A Case for Intelligence Reforms in India
AA CCASE FOR IIINTELLIGENCE RREFORMS IN IINDIA
IDSA TASK FORCE REPORT
1 IDSA Task Force Report
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, sorted in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).
ISBN: 978-93-82169-03-1
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this Report are of the Task Force members and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute and the Government of India.
First Published: 2012
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2 CONTENTS
Foreword ...... 5 Executive Summary ...... 7 Abbreviations ...... 10 Chapter 1 The Rationale for Intelligence Reforms ...... 15 Chapter 2 New challenges of national security management ...... 20 Chapter 3 Legal status ...... 32 Chapter 4 Recruitment ...... 36 Chapter 5 Content of analysis & operations ...... 51 Chapter 6 Technology updates ...... 58 Chapter 7 Military intelligence needs ...... 61 Chapter 8 External intelligence- relations with MEA ...... 74 Chapter 9 Coordination of intelligence ...... 82 Chapter 10 Accountability ...... 110 Conclusion ...... 111
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4 FOREWORD
The unprecedented attack on Mumbai necessity for the regular and periodic -on 26.11.2008 focused attention on the briefings of the political executive after complex security challenges facing they receive the intelligence inputs in a India, which have the potential to derail processed form. its economic and social progress. In the A Task Force, consisting of S/Shri R. aftermath of that incident, the Banerji, Special Secretary (Retd.) in the functioning of India's security and Cabinet Secretariat, P. K. Upadhyay, intelligence set-up and its ability to (Consultant, IDSA), Harinder Singh (then meet the new emerging challenges was Research Fellow, IDSA), have brought out extensively discussed in various circles. the present report. It was assisted by Brig Even earlier, after the Kargil intrusions (Retd.) Rumel Dahiya, (presently the in 1999, the issue of intelligence lapses Deputy Director General, IDSA), Raj had been examined in depth and several Shukla (then Research Fellow, IDSA), Alok recommendations made by the Task R. Mukhopadhyay, and other experts. Force set up by the Group of Ministers Colleagues from the diplomatic service were implemented. Nevertheless, provided some inputs on the interface doubts persist about the adequacy of between the intelligence agencies and the intelligence mechanisms and the Ministry of External Affairs. somewhat piecemeal or ad hoc nature of reforms being implemented. We were also fortunate to have the benefit Besides, no less a person than the Vice of the advice from noted experts in the President of India, Shri M. Hamid field, who participated in a round table Ansari has also spoken about the need discussion at IDSA in August 2010. These for the accountability of intelligence included the veteran security analyst (late) agencies and the necessity for them to Shri K. Subrahmanyam, former National function under some sort of legal cover. Security Adviser, Shri Brajesh Mishra, former intelligence professionals - Shri The Institute for Defence Studies and G.C. Saxena, Shri A.K. Verma, Shri Ajit Analyses (IDSA), on its part, has tried Doval and experienced police and to look at the problem in somewhat military officers like Shri Ved Marwah broader terms and study the and Lt Gen (Retd) R. Sawhney. functioning of country's intelligence set-up; analyse the factors that impede The project also benefited from the good intelligence at various stages of advice provided by some other collection, initial analysis, inter-agency intelligence professionals like: Shri cooperation and assessments and what Kalyan Mitra, former Director General can be done to improve assessments Security; Shri D. C. Nath, former Special and human resources. It has also tried Director, Intelligence Bureau; noted to examine the related issue of the terrorism expert, Shri B.Raman; Shri K.
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Santhanam, former Chief Adviser, provided a legal-framework for their Technology to the Government of India existence and functioning; their and ex-DG, IDSA; and Shri V. functioning must be under Parliamentary Balachandran, former Special Secretary, oversight and scrutiny; and extensive Cabinet Secretariat and co-author of the reforms must be carried out in the Pradhan Committee report on the recruitment and training processes of their Mumbai 26/11 lapses. personnel, their pay structures and career progression to attract the best talent A report based on these consultations and available in the country. It is only then that discussions, stretching over a year-long the Indian intelligence agencies would be period was drafted by Shri R. Banerji. able to meet the myriad challenges the Besides, the former Director General of the country faces in the new millennium. IDSA Shri N.S Sisodia not only provided valuable inputs, suggestions and directions We believe that this report, which relies on from time to time, but also extensively inputs in public domain and does not vetted the report, which was finally given reflect the views of either the Government its present shape by Shri P.K. Upadhyay. of India, or the IDSA, will nonetheless promote an informed discussion on key The key recommendations made by the issues affecting our intelligence set up and Task Force in the report are: The hopefully, set in motion the process for intelligence agencies in India must be further reforms.
Arvind Gupta New Delhi Director General, IDSA
6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
TOWARDS REFORMS IN THE Public Service Commission;
COUNTRY’S INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS l Use deputation slots to induct experts l The paradigm shift in the nature of from the military and science & the security challenges facing the technology streams; country lends urgency to the need l Outsource to meet specialised needs; for reforms in country’s intelligence apparatus; l Improve training modules, including specialised training for analysts; l There is a need for comprehensive, not adhoc and piecemeal, reforms; l Improve quality of trainers, bring in military trainers; l The focus of this exercise should be on removing the deficiencies within l Review the present system of writing the system, improving coordination Annual Confidential Reports (ACR) in between intelligence agencies and intelligence agencies to eliminate ensuring better accountability and subjectivity and bring about better oversight. objectivity; l Review in situ promotions to improve LEGAL STATUS morale at middle, mid-senior levels. l Introduce legislation in Parliament for laying down the charters, ANALYSIS & OPERATIONS functions and duties of intelligence l Improve training for analysts in organisations; tools of modern prescriptive work; l Provide a legal basis for different l Improve quality of supervision in tiers of accountability – executive, operational branches of intelligence financial and legislative; agencies, reverse drift in operational work, discard useless and profligate RECRUITMENT, DEPUTATION, sources; PROMOTION, TRAINING l Bring better financial probity in l Have open and separate direct intelligence operations; recruitment mechanisms for different l Introduce concept of social welfare intelligence agencies - advertising for safeguards for assets who rendered the best talent available, specifying the valuable service for national qualifications required, including security, but became casualties on the linguistic abilities – by using the job. existing mechanism of the Union
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TECHNOLOGY UPGRADE area desk officers;
l Enhance in-house technical research l Resume the practice of posting a Joint and development capabilities- Secretary level Foreign Service officer especially in relation to signals in external intelligence – for better decryption work, and cryptography coordination and liaison. capabilities;
l Examine feasibility of outsourcing COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE relevant tasks to experts for l Appoint a National Intelligence improving output; Coordinator/Director of National l Fast track equipment procurement Intelligence to bring about better inter- processes, with innovative agency coordination, remove overlaps association of financial experts at and duplications, end ‘turf-wars’ and suitably high levels, so that balance ensure better utilisation of national is maintained between time frames resources. Alternatively, the National and norms of financial propriety; Security Adviser (NSA) may function independently under a Minister for l Upgrade Open Source Intelligence National Security. (OSINT) capabilities; Use advanced commercial search engines; ACCOUNTABILITY l Upgrade offensive as well as l Strengthen financial accountability of defensive capabilities in cyber intelligence agencies; annual reports to warfare. go to Comptroller & Auditor General (CAG)/NSA; RELATIONS BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE l Provide for an in camera audit of AGENCIES & MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL Secret Service Funds; AFFAIRS l Have a separate intelligence l Introduce a system of inter- ombudsman for IB, R&AW & NTRO; changeability between various intelligence agencies and the l Enhance staff support by posting connected Ministries of the intelligence professionals in external Government of India; processing units serving the Cabinet Secretariat (for R&AW and NTRO) l In case of external intelligence, and MHA( for IB); institutionalise cover assignments in consultation with Ministry of l Examine the option of having a External Affairs to improve Minister for National Security & cooperation; Intelligence, who could exercise administrative authority on all l Have regular inter-action between intelligence agencies; heads of intelligence agencies and Secretaries of the concerned l Set up a Parliamentary Accountability Ministries, as also between their Committee for oversight of intelligence
8 Executive Summary
agencies through legislation; Parliamentary Accountability Committee for oversight of intelligence l Provide adequate professional agencies? secretarial assistance to the oversight committee through the Intelligence l What should be the boundaries of Ombudsman and a professionally intrusive inspection and accountability staffed unit in the Cabinet Secretariat; of intelligence agencies on invasion of privacy or human rights violations DECISION POINTS under the Right To Information (RTI) Act? Should this be confined to l Whether line departments – personnel and administrative/ Department of Atomic Energy, BARC, disciplinary matters only? Should the ISRO, DRI, the Economic Offences safeguard of the prior exhaustion of the Wing, Department of Science & Ombudsman process be prescribed Technology etc - should have their own before RTI can be invoked in respect intelligence wings or appoint of intelligence agencies? intelligence liaison or nodal officers to interact on regular basis with main intelligence agencies? l Whether analysis and operations work should be completely separated in intelligence agencies and whether a Joint-Tactical Analysis Centre (J-TAC), on the UK model) should be established? l Whether strategic military intelligence should be taken out of the charter of external intelligence and handed over to the Defence Intelligence Agency? l To what extent should Heads of Mission of Indian legations abroad be kept in the broad loop of the operational initiatives of intelligence agencies? Should separate parameters or yardsticks be followed in neighbouring countries? l What option of legislative accountability is to be chosen? Whether to have a separate Minister for National Security, answerable to the Prime Minister and Parliament, and/or to have a statutorily constituted
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ABBREVIATIONS
A ACR - Annual Confidential Report ACIO - Assistant Central Intelligence Officer AEC - Atomic Energy Commission (India) AIVD - General Intelligence & Security Service (Holland) B BND - Federal Intelligence Agency (Germany) C CAG - Comptroller & Auditor General CCS - Cabinet Committee on Security (India) CDS - Chief of Defence Staff CEIB - Central Economic Intelligence Bureau (India) CI - Counter Intelligence CIA - Central Intelligence Agency (USA) CID - Criminal Intelligence Department COMINT - Communication Intelligence CSIS - Canadian Security Intelligence Service CYBERINT - Cyber Intelligence D DCI - Director Central Intelligence (USA) DGS - Directorate General of Security DGMI - Director General of Military Intelligence (India) DIA - Defence Intelligence Agency (India) DIA - Defence Intelligence Agency (USA)
10 Abbreviations
DLB - Dead Letter Box (commonly called a "Drop Box') DNI - Director of National Intelligence (USA) DNS - Department of Nuclear Safety (USA) DRI - Department of Revenue Intelligence DRDO - Defence Research & Development Organisation E ECOINT - Economic Intelligence EIC - Economic Intelligence Council (India) ELINT - Electronic Intelligence ECHR - European Court of Human Rights EOW - Economic Offences Wing (India) F FICCI - Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry FIS - Foreign Intelligence Service (Russian) G GoM - Group of Ministers (India) GCHQ - Government Communications Headquarters (UK) H HuJI - Harkat-ul Jihad-e-Islami HUMINT - Human Intelligence I IB - Intelligence Bureau (India) ICG - Intelligence Coordination Group IED - Improvised Explosive Device IIF - International Islamic Front IMINT - Image Intelligence IPKF - Indian Peace Keeping Force IPS - Indian Police Service ISRO - Indian Space Research Organisation
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J JIC - Joint Intelligence Committee (In India, UK and USA) JTAC - Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (UK) JUP - Jamiat-ul Ulema-e-Pakistan K KRC - Kargil Review Committee L LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam M MAC - Multi Agency Centre (Central, India) (State units known as SMACs - State Multi Agency Centres) MASINT - Measurement & Signature Intelligence MCI - Ministerial Committee on Intelligence (UK) MI-5 - Directorate of Military Intelligence, Section V (UK - Now Known as Security Service) MI-6 - Directorate of Military Intelligence, Section VI (UK - Now known as Security Intelligence Service) MIVD - Defence Intelligence & Security Service (Holland) N NCTC - National Counter Terrorism Centre NIA - National Intelligence Agency (South Africa) NIB - National Intelligence Board (India) NIB - National Intelligence Bureau (Sri Lanka) NIC - National Intelligence Council (US) NGA - National Geographical Intelligence Agency (US) NSA - National Security Agency (US) NRO - National Reconnaissance Organisation (US) NSC - National Security Council (US) NSC - National Security Council (India) NTRO - National Technical Research Organisation
12 Abbreviations
O OFC - Operation Forces Command (Indian Army) OSINT - Open Source Information ORBAT - Order of Battle OSS - Office of Strategic Services (WW-II ancestor of CIA of USA) P POLINT - Political Intelligence PSIA - Public Security Intelligence Agency (Japan) R RAS - Research & Analysis Service RCMP - Royal Canadian Mounted Police R&AW - Research & Analysis Wing S SANDF - South African National Defence Forces SASS - South African Secret Service (External) SB - Special Branch (In state police set-up in India) SIGINT - Signal Intelligence SIS - Secret Intelligence Service (UK -Erstwhile MI-6) SPG - Special Protection Group SS - Security Service (UK-Erstwhile MI-5) SSB - Special Service Bureau (India) SSF - Secret Service Fund T TACINT - Tactical Intelligence TCG - Technical Coordination Group (India) TECHINT - Technical Intelligence U UP - United Press (London) UPSC - Union Public Service Commission W WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction
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14 Chapter 1
THE RATIONALE FOR INTELLIGENCE REFORMS
The need for reforms in the Indian According to Shri M. Hamid Ansari, the intelligence set-up does not spring from Vice President of India, “While intelligence any desire to ape the West, but from the information is at times incomplete, good fact that notwithstanding numerous intelligence often has made the difference failures so far, there does not seem to have between victory and defeat, life and death. been any broad-based exercise to reform By the same token, faulty intelligence leads the country’s intelligence apparatus and to failures of varying degrees”.1 Despite make it more pro-active and in harmony some success stories, the Indian with the pursuit of nation’s internal and intelligence agencies appear to have failed external policies. Whatever piecemeal on numerous occasions to perform by restructuring that has been tinkered with producing meaningful actionable and from time to time, has mostly been crisis- timely internal and external intelligence to driven and not a comprehensive need- safeguard national security and interests. based attempt to address the basic and The Bangladesh operations, the advance structural flaws in the Indian intelligence information given to Indian Air Force set-up that appear to be a legacy of its regarding Pakistani plans to launch a pre- origin as a branch of policing of the society. emptive air-strike on Indian bases on or The Indian intelligence system did not before December 3, 1971, the unearthing evolve out of any detailed and well thought of plans by many modules of terror groups out administrative policy, but emerged as to hit at Indian interests both inside and an extension of the Indian police system outside the country, are some of the major due to a need driven colonial decision successes of the Indian intelligence making process, designed to meet the community. Yet, these have mostly been requirements of maintaining law and like flashes in the pan and not reflective of order and internal security. Its primary the general levels of performances. Even duty was to keep a check on the nascent in those cases, where Indian intelligence ideas of modern Indian nationalism and apparatus has succeeded in busting terror counter them through police methods that and espionage rings, it has not been able were considered most effective and to provide accurate information which adequate. could be developed into concrete evidence
1 Kao Memorial Lecture by Vice President Shri Hamid Ansari, Jan 19, 2010.
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able to stand judicial scrutiny (as was the 6. Pakistan’s decision to initiate its case with MI-5’s unearthing of the plot to nuclear programme in 1972 (The blow-up trans-Atlantic flights over Multan conclave of Z.A. Bhutto, American cities). Pakistani physicists and nuclear scientists); Some of the major failures of Indian intelligence over the years have been: 7. The extent of popular support enjoyed by movements like those for a 1. Almost total ignorance about Chinese separate Telangana state, or the intentions and capabilities in Tibet growth of left-wing extremism in the and their designs against India in the post-Naxalbari phase; 50s. (A case in point is the non-use of Indian Air Force to bomb Chinese 8. The Samba spy scandal; positions on Indian side of the border 9. Pakistani plans to subvert Kashmiri during the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Muslims in the name of religion in the because of the fear that it could lead 70s.Pro-Deobandi/Wahabi to Chinese retaliatory air raids against proselytising activities in the Valley in Indian cities in North India. This was the mid-80s and recruitment of a major intelligence failure since the Kashmiri youth for arms training in PLA Air Force did not have large Pakistan and their infiltration back bases or aircraft in Tibet at that time, into the Valley with arms to launch having the capability to launch raids the ‘Kashmiri Jehad’ in late 80s; across the Himalayas, bomb Indian cities and return to their bases ); 10. The developing situation in the North- east from the early 80s; Links between 2. Failure to assess the extent of popular Phizo and the ISI; alienation Centre’s policies were creating in Kashmir through repeated 11. The growth of Sikh-separatist changes in state governments since sentiments in the early 80s and, more the early 1950s and, more specifically, specifically, the volume of the arsenal during 1986-87; stockpiled inside the Golden Temple complex before ‘Operation Blue Star’; 3. Failure to predict Pakistani plans to infiltrate military personnel disguised 12. LTTE’s reaction to Indian peace as civilians into J&K in 1965; making efforts in Sri Lanka and the extent to which its armed capabilities 4. Total ignorance about Pak plans to had grown to target Indian interests; attack Chhamb in the 1965 war and the existence of an additional 13. Kargil incursions; involvement of armoured division in the Pakistani Pakistan Army regulars from Army; Northern Light Infantry (NLI) in infiltrating deep into Indian territory, 5. The extent of the growing and construction of fortified ‘sangars’; unpopularity of Sheikh Mujib government in the Bangladeshi 14. Various terrorist attacks in India either armed forces and the plans for his directly by Pakistani players, or their ouster; Indian proxies, specially the Mumbai
16 The Rationale for Intelligence Reforms
attack of 26/11 and those in New National Security and Terrorism (Rajeev Delhi before that. Chandrasekhar report – Vol. 1, 2009), which made several suggestions for There are instances of intelligence failures strengthening intelligence collection efforts of such magnitude in the developed world and national security management. also. However, they have all been thoroughly enquired into, responsibilities However, most of these reports were crisis- fixed and remedial measures taken. driven reviews,2 retrospective in nature, However, this has not happened in India rather than need-based broad perspective and the public impression persists that on plans to reform and revamp. They looked most occasions the dirt was merely pushed into what went wrong, examined under the carpet. After the Sino-Indian war particular lapses and suggested ways and of 1962, a review of performance of the means to prevent their recurrence. More Intelligence Bureau (IB) led to the creation often than not their suggestions were for of the Directorate General of Security setting up new agencies to plug the gaps, (DGS). The Indo-Pak War of 1965 and the such as the one being presently discussed Mizo revolt in 1966, lead to the for setting up a National Counter- responsibility for external intelligence Terrorism Centre (NCTC); a new Maritime collection being taken away from IB and Intelligence and Coastal Security Centre; assigned to the newly created Research & or a new Centre for Nuclear and Missile Analysis Wing (R&AW). After the Kargil Intelligence, without clearly spelling out operations in 1999, an enquiry by Kargil the ways and means to prevent overlaps Review Committee lead to the setting up or turf-wars. This persistent failure is, of the G.C. Saxena Special Task Force perhaps, significantly responsible for the which recommended the creation of the tussle between the newly created NTRO Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) as the and the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) nodal point for processing all military over the use and bifurcation of expensive related intelligence. The National valuable assets and facilities. There is Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) clearly a growing perception in the media was also created to collect technical and and amongst an ever-widening spectrum communications intelligence. In June 2009, of intellectuals and academics engaged in the Pradhan-Haldar-Narsimhan task force the study of national security related issues in the National Security Council (NSC) that a rigid and stodgy bureaucracy may made suggestions for improving have stood in the way of developing or intelligence organisations in India. The enhancing the desired core competence in Federation of Indian Chamber of the field of intelligence operations and Commerce and Industry (FICCI) also analysis. According to a leading came out with a task force report on intelligence expert, Indian intelligence set-
2 B. Raman : Dimensions of Intelligence Operations: Maj. Gen. Sinha lecture at USI, New Delhi,26.4.2004;
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up is like an aircraft that can fly at a issues uncomfortable to the intelligence maximum height of only 10,000 feet. If the establishment in the country, such as, nation has a need for an aircraft to go up whether intelligence should remain the to the height of 15,000 feet, no amount of preserve of the police; whether recruitment overhaul and up-gradation of the old and lateral intake policies should not be aircraft’s systems would make it attain that adopted to take advantage of the available height. There would be no alternative then immense cross–cultural talent in the form but to develop an entirely new technology of political analysts, legal experts, and have an aircraft that can go up to linguists, financial wizards, social 15,000 feet and beyond.3 scientists, journalists and domain specialists, who could be roped in to However, apart from the natural provide valued inputs based on the acuity, inclination not to risk or gamble, three ingenuity and contextualised insights of factors seem to have conspired against the their own experience and wisdom . adoption of an imaginative and unconventional approach to equip and A broad consensus that is apparently improve capacities of the intelligence shared by a wide section of Indian agencies to meet new threats, intelligence professionals presently, commensurate with India’s emerging underlines the need for the following: responsibilities as a global power: i) A focus on “improvement of i) Conflicting motivations of those capabilities, or removal of deficiencies, considering reforms; within the agencies themselves, whether in terms of manpower or ii) Environmental challenges at initiation quality of assessments”; of reform; and ii) “Co-ordination amongst various iii) Failure of leadership. agencies- there must be someone who Understanding these factors and seeing knows everything that is happening where gains have been made despite and who can go and report to the handicaps may lead to the realisation that Prime Minister frequently”, i.e. a real change may still occur, but only if “Minister for National Intelligence”; difficult choices are made while iii) “Thirdly, how do you manage opportunities exist.4 Any quest for Parliamentary oversight?”5 meaningful reform in the intelligence machinery would necessarily bring up
3 Views of Shri A. K. Verma expressed in the round table at IDSA on August 6, 2010 4 Patrick C Neary, Intelligence Reforms‘, Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2010 5 The consensus view of intelligence experts expressed in the IDSA Round Table, August 2010. Brajesh Mishra ,former National Security Adviser & Principal Secretary to PM, strongly underlined the need for a “Minister for National Intelligence”.
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Shri M. Hamid Ansari has expressed concern about the nature and extent of supervision over intelligence agencies by the political executive and the possibility and scope of misuse of these agencies by that authority. He has also highlighted the issue of accountability and oversight as these measures were being undertaken in various modern intelligence organisations.6 Clearly, the time has come for the political executive to confront these issues head on and not skirt around them.
6 M. Hamid Ansari: Kao Memorial lecture, R&AW: Jan 19, 2010;
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Chapter 2
NEW CHALLENGES OF NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT
The five components of national security The concept of national security itself has management presently relate to changed dramatically. Till the First World diplomacy, economy, military, internal War, it was viewed largely in military and security, and intelligence. In the US, the political terms, and was mainly concerned Hoover Commission report of 1953 with the armed forces of known defined intelligence as the collection, adversaries. The ideological impetus of collation, analysis and assessment of USSR-backed communism for causing information pertaining to national security political destabilisation in other countries or having a bearing on formulation of was recognised as a major threat during national strategies. Intelligence services the the Cold War years and was often covertly world over have faced difficulties in exercised. meeting these tasks due to the constant The support given to Islamic fraternal emergence of newer conventional and forces to push back or counter Soviet non-conventional threats to security. expansionism in Afghanistan gave rise to Conventional threats are defined as an even more dangerous force with extra- “offensive armed postures by hostile territorial powers. Today, non-state actors, powers, subversion, nuclear, biological and aided and abetted by the establishments chemical threats, as also terrorism” while, of some states, pose major threats to “non-conventional threats could extend to national security. This has made the task include migration, epidemics, natural of national security management disasters, human trafficking, trans- increasingly complex, requiring national crimes (e.g. drug smuggling or knowledge, expertise and organisational trade in counterfeit currency) and infrastructure of a kind that is qualitatively environmental security”.7 different from what has been available hitherto.8
7 According to Amy Zegart, organisational pathologies do require urgent attention even as risks emerge, adding new layers of bureaucratic complexity. ‘Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11’, Princeton University Press, 2009 8 B. Raman, National Security Management & Pakistan, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 507, August 16, 2002.
20 New challenges of national security management
The view that terrorism is a threat to law Islamic Front (IIF), (formed in and order and can be controlled by the February, 1998) that are revanchist in police alone itself has started changing character, medieval in their objectives, since: yet modern in their methods of operation. They espouse trans-national l Terrorism began to be used by certain or pan-Islamic goals.9 states to achieve perceived ‘strategic objectives’; l Cyber terrorism, and remote controlled missile attacks could be l Terrorists started resorting to hijacking, other new threats; hostage taking, using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to intimidate l Maritime terrorism, such as the attack civilian populations; on USS Cole in October 2000 and thereafter, the incidents of piracy l Suicide terrorism, first used with mainly off the Somali and Ethiopian devastating effect by the Liberation coasts. The Mumbai attack of 26/11 has Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has since also raised the level of such threats and been adopted by Islamic terrorists. This taken them to an entirely different has contributed exponentially to level; raising the threat to national security; l The Maoist movement has emerged l Easy availability of modern arms and as the single most serious internal ammunition, and technological security threat to India in terms of the innovations to terrorists of different levels and spread of violence, affinities. extending across a wide swathe of l Informal cash flows directed to sustain almost contiguous territory in West terror modules, including, through Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, drug trade, in terrorism affected areas; Chattisgarh, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. Here the Naxals have l Terrorism has been buttressed by the consolidated their position and battle building up of regional and trans- capability by exploiting the societal national networks e.g. between jehadi grievances of backward tribal terrorist groups owing a mixed degree communities and stoking antagonism of ideological allegiance to against the state to their advantage; organisations like Al Qaeda. l Globalisation, networking and easy l Organisations like the International access to information technology have
9 Two of the original signatories of the IIF were Pakistan’s Fazl-ur Rahman Khalil of Harkatul Jehad-e-Islami (Huji) and Mir Hamza of Jamiat-ul Ulema-e-Pakistan (JuP). Later 13 other Islamic organisations from different countries also joined - five of which were from Pakistan. In the face of subsequent concerted efforts to search attack and decimate IIF’s leadership, through intensified drone operations by USA in recent years, it has adopted several manoeuvres to develop regional linkages and ever expanding networks with new disenfranchised or embittered groups, mostly in Muslim majority countries.
