REPORT NO. 230
PARLIAMENT OF INDIA RAJYA SABHA
DEPARTMENT-RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT, TOURISM AND CULTURE
TWO HUNDRED THIRTIETH REPORT
Issues related to Security at Airports in India
(Presented to the Rajya Sabha on 21st December, 2015) (Laid on the Table of Lok Sabha on 21st December, 2015)
Rajya Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi December, 2015/Agrahayana, 1937 (Saka) Hindi version of this publication is also available
PARLIAMENT OF INDIA RAJYA SABHA
DEPARTMENT-RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT, TOURISM AND CULTURE
TWO HUNDRED THIRTIETH REPORT Issues related to Security at Airports in India
(Presented to the Rajya Sabha on 21st December, 2015) (Laid on the Table of Lok Sabha on 21st December, 2015)
Rajya Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi December, 2015/ Agrahayana, 1937 (Saka) Website : http://rajyasabha.nic.in E-mail : [email protected] C O N T E N T S
PAGES 1. COMPOSITION OF THE COMMI TEE...... (i)⎯(ii)
2. INTRODUTION...... (iii)
3. ACRNYMS...... (iv)⎯(v)
4. REPORT...... 23
5. RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATION/CONCLUSIONS-AT A GLANCE...... 24⎯28
6. MINUTES ...... 29⎯36
7. ANNEXURES...... 37⎯41
COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE (Constituted on 1st September, 2015)
1. Dr. Kanwar Deep Singh ⎯ Chairman
RAJYA SABHA
2. Shri Ritabrata Banerjee 3. Dr. K. Chiranjeevi 4. Shri Narendra Kumar Kashyap 5. Shri Avinash Rai Khanna 6. Dr. Prabhakar Kore 7. Shri Kiranmay Nanda 8. Kumari Selja 9. Shri Rajeev Shukla 10. Vacant
LOK SABHA
11. Shri Ram Charitra Nishad 12. Shri Vinod Chavda 13. Shri Rajeshbhai Naranbhai Chudasama 14. Kumari. Arpita Ghosh 15. Shri Rahul Kaswan 16. Shri P. Kumar 17. Shri Faizal P.P. Mohammed 18. Yogi Aditya Nath 19. Shri Kristappa Nimmala 20. Shri Rajesh Pandey 21. Shri Rajesh Ranjan 22. Shri P. Srinivasa Reddy 23. Shri Ram Kumar Sharma 24. Shri Prathap Simha 25. Shri Dushyant Singh 26. Shri Kunwar Haribansh Singh 27. Shri Rakesh Singh 28. Shri Shatrughan Sinha 29. Shri Dasrath Tirkey 30. Shri Manoj Tiwari 31. Shri K.C. Venugopal (i) SECRETARIAT Shri J. G. Negi, Joint Secretary Shri Swarabji B., Joint Director Shri Arun Kumar, Assistant Director Smt. Catherine John L., Assistant Director Shri P. P. Raumon, Committee Officer
(ii) INTRODUCTION
I, the Chairman, Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tour- ism and Culture, having been authorized by the Committee, do hereby present on its behalf this Two Hundred Thirtieth Report on “Issues related to Security at Airports in India”. 2. The violent incident which occurred at Karipur International Airport at Kozhikode on 10th June, 2015 involving the employees of Airports Authority of India and Central Industrial Security Force was an eye opener regarding the security system available at Indian airports. With this backdrop, the Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture decided to take up the Issues related to Security at Airports in India for examination and Report. 3. The Committee heard the views of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Home Affairs, Airports Authority of India, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security, Central Industrial Security Force and Intelligence Bureau during its meeting held on the 10th July, 2015. The Committee visited the Delhi International Airport to have on-the-spot study of the security arrangements at the Delhi Airport on 31st August, 2015 and heard the security agencies, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Home Affairs, and GMR on various aspects of security at Delhi Airport. The Committee, during its study visit to Mumbai and Kochi in October, 2015 also heard the views of MIAL, GVK and CIAL, the Airport operators as well as various agencies involved in providing security to these airports. 4. The Committee wishes to express its thanks to the officers of Ministries of Civil Aviation, Home Affairs, Airports Authority of India, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security, Central Industrial Security Force, Intelligence Bureau, Government of Maharashtra and other stakeholders for placing before the Committee, the material and information desired in connection with the subject and for clarifying the points raised by the Members. 5. The Committee considered and adopted the Report at its meeting held on the 18th December, 2015.
DR. KANWAR DEEP SINGH NEW DELHI; Chairman, 18th, December, 2015 Department-related Parliamentary Standing Agrahayana 27, 1937 (Saka) Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture, Rajya Sabha.
(iii) ACRONYMS
AAI : Airports Authority of India ACP Assistant Commissioner of Police AEP : Airport Entry Passes AFRRO : Assistant Foreigners Regional Registration Officer AOC : Airline Operators Committee APSC : Air Port Security Committee ARC : Aviation Research Centre ASG : Aviation Security Group AVSEC : Aviation Security BCAS : Bureau of Civil Aviation Security BDDS : Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad BIAL : Bangalore International Airport Limited CCS : Cabinet Committee on Security CCTV : Closed-Circuit Television CIAL : Cochin International Airport Limited CISF : Central Industrial Security Force CoS : Committee of Secretaries COSAH : Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijack COSCA : Commissioner of Security, Civil Aviation CRPF : Central Reserve Police Force CSIA : Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport CTCP : Counter-Terrorism Contingency Plans DFMD : Door Frame Metal Detectors DG : Director General DGCA : Director-General Civil Aviation DIAL : Delhi International Airport Limited DIG : Deputy Inspector General ETD : Explosive Trace Detection ENC : Encroachment GHA : Ground Handling Agents GMR : Grandhi Mallikarjuna Rao GoM : Government of Maharashtra GVK : Gunupati Venkata Krishna HDIL : Housing Development and Infrastructure Limited HHMD : Hand-held Metal Detectors HIAL : Hyderabad International Airport Limited IB : Intelligence Bureau IBSS : In-line Baggage Screening System ICAO : International Civil Aviation Organization IEDs : Improvised Explosive Devices IG : Inspector General (iv) IGI : Indira Gandhi International IGIA : Indira Gandhi International Airport IRB : India Reserve Battalion LEI : Lack of Effective Implementation MCA : Ministry of Civil Aviation MCGM : Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai MHA : Ministry of Home Affairs MIAL : Mumbai International Airport Limited MIHAN : Multi-Modal International Cargo Hub and Airport MMRDA : Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority MoCA : Ministry of Civil Aviation NCASP : National Civil Aviation Security Programme NSG : National Security Guards OMDA : Operation, Management and Development Agreement P.S. : Police Station PAPs : Password Authentication Protocol PCR : Police Control Room PIDS : Perimeter Intrusion Detection System PSF : Passenger Security Fee QRT : Quick Reaction Team REM : Removal RGI : Rajiv Gandhi International SOPs : Standard Operating Procedures SRA : Slum Rehabilitation Authority UT : Union Territory VHF : Very High Frequency XBIS : X-ray Baggage Inspection System
(v) Printed at : Bengal Offset Works, 335 Khajoor Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-110005. REPORT
Airport Security is integral part of National Security. The objective of providing security to airports is to safeguard the passengers, crew, ground personnel, the general public and the airport infrastructure against unlawful acts as per International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices laid down in Annexure-17 to the Chicago Convention. Annexure – 17 (Security) of International Civil Aviation Organization requires that all Contracting States shall establish and implement a written National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP); shall have a designated appropriate authority to be responsible for development, implementation and maintenance of NCASP; shall allocate tasks and co-ordinate activities related to aviation security.
2. The Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) is the designated agency for providing security in accordance with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regulations. The broad security architecture is laid down by the BCAS in terms of codified five documents. They are called National Civil Aviation Security Programme, National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme, National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme and Bomb Threat Contingency Plan to deal with hijacking.
3. Airport security in the country is looked after by specialized Police agencies, State Police and airport security organizations, depending on the security conditions prevalent in a particular area. Bureau of Civil Aviation Security co-ordinates the working of the various agencies to ensure that all security norms are followed by them.
4. The violent incident which occurred at Karipur International Airport at Kozhikode on 10th June, 2015 involving the employees of Airports Authority of India and Central Industrial Security Force was an eye opener regarding the security system available at Indian airports. With this backdrop, the Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture decided to take up the Issues related to Security at Airports in India for examination and Report.
5. The Committee heard the views of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Home Affairs, Airports Authority of India, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security, Central Industrial Security Force and Intelligence Bureau during its meeting held on the 10th July, 2015. The Committee visited the Delhi International Airport to have on-the-spot study of the security arrangements at the Delhi Airport on 31st August, 2015 and heard the security agencies, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Home Affairs and GMR on various aspects of security at Delhi Airport.
6. The Committee, during its study visit to Mumbai and Kochi, also heard the views of MIAL, GVK and CIAL, the Airport operators as well as various agencies involved in providing security to these airports.
7. The issues dealt with by the Committee on the issues related to Security at Airports in India and the response of the Ministries of Civil Aviation and Home Affairs and other agencies thereon
1 2 and the observations/ recommendations of the Committee have been enumerated in the succeeding paragraphs. Policy on security at airports
8. The Committee was informed that the Commissioner of Security, Civil Aviation (COSCA), Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) is designated by Ministry of Civil Aviation (MCA) as appropriate authority for development, implementation and maintenance of National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP) of India in line with Annexure 17 of Chicago Convention of International Civil Aviation Organization. COSCA has been empowered to issue directions under Section 5A of Aircraft Act, 1934 with respect to civil aviation security matters. He is also empowered to exercise all powers and duties conferred under the Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011. Ministry of Civil Aviation is the nodal Ministry for all matters relating to Civil Aviation.
9. The Advisory Committee for Civil Aviation Security is headed by the Secretary (Civil Aviation) which meets every year. This Committee is responsible to advise Government on matters relating to Civil Aviation Security, recommend and review the effectiveness of security measures and procedures, and suggest enactment of such legislation as is found necessary and provide for co-ordination, at the national level, of all matters relating to the security.
10. Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) lays down Aviation Security (AVSEC) norms in accordance with ICAO Annex-17 for Airport Operators, Aircraft operators, Regulated Agents, Caterers, Ground Handling Agents, Central Industrial Security Force/Aviation Security Group and State/Union Territory Police personnel.
11. It was further informed that implementation of security rules and regulations is monitored by BCAS through Quality Control activities (security audits and inspections, security surveys and security tests to check professional efficiency and alertness of security staff and mock exercises to test efficacy of contingency plan and operational preparedness). AVSEC training is imparted to security personnel of all agencies concerned with civil aviation. BCAS also carry out planning and co-ordination of AVSEC matters. Present status of security at airports
12. On the matter of present status of security at Indian airports, the Committee was informed that major threats (acts of unlawful interference) are hijacking – unlawful seizure of aircraft; hostage taking on board aircraft / aerodromes; forcible intrusion on board aircraft / aerodrome / aeronautical facility; sabotage of airport / aircrafts; and terrorist attack on airport.
