The Australian Army's Independent Companies and Commandos 1940

Home , 3rd Division (Australia), 5th Division (Australia), 6th Division (Australia), 7th Division (Australia), 8th Division (Australia), 9th Division (Australia)

THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY’S INDEPENDENT COMPANIES

AND COMMANDOS 1940-1945

Gregory Lewis Blake

Thesis submitted for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Canberra

August 2019

Abstract

This dissertation examines the history of the Australian Independent Companies – Commando Squadrons during World War Two. There has been no collective history of Australia’s Independent Companies and Commando Squadrons and this dissertation aims to fill that gap in the historiography. The scope of this dissertation is broad and examines the Australian Independent Companies and Commando Squadrons from their initial formation in 1940, their operational history from 1942 until 1945, the manner in which the Army managed them during the war and how with the passage of time the nature of this management changed. The dissertation identifies an ongoing context between conservatism as represented by the traditional Australian Army ethos and the radically unconventional ethos of the initial Independent Companies. The contest was eventually won by the conservatives and this was manifested in the nature of the employment of the Commando squadrons during the last year of the war. It was, however, and incomplete victory with elements of the Army persisting with unconventional practices, reflecting the inability to establish a true consensus on the role Commandos were to play in the Army as a whole. Researching this history involved accessing archives in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, notable among these being the Australian War Memorial, The National Archives of Australia, the National Archives of the United Kingdom, the Liddell Hart Military Archives, the Dwight De Eisenhower Archives, The MacArthur Memorial Archives and The United States National Archives and Records Administration. This dissertation will provide a more nuanced and informative understanding of the role played by the Australian Independent Companies – Commando Squadrons 1940-1945 and the manner in which the Australian Army managed their employment during the war.

ii iii ORIGINALITY STATEMENT ‘I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.’

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ii

Declaration relating to disposition of project/thesis/dissertation iii

Originality Statement iv

Chapters v

List of Plates vi

Abbreviations vii

Acknowledgments viii

Introduction. 1

Chapter 1. An Army Unready: The Formation of the Independent Companies 19

Chapter 2. Training and Recruitment 52

Chapter 3. ‘Dumped and Written Off’ – The Initial Deployments of the Independent

Companies 76

Chapter 4. Kanga Force - The ‘Ragged Arsed 5th’ 104

Chapter 5. Kokoda and Buna 137

Chapter 6. Jungle Cavalry 1943 157

Chapter 7 Atherton 198

Chapter 8. Commandos at War 1944 – 1945: Aitape – Wewak 232

Chapter 9. ‘Spreading the Gospel’: Commandos on Bougainville 260

Chapter 10. Conflicting Models of Commando Warfare: Aitape – Wewak and

Bougainville 275

Chapter 11. Australian Commandos in an International Context 300

Conclusion. 333

Appendix A 342

Bibliography. 343

Plates

Plate 1 Colonel Jo Holland Commanding Officer of MI(R). p.24

Plate 2 Captain Freddy Spencer Chapman. p.31

Plate 3 Captain Michael Calvert. p.32

Plate 4 Spencer Chapman and Michael Calvert at Wilson’s Promontory. p.66

Plate 5 Independent Company’s First Deployments. p.103

Plate 6 Patrol report Harcourt to McNider 23 November 42. p.150

Plate 7 Position of 2/6 Independent Company during the fighting at Buna. p.154

Plate 8 Australian and Japanese dispositions Wau-Salamaua April-Sept 1943.

p.180

Plate 9 The Central Highlands 1943. p.190

Plate 10 Independent Company Operations New Guinea - Timor 1942-1943.

p.197

Plate 11 Commando Operations 1944-45. P.274

Plate 12 Bougainville Campaign. p.278

Plate 13 Aitape – Wewak Campaign. p.279

Footnote Abbreviations

AWM Australian War Memorial

DDEA Dwight D, Eisenhower Archives

LHCMA Liddle Hart Centre for Military Archives

MMA MacArthur Memorial Archives

NAA National Archives of Australia

NARA National Archives and Records Administration

NLA National Library of Australia

QUFL Queensland University Freyer Library

UKNA United Kingdom National Archives

vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Writing this thesis was very much a long journey which I undertook with at first very little

idea of just what and how to do so, other than I wanted to do it. The advice, assistance,

patience, encouragement and support offered by many people has enabled me to complete

this task. First among these are my supervisors. Primary amongst these is Professor Craig

Stockings, who first suggested the idea of examining the Australian Independent Companies

and Commandos of the Second World War and was always there to advise and guide me

throughout the long process of composing this thesis. My thanks also go to Professor Eleanor

Hancock who took the time to conduct a most comprehensive edit of the thesis which helped

me to focus and refine my thoughts. In the same way I owe an equally great debt to Professor

Peter Dennis whose super comprehensive editing of the penultimate draft of the thesis was of immeasurable assistance. I owe a great debt to Doctor David Stahel whose friendly practical and always useful advice was both consistently timely much appreciated. I also must acknowledge that this thesis would not have been possible without the consistently good natured and always valuable support of the administration staff of the School Humanities and

Social Sciences at ADFA, to all of them I thank you. Unravelling the story of the Australian

Independent Companies and Commandos involved accessing material here in Australia and in the United Kingdom and the United States. In the process of this I owe a great debt to the research staff of the Australian War Memorial research centre where I spend many long hours, the staff of the National Archives of Australia, especially the Melbourne Branch, the staff of the National Library of Australia and the staff of the Freyer Library at the University of Queensland. Researching the United Kingdom aspects of the history of the Australian

Independent Companies would not have been possible but for the generous grant provided by the Andrew Dennis Research Travel Award, for which I will be forever grateful. In the

United Kingdom I owe a debt of gratitude for the assistance of the staffs of the United

viii

Kingdom National Archives, the Liddle Hart Centre for Military Archives, and the Imperial

War Museum. Researching in the United States was assisted greatly by a grant from the

Australian Army History Unit. In the United States I am deeply indebted to the staff of the

Dwight D. Eisenhower Archives, especially David Holbrook whose personal assistance was invaluable. I also must thank the staff of the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington D.C. and the staff of the United States Marine Corps History Division in particular Annette Amerman. I also must thank James Zobel of the MacArthur Memorial

Archives for his endless patience and ability to find the most obscure references whenever I needed them. In assisting me to survive in foreign lands I have to thank Carole Brougham who provided me with a delightful B&B in Kew, London, which enabled me to access all the archives in London I needed to. In the same way I thank Fred Haub whose collegial hospitality made my stay in Washington D.C. so much better.

To all of those who assisted me complete this thesis I offer you my sincerest heartfelt thanks.

INTRODUCTION

Specialist units and formations concerned with irregular warfare, as a distinctive type

of military unit first, emerged during the Second World War.1 This dissertation focuses on

the Australian experience of those specialist forces, which formed part of the Second

Australian Imperial Force.2 Australia was not of course alone amongst the Allied nations in

raising specialist unconventional forces during the Second World War, with both Britain and

the United States forces raising significant numbers of specialist unconventional units during

the war. Australia’s specialist forces came from two distinct pedigrees, the first being the

Independent Companies, later renamed Commandos, raised by the Australian Army, and the

second being the covert groups ‘Z’ and ‘M’ Force raised by Special Operations Australia (the

Australian manifestation of the British Special Operations Executive), also known as the

Special Reconnaissance Department. The task of Z Force was clandestine special reconnaissance, sabotage and intelligence gathering behind enemy lines. M Force was a specialized unit whose task was gathering intelligence on Japanese shipping and troop movements. Neither formed part of mainstream Army operations. Because of this neither Z nor M force will be considered in this dissertation.3

It is the intention of this dissertation is to examine and analyse the histories of the

Independent Companies and Commandos raised by the Australian Army from their inception

in 1940 until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. When Japan attacked the United States naval

base at Pearl Harbor Hawaii on 7 December 1941 and immediately moved against Hong

1 A. Hargreaves, Special Operations in World War II: British and American Irregular Warfare, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2013, p. 269. 2 The Second Australian Imperial Force (2AIF) was the force raised by the Australian Army for overseas service during the Second World War. This was distinct from the First Australian Imperial force which was raised for service during the World War 1. All units raised as part for 2AIF have the number 2 as a refix before their unit number e.g. 2/48th Battalion, 2/2nd Independent Company. 3 For a comprehensive survey of Z Force operations, see: C.A. Brown, The Official History of Special Operations – Australia, SOA Books, Lexington, Kentucky, 2011. For reference to the work of M Force, see: D. Horner, SAS: Phantoms of the Jungle: a history of the Australian Special Air Service, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1991, pp. 25-27.

Kong, Malaya and the Philippines, Australia found itself, for the first time, subject to

an actual existential peril from a foreign enemy. The struggle that followed was, for

Australia, bitter and protracted. While the Royal Australian Navy and Royal Australian Air

Force played notable, and at times undeniably significant, roles in this theatre the

contribution made by the Australian army to the struggle was of paramount importance in

terms of numbers, casualties and to the dominant national ‘memory’ of the Pacific war.

Throughout all of its campaigns, a small but important component of the Australian army that

contributed towards its ultimate success was specialist forces in the form of Independent

Companies, later called Commandos. These were a unique element within the Army: small

sub-units trained, equipped and administered unlike any other land-based military force.

The beginning of the war in the Pacific found the most experienced elements of the

Australian army in the Mediterranean theatre. Available for the immediate defence of

Australia were a limited number of the volunteer Second Australian Imperial Force (2AIF)

troops and militia.4 Nonetheless, token forces from the 2AIF were deployed to the island

barrier chain north of Australia: Timor, Ambon, Rabaul and New Britain as well as New

Caledonia. Their purpose was to offer some political solace to Australia’s Dutch and French

allies, and to act as a guard to the approaches to Australia and provide some early warning of

enemy intentions. In addition, Singapore, the lynchpin of the British plan to defend South

East Asia, was reinforced with the Australian 8th Division. In each of these cases, with two

exceptions - Timor and New Caledonia - the outcome for such blocking forces was catastrophic, with each destroyed in turn by the Japanese.

4 During the Second World War Australia’s land based military forces were composed of two elements, the regular army (2AIF) which was intended to serve outside of the Australia and the Citizen Military Forces (CMF), also known as the Australian Military Force (AMF), which was intended for service only within Australia and its Territories. The CMF/AMF was universally referred to as ‘militia’.