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given terrorists an awesome power for incident occurred but they were found economic disruption and destruction; wanting in prevention or in the precise prediction of a planned attack. More often These developments have had an effect on than not, this was not always due to lack counter-terrorism as well. In the past, of precise intelligence inputs. The lapse was counter-intelligence in its traditional sense more on account of inadequate follow up could be defined as the pre-empting of action or close monitoring, lack of threats by hostile countries in espionage, coordination at different levels at the subversion or sabotage. Today counter- centre and the states or the concerned intelligence has to perforce focus more on implementing agency. constantly denying tactical victories to terrorists and frustrating the plans and In the context of internal security, where capabilities of non-state actors. This has to Naxalism has assumed priority, the be achieved through “smart counter- inadequacies of the central and state terrorism”, which has four components: intelligence apparatus became apparent in better intelligence, better security, better the most active hubs of Maoist activity in coordination between different agencies remote tribal areas of Chattisgarh, on the ground for attending to the above Jharkhand, Bihar and parts of south-west tasks, as also better investigation and crisis Bengal. Some superficial political inputs management when incidents occur. It also may be available but they are not enough entails a capability for deniable to provide access to hard-core operational retaliation.10 information for storming their hideouts. On the other hand, Maoists more often PRESENT CAPABILITIES, DEFICIENCIES than not have a string of local informers giving them advance information about AND GAPS troop movements and plans of operations. In keeping with the British model of police This can be illustrated further by studying administration in India, the intelligence examples of some major intelligence collection cells of the police were the Special lapses: Branch (SB) or the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). The armed forces and INTELLIGENCE LAPSES national level intelligence agencies played a back-up or support role. As more and Serious breaches of national security have more serious incidents of terror confronted an intelligence related cause and effect. the state, they came to be viewed as a threat Five such causes include: to national security as a whole - internal l zero intelligence (The Falklands as well as external. It was seen that invasion by the Argentine army national intelligence agencies were good in1982; and the Mumbai blasts in at investigation or detection work after an March 1993),
10 B. Raman, “Countering Terror: Challenge of 21st century, Paper available at the South Asia Analysis group Website.
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l inadequate intelligence: Rajiv Gandhi’s not seem to have been appropriately assassination, May 1991 and Kargil analysed to arrive at the right conclusions. in 1999, The enquiry identified three major gaps: l inaccurate intelligence: Assessments, the absence of systematic dissemination both in UK & USA about Iraq’s WMD and analysis of open intelligence having a capability; IB reports of 12 Naga bearing on the issue; the absence of the insurgent groups going to Yunnan in practice of reverse analysis to look at things 1968 via Kachin state in Myanmar to from the perspective of the adversary; and establish contact with China; R&AW the absence of independent thinking at the report in 1980s about Chinese troops level of the joint intelligence committee. stationed in Tibet, An evaluation by R&AW in 1989 of the l excessive intelligence or overload of likely threats to Rajiv Gandhi’s security, as often irrelevant intelligence faced by the then Leader of the Opposition in most modern intelligence agencies due Parliament, did focus on the threat from to increase in inputs, mainly through Sikh extremists in his travels in north India technical inputs (TECHINT) and a and from Sri Lankan Tamil terrorists plethora of open source inputs(OSINT), during travels in south India. The Verma and Commission of enquiry found this R&AW assessment fairly accurate. However, this l inadequate follow up action on general warning proved inadequate. available intelligence.11 There was no specific alert to find out if A study of some past cases of intelligence the LTTE was doing anything to prepare failure may help identify in broader terms for an assassination attempt. TECHINT issues that impede good intelligence at the means were not effectively utilised before level of collection and analysis, the level of the assassination. A few days after the human resources, in inter-agency co- event, R&AW did track the minute-to- ordination and in the quality of the final minute movement details of the surviving assessments.12 perpetrators of the attack. Communications from LTTE The Falklands enquiry in the UK headquarters were intercepted and their highlighted the importance of the physical codes successfully broken, but questions presence of an intelligence agency in a over why this capability could not help target country, either under diplomatic or detect the arrival of the assassination team non-diplomatic cover. There were enough in Chennai, its subsequent movements open source inputs regarding Argentinean and preparations, continue to linger.13 The intentions including press reports and Jain Commission found that the IB was British Embassy dispatches, but these do
11 B.Raman, “Maj. Gen. Sinha memorial lecture at United Services Institute”, April 26, 2004 12 N. S. Sisodia, “IDSA Round Table on Intelligence Reforms”, August 6, 2010 13 B.Raman, op cit: paras 39-42;
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intercepting the coded messages of the militants in the Jaffna peninsula had LTTE but did not have the capability to reached a vital stage, a small MI break their codes. The IB did not inform directorate team was moved to Chennai R&AW about these un-deciphered to cover Sri Lanka. Till the IPKF (Indian messages while the R&AW also did not Peace Keeping Force) moved into Sri indicate that it had the capability to break Lanka, this MI team was the DGMI’s sole the codes.14 source of intelligence. Of course, it had some access to IB and R&AW inputs. The There have been innumerable instances IB was keeping an eye on the activities of where intelligence agencies have played a Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka. It also had stellar role by gathering correct preventive very good knowledge of LTTE’s activities intelligence, but this advantage was in Tamil Nadu. The state police Special frittered away due to lack of effective Branch was another good source, but the coordination between various agencies. DGMI had no direct access to any of them. The Rajghat incident of October 1986 is the best example of that. The R&AW When India decided to send troops to Sri passed on a specific input, based on Lanka following the July 1987 Indo-Sri HUMINT, about the possibility of a Sikh Lanka agreement, the Army’s Southern terrorist hiding in the bushes near the Command based in Pune established an samadhi-sthal at Rajghat, during a VIP Operational Forces Command (OFC) in visit. This information was passed on to the Chennai to oversee the operation. The Delhi police directly and to the Special DGMI attached Tamil speaking Protection Group (SPG). Searches were Intelligence Corps officers to the OFC. conducted but the intruder was not Later, the 57 Mountain Division detected. The lack of adequate Intelligence Company was moved to coordination between IB, R&AW and Palaly, Sri Lanka to augment MI Delhi police came up for criticism during resources. the post-mortem of this case Several coordination problems between The Sri Lanka operation, which was the the MI and civilian intelligence surfaced Indian Army’s first ever overseas force during this period. The R&AW claimed projection operation, also underlined lack that the Army Headquarters did not take of adequate coordination between various it into confidence or seek its advice prior agencies. India’s military intelligence (MI) to the Jaffna operations. During the had limited HUMINT capability. The then operations, there was no advance available ELINT (Electronic intelligence) planning for the interrogation and and SIGINT (Signals intelligence) were screening of suspected civilians and primitive by modern day standards. When prisoners, either at the OFC HQ or at the the Sri Lankan army crackdown on Tamil divisional HQ.
14 B.Raman, op cit: paras 43-44;
24 New challenges of national security management
After initial hiccups, coordination between unfortunately this could not be achieved R&AW and the advance HQ of the OFC fully in the jungle terrain of Vavuniya and improved. However, the MI perception Mullaitivu districts due to lack of good remained that R&AW’s inputs on LTTE’s enough HUMINT. military capabilities were not specific or Though OFC MI had established useful detailed enough. Neither could their future links with Sri Lanka’s National Intelligence actions be accurately anticipated. No Bureau (NIB), some of its inputs were accurate maps of the theatre of operations misleading. Constant vigilance had to be were made available by R&AW to MI. maintained to prevent efforts to thwart Deliberate LTTE leaks (on TECHINT) operations, particularly between 1988-89. about Prabhakaran’s possible hiding The overall paucity of intelligence staff and places proved inaccurate. There was a view lack of inputs from air or naval Intelligence that success of interaction between the sources were also limiting factors.15 Army and R&AW often depended too much on the personal equations between Apparently, the failure to initiate remedial officers on the spot as, there were no measures in the light of the above incidents standard operating procedures for and their post-mortems, greatly intelligence sharing, in absence of which, contributed to the Kargil incursions. The both sides lived in ‘a culture of denial’. Kargil Review Committee (KRC) found serious deficiencies at various levels of The IB too was found to be focused on intelligence collection, operational gathering internal political intelligence, processes and coordinated sharing of whereas once the Indian Army went in to inputs but stopped short of deeming it an the Sri Lankan mainland, the fine line intelligence failure. This was more a case dividing political and operational inputs of inadequate intelligence. For one, the got blurred during counter insurgency armed intrusion by Pakistani Army operations. The MI officers felt the IB was regulars remained undetected and came unable to appreciate the needs of forces as a complete and total surprise. This had operating in an alien environment. more to do, perhaps, with a practice that The DGMI could not provide “top down” had developed over the years, of leaving assessments during the course of the some particularly hard or inaccessible operations, which hampered MI planning sectors in the Kargil-Dras-Batalik area at the Advance HQ OFC. The frontline unpatrolled, which was well known to the troops’ requirements of tactical intelligence armies of both India and Pakistan. The from OFC MI units could be met to a Pakistanis tried to exploit this situation certain extent wherever there was close with a somewhat harebrained, albeit bold coordination, notably in the Jaffna, scheme, hatched between a small group Trincomalee and Batticaloa sectors, but of four top generals who had served in
15 Col (Retd) R. Hariharan: Presentation at Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) seminar, New Delhi,Sept15-16,2008.
25 IDSA Task Force Report
these forward areas at some stage in their unusually large quantities of winter boots early careers. These included the Pak by the Pak Army and some logistic Army chief Gen Musharraf, the buttressing of forces in the Gilgit - Rawalpindi based Commander of the X Olthingthang region across Kargil. Corps Lt. Gen Mehmood Ahmed, However, none of this was considered good Divisional Commander FCNA (Force enough indication of the Pak Army’s Command, Northern Areas) Maj. Gen. Kargil plans. Ideally, there was need for Javed Hassan and the Chief of General much higher levels of penetration within Staff, Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz. the Pak Army hierarchy, for sounding the alert through HUMINT, which was The Director General of Military lacking. Operations (DGMO), Maj. Gen. Tauqir Zia was kept completely out of the loop in the Nonetheless, the R&AW got some very initial stages of planning. He also good TECHINT breaks during the Kargil acquiesced but much later. Generals Aziz standoff. The interception of a telephone and Mehmood Ahmed in particular, conversation between Gen Musharraf, presented the plan as an opportunity to during his visit to China, with his Chief of take advantage in this ‘no man’s sector’ General Staff, Lt Gen Aziz, provided and settle scores with India for Siachen, crucial evidence to international 1984.16 The usually powerful collegiate interlocutors and media, worldwide that body of other Corps Commanders was the intruders were Northern Light Infantry informed much later. One of them, Lt. ‘regulars’, whose ‘jugular’ (tooti) was Gen. Tariq Pervaiz, GOC XII Corps, being controlled throughout by the Quetta openly criticised the strategy in his Pakistan Army . discussions with his juniors, leading to his This helped turn the tide of world public subsequent sacking by Musharraf. opinion in favour of India, though the The Kargil Review Committee found subsequent casualty of the concerned R&AW‘s HUMINT to be quite weak. It technical intelligence link had to be had some graziers or shepherd assets who endured. The KRC report also traversed this terrain but not in the winter acknowledged the work of the Aviation months. Ultimately, in early May 1999, Research Centre (ARC), which produced just before an Army patrol sent to look out excellent aerial intelligence after the for intrusions was attacked, one such intrusion, was detected. The question as to, shepherd alerted the Army about the why the ARC was not deployed for similar sightings of suspicious intruders in the aerial surveillance in this area before the ‘sangars’ (stone hutments on Kargil conflict broke out, particularly after some heights). Apart from that, there were some trans-border sources of the IB and the sporadic reports about purchase of R&AW had reported heightened ground
16 Shuja Nawaz (2009), “Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within”, Oxford University Press: Karachi, pp 512-513.
26 New challenges of national security management
level activity in some military formations the response to central intelligence pointers on the other side, however remained in building up of resistance capability, in unanswered.17 assessing the overall picture and transmitting the pointers to the ground Though lack of coordination between the forces for adequate action. During our R&AW and the Army, especially DGMI enquiries we were told that the Multi- was highlighted in the Kargil Review Agency Centre (MAC) and its state-level Committee report, shortcomings in this compartments - State Multi-Agency regard persist and cannot be addressed Centres (SMACs) were doing only the simply by the creation of a separate collation work by pooling available Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). The intelligence with the members. There was DIA has functioned so far as a collation no “intelligence arbitration” with different agency for tactical intelligence whereas the agencies to analyse intelligence and arrive responsibility for strategic intelligence at a common threat perception. The remains with the R&AW. Yet the defence Mumbai police also neglected the OSINT services are generally believed to be although similar terrorist attacks had taken lukewarm to R&AW’s indent for serving place on the Serena Hotel, Kabul (January officers to meet its job requirements. 14, 2008) and the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad (September 20, 2008). In fact, MUMBAI ATTACKS in March 2007 the local press had reported The 26/11 Mumbai incidents, which that the Coast Guard had apprehended a should have been studied as a national suspected Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) boat intelligence and security lapse, was the heading towards the western coast but subject matter of a limited probe that was had allowed it to get away. These LeT confined to the Mumbai police’s reaction cadres were later arrested by Rajouri police to the terrorist attack. The Maharashtra (J&K). Had the local police been sensitised Government classified the report denying to these developments they could have their own police officers or other had a better appreciation of the threat from departments the opportunity to study it the LeT to Mumbai. Intelligence for for better future action. Even legislators ground action can thus originate not only were not allowed access to it for a long time. from secret sources but also from the open The enquiry committee received no help media.18 from the Central Government despite many requests. Central intelligence reports COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE LAPSES were made available only to the local Not much data is available in the open Director General of Police’s (DGP) office. domain about counter-intelligence lapses. However, even within the limited mandate, However observations, albeit guarded, can the committee discovered grave lapses in
17 B.Raman: op cit: para 51. 18 V. Balachandran, Special Secretary (Retd.), Cabinet Secretariat & co-author, Pradhan Committee Enquiry Report, in a note for IDSA Round Table, Aug 2010.
27 IDSA Task Force Report
be made about a case where a senior cupboards, which the officer claimed, intelligence officer in one of India’s contained only his personal belongings intelligence agencies was compromised were not searched. After three days of and eventually detected before too much strenuous denial and outrage, an eventual damage could be done to India’s national lucky break helped break down the security. suspect. One of the officers in the interrogation team was carrying a packet Early detection in this case happened due of magazines meant for the senior officer to the determination of a relatively junior which would have been delivered at his surveillance officer. Despite instructions to residence in the normal course. The officer ‘lay off’ a foreign operative engaged in mistook these for audio and video liaison contact, the surveillance official recordings confirming his guilt and detected rather elaborate warding off confessed his involvement but maintained measures being taken by this foreign that he was doing so only to further psy- intelligence operative. This eventually led war objectives, in India’s national security to the identification of the vehicle of the interest. This defence was not accepted as contacted Indian official used for their convincing enough and the officer had to meetings. Though the ownership of the quietly accept retirement with some vehicle could be traced, the first laxity in dishonour, despite his earlier exemplary the enquiry took place at this stage because record and high profile career.19 of the diffidence of the junior level officers to undertake follow up actions in a case Public discussion of intelligence failures where one of their very senior officers was almost invariably follows the slip ups, real involved. Surveillance continued in fits or perceived, of the intelligence and starts over the next six months or more, community, who try to balance out such during which period there were fresh perceptions by claiming and publicising, sightings to confirm the link between the at times over publicise, their successes. The foreign operative and the concerned propensity of the media and the academic official. A decision then had to be taken to community to dissect the performance of summon the officer before his seniors and intelligence agencies with their limited confront him with evidence about his understanding of the realities of complicity. At this stage too, damage intelligence work, or on the basis of such control actions were marked by overly publicised successes, or the not so considerable diffidence. For instance, highlighted failures, has the potential not though it was decided to search the officer’s only to demoralise the hard-core residential premises, the search itself was intelligence activists, but also to an erosion conducted somewhat perfunctorily - of public trust in their capabilities.20
19 Though no attributions can be made, the above account is based on first hand knowledge of some serving intelligence professionals whose names cannot be disclosed, for obvious reasons. Those in the intelligence community would be able to identify the case in question. 20 Nigel Inkster, “Review Essay: The Protecting State”, Survival –Oct-Nov,2010, IISS: London
28 New challenges of national security management
Timely intelligence can do much to reduce One question that needs to be asked is risks to national security. But the whether some of these requirements are limitations of this capacity need to be better left to the exclusive domain of line clearly understood. Intelligence cannot departments: e.g. the Department of predict the future. It can, given time and Revenue Intelligence (DRI), or the luck, reveal secrets. It cannot provide Economic Offences Wing (EOW) under foolproof pointers to the thought processes Ministry of Finance, Department of of particular leaders or the outcome of Science & Technology, the Atomic Energy complex and dynamic situations. It can Commission (AEC) and the Defence however serve to reduce uncertainties for Research & Development Organisation policy makers by making them confront (DRDO)? A related question would be uncomfortable realities.21 whether these departments would at all care to assign such intelligence collection HOW TO CREATE THESE CAPABILITIES tasks to agencies that are bereft of specialists? Alternatively, if they want to do these tasks themselves, then the Intelligence agencies must be clear about question may well be posed whether their the challenges to the security of the state. own specialists have the requisite training Their ambit will perforce need to extend or aptitude to handle this type of work? to the entire gamut of collecting This question is particularly relevant for intelligence on internal security, external collection of science and technology security, military intelligence – both tactical intelligence, being undertaken by agencies and strategic, economic and commercial like the Bhabha Atomic Energy intelligence as well as new data in science Commission (BARC) or the Indian Space and technology related issues. Research Organisation (ISRO).22 The creation of a world-class intelligence There would also be a need to take set-up to meet these requirements will cognizance of the many non-traditional necessarily have to be taken up over the areas of intelligence – financial long-term, with the short term and transactions, technological transactions, medium term objectives clearly identified. large company manoeuvres, organised While the main role of intelligence crime etc. Connecting the dots in these collection will remain focused on collection specialised areas of intelligence collection, of inputs (operations), compilation and would make the process of intelligence assessment (analysis) would be equally collection far more complicated. Two important but the kind of intelligence suggestions that could be considered in needed and the speed in obtaining it would this context are: every major economic be crucial. department may need an intelligence
21 David Omand (2010). “Securing the State”, Hurst: London 22 Authors interview with Shri K. Santhanam, former Scientific Adviser to Govt of India: discussions with author-07.01.11
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wing, and increased outsourcing from have begun the process of grappling with intelligence agencies to think tanks may the demands of “post-modern become necessary.23 In practice, such Intelligence”. The sheer pace of change, cooperation is already underway in the not only because of the technological and day-to-day functioning of government information revolutions, has left many in departments; but it has not always been the intelligence community struggling to uniform or regular, being dependent on update their practices and prescribe better the rapport between personnel involved. practical solutions, to avoid the tendency These arrangements need to be to lurch from crisis to crisis. institutionalised. The US intelligence community’s Another question which must be tackled traditional model was secret and in any worthwhile exercise on reform of “collection–centric”, and prized classified Indian intelligence set-up, would be to data. It was driven by data availability examine whether only personnel from the while analysis remained secondary. It was police can be considered fit for intelligence context-minimal, with analysts staying operations and organisations? What close to the data, in “narrow account makes them more suitable for analysing lanes”. It was ‘current’ oriented, with no intelligence inputs, than say an economist, collectible facts about the future and academic, area expert, or scientist? Or warning focused. It emphasised alarm should India cast its recruitment net wider, ringing, remained product centric, to include the sizeable national talent pool measuring success as being relative to the of technocrats and specialists of different “finished intelligence” provided to policy hues to assist in the task of intelligence makers, rather than on its utility or service. gathering. Given the intricacies and This model resulted in specialisation now required for intelligence compartmentalisation and, inevitably, collection in the modern era, the number reduced distribution. In today’s complex of police officers involved in intelligence strategic environment, access is largely collection, as opposed to counter- unrestricted and threats or opportunities intelligence, has to be not as pervasive as can emerge from almost anywhere in this so far it had been. This suggestion has ‘information–rich’ world. This argues for already been made in the FICCI task force a more “cognition–centric” model that report24 that advocates developing a prioritises sound thinking ahead of mere special cadre of trained personnel for secret data collection and moves towards national security management. After 9/ a synthesis of facts and analysis which is 11 and Iraq, Western intelligence agencies what is needed today.25 The intelligence
23 K. Subrahmanyam, Op cit – pg. 8 of transcript, IDSA Round Table, Aug 6, 2010. 24 FICCI Task Force Report on National Security & Terrorism, Vol.1, 2009 25 Josh Kerbel, “For the Intelligence Community, Creativity Is the New Secret, “World Politics Review, Vol. March, 2010, URL: http: //www. world politics review.com/articles/5329/for-the-intelligenced- community-creativity-is-the-new secret
30 New challenges of national security management
community in India too will have to take in the conduct of its operations, strategies note of these ‘multiple, overlapping and and tactics. The appointment of the heads often contradictory narratives to of these organisations should be the successfully cope with the challenges it prerogative of the political executive and, faces from multiple directions.26 finally, the performance of these intelligence organisations should be In other words, there is an urgent need for broadly monitored by oversight a significant paradigm shift in the focus committee/s set up by Parliament, while of intelligence agencies in India. A keeping operational matters outside their justifiable case can be made out for the ambit. widening of their charters to include subjects like environmental security or energy security, demographic change, climate change etc. Internal security responsibilities today are integrally enmeshed with the security clearances for public sector projects or even private sector projects in the telecommunications sector. Perhaps, an empowered ember in the Planning Commission could oversee security related issues.27 It is necessary to acknowledge that intelligence has gravitas and is not a dubious calling but an essential component of statecraft, with covert capacities inherent to its domain expertise. If this is accepted then the road map for any intelligence overhaul has to be appropriately designed to meet the modern day challenges facing India as an emerging global power. This would make it necessary that for an effective coverage of intelligence requirements in the 21st century India, the intelligence apparatus should be based on a system created by Parliament that clearly mandates the charters, functions and duties of each organisation, and it should be autonomous
26 Andrew Rathmell, ‘Towards Post-modern Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 17(3), Sept.2002, pp.87 – 104. 27 D. Nath, Special Director, Intelligence Bureau (Retd), Paper for IDSA Round Table: “Thoughts on Intelligence Reform”, IDSA: New Delhi.
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Chapter 3
LEGAL STATUS
It has been customary - ostensibly to The advent of international terrorism also maintain secrecy and in the interest of contributed to the changed priorities in national security - to deny the existence of recognising the role and resources of intelligence organisations. In the United intelligence agencies the world over. As Kingdom for many years, the MI 5 was British society became more open and less seen as a deeply mysterious organisation. deferential, the security services realised Successive governments intended it to be that levels of secrecy that went beyond so. The intelligence community, though it their operational needs actually eroded existed, was meant to stay as far away from public confidence and bred conspiracy the public view as possible.28 India’s theories about their functioning and intelligence organisations were a colonial capacities. heritage and thus they endorsed this In 1989, the Security Services Act placed legacy of anonymity and denial. Till MI-5 on a statutory footing. Three years recently, questions in Parliament later, Stella Remington, its first female chief pertaining to the legal architecture under was publicly acknowledged as its Director which the Intelligence Bureau (IB) General. She very seriously undertook the functions elicited the response that it task of demystifying the service for the figured in Schedule 7 (Entry 8) of the public and the media and touted this as Union List in the Constitution of India. 29 one of the main achievements of her term. This does not make IB into a statutory body, This demystification was further but merely an adhoc administrative encouraged by the establishment of a arrangement by the Executive. parliamentary oversight committee as well The end of the Cold War and the as the legal recognition of the external disintegration of the Soviet Union intelligence organisation - The Secret gradually transformed public perceptions Intelligence Service or MI-6, under the about the functioning of security services. Intelligence Services Act, 1994.
28 Christopher Andrew (2009), The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5 Allen Lane, London 29 Manish Tiwari, “Legally Empowering the Sentinels of the Nation, Issue Brief #20, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, August 2009.