13. India is amongst the most terrorism affected countries. Latest threat inputs include surgically implanted explosives for unlawful interference in civil aviation operations, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) hidden in printer ink and toner cartridges, inputs like Terrorists looking to hijack aircraft from airports using trained pilots and inputs point to increasing sophistication in terrorist Modus Operandi and the threat to hijack aircrafts / forcible intrusion at smaller airports. India has been rated highly in terms of aviation security in the last ICAO audit in 2011. The parameter, Lack of Effective Implementation (LEI) for India stood at 10.75% against global average of 34.01%. 3
Security arrangements at airports
14. On the subject of existing security arrangements at the airports in the country, the Ministry informed the Committee that Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) have been issued by BCAS in the form of AVSEC Circulars/ Orders regarding some important issues like procedure of passengers and carry-on baggage screening, items banned for carriage on-board the aircraft, dealing with cases of detection of arms and ammunition during screening of passengers or baggage, screening of hold baggage, security of cargo, courier and mail, access of vehicles up to the aircraft and the list of persons exempted from pre-embarkation security checks.
15. Categorization of airports, on the basis of intelligence inputs as well as threat and risk, has been made for the 98 airports (Hyper-sensitive – 26, Sensitive –56 and Normal – 16).
16. It was also informed that in the aftermath of hijacking of IC-814 in December 1999 from Kathmandu, the Committee of Secretaries took a decision to deploy CISF at the airports. The security of Airports is covered by the State/Union Territory Police, Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)/ India Reserve Battalion (IRB). CISF was inducted into airports consequent to IC-814 hijacking (24th December, 1999) as decided by Committee of Secretaries in a meeting held on 7th January, 2000. CISF was first inducted at Jaipur Airport on 3rd February, 2000. As on date, Central Industrial Security Force (Aviation Security Group) has taken over the security of 53 airports of Airports Authority of India and 06 Joint Venture/ Private Airports. The airports at Jammu and Kashmir, Mizoram, etc. are covered by State Police with the support of CRPF/IRB and rest of the airports are manned by Local Police.
17. In view of potential security threats and current aviation security scenario, State/UT Police have been requested to ensure that all operational airstrips/aerodromes in their jurisdiction including those belonging to flying clubs are properly guarded and all necessary measures are taken to ensure that no unlawful interference takes place with civil aviation operations, especially with regard to hijacking and operation of rogue aircrafts which may be used as weapons. Also to ensure that all those airstrips/aerodromes which are not in use currently are actually made non-operational so that no rogue aircraft can make use of the same.
18. The security infrastructure is provided by the Airport Operators. Some security functions are allocated to Airport Operators (in-line hold baggage screening), Aircraft Operators (screening of registered baggage, cargo, mail, catering, company stores and security of aircraft) and Regulated Agents (screening of cargo/courier/mail).
19. All authorized persons, employees, casual labour, passengers and vehicles while gaining entry into airside from any gate(s) are subject to security checks/frisking, baggage search, if any, by the Airport Security Personnel manning those gates.
20. Screening of passengers, staff and visitors at the entry gates of the airport through Door Frame Metal Detectors (DFMD)/Hand-held Metal Detectors (HHMD) and physical frisking on random basis are carried out depending on local situation and inputs received from the intelligence agencies. In case of suspected baggage, additional measures like screening through X-ray Baggage Inspection System (XBIS) and Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) may also be taken. 4
21. It was further informed that Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) is mandatory at all operational airports. Monitoring of CCTV is to be done by all agencies concerned at unified CCTV Control Room. It is the responsibility of Airport Security Unit of State Police and ASG (CISF) to monitor CCTV covering all areas of the airport. Other agencies like AAI, Customs, Immigration and Airline operators are authorized to depute their representatives in the Control Room for monitoring activities in their respective areas. The recorded cassettes are retained for a period of one month to allow any concerned agencies to review later.
22. Perimeter wall of 8" with 1½” overhang fencing has been prescribed around the airport. Watch towers are to be installed every one km or as per the local survey keeping in view the threat to a particular airport. Similarly, perimeter lighting and perimeter roads are prescribed for mobile and foot patrolling to prevent any unauthorized entry/intrusion into the airports. Perimeter Intrusion Detection System is also prescribed for installation.
23. Manpower for surveillance in and around the airports is also provided on the basis of requirements assessed by joint security survey team.
24. All authorized personnel working with Ground Handling Agents (GHA) while leaving airport from any gate(s) are subject to security checks (frisking/baggage search) by the airport security personnel manning those gates. Similarly, all staff when exiting the security restricted area of airports is to be frisked on random basis so that any element of preparation of an unlawful act can be detected.
25. Airport Operators, Airline Operators, GHAs and other agencies are required to have security clearance and approved security programme before operation.
26. All persons operating in the aviation environment need to undergo Aviation Security (AVSEC) awareness training. Security related personnel need to qualify in AVSEC Basic Training. Screeners are mandated to qualify in screener training. Refresher courses are prescribed for various training programme.
27. The Ministry submitted that the following is the mechanism existing to deal with hijacking situations: (i) Aerodrome Committee at airport level; (ii) Central Committee at National level; (iii) Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijack (COSAH); and (iv) Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS): Apex Body.
28. The Cabinet Secretary is the Chairman of COSAH. DGCA is the Chairman of Central Committee with COSCA as the Convener.
29. The Quick Reaction Team (QRT) of State Police / CISF / CRPF is responsible for cordoning of hijacked aircraft till the arrival of NSG, strengthening of perimeter and crowd management. Counter Terrorism Contingency Plan including various agencies i.e., CISF, NSG, Local Police, etc. are in place at Airports.
Role of Ministry of Home Affairs in Civil Aviation Security
30. When asked about the role of the Ministry of Home Affairs on the issue of Security at Indian airports, the Committee was informed that the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has an 5 important role in ensuring civil aviation security in the country. Whereas BCAS frames the rules and regulations for civil aviation security, Central Industrial Security Force, which is functioning under MHA, act as the implementing agency for the guidelines framed by BCAS, CISF is also entrusted with dawing up airport-wise Counter-Terrorism Contingency Plans (CTCP) and is at the forefront of activities in this regard. Currently CTCP is available only at Delhi and Mumbai airports where CISF has been entrusted with security of the city side area. CISF also has its own intelligence wing and is part of the multi-agency centre which disseminates intelligence and co-ordinates action at the airports.
31. The Intelligence Bureau also plays an important role in providing intelligence inputs related to civil aviation security. Further, Bureau of Immigration under Intelligence Bureau screens incoming and outgoing passengers from and to other countries.
32. It was further informed that the National Security Guard (NSG) under MHA is involved in Civil Aviation Security through deployment of Sky Marshals on aircrafts operating on sensitive sectors for prevention of and to act as first responders to any incident involving hijacking of an aircraft. NSG is also the primary Contingency Response Force for anti-terrorist operations at airports. NSG maintains a Task Force for this purpose ready to move at 30 minutes notice.
Role of other agencies in Civil Aviation Security
33. As per the status note furnished by the Ministry of Home Affairs on the subject, the following agencies are involved in civil aviation security:-
(i) Airlines - Airlines are responsible for screening of registered baggage and cargo. Airlines are also responsible for security of their aircraft. (ii) Airport Operators- Airport Operators are responsible for provision of security infrastructure such as In-line Baggage Screening Systems at the airports and also for co-ordination of various security related activities at the airports. · Airports Authority of India (AAI) operates 125 airports (including non-operational). · Six JVC Airports i.e. Delhi (DIAL), Mumbai (MIAL), Nagpur (MIHAN), Cochin (CIAL), Hyderabad (HIAL) and Bangalore (BIAL). · One airport is under Civil Administration Diu. · Air Traffic Services at all Airports in India are provided by the AAI. (iii) State Police- State Police is responsible for law and order and crime control related issues at the airports. Apart from this, at certain airports where CISF is yet to be deployed, State Police Force is the primary security agency for security related functions such as pre-embarkation security checks, protection of airport premises and intelligence/surveillance. (iv) Defence- Deployment of Quick Reaction Teams at Civil enclaves for anti-hijack cordon.
Threat perception and Security categorization of airports
34. When asked about the threat perception and the provision of adequate security at the airports in the country, the Committee was informed that threat perception to all operational airports in the country is reviewed by BCAS in consultation with the Intelligence Agencies and based on 6 the inputs received, airports are categorised into three categories viz., Hypersensitive, Sensitive and Normal. Currently, out of 98 operational airports in India, 26 airports are categorised as Hypersensitive (18 under CISF security cover), 56 categorised as Sensitive (37 under CISF security cover) and 16 are categorised as normal (4 under CISF security cover). Table showing category-wise list of airports under CISF security cover is at Annexure-I.
Background on Induction of CISF at Airports
35. The Ministry of Home Affairs, in its Status Note furnished to the Committee on the subject, has stated that before induction of CISF at airports, different State Police Forces used to provide security at airports. Despite the fact that the BCAS was the regulator framing policies and guidelines for uniform implementation across the States, the set up lacked semblance of uniformity. In the backdrop of hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC-814 from Kathmandu on December 24, 1999, airport security matters were reviewed by the Government and it was decided that airports security should be entrusted to a single dedicated Force instead of different State Police Forces with divergent work culture and practices. The Committee of Secretaries (CoS) in its meeting held on the 7th January, 2000 decided to assign the task of aviation security at Indian airports to the CISF. The dedicated CISF contingent earmarked for aviation security has been notified as Aviation Security Group (ASG). The first Airport Security Unit of CISF was inducted at Jaipur Airport on February 3, 2000. Presently, CISF is deployed at 59 operational airports out of 98 operational airports with a total strength of around 22000 personnel. Role of CISF
36. The Aviation Security Group of CISF is responsible for all the areas of airport security including Perimeter Security, Access Control, Terminal Building Security, Apron Security, Surveillance, anti-hijacking pre-embarkation checks, Passenger Handling etc.
37. The role of CISF is categorized in the following three operational units:-
(i) Anti-hijacking Unit dealing with Pre-embarkation security check of passengers and cabin baggage; and Access control of passengers, visitors, staff of various agencies, catering personnel, cargo and courier into the airport;
(ii) Protection Unit dealing with the Protection of airport and perimeter; Quick Reaction Team; and Cordoning of aircraft during contingencies (except civil enclaves); and
(iii) Intelligence and Surveillance Unit dealing with the Surveillance at airports for security.
Measures taken to strengthen the security arrangements
38. The Committee was informed by the Ministry that the following measures have been taken to strengthen the security arrangements at airports:-
Perimeter Security – This is ensured through perimeter wall of standard height as specified by 7
BCAS specifications. At metro airports, automatic Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS) has been installed at IGI Airport, New Delhi and RGI Airport, Hyderabad.
39. The Secretary, Ministry of Civil Aviation while deposing before the Committee informed that out of the requirement of 580 km boundary wall for covering Indian airports, 547 km is available. 26 kms of boundary wall has been constructed so far and work is going on for construction of another 4 kms. He also informed the Committee that 538 watch towers are functioning against the requirement of 629 watch towers in the airports. Works have already been started for the construction of 62 watch towers and for the remaining 29 watch towers, works have to start.