The landing of Japanese forces at Lae and Salamaua in New Guinea in March 1942 saw the deployment of a small Independent Company force to harass them. In the subsequent

1942 Kokoda campaign Australian forces were initially forced into a series of retreats but eventually halted and repulsed the Japanese offensive. In the following campaign to reduce the Japanese beachheads at Buna and Gona Australian forces operated in conjunction with

US forces. A single Independent Company saw service in both these campaigns. During 1943 and 1944 the Japanese presence in New Guinea and later Bougainville was subjected to a campaign of steady incremental reduction. Independent Companies, later known as

Commandos, were active in both New Guinea and Bougainville. The final Australian campaign of the war took place in Borneo in 1945 with the capture of Tarakan and

Balikpapan, and Labuan Island (Brunei). Australian Commandos constituted part of the forces involved in these campaigns.

The concept for the Independent Companies originated in 1940 with the British suggesting that Australia set up small units as ‘Commandos’, ostensibly to operate in the

Middle East and Mediterranean theatres. To this end, a team of British specialists arrived in

Australia to establish such units, and they remained until the formation of a cadre of

Australians capable of managing their training. The men who made up the subsequent

Independent Companies were at first all volunteers. Their training was physically tough and intensive with many new skills being taught. Nonetheless, for a number of reasons the concept of Independent Companies did not receive widespread support within the Army, and in November 1941 such training was discontinued. This changed on 8 December 1941 following Japan’s entry into the war. Faced with the necessity of countering Japanese aggression and struggling to find the resources to do so, the concept of the Independent

Companies, three which had during 1941 already been deployed as of previously noted on missions to the Island Chain to Australia’s north, was resurrected and training for further

companies recommenced. Even though the Companies had been revitalised there was still no consensus within the Army on how the companies were to be used, or what role they could fulfil.

As the war progressed and for a variety of common and disparate reasons Independent

Companies began to evolve methods of operations suited to their autonomous character: scouting, flank protection, close reconnaissance of enemy formations, terrain surveying and raiding characterized their service. The Companies often saw themselves as ‘jungle cavalry’ filling the role of the ‘eyes, ears and claws’ of their parent divisions.5 The understanding by the wider Army of how to employ Independent Companies effectively evolved in a patchwork and idiosyncratic manner. With no set doctrine, the influence of local commanders and their individual appreciation of how to employ Independent Companies became paramount. This lack of clear direction eventually resolved itself in late 1943 when the title

Independent Company was discontinued and replaced by Commando Squadrons.

In a reflection of the changing nature of the war from late 1943 to 1945, in which the jungle war of small sub-units was replaced by the employment of large formations employing overwhelming firepower, the role of Commandos within the Army was fundamentally transformed and redefined. In the place of independently administered companies recruited voluntarily, Commandos were recruited from the mainstream Army recruits and became more closely integrated into the Army’s order of battle. Contrary to the relatively freewheeling manner of the Independent Companies, Commandos were much more tightly

5 A. Bottrell, Cameos of Commandos: Memories of Eight Australian Commando Squadrons in New Guinea and Queensland, self published, Daw Park, S.A, 1971, p. 41; the term Jungle cavalry was adopted by 2/6 Independent Company in 1943, see: 2/6 Commando Squadron War Diary Novto Dec 1943, AWM52 2/2/58; General Stanley Savige inferred the term ‘Jungle Cavalry’ in his Tactical and Administrative doctrine for jungle warfare applicable to all formations under command 2 Aust. Corps (2AIF), HQ 2 Aust. Corps (2AIF) (New Guinea): N.G. Press Unit, 1945.

managed and given specific well-defined tasks which could and did frequently require

Commandos to act as conventional infantrymen.

Independent Companies/Commandos were participants in every major campaign

against the Japanese undertaken by the Australian Army in the South West Pacific theatre of operations. They contributed significantly to the tactical and strategic success of the

Australian Army on a number of occasions. Despite this the historiography of the Australian

Army’s war against Japan lacks any comprehensive analysis of them.

The published literature of the Independent Companies/Commando Squadrons is

diverse in character. What material there is tends to fall into three distinct yet complementary

categories. The first of these is unit histories. These offer collections of personal and collective memories by members of Independent Companies - Commandos. Examples of such works are Don Astill’s Commando White Diamond: Memoir of Service of the 2/8

Australian Commando Squadron, Australia and the South-West Pacific 1942–1945; Cyril

Ayris’s, All the Bull’s Men – No.2 Australian Independent Company (2/2 Commando

Squadron); Arthur Bottrell’s Cameos of Commandos; Ron Garland’s Nothing is Forever –

The History of 2/3 Commandos; George Lambert’s compilation Commando, Tidal River to

Tarakan; Andy Pirie’s Commando Double Black: an Historical Narrative of the 2/5th

Australian Independent Company, later the 2/5th Cavalry Commando Squadron, 1942–

1945.6 These works themselves can be subdivided into two genres; that written as a narrative

6 Astill, Commando White Diamond: Memoir of Service of the 2/8 Australian commando squadron; Australia and the South-West Pacific 1942-1945, Australian Military History Publications, Sydney, 1996; C. Ayris, All the Bull’s Men – No.2 Australian Independent Company (2/2 Commando Squadron), 2/2 Commando Association, Hamilton Hill, 2006; A. Bottrell, Cameos of Commandos: Memories of Eight Australian Commando Squadrons in New Guinea and Queensland, self published, Daw Park, S.A, 1971; R. Garland, Nothing is Forever – The History of 2/3 Commandos, self published, Riverwood N.S.W, 1998; Lambert, Commando - From Tidal river to Tarakan, the Story of No.4 Australian Independent Company, 2AIF later known as 2/4th Australian Commando Squadron, Australian Military History Publications, Loftus, 1997; A.A. Pirie, Commando Double Black - An Historical Narrative of The 2/5th Australian Independent Company later The 2/5th Cavalry Commando Squadron 1942-1945, Australian Military History Publications, Sydney, 1996.

of the unit history in which personal anecdote is present but secondary, and that in which

personal anecdote is dominant and the unit history is employed to link these anecdotes. While

such works are naturally subject to personal bias and modified recollections they nonetheless represent the only sources which provide access to the perceptions of the service of those who actually participated as members of the Independent Companies/Commando Squadrons.

Yet, such works have their limitations. Understandably, given their dominant focus on the experiences of single units and the individual soldiers who composed them, there is generally no attempt to look beyond the immediate experience. There is a very limited attempt at best, with a few notable exceptions, to consider or discuss the role of the

Companies/Squadrons in the context of the overall campaigns, or the relationship of the

Companies within the broader structure of the 2AIF. The exceptions to this can be found in

Syd Trigellis-Smith’s The Purple Devils: a History of the 2/6 Australian Commando

Squadron, formerly the 2/6 Australian Independent Company, 1942–1946, and Bernard

Callinan’s Independent Company The 2/2 and 2/4 Australian Independent Companies in

Portuguese Timor. 1941-1942.7 Trigellis-Smith neatly combines parochial concerns with a

broader appreciation of the operational environment the company found itself in during its

service in Australia, New Guinea and Borneo. In his description of the Kokoda campaign he summarised the operational tasks undertaken by 2/6th Independent Company, explaining in

the context of the campaign as a whole. He leaves one with a solid sense of just where the

company fitted into the bigger picture of the various campaigns in which it took part.

Likewise Callinan presents a comprehensive account of the travails of the 2/2nd Independent

Company when it found itself isolated in Japanese occupied Portuguese East Timor in early

1942. Callinan blends personal narrative and anecdote with a comprehensive assessment of

7 S.Trigellis-Smith, The Purple Devils: A History of the 2/6 Australian Commando Squadron, formerly the 2/6 Australian Independent Company, 1942–1946, 2/6 Commando Squadron, Melbourne, 1992; B.J. Callinan, Independent Company The 2/2 and 2/4 Australian Independent Companies in Portuguese Timor, 1941-1942, William Heinmann Ltd, Melbourne, 1953.

the overall tactical and strategic environment in which the 2/2nd and later 2/4th Independent companies operated.

A sub-genre of the unit histories is a hybrid between fiction and non-fiction work.

The best example in this regard are the books of Peter Pinney, who was a member of 2/3rd

Independent Company and 2/8th Commando Squadron. Three of Pinney’s books, The

Barbarians, The Glass Cannon and The Devil’s Garden, cover the experiences of

Commandos during the 1943 Salamaua and 1944-45 Bougainville campaigns.8 Even though

the books are written from the point of view of a fictional character, they are in fact

autobiographical, with events and details taken from the diaries Pinney kept during those

campaigns. When commenting on his books Pinney stressed that the events, attitudes and

actions depicted in his books all stem from his personal experiences. His recollections and

assessments cannot therefore avoid being viewed with reasonable caution, even if his

Commando contemporaries agreed that what Pinney related were accurate accounts of what

had occurred.9

The second genre found in the literature of the Independent Companies/Commando

Squadrons is that of unit histories written by non-participants. Examples of this are

Christopher Wray’s Timor 1942: Australian Commandoes at War with the Japanese, C.

Doig’s The History of the Second Independent Company, and Shawn O’Leary’s To the Green

Fields Beyond: the story of 6th Australian Division Cavalry Commandos.10 Such works vary

in usefulness and scope. Wray’s, for example, is an excellent account of operations on Timor

8 P. Pinney, The Barbarians: A Soldier’s New Guinea Diary, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1988; P. Pinney, The Glass Cannon: A Bougainville Diary 1944-1945, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1990; P. Pinney, The Devil’s Garden: Solomons Island War Diary, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1992. 9 Queensland Commando News, 10 Jan 1992, Papers of Peter Pinney Box 6, UQFL288, UQFL. 10 C.D. Doig, The History of the Second Independent Company, self published, Perth, 1986; S. O’Leary, To The Green Fields Beyond: The Story of 6th Australian Division Cavalry Commandos, Sixth Division Cavalry Unit Historical Committee, Sydney, 1975; C.H. Wray, Timor 1942: Australian Commandos at War with the Japanese, Hutchison Australia, Hawthorn, 1987.

in which the campaign conducted by the 2/2nd and 2/4th Independent Companies against the

Japanese is presented in great detail. It is apparent that in compiling his account Wray has

made extensive use of works such as Callinan to provide intimate details which implies a

certain lack of originality. Nonetheless, Wray discusses how the campaign was viewed and

managed from Australia. Doig’s account follows a similar pattern with additional detail

regarding the formation and training of the 2/2nd Independent Company and its service after

Timor.11 O’Leary’s narrative devotes more than half the book to describing in detail the

service in the Middle East of the Australian 6th Division’s armoured Cavalry regiment and

only the latter parts of his book discuss the service of the 6th Cavalry Commando Regiment

into which the 6th Division Cavalry administratively metamorphosed. While such accounts

are useful, they are limited. In the case of Wary and Doig this is by a narrow focus on events

in Timor, and in O’Leary’s case by its focus for a good part of the narrative on a subject

unrelated to the Commandos.