32 Legal Status
In the Harman & Hewitt vs. UK case which with foreign agencies dealing with came up before the European Court Of counter-terrorism “in consultation and co- Human Rights (ECHR) in 1992, the lack ordination with R&AW”, after obtaining of a specific statutory basis for MI-5 was permission from the government at the held to be fatal to the claim that its actions highest level.31 These charters have now were “in accordance with the law” for the been codified but they still lack the purpose of surveillance and file keeping, sanction of specific legislative enactments. contrary to safeguards provided by the Even earlier, after the 1975 emergency, the convention on the right to privacy.30 The L.P. Singh Committee had gone into the ECHR later further specified that working of the IB and recommended a observing the rule of law by maintaining written charter for it. It is imperative in a a simple veneer of legality would not democracy that every organisation of the suffice, a ‘Quality of Law’ test would have government draws its powers, privileges to be met , which required any such legal and authority from clearly defined legal regime to be clear, foreseeable and statutes as laid down by the supreme accessible. legislative body in the country. The legal basis must be clear to obviate any In India too, the Kargil Review Committee obfuscation about both the intent of the (KRC) took note of the legal vacuum in legislature and the mandate it seeks to which both IB and the R&AW were bestow.32 Not only should such laws spell working. The Task Force on Intelligence out the charters and authorise the Central formed by the Group of Ministers Government to fix broad goals within the recommended specific and formal charter charters, they should also hold intelligence of duties for both external and internal agencies accountable. Absence of intelligence services of the country. legislative cover can be a serious lacuna as According to this report, the R&AW was all intelligence work is carried out under assigned the role of being the primary executive instructions. Some of this work, intelligence agency for collecting and especially that pertaining to foreign analysing all forms of external intelligence, intelligence operations, may involve while the IB was earmarked for a similar violation of local laws in the target country. role in domestic matters. The IB was also There is no legal protection for those who designated the nodal agency for counter– undertake such operations. A legal terrorism within the country. It was further enactment could offer such protection to clearly mentioned that the IB would liaise Indian intelligence operatives.33 A case in
30 Hans Born & Ian Leigh (2005), “Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies, Publishing House of the Parliament of Norway: 2005. 31 The Group of Ministers’ (GoM), Report on the Kargil Review Committee referred by Mr Satish Chandra, in AGNI, Studies in International Strategic Issue Vol. 10(4), December 2007. 32 A K Verma, “Intelligence needs a new order”, Indian Express-10.2.2005. 33 A K Verma, Intelligence Reforms, Paper No. 3277, June 26, 2009, South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG), URL:www.http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers33%5Cpaper3277.html
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point is the Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby case in The Geneva Centre for the Democratic 2007, wherein the former Chief of Staff to Control of Armed Forces [DCAF), the the US Vice President, Dick Cheney was Human Rights Centre of Durham convicted on a charge sheet filed by a University, UK and the Norwegian Special Counsel, for revealing the identity Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight of CIA’s “deep cover operative”, Valerie Committee undertook a joint exercise to Palme, a US foreign service officer in draft legal standards for accountability of 2003.34 intelligence services in liberal democracies. According to them legal standards need There is growing and across the board to cater to four levels of oversight: support for such measure with reference to the Indian intelligence agencies, l Internal control at the level of the especially among well informed retired agency intelligence professionals. A case could also l Executive control be made out to protect intelligence agencies from excessive bureaucratic l Parliamentary oversight & restraints and controls relating to financial l Oversight by independent oversight management, without absolving them of bodies. the need to adhere to financial probity.35 In the context of accountability to a Most modern intelligence organisations in political executive in a parliamentary form the world today, function under the ambit of government too, the legislative of enacted legislation. The CIA in the US enactment of charters of duty for was created by the National Security Act intelligence agencies could safeguard and of 1947. The Federal Intelligence Service protect an honest, upright and (FIS) in Russia draws its legal basis from conscientious intelligence operative/ the Law on Foreign Intelligence Organs, official. “If you have a Minister telling the 1996. The Federal Intelligence Service intelligence man to go and do something, (BND) of Germany draws its legal status and for him to say I will not do it, he should from the Federal Intelligence Service Law, have a piece of paper to say this is what 1990. In Japan, the Public Security the law says.”36 For the same reason, “the Intelligence Agency (PSIA) is empowered charter for R&AW must be legislated” by the Subversive Activities Prevention asserts Brajesh Mishra, former Principal Law; in the Netherlands, both the General Secretary to the Prime Minister and Intelligence & Security Service (AIVD) and National Security Adviser 37 the Defence Intelligence and Security
34 V. Balachandran: Former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat: A Paper on Intelligence Reforms sent to IDSA Task Force – June,2010. 35 Op.cit. 36 K. Subrahmanyam, IDSA Round Table on Intelligence Reform, August 6, 2010. 37 Brajesh Mishra, IDSA Round Table on Intelligence Reform, August 6,2010
34 Legal Status
Service (MIVD) are mandated by the again and again in the media and lowering Intelligence and Security Services Act the prestige of the government.38 Thus, the 2002, as amended in November 2, 2006. very first reform recommended is to give Indian intelligence agencies the support of A study of these legislations reveals certain legislative enactments. The model of the key features. The role and spheres of UK Intelligence Services Act, 1994 could operation of intelligence agencies should be followed to frame the provisions of an be clearly defined by legislation. In a act to accord legal status to the R&AW democracy, the responsibility for while the Security Services Act, 1989 could delineating these tasks lies with the serve as a model for the IB. parliament. Threats to national security and the powers and mandates of officials entrusted to deal with organised crime, terrorism and espionage require careful definition and need to be specified. These may have variables that distinguish between internal and external services. The practice followed in Western democracies has been to refer to security services for internal threats and to intelligence services for external threats. Separate legislation has been drawn up for different agencies. The powers of the heads of the services are clearly delineated. It is clearly mentioned that they will report annually to the political executive – the Prime Minister, in a parliamentary model and the President in a presidential form of government. Other layers and institutions of oversight and supervision – internal, executive, judicial and legislative - are also defined in such legislation. Such a clear enumeration of duties at supervisory levels helps maintain accountability. Responsibility for misuse of office or secret funds can be fixed and allegations of misuse or other misdemeanours can be promptly enquired into by the competent legal authority, instead of their appearing
38 V. Balachandran, Op cit, Pg 6
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Chapter 4
RECRUITMENT
It will be difficult to bring about any any aptitude for this type of work. Perhaps effective intelligence reforms unless there too much faith was reposed in following is clarity about the fact that intelligence is the rather simplistic approach, of naively a specialised activity in which excellence identifying intelligence collection is at times achieved because of an inherent capabilities with requirements of a ‘law or individual knack but is generally built and order’ or criminal investigation up and cultivated as a life long passion.39 approach.41 Intelligence collection and operations are Most modern intelligence services across highly specialised skills, that include the world have refined their recruitment language skills, an in depth knowledge of processes over a period of time. In fact, an strategic matters of target countries/areas, analysis of the careers of leading their cultural mores, computer know-how, personalities from the field of intelligence technological skills, etc. These capabilities world over would reveal that hardly are not something that can be developed anybody has been from the regular overnight by everybody, or by men and bureaucracy: women who seek to join an intelligence l Sir Maurice Oldfield: Legendary Chief agency as a temporary haven, or as an of MI-6 (1973-78) on whom Le Carre opportunity to treat these organisations had based the character of “Smiley” merely as stepping stones to greener in his Tinker, Tailor series of novels, an pastures.40 In the past, persons recruited academic from Manchester University, for intelligence agencies at various levels Army officer, MI-6 Chief and after were not always ideally suited for retirement Chief Coordinator intelligence work. The recruitment Intelligence & Security, Northern processes were often too general and Ireland where he managed to exercise bureaucratic. No attempt was made, on a marked control over IRA activities the pattern of Service Selection Board procedures, to find out if the applicants had l William Casey: Lawyer, US Naval
39 D. Nath, “Thoughts on Intelligence Reforms”, Paper for IDSA Round Table, August,2010 40 Vikram Sood, “Intelligence Reform”, Indian Defence Review; Jan/Mar ’2009 41 P. K. Upadhyay, Concept Paper on Intelligence Reform, IDSA Round Table, Aug 2010
36 Recruitnent
officer, OSS, Chairman of Securities & Homeland Security reflected a pre- Exchange Commission, Reagan’s chief disposition to respond to ‘intelligence campaigner, CIA Chief (1981-87) failure’ with structural reforms, despite persisting scepticism among seasoned l Richard Helms: Journalist with United observers about the value of mere Press in London during the pre-World organizational reforms.42 War-II days, Indianapolis Times, Navy, OSS and CIA Chief (1966-73) Elsewhere in UK and Canada also changes have been implemented. In Britain, a new l William Colby: Academic from Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), has Princeton, US Army, OSS, law been established, which is housed within graduate from Columbia (1947), CIA the Security Service (SS –old MI – 5) Chief (1973-75) headquarters. A new Head of Intelligence l Prof. Joseph S. Nye: Harvard Analysis has also been appointed.43 On University, Chairman, National its part, the Canadian Security Intelligence Intelligence Council 1993-94 (Like our Service (CSIS) undertook a study on the JIC). Won Distinguished Service Medal relationship between climate change and for intelligence, now Dean, Kennedy environmental degradation as far back as School of Government (Harvard) 2004. More recently, the John Major Commission inquiring into the bombing In most developed countries, the practice of the Air India Kanishka aircraft, revealed of utilizing university dons as talent that divesting intelligence functions and spotters for campus recruitment is very responsibility from the Royal Canadian common. If this approach has to be Mounted Police (RCMP) by creating a adopted in India, the focus would have to separate civilian agency –the CSIS– had shift to merit based recruitment and not solved the problem of effective co- promotion practices which can be de- ordination of security intelligence.44 linked from hierarchical equivalences. The ideas of hire and fire and even outsourcing Intelligence agencies in various countries for specified tasks have to be seriously have from time to time undergone considered. The United States introduced extensive restructuring to adapt a new post of Director of National themselves to the changing situations. Intelligence (DNI) and set up the National Some examples: Counter Terrorism Centre in 2004 after the Kean Commission of Inquiry submitted its UNITED KINGDOM: report. In fact, the changes made within the US intelligence community, including In 1909 Capt. Vernon Kell (South the creation of a new Department of Staffordshire Regiment) and Capt.
42 Len Scott & G. Hughes : Intelligence & National Security in 21st Century : Published by Routledge. 43 Peter Hennesssy : From Secret State to Protective State : In The New Protective State: Government, Intelligence & Terrorism. Continuum Books, 2007. 44 V.Balachandran : Paper on Intelligence reforms sent to IDSA –July 2010.
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Mansfield Cummings (Royal Navy) supervised by the Foreign & established a “Secret Service Bureau” Commonwealth Secretary. (SSB). Capt. Kell (known as “K”) was in Recruitment to MI-5, MI-6 and charge of counter espionage while Capt. GCHQ: Cummings (“C”) dealt with foreign intelligence. In 1916 the SSB became part These three organisations have of military intelligence. The internal wing considerable autonomy in recruiting staff was designated MI-5 while the external and do not depend upon the general arm was known as MI-6. However, in 1931 recruiting channels of the UK Civil Service. MI-5, later known as Security Services (SS) The MI-5 advertises vacancies on their became independent and was placed website (www.mi5.gov.uk) and the under the Home Secretary. In 1992 the candidates can apply online. MI-5’s responsibility for coverage of Irish flexibility in recruiting senior management terrorism was taken away from the directly can be seen in the way Stella London Metropolitan Police and Rimington, the first woman MI-5 Chief transferred to MI-5. The Security Services (1991) was enlisted into the service in 1967 Act (1989 & 1996) placed it under while her husband was posted in New parliamentary scrutiny. Delhi as the First Secretary in the British High Commission. MI-6 also became part of the War Office & Admiralty in 1916 but became Rimington gives a detailed account of the independent in 1922 when it was recruiting process in MI-5 in her book Open designated as the Secret Intelligence Secret (2001). Till the 1980s the channel for Service (SIS). In 1940 Winston Churchill recruitment was either through Talent and Hugh Dalton set up the Special Spotters (not a great success) or from the Operations Executive (SOE) known also Civil Services. In 1996 both these were as “Baker Street Irregulars” to conduct given up and open advertisements started irregular warfare behind the enemy lines. appearing from 1997. Her book is a After the war the SOE was merged with treasure trove of information regarding the SIS in 1946. The Intelligence Services Act human resources’ problem of motivation (1994) placed the working of the SIS on a and performance assessment that bedevil statutory footing under the Foreign & a secret organisation, preventing it from Commonwealth Secretary. It is also under imbibing good management practices the watch of the Parliament’s Intelligence from outside because of the need for & Security Committee and the Ministerial secrecy. Committee on Intelligence Services (CSI) Like the MI-5, recruitment to GCHQ is chaired by the PM. also done through their website. However The technical intelligence for the services prospective candidates for MI-6 have to was provided by the Government Code & apply by post to the Secret Intelligence Cipher School, which later became the Service. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in 1946. Like the USA MI-6 the functions of GCHQ are governed At the beginning of the 20th century, the by the Intelligence Services Act (1994) and
38 Recruitnent
US Army’s G-2 Branch performed the Intelligence Agency (DIA) was set up in intelligence functions for United States. In 1961 while the National Intelligence 1942 the Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) Council (NIC) was established in 1980 to and Naval Intelligence (ONI) took over this prepare and disseminate “Intelligence task. The Pearl Harbour experience led to Estimates” (like the Indian JIC). the setting up of the Office of the Strategic Recruitment to the CIA: Services (OSS) under Col. Donovan, a distinguished lawyer who had seen action In the beginning CIA ‘recruiters’ used to during World War1. OSS began as a visit universities including Ivy League ‘Research & Analysis Organisation’ as part Colleges for recruitment. Several graduates of the Library of Congress, handpicking from these institutions joined the some of the best historians and scholars to organisation in the early days. In addition, give strategic assessments. In 1942 the the organisation was able to attract name was changed to OSS when it began intellectual giants like Prof. Willmore to undertake activities behind enemy lines Kendall and Prof. Sherman Kant in the like the British SOE. After the War, middle level management for the Analysis President Truman disbanded the OSS in Desks during the 1940s and 1950s. Robert 1945 and handed over the intelligence Gates, the youngest CIA chief in history functions to the Defence and the State who worked under five US presidents in Departments. However the compulsions of different capacities, including, as the the Cold War led to a re-think. A New York Deputy National Security Adviser was businessman, Ferdinand Eberstadt was recruited in 1965 from Indiana University. commissioned to prepare a blueprint for He joined the CIA in 1968 after the setting up of a civilian intelligence undergoing military training sponsored by agency. The National Security Act (1947) the spy agency. Now advertisements are and CIA Act (1949) for setting up the regularly placed for recruitment. An National Security Council (NSC) and the advertisement even appeared in The CIA were passed as a result of this exercise. Economist in September 1999. Vacancies The Director Central Intelligence (DCI) was even in superior positions in these made responsible for intelligence organisations are now advertised through coordination covering all the intelligence the general federal employment website organisations including military (www.usjobs.opm.gov). A prospective intelligence, besides heading the CIA. After candidate can go to this general website, the passing of the Intelligence Reform & check his/her preferences and directly Terrorism Prevention Act (2004), a new access the department concerned. For post of Director National Intelligence example “US Jobs” in July 2005 advertised (DNI) was created in 2005 in the White various positions in CIA including that of House to take over the coordination, Senior Intelligence Analyst (annual salary: previously under the DCI. The National $ 114,882). All these are for GS (General Security Agency (NSA) and the National Schedule) jobs. The candidate can also Reconnaissance Organisation (NRO) were access the websites of the concerned formed in 1952 and 1962 respectively to departments directly - even that of the CIA collect technical intelligence. The Defence (www.cia.gov/employment). None of
39 IDSA Task Force Report
these organisations depend upon the persons not yet sufficiently general federal recruitment procedure for indoctrinated in the habits of recruiting their staff. The CIA website in security to judge when they are July 2005 advertised for a Deputy Director talking out of turn and when they (Technical Services), which is a very senior are not. (The Craft of Intelligence) appointment on an annual salary of $149,200. There is no single civil service ISRAEL examination in the US and it is clearly stated that the candidate would not be Ben Gurion set up five intelligence and security outfits at the formation of the state required to take any kind of test at all for of Israel: most federal jobs. (a) Shai: Intelligence Wing of Haganah In July 2005 the CIA advertised for their (Jewish underground army) ‘Clandestine Services’ with this job description: (b) Shin Beth: internal security This is an elite corps that gathers the (c) Aliyah Beth: To smuggle in Jews from vital information needed by our other countries policy makers”. The requirements (d) Foreign Ministry were a Bachelor’s degree and an upper age limit of 35. The posts (e) Police advertised were: Core Collector, In 1951 a reorganisation was effected and Staff Ops. Officer, Collection Mossad (Institution for Intelligence & Management Officer Ops., Special Assignments) was created by Targeting Officer, Language Officer combining Shai, Irgun, etc and placed etc., carrying an annual salary of $ under the Foreign Ministry. Later it started 78,000 (possibly, at entrance level.) reporting to the Prime Minister. A new In order to target the youth, the CIA offers outfit – Aman - was created for collecting Student Internship Programmes and military intelligence while Shin Beth and Graduate Study Programmes whereby a Aliyah Beth continued with their original recruit is allowed to continue his education tasks. with funds from CIA and later join the For long Mossad followed the recruitment organisation. policy laid down by their legendary However CIA does not encourage short second chief Isser Harel (known as ‘Isser, term recruits or deputationists and has the Little’, because he was short) who been following the policy of Allen Dulles, became famous for his 15 year manhunt its pioneer: for Adolf Eichmann. Isser who was the Mossad Chief between 1952 and 1963 did A sizable turnover of short term not allow a single volunteer into the service. employees is dangerous because it He also cared little for seniority and means that working methods, promoted on merit. It was the official identities of key personnel and policy in the 1980s/1990s that recruitment certain projects in progress will have to Mossad was always through talent been exposed in some measure to
40 Recruitnent
spotters or from among the relatives of government to set up the Mackenzie serving personnel. Commission (1960) and McDonald Commission (1981) which recommended However, this started changing from 1998 divesting the RCMP of its role in national following various controversies involving security intelligence and establishing a Mossad when there was a public outcry civilian intelligence agency under to introduce more transparency into its parliamentary control. “The Commission working. This dramatic change took place found that it was not appropriate for a law when Ehud Barak was the Prime Minister. enforcement body like the RCMP to be Now an aspirant can apply directly on its involved in security intelligence work” website www.mossad.gov.il. All (Mackenzie). McDonald believed that applications are handled by the Prime “Law enforcement and security work are Minister’s office only. incompatible”. Following these reports, the The working of Mossad is totally different Canadian Security & Intelligence Service from that of conventional intelligence Act (CSIS) was passed in 1984. organisations. Firstly, it believes in having In 1987, the Osbaldeston Report on the a limited permanent cadre and more staffing of CSIS recommended that irregulars or retired persons who are paid recruitment be commensurate with the out of secret funds. Operations abroad are new requirements including counter- mostly undertaken through the Sayanim terrorism and counter-proliferation. The (local Jewish volunteers) and the Bodlim service was asked to recruit “high calibre (Safe House Keepers). At one time it was university graduates to become reported that there were as many as 2000 intelligence officers”. All vacancies are Sayanim in London alone. Most of the advertised on their website and prospective important operations are handled from candidates apply on line. the headquarters to ensure tighter control by the Katsas (Case Officers), while local units only play a supporting role. A Yarid SOUTH AFRICA: (Security Officer) whose job is to provide Far reaching intelligence reforms were facilities, cover, etc. is deputed for all introduced in South Africa after the important operations so that the local apartheid regime ended. The National operative is not exposed. Secondly, Mossad Strategic Intelligence Act (1994) gave the personnel are not given any cover jobs mandate for the new intelligence set up while posted in their missions, or given while the Intelligence Services Act (1994) only very light jobs with innocuous lead to the creation of the National designations. Intelligence Agency (NIA) for domestic intelligence and the South African Secret CANADA: Service (SASS) for external intelligence, which included external military For 120 years the RCMP (Royal Canadian intelligence as well. The NIA and SASS Mounted Police) handled Canadian were formed on Jan 1, 1995 after merging national intelligence functions. However the following intelligence services: various controversies about the excesses committed by the RCMP forced the (a) National Intelligence Service &
41 IDSA Task Force Report
Department of Intelligence & Security Both NIA and SASS allow direct of the former regime recruitment to various posts such as intelligence officers, analysts, legal (b) Pan-Africanist Security Service advisors, financial officers etc. Both services (c) African National Congress are exempt from the Labour Relations Act 1995, Basic Conditions of Employment Act (d) Intelligence structures in Transkei, 1997 and Employment Equity Act 1998. Bophuthatswana, Venda & coordinates with Ciskai SASS also has a student internship programme like the CIA. Such student The NIA and SASS work under the internees are first trained in the South Minister for Intelligence who coordinates African National Academy of Intelligence with the Minister for Defence (South (SANAI), which provides training for cadet African National Defence Force-SANDF) intelligence officers in basic subjects like and the Police Minister (South African intelligence orientation, and report Police Services-SAPS). In addition there is writing. After this they can continue also an Intelligence Co--coordinator who education in regular institutions or pursue heads the National Intelligence Co- a career in intelligence by getting further Coordinating Committee (NICOC) for training. disseminating intelligence (like the JIC in India). Oversight and control are exercised by the Cabinet Committee and the Joint INDIA Standing Committee on Intelligence Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) (JSCI). Besides there is an Inspector General to investigate any problems The R&AW was not conceived as a central within the agencies whose annual reports police organisation. The then Prime are made public. Minister, Smt. Indira Gandhi and the organisation’s founding fathers, Over a period of time, many ‘whites’ took Rameshwar Nath Kao and K. Sankaran voluntary retirement from the NIA which Nair repeatedly stressed that the R&AW was once a European dominated agency. should not become just another police The new recruits, mostly Africans, have organisation, but should draw talent from now taken their places. Its present race- wherever it could be found, including wise composition is as follows: from other services of the Government of 45 Africans: 62 per cent India. Whites: 32 per cent Initially, the in-house slotting of IPS officers from within IB, the parent body, was Coloureds: 4 per cent undertaken partly on the basis of options Asians: 2 per cent and partly through screening. Recruitment
45 V. Balachandran, Note on Recruitment Policy & other issues: restricted circulation: recorded- Aug,2005: made available on request , for IDSA report
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to what would become a new service – the A combination of deputationists from the Research & Analysis Service (RAS) - began Police, mainly the IPS, and other Central in 1971. Several lateral entrants got services as well as direct recruitment absorbed into this service in the first flush- through the UPSC continued to be the from 1971 to 1977 -through an elaborate method of recruitment to R&AW for a system of written examinations/ fairly long time. However, this practice has personality and psychological tests and suffered from the ‘tail-end syndrome’ in interviews. recent times. Only those at the bottom of the UPSC Combined All India Services Detailed service rules were formalised entrance exam list, who get allotted to the somewhat later - in the mid-80s, during not so popular, challenging or glamorous the tenure of G. C. Saxena - which spelt civil services, opt for R&AW and are out job requirements and the required interviewed and personality tested by a personality traits. Rigorous training, Screening Board set up for the purpose. including physical toughening in the The quality of these candidates has not training institutes of various security always been up to the mark. Many of the forces, was also part of the training candidates selected do not join, preferring regimen, though it was subsequently to remain with the parent service they are discontinued. New recruits were also called already assigned to, instead of opting for upon to develop language expertise. further training or language training, The second phase of direct recruitment which follows selection to the R&AW. The began from 1985, through direct direct recruitments to RAS are understood examinations and interviews for the first to have practically been discontinued for two years and then, from 1987, through the past couple of years, leading to the the Union Public Service Commission constant shrinking of the cadre. It would (UPSC). This continued till 1992. Sections appear that the ultimate demise of the of media have strongly contended that cadre in the course of the next few years many officers among the initial groups of due to retirement and other attritions is lateral or direct inductees happened to be clearly on the cards now. ‘relatives and associates’ of police officers, The confused cadre management and bureaucrats and senior serving or retired recruitment policies of R&AW become defence officers, who happened to be the even clearer from certain reported moves, colleagues of those at the helm in R&AW. unique in nature, to directly recruit These entrants, barring some exceptions, persons at the level of Deputy were unable to shed their own insecurities Superintendent of Police. It may be in the earlier phases of their careers, vis-à- mentioned that persons staffing this level vis their IPS colleagues, or hold their own of appointments are usually from lower among their peers in the Foreign Service ranks, who move upwards in rank due to while on cover assignments abroad. The their substantial grass-root level quality was much better in the second experience. They, however, lack the wide phase of recruitment, with the new vision and the in depth expertise to man entrants displaying greater confidence in senior positions. The composition of their own abilities and acquiring expertise R&AW’s senior positions is currently over a period of time.
43 IDSA Task Force Report
believed to be from among those who functioning of the recruitment procedure came on short term deputation and then followed by the organisation thus far - stayed on under the ‘Permanent which requires a deeper analysis. While the Secondment’ scheme and/or persons underlying principle separating R&AW recruited (including from within the from IB and setting up a new organisation department) from various other services/ for external intelligence was to avoid cadres, apart from those promoted from making it just another ‘police junior ranks. Presence of personnel at organisation,’ in practice the primacy of senior positions belonging to a plethora of the police officers in R&AW has continued services and entry levels might further unabated, leading to a constant and compound man-management problems debilitating tussle between the directly and increase heartburn and internal recruited personnel and those on tussles. deputation. The loss of morale within the organisation, especially among the former, Recruitment to lower ranks in R&AW was has been reported off and on in sections of initially an in-house exercise, without any the media and this has also possibly reference to the Staff Selection Board resulted in the low response from new All (SSB), or the UPSC. This appeared to have India Service applicants for joining the been given up subsequently and such organisation. recruitments were channelled through SSB. However, the organisation reverted back to conducting its own examinations INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (IB) by advertising vacancies. Again, the route Officers in the IB of the rank of Joint of recruitments from open market Assistant Director/Assistant Director used through normal processes of selection to be recruited through a special scheme through UPSC/SSB has been avoided. known as the ‘Ear-Marking Scheme How the aptitude of a selected candidate (EMS)’ from among successful IPS for intelligence work is determined, is not candidates. This was a planned process in clear. Physical tests seem to have been which the toppers from amongst the IPS abandoned for all ranks, nor there appears entrants were scrutinised to “earmark” to be any specific medical fitness standards candidates, who were then carefully vetted prescribed for any rank that could help in through an elaborate system of tests and the selection of physically suitable personal interviews. Officers brought in personnel for future operational and under the scheme were given special pay fieldwork requirements of the and usually got faster promotions than organisation. The recruitment process at their peers in most states. This was seen as various levels in R&AW is clearly an incentive for their tough and indicative of the nebulous character of unglamorous work and the lack of the policies regarding the organisation’s official perquisites enjoyed by the composition and character. It also is uniformed service in the states.46 indicative of the less than satisfactory