40. On the issue of installation of Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS) in Indian airports, the Secretary apprised the Committee that PIDS has been installed at the Delhi International Airport. A portion of the perimeter of the airport has been placed under PIDS on pilot basis. The imported PIDS is not functioning properly in the Indian conditions and the Ministry of Civil Aviation is looking out for a technology to suit the Indian conditions which is cost effective as compared to the construction of watch towers and manning the towers through CISF.
1. Access Control – Entry at airports is regulated by Airport Entry Passes (AEP) of different categories issued by the BCAS. Entry of passengers is through boarding tickets.
2. Anti Hijacking Measures – These include frisking and checking of passenger and their baggage through electronic aids. Passengers are also subjected to surveillance and profiling. Further measures taken include Behaviour Detection Training for random screening, deployment of Dog Squads and Bomb Detection and Disposal Squads, Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) etc.
3. Anti Sabotage Measures – Aircrafts are subjected to anti sabotage checks at originating station and guarded till take off. Baggage is supervised from check-in counter till loading into the aircraft by airlines security staff and is subjected to X-ray examination and/or physical check. In-line Baggage Screening System (IBSS) is being installed at Metro airports in India and consists of five levels of detection wherein suspicious baggage is successively sent to the higher levels, depending upon the results of checks at the lower levels.
4. Measures against terrorist attacks – Approach roads to airports are manned by armed guards and Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs). QRT is also deployed at the Terminal Building to thwart any armed intrusion. QRT of CISF/ State Police are to hold the situation till the arrival of NSG QRT in case of an armed attack.
5. Training – CISF trains its personnel in tune with the National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme. Its personnel are also trained specially for counter-terrorism, surveillance, Quick Reaction Team, courtesy and behaviour, dog handling, bomb detection and disposal, etc. CISF personnel undergo Basic Aviation Security Course with 17 varied training modules as per International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards. CISF personnel also undergo soft skills training and behaviour detection training. 8
6. Mock Drills – Mock drills, decoy checks etc. are conducted at all airports regularly to check the efficacy of various plans and to fine tune the efficiency of the security agencies to meet any sudden eventuality.
Kozhikode Airport Incident
41. There was a fight between Fire Service Officials of Airports Authority of India and CISF personnel at the Kozhikode airport on the 10th June, 2015 in which one CISF official was killed. The issue got media coverage worldwide. There was widespread damage of airport property and the runway was blocked for some time. As a result, the airport was closed for six hours and four flights were diverted.
42. The Ministry of Home Affairs, in the Status Note furnished to the Committee on the issue, has stated that apart from the recent incident of violence at Kozhikode International Airport on the 10th June, 2015 there has been no major security related incident at any airport since the induction of CISF in the airport sector.
43. The Home Secretary informed the Committee that cases have been filed and that investigation is going on and let us wait for the conclusions. The Home Secretary further stated that there is a disconnect amongst multiple agencies that are involved in ensuring security at the airports. Lack of co-ordination between them is one of the biggest problems this country faces today. Therefore, there is absolutely a case to improve intra-agency co-ordination at the airports.
44. The Secretary, Civil Aviation submitted before the Committee that the Kozhikode incident was essentially due to the perception that the death of CISF constable had been caused by the fire service personnel of Airports Authority of India. It was this mistaken impression that led to the unfortunate incidents and certainly, it should not have happened. Steps have already been taken to ensure unity of command at the airport level wherein the Airport Director will now be overall in-charge of the Airport including the CISF personnel and their deployment.
45. The Committee, during its deliberations, asked the Ministry of Civil Aviation as well as the Ministry of Home Affairs about the steps taken to avoid such incidents in future.
46. The DG, CISF apprised the Committee about the measures taken in the wake of the violent incident that happened at Karipur Airport on 10th June, 2015 as follows:- (i) All Chief Airport Security Officers have been directed that it is their bounden duty to ensure that there is no source of friction amongst the stakeholders and that they should take proactive and corrective measures, if there is any problem; (ii) Supervisory officers have been directed to visit all airports with a view to ascertaining and resolving any inter-agency friction; (iii) Special drive to have refresher courses in soft skill training for CISF personnel to ensure courtesy and good behavior; (iv) It has, however, been reiterated to all formations that there shall be no slackness in implementation of security measures to ensure safety and security of the airports; and (v) A Board of Officers has been constituted to examine the duty point-wise holding of weapons by CISF personnel at the airports. 9
47. Further, the Ministry of Civil Aviation has intimated that subsequent to the Kozhikode Airport incident, a meeting was held between Regional Executive Director (Southern Region), Airport Director - Calicut of Airports Authority India and Additional DG, IG, DIG Southern Zone and Commandant of CISF with emphasis on mutual co-operation and confidence building measures as well as long term procedural and technical solutions needed for preventing re-occurrence of such unfortunate incidents. Similar meetings have also been held at all the major airports to create harmony among the agencies for smooth operations of the Air Services.
48. The Ministry of Home Affairs vide their communication dated the 14th December, 2015 informed the Committee that the four cases registered on the Kozhikode airport incident are still being investigated by the local police and charges are yet to be filed.
49. The Committee condemns the violent incident at Kozhikode Airport. The Committee demands that the Government should ensure that such incidents do not occur in future. The Committee notes that six months is more than sufficient time to complete the investigation. The Committee recommends that the investigations may be completed at the earliest and the guilty may be punished. Findings of investigations may be shared with this Committee as soon as it is submitted.
Co-ordination mechanism at the airports
50. The Home Secretary informed the Committee that he has already mooted the idea of a co-ordination mechanism at the airport level wherein the Airport Director who is an officer of the Airports Authority of India and the Chief Security Officer who comes from the CISF meet more often. They should have structured interactions and a dialogue with all the wings of the airport management.
51. Another level of co-ordination can be between DG, CISF and Commissioner BCAS which as a standing co-ordination mechanism would meet once in three months along with the airport operator i.e., Airports Authority of India and CISF officers. They can discuss the gaps in security infrastructure.
52. The Home Secretary further assured the Committee that he is going to constitute another standing mechanism at Home Secretary level wherein he, the Secretary, Civil Aviation, DG, CISF and the Chairman, Airports Authority of India would meet once in three months to look at the gaps in security infrastructure and also look at what is happening at the airports and suggest remedial and corrective measures for the problems.
53. The Secretary, Civil Aviation while deposing before the Committee submitted that as per the Standard Operating Procedures, the Airport Director may supervise the operational functioning of CISF in so far as the deployment on airport security duties is concerned.
54. The Committee noted the suggested co-ordination mechanisms and hope that it will be implemented soon to prevent any loopholes in the security apparatus.
Security concerns in Civil Aviation Security
55. As per the earlier Committee of Secretaries’ decision, the airport security at all airports was to be taken over by CISF gradually. So far, CISF has been deployed at 59 airports. However, 10 considering the high cost of deployment of CISF and the low scale of operations at many airports making CISF deployment further unviable, a proposal to reduce CISF deployments and instead going for State Police, etc. is under consideration.
56. BCAS is in acute need of restructuring to fulfil its mandate. A proposal to increase its strength to 970 has been submitted.
57. The Ministry also stated that the list of persons exempted from frisking and the list of vehicles permitted access to airside is very long, creating problems in the security architecture.
1. Cargo Security – Security of Cargo is a major cause of concern due to the following reasons :- Private security guards are deployed for access control duties. Involvement of multi agencies i.e., Security Guards of Airport Operators, Security personnel of Cargo handling agents and CISF. The CCTV surveillance cameras are generally not installed from the point of view of security and the feed from those cameras is also not available at the CISF Control Room.
In the backdrop of the attack at Karachi Airport, a fresh survey of the Cargo Complex at various airports would be desirable so that this weak link in the aviation security may be addressed. 2. Perimeter security - Perimeter Security is a weak link at most airports. At present there is a gap of 1 kilometer between two watch towers. It is humanly not possible for sentries to have a clear ‘line of sight’ at such a distance. Operationally, for foolproof security, a ‘line of sight’ distance of 300 meters should be the optimum distance. There is no alternative mode of communication at watch towers which is a hindrance to quick communication. The present Walkie-Talkie system is a one way system and can be jammed during any contingency. Hence, there is a need for intercoms at each watch tower along the perimeter. 3. Need for uniform format of e-ticket or provision of machine readable bar coded tickets - At present, there is no uniformity in the format of e-tickets. CISF has detected 36 cases in the year 2014 in which printouts of fake/cancelled e- tickets were used for gaining entry into the terminal building.
4. Augmentation of CISF staff- While the number of flights has increased, the strength of CISF at airports has not kept pace with the changing requirements. Augmentation proposals of CISF strength at 13 airports are pending with the Ministry of Civil Aviation, while similar proposals in respect of 08 other airports are pending with the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security for approval since long.
During the deliberations of the Committee, the issue of shortage of CISF staff for airport security was raised. It was informed that out of the required strength of 24,333 CISF personnel for manning 59 Indian airports which are controlled by the CISF, the current deployment is 22,411 only. DG, CISF while deposing before the Committee accepted the shortage of strength in the Aviation Security Group of CISF and assured the Committee that necessary steps will be taken to maintain the vacancies level to a minimum. 11
5. Deficiency of Security Gadgets- There is shortfall in Random Screening Equipment (X-BIS, DFMD, HHMD & ETD), Communication Equipment (VHF, walkie-talkie and hands free), BDDS equipment etc.
6. Installation of CCTV Cameras & clearance of shadow zones Installation of CCTV system does not exist at 06 airports (Dimapur, Jorhat, Lilabari, Silchar, Tezpur & Khajuraho). Full coverage of CCTV not available at 33 airports – blind spots remain. Provision of digital Video recording system for 30 days does not exist at 20 airports. Video Analytic Features need to be activated at all airports.
7. Dog Squads not available at 6 airports (Coimbatore, Agra, Gwalior, Porbandar, Portblair and Diu).
8. Counter Terrorist Contingency Plan (CTCP) by CISF at approach roads available only at Delhi and Mumbai. The same needs to be put in place at 20 more international and hyper-sensitive airports.
9. Deficiency of Family & Barrack accommodation for ASG personnel
60. It was further informed that out of the requirement of 13241 barracks accommodation, only 10951 are available at present. The deficient 2290 barracks are spread over 26 airports. As far as the family accommodation is concerned, 3807 units are available against the requirement of 11020. The deficient 7213 units are spread over 56 airports in the country.
Security at Delhi Airport
58. The Committee, during its visit to Indira Gandhi International Airport, Delhi on 31st August, 2015 heard the views of the Ministries of Civil Aviation and Home Affairs, Central Industrial Security Force, Delhi Police and Delhi International Airport Limited on the security related issues of Delhi Airport. The Airport operator, Delhi International Airport Limited briefed the Committee on the existing security system available at the airport – both at the city side and the airport side.