The third category of works identifiable within the literature is general histories of the

Pacific War campaigns.12 While not being entirely ignored the attention paid to the role of the

Independent Companies/Commandos in all of these works is marginal to the main story,

understandable because the commandos were very small players in the grand scheme.

Exceptions to this rule do exist, for example Phillip Bradley’s The Battle of Wau, gives

extensive coverage to the actions of the Independent Companies at Salamaua, Mubo and

Wau, and Dick Horton’s Ring of Fire devotes a chapter to the operations of Independent

11 One characteristic of the popular literature related to Independent Companies is that with few exceptions the activities of the Companies other than those on Timor, the 2/2nd and the 2/4th, are given little attention. 12 These general works include such as the official histories found in Lionel Wigmore’s Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Vol.IV, The Japanese Thrust, The Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1957; David Dexter’s Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Vol.VI, The New Guinea Offensives, The Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1961; Dudley McCarthy’s, Australia in the War of 1939-1945 First Year Vol. V, Kokoda to Wau, The Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1959; and Gavin Long’s, Australia in the War of 1939-1945 Vol. VII, The Final Campaigns, The Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1963. Other narratives that exhibit scholarly rigour include works such as Peter Williams’s The Kokoda Campaign 1942 Myth and Reality, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2012; E.G. Keogh’s South West Pacific 1941-1945, Grayflower Productions, Melbourne, 1965, and Raymond Paul’s Retreat from Kokoda, Heinemann, Melbourne, 1958.

Companies.13 Included in this category are the Australian Official Histories of the land War

against Japan. These include Lionel Wigmore’s The Japanese Thrust, Dudley McCarthy’s

First Year: Kokoda to Wau, David Dexter’s The New Guinea Offensive, and Gavin Long’s

The Final Campaigns. 14

Understandably, in the general narratives and official histories the attention paid to

the Independent Companies/Commando Squadrons, when they are mentioned at all, can

never be extensive. In the case of works such as Bradley’s and Horton’s, in which more than

average attention is paid to the subject, there is no attempt to look beyond the immediate

operational history of the Independent Company concerned.15

The fourth genre are works devoted to post-war Special Forces. Peter Collins’ Strike

Swiftly: The Australian Commando Story, Russell Miller’s Commando, Donald Horner’s

Phantoms of the Jungle, and Horner and Thomas’s In Action with the SAS are examples of these.16 Typical of such works Collins and Horner include sections on the Independent

Companies and Commandos of 1941-1945 as preambles to their main narratives. In this way

they attempt to create a lineage from the Second World War formations to later Australian

Special Forces. Miller briefly mentions the Australian Independent Companies/Commando

Squadrons in a work mostly devoted to the Commandos of other nations. In all these works

13 P. Bradley, To Salamaua, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2010; D.C. Horton, Ring of Fire, Australian Guerrilla Operations Against the Japanese in World War II, Secker & Warburg, London, 1983. 14 D. Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives,; G. Long, The Final Campaigns; D. McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau; L. Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust. 15 Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust; Long, The Final Campaigns; Williams, The Kokoda Campaign Myth and Reality; E.G. Keogh, The South West Pacific 1941-1945; R. Paul, Retreat from Kokoda; P. Bradley, The Battle for Wau, New Guinea’s Frontline 1942-1943, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008;Horton, Ring of Fire Australian Guerrilla Operations Against the Japanese in World War II; P. Brune, A Bastard of a Place : The Australians in Papua : Kokoda, Milne Bay, Gona, Buna, Sanananda, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, N.S.W, 2004; P. Brune, Those Ragged Bloody Heroes; Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 1991; Brune, The Spell Broken; Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1997; Peter FitzSimons, Kokoda, Hodder-Headline Australia, Sydney, 2005; Paul Ham, Kokoda, Harper Collins, Pymble, 2004. 16 Peter Collins, Strike Swiftly: The Australian Commando Story, Watermark Press, Boorowa, 2005; D.M. Horner and N. Thomas, In Action with the SAS, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2009. Other examples of this sub-set genre are: R. Miller, Commando, Time Life Books, New York, 1998; D.M. Horner, SAS: Phantoms of the Jungle.

the Independent Companies/Commandos once again form only a minor part of the story and no deep examination of them is attempted.

There is no single account that offers a comprehensive history of those formations and in concert with the preceding discussion taken in total, the historiography of Australia’s

Independent Companies/Commandos during the Second World War is thin. There is no examination of the process which occurred at the inception of the Companies or the attitude of the Army in general to the formation of the companies. No published source examines the resources devoted to the training, equipment and maintenance of the companies. There is no attempt to examine the evolution of the relationship between the Army and the Independent

Companies and the progress or not of the Army’s understanding and appreciation of

Companies. Nor is there any attempt in the published literature to assess the overall contribution by the Independent Companies/Commandos to the Australian War effort 1941-

1945 other than brief references related to the contribution of the Companies on Timor.

Taken as a whole, the existing literature of the Independent Companies/Commando does not offer an opportunity to develop a complete understanding of the history of those formations.

The first aim of this thesis is to contribute to filling this gap in the historiography of the

Australian Independent Companies/Commandos.

Any endeavour to establish such an understanding requires posing a number of questions. Just what does ‘Independent Company/Commando’ mean in the context of the

2AIF 1941-1945? The 1943 change of title from Independent Company to Commando confuses this investigation. The use of ‘Commando’ causes frequent confusion between the

2AIF ‘Commandos’ and organisations such as ‘Z’ and ‘M’ Special Units which as noted

previously had no connection with the Independent Companies/Commandos of the 2AIF.17

Two examples of this confusion of identity can be found in A.B. Feuer’s Australian

Commandos: Their Secret War Against the Japanese in World War II, in which ‘Z’ Special

Unit is referred to throughout as Commandos. While technically correct this provides only a

very narrow window on Australian Commando operations during the Second World War, and

blurs the distinction between ‘Z’ Force and 2AIF Commando formations.

Following on from this it is necessary to trace where the inspiration to form the

Independent Companies originated and the nature of the negotiations which led to the agreement to establish Independent Companies in Australia. Which British agency was responsible for establishing the Independent Company training team despatched to Australia?

Why was it that when the British team designated to train the companies was despatched to

Australia in November 1940, it arrived unheralded, catching the Australian Army by surprise.

What was the nature of the response from the Army to this uncalled-for imposition? Most

importantly in what way did the relationship between the Army and its Commandos evolve

over the period 1941-1945? Was there at any stage during this evolution a time when there

was a general consensus within the Army as to the most appropriate method to employ its

Commandos? What resources, human, material and financial were allocated to the formation

and maintenance of the Companies? What were the characteristics of the Independent

Company training regime and how did this differ from that of standard 2AIF infantry?

Equally how did this training regime change when the Independent Companies were

transformed into Commandos? How important was the contribution to overall operations of

the Independent Companies and Commandos at different times during the war? How

important was the influence of individual commanders on the manner in which the

17 It will be noted, however, that the modern day Australian Commando Association has adopted both ‘Z’ and ‘M’ Force and assimilated them into its organisation as equal and equivalent formations to the 2AIF Independent Companies/Commandos.

companies/squadrons were employed? How did the Australian experience of raising and managing Commandos compare to that of Allied nations who raised similar troops? In the final analysis what was the overall contribution of the Independent Companies/Commandos to the Australian Army’s operations during the Pacific war? The second aim of this thesis is to seeks answers to these key historical questions.

Maurice Tugwell, Director of the McKenzie Institute for the Study of Terrorism at the

University of New Brunswick, in Adapt or Perish: The Forms of Evolution in Warfare identifies two types of wartime adaptation appropriate to military forces. The first of these is the product of inspired imagination, which Tugwell calls ‘innovative adaptability’. The second is the product of reaction to unforeseen or new circumstances or events; this he calls

‘reactive adaptation’.18 Innovative and reactive adaptation, are both displayed throughout the history of the Independent Companies/Commandos. The initial formation of the companies was the product of inspired imagination, but not from the Army. Instead it was the consequence of a decision made by one individual. The Army, however, certainly exhibited evidence of reactive adaptation following the Japanese onslaught of 7 December 1941.

Caught with minimal resources the Army was forced to grasp at anything at hand and in such circumstances reactivated the Independent Companies which it had terminated in November

1941. The training and recruitment regimes experienced by the Independent Companies and

Commandos during the years 1941-1945 were subject to adaptation depending upon the strategic and tactical circumstances facing the Army at various times. This adaptation occurred in two very distinct phases, these being the Independent Company period

1941to1943 and the Commando period late 1943-1945. The evolution of the training regime from Independent Company to Commando was an example of the Army reacting adaptively

18 M. Tugwell, ‘Adapt or Perish: The Forms of Evolution in Warfare’, in D. Charters and M. Tugwell (eds), Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict, Brassey’s Defence Publishers, London, 1989, p. 1.

to the changing strategic and tactical circumstances it found itself in during the later stages of the war.

The process of reactive adaptation in relation to the Army’s relationship with it

Commandos continued throughout the War. During the series of campaigns in New Guinea from 1942 until 1945 and on Bougainville during 1944 and 1945 the Army exhibited the ability to adapt its institutional culture, albeit hesitantly, to embrace the Commando concept.

This progression of evolutionary change by the Army in its relationship with the Independent

Companies-Commandos will feature as a main theme throughout this dissertation.

In order for this thesis to achieve its aims it is necessary to establish a set of criteria by which Australian Independent Company-Commando specialist forces can be examined. Such a set of criteria is provided by Andrew Hargreaves in Special Operations in World War II:

British and American Irregular Warfare. Hargreaves approaches his investigation by posing a series of measures against which specialist forces can be assessed. These are Inception,

Command and Control, Employment, and Cost Effectiveness. Supplementary to these are five criteria identified by David Thomas in The Importance of Commando Operations in

Modern Warfare 1939-1892. These are: the existence of a formal military command structure authorised to conduct commando operations; to include these operations in war planning and ensure the adequate capability for their execution in the formulation of strategy and doctrine; the acceptance of Commando operations as an important form of warfare; the presence of a coherent doctrine for the employment of commando forces; and the recognition of the value of integrating commando operations with the mission of regular forces.19

19 D. Thomas, ‘The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939-1982’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 18, No.4, Oct1983, pp. 689-717, p. 690.