46 D. C. Nath, op cit.
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At a junior level, Assistant Central work, especially where domestic or Intelligence Officers-Grade-II (ACIOs-II) internal security are concerned. However, were recruited directly through a rather the requirement of finding appropriate strict system of written examinations manpower to meet the specialised Science combined with a process of selection based and Technology (S&T) needs or defence on aptitude tests. The quality of intake was services personnel has hardly been met. very good in the initial years after Dependence on an ageing, depleting cadre independence, with many meritorious of the earlier recruits with an S&T double graduates, including Law background has not helped. New Graduates making the selection. There recruitment, though attempted has not were instances, albeit rare, when those who unearthed quality talent and the failed to make it as ACIOs later qualified verification of antecedents takes so long for the IPS. The healthy practice of getting that applicants interviewed and selected deputationists from the state police at the leave for better pastures. cutting edge level of Sub-Inspectors, The secondment of military personnel to Inspectors or Deputy Superintendents of these organisations occurs in fits and starts, Police has lapsed. This needs to be revived and is delayed by the processing routine. urgently, especially in larger metropolitan The defence services today insist on proper areas as the maintenance of an umbilical equivalence of rank for serving officers chord between field policing and internal who are spared for deputation to the security & intelligence work remains vital, intelligence agencies. This has become particularly for effective counter terrorism problematic as the old equivalence tasks. specified in rules of the Department of At both these levels, the old system of Personnel is not acceptable to them. Senior selection appears to have been diluted in Colonels or Brigadiers do not want to come later years with a concomitant decline in in as Directors. This has resulted in the quality. Lack of incentives has contributed induction of officers who are on the verge to a large number of vacancies. The of retirement, or those who have missed concept of the central intelligence services due promotions in their own service cadres. being seen as elite organisations of (This aspect is discussed also in Chapter 9). excellence has suffered because of modern A more imaginative and well-regulated day values of perks and pelf so coveted by utilisation of deputation quotas is the uniformed services in states. necessary to improve the quality of intake of defence service officers and experts in DEPUTATION S&T, or economic intelligence. A Deputation slots in the central intelligence suggestion worth considering in this agencies have by-and-large remained context is to form a ‘brains trust’ of confined to the IPS and a few other Central authorised personnel in government or All India Services. The induction of departments or public sector companies mostly police officers has helped in dealing with the electronics, nuclear or perpetuating the myth of close link bio-technology matters, who could be between field policing and intelligence designated either individually or jointly as
45 IDSA Task Force Report
nodal points to whom raw data provided private enterprise has even extended to the by intelligence agencies could be sphere of covert action, as in Afghanistan periodically referred for interpretation or and Pakistan (DynCorp, Black Water - assessment.47 now XE, Booz, Allen Hamilton, etc). After the unification of Germany, in the 1990s OUTSOURCING cryptologists who had earlier worked for the East German intelligence service, Outsourcing or intelligence contracting is STASI, were recruited through an indirect another concept worth considering. An process by the setting up of a private intelligence contractor can be defined as company-Rohde & Schwarz SIT Gmbh - someone who provides analytical or who today do advanced cryptology and technical support to the intelligence other connected technical interception community in exchange for monetary work for NATO.49 compensation. They include authorised contractors who provide products or services which are not readily available but REQUISITE REFORMS are relevant for national security. Studying the recruitment processes Historically, intelligence contracting is well followed by the intelligence agencies of known and was developed in the West advanced or economically developed during the two World Wars or even earlier countries can be instructive. They have (Pinkerton, Securitas, etc).48 The Office of kept pace with advances in technology Strategic Services in USA used Standard and have adopted flexible practices of Oil executives to obtain reports on the ‘Axis recruitment not only to upgrade the Powers’ fuel supplies. Goldman and Sachs technical skills of their operatives but to were tasked to ferret out measures for encourage area expertise and language funding of resistance groups. Specialists in skills.50 In the UK, recruitment is direct. major universities like Stanford, Berkeley, The element of secrecy has been relaxed Columbia and Princeton were contracted somewhat to try and recruit the best to help in crypto-deciphering work. young talent available from reputed Military intelligence has also turned to universities. The intake also private industry in the research and accommodates a flexible complement of development arena (e.g. Lockheed Martin referrals by university dons of talent banks Advanced Development Projects Unit, of bright scholars, who are recruited after etc). a prolonged scrutiny of their personal antecedents, social habits etc. Security In modern combat scenarios, the use of
47 K. Santhanam, during discussion with author: 07.01.2011; 48 Ralph Cohen, “Putting a human & historical face to Intelligence Contracting, Orbis’, Foreign Policy Research Institute Journal, Spring 2010, pp.240 49 Der Spiegel online, 27.09.10 50 P. K. Upadhyay, op cit
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vetting is extremely thorough. an established institution. The UPSC route Favouritism plays no role in such intakes. has the advantage of transparency but There are cases of bright professionally seems increasingly unimaginative and qualified executives from the private inadequate to meet current needs. A sector- in economics, marketing or modified system could be worked out in business management - who have been consultation with the UPSC and the attracted by the prestige and excitement Department of Personnel, to provide for of a career in intelligence. The CIA specially designed parameters entailing an similarly absorbs the best talent from open, written competitive examination for universities like Harvard, George intelligence services, which prescribes Washington, Princeton, Stanford, specialised papers like current affairs, Columbia and Berkeley. Attracting the international relations, history of modern best talent for Indian intelligence agencies India, nuclear disarmament etc. to be is the most pressing challenge for the followed by initial screening and selection government. Even the FICCI task force by the UPSC. Selected candidates could report on National Security and Terrorism then be sent to a Screening Board recommended the creation of a specialised established for the purpose of direct cadre for national security recruitment into intelligence agencies like management.51In India too, murmurs R&AW, which comprises senior have begun to be heard about the need representatives from the Ministries of for ‘public-private partnership’ in security External Affairs/Ministry of Home Affairs, management. Department of Personnel and the Cabinet Secretariat. A representative of UPSC Ideally, an intelligence agency should be could also be an ex-officio member. These able to pay its personnel well. It should also recruitments could be open to those also be able to ‘hire and fire’ for non- who are already working in the performance, breaking out from the iron government in any capacity and in any cage of bureaucratic rules and safeguards. service, and meet the requisite qualifying Promotions would have to be on fast track, standards for employment with ultimately moving from seniority based intelligence services. Keeping in view the structure to a merit oriented system. functional requirements of the intelligence Flexible pay bands could be considered agencies, it may be mandatory for the and equivalence with peer groups in other candidates applying for a job at any level segments and routine government to have high level of computer proficiency. bureaucracies can be dispensed with52. Possession of language specialisation and However, given the past history of such other technical qualifications could be discretionary recruitment practices in given additional weightage during this India, on balance, it may be better to opt screening. The present practice of for a variant of direct recruitment, through
51 FICCI report ibid 52 Vikram Sood, op cit
47 IDSA Task Force Report
recruiting candidates without these special career progression in most government attributes and then training them into them departments. Intelligence agencies are no is neither satisfactory nor cost-effective, exception. However, in the name of when persons with such skills can be easily operational security, ACRs in intelligence found in the Indian job market. Separate organisations are written in rather general aptitude tests could also be conducted for terms and are cloaked in secrecy. As a the shortlisted group of candidates for result, subjectivity often reigns supreme recruitment to different agencies, factoring and ACRs are often at variance with the in the requirement for the knowledge of actual work done by the operative. There additional Indian language/s, or a is a prescribed system of operational technical qualification in electronics, or evaluation for field operatives, but Information Technology. instances abound wherein these assessments are disregarded or Three things are necessary to attract the downgraded on other considerations. To best brains to intelligence organisations: obviate this flaw, the restriction on writing The belief in the academic world that of self evaluation in totally bland terms has intelligence is merely ‘dirty tricks’ has to to be done away with. Instead, there change. In the US, this has been sought to should be a system whereby the ACRs of be achieved by introducing the practice of mid-level and above officers, should be in intelligence officers going back to teaching two parts – a general comments portion assignments in reputed universities (e.g. and a classified second part that details the Richard Bundi at Harvard, Lincoln actual work done with the comments of Bloomfield at the MIT). In India, hardly the Controlling Officer on the validity or any ex-intelligence professional goes to otherwise of the claims made in this self teach, even as guest lecturer. Second, think evaluation. Gradings awarded should be tanks should be strengthened and communicated. In case of contested promoted. The entire discipline of evaluations, a review board consisting of international studies/international relations three senior officers- either in-house, or in has been developed in the United States case of more senior posts of the level of through think tanks and universities. Joint/Additional/Special Secretary, even Intelligence agencies should start from outside (say the Cabinet Secretary, interacting with them to expand their Foreign Secretary and Home Secretary) capacities,. Thirdly, intelligence agencies could be set up to reduce the impact of should even outsource tasks to think subjective assessments on senior tanks.53 appointments.
ACRS & CAREER PROGRESSION In an effort to counter stagnation at various levels, the concept of ‘in situ Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) promotion’ has recently been introduced, usually are the sole yardstick for assessing with newly specified yardsticks of
53 K. Subrahmanyam, Observations at IDSA Round Table, Aug 06,2010
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evaluation that are however quality of instructors. It is not known to discriminatory when compared to the what extent these recommendations have prevailing norms for promotion in other been implemented. services of Government of India at Though various intelligence agencies equivalent levels. This, coupled with the follow the Department of Personnel & fact that deputation officers often earn Administrative Reforms (DP&AR) norms promotions on the basis of work done by and provide 15 per cent training allowance them in their parent departments in an to instructors, this does not seem to have entirely different environment, has led to attracted more competent persons to join needless heartburn and loss of morale at the faculty and several posts remain fairly senior levels of the intelligence vacant, or filled by persons with average services. This definitely needs to be skills. In many cases these slots in training reviewed to ensure a uniformity of practice establishments have been used to and a balance between merit, objectivity ‘accommodate’ either the ‘inconvenient and performance over a period of time. persons’ or reward the ‘favoured ones’. The healthy convention of assigning senior staff TRAINING - with due weightage given to quality of Personnel selected for intelligence services the selected trainers - for supervising are being inadequately or incorrectly training at various levels has not been trained and are not being sufficiently consistently followed. As a result, piquant groomed in academic and professional situations develop of not being able to find disciplines to successfully accomplish proper replacements on the assigned tasks. The training curriculum superannuation of some seasoned training remains archaic and too police-centric, instructors, or when some of them leave relying on a heavy handed police for other assignments. Moreover, there is approach rather than on human a need to call in professionals - scientists, interaction. Tradecraft practices have not computer software and hardware experts been adapted sufficiently to include - to impart up to date skills in computer modern technological advances in hacking, cyber warfare, etc and to methods of communication for source associate them integrally as nucleus of the running. training faculty with a major say in devising and updating curriculum Some years ago, a special study was content. These experts could be employed conducted by a senior retired Naval on contract basis after preliminary security Officer regarding the training methods vetting, if it is felt that an open door policy being used in the R&AW54. It is not feasible. recommended a wide-ranging overhaul and modernisation/upgrade of equipment, Strategic military intelligence remains one facilities and mechanisms to upgrade the of the important tasks in the charter of
54 Admiral (Retd) Bangara report, Restricted circulation, not available in open domain
49 IDSA Task Force Report
duties of intelligence agencies, yet not from the private sector to impart training enough is being done to impart basic in these languages. Also, it is very knowledge and skills to general duty important that career planning and officers who are given field assignments postings take into account the training for this purpose. They do not know what imparted. Cases abound where language to look for and where. This has led to experts end up doing their field faulty, inadequate and at times, assignments at a place where their misleading intelligence being sent to language skills are wasted! defence services. There could be no justification for The posting of military instructors in the truncating the time schedule for running training institutes becomes crucial in this various training programmes. Yet, this is regard. In the past this requirement was often resorted to in intelligence agencies always met but in recent years there has on the grounds of operational necessity. In been a dearth of staff or adequate numbers the IB, ideally, the training period should of trainers have not been made available. be for about two years and include a This has led to a marked deterioration in compulsory attachment of about six the quality of training imparted and the months with the police set up in the skills generated. Field officers engaged in states.55 One of the suggestions put trans-border military intelligence work forward has been to set-up a common have been found wanting in targeting training centre for all intelligence agencies proper quality assets and in tasking the and to train instructors from the states. This narrow band of HUMINT assets available recommendation has not found much for meeting the needs of intelligence acceptance among experts in the field.56 consumers – the defence services – whose Leadership at the highest level would be needs and tasks keep expanding. required to implement these changes. Language training capabilities too have Once the nation decides that it needs better deteriorated in recent years. General duty intelligence, a case could be made out for field intelligence officers must be familiar an intelligence wing in every major with the language of countries where they economic department of the government. will be posted, or the areas where they may Once we have that and the broad have to work. This is especially essential structure is agreed on, the recruitment, in respect of the major neighbouring training and the management of career countries. Instruction facilities for graphs can be left to the concerned languages like Chinese, Persian, Pashto departments themselves. The main issue; and Arabic need to be upgraded. however is to determine the role and need Instructors themselves have to be for intelligence and then build for the proficient. Intelligence agencies should not future.57 hesitate to utilise the services of experts
55 D. C. Nath, op cit. 56 S. D. Pradhan, IDSA Round Table, Aug 06, 2010 57 K. Subrahmanyam, op cit;
50 Chapter 5
CONTENT OF ANALYSIS & OPERATIONS
Most modern intelligence organisations in reports to the government. Someone with the world make a broad distinction adequate experience has to interpret these between the ‘analysis’ and ‘operations’ reports to the government.” He also functions. Operators collect intelligence referred to an observation made by late while analysts assess its veracity – they Smt Indira Gandhi earlier that intelligence have to weigh and sift the input in the light organisations by themselves “did not see of all other reports. The aim is to give value the wood for the trees.”60 and arrive, if possible, at a prognosis or That has been reason enough for some trend. other experienced and perceptive Analysis intelligence practitioners to suggest that intelligence reform should primarily focus Many breaches of national security have on ‘the improvement of collection, analysis occurred in the past and continue to occur and dissemination of intelligence’ and not today, not for want of intelligence, but focus unduly on other related issues like because of the faulty analysis of available ‘recruitment or cadre management’.61 intelligence and inadequate follow up action thereon, and/or co-ordination of All secret intelligence collection, whether inputs.58 This is not adequately highlighted it is based on HUMINT or TECHINT, in most post mortems of perceived results from the penetration of the intelligence failures surfacing in the media. adversary’s - a neighbouring state or an Responding to the observations made amorphous non-state actor - system. This regarding the Coomar Narain spy case collection is usually done by a variety of and lack of intelligence specific to the means – either through physical presence, Rubaiya Syed kidnapping in 1990, 59 the or if that is not possible for hostile/historical doyen of India’s external intelligence, R. N. factors, through trans-border or third- Kao said, “It is not enough either for the country intelligence collection efforts. IB or the R&AW to send intelligence There is, therefore a flood of inputs from
58 B. Raman, SAAG paper on Intelligence & Counter –Terrorism, dated, 21.04.2004 59 V. Balachandran, “Intelligible Intelligence”, Times of India: 21.09.2000 60 R. N. Kao, D. O. letter dated. 25 September 2000 to Shri V. Balachandran. 61 R. Nagarajan, Special Secretary (Retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Observations sent to IDSA Task Force: July, 2010
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different sources HUMINT or intercepted major causal factors of the event being electronic inputs i.e. TECHINT to the examined and familiarise himself with analysis desks in any intelligence agency. strains of divergent or convergent thinking connected to such a hypothesis. He should Given the information revolution and be able to sort out chronologies or time- Internet communication, open source lines while analysing an incident or while inputs provide more than 90 per cent of assessing prospects. material relevant for any intelligence analysis. Monitoring and collation of One of the methods used for this is to have Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) a ‘decision tree’ for any event – which therefore becomes vitally important. A dissects scenarios, shows causal linkages good analyst can only perform his and identifies problems, factors or function effectively if he can weld together alternatives. After listing all criteria, the inputs from HUMINT & TECHINT with analyst has to, or should assign weightage OSINT without being dishonest to any to likely scenarios and undertake a ‘sanity particular aspect, thus achieving a balance, check’ of the weightage given. The basic which is nearest to the truth. function of analysis – hypothesis testing – involves asking searching questions: who This is a task easier said than done and is the source, what is his access (from requires backbreaking hours of sustained whom is he claiming to get inputs), what diligence, building up one’s background has been his reliability in the past (did it on the subject, searching for grain in the prove correct?) and the overall plausibility chaff, with many mistakes in the course of the report. of learning on the job. Experience, area specialisation and the ability to read There are several proven methods of between the lines count for a great deal in hypothesis testing. These include creating this type of work, particularly in respect a probability tree, comparing utility of end of the sensitive ‘grey areas’ of political or results, ranking options as well as devil’s military related value judgments in respect advocacy or reverse analysis – perceiving of target countries where penetration of a development or outcome not from one’s HUMINT is difficult. Yet the analyst is own perspective, but from that of the expected to come up with an accurate and adversary. timely prognosis of events affecting the It is very important that this analysis and security of nations. assessment is undertaken in an Using modern tools of analysis for sifting independent and unbiased manner, of intelligence inputs becomes very without being affected by the baggage of important. The analyst should be aware pre-conceived ideas, conventional wisdom of the pros and cons of any intelligence or political compulsions of policy makers, hypothesis. He must try to identify the whether these be of the political leadership or the policy making bureaucracy.62
62 Jerome Clauser (2010), “An introduction to Intelligence Research & Analysis” Pentagon Press: Washington DC
52 Content of Analysis & Operations
Training of analysts is therefore very Such assets can be difficult to find and important and these skills and traits, still more difficult to sustain. A lot especially of estimative analysis can only depends on the motivation of such be honed after spending long years on the persons – whether it is monetary job. alone or a combination of monetary and personal or ideological/ Unfortunately, the pressures of the emotional/psychological, which may moment often overwhelm these often constitute various strains in the considerations, especially as more and personality of the asset. A lot also more analysts are made to feel insecure if depends on the nature of rapport that they hold on to any threatening inputs is struck between such assets and a pertaining to terrorist actions by non-state particular Handling Officer. Often, actors that may take place. These pressures such assets become problematic when also lead to intelligence analyses being the handler changes. The handling characterised as suffering from the ‘cry- officer has to be continuously aware wolf syndrome’, if they do not prove to be of and adapt to safety and correct. In sum, the analytical process has surveillance environs, while handling to be action oriented and accountability such assets. The casualty rate of such driven. assets is high. For these reasons, as the task of an analyst ii) The second type of intelligence becomes increasingly complex, most operation can be described as the modern intelligence agencies in the world ‘influence operations’- which involve are now clearly and completely separating cultivation of prominent policy the tasks of intelligence operations and formulators in the target country, or analyses. society, – to influence, change or continue policies that benefit the OPERATIONS home country’s larger or long term Intelligence operations can be broadly strategic or national security interests. divided into three categories: Major decisions with regard to this i) The ‘classical’ intelligence collection second category of intelligence activity which involves locating and operations, particularly in the external then subverting well placed field, are usually not left to the HUMINT in sensitive areas of the individual discretion of any one target subject. Such assets, in external intelligence operative of the agency intelligence, can provide accurate dealing with such issues. Rather, the foreknowledge of that country’s main thrust areas of such initiatives security policies, approaches on vital or tasks are identified collectively at international or bilateral issues quite a high level, with even the impinging on the home country’s own concerned committee of the cabinet national security concerns, data on being kept in the loop, if not with target country’s defence and nuclear regard to the specific nitty-gritty of potential etc, preferably or ideally operational details, then at least in with documentary support.
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general terms about the direction of partly to political compulsions/parameters such efforts. and partly, perhaps, due to a conservative or overly cautious operational mindset. Large sums of money can be involved at this stage and it may sometimes be DRIFT IN OPERATIONAL WORK difficult to quantify results in the short term or have justifiable yardsticks to Operational routine in the above continuously monitor or review categories tends to get caught up in a ‘drift’ progress in the assigned tasks and in in most intelligence agencies across the terms of the objectives achieved, or world. This may be because of HUMINT sought to be achieved. This is also the without having a clear, direct or reliable area where major lacuna can occur, access to the type of information required, requiring mid-term course correction both at the at the grass root level, as also or even a reversal of the operational at senior levels of intelligence. They may policy. While initial policy decisions have had access at one time or been proved may have been authorised initially at right on one or two occasions, but since the highest level, qualitative reviews then, they may have fallen out of either do not take place at those levels circulation in the quarters where they regularly or with sufficient frequency enjoyed access and do not presently have or in the required depth . the same capacity to cater the required information. Yet they are reluctant to iii) Finally, there are ‘liaison operations’ admit this. – which involve relations between intelligence agencies of different Operators in the intelligence community countries, facing common security do not often have the honesty to make problems or want to share intelligence quick course corrections by either on issues like terrorism. These too are acknowledging their reduced access to the usually authorised at the highest level source, and the concomitant reduced of political decision making and are value of the output. They find it difficult carried out by specifically designated to discard such assets and tend to pad up intelligence agencies. flimsy inputs. Their reports then merely serve the purpose of statistically inflating Trans-national intelligence co-operation the output. Another reason for this has three aspects: sharing of intelligence tendency of not discarding sources who are collected independently, making available no longer useful is the convention in the training facilities to each other and joint intelligence community – that of being operations for collection of intelligence able to handle several HUMINT assets through penetration and for neutralising and of not wanting to be seen to have terrorist organisations identified as closed down a HUMINT operation and common enemies.63 It would seem that dropping of an erstwhile useful source. India’s success or progress in the last aspect has apparently been rather limited, due The very nature of field operations makes
63 B. Raman, “Intelligence & Counter Terrorism”, SAAG paper, April 2004
54 Content of Analysis & Operations
it necessary that an operative has the same the information and psy-war operations, background and in-depth knowledge of continue to send cleverly padded reports the subject as an expert on the analysis that analysts at headquarters would like desk. He should, in addition know the to receive, or pass on to their political language of the target area, local customs masters, as coming from impeccably and social mores and have an reliable and highly paid assets. Over time, understanding of the psychology of the this can become a money spinning racket people in target area. Any compromises detectable by seasoned analysts at in this regard make the success of the relatively junior levels, who can at best intelligence collection exercise doubtful. voice their muted suspicions to superiors. The problem gets compounded due to the Again, over the years a convention might inadequate or poor supervision of have developed and persisted – because of intelligence collection efforts on the ground inadequate supervision - that a good by supervisory officers, specifically operator is one who maintains a entrusted with the task of scrutinising the voluminous data bank of sources and quality of the intelligence production higher source expenditure rather than one work. Instead of actively guiding and who concentrates on good quality and less controlling operations, they fail to make a voluminous reporting. Intelligence experts critical assessment of the modalities of generally speak of cases where Handling intelligence collection or take the tough Officers have been found to be not fully though unpopular decisions of discarding committed to improving the quality of unproductive assets and curbing wasteful output and maintaining an unholy nexus expenditure connected with such between them, their useless sources, and operations. perhaps even their supervisory or Some very common examples of the abuse controlling officers. To rid intelligence of operational practices can be cited here. agencies of this malady, the supervision of One is to artfully cloak open source inputs production work needs to be taken a lot (OSINT) from international publications more seriously and with high ethical or local media as source reports based on standards than is, perhaps, presently the non-existent HUMINT assets and claim case within most intelligence agencies in expenses for the reports. Though ease of India. Internet access has reduced time lags Of late another dangerous trend has been which used to benefit such practices, still, underlined in the IB. Because of if the officer in the field station is senior operational requirements, more or ‘better’ and the officer vetting his expenses at the men are often diverted to ‘high-profile’ headquarters desk is a junior, chances are operational tasks to the detriment of the that the former may get away with such hardcore, basic and unglamorous field claims! Some long standing assets who intelligence or counter intelligence (CI) may have done well in the past due to work. CI branches get denuded and the better access at some stage, especially in quality of CI work suffers.64
64 D. C. Nath, “Thoughts on Intelligence Reform”, Paper submitted at IDSA Round Table, Aug 06, 2010
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WHETHER ANALYST OR OPERATOR is the alignment of Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) with the JTAC.65 In their reports The issue of the overlapping or to consumers – Foreign Office, J-TAC or interchanging of roles of intelligence JIC/recently set-up National Security professionals requires careful deliberation. Council, SIS operators send in almost In the past, intelligence agencies followed unprocessed inputs, indicating only a mix of practices wherein the analyst of vaguely from where obtained or today could be the operator of tomorrow commenting in only very general terms or vice-versa. Some agencies in India still about the reliability thereof. Any analysis follow this practice, partly to provide all- value or assessment is left to the specialist round exposure to the intelligence analysts in these specially designated professionals and partly, to alleviate or bodies. balance the arduous grind of analysis with the adrenalin rush of operations. The merits of continuing with this practice however ANALYSTS’ VS. OPERATORS are debatable. Though the functions of both analysis and Today, the CIA in USA has analysts who operation are equally important, in perform what is seen as a specialised practice, the analysts tend to get the rough function. Exposure to the local situation, end of the stick while operators get the for which there can be no substitute, is glitter and perks of the job, which may given in diverse ways – either by include ‘justifiable’ absence from the desk temporary tours of short duration, or during office hours and large expense through long term undercover accounts which cannot be questioned, or assignments. The British MI-6 or SIS has are not generally questioned. As a contrast, also reverted to this model now, by apart from the sustained grind, the present establishing the Joint Terrorism Analysis day analyst has to cope with the Centre (J-TAC) that has a multi- increasingly alarmist nature of source disciplinary outlook and a manpower inputs pertaining to terrorism incidents or deployment profile, wherein analysts have threats, which require immediate to play a more specialised role, separate dissemination, with scant time for proper from operations. The Butler Committee evaluation through established modes of review (2004) in UK after the Iraq WMD analysis. assessment debacle led to the creation of High flyers in the intelligence community the post of Head of Intelligence Analysis - try to avoid this grind and gravitate that has been merged with that of the towards ‘more glamorous’ operational Chairman, JIC since 2007. The JIC is now desks. This also leads to heartburn among supported by a small, specially trained analysts. In the long run though, even team of analysts. Of particular importance among those who project themselves as
65 British Cabinet Office paper on Improving the Central Intelligence Machinery published in Journal of Intelligence & National Security; July 2009
56 Content of Analysis & Operations
‘great operators’, it is possible within the intelligence community to separate the chaff from the grain. As stated earlier, it is difficult for the really good operator to completely ignore the tenets of sound analysis or habits of sound analysis such as extensive area/topical reading to assist in his operational work, especially if he is to elicit substantive output from high value assets. Meaningful intelligence reform in Indian agencies would perforce have to take note of emerging international practices and take a considered or balanced decision on those most suited for Indian conditions.
SOURCE PROTECTION/WELFARE OF RETIRED ASSETS This brings up the related and important issue of what to do with discarded assets or sources that may have become casualties in hostile territory but may re- surface later, after being incarcerated. This is an area where there is a lot of adhocism about how different intelligence organisations in India deal with such assets. This is in sharp contrast with the practice in the West. Both the CIA and SIS/ SS have detailed and prescriptive safeguards for dealing with retiring/retired assets or casualties and their families. Indian establishment also needs to devote more attention to this aspect of intelligence reform.