59. The Delhi Police, during the deliberations, apprised the Committee on their role in providing security to Delhi Airport. They also highlighted the grey areas, where the existing system needs to be strengthened. The representatives of Delhi Police flagged the below-mentioned requirements/ lacunae :-
(i) Bullet-Proof Vehicles are required;
(ii) Inadequate CCTV coverage;
(iii) The old building of P.S. Domestic Airport was acquired and demolished by the DIAL and no land was allotted in lieu of the same;
(iv) A five floor new building has been erected but only a portion of the ground floor has been given for the police station and ACP/Sub-Div office is insufficient for smooth functioning. Either an additional floor or separate land may please be allotted for the same;
(v) No space allotted for Aerocity police post; 12
(vi) Rent is levied by DIAL for the domestic police station building and the land allocated for the T-III P.S.;
(vii) Electricity charges are being charged by DIAL which are significantly higher in comparison to BSES rates;
(viii) Jungle area around T-3 is vulnerable place from security point of view. Private land of DIAL has neither boundary/fencing nor is protected by guards. It can be used by anti-social elements;
(ix) DIAL was asked to erect all weather ‘Machans’ in the said area and no decision has been taken as yet;
(x) Clearing shrubs and bushes not done on a regular basis;
(xi) Three vulnerable villages viz., Mahipalpur/ Rangpuri, Shahbad Mohamadpur and Mehram Nagar adjoining IGI Airport cause security threat; and
(xii) Watch towers at 300 mtrs distance required.
60. Regarding the systemic loopholes in the prevention of human trafficking, the Committee was told that the following are the areas of concern:-
(i) Checking and segregation of arriving International and domestic passengers from International side is not done near Transit Area;
(ii) Procedure of issuing boarding cards to international passengers in transit is not fool proof;
(iii) No immigration counter in transit Area;
(iv) No system to monitor conduct/behavior of airlines staff; and
(v) Ticketing counters on International side of Transit Area are not covered with CCTV Cameras.
61. In this regard, the point- wise response of DIAL is given as follows:-
(i) The Delhi Police has been making various security arrangements outside the terminal area, including putting up barricades, posting manpower and upgrading mobile patrolling through extra deployment of PCR vans and Motor-cycles. If Delhi Police considered it as an essential security measure to deploy Bullet-proof vehicles around the city side area and approach road of IGI Airport, they can do so. DIAL welcomes these steps, if it is so needed to upgrade security;
(ii) With regard to rental charges, it was informed that the following areas/buildings at the IGI Airport are in occupation of Delhi Police as on date:
(a) Ground Floor of G+5 Building (Built up area-520 Square Meters) opposite Terminal-IB for Police Station;
(b) Traffic Inspector’s office opposite Terminal-1B at G+5 Building; 13
(c) Land and built up space of 1200 sq. m (250 sq. m. built-up & 950 sq. m land) opposite CISF barracks, Mahipalpur for Airport Police Station. This Police Station was shifted to a location near the Terminal-2. However, even after the shifting, the building and land at Mahipalpur has not been handed back to DIAL till date. Surprisingly, the issue has been raised by Delhi Police in front of the Committee even though it was never discussed with DIAL before the resolution. The said premises were handed over to Delhi Police more than 5 years back;
(d) 1600 sq. m (built-up 1165 sq. m & 450 sq. m. land) near Terminal 2 for Airport Police Station, this was earlier operating from the accommodation mentioned at (c) above;
(e) Traffic Inspector’s office at T2 near pass section;
(f) 500 Sq. m land near ARC Hanger for storage of vehicles;
(g) 2960 Sq. m land near T-3 for a new Police Station building;
(h) Space inside Terminal-3 (16 Sq. m) for courtesies by Delhi Police.
62. DIAL informed that neither any agreement has been signed nor any license fee/ rentals have been received from Delhi Police till date for any of the above mentioned premises. Despite repeated reminders, Delhi Police is skipping the matter. Even with respect to the land provided for new police station near Terminal-3, Delhi Police says that the matter of payment of license fee for this land has been forwarded to the Ministry of Home Affairs and will be paid on the basis of the decision of MHA. The matter is pending with MHA for long without any decision communicated to DIAL despite repeated requests. It is imperative for Delhi Police to at least sign the License Agreement for legalizing their occupational rights on the land and built up spaces at IGI Airport. DIAL also submitted as follows:
(i) the Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS) has been made serviceable and is working satisfactorily. This has been verified by CISF and they are operating the system;
(ii) there are a total of 41 watch towers at IGI Airport which are more than the requirement mandated by BCAS vide BCAS circular No.18/2002. All the watch towers are being manned by the CISF on a round-the-clock basis. The watch towers are located all around the perimeter and have been placed after complete survey by the CISF which is tasked for protecting the airport;
(iii) matter regarding installation of Body scanners and Cargo scanners for the Airports in India is under consideration of MoCA and BCAS;
(iv) immigration authorities of Government of India may like to keep a Complaint Registration book in the office of the AFRRO and passengers can lodge their complaints there. The telephone number of the AFRRO could also be given wide publicity. The presence of a very senior officer like the AFRRO in the Airport on a round-the-clock basis itself is a huge inbuilt advantage of immigration to control the activities in the premises; 14
(v) with regard to the replacement of damaged scan machines, it is informed that the scan machines are regularly maintained. As and when any machine is found to be malfunctioning, it is immediately attended to and rectified/replaced;
(vi) Air Port Security Committee (APSC) meeting is held regularly on a monthly basis. As mandated by BCAS, it is held on the 3rd Thursday of every month and the minutes of the meeting are circulated to all participants and the BCAS. The meeting is attended by all the concerned stakeholders including DIAL Security team, DIAL Operations Team, DIAL maintenance Team, Airliner operators, AOC Chairman, CISF, Immigration, Customs, Delhi Police etc. In addition, in case of specific alerts received from our intelligence agencies/Home Ministry etc., a special APSC meeting is convened at short notice; and
(vii) DIAL is extremely conscious of security in and around the airport and constantly reviews its Security and Contingency plans. Any grey areas identified/observed are immediately looked into and addressed. Last week we conducted a walkthrough with the AOC Chairman and representatives of airlines, through the Baggage Handling System and CCTV coverage thereof to identify, if there are any grey areas that need to be plugged.
63. The Committee expresses its serious concern over the grey areas and security related problems as mentioned by Delhi Police. It is equally appalled to see the existing interface between the Delhi Police and DIAL in respect of security related issues at the Airport. It reflects a lack of mutual confidence in one another as well as required co- ordination between the two. Otherwise, Delhi Police, instead of taking up these issues with the Parliamentary Committee and DIAL giving point-wise clarification before it, the two should have mutually resolved them. BCAS and the Ministries of Civil Aviation and Home Affairs also appeared to have remained unconcerned in this regard. IGI Airport, being one of the most sensitive Airports in the existing security scenario, such gaps are sure to lead to any disaster at any time.
64. The Committee notes the various concerns expressed by the Delhi Police as regards the security at Delhi International Airport. The Committee observes that the issues are very serious and need immediate attention of the Ministries of Civil Aviation and Home Affairs and various other stakeholders involved. The Committee recommends that all the issues need to be considered for immediate redressal and status note be submitted to the Committee containing steps taken in these regards.
65. As regards payment of rent and electricity charges by Delhi Police to DIAL for the space occupied by them and signing of License Agreement, the Committee recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs may take immediate decision in those matters as the Delhi Police is under that Ministry, discharging sovereign function of maintenance of security in and around the IGIA.
66. As regards providing space to the Delhi Police in the Delhi International Airport, the Committee directs the Ministry of Home Affairs to find out a workable solution in consultation with the Ministry of Civil Aviation and BCAS to provide an adequate space to discharge their sovereign duty of security at the International Airport in Delhi. 15
Security at Mumbai Airport
67. As regards the Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport, Mumbai, the Committee, during its study visit to Mumbai on 13th October, 2015 was informed that :-
(i) Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport, Mumbai is one of the busiest airports in India;
(ii) CSIA handled 36.63 million passengers in the year 2014-15 and is expected to handle 40 million passengers in the current fiscal year 2015-16;
(iii) MIAL has been mandated to undertake operations, management and development of the CSIA, pursuant to the Operation, Management and Development Agreement dated April 4, 2006 (the “OMDA”) entered into between MIAL and AAI.
68. The Committee, during its visit to Mumbai on 13th October, 2015, heard the views of Mumbai International Airport Limited, Airports Authority of India, Central Industrial Security Force, Mumbai Police, State Government of Maharashtra and the Ministry of Civil Aviation on the Issues related to security at Mumbai International Airport.
69. The Mumbai International Airport Limited also raised the issue of deployment of 3797 CISF personnel as against the sanctioned strength of 3996. They have also placed a demand of additional 882 persons for the domestic operations from T2, which is pending approval from the Ministry of Civil Aviation. Various police agencies and stakeholders have expressed the view that the airport security is adequately provided with all the modern equipments with the active involvement of the airport operator i.e., MIAL.
70. The Committee was informed that cargo operations inside the airport is another cause of concern as far as security of the airport is concerned. The cargo complex is accessed by more than 5000 casual employees daily for their work. These employees do not have validated entry passes and have an easy access to apron side also. The security agencies expressed their apprehension over the issue and requested the Committee to look into the matter.
71. During the meeting, the issue of presence of slums in the vicinity of the airport area which are posing a security threat to the safety, security and operations of the airport was raised. The Committee decided to take up the matter in detail and requested the Housing Department and Slum Rehabilitation Authority of State Government of Maharashtra and Mumbai International Airport Limited to submit the necessary information on the issue.
72. The Mumbai International Airport Limited, in their written submission, informed the Committee that 308.95 areas of airport land is encroached and around 4 lakh people are staying there. Slums at Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport have been existing for the past several decades and that it was part of the Demised Premises when the Airport was handed over to the Joint Venture Company. Major concentration of these 35 slum pockets is on the eastern side of the airport site area, particularly along Airport’s operational area boundary wall. Slums are a security threat to the Airport and rehabilitation of slum dwellers is essential to release land for Airport development and to ensure security of the CSIA. 73. The Mumbai International Airport Limited has further submitted the details of projects proposed to be constructed in the area occupied by the slums. Aeronautical area of CSIA is to be 16 expanded and airport operational facilities are to be constructed in the part of land currently occupied by slums. Aircraft parking stands (apron), taxiway extension, airside perimeter road, perimeter security wall, airport maintenance compound, general aviation parking, aircraft hangers are some of the works to be taken up in the land under encroachment.
74. Regarding the steps taken by different authorities to rehabilitate the slum dwellers, the Committee was informed by GVK (MIAL) that in the past, Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) had taken up slum rehabilitation of some hutments located in Kranti Nagar slum area, on the eastern side of CSIA located near Mithi River. This was done by MCGM for widening of existing Mithi River Channel. In 2007, MIAL appointed Housing Development and Infrastructure Limited (HDIL), as an agency for taking up slum rehabilitation on its behalf. In 2009, Government of Maharashtra appointed Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) as Special Planning Authority for CSIA, HDIL, with collector (Mumbai Suburban District), had taken up survey of some of the slums at CSIA to initiate slum rehabilitation. However, this work was not completed and the process was stopped midway. In 2011, MMRDA had taken up rehabilitation of approximately 600 slum hutments in Bamanwada area of CSIA for construction of Sahar Elevated Road. Since 2013, MIAL has been requesting Government of Maharashtra for formulation of appropriate slum rehabilitation scheme for Airport to enable feasible resolution of slum rehabilitation issue of CSIA.
