes to this question goes against a basic drive to reproduce, so we must be careful not to let such drives bias our analysis. Having children satisfies many needs for those who bring children into existence, but this does not mean it serves the interests of the children—in fact, it Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence them great harm. One could reply that the Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence is not that great to the children, since the benefits of existing may outweigh the harm, and, at any rate, we cannot ask future persons if they want to be born. Since we enjoy our lives we assume they will too, thus providing the justification for satisfying our procreational needs. Most people do not regret their existence, and if some do we could not have foreseen it. But might we be deceiving ourselves about how good life is? Most of us assume life would be unbearable if we were in certain situations. But often, when we find ourselves in these situations, we adapt. Could it be that we have adapted to a relatively unbearable life now? Benatar says that a superior species might look at our species with sympathy for our sorry state. And the reason we deceive ourselves is that we have been wired by evolution to think this way—it aids our survival. You may think it tragic to allow the human race to die out, but it would be hard to explain this by appealing to the interests of potential people. David Benatar Lanham, Md. Definitely makes me think long and hard about procreation and life. It is kind sort of odd how we celebrate life. He says that the absence of pain is good, even if there is no one to experience it. Pain is only bad because people experience it not because of pain itself. Glad to see others reading through these things as well. Third premise can also say something about an actual suffering person. For example, the pain I experience right now is bad. I am disadvantaged. The nail in my hand better never to have happened regardless of me being there or not. Bolstered by the fact that I am not worse on the account of absent goods fourth premise. How could death, which is the cessation of current and future pain, be bad? I always refer to Ernest Becker when I consider how humans relate to death. According to Becker most of us think death is bad mostly because we fear the unknown. Logically it seems to me that if living is a harm then death itself cannot be bad. Dying painfully might be bad but a life that is a harm ending cannot be a bad thing once we get past these irrational fears. Yes I know, easier said than done. I know this from some experience. I return to it occasionally. Zapffe would address my problem here! Maybe just his style: maybe a novel or a poem or a work of art intuits more than a dry philosophical work. All points well taken Scott. Best, JGM. Your email address will not be published. Notify me of new posts by email. This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed. Summary — It is better never to come into existence as being born is always a harm. Liked it? Take a second to support Dr John Messerly on Patreon! Take care. A nail in my hand bette never to Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence hapoened regardless of me bing there or not. Good question. Multiple posts under the death heading discuss this topic in great detail. You should remove it. Thanks for pointing that out. I believe I have found a real picture and put it up. Leave a Reply Cancel reply Your email address will not be published. Better Never to Have Been - Wikipedia

David Benatar born is a South African philosopher, academic and author. He is best known for his advocacy of antinatalism in his book Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existencein which he argues that coming into existence is a serious harm, regardless of the feelings of the existing being once brought into existence, and that, as a consequence, it is always morally wrong to create more sentient beings. Not much is known about Benatar's personal life as he deliberately guards his privacy. He has held antinatalist views since his childhood. Benatar argues from the Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence that pain is, in itself, a bad thing. Benatar has stated his lack of approval toward the benevolent world-exploder view. Benatar argues there is crucial asymmetry between the good and the bad things, such as pleasure and pain, which means it would be better for humans not to have been born:. Benatar argues that bringing someone into existence Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence both good and bad experiences, pain and pleasure, whereas not doing so generates neither pain nor pleasure. The absence of pain is good, the absence of pleasure is not bad. Therefore, the ethical choice is weighed in favor of non-procreation. Benatar raises the issue of whether humans inaccurately estimate the true quality of their lives, and has Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence three psychological phenomena which he believes are responsible for this:. The above psychological phenomena are unsurprising from an evolutionary perspective. They militate against suicide and in favour of reproduction. If our lives are quite as bad as I shall still Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence they are, and if people were prone to see this true quality of their lives for what it is, they might be much more inclined to kill themselves, or at least not to produce more such lives. Pessimism, then, tends not to be naturally selected. Benatar's The Second Sexism: Discrimination Against Men and Boys examines various issues regarding misandry and the negative socially-imposed aspects of male identity. As a work within the men's liberation movementit does not seek to attack or diminish the ideas of feminismbut rather to shine light on the parallel existence of systemic and cultural discrimination against men and boys, and how it simultaneously contributes to the oppression of women. In a review of the book, philosopher Simon Blackburn writes that "Benatar knows that such examples are likely to meet snorts of disbelief or derision, but he is careful to back up his claims with empirical data," and through this book, he shows that "if it is all too often tough being a woman, it is also sometimes tough being a man, and that any failure to recognise this risks distorting what should be everyone's goal, namely universal sympathy as well as social justice for all, regardless of gender. Benatar is veganand has taken part in debates on veganism. If that level of destruction were caused by another species we would rapidly recommend that new members of that species not be brought into existence. Benatar is an atheist. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. David Benatar. Not if you love the planet". Orange County Register. Retrieved 29 April The New Yorker. Department of Philosophy. Retrieved 15 April Journal of Controversial Ideas. Retrieved 20 April American Philosophical Quarterly. Benatar, Better The Critique. Archived from the original on 17 July Retrieved 5 April Big Think. The New York Times. Retrieved 22 April David Benatar vs Bruce Blackshaw". Retrieved 14 March Retrieved 13 June Social Theory and Practice. The American Journal of Bioethics. Retrieved 6 April Haupt, Adam 14 May Retrieved 21 February London, Leslie 4 June University of Cape Town. Raditlhalo, Sam 25 April Cape Times. Monday Paper. Veganism and vegetarianism. Vegetarians Vegans Fictional characters Vegetarian festivals Vegetarian organizations Vegetarian restaurants List of vegan media. List of vegetarian and vegan companies. Elisa Aaltola Carol J. Adams Martin Balluch Neal D. McDougall James E. Schwartz Peter Singer William O. Stephens David Sztybel Kim A. Clubb Antonio Cocchi Charles W. Kress William Lambe W. Howard Moore Reuben D. Vegetarian and vegan symbolism List of vegan media Juice fasting Vegetarian and vegan dog diet Vegaphobia Semi-vegetarianism Macrobiotic diet Pescetarianism Pollotarianism. Categories : births Living people 20th-century South African philosophers 21st-century South African philosophers Anti-natalists Animal ethicists Bioethicists Critics of postmodernism Free speech activists Philosophers of pessimism Philosophical pessimists South African academics South African atheists South African ethicists University of Cape Town academics Veganism activists. Namespaces Article Talk. Views Read Edit View history. Help Learn to edit Community portal Recent changes Upload file. Download as PDF Printable version. Moral philosophysocial philosophyphilosophy of religion. Contemporary Elisa Aaltola Carol J. David Benatar - Wikipedia

He is best known for his advocacy of antinatalism. Here are his basic arguments. It is commonly assumed that we do nothing wrong by bringing future people into existence if their lives will, on balance, be good. This assumes that being brought into existence is generally beneficial. Here it is in matrix form:. The first is that: 1 while there is a duty not to bring people who will suffer into the world supports 3there is no duty to bring people who will be happy into the world supports 4. Thus a lack of suffering is always good, whether or not someone enjoys this absence; whereas a lack of happiness is not always bad unless people exist to be denied it. His second argument is that though we think it strange to say we have children Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence they will benefit, we think it normal to say we should not have children because they will be harmed. His third argument to support the asymmetry is that while not having children may be bad or good for the living, not having been born cannot deprive those who have never been born of anything. This fundamental asymmetry—suffering is an intrinsic harm, but the absence of pleasure is not —allows Benatar to draw his nihilistic conclusions. In other words, the amount by which the absence of pain is better than its presence is greater than the amount by which the presence of pleasure is better than its absence. This means that not existing is either a lot better than existing—in the case of pain—or a little worse, in the case of pleasure. Or to think of it another way, the absence of pain and the presence of pleasure are both good, but the presence of pain is much worse than the absence of pleasure. Here is my own thought experiment that might help us understand this. Suppose that before you were born the gods were trying to decide whether to create you. If they decide to create you, you will suffer much if you have a bad life or gain much if you have a good life. To further his argument, Benatar notes that most persons underestimate how much suffering they will endure. If their lives are going better than most, they count themselves lucky. Now consider death. It is a tragedy at any age and only seems acceptable at ninety years of age because of our expectations about lifespans. But is lamenting death inconsistent with his antinatalism? Benatar thinks not. While non-existence does not harm a possible person, death is another harm that will come to those in existence. Benatar grants that you may not be mistaken if you claim that you are currently glad to have been born, but you could still be mistaken that it was better to have been born at all. You might now be glad you were born and then suffer so badly later that you change your mind. What follows from all this? That no one should have children? Benatar claims that to answer yes to these questions goes against a basic drive to reproduce, so we must be careful not to let such drives bias our analysis. Having children satisfies many needs of those who bring children into existence, but this does not mean it serves the interests of the children—in fact, it causes them great harm. One could reply that the harm is not that great to the children, since the benefits of existing may outweigh the harm, and, at any rate, we cannot ask future persons if they want to be born. Since we enjoy our lives we assume they will too, thus providing the justification for satisfying our procreational needs. Most people do not regret their existence, and if some do we could not have Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence it. But might we be deceiving ourselves about how good life is? Most of us assume life would be unbearable if we were in certain situations. But often, when we find ourselves in these situations, we adapt. Could it be that we have adapted to a relatively unbearable life now? Benatar says that a superior species might look at our species with sympathy for our sorry state. And the reason we deceive ourselves is that we have been wired by evolution to think this way—it aids our survival. So Benatar views our claims about the benefits of life skeptically, just as he would the ruminations of the slave who claims to prefer slavery to death. You may think it tragic to allow the human race to die out, but it would be hard to explain this by appealing to the interests of potential people. He concludes that it is better never to come into existence, as being born is always a harm. The validity of this asymmetry is questionable. Yet despite Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence philosophical subtlety, it is hard to believe that Benatar believes his own argument. Can one really prefer eternal nothingness to the possibility of a good or bad life? If I prefer to remain alive, am I not implicitly accepting that life is better than non-life? Does it really make sense to dedicate a book to your parents as Benatar does if they harmed you by bringing you into existence? Thus the end state will be so rewarding that we can say, in retrospect, that it was better to have been. Still, this kind of eschatological talk scares me, inasmuch as it relies on a future that may not transpire. Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence also implies that somehow this better future will justify past suffering. If this justification depends upon an eternal plan, then the Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence planner is exceptionally evil. As Dostoevsky said, the torture of a single child cannot be justified by a good future. But if reality was a matter of happenstance, and if all those who previously suffered somehow partake in this better future, then one might justifiably conclude that, on balance, it was better that consciousness arose. Perhaps we just have to hope that life is worth living. As for me, I now find my life to be worthwhile. However, if at some point in the future that is not the case, then I hope to have the option to end my life without help or be able to get help ending it if necessary. I also hope that my family reads the pieces I have written on this topicas well as consult my end of life documents. Until then, I try to follow the advice of Thoreau:. I did not wish to live what was not life, living is so dear; nor did I wish to practice resignation, unless it was quite necessary. I wanted to live deep and suck out all the marrow of life …. Wow, thanks for sharing this. This is a great summary, which saved me from reading the book which has been on my wishlist forever. Feathers are lighter than hammers, but one million features are heavier than one hammer. Still, his larger point that being born is not as good as we often believe and want to signal seems correct and very intriguing. We have evolved to register suffering as a benefit to ourselves for our self-preservation, not as as an absolute right to dictate the behavior of others. I have a sense of smell and it may be offended by what the perfume someone is wearing. The same principle Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence for something that causes me pain, with the difference that causes all this confusion for people being that what causes us pain is routinely objectively dangerous. But not always! We can prove this by the fact that some people are hyper-sensitive to pain, even to touch. We would think that a claim by such a person that clothes are criminally too heavy, that they should be fed so as not to have to hold a utensil, and so on, are not strong enough to impose a general duty on others. Likewise some people enjoy pain. We do not think that it imposes a duty to torture them or even absolve anyone of mistreating them. That someone is going to get pain or pleasure in their life is not the only issue worth considering in an abstract, objective sense. It has a Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence claim among peers out of civility and agreed concern for one another… but even then not that strongly. I agree with everything Kip say here. Aristotle suggested the only way to determine whether a life had been a good one was after it was over. Because a life might start of bad or good and then get better or worsen. Finally I do think coming into existence for many people in the world is an injury or harm. The argument only works if you consider all pain a negative. Considering all painful experiences negatives takes for granted the existence of conscious experience in the first place. Subjectivity imparts a unique group of feelings, thoughts, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, etc. Even painful ones have more meaning than total non-existence. The argument that never having been born is preferable is based on an over sensitivity to pain and a taking for granted of the fact that experience itself has a unique value to it. Thanks for your perceptive comment. I do think though that some fates are worse than death, so at least sometimes death is preferable. Thanks for bringing this article to my attention. I really have quite a few things to say about it. That is the way it should be. As you have implied, this kind of deliberations and knowledge can be very bitter medicine. It is very striking to me to observe that most of what I read from Benatar here, was already said by Schopenhauer. Or a new job. Or new friends. Or more money. Or that I want to have an holiday to a particular place. Or that I want to have a lot of sex. Or that I want to eat a lot of great food. The problem with getting any of this is that, in the best of cases, I will get used to it. Soon it will feel habitual. You can see this happening everywhere, in yourself and other people. I ask myself, how is this possible?