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Chapter 6
TECHNOLOGY UPGRADE
Intelligence agencies must continuously circumvent this problem would be to upgrade their technical capabilities - be it follow the ‘expression of interest’ method, signal intelligence (SIGINT), under which companies known to be communications intelligence (COMINT- having the required equipment could be interception capability), monitoring, approached to make presentations. This cryptology - in both encryption and could be in two stages – technical and decryption modes- information sharing financial. At the latter stage, a committee mechanisms and creation of databases of could be formed, at an appropriately high security relevant materials which may level, associating the competent and need to be shared for better coordination authorised finance department with other sister agencies (NATGRID). representative to scrutinise and clear the Personnel in intelligence agencies must proposal. Once this ‘fast track’ approach also be skilled in these modern is adopted there should be no scope for technologies. subsequent delays at the processing stage, or at the level of the Internal Financial DELAY IN PROCUREMENT OF Advisers. However, there has to be an adequate appreciation of the need for fast MODERN EQUIPMENT tracking of the purchase of technical Several lacunae in the procurement and equipment without sacrificing the norms deployment of V-SAT equipment have of financial propriety. been detected in the telecommunications sector. Procurement was initially CRYPTOGRAPHY hampered by long procedural delays. It needed to be fast tracked but this has not While encryption capabilities were built always been possible due to established up, not enough attention was paid to government procedures. In-house security requirements. Some systems were financial scrutiny has often been more in claimed to be secure enough but when the nature of a somewhat unhealthy or offered for communication use with needless curiosity to learn about the friendly liaison agencies abroad, were not operational utility or applicability of the found to be secure enough or state of the equipment sought to be purchased, which art. The decryption capacity and technical goes against the ‘need to know’ principle, know how of personnel in intelligence especially as some of the operations are of agencies are in any case extremely limited. a highly sensitive nature. One way to Therefore, there is a need to create in-house
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Research & Development facilities in every agencies, but do not get adequate support agency, as also a centralised or dedicated from those in authority, perhaps due to the training agency for encryption/decryption inadequate appreciation of the special work related to intelligence functions. constraints under which intelligence agencies have to function. Better qualified MANPOWER & TRAINERS recruits can also make a big difference to in house R&D work as well. Direct Finding appropriate trainers for any such recruitment of qualified engineers through institute is also extremely important. The the UPSC could also be considered, short term deputation of specialists/ clubbing the additional requirement of 5 engineers from Ministries/Departments of or 10 posts at equivalent levels to those of Telecommunication, Railways (Signals) or other government departments like Defence (Signals) could be one way to do Telecom. Personnel taken in through this so. Doubts persist within the intelligence process could then be given intensive community about the extent to which training in intelligence work. outsourcing of such tasks to experts – even from reputed institutes of technology etc. Linguistic capability is another vital - would be worthwhile without them really qualification for those in technical cadres. understanding the concepts and They must have more than just a modicum operational contexts of intelligence work. of familiarity with languages/dialects There are successful examples of such spoken in border and bordering areas – specialised or dedicated institutes for such as Urdu, Bengali, Pashto, Persian, intelligence agencies abroad, both in the Chinese, Bodo, Assamese, Naga, West and in the erstwhile Soviet bloc Manipuri, Kuki, Kashmiri, etc. Training in countries. some of these languages could be imparted just after initial recruitment, but the quality Existing in-house capabilities and quality thereof and the expertise acquired by the of manpower are stated to be below par in telecom staff would depend on application most of these fields at present. Manpower as well as learning on the job. Nowadays, upgrades are essential. At present, standards of capability are being technical field officers are recruited at the mandatorily linked to career progression level of non-gazetted employees whose for the telecom recruits, but hazards of pay scales are lower than those of frequent inter-operability due to any ministerial cadres. As a result, even after possible shortages of staff remain. considerable investment of time and money on their technical training, they often seek transfer to other general cadres OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION which offer better opportunities for career (OSINT) progression. One solution for this would Any and all information that can be be to provide fast track promotion avenues derived from overt collection i.e. published to technical staff, so that their careers documents, scientific research reports, could advance within a short time span. documents posted on commercial websites Such proposals are considered during – can be useful inputs for desk analysts in various cadre reviews in the intelligence intelligence agencies. New information
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technologies are today very much part of time intelligence has become an urgent the information revolution. These may requirement. Some groundwork in this include high resolution satellite imagery, regard has already been completed. Once sophisticated search and data-visualisation the system becomes functional, data- systems, and multiple language search mining will become an important tool to and translation tools. Also, this vast data establish correlations between information bank must be accessed swiftly. available from immigration authorities, transport bodies, police stations, Intelligence agencies in India have only intelligence agencies, banks, mobile hesitantly started taking steps to enhance telephone operators etc. The capability of their OSINT capabilities. Partly, this is due intelligence analysts would thus be to mental blocks against the hazards of enhanced, with better prediction potential. hacking or intrusion wherein Internet connectivity has been made available too easily. However, a balance is necessary. CYBER WARFARE Today, every area analyst needs timely The not so uncommon hacking of some of access to all vernacular publications India’s sensitive websites should bring the relevant to the target area as well as any country abreast with the Cyber warfare specialised reports or documents which capabilities of its opponents, particularly may help in analysing the offensive, the Chinese. The threat has the potential defensive or nuclear capabilities of target to multiply manifold if we add to this the countries. A case can be made out for efforts by terrorist and criminal groups to centrally provided Internet connectivity acquire the capability to hack into various but also access to advanced meta search websites to ferret out information, or to engines like Copernic, Profusion, Lexibot, plant misinformation. Existing offensive Ixquick, Dogpile, Metacrawler, Northern and defensive capabilities of various Light, Lexis-Nexis etc. Specialised search agencies need to be enhanced, by keeping engines like International Security abreast with the latest technological Network (ISN), Limited Area Search developments in the connected fields. Engine (LASE), FAS & CIAO (Columbia International Affairs Online)-for nuclear research, could also be considered. Analysts will have to be trained in the proper use of search engines- they must familiarise themselves with techniques like needle in the haystack, treasure hunt, fishing or trawling, save and run as well.
NATGRID Actionable intelligence should be accessible to all law enforcement agencies. Building up a national database of intelligence that allows all agencies to receive crucial real-
60 Chapter 7
ESTABLISHING INDIA’S MILITARY INTELLIGENCE NEEDS AND STRATEGY
The use of intelligence by militaries across intelligence collection, collation and the world is as old as warfare. No military dissemination - both in the military and commander will knowingly or non-military domain. unknowingly risk an operation by leading The importance and relevance of military his rank and file against an enemy, and intelligence in the Indian context has to be into a terrain of which he has little or no examined at five levels. First, the problem knowledge. In any conflict situation, it is of military intelligence is to be analysed in essential for the military commanders to strategic and tactical terms. Second, the continuously collect, collate and evaluate sources of military intelligence have to be all relevant information concerning the identified. Then India’s military intelligence enemy and the terrain, as also the military needs and strategy in their wider context capability and the intent of an adversary have to be established. The fourth point to deal with any a hostile military action. concerns the limitations and hurdles in This applies not only to times of achieving this strategy. And the last point conventional war or conflict, but also is to consider some of the remedial peace-time to deal with myriad sub- measures to improve the management of conventional and non-traditional military military intelligence. threats that a country faces.
India’s security concerns are accentuated THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY both by external and internal factors. The INTELLIGENCE external security threats emanate from China and Pakistan, while the internal Over the decades since India attained security threats involve challenges arising independence, there has been a continual from cross-border terrorism, non-state and pressure and change in the intelligence trans-national actors, illegal migration, requirements of the Indian Armed Forces. drug trafficking and organized crime. The general trend has been the broadening These threats are ever mutating and of military intelligence needs in terms of blurring – particularly the collusive China- geographical space for military Pakistan military nexus and the growing commanders-both at the strategic and Naxal challenge in the Indian hinterland. tactical level. This has primarily resulted This demands adoption of superior from the increase in the range and the power of destruction of weapons, and
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secondly from the increase in military could increasingly be carried out by a joint mobility. In addition to this extension of services organisation. the geographical and technological area In this connection, three important aspects of interest, there has been a widening of of the issue are as follows: the range of military engagements in which the army might have legitimate intelligence interests. Clearly, and apart SOURCES: from the basic intelligence required about In peace time, the problems of military the enemy’s whereabouts, intentions, intelligence collection are very different strengths, weapons, state of training and from those during war, but in both cases morale, the requirements are gradually there is likely to be greater reliance on extending the military intelligence needs technical (TECHINT) rather than human to include, political, economic, manpower, intelligence (HUMINT). This trend is research and development, industrial, obvious and will undoubtedly continue in communications and other matters times to come. However the information relating to the potential adversary. This sought will become progressively more extension of the range and breadth of the difficult to obtain, as methods of electronic country’s military intelligence needs today and spectral camouflage and deception even impinges upon or overlaps into the evolve to keep pace with the new ways of domain of foreign policy. In other words, gathering military intelligence. TECHINT there is likely to be increased dependence is inherently more reliable, the intelligence on strategic intelligence in the future. provided is more current and measurable, and there are no problems of ESTABLISHING MILITARY communication. It does without the INTELLIGENCE NEEDS dependence on human resources and to commit them to situations that can be Military intelligence needs are only likely dangerous. With advancements in the field to grow rather than diminish in the future. of electronics, more sophisticated means Not only will they have to cover the of eavesdropping on the plans of extended range of future weapon systems potentially hostile countries will follow and equipment but will also have to cover rapidly. This will entail keeping ahead in the possibility of local conflicts, the field of military specific technical conventional war, as well as terrorism and intelligence methods and devices. Fewer other subversive threats. According to systems will be in active mode, and those Services’ experts, particularly from the active will be so for even briefer periods of Army, at the tactical level, military time, thus making interception and commanders in the field will still need their deception more difficult. own eyes and ears, and perhaps to a greater extent than at present. Thus to This is not to say that HUMINT will lose prevent duplication and simplify the inter- all its relevance in the future. Even in the communication of intelligence between the case of the hunting down of Osama bin- armed forces because of overlapping of the Laden by US commandos, the very intelligence interests; the collation and substantial technical inputs could not have dissemination of strategic intelligence ensured the success of the mission, without
62 Establishing India’s Military Intelligence Needs and Strategy
key and crucial inputs provided by equipment manufacturers, government traditional human sources. The temptation publications and Internet resources. The to totally replace HUMINT resources with open skies policy adopted by several TECHINT will have to be resisted since countries with regard to their continental there are still situations where human and maritime mapping initiatives provides agents can be invaluable. For instance, in mind boggling imagery related data and sub-conventional threats such as rural intelligence (IMINT). insurgencies and Naxalism, quality penetration by human intelligence can be WAR TIME NEEDS: crucial. HUMINT will continue to be a cost In war time or situations of localised effective means of gathering military military conflict, HUMINT will remain intelligence, specifically where technology important, especially for operating behind cannot penetrate or simply cannot decode the enemy lines, identification of enemy the complexity of the intelligence problem. units, troop movement and equipment, There will continue to be a place for and obtaining documents of operational human agents in the overall context where relevance. Most intelligence during selectivity and judgment are required. localised conflicts will come through captured documents, interrogation reports, PEACETIME NEEDS: maps etc. In addition, there will be a wide In peacetime, it is probable that the future range of all weather military sensors and will see further increases in the quantity surveillance equipment that will open up and quality of military intelligence from on the battlefield on outbreak of hostilities. technical sources due improvement in This will enhance the peacetime HUMINT sensor based collection devices; computer and TECHINT capabilities on the based analytical tools and electronic battlefield. In other words, there will dissemination. The security of computer obviously be a requirement for both systems will, however, be the weak link. strategic and tactical intelligence in times This will be true for the adversary as well. of war, regardless of the type and duration. Emissions in the electromagnetic Collation and dissemination of strategic spectrum, open broadcast policy, and as intelligence has increasingly become a tri- sound waves, vibrations and radiations service affair, whose output will percolate sensed or monitored in the active and down to the tactical level through passive mode today are important sources computer based secure communications of technological intelligence. and information management systems. At yet another level, the peace time At yet another level, initial and military intelligence gathering will have to replacement costs of the technical means increasingly rely on open source of collection can be high. Information and information or intelligence (OSINT). This communications systems are required for includes vast OSINT resources in the form analysis and dissemination. All these of international, national and regional systems require highly skilled manpower press, electronic media, defence to design them, to man them, and to periodicals, literature from the original maintain them. Security of these systems
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adds to the technical and operating costs. intelligence gathering and dissemination. Some of these devices are extremely Experience shows that gaps in border vulnerable to direct or indirect attacks. security have exacerbated insurgencies and Even if a fully effective strategic defence have created additional problems like were to prove feasible, the eternal security illegal migration, entry of political asylum dilemma of attack and defence will ensure seekers and the movement of terrorist that means of countering, deceiving or groups. Similarly, sporadic Chinese destroying will necessitate the incursions continue despite the many development and deployment of counter confidence-building measures undertaken. measures. In the west, infiltration by Pakistan- abetted terrorist groups and border The future of counter-intelligence is very violations continues. Surveillance across closely tied to the technical developments and along the borders by utilising in the field of intelligence collection, HUMINT and TECHINT therefore collation and dissemination. Developments becomes important. in technology will play a great role in the acquisition of counter-intelligence information through passive electronic, or INTERNAL SECURITY: optronic devices and active audio In recent times, the menace of left wing surveillance devices. extremism has been characterised as the single biggest internal challenge faced by EVOLVING MILITARY INTELLIGENCE India. At yet another level, the scourge of STRATEGY Pakistan sponsored militancy in Kashmir, which though substantially reduced, is still India occupies a predominant geo- a cause for concern. Maintaining large strategic position in South Asia. Some counter insurgency forces will require analysts argue that, while India’s location appropriate military intelligence structures makes eminent geographic sense, its to generate local information wherever natural boundaries are vulnerable and and whenever military forces are prone to conflict. The country shares land employed. Here Indian armed forces have borders with six countries. Against this to make the painful choice between the backdrop, India’s critical security conventional and sub-conventional challenges and threats that drive military military intelligence needs because of its intelligence needs can be discussed at five future internal security commitments. broad levels:
EXTERNAL SECURITY: BORDER SECURITY: While an all out war with China and The long and porous land borders present Pakistan is somewhat unlikely, given its a significant security challenge. The political costs and dangers, the multiple security agencies deployed along obsolescence of the concept of a limited India’s extensive land borders compound war is not assured. So how India manages the security issue. Issues of uneven its military intelligence needs to operational control and organisational successfully implement a fast paced efficacy over time have led to gaps in
64 Establishing India’s Military Intelligence Needs and Strategy
limited war will be important. It will the future. In this regard, the military require, besides new technologies, intelligence units of the navy and air force, doctrines and concepts of operation, especially their TECHINT resources, can enormous amounts of investment in be expected to play an important role. military intelligence. Another aspect How these responsibilities are to be fulfilled affecting military intelligence planning will by the Coast Guard and the Indian Navy, pertain to the acquisition of nuclear and what should be the mechanism for capabilities in the neighbourhood. It is coordination or division of responsibilities imperative to have a clear appreciation of between them needs to be clearly spelt out. the Chinese and Pakistani nuclear doctrines and their arsenals in order to REGIONAL SECURITY: fashion a sound military strategy and If India aspires to become a power of some capability. consequence, it has to become a net The disruptive potential of technologies provider of regional security in the sub- such as nanotechnology, biotechnology, continental context, and even beyond. This and information technology, if used by our might involve a developed capacity to deal adversaries with malicious intent is also a with natural disasters, threats to or matter of concern. Clearly, the possession overthrow of friendly, legitimate and impact of such technologies by trans- governments, civil strife, illegal migration, national and non-state actors could also organised crime, trans-national terrorism, seriously hamper national security. and occupation of island territories, Effective military security against such blockade of sea routes or channels, and external threats will demand heavy countering the illegal exploitation of the investments and building up both exclusive economic zone. Once the HUMINT and TECHINT resources. military intelligence needs for the foreseeable future are identified, there will MARITIME SECURITY: also be a need to formulate a broad approach to collect, collate and The Indian Ocean Region is critical to the communicate these strategic and tactical country’s security in terms of trade, energy intelligence needs down to the appropriate needs, protection of island territories and levels of military command with clarity. exploitation of the EEZ. This strategically significant oceanic region characterised by The process of collection, collation and narrow navigational channels to its east dissemination of intelligence to meet the and west can be easily interdicted or military’s operational needs brings to fore disrupted. The littoral spread too, is critical the question of the shape and structure of for the smooth flow of oil, raw materials civilian and military intelligence agencies, and trade for several countries. The need their capacity to perform in a rapidly to evolve comprehensive security and altering geo-strategic environment and the intelligence gathering measures for gaps and deficiencies in inter-agency protection of India’s exclusive zone, island coordination. Currently there seems to be territories, deep sea mining zones and an apparent and serious dissatisfaction littorals will assume greater importance in within the military directorates about the
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availability, quality and timeliness of the pertain to the quality and competence of intelligence inputs received from the the military intelligence staff and the premier civilian intelligence agencies of the incentives to perform. country. Their ability to provide military grade or specific strategic and tactical DIA - AN INADEQUATE MANDATE? intelligence of significance is rather limited, and this in turn, drives the much-reported The military intelligence needs of three services in the emerging context can be friction between the “collector” and “consumer” of intelligence. Though some stratified at three levels namely: the broad security or operating scenarios for the remedial measures have been taken in recent years, there still remains a military in the foreseeable future; the intelligence tools required to meet the considerable disconnect between the civilian and military intelligence agencies intelligence challenge and the efficacious intelligence production. The following Besides, there also remain several structural and systemic deficiencies within tabulation attempts to contextualise the broad strategy for fulfilling the military the military intelligence directorates and units of the three services. These primarily intelligence needs of the future:
STRATEGISING MILITARY INTELLIGENCE NEEDS
Military Central DIA MI Remarks Scenario (s) Agencies
Border POLINT TECHINT HUMINT * refers to the technical TECHINT HUMINT TACINT* resources organic to each OSINT IMINT military service.
Internal POLINT TECHINT HUMINT POLINT and HUMINT TECHINT IMINT TACINT* will be the principal OSINT drivers.
External POLINT TECHINT HUMINT POLINT, TECHINT and TECHINT HUMINT TACINT* IMINT will be the OSINT IMINT principal drivers. OSINT
Maritime POLINT TECHINT TECHINT HUMINT shall play a OSINT IMINT IMINT limited role. OSINT HUMINT
Regional POLINT TECHINT - POLINT and IMINT will interventions TECHINT IMINT be the principal drivers. OSINT OSINT
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The above analysis highlights two how and capacity has been the bane of the important issues. First, the focus of military intelligence community. Most importantly, intelligence collection and collation, due to the external intelligence system is focussed the nature of military engagements in the more on political content, and less on future, will have to gradually shift from military intelligence aspects. On the other the service specific military intelligence hand, the military intelligence functions directorates to the Defence Intelligence are confined to the services but have little Agency (DIA). There is some evidence that authority to operate beyond tactical such a shift is already taking place but horizons. This lack of coordination greater organisational clarity is required contributed to three gravest intelligence regarding the division of work between failures in independent India: the 1962 war these agencies. Secondly, the increased with China, the ill-conceived intervention involvement of the three military services in Sri Lanka, and the limited Pakistani in benign but non-traditional and trans- incursion in the Kargil sector. There is yet continental roles will require that specific another important inter-organisational aspects of external military and strategic problem - that of mutual distrust between intelligence resources be either accessible the civilian and military intelligence or directly placed under the charge of the agencies. The civilian intelligence agencies DIA and the military intelligence seldom take the military intelligence directorates. For instance, military agencies seriously. Consequently, there is interventions overseas in the form of no forum for military intelligence to peacekeeping missions, disaster relief etc present its assessments to the highest would demand more than the routine authority except when crises are technical or tactical intelligence. In this imminent. By which time, the damage context, the collection and collation of may have already been done. Though localised POLINT might become equally there have been significant attempts to important for the armed forces in the address this problem post the 26/11 designated area of operations. Mumbai terror attacks, the intelligence flow is predominantly one way. The LIMITATIONS AND HURDLES military makes an intelligence demand, and the intelligence agencies often supply Rigidity has been the hallmark of India’s it without duly confirming its relevance intelligence agencies – both civilian and and validity in the given operational military. This is the absolute antithesis of context. Although the civilian agencies the desired core competence of purport to supply strategic intelligence, “imagination” and “unconventional-ism” the inputs delivered seldom fit the bill or in the field of intelligence. In India, the are merely operational in nature. evolution of the intelligence agencies has Therefore, many military experts feel that suffered particularly because of the lack the military too needs to invest in strategic of cross-cultural talent or cross-pollination intelligence gathering, collation and among civilian intelligence agencies. This analysis so as to arrive at a correct is partly reflected also within the military estimation of enemy’s intent and capacity. intelligence community. The inadequacy There, however, is no attempt to explain of field footprints and technological know-
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how this military intelligence structure agencies, given the domain expertise of the would avoid the pitfalls bedevilling its former. In the foreseeable future, pursuit civilian counterpart. Or, why military of out of area contingency tasks by the intelligence is equally at sea in providing military might require the placing of select hard and actionable inputs in disturbed HUMINT resources at the disposal of the areas, such as J&K and the Northeast, etc. DIA to acquire strategic intelligence.
While the shortcomings discussed above l Capacity: In terms of capacity, the DIA pertain to both civilian and military and the military intelligence intelligence agencies, the following section directorates suffer from several specifically examines the limitations and qualitative and quantitative hurdles that hamper the military’s deficiencies. The recruitment, training, intelligence needs and strategy at the three and calibre of the intelligence staff, levels of structure; capability and ranging from officer down to the non- coordination. commissioned levels requires a serious re-think in terms of their technical l Structure: The establishment of the qualifications. A military intelligence DIA under HQ Integrated Defence operative today needs to have a fine Staff set the pace for integration of balance of qualities that span military intelligence needs of the three geographical, political, economic, services. While the DIA is gradually cultural, sociological, and technical emerging as the nodal intelligence knowledge to perform the assigned coordination agency among the strategic and tactical intelligence tasks. military services, the primacy of service specific military intelligence Language skills, area and technical directorates still holds. With the expertise will be an important qualification SIGINT, HUMINT (Defence Attaches for military intelligence staff in the future. only) and IMINT resources now placed The knowledge of advanced information under the DIA, the collection, collation and communication systems will be and dissemination of these aspects of equally important to handle military military intelligence has been partly intelligence related collection, collation centralised. A major part of HUMINT and dissemination tasks. Data mining in and counter-intelligence resources on the open source Internet domains (OSINT) the other hand remain with the will be an added requirement for military military intelligence directorates of the intelligence practitioners and analysts in three services. the future.
There might be a case to allocate a larger l Coordination: There are several gaps role and resource to the DIA in the context and deficiencies in inter-agency of CYBERINT and HUMINT related coordination that need to be operations. Today, cyber based capabilities addressed. These are essentially at two in the neighbourhood have discernable levels - inter-service and inter-agency. military components. Therefore, this aspect Among the services, the three military might need the specific indulgence of the intelligence directorates of the Army, military vis-à-vis civilian intelligence Navy and Air Force still act as the
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principal field or tactical intelligence not suitably equipped with strategic collection agencies (barring SIGINT intelligence resources. and IMINT- handled by DIA). It is apparent that the military today seeks Furthermore, these military an enhancement in its capability to intelligence directorates differ in size, generate strategic (only requisite) and role and structure, and are extremely tactical intelligence required to meet the stove-piped – even when it comes to myriad security challenges and threats of sharing information between the future. Given the intelligence mandate, themselves. Though the establishment resources and capacities at its disposal, the of DIA has facilitated the exchange of Indian Armed Forces feel constrained in information among the three services, terms of military planning and future the problem of inter-service development. Specifically, they seek a coordination still persists. A more share in external military intelligence critical problem is that of the inter- (strategic) resources, both in terms of agency coordination -between the HUMINT and TECHINT. DIA, IB and R&AW. Turf issues invariably crop up and have a While HUMINT needs can be separately tendency to turn prickly. As of now the explicated, the importance of military basic differences essentially stem from specific IMINT and CYBERINT resources two issues: recognising or accepting (as subsets of TECHINT) have a greater the Army’s role and resources in relevance for tactical intelligence. Imagery collecting and generating strategic and cyber technologies greatly influence intelligence; and the precise status of military planning and execution on a the DIA and the three MI Directorates modern day battlefield, and hence the in the hierarchy of other national operational necessity of launching defence intelligence agencies. Till these issues satellites. are resolved, the inter-agency It might be prudent to draw a lesson from coordination dilemmas will persist. the United States in this regard, where the Militaries of today are far different three technical agencies namely the from those of yester years in terms of National Security Agency (NSA), the their fighting capabilities, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), organisational capacity and strategic and the National Geospatial-Intelligence reach. For instance, an aircraft carrier Agency (NGA) are the important technical tasked to undertake a relief mission in intelligence gathering components under response to a catastrophic natural the Department of Defence. The disaster several hundred miles away Intelligence Reforms and Terrorism cannot be expected to operate without Prevention Act promulgated post 9/11 in dedicated strategic intelligence 2004 was consciously retained by the DoD resources. Similarly, an army’s field despite several reservations expressed by formations deployed on peace keeping the office of the Director of Central mission or in conflict stabilisation Intelligence (now DNI) and other operations far away cannot be intelligence organisations. expected to perform effectively if it is
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REMEDIAL MEASURES so that they have tended to become both the “producers” and “policy Remedial measures can be taken with makers” of intelligence. Over-reliance regard to role, structure, capacity, culture for intelligence needs even at the and accountability. tactical level on civilian intelligence l Role: Security itself is seen in an all agencies compounds the problem. encompassing national construct with Consequently the ability of the armed political, social, cultural, economic and forces to formulate military strategy territorial dimensions; intelligence and generate options in times of crises gathering too needs to be seen as a is constrained. Military intelligence construct of “national security therefore needs to be vested with intelligence” rather than as two distinct requisite capability and authority to domains of “strategic” and “tactical” generate military grade strategic and intelligence. The role and charter of tactical intelligence. civilian and military intelligence l Capacity: security intelligence needs agencies must undergo a are simply too vast to be met by any corresponding change. National single agency. However, new security intelligence is eventually to be technologies and practices have made seen as the accumulation of this task easier. Today a wide range of complementing information (i.e. intelligence gathering tools ranging emanating from various sources), from HUMINT, to OSINT, to several process (i.e. intelligence cycle), missions forms of TECHINT such as SIGINT, or tasks (collection and collation, or COMINT, ELINT, MASINT and analysis and dissemination, and/or IMINT are available. The sheer volume counter-intelligence) and of TECHINT compared to HUMINT organizations (comprising R&AW, IB, poses a problem. The ability, or NTRO, DIA, MI etc). The context of inability, of the intelligence agencies to military intelligence needs and process these large volumes of strategy will have to be defined in the information raises the question of context of “national security capacity and competence. Clearly this intelligence”, no more or no less. is lacking because of uneven division l Structure: The structural imbalance of intelligence work, particularly the between intelligence agencies is at inadequacies in the handling of present rather acute. Given the role of external military intelligence by the the armed forces in guaranteeing civilian intelligence agencies. Besides, security against internal and external what was deemed as strategic security threats, the significance intelligence a few years ago is relevant attached to military intelligence in the today for planning intelligence at the national context is rather low. Civilian tactical level as well. This implies that intelligence agencies, over time, may a substantial amount of strategic have managed to monopolise the intelligence related resources and business of intelligence gathering, processes can be transferred to the collation and dissemination, so much military. A capacity related issue that
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assumes significant importance in the specialised tenures for the officers so military context is the allocation of deputed - at the request of the intelligence advanced IMINT and CYBERINT services - it was felt that these officers were technologies. The sooner this need is being lost to the parent defence addressed the better. However, a organisation, both in terms of the parent related issue that will have to be arm professional expertise and intelligence resolved concerns the inter-relation specialisation. If there was a regular between the NTRO and the MI’s turnover of officers from the services to the various wings and the overlaps and intelligence agencies, this problem could redundancies. have been obviated. However, the requirement or aspiration for foreign l Institutional culture/ recruitment, assignments under intelligence deputation policies: The need organisational cover, to which the deputed for close coordination among defence officer could justifiably aspire, intelligence agencies cannot be stressed with concomitant financial benefits, enough. The oft repeated “need to interfered with his career advancement in know” dictum of intelligence perhaps the parent service. now needs to give way to the “need to share” principle. This alone can foster Defence officers even now voice the view better cooperation. Collectively – that the deputed personnel should get attending training courses of adequate opportunities for assignments professional interest could pave the abroad. They have been given such way for institutional bonding and opportunities within the external camaraderie. intelligence organisation, though not in a consistent manner. For instance, some Defence services need to take due care times the defence officers have been while selecting and posting candidates on deputed to a domestic trans-border field deputation to civilian intelligence agencies. stint in the intelligence set up, which they This aspect has significantly suffered in have been reluctant to take on, for family recent years and needs to be righted by constraints and also the comparative lack the personnel directorates of the three of creature comforts and the anonymity services. The civilian intelligence agencies that such postings entail. too on their part must be willing to accept military intelligence personnel with proper The policy of the regular inflow and equivalence of rank and seniority. In the outflow of defence officers in intelligence old days, deputation and the posting of agencies deserves a close and urgent re- officers from the defence forces to look, especially if strategic intelligence intelligence agencies used to be much needs have to be met by the external simpler and an easy flow of traffic was intelligence organisation. The problem of maintained. Most of the officers so selected equivalence of rank needs to be tackled were from the military intelligence stream head on. Military experts feel that if an and had field exposure, experience in Army Colonel or Brigadier, or officers from trans-border intelligence collection work, the Navy and the Air Force of similar at least relating to tactical intelligence. seniority is reluctant, or deem it a Over time, however, due partly to long or humiliation to join the intelligence set up
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as Under Secretary/Deputy Secretaries/ ‘son-of-the-soil’ colleagues. Directors, where even promotee field Surely, imaginative policies could be officers directly recruited from the Grade framed to ameliorate promotion ‘B’ intelligence cadre are serving as bottlenecks and overcome rigid structures Directors, then there is a justifiable case to and mindsets. ensure a flexibility in the ranking and the perquisites offered to the particular deputationist. This argument shuts the eye DNI – A POLITICAL APPOINTEE? to the fact that the criterion for career A sizeable section of young and middle progression in the armed forces and the level serving officers in the defence forces civilian intelligence agencies are different have begun to believe that the answer may and equating oranges with apples is not lie in simply empowering the DIA to going to solve the problem. It is also argued deploy suitable resources for analysing that perhaps a fixed initial tenure of four foreign military developments - years could be agreed upon for defence particularly in China and Pakistan. They service officers going on deputation to a believe external, strategic military civilian intelligence agency, within which intelligence has to be brought under the time frame a very deserving or especially charter of the DIA. Concomitantly, some proficient officer could even be given a of them even espouse a rather radical view foreign assignment. Obviously, this that civilian and military intelligence argument also does not go into, or agencies need to be placed under a Director considers the nitty-gritty of the process of National Intelligence (DNI), who would through which a person could be getting be fully aware of security matters, have selected for a foreign assignment and first hand and in depth knowledge of considers such assignments to be one of security issues and an articulate political the ‘advantages’ of service and an integral person rather than an intelligence part of the service conditions of services professional to avoid the ‘stove-piping’ of officers’ deputation to a civilian intelligence intelligence inputs to decision makers at agency. the highest level. However, such a Perhaps, a better alternative could be the viewpoint may be somewhat radical or reversion of a defence service officer to his even flawed. Just because intelligence parent service as per prior commitment, agencies may not be performing their job with the proviso that an officer with well enough – as regards military or intelligence expertise could return to the external strategic intelligence – is not a organisation at a later date, after picking sufficient reason to so empower the DIA, up his rank and performing the required or create an entire intelligence collection professional stint within his service. edifice under the services headquarters, However, this could seem like the which may then be in danger of becoming ‘Permanent Secondment’ policy for police a colossal behemoth without adequate officers to central intelligence services, expertise. Let us take the example of which is creating more problems than Pakistan. Has the creation of the offering solutions, by way of inter-se mammoth Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) seniority, promotions etc, vis-à-vis their by emasculating civilian intelligence
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agencies ensured that Pakistan has effective intelligence to deal with its internal security problems? Has it managed to penetrate and influence the Tehriq-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) till date? The ISI used its powers and reach to create various jihadi networks as an extension of its military policies and doctrines of fomenting trouble in Afghanistan and India. The jihadi networks willingly cooperated with it at that point of time, making the ISI gloat over its successes. However, when the goals shifted, ISI is all at sea in dealing with either these groups or their plans. Whatever reform is undertaken in this regard would have to be carefully thought out after a careful weighing of all options.