75. In 2014, the Minister of Civil Aviation, requested Hon’ble Chief Minister of Maharashtra to prepare and implement Airport Specific Slum Rehabilitation Scheme for CSIA.
76. The Committee was further informed that as part of the proposed Airport Specific Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (and also as per the current Slum Rehabilitation Authority Scheme of Government of Maharashtra), a constructed tenement of 25 sq. mtrs. (269 sq.ft) of carpet area is to be given against each hutment (based on eligibility), along with related community level infrastructure like balwadis, health clinics, roads, open area, parking etc. The slum rehabilitation scheme also provides for rehabilitation of existing shops/commercial establishments.
77. There is a hillock near runway 27 end of CSIA, along with Mithi River, which overlooks the operational area of CSIA. The hillock is completely covered by slums with a clear view of Airport operations and aircraft. In view of this, the hillock and the slums on it are a serious security concern. The slums on the hillock are to be rehabilitated and the hillock itself is to be removed for construction of taxiway extension for runway 27. This is a priority project for CSIA and has been included in MIAL’s priority list of critical slum pockets requiring immediate slum rehabilitation, submitted to Government of Maharashtra. Currently, Mumbai Police and CISF personnel keep constant vigil on the slums on this hillock and ensure security of airport operations.
78. The Housing Department of State Government of Maharashtra has submitted the details of action taken by them on the relocation of slums of CSIA, steps that are needed to be taken to make settlement of the slums to relocate to some other areas and also the present status of slums. As stated in the agreement between the Mumbai International Airport Limited and the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) dated the 12th December, 2006 approximately 80,000 families were expected to be living on the airport land. They have further stated that the slum dwellers are demanding rehabilitation on the same land. The airport land is owned by Airports Authority of India. The policy in this regard has to be finalized by the Airports 17
Authority of India and the Ministry of Civil Aviation. There is no concrete plan of rehabilitation proposed or submitted by Mumbai International Airport Limited. A large number of hutments and huge area of encroachment has made the issue complicated and sensitive, which needs specific solution and policy intervention.
79. It was also informed that the State Government and Mumbai International Airport Limited have signed a State Support Agreement on the 27th April, 2006 according to which the State Government has to provide support to Mumbai International Airport Limited and Airports Authority of India in clearing the encroachments. The Government of Maharashtra has stated that the Mumbai International Airport Limited is duty bound to relocate the slums with the assistance of Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority. Mumbai International Airport Limited has not provided a comprehensive and concrete plan of rehabilitation and resettlement of all concerned project affected persons on the entire airport land.
80. As regards the agencies responsible for rehabilitation of the slum dwellers, the Government of Maharashtra informed the Committee that prime responsibility of rehabilitation is of MIAL as per the agreement between MIAL and AAI (OMDA Agreement). MMRDA is a nodal authority appointed by State Government of Maharashtra to assist MIAL in the airport slum rehabilitation. Housing Department, Government of Maharashtra, Slum Rehabilitation Authority, the Additional Collector and Dy. Collector ENC (REM) are also responsible for the rehabilitation of slum dwellers.
81. The Government of Maharashtra (Housing Department) has further informed the Committee that so far, seven slum rehabilitation schemes are under implementation at different locations in the area of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai viz., at Kurla, Mahul, Bhandup, Mulund and Andheri (Annexure-II).
82. The Committee was further informed by the Government of Maharashtra that as per the agreement between MIAL and MMRDA, MIAL shall bear the entire project cost including incidental expenditure and will pay the agency charges to MMRDA as determined under Article III.
MIAL shall procure the land and tenements required and handover to MMRDA for rehabilitating the Password Authentication Protocols.
MIAL shall make available to MMRDA necessary funds for providing temporary transit accommodation including any out of pocket expenses required by MMRDA.
MIAL will procure the tenements under four different options.
Procure the Government or private land and build the tenements through the contractors.
Procure the tenements through private developments under SRA scheme.
Procure the tenements by assigning the developmental rights to private developers on their land.
Purchase of tenements from the Government agencies or from the market. MIAL shall pay fees concurrently with the reimbursement of cost to MMRDA in accordance with Article III. 18
83. The entire cost of procurement of tenements, developing of on-site infrastructure and off- site infrastructure shall be borne by MIAL. After procuring the tenements in consultation with MMRDA, MIAL shall handover the tenements in good condition with all the physical and social amenities to MMRDA for shifting the PAPs. MMRDA shall shift the families as per the priority area given by MIAL.
84. The Committee finds it pertinent that the issue of encroachment of airport land and adjoining hillock by slum dwellers is settled at the earliest. In this regard, the Committee took note of the replies furnished by MIAL and the Housing Department, Government of Maharashtra on various aspects of the encroachment.
85. The Committee observes that the 35 pockets of slums in the airport and the slums on the hillock along the Mithi River are potential threat to the aircrafts and the CSIA airport. The problems are persisting for the last so many years. The Committee feels that the Governmental agencies, both at the Centre and the State level, could not rationally judge the menace of slums inside the airport area as a potential security threat. Mumbai is the commercial capital of the country. Any breach of security at the airport will have far reaching consequences. The threat is perennial and no amount of policing could provide adequate security to the airport if the slums are allowed to exist and flourish inside the airport. The Committee feels that the Government agencies are happily unconcerned about the airport security at CSIA, Mumbai. In Mumbai International Airport, a disaster is waiting to happen at any moment in view of these dangerously placed encroachments overlapping operational areas, of the Mumbai Airport. The Committee calls upon all the agencies such as AAI, Ministry of Civil Aviation, BCAS, State Government of Maharashtra and MIAL to wake up from their slumber and see the danger looming large on the Mumbai Airport. The Committee expresses its serious concern on this and strongly recommends that all the slums must be removed and relocated from the airport area. There is no justification for allowing encroachers inside the airport area and the Committee is of the view that so long as this area is occupied by the slum dwellers, the Mumbai airport is sitting on a ticking bomb until it is relocated. Therefore, the Committee recommends that MIAL along with Government of Maharashtra should come forward immediately with adequate proposals to rehabilitate the slums taking support of various Governmental agencies.
86. The Committee understands that MIAL has been pursuing with the Government of Maharashtra (GoM) for rehabilitation of hutment dwellers at CSIA since taking over operations of CSIA in 2006. The Committee hopes that the Government of Maharashtra will expedite its approval for the Airport Specific Slum Rehabilitation Scheme for CSIA, to enable the slum rehabilitation process quickly.
Security at Cochin Airport
87. The Committee, during its visit to Cochin, heard the views of the Cochin International Airport Limited, Airports Authority of India, Central Industrial Security Force, Kerala Police, State Government of Kerala and the Ministry of Civil Aviation on the Issues related to security at Cochin International Airport.
88. The representatives of the Cochin International Airport Limited briefed the Committee on the measures taken by various agencies including the airport operator, airlines operators and the 19
Central Industrial Security Force for strengthening the security of the airport. The stakeholders involved in providing security to the Cochin Airport had expressed their satisfaction with the facilities and instruments provided by CIAL⎯the airport operator. The CISF and the security agencies informed the Committee that the Cochin Airport has all the modern equipments to provide adequate security to the airport.
89. The representatives of the Cochin International Airport Limited, during the deliberations of the meeting, placed the demand for deployment of 917 CISF personnel based on the new survey conducted on the basis of increase in passenger flow which stands at 61 lakh per annum as on 1st April, 2015. The current deployment of 494 CISF personnel is based on the 2007 survey for 25 lakh passengers’ inflow at that time.
90. The Committee compliments the CIAL, CISF and other security agencies for providing security to the Cochin Airport.
Security of the Airports a Sovereign Function
91. The Committee noted that the CISF is providing service to the airports on the basis of payment made to them. The Home Secretary, while deposing before the Committee, informed that CISF is a zero cost force. It is deployed for security of airports, vital installation and Government Buildings on payment. Therefore, resources have to be raised and there is no way of deployment of CISF without the payment. The Home Secretary further stated that due to this reason, presently CISF is deployed only in 59 airports and 39 airports are still not with the CISF, which means that they are with the State Police. From the national security perspective, the Home Ministry would like all these airports to be covered under CISF.
92. The Secretary, Civil Aviation while deposing before the Committee, submitted that since the year 2000, `130 is levied on every departing passenger as security component of the PSF. The security expenditure is met from the PSF security component. For the year 2014-15, total collection of PSF Security component is `1132 crores and the expenditure on security is around `1319 crores. Besides, some amount is collected from cargo side also. So, there is a deficit of around `200 crores. Thus the fund available is less than the fund required for security purposes.
93. The Home Secretary submitted to the Committee that he is not really very sure as to how much of the PSF security component is really being spent on security or is it being spent on something else. It is also not clear whether there was a concurrent audit of this amount being spent on security by the airport operator. He suggested that the entire PSF security component should be put on an escrow account so that it is not spent for any other purpose.
94. The Secretary, Civil Aviation submitted to the Committee that when providing security at airport is, actually a sovereign function, it does not and should not matter whether we fully meet the requirement of funds or not. If there is a security requirement which has to be met, it should be met by the Ministry of Civil Aviation or the Government of India, the sovereign. The Secretary further informed the Committee that CISF is providing security cover to Delhi Metro considering it as a sovereign function. The Delhi Metro does not pay a single paisa for the CISF which is deployed in various metro stations. Payments and salaries for CISF are met by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. The Secretary, Civil Aviation further stated that since it is a sovereign function, Government has no option to depute private firms to provide security to the 20 airports. The Secretary emphasized that sovereign function must be discharged by the Government and fund constraint should not be seen as an obstacle.
95. The Committee observes that National Security cannot be compromised. Civil Aviation Security is a very integral and important element of national security. Airport complex is a crucial infrastructure. Any large scale damage/terrorist attack on the airport complex will be catastrophic with far reaching grave implications for the citizens and the economy. Investments flowing into the country depends on the state of the security and safety. The Committee further notes that the airports have been categorized as hyper-sensitive, sensitive and normal. Operational airports in hyper- sensitive categories are 26 out of which only 18 airports have been provided with CISF security cover. Which means that eight hyper-sensitive airports are not provided the security cover of CISF. In sensitive category, there are 56 airports, out of which 37 are covered by CISF and 19 are not covered. In the normal category of 16 airports, only 4 are provided with CISF security and 12 are not covered. Thus, out of 98 functional airports, only 59 are covered with CISF security cover and 39 are not under CISF. Explanations given to the Committee was lack of funds for providing CISF security cover at all the 98 airports.