To these can be added consideration of the operational and institutional context in which the

Australian Government and senior Army leadership made decisions which resulted in

changes to, and the deployments of, the Independent Companies/Commandos.

The examination of the Australian Independent Companies/Commando Squadrons in

this thesis will follow a series of themes assessed against the above criteria. These themes are

inception, logistical, administrational and training requirements. In the process case studies of

operational deployments from the very first deployments in 1941 and early 1942 through to

the various campaigns fought by the 2AIF during 1942 and 1943 will be used. The 1944-45

campaigns of Aitape-Wewak and Bougainville will be examined to illustrate the lack of

consensus within the Army as to how commandos were to be employed. How Australia

managed its Commandos, and the difference and similarity to how Allied Nations,

specifically Britain and the United States Marine Corps, managed their Commandos, also

features at appropriate times.20

This thesis is based on archival and other empirical research, and secondary sources.

These sources can be found in a number of locations. Archival material relevant to the

operations of the Independent Companies/Commando Squadrons is to be found at the

Australian War Memorial in a wide range of series, specifically Second World War unit War

Diaries, Second World War Unit and Headquarters files, Personal Papers, recorded

interviews and unpublished manuscripts. The National Archives of Australia Canberra,

Melbourne and Sydney offer a great deal of material related to the formative and later

operational period of the Independent Companies. The papers of Peter Pinney, a member of

both 2/3 Independent Company and 2/8 Commando Squadron, held at the Freyer Library of

20 The focus on British Commandos is because it was from Britain that the inspiration for the Australian Independent Companies came. The focus on the United States Marine Corps is that in early 1942 the Marines raised two ‘Raider’ battalions which were intended to operate as Commandos in the South West Pacific area and are thus analogous in both purpose and theatre of operations to Australian Commando forces.

the University of Queensland, provided a comprehensive collection of personal observations and reminiscences of Pinney’s commando service with both units.21 The State Library of

New South Wales is custodian of the diary of Damian Parer, who spent considerable time with the Independent Companies in 1942 and 1943 and whose insights on his experience are most valuable.22

Sources outside Australia also offer opportunities for research, particularly important due to the paucity of material within Australia related to the original agency responsible for the formation of the training mission for the Australian Independent Companies and accounts from members of the training mission, as well as American accounts of the Independent

Company which served with them during the Buna campaign. The National Archives of the

United Kingdom offer an opportunity to investigate the British connection to the formation of the Independent Companies in 1940, in particular for material related to the Military

Intelligence - Research (MI(R)) sub unit which was the agency responsible for establishing the Companies in Australia.23 These archives also offered useful material related to the

British Commandos.24 The resources of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at

King’s College London offers the personal papers of Field Marshal Sir John Dill, and the personal papers of Major General Robert Laycock, Commando commander and later head of

Combined Operations.25 The Imperial War Museum provided the taped recording of an interview with Michael Calvert who was one of the three primary members of 104 Military

Mission which trained Independent Companies in Australia.26 The British Library allowed access to books specifically related to the subject of MI(R) and Commando training.27

21 Papers of Peter Pinney, Freyer Library University of Queensland, UQFL288, UQFL. 22 The Diary of Damien Parer, State Library of New South Wales, MLMSS 1097. 23 Series WO208, HS8/256, 257, 258, 260, 261, 263, 294, UKNA. 24 Series WO106/1986, WO204/1527, WO208/644 and DEFE2/1134, UKNA. 25 Papers of Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Dill 3/2/1-6; Papers of Major General Robert Laycock, Laycock 1/3, 2/3, 2/5, 2/8, 4/1, 4/11, 4/21, 5/7, 5/27, 6/3, 6/13 and 6/16, LHMA. 26 Audio Interview Michael ‘Mad Mike’ Calvert, IWM9942. 27 J.B. Astley, The Inner Circle – A View of War at the Top, The Memoir Club, Stanhope, 2007; D. Gilchrist, Castle Commando, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1960.

United States sources were equally valuable, especially for the activities of 2/6th

Independent Company during the time when it was attached to the U.S. 32nd Infantry

Division at Buna. The archives consulted in this case were The Dwight D. Eisenhower

Archives in Abilene, Kansas, where the Journal of the 1st Battalion 128th Infantry provided

material related to 2/6th Independent Company.28 The National Archives and Records

Administration in College Park, Maryland, offered material related to the service of 2/6th

Independent Company with US Forces. Of particular value was the collection of material

related to the official U.S. Army history of the campaign in Papua.29 The MacArthur

Memorial Archives in Norfolk, Virginia, has a comprehensive collection of Historical Index

Cards which provided a wealth of information concerning the activities of 2/5th Independent

Company during 1942.30 The United States Marine Corps History Division provided

material related to the Marine Corps Raiders.31 Equally valuable were discussions with the

staff at the History Division who provided insights into aspects of the Marine Raiders not

readily apparent solely from written sources. In the same way the United States Marine Corps

Archives Branch Division made available their extensive collection of transcribed oral

histories and personal correspondence.32 Complementary to these sources was the Marine

Raiders Museum, which while not a repository of archival material, is surprisingly well

endowed with artefacts related to the Marine Raiders.

Back in Australia oral history resources have been of significant value. The recorded

interviews of historian Neil MacDonald with officers and men of the 2/3rd independent

Company found at the Australian War Memorial are for example of immeasurable

28 Journal of 1st Bn 128th Infantry, Sept – Nov1942 (incomplete), Series II Library, DDEA. 29 WWII Operations Reports, 1940-48, RECORDS OF THE ARMY STAFF, Center of Military History VICTORY IN PAPUA, Series: RG 319, RG407, RG496, NARA. 30 Historical Index Cards (Actual) Record Group 3, MMA. 31 Series PC56 Marine Raiders, USMCHD. 32 Oral History Transcripts History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps: Major General Thomas Holcomb, Major General Omar T. Pfeiffer, Lieutenant Colonel Evans Carlson, Lieutenant Colonel James Roosevelt and Sergeant Charles Land, USMCAB.

usefulness.33 In these interviews the recollections of John Lewin, Ron Garland, John

Winterflood and other prominent members of the 2/3rd Independent Company offer

unmatched first hand material. Online interviews with David Dexter, former officer with

2/2nd Independent Company and former Commando Stephen Murray Smith held at the

National Library of Australia, are of equal value and importance.34 In the same light

interviews with Japanese veterans conducted by Dr. Peter Williams during visits to Japan

provide a window onto an alternative view of the war.35 Various Commando Associations or

their successor organisations in Australia also possess useful primary source material.36

A final note should be made related to the methodology undertaken in this thesis. It

has not been possible to apply a comprehensive top-down approach to this subject as there

appears to be no high-level documentation produced by the Army during the period 1941 –

1943 which dealt with the formation of the Independent Companies or the intended use of the

Companies. Indeed, the only documentation discovered referred to the anticipated use of the

Companies and stated that the Army had no idea what to do with the companies. A clear

indication of the lack of high-level consideration. The situation did change to a degree in late

1943 and into 1944 when the Army established the Commandos and did produce guidelines

for Commandos. This thesis deals with the Commando guidelines at the appropriate time and

comments on the Army’s intentions for its Commandos as revealed by these guidelines. The

point is made, however, that even though guidelines had been produced the Army did not

collectively adhere to these guidelines or institute all of them. Generally, the evidence

suggests that the Army did not exhibit any serious top down interest for the Independent

33 Interviews by Neil MacDonald with members of 2/3rd Independent Company: AWM S04152-64 and AWMS04173. 34 David Dexter, interviewed by Mel Pratt for the Mel Pratt collection, 25 Aug – 21 Sept 1976, , accessed 10 Aug 2015; Murray-Smith, Stephen, interviewed by Hazel de Berg in the Hazel de Berg collection, 1961, , accessed 9 Aug 2015. 35 Dr. Peter D. Williams and Naoko Nakagawa interviews 2006: Major Masao Horie, Major Takahisa Okamoto, Lt. Colonel Masuo Shinoda, Captain Kokichi Nakamura. 36 Cavalry News, Official organ of 6th Div. Cav. Commando. Regt. Association. [NSW]; ‘The 2/4-THER’, Published by the 2/4th Australian Commando Association.

Companies and when it did for the Commandos it did not ensure a consensus of how to

manage its Commandos in line with its own stated guidelines. Conversely there is a great deal

of material available from lower levels within the army related to Independent Companies

and Commandos. This material covers all aspects of these formations. The plethora of bottom

up material is in direct contrast to the lack of top down material. As a consequence of the lack

of top down records (congruent with Army’s lack of a strategic plan to manage commandos)

this thesis pursues a bottom up analytical methodology. P.18

Australia’s war with Japan was protracted and bitterly contested. The Australian

Independent Companies and later Commando Squadrons made a notable, and at times vital,

contribution to Army’s ability to fight and overcome its Japanese foe. While the current

historiography acknowledges that contribution, the manner in which this has been done is

often populist in character, piecemeal in nature, uneven in quality, unduly focussed on specific parochial examples and lacking in any sense of examining the subject in anything but a superficial manner. Beginning to provide a correction to these shortfalls is the fundamental goal of this thesis. The importance of gaining a full appreciation of the contribution made by the Independent companies/Commando Squadrons to the war against the Japanese justifies the attempt.

CHAPTER 1

AN ARMY UNREADY – THE FORMATION OF THE INDEPENDENT COMPANIES

The formation of the Australian Independent Companies saw an unconventional

military entity essentially imposed on an established conventionally-oriented army, leaving

the latter no option but to manage the encounter as best it could. The historiography of the

formative moment of the Australian Independent Companies reflects the uncertainty of this

period, and is characterised by anecdote and speculation. By contrast this chapter seeks to

carefully trace and analyse the formation of the Australian Independent Companies.

The decision to form the Independent Companies was made as a consequence of a

series of private, personal and secret communications between May and July 1940 between

General Sir John Dill, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (C.I.G.S), and Lieutenant

General Sir Cyril Brundenell-White the Chief of the Australian General Staff (C.G.S). White

told no one about the communications, not even Major General John Northcott, his deputy.