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Chapter 8
EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE – RELATIONS WITH MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
When modern states were in their infancy, receiving state, and reporting thereon to their foreign policies were often an the government of the sending state”. amalgam of diplomacy, espionage and After the 1815 Vienna Treaty proscription, covert action. Only gradually did the intelligence services had to become more boundaries and distinctions between the professional and the differences between two emerge, but the links between them intelligence and diplomacy in terms of remained crucial. norms, objectives, means and methods The 1815 Treaty of Vienna codified some gradually crystallised.67 Intelligence guidelines in this regard; terming any services realised they had to obtain interference in the internal affairs of information, but in their own particular another country to be unwarranted, and way. Intelligence had to focus on what was condemning espionage. In 1876, Etienne either inaccessible or accessible only with de Condillac in his Dictionnaire des difficulty to the diplomat. This could Synonymes defined an Ambassador as, “ extend to the hidden face of powers and a man sent to a court, first to represent his people, concealed intentions and the country with pomp and splendour, then anticipation of threats before they to deal with problems should they arise, materialised. Intelligence thus has to cover and third, to give an account of what he the full gamut of security issues in the observes…” Other rules and customs were modern world- terrorism, proliferation, codified at the 1961 Vienna Convention on trafficking, trans-national crime etc. Diplomatic Relations.66 It is acknowledged One of the fundamental distinctions -now that a diplomat’s job includes commonly accepted- is that although both “ascertaining by all lawful means deal with international affairs, they do not conditions and developments within the
66 Pascal Teixeira, Director of Strategy, DGSE, France, “Diplomacy & Intelligence: Mondes”, Journal of the French Foreign Office, Winter 2010; pp122 67 John D. Stempel, “Intelligence, Covert Action and Ethics: Oxymoron or Necessity”, ISA Conference, March, 2008
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have access to the same type of Cooperation between the Foreign Service information. They acquire information and external intelligence, which is vital and through different means. This difference essential, can be examined from a four in operating methods often leads to point perspective: irritation and raises suspicions about each i) Information: the role of intelligence in other’s activities. Diplomats often do not understanding and anticipating take kindly to covert activities, fearing that problems; these may adversely damage their countries’ relations with important allies or ii) Action: intelligence in support of enemies. Intelligence officers on the other diplomatic activity; hand believe that diplomats are iii) Protection: intelligence that ensures sometimes too diffident or nervous about the security of diplomats and citizens; taking steps that could benefit a nation’s security and vital national interests. iv) Influence: intelligence in public, bilateral and multi-lateral The 1961 Vienna Convention highlights diplomacy;69 that diplomacy is a matter of representation, negotiation and An intelligence service’s areas of interest development of bilateral relations. These and activity naturally overlap the are not intelligence tasks. However, in geographical and thematic territory order to negotiate successfully, diplomats covered by the Foreign Service. In order may need to anticipate the strategies and not to tread on each other’s toes and intentions of the other parties, and maximize complementarities, some intelligence may help them to do this measures may be needed to be taken. better. Intelligence serves not only First, at a strategic level, both must identify diplomacy but also the military and the areas where intelligence is required. national policy makers in the context of Most countries nowadays specify or codify internal security these tasks at a fairly high level - in the national intelligence council or in a core “Intelligence diplomacy” also exists in the committee consisting of the National form of liaison between intelligence Security Adviser, Foreign Secretary and services of friendly, or sometimes, even not other co-opted special dignitaries/officials. so friendly countries. These relations are Some states formulate their national part of a wider set of bilateral relations intelligence plan annually. which usually the foreign ministries of both the liaising countries are aware of and Within this framework, the demands of may themselves have initiated or diplomats and others have to be matched sanctioned.68 with supply from intelligence services.
68 Teixeira, Op cit. 69 Teixeira, op cit.
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These needs have to be identified, updated nation’s top policy makers so that no or modified through the constant or conflicts occur at the local level and lines ongoing mechanism of dialogue. These of communication do not get crossed. The needs could range from the macro to the intelligence service operatives in the field micro: the security situation in a conflict must know how far they can or should zone; the threat of terrorism in general or pursue this type of contact and the element in any particular country or part of it; of risk it entails- both for the service and identifying the decision making channels the country’s diplomats. In some cases, or centres within the country; the actors secret communication channels can involved in destabilising activities; as also successfully lay the groundwork for issues like the personality traits of diplomacy, once the conditions are right important foreign dignitaries; their for diplomats to take over. integrity profiles, foibles or weaknesses, In the related sphere of nuclear which could be exploited; intentions of a proliferation, the intelligence community’s protagonist at any given moment in time nuanced understanding of the different and factors which could influence or actors in the host nation’s proliferation change these attitudes etc. Diplomats can programme and operating methods could and should call for data from intelligence prove useful, not only for formulating units on historical aspects i.e. to find old policy on sanctions etc., but also to reduce or forgotten connections between actors or prevent illicit activities. Recently, Iran’s and events. Intelligence services have the covert nuclear facility at Qom was detected advantage of long memories. Feedback by an intelligence operative. Diplomats from diplomats on the inputs being then alerted their national policy makers supplied by the intelligence service is and partner countries. Information was crucial and must be given freely and in a shared both through diplomatic and constructive rather than in an overly intelligence channels. critical manner. In the fight against terrorism, a Intelligence is essential but its purpose comprehensive diplomatic strategy should must be to inform action. It has a broader include a security dialogue with the range of applications in the context of affected countries. The capacity of the modern day threats. For instance, diplomatic establishment to design and intelligence could open up channels of implement such strategies would depend communication with non-state actors, with on their analysis of crucial intelligence whom it might be difficult for diplomats inputs relating to the attitudes of local to associate officially. At any time, it may actors, terrorist groups, the fringe elements be useful for foreign policy decision in the community with pro-terrorist makers not only to know what is really sympathies and the likely response of the going on in a semi-clandestine politico- political and security authorities of the host military movement, but also to be able to country. communicate with the movement discreetly, if necessary. Of course, the During important negotiations with the parameters of who should be doing what, host country, diplomats need to get timely have to be very clearly laid down by the information about the intentions and the
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attitude and/or flexibility of the personnel of diplomatic legations. negotiating parties and here too Intelligence officials can, and do play a intelligence must provide the inputs that part, in tackling crisis situations. the diplomat cannot legally obtain for Influence control has become a himself. Sometimes, this interaction may fundamental aspect of diplomacy. raise issues of responsibility- whereas Intelligence services can be called upon to diplomats must constantly explain or detect disinformation and manipulation in justify themselves, intelligence operatives the host country’s media. At a more are not obliged to do so even when conventional level, they do participate in mistakes are made, as they do not carry bilateral influence diplomacy, which may the burden of decision making. It is not partially be conducted through liaison their duty to build up political support for channels. any policy that is being determined. In fact, good intelligence should highlight the costs Despite these philosophical or theoretical and dangers implicit in such policy.70 foundations postulating constructive cooperation and inter-dependence Intelligence can continue to contribute between diplomats and intelligence only if diplomats absorb or understand the officers in a legation abroad, what should pitfalls and limitations of operations. be a symbiotic relationship degenerates Otherwise, intelligence operatives may into estrangement and several practical tend to remain silent, in order to protect issues make the relationship abrasive, their sources and operating methods. leading to erosion of trust. Secondly, in many cases, time is of the essence. Intelligence delayed may become Despite their efforts to adapt and change, intelligence wasted. The long term focus most foreign intelligence agencies continue of national policy objectives or interests to follow the World War II model. They may have to give way to the short term were meant for supplementing their necessities of crisis management. foreign offices, and were to adopt a similar culture and outlook, for undertaking Diplomatic services remain exposed to intrusive and at times coercive diplomacy. espionage by host country’s agencies. They succeeded to a greater or lesser Some of these threats are not new but extent, depending on how well the terrorism against diplomatic agents has operational, protocol or other related emerged as a new feature. Here too, constraints could be managed. They intelligence services play a vital role – to operated largely out of the safe sanctuary prevent and to provide assessments of of their embassies, using the conventional such threats, or those that are likely to tools of intelligence such as cut outs, drop develop in the country of assignment. boxes (DLBs) and ‘cover’ meetings. Intelligence can raise timely alarms about Liaison contacts and TECHINT also imminent threats to premises and
70 Robert Jervis (2010), “Why Intelligence & Policymakers clash, Political Science Quarterly, summer, Vol. 125(2), pp. 187-196
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helped. All this may have changed with intelligence official to enable him to come the onset of terrorism and globalisation, in contact with the largest cross-section of whereby the origins of security or strategic diasporas, as also potentially suspect visa threats have moved away from the aspirants. Yet, where the pressure of visa domain of normal diplomatic life.71 applicants is heavy, there is scope for misuse of these powers. THE COVER JOB Sometimes, misunderstandings occur The first point of potential conflict lies in because most HoMs want to retain some what sort of cover job is assigned to the discretion in the grant of visas. It is the duty intelligence official in a mission. It is only of the intelligence officer handling visa fair and reasonable for the intelligence work to point out the proscriptions in the official deployed to a mission to expect to visa manual that forbid such be given facilities commensurate with his authorisations. A balance needs to be rank and position in the mission. struck between discretionary powers and Sometimes this is not done or equivalence rules. In fact, with the advent of terror issues are deliberately ignored. This can related threats, it may be wiser to stick to lead to bad blood. Proper conditions have the letter of the restrictive provisions and to be provided to maintain the cover of the patiently wait out the procedural delays intelligence official, particularly in hostile and let the safeguards of the verification conditions and this should clearly be the process take their course. The practice now responsibility of the Head of the Mission being followed in US missions abroad (HoM). needs to be studied and may be, emulated. For example, the Homeland Security unit Diplomatic cover limits access to real in the mission has absolute primacy in the targets. A heavy load of cover work could processing of visas and the discretion of also be a constraint. Long time cultivation the HoM is reduced to a minimum. of assets, especially high value assets, can be hindered because they sometimes resent being ‘handed over’. For gathering INTEGRITY economic intelligence, it may be essential The personal integrity of all intelligence to access likely sources in financial centres, staff assigned to visa duties is very multinational corporate offices and important and the head of station has to technology centres apart from the lead by example. Otherwise, mission government which diplomatic cover may diplomats are very easily convinced, by not always be able to facilitate. junior mission staff, about the nefarious intentions of the intelligence official in VISA WORK question. When allegations of this nature surface, instead of summarily making It has been customary to assign consular changes in the cover job; HoMs should duties such as visa/passport work to the
71 V. Balachandran, ‘Note of Non-Official Cover’ – recorded 12.01.2011 for IDSA Task Force
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give the officer in charge of the visa division can be offset by clarifying that the a chance to correct the lacuna or the authority of diplomats will not be perception of wrong doing. undermined. Intelligence officers in legations abroad have very clear OTHER COVER instructions to share all crucial matters relating to national interest and the The information and education desks in security of the missions and its personnel missions also make for useful cover fully and promptly with the HoM. The assignments, especially in countries from only reservation is against disclosure of the where students come to India. When the assets or intelligence sources from whom intelligence complement in any mission is inputs are obtained and details of the large, it may be possible to spread them methodology of operations. Most Heads across all such wings of the mission. of Mission are considerate enough not to Dissatisfaction arising from cover jobs not press for such disclosures, especially if being efficiently performed is often a there are no issues regarding the reason for friction between the regular intelligence officer’s probity and conduct diplomat and the intelligence official. The in cover duties. excuse given by intelligence officials is that Nevertheless, misunderstandings do occur the heavy workload of a cover job leaves and sometimes erupt into major scandals, little time for real intelligence work, which with consequences deleterious to both – may require very different type of legwork. the diplomats as well as the intelligence However, it has also been seen, that in the services. long run, an intelligence officer is more successful where he first earns the respect of his peers in the diplomatic mission by LIAISON RELATED virtue of the efficient discharge of cover MISUNDERSTANDINGS duties. Here again, a balance needs to be Heads of Mission are sometimes suspicious struck. A proper appreciation of the about the substantive aspects of onerous nature of the intelligence officer’s intelligence sharing or about the comings real work and making due allowances and goings of mission officers. They are instead of insisting on too literal a very much within their rights to expect to discharge of routine cover duties can be kept generally informed about the drift reduce mutual distrust, which is often an of the liaison relationship and the day-to- inherent part of intra-service hostility. day movements of mission officials or deployments within the host country INDEPENDENCE IN CONDUCT & made at the direction of the HQ. But such MANNER OF REPORTING problems can be resolved with a little tact on the part of the intelligence officer on Sometimes HoMs and other senior the spot. Again, experience shows that if diplomats take umbrage over the the initial relationship has been comparative independence and access to harmonious, usually through respect separate channels of reporting enjoyed by earned by good cover performance, not the intelligence officer. Such reservations much difficulty is faced in this regard.
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PLAYING INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES situation. It may be better to take on the AGAINST EACH OTHER task and later explain the reluctance to do so to the HoM. Sometimes problems can occur because of the scope to play officers of different Misunderstandings also occur due to a intelligence agencies deployed in the perception that the HoM has to shoulder mission, against one another. Because of the blame if anything goes wrong in covert the threat from terrorism and need to operations, authorised or seen to be deploy specialised personnel for mission authorised by the political executive back security and protection duties, such officers home. This justifies the demand, especially are posted together. Though their duties in neighbouring countries, that the and approaches are different, their Ambassadors must be kept broadly in the professional training is similar and in intelligence loop at the mission level and larger legations, or in places where there has some sort of say in what goes on in is a large diaspora, Heads of Mission find various operations, even if he is kept in the it convenient to use these intelligence dark about the exact details of source officers for mission related tasks. This can running. be because of better personal chemistry or psychological pre-disposition. INSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS Officers from some agencies sometimes A mechanism that usually works well is harbour grandiose ideas about their own that a HoM on a visit to homeland superiority or their expanded scope of headquarters or a HoM designate calls on duties. They may be insecure or report the the chiefs of intelligence services. During external intelligence official for making such meetings, problems that are either unwarranted contacts with foreigners, endemic or location/person specific can be who may be potential targets. They can discussed and sorted out in a spirit of play up these traits if supported by mission camaraderie. diplomats. In such cases the external In hostile stations, a supportive HoM can intelligence service official can overcome be extremely useful in tackling sensitive such obstacles by displaying resoluteness operational initiatives though contrary of character, unimpeachable integrity and views exist within the intelligence a dogged dedication to the tasks at hand. community, especially among senior level He should refrain from falling into the trap supervisory intelligence officers, who have of one-upmanship or petty squabbling served only in cushy locations abroad, Perceived cowardice during crisis about the extent to which the operational situations in difficult/hostile stations can methodology can be shared. Nowadays, queer the pitch for intelligence officers in hard and fast rules can be laid down in the eyes of the HoM or the deputy chief of this regard as intrusive practices have legation. Sometimes the intelligence officer developed even at headquarters, where can be directed to take on ticklish joint high level scrutiny has become the responsibilities, which may needlessly norm rather than the exception, before blow his cover, and he deliberately avoids granting approval for any influence taking on such tasks. This can be a difficult operation abroad. The recent practice has
80 External Intelligence – Relations with Ministry of External Affairs
been to associate the HoM in such to them in the intelligence agency, decisions. The implementation is left to the especially in terms of sensitive operational intelligence official on the spot but the work. Such problems could easily be HoM remains broadly aware of the sorted out if there is proper synergy progress in such operations. This system between the two organisations in general usually works well enough. and the respective heads of service in particular. External intelligence service Other mechanisms are also possible. The officers could also benefit from postings in Foreign Secretary and head of external the foreign ministry. intelligence should meet periodically to develop or discuss joint plans of action for In the perception of some Foreign Service the quarter, half-year or year. Instructions officers, a reform worth considering is to could go out to missions regarding certain place the external intelligence organisation crucial or sensitive projects, where the under the External Affairs Ministry instead HoM should clearly be the overall mission of the Cabinet Secretariat, as this might supervisor, so that there is some order and lead to better coordination similar to that discipline. This could even be done prevailing between the Intelligence Bureau selectively. and the Ministry of Home Affairs. However, career intelligence officers may Cooperation at the cutting edge of area have reservations about the efficacy of desk level, between Joint Secretaries, is such a change. essential. Foreign Service officers do not always have an understanding of the intelligence officers’ role in a mission and CASE FOR NON-INSTITUTIONAL may not take them seriously or even treat COVER (NOC) them as undeserving interlopers. This In the long term, intelligence agencies could change for the better if there is a need to consider the option of deploying mechanism for greater interaction or their personnel for non-diplomatic exposure by posting Foreign Service assignments abroad. This may be possible officers in intelligence organisations for in countries where the Indian diaspora are limited tenures in the domestic circuit. In getting employment opportunities in the the past, there used to be a system of services, high-tech or trade related sectors. posting a fairly senior Foreign Service Such officers themselves can become officer - of Joint or Additional Secretary agents. If successfully placed, they can be level- in the external intelligence agency. deemed more reliable than paid sources. This system has almost fallen into disuse, Such non official cover (NOC) employees partly on account of reluctance of Foreign may need to be recruited through a Service officers to take up this post on separate process, without exposing them alleged grounds of career planning or due to other regular staff. They could even be to the indifferent quality of exposure given placed under cover with business houses.72
72 V. Balachandran, restricted circulation note recorded Aug, 2005, made available on request for IDSA report
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Some of the well-known CIA NOCs have been Air America and its successor Aero Contractors Ltd. In India, efforts were made to experiment with non-NOC- by the setting up of a travel agency or a security agency for operations overseas but these proposals did not get off the ground due to last minute bureaucratic obstacles. Professional training as also language facility would be essential to succeed in such endeavours. This must be undertaken in real earnest and institutional mechanisms to seek out such openings for appropriately qualified intelligence personnel must be created in consultation with federations / chambers of industry and commerce.
82 Chapter 9
INTELLIGENCE CO-ORDINATION
Consequent upon the establishment of the Chiefs of Staff, and heads of intelligence National Security Council (NSC) and its agencies are invited to these meetings on substructures in April 1999 in India, a need basis. reforms were undertaken from May 2001 Discussions in the CCS as well as the Core onwards in pursuance of the Group of Group have tended to centre on security Ministers (GOM) report on “Reforming matters of immediate concern. There is the National Security System” neither the time nor the inclination in these bodies to debate, analyze and develop ROLE OF CCS medium and long-term policy options and Prior to 1999, and indeed right down strategies. Moreover, neither of these to this day, apex level political decisions on bodies is geared to view security security issues are taken in the Cabinet holistically. Their field of vision is restricted Committee on Security (CCS). The CCS, essentially to insurgencies and law and which continues alongside the NSC order, terrorism, foreign policy, defence etc. system, is chaired by the Prime Minister The security aspects of issues like good and currently includes as regular members governance, health, water management, the Ministers for Defence, Home, Finance, environment, technology or even the and External Affairs. Other Ministers are economy are rarely debated in these invited to CCS meetings on a need basis. bodies. Indeed, many issues with security During the NDA government, the Deputy implications are discussed in other Chairman of the Planning Commission committees of the Cabinet such as the attended all CCS meetings as a special Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs invitee. (CCPA) or the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) and as a result their security dimensions often escape CORE GROUP attention. At the bureaucratic level, security issues have traditionally been, and COSC continue to be addressed by the Committee of Secretaries (also called the Issues of inter service coordination, both Core Group). This is presided over by the before and after 1999, have fallen within Cabinet Secretary and has the Home, the domain of the Chiefs of Staff Finance, Defence and Foreign Secretaries Committee (CoSC). The Chairman of this as its members. Other Secretaries, the Committee is the senior most of the three
83 IDSA Task Force Report
serving Chiefs of Staff, with seniority intelligence. The various intelligence being counted from the date of agencies like R&AW, IB, etc have always appointment as Chief of Staff. The furnished their inputs and assessments incumbent also continues to remain the directly to the user agencies/departments head of his Service. as well as to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), and, after 1999, to the The Chairman’s efficacy in bringing about National Security Council Secretariat coordination and offering single point (NSCS). military advice to the government is limited by the fact that he cannot impose his will on his other two colleagues. JIC / NSCS Moreover, most of his time is devoted to Prior to 1999, the JIC was the apex the running of his own Service. It was with intelligence coordinating organization.73 a view to overcoming this lacuna, as well Lacking any primary intelligence as creating greater joint-ness in the Armed collection capability, it was to be provided Forces and administering the strategic with all relevant inputs by the intelligence forces that the GOM report recommended agencies as well as the Ministry of External the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff Affairs and the Ministry of Home Affairs. (CDS) who would act as the head of the In addition, it could call for any input from Chiefs of Staff Committee. His objectivity any department of the government. On and independence were sought to be the basis of these inputs, and discussions ensured by providing that after with all concerned as well as open source completion of his tenure he would not material, the JIC and later, the NSCS return to his Service. Unfortunately, a issued a Monthly Intelligence Review and decision on this recommendation was Strategic Analysis as well as special papers deferred and therefore the Chiefs of Staff on important topics. Committee continues to be headed, as in the past, by one of the Chiefs of Staff in Its charter of duties as detailed in the KRC report and as laid down in 1985 mandated rotation and not by a CDS. the JIC to:
INTELLIGENCE (a).assemble, evaluate and present intelligence from different sources While acquisition of intelligence on pertaining to internal and external developments abroad has been the developments as may have a responsibility of the R&AW, both before bearing on National Security; (b) and after 1999, intelligence pertaining to prepare reports on its own initiative domestic developments has been, and or as required by the Policy continues to be, the responsibility of the Planning Group on National Intelligence Bureau (IB). In addition, each Security or by the Cabinet of the three services has its own intelligence Committee on National Security; wing for collection of defence related
73 Kargil Review Committee Report
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(c) prepare special reports which Dissatisfaction with the prevailing security would help in policy formulation in system, which lacked the mechanism for the Ministry of Home Affairs viewing security holistically and of paying (MHA)/Ministry of Defence focused attention to the entire range of (MOD)/ Ministry of External Affairs security related issues on a continuous (MEA). basis, led the government from the 80’s onwards to experiment with new SYSTEMIC DEFICIENCIES structures to overcome this lacuna. Thus, as cited by Mr K Subrahmanyam in The glaring deficiency in the actual “Shedding Shibboleths”, an inter functioning of this intelligence system was disciplinary group was set up under Prime the lack of any effective direction or control Minister Rajiv Gandhi, interalia over the various intelligence agencies and comprising two key ministers from the an absence of any meaningful Cabinet, Shri Arun Singh, the Cabinet coordination of their activities. They tended Secretary, Chairman CoSC, the two to work in watertight compartments. intelligence chiefs, the Chief Economic There was no institutionalised system for Advisor, Chairman Atomic Energy coordinated action or for information Commission, Director IDSA and sharing. Neither was there any apparent Chairman of the JIC. It served as an and concerted sharing of information informal discussion group for amongst each other. There was also no brainstorming on a variety of security systematic tasking of the agencies or any related issues. It lasted only a year. A focused evaluation of their performance. multidisciplinary policy planning Upgradation of TECHINT was committee was also set up under G. undertaken in a somewhat haphazard Parthasarthy. It too was wound up after fashion and there was little coordination seven or eight meetings. in the acquisition of TECHINT assets. The JIC, as an evaluator and coordinator NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL of intelligence, was marginalised. Its Subsequently in August 1990, the VP product rarely received the attention it Singh Government announced the deserved. It had no political support and establishment of a National Security was not nurtured to play its required role. Council (NSC) along with supporting Accordingly, it had no clout within the structures. This exercise was as short lived system. It is no surprise, therefore, that the and the 1990 model of the NSC never took intelligence collection agencies tended to off. The next government set up a task force bypass the JIC in their keenness to be seen under K.C. Pant in April 1998 to work out as being the first to provide important the constitution, role and functions of a information at the highest level. Such new NSC. bypassing not only resulted in an The prevailing NSC system, influenced in information overload but also in part by the system set up in 1990 and in submission of unprocessed and part by the Pant Committee report, was inadequately assessed intelligence to put in place by the Cabinet Secretariat decision makers.