96. The security must be adequate and in proportion to the threat perception. Funds should not come in the way of providing security. The Committee recommends that the security component of PSF needs to be enhanced to commensurate with the security expenditure and ensure that security is not compromised at all the airports in India and the PSF security component must be deposited in the Consolidated Fund of India.
97. The Committee recommends that Airport Security should be absolute. The Committee observes that Security of the Airports is an integral part of National Security and therefore, recommends that providing security should be a sovereign function. Adequacy of PSF Security component collection should not be the criteria for providing security. If CISF security cover can be given to the Delhi Metro, why cannot all the operational airports be provided with CISF security cover?
98. The Committee feels that ideally, the CISF security cover should be provided to all the 70 odd airports which are having normal scheduled operations. But to begin with, the Committee recommends that all the Airports rated hyper-sensitive from security angle be given to CISF as soon as possible followed by the sensitive airports. In view of shortage of manpower and logistics available with CISF, security of normal airports can continue with State Police for the time being. But these airports also be given all modern equipment, training etc.
Dedicated Security Force
99. The Civil Aviation Ministry had a proposal for a dedicated Security Force i.e., Civil Aviation Security Force for manning the security affairs of the Airports in India. While deposing before the Committee, the Home Secretary submitted to the Committee that the Ministry of Home Affairs is not in favour of that. He submitted that there is no need of having another dedicated Force when there is already a dedicated Force. In 2000, it was so decided after the hijacking of IC- 814 that CISF would cover all the airports. CISF has a huge force of 1,45,000. Twenty two 21 thousand officials of CISF have been specially earmarked for airport security. They are called the Security Aviation Group. CISF is able to rotate these officials and make sure that the age profile is also maintained.
100. On the issue of Civil Aviation Force, the Secretary, Civil Aviation stated that core competency of the Ministry of Civil Aviation or the Airport Authority of India is not to raise Force and run a security agency. It is the core competency of the Ministry of Home Affairs and CISF. It is better that the civil aviation security remains with a specialized agency such as CISF. He did not support the idea of Civil Aviation Security Force.
101. The Committee noted the arguments of Home Secretary and Secretary, Civil Aviation and observes that there is no need for a separate Civil Aviation Force at this juncture and that Airport Security can remain with the CISF and Ministry of Home Affairs especially in view of the fact that the IB, NSG and other Police Forces who have a substantial role to play in airport security are also under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
102. The Committee, after examining the papers/documents submitted to it and hearing the arguments of various stakeholders on the subject, could understand that there are multiple agencies involved in providing security at Indian airports.
103. The Committee notes that Bureau of Civil Aviation Security is responsible for laying down the standards for pre-embarkation security and anti-sabotage measures in respect of civil flights and ensuring their compliance through regular inspections and security audits. Commissioner of Security, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security has been empowered to issue Directions under Section 5A of Aircraft Act, 1934 with respect to civil aviation security matters.
104. The Committee also notes that whereas BCAS frames the rules and regulations for civil aviation security, the Central Industrial Security Force which is functioning under the Ministry of Home Affairs acts as the implementing agency for the guidelines framed by BCAS. The Intelligence Bureau plays an important role in providing intelligence inputs related to civil aviation security. National Security Guard (NSG) under the Ministry of Home Affairs is also the primary Contingency Response Force for anti-terrorist operations at airports.
105. The Committee was at a loss to find that the post of the Commissioner of Security, BCAS, the Appropriate Authority for the development, implementation and maintenance of National Civil Aviation Security Programme of India, is lying vacant for the last two-and- a-half years. The Committee would like to know the reasons for keeping this important and sensitive post vacant for more than two years. The Committee may also be apprised on the steps taken to fill up the post on priority.
106. The Committee finds that the violent incident involving employees of Airports Authority of India and the Central Industrial Security Force at Karipur Airport in Kozhikode on 10th June, 2015 raises a question mark over the effectiveness of the existing co-ordination mechanism between various agencies involved in providing security at Indian airports. When the issue was raised during the deliberations, both the Home Secretary and Civil Aviation Secretary assured the Committee to look into the matter and to address the 22 shortcomings in the system. The Committee hopes that apart from conducting various meetings to address the issues related to airport security with agencies involved in the process, both the Ministries will have a periodical review of the performance of the co- ordination mechanism so that any grey areas identified could be addressed immediately.
107. The Committee also feels that the issue of deficiency of security gadgets and installation of CCTV cameras and clearance of shadow zones at various airports should be taken up on priority so that such deficiencies do not become a cause for concern in the Indian airport security system. As it is said that the performance in the battlefield is obviously known before hand if we are not fully equipped with the modern equipments to fight with the enemy. The Committee, therefore, hopes that PDIS which is currently operating on pilot basis at Delhi Airport should be reviewed and efforts should be made to remove the flaws found in the system. The Ministry of Civil Aviation should also look out for such PDIS technology which could function properly in the Indian conditions.
108. The Committee desires that the areas of concern on providing security to Delhi Airport, expressed by the Delhi Police should be given due consideration. The Ministry of Civil Aviation and Delhi International Airport Limited are urged to look into the problems faced by the Delhi Police on the city side as well as within the T-3 terminal building of Delhi Airport.
109. The Committee also hopes that the issue of relocation and rehabilitation of slum dwellers from the vicinity of Mumbai International Airport will be settled as soon as possible so that the encroached land is brought within the control of airport operator and the necessary expansion works of Mumbai Airport are commenced shortly. Upon that, the present security threat to the Mumbai Airport will automatically wither away. The Committee, after cross examination of the Governments and concerned organizations, has come to the conclusions that the Ministry of Civil Aviation, State Government of Maharashtra, Mumbai International Airport Limited and Airport Authority of India should sit together to sort out the long pending issues which have presently become the major issue of threat to Mumbai airport. The Committee also requests the Ministry of Civil Aviation and Government of Maharashtra to take a lead in settling the issues with no loss of time.
110. The Committee desires that vacant posts in the Aviation Security Group of CISF which is manning the Indian airports through the length and breadth of the country are filled up at the earliest so that the existing security apparatus is strengthened.
111. There is an involvement of multiple agencies in providing Security at Indian airports and the Committee has found a lack of proper co-ordination between the agencies. The Committee, therefore, recommends that a think tank may be created to bring out a proper co-ordination involving all the stakeholders to help the Commissioner of Security, BCAS to perform his duties satisfactorily.
112. The Committee finds it quite scary to know that the security of 8 of our hyper- sensitive and 19 of our sensitive airports are not covered by the CISF which has now 23 become the only specialized force for aviation security; now question is who is then guarding these airports and how secure these airports are? In these existing threats perceptions at our airports, the country can ill-afford such a situation to continue any more. The Committee finds that aviation security has not received the attention and importance that it deserves. The Committee feels that in view of several gaps and lack of unified command and control for the multiple agencies involved, there is an urgent need for having an Aviation Security policy in the country for ensuring fool proof security at our airports before a major untoward incident takes place in the country. RECOMMENDATIONS /OBSERVATIONS/CONCLUSIONS-AT A GLANCE Kozhikode Airport Incident The Committee condemns the violent incident at Kozhikode Airport. The Committee demands that the Government should ensure that such incidents do not occur in future. The Committee notes that six months is more than sufficient time to complete the investigation. The Committee recommends that the investigations may be completed at the earliest and the guilty may be punished. Findings of investigations may be shared with this Committee as soon as it is submitted. (Para 49)
Co-ordination mechanism at the airports
The Committee noted the suggested co-ordination mechanisms and hope that it will be implemented soon to prevent any loopholes in the security apparatus. (Para 54)
Security at Delhi Airport
The Committee expresses its serious concern over the grey areas and security related problems as mentioned by Delhi Police. It is equally appalled to see the existing interface between the Delhi Police and DIAL in respect of security related issues at the Airport. It reflects a lack of mutual confidence in one another as well as required co- ordination between the two. Otherwise, Delhi Police, instead of taking up these issues with the Parliamentary Committee and DIAL giving point-wise clarification before it, the two should have mutually resolved them. BCAS and the Ministries of Civil Aviation and Home Affairs also appeared to have remained unconcerned in this regard. IGI Airport, being one of the most sensitive airports in the existing security scenario, such gaps are sure to lead to any disaster at any time. (Para 63)
The Committee notes the various concerns expressed by the Delhi Police as regards the security at Delhi International Airport. The Committee observes that the issues are very serious and need immediate attention of the Ministries of Civil Aviation and Home Affairs and various other stakeholders involved. The Committee recommends that all the issues need to be considered for immediate redressal and status note be submitted to the Committee containing steps taken in these regards. (Para 64)
As regards payment of rent and electricity charges by Delhi Police to DIAL for the space occu- pied by them and signing of License Agreement, the Committee recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs may take immediate decision in those matters as the Delhi Police is under that Ministry, dis- charging sovereign function of maintenance of security at and around in IGIA. (Para 65)
As regards providing space to the Delhi Police in the Delhi International Airport, the Committee directs the Ministry of Home Affairs to find out a workable solution in consultation with the Ministry of Civil Aviation and BCAS to provide an adequate space to discharge their sovereign duty of security in the International Airport at Delhi. (Para 66)
24 Security at Mumbai Airport The Committee finds it pertinent that the issue of encroachment of airport land and adjoining hillock by slum dwellers is settled at the earliest. In this regard, the Committee took note of the replies furnished by MIAL and the Housing Department, Government of Maharashtra on various aspects of the encroachment. (Para 84) The Committee observes that the 35 pockets of slums in the airport and the slums on the hillock along the Mithi River are potential threat to the aircrafts and the CISA airport. The problems are persisting for the last so many years. The Committee feels that the Governmental agencies, both at the Centre and the State level, could not rationally judge the menace of slums inside the airport area as a potential security threat. Mumbai is the commercial capital of the country. Any breach of security at the airport will have far reaching consequences. The threat is perennial and no amount of policing could provide adequate security to the airport if the slums are allowed to exist and flourish inside the airport. The Committee feels that the Government agencies are happily unconcerned about the airport security at CSIA, Mumbai. In Mumbai International Airport, a disaster is waiting to happen at any moment in view of these dangerously placed encroachments overlapping operational areas of the Mumbai Airport. The Committee calls upon all the agencies such as AAI, Ministry of Civil Aviation, BCAS, State Government of Maharashtra and MIAL to wake up from their slumber and see the danger looming large on the Mumbai Airport. The Committee expresses its serious concern on this and strongly recommends that all the slums must be removed and relocated from the airport area. There is no justification for allowing encroachers inside the airport area and the Committee is of the view that so long as this area is occupied by the slum dwellers, the Mumbai airport is sitting on a ticking bomb until it is relocated. Therefore, the Committee recommends that MIAL along with Government of Maharashtra should come forward immediately with adequate proposals to rehabilitate the slums taking support of various Governmental agencies. (Para 85) The Committee understands that MIAL has been pursuing with the Government of Maharashtra (GoM) for rehabilitation of hutment dwellers at CSIA since taking over operations of CSIA in 2006. The Committee hopes that the Government of Maharashtra will expedite its approval for the Airport Specific Slum Rehabilitation Scheme for CSIA, to enable the slum rehabilitation process quickly. (Para 86)