White’s untimely death in the Fairbairn Air disaster of August 1940 complicated the situation in that all first-hand knowledge of the agreement that he made with Dill died with him.37

Consequently, there is very little direct evidence of the agreement to establish Independent

37 The scenario of a private and personal arrangement between Dill and White to decide on the formation of the Australian Independent Companies certainly rings true. Dill knew several prominent members of the Australian military establishment, being reminded of his Australian ‘friends’ Morsehead, Wynter and Bridgeford in a 21 Jul1940 letter, see: DILL 3/3/2 Captain Beeman to Dill 21 Jul1940, LHCMA. These Australian friends being at the time of the letter, Brigadier Leslie Morsehead, Major General Henry Wynter, Brigadier William Bridgeford. Dill would have also known White from the time he served as General Staff Officer (Grade 1) of the Australian 1st Division during 1917 at the same time White had been Brigadier General Staff of the ANZAC Corps. White had also been the first Australian Officer to attend the Imperial Staff College at Camberley in 1906 of which Dill would have been aware, see: R.C, Stevenson, ‘The Anatomy of a Division: The 1st Australian Division in the Great War, 1914-1919’, PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales, 2010, p. 310; J. Bentley, ‘Champion of ANZAC: General Sir Brudenell White, the First Australian Imperial Force and the emergence of the Australian Military Culture 1914-1918’, PhD Thesis, School of History and Politics, University of Wollongong, 2003, p. 6. Approaching White would therefore not have been an entirely unexpected initiative. That this was conducted in very much the form of a gentleman’s agreement, without recourse to any formal structure, is also not surprising, given the multitude of interpersonal relationships that existed within the Imperial military hierarchy of the day.

Companies in Australia. Complementary contemporary sources do acknowledge that an

agreement did take place.38 In subsequent years the undocumented nature of the discussion

between Dill and White has provided an opportunity for somewhat imaginative

interpretations of the genesis of the Independent Companies within the existing body of the

relevant literature. In All the Bulls Men, for example, Cyril Ayris states that a training mission

to Australia was the idea of Prime Minister Menzies and it was he who proposed it to the

British at a Prime Ministers conference in London in 1940.39 This did not occur.40 Equally

imaginatively, Don Astill in Commando White Diamond – Unit History of the 2/8 Australian

Commando Squadron, makes the claim that the establishment of the Independent Companies

came about from a conversation between White and Lieutenant General Vernon Sturdee,

which was certainly not the case.41 The idea that protracted negotiations between Britain and

Australia on the establishment of a Military Mission to Australia is a feature of several accounts.42 Again, however, this is misleading. There were in fact, no such ‘protracted negotiations’. Confirmation that the wider Australian officialdom knew nothing of any

agreement to establish Independent Companies came in January 1941 when a most contrite

cable arrived from the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs apologising to the

Australian Government for failing to inform it of the Independent Company training mission

which had been despatched from Great Britain to Australia in accordance with the original

38 Lieutenant General Vernon Sturdee mentioned an exchange of cables on the subject of establishing Independent Companies in Australia on his assumption of the role of C.G.S. following White’s death, see: Callinan, Independent Company, p. xiii; A note dated 23 Jul1941 from Northcott to Percy Spender, the Australian Army Minister, mentioned the conversation between White and Dill, referring to ‘secret and personal cables between the C.I.G.S and C.G.S. direct’, in connection with arrangements for the Independent Company training program, see: Deputy C.G.S to Minister 23 Jul41, MP742/1/0 M/7/168 NAA; Prime Minister Robert Menzies, Army Minister Frank Forde and Sir George Knowles of the Attorney General Department were aware of an exchange of messages between White and Dill, see: War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission), A1608 G39/2/1 NAA, and Forde to Blamey 13 Jun 1942, MP729/6/0 29/401/477 NAA, and Knowles to Acting Attorney General (no date), War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission), A1608 G39/2/1 NAA. 39 Ayris, All the Bull’s Men, p. 24. 40 Menzies was not in London during 1940 and no such Prime Ministers Conference occurred. 41 Astill, Commando White Diamond, p. 1. 42 E. Walker, ‘History of No.7 Infantry Training Centre and the formation of the Independent Companies 1941- 1942’, Despatch, Vol. XII No.12, Jun 1977, p. 335; K. James, Double Diamond Australian Commandos in the Pacific War, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 2016, p. 28.

Dill/White exchange of cables on the matter.43 This oversight was underscored on 26 March

1941 when a note from the British War Office to Australia stated that someone had blundered

in not formally informing Australia about the Mission.44

In fact White’s arrangement with Dill had set in place an agreement for the Australian

Army to take on board a type of unit which defied every norm of the Army’s traditional

military culture and tradition. Most importantly it was an arrangement made without any

attempt to consult with the wider Australian Army prior to the agreement. By the end of July

1940 Dill and White had made their private agreement to despatch a British Independent

Company training team to Australia and New Zealand. What needed to be done then was for

the project to be handed on to the appropriate agency. The Independent Company training

mission to Australia went under the designation of 104 Military Mission. The establishment

of the mission and the subsequent formation of the Companies in Australia has been

mistakenly attributed to the Special Operations Executive (SOE), newly formed in October

1940. Indeed the files on 104 Military Mission held by the National Archives of Australia are

listed as ‘Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission)’, making an explicit connection

between the Mission and SOE.45 It was even thought by some such as Captain Michael

Calvert, one of the British trainers with 104 Military Mission, that SOE was the agency which administered the mission.46 On 2 February 1941 British High Commissioner Sir

Geoffrey Whiskard sent a message to acting Prime Minister Arthur Fadden related to the

provision of unconventional training resources to be provided by SOE.47 In January 1941 the

43 From Sec of State for Dominion Affairs, London, to PM Department 22 Jan 41 – 27 Jan 41, War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission), A1608 G39/2/1, NAA. 44 Extract from a letter received from M.L.O. London, ‘For Information and Necessary Action’, dated 26 Mar1941, MP729/6/0 38/401, NAA. 45 War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission), A1608 G39/2/1, NAA. 46 Michael ‘Mad Mike’ Calvert interview, 9942 Reel 3-5, IWM. In Calvert’s case this may have been technically correct, if he was discussing the period post-Oct1940, as SOE officially adopted 104 Military Mission in Oct 1940, even though it did not administer the formation or despatch of the mission to Australia. 47 Wiskard to Fadden 2 Feb 1941, War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission) A1608 G39/2/1, NAA.

Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs wrote to the Australian Prime Minister’s Department

referring to SOE in regard to countering subversive activity.48 While neither Whiskard nor

the Secretary’s communiqués directly refer to 104 Military Mission, the subject matter they

discussed was very much akin to that intended for 104 Military Mission. In 1984 the Aide de

Camp of Sturdee alluded to SOE as the controlling agency for the mission.49 Based upon

such sources it would reasonable to accept that the originating agent for 104 Military Mission

was SOE. A recent secondary source, Karl James’s Double Diamond, indirectly implies an

SOE connection with the Independent Company program.50 All of these claims and

assumptions regarding SOE being the agency responsible for the formation and despatch of

104 Military Mission to Australia are incorrect.

The originating agent for Australian Independent Company training mission was in

fact a sub-unit of the British Military Intelligence Directorate known as Military Intelligence

Research - MI(R).51 MI(R) was a classic example of the small esoteric intelligence agencies

that flourished within the British military establishment in the early years of the war. It consisted of a small nucleus of staff officers who acted as a link between various branches of the General Staff. 52 MI(R)’s original charter had been to research problems of tactics and

organisation. By June 1940 its role had come to include general research for the employment

of special and irregular forces, technical research and production, collecting information and

interviewing, training and recording personnel.53 Administered by ‘Section D’ whose role

was to manage sabotage and spying, MI(R) was considered to be part of the Secret Service.54

48 Ibid. 49 Calvert interview, 9942 reels 3-5, IWM. 50 James, Double Diamond, p. 28. 51 Astley, The Inner Circle, p. 20. 52 MI (R) Functions and Organisation, WO208 8/256, UKNA. 53 MI(R) Progress Reports: Report of the Organisation within the War Office for the Conduct of Para-Military Activities, 25 Aug 1940, HS 8/260, UKNA. 54 Astley, The Inner Circle, pp. 20-1.

MI(R) was commanded by Colonel Jo Holland, an independently minded and

imaginative officer (Plate 1). In 1938 Holland had been the original and only member of the

General Staff (Research) sub-unit and had been given the task of considering the coming war

with Germany and how Britain could best fight it.55 By 1940 General Staff (Research) had

become MI(R). In June 1940 the establishment of MI(R) had increased to one colonel, three

majors, five captains, one military clerk and three civilian female stenographers. Officers

were frequently abroad on ‘missions’.56 At that time MI(R) was managing twenty-four such

missions to diverse places such as Abyssinia, Aden, the Belgian Congo, Kenya, Central

America, the Atlantic Islands and intriguingly titled ‘Shadow’ missions to Yugoslavia and

Greece. Each Mission was numbered. Mission 18 was, in fact, 104 Military Mission to

Australia and New Zealand. By August 1940, with Australian authorities in blissful

ignorance, a leader for 104 Military Mission had been selected and the selection of assistants

was in hand.57

55 Ibid., p. 19. 56 MI(R) Progress Reports: Report of the Organisation within the War Office for the Conduct of Para-Military Activities, 25 Aug 1940, HS 8/260, UKNA. 57 Ibid.

Plate 1: Colonel Jo Holland Commanding Officer of MI(R).58

58 Astley, The Inner Circle.

The second misconception associated with the formative era of the Independent

Companies is that the role of 104 Military Mission was primarily a military one. All

secondary sources which mention the training team focus solely on the military aspects of the

mission. That this misconception could occur is once more understandable. The primary

focus of MI(R) was to facilitate the formation of units which were designed ‘to carry out

military operations to further para-military activities, these being represented by Commandos,

Independent Companies and special units for home defence’.59 The intention by the British

War Office to form such units in Australia to operate in the Middle East and North Africa as well as other ‘enemy occupied territories’ was conveyed to Australia in mid-1940.60 Such

units were to engage in guerrilla warfare, special weapons and demolitions all of which were

in the gamut of the Independent Company milieu.