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Resolution of April 16, 1999, with the Advisory Board (NSAB), the Strategic objective of ensuring a more pro active, Policy Group (SPG), the National Security coordinated and holistic approach to Advisor (NSA) and the National Security security management. Underlining that Council Secretariat (NSCS). national security needed to be viewed “not The NSC, as constituted in 1999, was only in military terms, but also in terms of chaired by the Prime Minister and its internal security, economic security, members included the Home Minister, the technological strength and foreign policy” Defence Minister, the External Affairs the Resolution stated that the Government Minister, the Finance Minister and the recognised that national security Deputy Chairman of the Planning management required “integrated Commission. (Under the UPA thinking and co-ordinated application of Government the NSC was reconstituted the political, military, diplomatic, scientific and omitted the Deputy Chairman of the and technological resources of the State to Planning Commission. This brought the protect and promote national security NSC’s membership in line with that of its goals and objectives.” 1990 predecessor, but diluted somewhat The NSC system was not meant to the holistic flavour that the earlier supplant the existing apex institutional composition of the NSC reflected. mechanisms, like the CCS or the The Cabinet Secretariat Resolution, while Committee of Secretaries, but to provide clearly limiting the NSC to an advisory support to them and to cover the gaps left role gave it an extensive remit in order to unaddressed by them. These gaps arose enable it to address security holistically. from the fact that the existing mechanisms Accordingly, it specifically called upon the were essentially geared only to handling NSC to deal with the following broad areas crisis situations in areas traditionally of interest: associated with security and were unable to bring to bear coordinated action across (a) external security environment and the entire spectrum of national life threat scenario; designed to promote national security. It (b) security threats involving atomic was clearly recognised that efficient energy, space and high technology; management of national security entails not merely the effective handling of crisis (c) trends in the world economy and situations but, perhaps, even more security threats in the areas of energy, importantly their pre-emption. While the foreign trade, food, finance, and former demands coordinated action by ecology; several different departments, agencies (d) internal security, including counter and authorities, the latter requires the insurgency, counter-terrorism and undertaking of threat assessments - short, counter intelligence; medium and long term, identification of contingencies likely to impact the country, (e) patterns of alienation emerging in the and formulation of alternative strategies country, especially those with a social, to counter such contingencies. The NSC communal or regional dimension; system comprises the National Security (f) security threats posed by trans-
86 Intelligence Co-ordination
border crimes such as smuggling and that its establishment enables government traffic in arms, drugs and narcotics; to tap expertise from outside the existing and official set up. (g) co-ordination in intelligence collection The NSAB has been amongst the more and tasking of intelligence agencies so active substructures of the NSC system. as to ensure that intelligence is NSAB members for the first four Boards focused on areas of concern for the were appointed for a one-year term, which nation. was normally extended by another year. On advice from the late NSA, J.N. Dixit, It may be mentioned that, contrary to NSAB members for the fifth Board under what has been made out by some experts, the UPA government were nominated for the NSC’s remit is not limited to only a full two year term ab initio. The NSA medium or long term issues as was the case invariably attends the first and last plenary with its 1990 predecessor, it is free to of the NSAB. At the first plenary he sets address all security related issues, along the agenda for the NSAB. This is the entire time spectrum, including those sometimes increased or modified by him, of immediate import. during the course of the year, depending upon the requirements of government. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORY The NSAB meets in plenary at least once, BOARD (NSAB) and often twice, each month. However, The NSAB which was approved by its sub-groups meet much oftener in order Government in December 1998, comprises to develop papers on subjects allocated to a Convenor and other persons of eminence them by the Board. outside government “with expertise in the The NSCS quite deliberately has been fields of foreign affairs, external security, given no role in the development of NSAB defence and armed forces, strategic studies, apart from providing purely analysis, economics, science and secretarial assistance, with a view to technology, internal security, and related ensuring - as stated earlier - that the 74 areas.” The size of the NSAB, inclusive NSAB’s views are independent and in no of the Convenor, is limited to a maximum way coloured by government thinking. An of 30. While the first NSAB had as many effort was, however, made by the then as 27 members, subsequent NSAB’s have NSA to encourage the preparation of joint been much smaller, ranging from 15-20 studies by the NSCS and the NSAB. This members, in the interests of cohesion and effort did not succeed, primarily due to efficacy. The NSAB’s role as stipulated by opposition from the NSAB members who the Cabinet Secretariat Resolution is to realised that this would impact on their advise the NSC on issues relating to mandate of placing their views before the national security referred to it by the government, untainted by NSCS advice. Council. The NSAB’s utility lies in the fact
74 Cabinet Secretariat Resolution of April 16, 1999
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All major NSAB papers produced by the Director, Intelligence Bureau, Secretary, sub-groups are cleared in a plenary and R&AW and Secretary, NSCS (ex–officio are sent to the NSA through the NSCS. It Deputy to the NSA). As and when is free to interact with Ministries, the necessary, representatives of other Services, any agencies, or indeed anyone Ministries/Departments can be invited to within the system. The NSAB has proved SPG meetings which may be convened by itself to be a useful conduit for passing on either the Cabinet Secretary or the NSA. advice to the government from outside the The SPG is a critical component of the system. Every Board each year provides NSC system. By convention its meetings the government with several studies, some are to be convened by the Cabinet on request and some self initiated. Their Secretary on the first Wednesday of each main value lies not in the details or facts month in order to discuss NSCS monthly furnished, which cannot and are not intelligence reports and strategic analyses expected to be comprehensive, but in their as well as security related papers prepared line of approach. The output of the first by the NSCS or other organisations/ two Boards of which K. Subrahmanyam agencies/ ministries. These meetings was convenor has yet to be matched. It usually lead to meaningful action oriented produced two seminal high quality papers: decisions. Though theoretically the NSA one on India’s nuclear doctrine and another is authorised to call SPG meetings, in entitled “Strategic Defence Review”. Much practice this has never happened and the of what was contained in the former SPG has remained very much a creature became a part of India’s official nuclear of the Cabinet Secretary. The frequency of doctrine and the latter served as a template its meetings has therefore tended to depend for subsequent National Security Reviews on the Cabinet Secretary’s interest in that were extensively absorbed within the security related issues. Accordingly, while government. in some years the SPG has met on 7 or 8 occasions, in others the frequency of its STRATEGIC PLANNING GROUP meetings has been much lower. In these The SPG is required to assist the NSC by circumstances it would be evident that the acting, as stated in the Cabinet Secretariat SPG has not been as effective as it could Resolution, as the “principal mechanism be. for inter-ministerial coordination and integration of relevant inputs in the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL formulation of national security policies”. SECRETARIAT (NSCS) The SPG is chaired by the Cabinet The NSCS was set up for servicing the Secretary and comprises the three Service NSC, the NSAB, and the SPG. In order to Chiefs, the Secretaries to Government enable the NSCS to effectively support the comprising the Core Group, Governor of NSC and the SPG it was specifically the Reserve Bank of India, Secretary, mandated by the Cabinet Secretariat Department of Defence Production and Resolution of April 16, 1999 to “prepare or Supplies, Scientific Advisor to the Raksha cause to be prepared papers for Mantri, Secretaries of Departments of consideration” of each of these bodies. It Revenue, Atomic Energy and Space,
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needs to be noted that the Resolution each month, as was done by the JIC, the imposed no similar obligation on the NSCS does this oftener on a need basis. NSCS in respect of the NSAB. The reason The NSCS evolved mechanisms that were for this was that the Government wanted designed to encourage the intelligence the views of the NSAB to be independent community to work together in a more and uninfluenced and untainted in any cooperative and cohesive mode. One of the manner, by the thinking within the most significant achievements of the system. NSCS was to put in place a system for the In addition to its role as a secretariat for annual tasking and evaluation of the the NSC system, the NSCS also inherited agencies. Hitherto, there was little interface all the intelligence related functions of the between the consumers and producers of JIC. Indeed, it was created out of the intelligence. As a result, while the existing JIC, which had to be revamped in consumers did not know what they should order to meet the enlarged responsibilities seek from the agencies on an annual basis, of the NSCS. There was sound logic in the latter furnished whatever they could vesting so important an intelligence role get to the consumers, irrespective of the in the NSCS as the NSC itself was actual requirements. In the absence of any specifically mandated to address the conscious tasking by the consumers there coordination of intelligence collection and could not be any realistic evaluation of the the tasking of the agencies. performance of the agencies. This was further fine tuned in the Intelligence The importance attached by government Coordination Group (ICG). This system to the NSCS may be gauged from the fact was designed to ensure the greater that the Resolution establishing the NSC accountability of the agencies and a more system required all ministries/departments focused collection of intelligence in to “consult” it “on matters having a accordance with the requirements of the bearing on national security”. Moreover, consumers through the reallocation of while initially the NSCS was “located” in resources. Subsequently, the change of the Cabinet Secretariat, from March 2002 guard in the NSCS saw this mechanism it became a special unit under the direct being discontinued. It needed to be tried charge of the NSA in the Prime Minister’s for a longer period and its resumption is office. strongly recommended if the NSCS is to In the area of intelligence the NSCS, like continue playing a constructive role in the JIC, is not a collecting agency but is providing long term strategic analyses. totally dependent on intelligence inputs from various agencies like R&AW, I.B. SECURITY REFORM DIA, etc. Its task is to evaluate these inputs, by weighing them against each other and Based on the recommendations of the against inputs received from ministries/ GOM report on “Reforming the National departments, as well as from open sources Security System” that was accepted, more to develop a more authentic and complete or less in toto, by the CCS in May 2001, picture. Apart from presenting these the role of the NSA and the NSCS saw a evaluations to the Government regularly further enhancement. Over and above
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what was originally envisaged, the NSA equipment costing more than Rs 3 and the NSCS came to acquire oversight crores, for consideration by TCG functions over the newly created National 3. Plan and establish modern, secure Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), digital networks connecting the and mechanisms like the Intelligence intelligence agencies in Delhi as well Coordination Group (ICG), Technical as (where required) outside Delhi. Coordination Group (TCG), and National Intelligence Board (NIB). 4. Create, support and maintain a common database of requisite NATIONAL TECHNICAL RESEARCH information as approved by the TCG so that intelligence can be rapidly ORGANISATION (NTRO) disseminated among all concerned The idea of setting up an apex TECHINT agencies to authorised guidelines and organisation like the NTRO emanated protocols. from the KRC Report which recommended that the possibility of 5. Explore and establish facilities establishing such a body patterned on the required for monitoring missile US National Security Agency should be launches, or preparations therefore, in examined, as it was “neither healthy nor any country of interest. prudent” to endow any one agency alone 6. Develop capabilities for defensive and with “multifarious capabilities” for both offensive cyber operations. HUMINT and TECHINT capabilities. The GOM duly examined this idea and 7. Carry out such other projects or 75 endorsing it, proposed the creation of the programmes as the TCG may direct. National Technical Facilities Organisation The creation of such an apex TECHINT (NTFO), subsequently renamed as the organisation was one amongst the National Technical Research Organisation approximately 340 recommendations (NTRO), as the apex TECHINT contained in the GOM report approved by organisation which would: the CCS in May 2001. It proved difficult 1. Plan, design, set up and operate any to implement as the modalities for major new strategic and expensive executing the task with optimal efficiency TECHINT facilities as approved by and economy remained unaddressed. the TCG keeping in view the rapid Specifically, the GOM report had not convergence now taking place among looked into the fact that if the NTRO’s hitherto different technologies. capabilities were to be built up from scratch, it would not only be prohibitively 2. Examine and process plans of the expensive, but also very time consuming. intelligence agencies for the Its early and cost effective setting up quite acquisition of all new facilities/ obviously required a judicious transfer of
75 Press release issued after CCS meeting,, May 11,2001
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capabilities from existing structures like allocation of funds for this purpose.76 It is the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) to it. also required to ensure that in the Neither the Task Force on Intelligence (set procurement of expensive assets, there is up by the GOM to help it in its work), nor no avoidable duplication or redundancy. the GOM itself apparently foresaw this It is headed by the NSA and the Chairman problem. Accordingly, they failed to specify NTRO serves as its Member Secretary. what assets were to be transferred to the Other members include the Principal NTRO and from which organisation. It fell Scientific Advisor to Government of India, to the lot of the NSA and the NSCS to the Cabinet Secretary, the Chairman, resolve this thorny problem, which was Chiefs of Staff Committee, Secretaries of essentially a battle for turf. After much the Department of Space and Atomic cogitation, involving a feasibility study on Energy, Scientific Advisor to Raksha the matter undertaken by the then Mantri, Deputy to the NSA, Secretary (R) Principal Scientific Advisor, Dr Kalam, and Cabinet Secretariat, DIB, and DG Defence innumerable interagency discussions, the Intelligence Agency (DIA)77 NTRO was finally established as late as April 2004, though its Chairman had been INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION appointed in March 2003. The NTRO’s GROUP (ICG) charter as ultimately determined was largely along the lines recommended in the The Intelligence Coordination Group (ICG) Group of Minister’s report and agreement became operational in June 2001. It is was also reached on the manner and time presided over by the NSA and includes the frame in which assets would accrue to it Cabinet Secretary and Secretary NSCS, from various other entities. The NTRO, like as Member Secretary, other Secretaries, the NSCS, is directly answerable to the Secretary (R), DIB, DG DIA, the head of NSA. NTRO, and Chairman CoSC. Service Chiefs can be called for meetings as and when required. Its main purpose is to TECHNICAL COORDINATION GROUP provide systematic intelligence oversight (TCG) at the apex level to address the following The Technical Coordination Group issues: (TCG) was constituted in June 2003 soon l Allocation of resources to the after the appointment of the Chairman of intelligence agencies NTRO. Its main function is to coordinate and regulate plans for acquisition of all l Consideration of annual reviews on the new, costly, major strategic facilities/ quality of inputs equipment by the intelligence agencies, l Approve the annual tasking of exercise oversight over intelligence agencies intelligence collection and examine issues relating to the
76 Press release after CCS meeting, May 11,2001 77 NSCS Resolution of June16,2003
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l Oversee the functions of intelligence to promote greater “jointness”. In the area agencies of intelligence, a Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was created to ensure a l Examine national estimates and better integration of intelligence collected forecasts.78 by the three service directorates and to serve as the principal military intelligence NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD agency. While the creation of a Chief of (NIB) Defence Staff was stymied, a Chief of The NIB was constituted in August 2002 Integrated Defence Staff was appointed in for national level policy formulation on lieu of a Vice Chief of Defence Staff in information warfare and information order to promote ‘jointness’ over a variety security as well as for the creation of the of issues like doctrine, training, the required institutions and structures for planning process, both long term and implementation of the policies developed. short term, etc. The NIB was also mandated to task and As regards economic intelligence the monitor the institutions and structures GOM while stressing that the intelligence created by it. Chaired by the NSA, the NIB agencies should upgrade their capabilities is serviced by the NSCS. The Cabinet in this area also called for the broadening Secretary, service chiefs, Secretaries who of the mandates of the Economic comprise the Core Group, Secretaries Intelligence Council (EIC) and the Central belonging to the Ministries/Departments Economic Intelligence Bureau (CEIB) as of Information Technology & Telecom, well as for the setting up of a Financial Information & Broadcasting, Dept of Intelligence Unit to keep a track of Space, Chairman Atomic Energy suspicious financial transactions. Commission, Scientific Advisor to Raksha Mantri, DIB, Secretary (R), Chairman STRUCTURES TO MANAGE NUCLEAR NTRO, DG DIA are members and Secretary NSCS/Deputy to the NSA is DETERRENT Member Secretary.79 The GOM report had recommended the creation of a Strategic Forces Command Apart from the foregoing elements of (SFC) to manage India’s strategic forces. security reform which impinged directly It had also recommended the creation of a on the NSC system there were two other CDS who would, apart from his other elements which also impacted it but not functions, also exercise administrative in so direct a manner. The first pertained control over these strategic forces as to the Armed Forces and the second to the distinct from operational military control issue of economic intelligence. which would vest in the highest political As regards the Armed Forces, a number authority. In effect, the Commander in of measures were implemented designed Chief, SFC, would function under the
78 Press release after CCS meeting, May 11,2001; 79 NSCS Resolution, Aug 29,2002
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control of the CDS who would be the would “function as the channel for channel for communication between the servicing the National Security Council”. Government and him. While the The NSAs have had a critical role in the Commander in Chief, SFC, was appointed selection of each NSAB and in giving it in early 2003, a CDS has not been the requisite guidance. Each NSA has set appointed till date. This, incidentally, was the agenda for the NSAB and engaged the only major GOM recommendation not with it from time to time. The NSA has accepted by the CCS in May 2001. In the traditionally been the sole recipient of all absence of the CDS all his functions, the NSAB’s output. including those pertaining to the nuclear deterrent, are undertaken by the The NSA, has, under the NSC system and Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee who with the creation of the ICG, NTRO and currently also doubles as a Service Chief. the TCG, emerged as a powerful coordinator of intelligence. Apart from Subsequent to the GOM report, the CCS being the recipient of all critical intelligence in January 2003 reaffirmed that the SFC inputs from the agencies, he also gets would manage and administer all our regular evaluations and assessments from strategic forces and that nuclear retaliatory the NSCS of the intelligence inputs attacks could only be authorised by the transmitted to it by the agencies which civilian political leadership. Such include not only the R&AW, the IB and authorisation would be through the the intelligence wings of the military and Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) paramilitary forces etc, but also the newly comprising a Political Council and an created DIA as per the recommendations Executive Council. The Political Council is of the Group of Ministers. chaired by the Prime Minister. It is the sole body which can authorise the use of In more recent times, the NSA has also nuclear weapons. The Executive Council been playing a vital role also as the is chaired by the NSA. It provides inputs principal diplomatic adviser to the Prime for decision making to the NCA and Minister, be it in the negotiations relating executes the directives given to it by the to the civil nuclear deal with the United Political Council.80 States, or any bilateral Track –I or Track – II initiatives undertaken to resolve thorny NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER stalemates. (NSA) The importance of the role of the NSA in The Cabinet Secretariat Resolution for making our nuclear deterrent operational setting up the NSC system somewhat and ensuring its credibility cannot be cryptically stated that there would be a underestimated. As Chairman of the National Security Advisor (NSA) who Executive Council he is the main conduit
80 Press release after CCS meeting, Jan 4,2003
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for the inputs passed on to the Political hampered the evolution of a culture of Council for decision making and for the looking at security holistically. The execution of its orders. management of soft security issues like water, health, energy, etc has suffered as It would be evident from the foregoing these are rarely viewed from the prism of that, contrary to what has been made out national security. Regrettably, the political by the critics, the NSC system actually and bureaucratic leadership continues to works and along with introducing some remain wedded to a damage control mode reforms in the security sector, has added rather than a more systematic and well- value to our security/intelligence structures structured long term policy evolution like the CCS with which it has coexisted. mode as reflected by the fact that the However, this is not to suggest that the meetings of the CCS and Committee of NSC system is performing perfectly and Secretaries are held far more frequently that there is no scope for improvement. than the NSC or SPG meetings. Indeed, a view has been expressed that the NSA’s overall responsibilities are so vast Progress in addressing economic security that they leave him with little time to issues also leaves much to be desired. devote to the intricacies of intelligence While, as recommended, intelligence coordination. There may seem to be a need agencies, like R&AW and IB, were asked to clearly define the NSA’s responsibilities to upgrade their ECOINT collection and functions relating to intelligence capabilities and the mandates of the through statutory provisions so that there Economic Intelligence Council (EIC) and is no vacuum at the apex of the intelligence the Central Economic Intelligence Bureau structure. (CEIB) have been revised and a Financial Intelligence Unit has been set up, the EIC While in purely structural terms the and CEIB have regrettably remained system per se cannot be faulted, its actual largely inactive. performance has remained less than optimal because its meetings are held Another major deficiency in the manner rather infrequently. The SPG headed by in which the NSC system has been the Cabinet Secretary has met less functioning is that the NSCS is not kept frequently than warranted. Inter-agency fully in the loop on all security related turf battles have also taken their toll in issues as mandated. Advice on security slowing down or even completely related issues is sought from the NSCS on blocking reforms. Implementation of the an ad hoc basis rather than as a matter of GOM recommendations has been much routine. If the NSC system is to work with slower than it should have been. Perhaps, optimal efficacy the NSCS must be kept what really demonstrates the general fully in the picture on all security related absence of security consciousness afflicting issues including “soft” security issues and both the political class and the bureaucracy it should be consulted regularly In is the fact that the NSC has rarely met. addition, its products should be given the benefit of due consideration at the highest The infrequency of NSC and SPG level. If these lacunae are addressed the meetings, designed to be in the nature of NSC system will function much more freewheeling brainstorming sessions, has
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effectively and enable the Government to intensify turf battles among existing better handle our internal and external agencies with overlapping spheres of security concerns. 81 responsibilities. Some such problems have already been experienced between the Implementation of recommended reforms newly set up NTRO and the ARC, over the raises problems of coordination, which is ownership, use and sharing of expensive, not always fully thought through. The valuable technical facilities and assets. Kargil Review Committee (KRC) flagged this lack of coordination while noting in By 2003-2004, a Multi Agency Centre particular, that a June 1998 report of the (MAC) and a Joint Task Force on IB disseminated at the highest level was Intelligence attached to the Intelligence not copied to either the R&AW or the JIC. Bureau had also been set-up, mainly to It pointed out several instances where the effectively coordinate inputs related to military did not share relevant information terrorism obtained from different field with other concerned agencies that could agencies on a day-to-day basis. Subsidiary corroborate the inputs. For instance, ‘bits MACs (S-MACs) were also established at and pieces’ of information regarding the the state level, assigning their ORBAT changes of Pakistani Battalions responsibilities to different lead agencies opposite Kargil was available but the (BSF, CRP or SSB) with the main task of central message emanating from these synergizing the special or intelligence inputs could not be read correctly. branches of the state police organisations and bringing about operational The G.C. Saxena Task Force after Kargil convergence between them and central had recommended a two tier arrangement agencies . to tone up coordination -the NSA & then Principal Secretary to PM presiding over After the Mumbai attack in November all intelligence agencies-IB, R&AW, etc and 2008, question marks arose once again a separate Committee on Technical about the effectiveness of these Intelligence. coordination mechanisms. The NSCS and the JIC have had to undergo a role Several measures for reform that are being redefinition. The latter has been directed currently undertaken, include the proposal to focus more on the immediate or short- to establishment of a National Counter- term intelligence inputs, that too on Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and some others terrorism centric data, while the NSCS has that are still in the proposal stage, such as reverted to more in-depth, policy oriented a new Maritime Intelligence and Coastal prognoses relating to intelligence and Security Centre, or a centre for Nuclear national security priorities. These changing and Missile Intelligence. Although much roles are still in the process of evolution. needed but they do have the potential to
81 Satish Chandra, former Deputy NSA: Article on the National Security set up: AGNI: Forum for Strategic Studies journal, Vol X, No IV, Oct-Dec ’07; also see Satish Chandra: Article on National Security Coordination in journal: Indian National Security Review,2005;
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COORDINATION PROBLEMS IN USA within the CIA in this period – Porter Goss to Michael Hayden and later Leon The question as to who should take on the Panetta.82 Though notionally the DNI is mantle of responsibility at the apex level superior to the CIA Director, who should for intelligence co-ordination could be open report to him, in practice this did not to controversy, as has happened over the happen immediately.83 CIA lawyers raised appointments of successive DNI in the questions of legislative language to stress USA. As envisaged by the Kean its independence and pointed out that Commission recommendations, the nowhere was it clearly specified that the hierarchy chart of intelligence outfits DNI was the CIA Director’s boss. In five would look something like this:
President () Director National Intelligence ↓ ↓ ↓ CIA NCTC Pentagon NICs FBI WMD, Narcotics, Area units;
Before the appointment of the DNI, the years, there have been three DNIs, each CIA Director was also designated Director, with a different approach to the job. High Central Intelligence (DCI). Three multi- profile appointments of Negroponte and disciplinary centres – the Counter Dennis Blair were rather short lived, Terrorism Centre (CTC), the Counter though reasons for their short tenures have Proliferation Centre (CPC) and Counter not been made public so far.84 Though Intelligence Centre (CIC) reported to DCI. intelligence spending has doubled in the The CIC leadership rotated between the last few years, many intelligence Directors of the CIA and the FBI. Several professionals in USA ‘looked at the reform quick changes of leadership occurred brouhaha with detached bemusement,
82 B.Raman :CIA & the war on Terrorism –Saag Paper no70,June 2006 83 B.Raman -9/11 Report – Old Wine in new Bottle – Five Part analysis: Saag.Org -July-Aug, 2004 ; 84 Economist.com ,May 27,2010: Seeking a new spy-in-chief ;& ISN ,ETH Zurich: DNI: Help Wanted again: May 26,2010;
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believing that reform would result in no as per the recommendations of the Kean meaningful change’.85 Commission report of 2004. In India too, post Mumbai 26/11, the In May, 2010 the Times of India reported question whether India should or should that the PMO was contemplating the not have an intelligence Czar has been setting up an Intelligence and Security Co- much debated. ordination Committee, consisting of the NSA, the Cabinet Secretary and the Home ROLE OF HM Secretary. These steps have the potential to dilute the co-ordination role and After P. Chidambaram became Home responsibilities of the NSA. The PMO is Minister, the Ministry’s marginalisation in trying to find an alternative mechanism matters relating to intelligence co- by making the NSA share this ordination has been decisively reversed responsibility with the Cabinet Secretary and steps have been taken to strengthen and the Home Secretary. 87 its role in internal security management. The Home Minister currently holds a daily Other security analysts and professionals meeting of Intelligence chiefs where all have opined differently. A suggestion intelligence inputs relating especially to which was discussed in some depth at the terrorism threats are examined in detail IDSA Round Tables on the subject was that and follow up action points and co- there should be a National Intelligence ordination bottlenecks between central Coordinator (NIC), directly under the PM and state agencies are sorted out. This has and the NSA, on the pattern of the US brought about some toning up of the DNI. He could report directly to the Home performance, alertness and coordination Minister on matters relating to internal between agencies, both at the centre and security and to the External Affairs in the states. Minister on issues impinging on foreign policy matters. The JIC would be under the The Home Minister’s statement in the DNI or NIC and not the Home Ministry. December 2009 meet of Directors General The proposed NCTC can still report 86 of Police indicated that more soul directly to the Home Minister. The searching was in process, even as steps DNI/NIC and NSA would continue were being formulated to set up a new to be the vital organs in the functioning NCTC, which could be modelled on the of the national security apparatus.88 US Homeland Security Department set up
85 Patrick Neary, Principal Dy. Dir, ODNI: Intelligence Reform,2001-2009:Requiescat in Pace ? :Studies in Intelligence, Vol 54,No1 : Quarterly Intelligence Journal ,April 2010; 86 22 nd Intelligence Bureau Endowment lecture, New Delhi, 23.12.09; 87 B.Raman: No More Co-ordination Czar ?: Saag.Org paper No.3832 ,28.05.10; 88 K. Subrahmanyam: views shared at IDSA Round Table,Aug2010;
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The flow chart for the intelligence initiatives. Similarly, he could provide apparatus would then look something like coordinated inputs to the Home Minister this: on internal security matters, if needed. On defence related issues, NIC could assist the
PM HM EAM DM (Defence Min)
NSA 2
NIC
(National Intelligence Coordinator) (IB, NIA, NCTC R&AW (NTRO, DRI, EIU)89
(National Counter Terrorism Centre
NSA or advise the Defence Minister The logic behind this coordination directly if required, without disturbing the mechanism would be to leave enough hierarchy of the Service Chiefs, DIA and scope for a specialised role. The NIC and Chief of Defence Staff, if and when the NSA would be complementary appointed. assisting structures for the Prime Minister, Home Minister and a Minister for Another view voiced in this context by Intelligence. The NIC could be at a level eminent retired intelligence exponents, lower than the NSA and the primary who have dealt with security issues, is to responsibility of giving advice on strategic consider having a separate Minister for matters, or long term foreign policy would National Security, who could be entrusted still remain with the NSA. The NIC would with all national security related assist on specific security policy related responsibilities and be answerable to the
89 A. K. Verma, former Secretary, R (Cabinet Secretariat): IDSA Round Table, Aug 2010;
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Prime Minister and the Parliament for the same. Routine functions of the Home Ministry could be separated from this role. The NIC could then emerge as the main intelligence professional to assist such a Minister while the NSA could focus more exclusively on his diplomatic tasks while assisting the PM.90 In such an eventuality, the nomenclature of the NSA may have to be changed. This proposal to have a separate coordinating mechanism on the lines of a NIC would, of course, have the disadvantage of eroding the powers and access of the DIB and Secretary, R&AW to some extent, as their direct access to the Prime Minister will tend to get restricted in this arrangement (the ‘dwarpal’ concept). This is already happening to an extent ever since the office of the NSA came into being -though all NSAs strenuously refute the idea that they prevent the access of the chiefs of agencies to the PM. But, it may reduce the burden on the Home Minister for day to day coordination, even if it pertains specifically to terrorism related follow up coordination only.