Security at Cochin Airport The Committee compliments the CIAL, CISF and other security agencies for providing security to the Cochin Airport. (Para 90) Security of the Airports a Sovereign Function The Committee observes that National Security cannot be compromised. Civil Aviation Security is a very integral and important element of national security. Airport complex is a crucial infrastructure. Any large scale damage/terrorist attack on the airport complex will be catastrophic with far reaching grave implications for the citizens and the economy. Investments flowing into the country depends on the state of the security and safety. The Committee further notes that the airports have been categorized as 25 26 hyper-sensitive, sensitive and normal. Operational airports in hyper-sensitive categories are 26 out of which only 18 airports have been provided with CISF security cover. Which means that eight hyper-sensitive airports are not provided the security cover of CISF. In sensitive category, there are 56 airports, out of which 37 are covered by CISF and 19 are not covered. In the normal category of 16 airports, only 4 are provided with CISF security and 12 are not covered. Thus, out of 98 functional airports, only 59 are covered with CISF security cover and 39 are not under CISF. Explanations given to the Committee was lack of funds for providing CISF security cover at all the 98 airports. (Para 95)
The security must be adequate and in proportion to the threat perception. Funds should not come in the way of providing security. The Committee recommends that the security component of PSF needs to be enhanced to commensurate with the security expenditure and ensure that security is not compromised at all the airports in India and the PSF security component must be deposited in the Consolidated Fund of India. (Para 96)
The Committee recommends that Airport Security should be absolute. The Committee observes that Security of the Airports is an integral part of National Security and therefore, recommends that providing security should be a sovereign function. Adequacy of PSF Security component collection should not be the criteria for providing security. If CISF security cover can be given to the Delhi Metro, why cannot all the operational airports be provided with CISF security cover? (Para 97)
The Committee feels that ideally, the CISF security cover should be provided to all the 70 odd airports which are having normal scheduled operations. But to begin with, the Committee recommends that all the Airports rated hyper-sensitive from security angle be given to CISF as soon as possible followed by the sensitive airports. In view of shortage of manpower and logistics available with CISF, security of normal airports can continue with State Police for the time being. But these airports also be given all modern equipment, training etc. (Para 98)
Dedicated Security Force
The Committee noted the arguments of Home Secretary and Secretary, Civil Aviation and observes that there is no need for a separate Civil Aviation Force at this juncture and that Airport Security can remain with the CISF and Ministry of Home Affairs especially in view of the fact that the IB, NSG and other Police Forces who have a substantial role to play in airport security are also under the Ministry of Home Affairs. (Para 101)
The Committee, after examining the papers/documents submitted to it and hearing the arguments of various stakeholders on the subject, could understand that there are multiple agencies involved in providing security at Indian airports. (Para 102)
The Committee notes that Bureau of Civil Aviation Security is responsible for laying down the standards for pre-embarkation security and anti-sabotage measures in respect of civil flights and ensuring their compliance through regular inspections and security audits. Commissioner of Security, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security has been empowered to issue Directions under Section 5A of Aircraft Act, 1934 with respect to civil aviation security matters. (Para 103) 27
The Committee also notes that whereas BCAS frames the rules and regulations for civil aviation security, the Central Industrial Security Force which is functioning under the Ministry of Home Affairs acts as the implementing agency for the guidelines framed by BCAS. The Intelligence Bureau plays an important role in providing intelligence inputs related to civil aviation security. National Security Guard (NSG) under the Ministry of Home Affairs is also the primary Contingency Response Force for anti-terrorist operations at airports. (Para 104)
The Committee was at a loss to find that the post of the Commissioner of Security, BCAS, the Appropriate Authority for the development, implementation and maintenance of National Civil Aviation Security Programme of India, is lying vacant for the last two- and-a-half years. The Committee would like to know the reasons for keeping this important and sensitive post vacant for more than two years. The Committee may also be apprised on the steps taken to fill up the post on priority. (Para 105)
The Committee finds that the violent incident involving employees of Airports Authority of India and the Central Industrial Security Force at Karipur Airport in Kozhikode on 10th June, 2015 raises a question mark over the effectiveness of the existing co-ordination mechanism between various agencies involved in providing security at Indian airports. When the issue was raised during the deliberations, both the Home Secretary and Civil Aviation Secretary assured the Committee to look into the matter and to address the shortcomings in the system. The Committee hopes that apart from conducting various meetings to address the issues related to airport security with agencies involved in the process, both the Ministries will have a periodical review of the performance of the co-ordination mechanism so that any grey areas identified could be addressed immediately. (Para 106)
The Committee also feels that the issue of deficiency of security gadgets and installation of CCTV cameras and clearance of shadow zones at various airports should be taken up on priority so that such deficiencies do not become a cause for concern in the Indian airport security system. As it is said that the performance in the battlefield is obviously known before hand if we are not fully equipped with the modern equipments to fight with the enemy. The Committee, therefore, hopes that PDIS which is currently operating on pilot basis at Delhi Airport should be reviewed and efforts should be made to remove the flaws found in the system. The Ministry of Civil Aviation should also look out for such PDIS technology which could function properly in the Indian conditions. (Para 107)
The Committee desires that the areas of concern on providing security to Delhi Airport, expressed by the Delhi Police should be given due consideration. The Ministry of Civil Aviation and Delhi International Airport Limited are urged to look into the problems faced by the Delhi Police on the city side as well as within the T-3 terminal building of Delhi Airport. (Para 108)
The Committee also hopes that the issue of relocation and rehabilitation of slum dwellers from the vicinity of Mumbai International Airport will be settled as soon as possible so that the encroached land is brought within the control of airport operator and the necessary expansion works of Mumbai Airport are commenced shortly. Upon that, the present security threat to the Mumbai Airport will automatically wither away. The Committee, after cross examination of the Governments and concerned organizations, has come to the conclusions that the Ministry of Civil Aviation, State Government of Maharashtra, Mumbai International Airport Limited and Airport Authority of India should sit together to sort out the long pending issues which have presently become the major issue of threat to Mumbai Airport. The Committee also requests the Ministry of Civil Aviation and Government of Maharashtra to take a lead in settling the issues with no loss of time. (Para 109)
The Committee desires that vacant posts in the Aviation Security Group of CISF which is manning the Indian airports through the length and breadth of the country are filled up at the earliest so that the existing security apparatus is strengthened. (Para 110)
There is an involvement of multiple agencies in providing Security at Indian airports and the Committee has found a lack of proper co-ordination between the agencies. The Committee, therefore, recommends that a think tank may be created to bring out a proper co-ordination involving all the stakeholders to help the Commissioner of Security, BCAS to perform his duties satisfactorily. (Para 111)
The Committee finds it quite scary to know that the security of 8 of our hyper- sensitive and 19 of our sensitive airports are not covered by the CISF which has now become the only specialized force for aviation security; now question is who is then guarding these airports and how secure these airports are? In these existing threats perceptions at our airports, the country can ill-afford such a situation to continue any more. The Committee finds that aviation security has not received the attention and importance that it deserves. The Committee feels that in view of several gaps and lack of unified command and control for the multiple agencies involved, there is an urgent need for having an Aviation Security Policy in the country for ensuring fool proof security at our airports before a major untoward incident takes place in the country. (Para 112)
28 MINUTES XVIII
EIGHTEENTH MEETING
The Committee met at 3.00 P.M. on Friday, the 10th July, 2015 in Committee Room ‘D’, Ground Floor, Parliament House Annexe, New Delhi. MEMBERS PRESENT 1. Dr. Kanwar Deep Singh ⎯ Chairman
RAJYA SABHA
2. Shri Rajeev Shukla 3. Shri Narendra Kumar Kashyap 4. Shri Avinash Rai Khanna 5. Dr. Prabhakar Kore 6. Shri Kiranmay Nanda 7. Kumari Selja 8. Shri Ritabrata Banerjee
LOK SABHA 9. Mohammed Faizal 10. Kumari Arpita Ghosh 11. Shri Rahul Kaswan 12. Shri Nirmala Kristappa 13. Shri Ram Kumar Sharma 14. Shri Rajesh Pandey 15. Shri Srinivasa Reddy Ponguleti 16. Shri Kunwar Haribansh Singh 17. Shri Shatrughan Sinha 18. Shri Dasrath Tirkey 19. Shri Manoj Tiwari 20. Shri K. C. Venugopal 21. Shri Ram Charitra Nishad
SECRETARIAT
Shri N.K. Singh, Additional Secretary Shri Swarabji B., Joint Director Shrimati Catherine John L., Assistant Director Shri T. Kennedy Jesudossan, Committee Officer Shri P. P. Raumon, Committee Officer 31 32
WITNESSES
Ministry of Home Affairs
1. Shri L.C. Goyal Secretary 2. Shri Jaideep Govind Additional Secretary 3. Shri V. Vumlunmang Joint Secretary (PM) 4. Shri Sailesh Joint Secretary (P. II) 5. Shri Harish Chander Director 6 Ms. S. Chowdhury Director
Central Industrial Security Force
7. Shri. Surender Singh Director-General 8. Shri R.K. Pachnanda Additional Director-General 9. Shri Ajay Kumar Assistant Director-General
Intelligence Bureau
10. Shri P.K. Bharadwaj Joint Director
Ministry of Civil Aviation
11. Shri Rajiv Nayan Choubey Secretary 12. Shri Arun Kumar Joint Secretary 13. Shri G. Asok Kumar Joint Secretary 14. Shri Suyash Narain Director
Bureau of Civil Aviation Security
15. Shri. B.B. Dash Jt. Commissioner of Security 16. Shri R.N. Dhoke Addl. Commissioner 17. Shri M.T. Baig Asstt. Commissioner
Airports Authority of India
18 Shri R.K. Srivastava Chairman 19. Shri G.K. Chaukiyal Member (Operation) 20. Shri Pankaj Jain E. D. ICID 21. Smt. Neera Rawat Director (Security) 22. Shri R.K. Malik GM (Security)
II. At the outset, the Chairman welcomed the Members of the Committee and informed that the representatives of Ministries of Home Affairs and Civil Aviation have been called to discuss the issues related to Security at Airports in India. The Chairman also informed the Committee that the subject could not be taken up for discussion during the last meeting since the Home Secretary was not able to attend the meeting on that day.
III. Thereafter, the Chairman welcomed the Home Secretary, Director-General, CISF and other officials and asked the Home Secretary about the arrangement the CISF has for providing 33 security at the airports, existing interface between all the agencies involved in the operation of airports, proposed creation of dedicated security force for guarding the Indian airports by the Ministry of Civil Aviation, staff strength and organizational capabilities of CISF in providing security at airports and special training given to the CISF for handling hi-tech equipment as also for the development of soft skills to deal with the passengers with required etiquette and discipline. The Committee also expressed concern about the incident that took place at Kozhikode International Airport, Karipur on 10th June, 2015.