Raising Independent Companies was, however, only one aspect of 104 Military

Mission’s agenda. Running parallel to the military intention of the Mission was another

equally important and decidedly non-military task. An Instruction from the British Director

of Military Intelligence issued two days before the Mission embarked for Australia made

clear that the primary focus of the Mission was to ‘initiate defensive action against enemy

fifth column and para-military activities in Australia and her dependencies’.61 There was no

mention of raising or training Independent Companies, although the use of the term para-

military implies that some type of unconventional unit was in mind. To this end 104 Military

Mission was to facilitate the establishment within Australia of a system of special branches to

provide security against domestic enemy activity.62 Indeed the majority of the original MI(R)

59 MI(R) Functions and Organisation, DMI to DRO 28 Jun 40; HS 8/260 UKNA; MI(R) Progress Reports: Report of the Organisation within the War Office for the Conduct of Para-Military Activities, 25 Aug 1940, HS 8/260, UKNA. 60 Extracts from files dealing with the Object and Control of 104 Military Mission, MP729/6/0 38/401/172, NAA. 61 Instructions of No.104 Military Mission 9 Oct1940, MP729/6/0 38/401/172, NAA. 62 Extract MI(R) War Diaries, HS 8/263, UKNA.

documentation for 104 Military Mission focuses on these internal security tasks; very little

space is given to the intention of raising the Independent Companies.

The focus on internal security by 104 Military Mission was the product of a serious

concern about the extent of German and Italian subversion within nations around the world.

The claim was made that German military success had to a large extent been achieved by its subversive activities.63 Lieutenant Colonel Colin Gubbins, a member of MI(R) during 1939

and 1940 who later went on to head the SOE, noted after the war that,

the tremendous harvest that Germany reaped through the use of these [unconventional] means, for example the subversion of Austria in 1939 [sic], the rape of Czechoslovakia in 1939 all without a shot being fired – and then in 1940 the elimination of France as a combatant, fundamentally attributed to the rot in Government circles achieved by German “5th Column” activities.64

While Gubbins may well have overstated Germany’s gains in this regard he was

expressing a very real concern at the influence and impact of German subversive activities.

Australia was not immune to such activities or the fear of such activities. The Germans had agents in Australia as part of their Auslands operation of which Australia was a branch.

According to MI(R) the fifth Column in Australia was called the Landskreis. In 1936 Nazis unsuccessfully tried to take over the German clubs in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne.

Nazis did make progress in Tanunda, South Australia (43 miles from Adelaide) whose population was mostly of German ancestry. The acting Consul for Germany made pro-Nazi speeches and showed Nazi propaganda films.65 A primary function of 104 Military Mission was to create safeguards against such enemy subversion. It was a role unrelated to the

63 Ibid. 64 A.R.B. Linderman, Rediscovering Irregular Warfare Colin Gubbins and the origin of Britian’s Special operation Executive, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2016, p. 96. 65 MI(R) Operational Reports, HS 8/261, UKNA.

establishment of organised military units within the A.I.F and one that would consequently

occupy the majority of the attention of the Mission commander to the detriment of its

relationship with the Army.

A significant contributing factor in the failure to communicate the arrival and

intentions of 104 Military Mission was the nature of MI(R) itself, an organisation intensely focused on security and secrecy. The nature of its missions, many of which were clandestine, required close attention to both. The culture of secrecy was reinforced by MI(R)’s relationship with Section D under whose guardianship MI(R) came. Section D’s rules on security were obsessive to the point of absurd. Employees of Section D were advised not to leave the office for any reason during daylight hours. This was so German agents would have difficulty identifying them. For the same reason Section D employees were forbidden to acknowledge each other in the street although Colonel Holland undermined this decree somewhat by insisting on shouting ‘Boo’ at anyone he recognised from Section D in the street.66 The desire to secure security influenced even the mundane aspects of MI(R)’s work.

A routine order issued to staff, for example, ordered them to minimise paperwork and very sensibly to not leave any paper on their desks when they completed their work for the day.67

This minimising of paperwork resulted in the retention of far less formal paper records to and

from MI(R). This combined with the small number of clerical staff, three stenographers and

one clerk, who were working for MI(R) and their work load, at one time managing up to

twenty-four missions outside the UK, may have been a contributing factor to the failure to

issue a formal notification of the mission to Australia.68

The culture of secrecy surrounding the Mission extended beyond the concerns of MI

(R) and was echoed in Australia. In January 1941 Prime Minister Menzies, after having been

66 Astley, The Inner Circle, p. 21. 67 MI(R) Functions and Organisation, HS 8/256, UKNA. 68 MI(R) Progress Reports, HS 8/260, UKNA.

told about the arrival of 104 Mission from Britain to train ‘Assault Troops’, directed that all

knowledge of the Mission was to be restricted to himself, Percy Spender the Minister for the

Army, and Arthur Fadden now acting as the Federal Treasurer.69 There is no record that

either Spender or Fadden passed on their knowledge of the Mission to the Army. It was in

such a furtive environment that 104 Military Mission began work on Australian shores.

The officer commanding 104 Military Mission was Lieutenant Colonel John

Mawhood. The task Mawhood had been sent to Australia to undertake, and his

unconventional military background, would conspire to make his time in Australia both

controversial and confrontational. In June 1940 Mawhood was not an officer of the Regular

British army. He had served during the World War 1 in a variety of roles, including some

time with the AIF.70 Mawhood had cut his full-time ties with the military during the early

1920s, and become a member of MI5, the British internal security service. It was because of

his expertise in this role, which would service the mission’s primary security role, that he was

appointed the commander of 104 Military Mission and despatched to Australia, having been

given the rank of Lieutenant Colonel ‘for form’s sake’.71 Mawhood’s reception in Australia,

however, was anything but cordial.

Mawhood’s intention to review and rearrange Australia’s internal security services

was seen as a direct threat to the established state and military security services within

Australia. In 1940-1941 internal security in Australia was the province of the Army and it had

no intention of surrendering its responsibilities in this area. Mawhood was seen as threat in

69 Fadden to Spender, Proposed formation and training of Special Assault Troops, 20th May 1941, War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission), A1608 G39/2/1, NAA. 70 Mawhood had served during 1915-1921 with the Australian 8th Light Horse, the ANZAC Provost Corps, The Guides (Indian Cavalry), Brigade Major North Persia, General HQ Baghdad. In Aug 1939 he was called up as a Lieutenant on the T.A.R.O. special list and by Dec had been appointed temporary Major. He was given command of 104 Military Mission and appointed temporary Lt. Colonel in Sept 1940, see: Response to personal message from First Naval Member of the Director of Naval Intelligence - 6 Aug 41 A.R. Nankervic Secretary, Mawhood’s prior service, War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission), A1608 G39/2/1, NAA. 71 Calvert interview, 9942 Reels 3, 4, 5, IWM; War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission), A1608 G39/2/1, NAA.

this regard. Consequently, the Army did everything in its power to oppose Mawhood’s

mission and for him to be returned to Britain. Indeed, the matter would produce voluminous

amounts of paperwork aimed at undermining Mawhood’s legitimacy. One example of this

was an extraordinarily lengthy letter written by Blamey to the Minister for Defence which

listed point by point all of Mawhood’s supposed failings as an officer and recommending his

immediate dismissal and return to Britain.72 The acrimony directed personally at Mawhood

grew so incredible as to become a farce. Senior military officers claimed that the person

purporting to be Mawhood was in fact an impostor and that the real Mawhood had been

pushed off the ship on the way to Australia. Despite Mawhood’s identity being confirmed by

the Attorney General’s Department, the Director of the Security Services continued to repeat

the claim that Mawhood’s identity was in question, claims that only ceased when the

perpetrator was personally rebuked by the Attorney General William Morris Hughes.73

Nonetheless, the Army’s crusade against Mawhood continued. In October 1941 an

arrest warrant was issued by the C.G.S. for Mawhood. Mawhood went into hiding, but as this

coincided with the fall of the Menzies government the matter was soon forgotten.74 The

Army’s persistence in its vendetta against Mawhood caused tension between the Army and the Federal Government. Mawhood had the support of the Federal Attorney General’s

Department as well as Prime Minister Menzies, who personally intervened on his behalf.

Federal Government agencies expressed written concern of the Australian High Command’s handling of the matter. Eventually the Federal Attorney General’s Department seconded

Mawhood to its service removing him from the Army’s authority and beyond its reach.75 It is

72 From Blamey CinC Army Land Forces HQ 10 Jul42 – to Minister for Defence on Lt. Col Mawhood, War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission), A1608 G39/2/1, NAA. 73 Attachment 1 Copy of Attorney Generals file 1955/4428: Lieutenant Colonel Mawhood, A12383 A/2/1, NAA. 74 Calvert Interview, 9942 reels 3-5, IWM. 75 Prime Minister’s Department to Australian High Commissioner London and Spender, 29 Aug 41, MP729/6/0 29/401/477 NAA; Department of Defence Co-ordination to Secretary Department of the Army 22 Jul41, MP729/6/0 29/401/477, NAA.

difficult not to believe that this ongoing conflict between Mawhood and the Army would not

influence the attitudes of the Army towards Mawhood’s Mission as a whole. The subsequent

less than enthusiastic and ultimately dismissive attitude of the Army to the Independent

Company training program during 1941 indicates that this was so.

Distracted by his internal security role and consequent ongoing battle with the Army

authority Mawhood delegated the day-to-day business of managing the training of Australian

Independent Companies to his subordinates. It was in the hands of these subordinates that the

fate of the Australian Independent Companies would rest. Luckily, those hands were most

capable. The officers under Mawhood’s command were personifications of the idiosyncratic

manner by which MI(R) managed its training programs. One of MI(R)’s tasks was to create a

list of names, a pool of personalities who were experts in certain fields no matter how

esoteric.76 These individuals would be approached and offered employment when and if their

particular skill was needed. It was in this way that personnel were chosen for 104 Military

Mission. Mawhood had been chosen for his experience with internal security matters, but this

did nothing for the military side of the mission which was to establish Independent

Companies. For this two officers were chosen whose skills matched the requirements to train

unconventional soldiers in guerrilla warfare.

The first of these was Captain Frederick ‘Freddy’ Spencer Chapman (Plate 2).

Spencer Chapman was a British Territorial officer with the 5th Battalion Seaforth

Highlanders.77 Before the war he had surveyed the Greenland coast from an open boat; taken

part in the British Arctic Air Route Expedition; conducted a further private expedition to

Greenland; trekked with reindeer across Lapland; climbed mountains in Sikkim and Tibet;

and visited Lhasa. He was a noted expert on birds and had written several books including

76 DMI to DRO, 28 Jun 40. MI(RT) had 1500 individuals on its list, HS 8/257, UKNA. 77 The British Territorial Army was the volunteer reserve component of the British Army. Its members held civilian jobs and paraded at their units on a regular basis or when called up.

