History argument by considering the conduct towards Jews of the Italians who served the republic of Salo.

R. A. C. Parker, Queen's College, Oxford

Foundations of the Nazi police state: the formation of SIPO and SD. By George C. Browder. Lexington, KT: University of Kentucky Press. 1990. 346PP. Index. $35.00. ISBN ° 813I 1697 x. Under the leadership of Reinhard Heydrich, the Nazi Party's' Security Service' (SD) and the Nazi state's' Security Police' (SIPO) figured large in the Third Reich's campaigns ofpolice terror and mass murder. In his study of their formation, George Browder concentrates on their Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/67/2/349/2407424 by guest on 01 October 2021 organizational history and on the various conflicts among the Nazi leadership which framed their development. This offers insight into how Heinrich Himmler came to control and unify the German police--a circumstance which Browder regards largely as an unplanned consequence of these conflicts. The picture which emerges is rather confusing, however, and Browder's book itself reflects the bewildering nature of the innumerable rivalries and intrigues among Nazi leaders. Browder is not particularly interested in the day-to-day work of the Nazi 'security' organizations (along the lines of Robert Gellately's revealing recent work on the Gestapo), nor does he probe how his subject might fit into the longer-term general development of policing. Instead, his book is limited to describing the rise of the SIPO and SD organizations, and forms a 'preface to other work'. Perhaps in later work readers will be taken beyond the personal rivalries among the Nazi leadership.

Richard Bessel, Open University

British intelligence in the Second World War. Vol. 5: Strategic deception. By Michael Howard. Norwich: HMSO. 1990. 27IPP. Index. £12.95. ISBN ° II 63°9547. Sir Michael Howard had unrivalled credentials for producing the final volume, concentrating on strategic deception, of the official history of British intelligence in the Second World War. Its publication comes ten years after the text was completed, and understandably the author's preface politely explains that he was not responsible for the delay. Once again, it can only be assumed that the censor was in 10 Downing Street. This detailed analysis, drawn from source material in both the Allied and German archives, clearly demonstrates how strategic deception became an essential ingredient of von Clausewitz's concept of surprise. Its successes were due to two main reasons. The first was the Abwehr's inefficiency and credulity in believing their agents' reports from Britain, which were in fact composed by MI5 after the agents concerned had been skilfully turned. Two outstanding examples were the Yugoslav, Dusan Popov codenamed Tricycle, and the Spaniard Juan Garcia codenamed Garbo, who ran a 'Dickensian cast' (p. 63) of sub-sources. The second reason was the no less skilful breaking ofthe German codes at Bletchley Park, which proved that the German High Command was being deceived. In contrast to Britain, the need for operational deception in the Middle East was urgent and continuous in a highly unfavourable environment. 'A' Force, under Dudley Clarke's direction, was Wavell's brain child. It succeeded in its objective of exaggerating the size of his forces, as evidenced by the German overestimate of the armoured strength of the British forces by 40 per cent and the infantry strength by 45 per cent. But perhaps the most successful single deception ofthe entire war was Operation Mincemeat, when an officer's body was washed ashore in Spain carrying a personal letter dated 23 April 1943 from the Vice-Chief ofthe Imperial General Staff to General Alexander indicating plans for a landing in Greece. In fact, the actual landing was in Sicily. However, Howard's account does not mention the supporting action of SOE, operating with the Greek resistance, contributing to German preparations for an Allied landing in Greece. By the end of 1943, Hitler had correctly calculated that the decisive invasion battle would be in Western Europe. Yet the entire redeployment of Allied Forces from the Mediterranean to Britain took place without the Germans getting wind of it. The Abwehr's very considerable

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