IV. The Home Secretary apprised the Committee on the role of Ministry of Home Affairs and CISF in the aviation security of the country and the different agencies involved in that process. The Secretary also assured the Committee that the incident which occurred at Kozhikode Airport should be seen as stand alone incident, it was not a result of any gap in the system that is in place. However, all the necessary action will be taken once investigation findings come out. The Home Secretary was not in favour of creation of dedicated security force for airports under Ministry of Civil Aviation as it will not have the required expertise as that of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) which was currently doing that job very well. He requested the Committee to look into the issue of adequate budgetary allocation for airport security as the current allocation is meager. He also raised the issue of delay on the part of Ministry of Civil Aviation for making payment to CISF for their services provided at the airports. When asked about asking more funds for airport security by the Ministry of Home on Gross Budgetary Support (GBS), Secretary argued that it may not be possible as aviation security was not treated as a sovereign function.
V. The Secretary accepted the lack of an effective co-ordination between CISF, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security and all other agencies involved in ensuring airport security:- CISF, BCAS, airport operators, aircraft operators, ground handling agencies who are performing some very important aspects of airport security. DG , CISF informed the Committee about the organizational capabilities and manpower of CISF in providing security to airports and also training facilities available to personnel of CISF at various levels.
VI. Then the witnesses withdrew.
VII. Thereafter, the Chairman welcomed the Secretary, Ministry of Civil Aviation and other officials to the meeting and expressed the Committee’s concerns over the recent violent incident involving employees of Airports Authority of India and Central Industrial Security Force on 10th June, 2015 at Calicut International Airport at Karipur which resulted in closure of Kozhikode Airport for six hours. The Chairman in his opening remarks raised all the issues which were discussed with the Home Secretary earlier.
VIII. The Secretary, in his presentation, informed the Committee on the existing security arrangement at the Indian airports and the role of different agencies under the Ministry of Civil Aviation, involved in that process. He also submitted that the incident which occurred at Kozhikode Airport may not be seen as a security lapse. He also informed the Committee on the Standard Operating Procedure used for providing security at airports in the county and also the various levels of co-ordination between inter-Ministerial agencies and intra-Ministerial agencies.The Secretary also stressed on the need for enhancement of the security component of the Passenger Service Fee on the air fares since the expenditure spent on security is more than what is collected 34 from the departing passenger under this head. The Secretary informed the Committee that creation of dedicated security force for Indian airports will complicate the security operations and that the Ministry will not proceed further on this matter. Neither the Ministry of Civil Aviation nor the Airports Authority of India has the core competency to raise a Force and run a security agency. It should rest with the Ministry of Home Affairs and CISF.
IX. The Secretary, Ministry of Civil Aviation suggested that the security at the airports may be considered as a sovereign function and adequate security may be provided based on the threat perception at various airports. The security component of the passenger fee collected may be directly credited to the Consolidated Fund of India. Sovereign function must be discharged by the Government and the fund constraint should not affect the security preparedness.
X. The Commissioner, Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) informed the Committee on their role in providing security at Indian airports and their co-ordination mechanism with various security agencies. He gave an overview of the operation of various agencies involved at airports on the basis of the broad security architecture laid down by the BCAS. He also informed the Committee that all the airports in the country are subject to annual security audit followed by inspection by the officials of BCAS.
XI. Members also raised queries on various points to which the officials responded. The Committee directed the Ministries to furnish the replies to all the unanswered queries in writing at the earliest.
XII. A verbatim record of the proceedings was kept.
XIII. The meeting adjourned at 5.15 P.M. to meet again on 17th July, 2015. 35
VII
SEVENTH MEETING
The Committee met at 3.00 P.M. on Friday, the 18th December, 2015 in Committee Room 67, First Floor, Parliament House, New Delhi.
MEMBERS PRESENT: 1. Dr. Kanwar Deep Singh ⎯ Chairman
RAJYA SABHA 2. Shri Narendra Kumar Kashyap 3. Shri Avinash Rai Khanna 4. Dr. Prabhakar Kore 5. Shri Kiranmay Nanda 6. Kumari Selja
LOK SABHA
7. Shri Ram Charitra Nishad 8. Shri Rajeshbhai Naranbhai Chudasama 9. Kumari Arpita Ghosh 10. Shri Rahul Kaswan 11. Shri Rajesh Pandey 12. Shri Dushyant Singh 13. Shri Kunwar Haribansh Singh 14. Shri Shatrughan Sinha 15. Shri Dasrath Tirkey 16. Shri Manoj Tiwari 17. Shri K.C. Venugopal
SECRETARIAT Shri J.G. Negi, Joint Secretary Shri Swarabji B., Joint Director Shri Arun Kumar, Assistant Director Shrimati Catherine John L., Assistant Director Shri P.P. Raumon, Committee Officer
II. At the outset, the Chairman welcomed the Members to the meeting. Thereafter, the Committee considered draft Report on the issues related to ‘Security at Airports in India’. After some discussion, the Committee adopted the report with minor changes and decided to present the Report to the Parliament on 21st December, 2015. III. The Committee, accordingly, authorized the Chirman and in his absence, Shri Kiranmay 36
Nanda, M.P. and in his absence Kumari Selja, M.P. to present the Report in Rajya Sabha. Shri Ram Charitra Nishad, M.P. and in his absence, Km. Arpita Ghosh, M.P. was authorized to lay the Report on the Table in Lok Sabha on 21st December, 2015.
IV. * * *
V. The meeting was adjourned at 3.30 P.M.
***Relates to other matter. ANNEXURES ANNEXURE -I (Vide Para 34 of Report)
LIST OF CATEGRIZATION OF AIRPORTS UNDER CISF COVER
Hyper-Sensitive Sensitive Normal S.No. Airport S.No Airport S.No. Airport S.No. Airport 1. Amritsar 1. Agra 20. Bhopal 1. Gwalior 2. IGI Delhi 2. Chandigarh 21. Bhuj 2. Madurai 3. Jaipur 3. Indore 22. Goa 3. Rajkot 4. Varanasi 4. Bhuntar 23. Nagpur 4. Bhavnagar 5. Lucknow 5. Kanpur 24. Vadodara 6. Agartala 6. Shimla 25. Calicut 7. Bagdogra 7. Udaipur 26. Cochin 8. Guwahati 8. Dehradun 27. Coimbatore 9. Imphal 9. Khajuraho 28. Mangalore 10. Kolkata 10. Dibrugarh 29. Tirupati 11. Raipur 11. Dimapur 30. Trichy 12. Bangalore 12. Gaya 31. Trivandrum 13. Chennai 13. Jorhat 32. Vizag 14. Hyderabad 14. Lilabari 33. Tezpur 15. Mumbai 15. Patna 34. Shillong 16. Pune 16. Ranchi 35. Bhubaneswar 17. Jodhpur 17. Silchar 36. Diu 18. Ahmedabad 18. Aurangabad 37. Portblair 19. Porbandar
Total 59 Airports under CISF cover
39 ANNEXURE-II (vide para 83 of Report) Chart-I
(1) Premier project at Village Kurla, Kurla (West).
(1.A) Last revised Letter of Intent is issued on 01/07/2015 for 17346 Nos. of Rehab Residential & 737 Nos. Rehab commercial tenements. (1.B) IOA & Commencement Certificate for 30 Nos. of Rehab buildings are issued and work of construction is nearing completion, the work of infrastructural facilities is under progress. (2) Bhandari Project at Village Kurla, Kurla (East). (2.A) Last revised Letter of Intent is issued on 16/10/2009 for 1834 Nos. of Rehab Residential tenements. (2.B) IOA & Commencement Certificate for all 4 Nos. of Rehab buildings were granted and work is nearing completion. (3) Kilburn Project at Village Nahur, Nahur (West). (3.A) Revised Letter of Intent is issued on 26/09/2012 for 2004 Nos. of Rehab Residential tene- ments. (3.B) IOA & Commencement Certificate were granted to all 4 Nos. of Rehab buildings and work is in progress. (4) Mahul-I project at Village Mahul, Chembur. (4.A) Letter of Intent is issued on 16/06/2010 for 416 Nos. of Rehab industrial tenements. (5) Mahul-II project at Village Mahul, Chembur. (5.A) Letter of Intent is issued on 29/06/2010 for 451 Nos. of Rehab industrial tenements. (6) Bombay Oxygen project at Village Nahur, Mulund (West). (6.A) Letter of Intent is issued on 17/08/2010 for 2919 Nos. of Rehab residential tenements. (6.B) IOA & Commencement Certificate were granted to all 3 Nos. of Rehab buildings and work is in progress. (7) Popular Car Bazar project at Village Mulgaon, Andheri (East). (7.A) Last revised Letter of Intent is issued on 07/02/2013 for 1300 Nos. of Rehab residential tenements. (7.B) IOA & Commencement Certificate were granted to all 3 Nos. of Rehab buildings and work is in progress.
40 Chart-2
Tenement details of 3.11 Projects of M/s. HDIL
Sr. Scheme No. of No. of No. of Balance No. No. Tenements Tenements Tenements of Tenements Proposed as for which Handed over under per last LOI OCC granted to MMRDA construction
1. Premier ‘L’ Ward Kurla 18644 6139 697 12505
2. Bhandari ‘L’ Ward Kurla 1882 0 0 1882
3. Bombay Oxygen ‘T’ Ward Nahur 3009 0 0 3009
4. Kilburn ‘S’ Ward Bhandup 2064 0 0 2064
5. Popular Carbazaar K/E Andheri 1339 0 0 1339
6. Mahul Chembur CTS No. 611 456 0 0 0
7. Mahul Chembur CTS No. 604, 605 420 0 0 0
TOTAL 27814 6139 697 20799
41 ANNEXURE-III
List of Witnesses who appeared before the Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism And Culture.
10th July, 2015
I. Ministry of Home Affairs
1. Shri L. C. Goyal Secretary 2. Shri Jaideep Govind Additional Secretary 3. Shri V. Vumlunmang Joint Secretary (PM) 4. Shri Sailesh Joint Secretary (P. II) 5. Shri Harish Chander Director 6 Ms. S. Chowdhury Director II. Central Industrial Security Force 7. Shri. Surender Singh Director-General 8. Shri R. K. Pachnanda Additional Director-General 9 Shri Ajay Kumar Assistant Director-General III. Intelligence Bureau 10. Shri P. K. Bharadwaj Joint Director IV. Ministry of Civil Aviation 11. Shri Rajiv Nayan Choubey Secretary 12. Shri Arun Kumar Joint Secretary 13. Shri G. Asok Kumar Joint Secretary 14. Shri Suyash Narain Director V. Bureau of Civil Aviation Security 15. Shri. B. B. Dash Jt.Commissioner of Security 16. Shri R. N. Dhoke Addl. Commissioner 17. Shri M. T. Baig Asstt. Commissioner VI. Airports Authority of India 18. Shri R. K. Srivastava Chairman 19. Shri G. K. Chaukiyal Member (Operation) 20. Shri Pankaj Jain E. D. (KID) 21. Shrimati Neera Rawat Director Security 22. Shri R. K. Malik GM (Security)
42