Northern Lights, Watkin’s Last Expedition, Lhasa: The Holy City and Helvellyn to

Himalaya.78 Spencer Chapman’s greatest talent was field-craft and it was for this skill that

he was recruited by MI(R) to go to Australia. Those who met Chapman described him as an

individualist lone-wolf type of adventurer, whose field-stalking abilities were phenomenal.79

Plate 2: Captain Freddy Spencer Chapman80

The second of the military trainers of 104 Mission was Captain Michael ‘Mad Mike’

Calvert (Plate 3), was an officer of the Royal Engineers. As an instructor Calvert was both

irrepressible and enthusiastic. He was a natural rebel, a maverick who was full of original

ideas on irregular warfare.81 Calvert’s talent was for demolitions and earned him a label as ‘a

78 F. S. Chapman and H.G. Watkins, Northern Lights; The Official Account of the British Arctic Air-Route Expedition, 1930-1931, Chatto and Windus, London, 1932; F. Spencer Chapman, Watkin's Last Expedition, Penguin, Hammondsworth, 1938; F. Spencer Chapman, Lhasa : the Holy City, Chatto & Windus, London, 1938, F. Spencer Chapman, Helvellyn to Himalaya . London: Chatto & Windus, 1940. Spencer Chapman was awarded the Arctic Medal (1931) and the Gill Memorial Medal (Royal Geographical Society), 1941. 79 2/2nd Commando Squadron War Diary May 1945 to Feb 1946, AWM52 2/2/54. 80Daily Mail ‘How Cambridge educated botanist fought 4 Year War against Japanese’ accessed 10 Jul2017. 81 R. Barker, One Man’s Jungle, a Biography of F. Spencer Chapman, Chatto & Windus, London, 1975, p. 175; S. Bidwell, The Chindit War – Stillwell, Wingate and the Campaign in Burma 1944, MacMillan Publishing Co, Inc, New York, 1979, pp. 58-9.

definite destruction fanatic’, able to blow up anything from battleships to brigadiers.82

Calvert’s mind was already attuned to unconventional warfare, having written a lengthy

appreciation of guerrilla warfare in early 1940, which he had submitted to Holland.83

Plate 3: Captain Michael Calvert84

Supplementing Spencer Chapman and Calvert were two senior NCOs: Staff Sergeant P.

Stafford, Duke of Wellington’s Regiment, recruited to teach demolitions, and Sergeant F.A.

Misselbrook, Royal Corps of Signals, to teach radio and other communication skills.85

On 6 October 1940, 104 Military Mission embarked from Britain aboard the SS

Rimutaka.86 The delegation was well prepared, having aboard half a ton of plastic explosive,

82 F. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral, Chatto & Windus, London, 1950, pp. 8-9; 2/2nd Commando Squadron War Diary May 1945 to Feb 1946, AWM52 2/2/54; CDO NEW BRITAIN Vol 1:1 11 Jul’45, p. 6. This publication was a periodical newsletter for the Commandos on New Britain produced by 2/2nd Commando Squadron during the war. 83 Calvert to Holland 13 Sept 1940, HS8262, UKNA. 84 Axis History Forum, , accessed 10 Jul2017. 85 Walker, ‘History of No.7 Infantry Training Centre and the formation of the Independent Companies 1941- 1942’, p. 335. 86 Barker, One Man’s Jungle, p. 179.

36 Tommy guns, 50,000 maps of South Pacific islands and ‘Hurricane’ radio sets for ground

to air communication.87 Sailing by the Panama Canal route the Mission arrived in Australia

in November.88 Due to secrecy and the failure to inform Australian authorities the Mission’s

arrival was completely unheralded. This was, as intimated in the British communiqué of 26

March 1941, something of a blunder by the British War Office. The British War Office was

not, however, solely at fault for the unheralded arrival of the mission. On 28 August 1940 MI

(R) files indicate that Australian authorities, just which authorities is not revealed, were

informed by the War Office that Lieutenant Colonel Mawhood and his party would be

departing for Australia in September, indicating that there was some foreknowledge in

Australia of the arrival of 104 Military Mission, even if the nature and purpose of the mission

was unknown.89 For whatever reason it appears that this information was not passed on to the

relevant authorities in Australia or if it had been nothing was done with it. This may have

been because without further information as to what the mission was or what was the purpose

of the mission it was felt that there was in fact nothing to pass on.

Be this as it may, some elements within the Australian military certainly had some

knowledge of an impending mission to train specialised troops in Australia. On 30 September

1940, Sturdee wrote to Spender advising him of the agreement between the C.I.G.S. and the

Australian C.G.S. to raise specially trained ‘Assault Troops’ in Australia. Sturdee mentioned

87 Michael ‘Mad Mike’ Interview, 9942 Reels 3-5, IWM. 88 B. Moynahan, Jungle Soldier, The True Story of Freddy Spencer Chapman, Quercus, London, 2009, p. 93; Walker, ‘History of No.7 Infantry Training Centre and the formation of the Independent Companies 1941- 1942’, p. 335. It may have been that the Training Team did not arrive in Australia aboard the Rimutaka. The Rimutaka, formerly SS Mongolia, was taken into Liner service in Mar1940 and served the U.K. – New Zealand route during war years. In peace time the Rimutaka terminated its voyage from the U.K. via the Panama Canal in Wellington. If this was so, in Nov 1940 the training team personnel may well have transferred to another vessel to complete their journey to Australia presumably landing in Melbourne although there is no record of which port they disembarked. Details of the history of SS Rimutaka can be found at, < https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS_Mongolia_(1922)#Rimutaka.2C_1938.E2.80.9350 >, accessed 3 Mar2017. 89 Extracts from files dealing with the Object and Control of 104 Military Mission, MP729/6/0 38/401/172, NAA.

that a team of three officers and two N.C.O.s were to be sent to Australia.90 Sturdee’s recommendation that assault troops should be raised was passed on the Prime Minister

Menzies. As previously mentioned Sturdee was aware of the exchange of messages between

Dill and White regarding the establishment of Independent Companies when he assumed the post of C.G.S. following the death of White in August 1940. Further, on 9 October 1940 a directive for the establishment of a Special Secret School of Demolitions was issued by Army

Headquarters, Melbourne. This made reference to a training team arriving from Britain to run the school. A training area was being sought for the school and Timboon, south of

Camperdown in N.S.W., had been identified for that purpose.91 The date of this directive, the

reference to ‘demolitions’, the acknowledgement of a mission of some type en-route to

Australia, all indicate there was at least an inkling of a special mission coming to Australia.

Significantly the actual composition and purpose of the mission was still unknown and consequently it had been misidentified as a demolitions school. There had in fact been no

‘formal approach’ from Britain to Australia regarding despatching a training Mission to

Australia. In this case the fault lay with Britain, but at the same time it does appear there was a degree of foreknowledge in Australia that a Mission was imminent, but this knowledge was either not passed on or muddled and misunderstood. As such, fault for the failure to inform the Australian Government of the arrival, or more accurately failure to pay heed to the imminent arrival of the Mission, was not entirely due to British inefficiency.

The initial reaction from Australian authorities, when confronted by an unexpected ship loaded with explosives, automatic weapons, maps and radios, was to suspect the members of the Mission of being enemy agents. Calvert recalled that the Mission personnel were initially accused of being ‘Nazi saboteurs’ and that for some time they were under

90 Sturdee to Minister 30 Sept 1940, War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission), A1608 G39/2/1, NAA. 91 Special School of Demolitions Mission 104, AWM193 MS 19/40.

serious suspicion from authorities.92 Other aspects of the Mission caused the Australian

military to regard Mawhood’s team with suspicion. Mawhood’s less-than-conventional

military background caused immediate suspicion. Spencer Chapman insisted on wearing his

regimental kilt, but as he was from the 5th Battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders and that

battalion wore a different tartan from the remainder of the regiment he was suspected of

being an impostor. For his part Calvert was suspected as his attitude towards common

soldiers was relaxed and somewhat informal which was, according to those Australian

officers who were watching him, not at all how a British officer would be expected to behave.

The suspicion of the Mission as an enemy-inspired operation eventually dissipated thanks to

the intervention and ‘utmost cooperation’ from Sturdee.93

Even though the Mission was eventually accepted for what it was, as opposed to what

it had been imagined to be, progress towards establishing a training program for Independent

Companies moved at a snail’s pace. One factor influencing this tardiness may have been the

continuing ambiguity of just what the purpose of the Mission was. On 21 January 1941 a

cablegram from the Prime Minister’s department continued to identify the three objects of the

Mission as countering enemy fifth column activity in Australia, training Independent

Companies, and organising native guerrilla operations in enemy-held territory.94 The very

next day a similar cablegram reinforced the anti-fifth column purpose of the Mission.95 In

fact there were no definite written instructions received from Britain as to just what exactly

the object of the Mission was. The lack of any specific directives would have frustrated the

92 Calvert Interview, 9942 reels 3-5, IWM. 93 Ibid. Sturdee’s support may have stemmed from his earlier advocacy on 30 Sept 1940 of special service ‘assault troops’ for the Australian army, see: War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission), Sturdee to the Minister 30 Sept 1940, NAA – A1608 G39/2/1. Sadly, following his death Sturdee’s wife burned all his papers. Those papers related to Sturdee which do exist can be found as component parts of official files of other senior commanders or official communiqués, or as in the case of the 30 Sept letter to the Minister advocating the formation of assault troops, within files related to Mawhood. 94 Prime Minister’s Department Cablegram to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 21 Jan 1941, War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission), A1608 G39/2/1, NAA. 95 Ibid.

Australian Army’s ability to form a special training centre appropriate to the purposes of the

mission.96

A further reason for the Australian Army’s reticence would have been that that the

whole initiative could easily be viewed as one driven by and serving British interests. Indeed

the idea for the Mission had originated in Britain and beyond General Brudenell White

Australia had not been consulted in any way regarding it. Within this context the Independent

Company training mission was viewed by many in the Army as one which did not serve

Australian interests and was therefore of no immediate interest. A further roadblock to the

Army accepting the Independent Company training program was the nature of the

organisational processes and relationships practised by the Army at that time. The

requirement to establish unconventional formations which operated in a manner having no

relationship with formal doctrine was something outside the Army’s experience and was

asking a great deal from an institution which, given the unwanted imposition, was naturally

resistant to change.