90 Brajesh Mishra, former Principal Secretary to PM & NSA : at IDSA Round Table, 19.2.11;
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Chapter 10
OVERSIGHT & ACCOUNTABILITY
Modern day theorists on intelligence Human Rights Centre of Durham reform identify the following principal University, UK and the Norwegian concerns relating to oversight: Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee undertook a joint exercise to 1) Legality, 2) effectiveness, 3) efficiency, draft legal standards for accountability of 4) budgeting & accounting, 5) conformity intelligence services in liberal democracies. with human rights and 6) policy & They followed the definition of ‘good administration;91 governance’ prescribed by the World These could be divided into two main Bank.92 They created a methodology areas – efficacy and propriety. Efficacy has according to which legal standards need several dimensions – one of which is to see to cater to four levels of oversight: internal the extent to which an intelligence service control at the level of the agency; executive is able to meet expectations of its control; parliamentary oversight and consumers- the military headquarters or oversight by independent bodies.93 the Ministries for External Affairs or Home. The other concern, of propriety, is to ensure DIFFERENT OVERSIGHT STRUCTURES that ethical and legal standards are ACROSS THE WORLD maintained and adhered to by intelligence agencies. This relates to achieving a The need for establishing oversight balance between commitment to civil mechanisms vis-à-vis intelligence agencies liberties/human rights and tolerance for has been felt and dealt with in different their inevitable infraction in the national parts of the world. The United States set security interest. up two Congressional committees in 1976 and 1977- the Church and Pike The Geneva Centre for the Democratic committees, which documented Control of Armed Forces [DCAF), the systematic abuse both in the United States
91 Wolfgang Krieger: Oversight of Intelligence: A comparative approach : National Intelligence Systems, Current Research & Future Prospects: Treverton & Agrell : Cambridge University Press,2009; 92 The World Bank: ‘Governance : The World Bank Experience’ 93 Born & Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal standards and Best Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies, pg 23…
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and abroad by US intelligence agencies. committees that have representation on These became a model for the their chamber’s intelligence committee. strengthening of oversight that has been Additional panels with oversight or replicated in many countries since.94 legislative jurisdiction over parts of US Following the US, Australia95 and intelligence include those dealing with: Canada96 also legislated for intelligence civil liberties, cyber security, government- oversight in 1979 and 1984. Reforms controlled information and access to it, spread to Europe over the next two government organisation and decades. Countries like Argentina, South reorganisation, homeland security, Korea and South Africa have also military affairs, or individual agencies that established systems of accountability. collect intelligence themselves or rely on other entities for it.98 Further, there are THE UNITED STATES informal agreements between members and staff in the Congress and officials and A set of 16 agencies constitute the United staff in the executive branches.99 This States intelligence establishment. Led by organisational structure of the US the DNI, these include units under the intelligence community has been criticised United States Departments of Defence, for being a bit of a morass and it still Justice, State, Homeland Security, Energy continues to be extremely fragmented. and Treasury.97 The DCI, who is the CIA chief himself, is Though there is overlapping both in seen as being weak, lacking as he does, foreign and domestic areas, oversight of the final budgetary and personnel intelligence, particularly in the foreign authority over the agencies, (with the realm is concentrated to a large degree in exception of the CIA) that are supposed to the House and Senate Select Committees be his responsibility. In addition, the on Intelligence. It, however, is not management of satellite imagery remains centralised there. Each panel has exclusive in a muddle, with tangled lines of legislative authority over only the CIA and authority and responsibility between the the DNI. A number of other committees NSA, the National Reconnaissance Office share oversight. These include the and the new National Geo-Spatial Agency. appropriations, armed services, foreign Other structures have arisen in the affairs/foreign relations, and judiciary
94 U.S. Senate (1976), Final Report, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church Committee) 95 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 96 Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1984 97 An Overview of the United States Intelligence Community for the 111th Congress, 2009 98 Frederick M. Kaiser, Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives, CRS Report for Congress, available at www.crs.gov. 99 Ibid.
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aftermath of 9/11, such as the Department published document detailing the work of of Homeland Security and the Terrorist the intelligence agencies and from where Threat Integration Centre, where there is they drew their power.102 This charter even more fragmentation and ambiguity could be changed without reference to over mission and authority definition.100It Parliament, and established no formal can even be argued that the lesson to be legal limits and controls. The operation of learnt from the United States is the danger the intelligence services of the UK in such of too much oversight. Accountability has a legislative void was eventually challenged been spread over too many committees, at the European Court of Human Rights with oversight becoming too in the case of Harman and Hewitt v. UK103, complicated.101 The Department of where the lack of a specific statutory basis Homeland Security for instance, has to for the MI5, was held to be fatal to the answer to a total of 44 Congressional claim that its actions were “in accordance committees. with the law” for the purpose of complaints of surveillance and file-keeping, contrary THE UNITED KINGDOM to Article 8 of the convention on the right to privacy. While the ECHR permits The Security Service (SS), which is UK’s restrictions of certain rights such as that domestic intelligence agency is responsible of privacy in the interests of national for security threats that include terrorism, security, the necessary precondition is that counter-intelligence, weapons of mass the restriction must be authorised by law: destruction, and organised crimes. Falling clearly the administrative charter fell foul under the Home Ministry, and equivalent of this requirement. It was following this to India’s IB, the SS, along with the Secret ruling that the UK enacted a statutory Intelligence Service (SIS) which is the charter for the SS in 1989104, and later in external intelligence agency, and the 1994, for the SIS and GCHQ105. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), responsible for Further, the Interception of communication interception and code Communications Act 1985 allowed breaking, is one of the three tiered communications (telephone, fax, telex and coordinated intelligence structure in UK. post) to be intercepted when authorised by a warrant signed by a Secretary of State. Initially, it was the Maxwell-Fyfe directive It was replaced by the Regulation of of 1952 that was the sole officially
100 Born, Johnson and Leigh; “Who’s Watching the Spies: Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability, p. 58 101 Ibid, at p. 65. 102 Maxwell-Fyfe Directive,1952 103 (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 657 104 Security Service Act 1989 105 Intelligence Services Act 1994
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Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which was general. It is influenced by British designed to ensure that the UK legislation philosophy, and does not have was compatible with the ECHR and the independent arrest powers. The Human Rights Act 1998.106 government’s counter-terrorism approach is based on prevention, preparedness, Agency heads are required by the Security response, and recovery. Improving Service and Intelligence Services Acts to intelligence capacity, increasing the report annually to the Prime Minister and effectiveness of information sharing, the relevant Secretaries of the government. seeking better detection capabilities, and The Foreign Secretary is responsible for the improving law enforcement are the activities of the SIS and GCHQ as he signs overarching themes under prevention and their warrants and authorisations. preparedness.107 Similarly, the Home Secretary is responsible for the activities of the SS and There is a greater separation between signs their warrants. executive and legislative oversight roles than prevailing in UK. The parliamentary Oversight is further undertaken by the joint committee can initiate investigations Parliament through the Intelligence and or respond to requests from the attorney Security Committee which examines the general. Executive oversight is stronger: administration, policy and expenditure of there is a separate Intelligence Officer the agencies. In this the MPs are assisted independently appointed and located in by Commissioners, who review the the PM’s office. exercise of powers by a Secretary of State and report to the Prime Minister annually. Commissioners hold, or have held, high FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND judicial offices. In addition, tribunals OVERSIGHT IN INDIA - BUDGETING appointed by the Queen and presided over & AUDIT OF ACCOUNTS-IN-HOUSE, by a person who either holds or has held EXTERNAL AND PARLIAMENTARY high judicial office are tasked to investigate A Directorate of Accounts (DACS) was set individual complaints into actions of the up in 1963 to serve the ARC and the SSB. agencies. In 1968 the R&AW and in 1984-85 the SPG were also brought under its ambit. The AUSTRALIA SSB has, however, now been taken out of The Australian Security Intelligence its jurisdiction. Organisation (ASIO) works closely with The DACS, which is headed by a Joint the Australian Protective Service, both Secretary level officer from the Indian agencies falling under the attorney Audits and Accounts Service, was declared
106 Intelligence Oversight, published by the Intelligence and Security Committee, UK 107 James Burch, A Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United States? A Comparative Analysis of Domestic intelligence Agencies and their implications for Homeland Security, Homeland Security Affairs, Vol. III, No. 2, June 2007.
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as an organised accounts cadre for these Reports, of different outfits under the DGS services in 1990. Recruitment to posts in and R&AW on an annual basis. These DACS is through open recruitment under reports are not published. The audit covers the Staff Services Selection Commission. all normal expenditures relating to the establishment, services, procurement of Presently, the DACS receives allocations equipment but not the Secret Service from two or three different budgetary Funds (SSF) complement. sources. These allocations are lump sum grants, camouflaging details in interest of From 2008-2009 onwards, an additional national security, but the budget proposals annual audit report is sent by DACS to are drawn up following the same general the secretary (R&AW). These reports cover procedure as in all other government the activities of the R&AW, ARC, SFF and departments, wherein the Financial the Procurement Division of the Cabinet Adviser calls for expenditure proposals Secretariat (SR Wing) and constitute the from the organisation concerned and these normal transaction oriented scrutiny of are then finalised in consultation with the expenditures incurred. However, this Secretary Finance (Expenditure). annual audit report does not go beyond the secretary (R&AW), to a higher The monitoring of accounts, with detailed authority in the government. This is, head-wise break up is done on a monthly perhaps a historical oversight. In 1968, basis by the DACS. The expenditure is also there was an executive order that the audit reviewed by examination of enhancement reports should go to the Cabinet Secretary or reduction proposals at revised estimates and not to the CAG but at present they stage. This procedure is generally similar are not being sent to either. There should to that followed in other government be a ‘higher, distanced authority’, who departments - the only difference being should be satisfied about the veracity of that these details are not made public or the expenditures incurred. In fact, a strong are not accessible to legislators. Separate case can be made out to change the running ledger accounts of expenses are nomenclature of the DACS to that of the maintained in a nationalised bank and Principal Director (Audit) for the Cabinet closely supervised by the DACS. Secretariat. Audit powers are derived from the A standing audit committee could be set Comptroller & Auditor General of India’s up with the Secretary (R&AW), the (CAG) and function under the Duties, Financial Adviser and DACS as members, Powers & Conditions of Service Act, 1971. to look into any specific aspects or to In the first two years, audit was oversee that audit objections are being met, undertaken by the Auditor General as is done in other government Central Revenues (AGCR), but in 1964, the departments. Another suggestion is to then Director, IB, B. N. Mullick proposed undertake special audits, periodically at to the PMO to entrust the auditing least, of procurement oriented projects or function to the DACS for greater secrecy. schemes, to review expenditure patterns This suggestion was accepted. Since then, and oversee if the objectives of the scheme the DACS conducts the audit and sends have been achieved. its reports, till recently termed as Inspection
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The newly set up NTRO, whose budgetary suggestion of misuse and emphasises the allocation comes from the PMO, is need for change and some better form of presently being serviced by an in-house regulation without compromising secrecy. accounts directorate. It is understood that Here too, it is extremely important that the there is a proposal under active certification of appropriateness of SSF consideration of the Government to have expenditure by the head of the concerned a full-fledged Additional Secretary level intelligence agency, with broad financial /audit official to look after NTRO expenditure patterns and heads work. enumerated should go to a higher, distanced authority, who could be the NSA The IB has not been subjected to rigorous or a Minister for National Security. accounting and auditing scrutiny by the CAG. The Financial Adviser in the Home Several disreputable financial practices Ministry does oversee its budget have thrived under the garb of operational allocations, but only the Home Secretary secrecy, including purchase of capital can give a certificate that the expenditure equipment like cars in violation of has been appropriate. There could be a standard prescribed norms of the strong case to strengthen audit Government, or the indiscriminate hiring mechanisms that have been avoided so far of Safe-Houses, which more often than not on the grounds of maintaining secrecy. are properties belonging almost exclusively This opens up the possibility that even to in-house employees at different levels former Home Secretaries could have of seniority. In earlier times, these practices entertained reservations about the IB’s were perhaps tempered by higher reluctance to submit these expenditures to standards of personal probity, but today scrutiny. not all of these hire or purchase powers are exercised with total judiciousness or even SECRET SERVICE FUNDS (SSF) been warranted by strict operational needs. Contrary to popular perception, SSF do not form the entire budgetary allocation Another recent practice has been to made from the respective budgets to the routinely engage retired employees, even intelligence agencies but only a smaller in non-specialised categories and keep portion thereof, which however, remains them employed indefinitely on hefty outside the purview of any audit - so far. salaries paid from the SSF, totally by- Only a bland annual certificate of full use passing the laid down government rules has to be given by the head of the and regulations. organisation. Ironically enough, the SSF portion has INTELLIGENCE OMBUDSMAN/ been steadily increasing and its unutilised INSPECTOR GENERAL component never gets surrendered, Drawing upon the practices in other whereas other funds lapse if the project for countries, it is essential that in India too which they are sanctioned remains every intelligence agency has an internal unimplemented. corrective mechanism to detect report and This understandably encourages a correct irregular or illegal actions. This can
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be done through the institution of an financial matters, especially those relating Intelligence Ombudsman or Inspector to the procurement of high tech General, who can be a senior retired or equipment, but in practice, this office has even sufficiently senior serving functioned merely as a post office without professional inured from all other any clout. Ideally, the executive would also pressures. He can also look into employee exercise control over covert action and grievances relating to postings, undertake a concomitant though broad promotions, etc. scrutiny of operational funds, without compromising the secrecy of source 108 EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT operations. At present, the NSA has been able to perform such a controlling function Executive control should also be exercised to a limited extent, subject to his over the agency concerned at a senior or personality and personal proclivities. supervisory level in the concerned line. These channels exist even today but a case can be made out for greater OVERSIGHT & PRIVACY professionalism in the exercise of this A major concern with regard to oversight executive control function. As of now, the is that of privacy. A recent expose of illegal manifold responsibilities vesting in both the phone tapping by the NTRO109 Home Secretary and the Cabinet highlighted the need to review the Secretary make it impossible for them to telephone tapping powers enjoyed by exercise an effective oversight on the day intelligence agencies in India and the to day running of intelligence agencies. safeguards for the privacy of individuals Heavy dependence on the head of the under law. agency alone can impact objectivity, Section 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act, fairness and morale. The practice followed which specifies the powers of the in some countries like the United government to take control over licensed Kingdom where in there is a separate telegraph operations and to order division for looking after all establishment interception of messages. The provisions and financial matters pertaining to the SIS of the section are as follows: in the Cabinet Office. This arrangement could be considered for India also. This unit (1) On the occurrence of any public is headed by a very senior serving or emergency, or in the interest of the retired intelligence official who is fully public safety, the Central Government familiar with the working of the agency or a State Government or any officer in question. In India, there is a Special specially authorized in this behalf by Relations (SR) wing in the Cabinet the Central Government or a State Secretariat to process administrative and Government may, if satisfied that it is
108 British Cabinet Office Paper, “Improving the Central Intelligence Machinery, July, 2009 109 Saikat Datta, “Bootleg Tapes: The Rulers Who Listen”, Outlook, May 2010.
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necessary or expedient so to do, take been prohibited under this sub-section. 110 temporary possession (for so long as The Supreme Court judgment in the case the public emergency exists or the of PUCL v. Union of India issued a set of interest of the public safety requires guidelines regarding telephone tapping, the taking of such action) of any which are as follows111 : telegraph established, maintained or worked by any person licensed under 1. An order for telephone tapping in this Act. terms of Section 5(2) of the Act shall not be issued except by the Home (2) On the occurrence of any public Secretary, Government of India emergency, or in the interest of the (Central Government) and Home public safety, the central government Secretaries of the State Governments. or a state government or any officer In an urgent case the power may be specially authorised in this behalf by delegated to an officer of the Home the central government or a state Department the Government of India government may, if satisfied that it is and the State Governments not below necessary or expedient so to do in the the rank of Joint Secretary. Copy of interests of the sovereignty and the order shall be sent to the Review integrity of India, the security of the Committee concerned with in one state, friendly relations with foreign week of the passing of the order-. states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an 2. The order shall require the person to offence, for reasons to be recorded in whom it is addressed to intercept in writing, by order, direct that any the course of their transmission by message or class of messages to or means a public telecommunication from any person or class of persons, system, such communications as are or relating to any particular subject, described in the order. The order may brought for transmission by or also require the person to whom it is transmitted or received by any addressed to disclose the intercepted telegraph, shall not be transmitted, or material to such persons and in such shall be intercepted or detained, or manner as are described in the order. shall be disclosed to the government 3. The matters to be taken into account making the order or an officer thereof in considering whether an order is mentioned in the order: necessary under Section list of the Act Provided that press messages intended to shall include whether the information, be published in India of correspondents which is considered necessary to accredited to the central government or a acquire could reasonably be acquired state government shall not be intercepted by other means. or detained, unless their transmission has
110 The Indian Telegraph Act, No. 13 of 1885. 111 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India and Ors. (18 December 1996)
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4. The interception required under period for the operation of the order Section 5(2) of the Act shall be the shall not exceed six months. interception of such communications 6. The authority which issues the order as are sent to or from one or more shall maintain the following records: addresses specified in the order belong an address or addresses likely (a) the intercepted communications ; to be used for the transmission of (b) the extent to which the material is communications to or from, from one disclosed; particular person specified or described in the order or one (c) the number of persons and their particular set of premises described in identity to whom any of the material the order. is disclosed; 5. The order under Section 5(9) of the Act (d) the extent to which the material is shall, unless renewed, cease to have copied and effect at the end of the period of two (e) the number of copies made of any months from the date of issue. The of the material. authority which issued the order may, at any time before the end of two 7. The use of the intercepted material month period renew the order if it by shall be limited to the minimum that the State Government. (a) The is necessary in terms of Section 5(2) Committee shall on its own, within of the Act. two months of the passing of the order 8. Each copy made of any of the by the authority concerned, intercepted material shall be investigate whether there is or has destroyed as soon as its retention is no been a relevant order under Section longer necessary in terms of Section 5(2) of the Act. Where there is or has 5(2) of the Act. been an order whether there has been any contravention of the provisions of 9. There shall be a Review Committee Section 5(2) of the Act. (b) If on an consisting of Cabinet Secretary, the investigation the Committee Law Secretary and the Secretary, concludes that there has been a (Telecommunications), at the level of contravention of the provisions of the central government. The Review Section 5(2) of the Act, it shall set aside Committee at the State level shall the order under scrutiny of the consist of the Chief Secretary, Law Committee. It shall further direct the Secretary and another member, other destruction of the copies of the than the Home Secretary, appointed intercepted material. (c) If on under 5(2) of the Act, it shall record investigation, the Committee comes to the finding to that effect. the conclusion that there has been no It is clear from a reading of the above that contravention of the provisions of only specific phone numbers may be Section considers that it is necessary intercepted. These are to be identified by to continue the order in terms of the intelligence authority prior to the Section 5(2) of the Act. The total interception, with accompanying
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justification. The written authorisation of PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT the Home Secretary must be obtained Parliamentary oversight has been a very before the interception can begin. sensitive, almost taboo subject amongst the While it is true that the government has to intelligence fraternity in India. Speaking resort to phone-tapping for some degree on the occasion of the fourth R.N. Kao of intelligence gathering, it is also true that memorial lecture in January, 2010 Vice the prevalent safeguards have not been President, M. Hamid Ansari categorically very effective. In actual implementation or flagged the issue as to ‘why a democratic practice of day to day snooping, practical system like ours should not have’ some problems of discretion may crop up. If the form of parliamentary accountability. specific phone number is not available, Dwelling at length on the possibility and then how can its interception be scope of misuse of intelligence agencies, authorised? If the target is a VIP, why will and the widespread perception in media the Home Secretary give a written about instances of intelligence lapses or authorisation? failures in related issues like co-ordination, he said it was essential for India to adopt The NTRO uses its equipment to search the accountability practices prevailing in for that one possible number having a democracies worldwide. Ansari identified bearing on national security from among three models of intelligence oversight: thousands of others which may not be that relevant. In course of a random search, it (a) Comprehensive- to include both may intercept a thousand calls and all of policy and operations, as in the USA them illegally. The equipment may be and Germany; deployed every day in some part of the (b) Limited to matters of policy and country or the other. The prior finance, as in the UK; authorisation of the Home Secretary cannot be guaranteed. One way could be (c) Focused on human rights and rule to safeguard a few VIPs, including senior of law, as in Norway; intelligence officials, by creating a set of Ansari himself favoured an oversight body mobile numbers that cannot be tapped. that would be given some access to The scanning machine could be operational details, so as to ensure effective programmed to shut down on detecting supervision and improve the efficiency of this number. However, how many intelligence agencies112 . numbers can be secured and protected in the long-run or how could such self- There is likely to be considerable furore, restraint be ensured? Appropriate checks debate and opposition to the proposed and balances have to be carefully drawn scrutiny of intelligence agencies in the up in this regard. name of oversight. The composition of a
112 Address of Vice President M. Hamid Ansari at 4th Kao Memorial Lecture, Jan 19, 2010: “Intelligence for the World of Tomorrow”
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compact but effective legislative body in an increasingly fractured legislature, dependent on small regional parties may itself pose problems. One suggestion given by senior retired professionals conversant with the issue was that there could be a Minister for National Security and Intelligence, who could also double up as the NSA to the Prime Minister and who would be responsible to the Parliament. This would ensure that there were no security leaks.113 Another suggestion is for the PM to set up a small Ministerial Committee with the power to oversee the functioning of intelligence agencies, and the proper use of secret service funds.114 A more conservative view is that an oversight committee set up by the Parliament, headed by the Vice President and comprising the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, the Prime Minister, the Minister for National Security/Home Minister/NSA, the Leader of the Opposition in the two Houses of the Parliament, should monitor the performance of intelligence organisations115. While all policy, administrative and financial matters pertaining to the intelligence agencies may come under the purview of this Committee, specific operational matters may remain outside its ambit.116
113 Brajesh Mishra, IDSA Round Table, Aug 2010; 114 V. Balachandran, Paper on Intelligence reforms: IDSA Task Force deliberations; 115 A Private Member’s Bill on providing a legal framework for intelligence agencies, moved by Shri Manish Tiwari, MP, in Lok Sabha. 116 A. K. Verma, IDSA Roundtable, Aug 6, 2010 ;
110 CONCLUSION
Several efforts have been made in the past to implement a wide ranging set of to bring about reforms in the intelligence reforms to improve and empower sector. Our contention in this report is that intelligence agencies. these efforts have been piecemeal and ad Even the smallest of reforms can become hoc. New organisations were created but hostage to divisions, rancour or the no thought was given to prevent overlaps monumental short-sightedness prevailing of jurisdiction or turf wars on the creation within the intelligence community. This or sharing of expensive new technical must be avoided. A balanced approach assets or know-how. towards systemic and institutional Given the immense new security changes is required. Any changes within challenges confronting India as it emerges institutions should be invested with an as a global power, we believe that a ethical purpose and it must be ensured paradigm shift is needed to modernise that if new institutions are set up, they intelligence work in a holistic manner, should not reproduce the pathologies of the which may require radical changes in the existing ones! Any such effort is for the long existing intelligence culture. haul. We hope this exercise can contribute in some small measure to promote a We are mindful of reservations within the debate on the issue. intelligence community, especially among police officers in the profession, that It is argued by some that the total excessive harping on accountability could expenditure on intelligence agencies in damage operational efficiency and India may be a just a few thousand crores jeopardise secrecy. Yet, it has been felt, on of rupees, which is nothing compared to balance, that there can be no getting away various multi-billion scams in the country. from introducing some sort of external Therefore, even if there is some misuse/ supervision and control, including improper use of funds by intelligence legislative oversight to improve efficiency agencies, the nation should take it in its and to build in self-correcting stride and not rake-up unnecessary mechanisms. controversies. It may be mentioned that here the issue is not just money and The current moral crises across a range of resources, it is the security implications of institutions have given rise to this the imperfect functioning of the justifiable clamour for institutional reform intelligence agencies for the country in and political accountability. We believe terms of security, pride and stability. The that to tackle the widely perceived Indian intelligence community has for too incompetence and malfunctioning of long fallen short of these expectations and intelligence agencies- it will be necessary now is the time to remedy the lacunae.
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Lastly, any intelligence reforms must also address the internal man-management structures and policies of the intelligence agencies and provide for an effective and satisfactory grievance redressal mechanism. An intelligence agency with a dissatisfied and aggrieved work force can neither safeguard its own security nor that of the nation’s.
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