Resistance to accepting ideas that challenged accepted norms was a fundamental

factor in determining the Army’s acceptance or not of the Independent Companies.

Illustrative of the difficulty experienced in challenging the mindset within certain elements of

the army was the experience of Major Dudley McCarthy who at the time was serving as a

staff officer. McCarthy, who would after the war become author of one of the official histories of the Australian Army’s war against Japan, left a critical appraisal of the ability of

some of those in command within the Australian Army to accept ideas from those outside

their own circle. McCarthy was required to attend a conference in 1942 to discuss the

modification of Australian Divisions for tropical warfare. The main topic of discussion was

96 Prime Minister’s Department Cablegram to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 22 Jan 1941, War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission) A1608 G39/2/1, NAA.

which bits of equipment were required as well as the need to change clothes on a regular basis. None of the senior officers present had any experience in Tropical conditions apart from postings to Australia’s Northern Territory. McCarthy had experienced New Guinea,

Java, Timor and Malaya and brought up the issue of actually being able to supply a change of clothes to troops in the forward areas and the practicality of doing so considering the total absence of motor transport. He was told by the chairman of the conference, ‘thank you,

McCarthy, we will discuss that no further’ and in his opinion was ‘driven into the ground like a tack’.97 It was with this institutional reluctance by influential elements within the Army to allow any contest to established understandings and perceptions that 104 Military Mission had to contend.

The Australian Army’s unenthusiastic response to raising and maintaining unconventional special service units within it was not unique to Australia. Significant elements of both the British Army, who led the way forming commando-type units, and the

United States, which in 1942 raised Marine Corps Raiders, resisted the introduction of such specialist troops. Both the British and the United States Marines are of special interest when considering the Australian Independent Companies. The British Commandos provided the inspiration and ethos for the Australian Independent Companies, and the Marine Raiders operated in the South West Pacific area during 1942 and 1943, the main area of operations for Australia during the Pacific War. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 10, in both

British and United States cases there was opposition to the formation of specialist commando units. In Britain the opposition came as a normal consequence of Commandos taking the best troops from units at a time of national emergency and resentment towards the commandos who were thought to not be earning their keep due to the infrequency of Commando

97 Maj. D. McCarthy Aust L.O. to US VI Army – Humbolt Bay Jul1944, Gavin Long Notebook 40, AWM67 2/40.

operations during 1940-42.98 With the United States Marine Raiders, resistance was

immediate and ongoing and based on a deep antipathy towards the Raiders as an imposition

on the character and traditions of the Marine Corps.99 As in Australia, in the case of the

Raiders there had been no consultation with the Marines regarding their establishment. The

idea had been foisted upon them by outside agencies. Institutional animosity towards the

Raiders never relented and would ultimately lead to the Raiders being disbanded in late 1943.

The unenthusiastic response to the formation of special service Commando-style units was a common response from the military establishments in Britain and the United States. In this context the equally unenthusiastic response from the Australian Army was consistent with the attitude of its Allied peers.

Despite this resistance, planning for 104 Military Mission’s Independent Company training program did progress. Mawhood delegated the task of selecting the site for the training mission to Calvert. Calvert scouted around keeping in mind that he had been told by

Army Headquarters in Melbourne that the site had to be near Melbourne. Various sites were inspected, but one locale attracted repeated attention. This was Wilson’s Promontory in southern Victoria.100 Wilson’s Promontory offered a range of varied terrain from forests, to

scrub, mountains and swamps. One attraction appeared to be that it was similar to the

Scottish training grounds for British Commandos. Weather was harsh in the region and it was

thought that cold grim winters, a feature of the Promontory, would toughen the men for war

in a European environment.101

The Australian record regarding the choice of the Wilson’s Promontory site differs

from that given by Calvert. In the Australian version of events it is claimed that Wilson’s

98 C. Messenger, The Commandos 1940-1946, William Kimber & Co. Ltd, London, 1985, p. 407. 99 Major General Chas F.B. Price to Maj. Gen. Thomas Holcomb, 16 Jan 1942, Thomas Holcomb Series 1.1 Correspondence Dec 1941 - Jan 1942, USMCA. 100 Bottrell, Cameos of Commandos, pp. 289-90. 101 D. Rooney, Mad Mike – A Life of Michael Calvert, Leo Cooper, London, 1997, p. 25; Astill, Commando White Diamond, p. 5.

Promontory was identified as a training site for the Independent Companies prior to the

arrival of 104 Military Mission.102 Given the lack of awareness in Australia of the Mission’s

purpose prior to its arrival this is unlikely. There is certainly no contemporary documentary

evidence which supports this claim apart from the one document written in June 1941, some

seven months after the arrival of the Mission. What seems more likely is that Wilson’s

Promontory was one of several places already identified as a potential training site by the

Army and not one necessarily specifically allocated to Independent Company training. Such sites may have been offered to Calvert to choose from and from these he chose Wilson’s

Promontory.

Despite ongoing uncertainty within the Army as to just what the Independent

Companies could contribute, by February 1941 a training site had been chosen and infrastructure erected to house both the trainees and training staff. The cost of establishing and maintaining the training centre was not insignificant, especially at a time when the Army was maintaining forces overseas, which were no doubt a further reason why some within the wider organisation, were unenthusiastic about the project. With the site for the training centre chosen the months of December and January 1941 went by with no steps taken to commence the training program.

The reasons for the delay was continuing confusion caused by the Army’s ongoing understanding of the role Mawhood was to play. It is understandable that Australian military authorities assumed that Mawhood as Mission commander would take charge of the establishment of the Independent Company training centre. This was not the case.

Mawhood’s interest was firmly fixed on his internal security role; he chose not to be involved in the day-to-day management of the training centre. This perplexed the Army authorities

102 Spender to Prime Minister 6 Jun 1941, War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission) A1608 G39/2/1, NAA.

who, refusing to acknowledge Mawhood’s real priorities, repeatedly accused him of shirking

his duty. The consequent delays in establishing the training program were blamed, at least by

the Australian military, on the reluctance of Mawhood to manage the program as they

believed he should.103 Mawhood told a different story. In a 16 July 1941 letter to Army

Headquarters (AHQ) he related how the training of the Independent Companies had been

obstructed by the refusal of the Australian Army to supply resources despite the substantial allocated budget. He cited the absence of required stores and the lack of interest in the training program from anyone at AHQ with only one visit to the site by a single officer from

Headquarters, a Major.104

The relationship, or more accurately, lack of a relationship, that existed between the

Australian Army and the Independent Companies continued to hamper the project. The

failure of the Army to establish a sustainable stream of recruits for the original three

Independent Companies from November 1940 until December 1941, demonstrated that the

army had no interest in the establishment or long-term maintenance of the Companies and

thus no interest in ensuring that their training was given more than minimal attention.105

Nonetheless, training was begun for those recruits who had arrived. The results, however,

were disappointing. This had nothing to do with the standard or quality of the input from the

individual 104 Military Mission trainers who were acknowledged to have performed well, but

much more from the attitude of the army to the training of the companies in general.106

Mawhood on two occasions advised that the first Companies trained had not completed their

instruction in guerrilla warfare, and warned that such companies would be of little use and

103 Ibid. 104 Mawhood to AHQ 16 Jul41, MP508 251/758/395, NAA. 105 Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 9. 106 From Blamey CinC Army Land Forces HQ 10 Jul42 – to Minister for Defence on Lt. Col Mawhood, War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission), A1608 G39/2/1, NAA.

likely to suffer unnecessary casualties.107 As it transpired Mawhood’s concerns proved to be

legitimate as 2/1st Independent Company was deployed outside Australia in June 1941

without completing its guerrilla warfare training and suffered accordingly.108 Mawhood also

criticised the lack of specialist instruction and guidance, inadequate rations, failure to grant

proper leave after the six-week training course was completed, failure by the General Staff to

establish a Special Operations Branch which could facilitate the ongoing training of such

troops, and failure to deliver special equipment and restock supplies of explosives. Mawhood

pointed out that those men who were training felt that because of the faulty organisation they

have been abandoned in an isolated area and neglected by all higher than their own company

officers.109 Unsurprisingly, considering Mawhood’s poisoned relationship with Army

Headquarters, his criticisms fell on deaf ears.

Once more, institutional disinterest in unconventional units, even after they were

raised, was not a solely Australian phenomenon. The British themselves were losing interest

in the Mission and keen for Australia to accept responsibility for the program. When MI(R)

was closed down in October 1940 and SOE inherited its missions, SOE had little interest in

missions outside Europe; such missions were euphemistically ‘left in doubt’.110 In this

context SOE wished to divest itself of what for it was the distraction of 104 Military Mission.

Meanwhile the Australian Army’s attitude towards the Mission remained equally unenthusiastic. In a 14 March 1941 response to a suggestion from the British Secretary of

State for Dominion Affairs that the Australian Army assume control of 104 Military Mission,

Sturdee replied that the taking over of the Mission by the Army was not in the Army’s best

interests. He justified this rejection on three grounds. The first of these was that the

107 Mawhood to Evatt, 18 Sept 41, Copy of Attorney General’s file 1955/4428: Lieutenant Colonel Mawhood – Report on Security in Australia. A12383 A/2/1 ATTACHMENT 1, NAA. 108 The operations of 2/1st Independent Company will be examined in Chapter 3. 109 Mawhood to AHQ, 16 Jul1941, MP508 251/758/395, NAA; Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission) Mawhood to Evatt, 18 Sept 1942, MP508 251/758/395, NAA. 110 Astley, The Inner Circle, p. 42; MI(R) Progress Reports: Report of the Organisation within the War Office for the Conduct of Para-Military Activities, 25 Aug 1940, HS 8/260, UKNA.

relationship between the para-military and civil security intelligence aspects of the Mission

remained uncertain. The second was that there were confidential considerations regarding one

of the officers of the Mission – Sturdee did not name the officer but this was undoubtedly

Mawhood. The third reason was that the Mission was not working in the interests of

Australia, but was in fact appearing to favour the interests of New Zealand. This was because

Mawhood, whose responsibilities for establishing a security service related to both Australia

and New Zealand, spent a great deal of time in New Zealand and that he had been accused of

using his lectures to New Zealand Independent Company trainees to belittle the Australian

General Staff and ingratiate himself with the New Zealanders.111 Sturdee’s opinion was

echoed in a 23 July 1941 note from the Deputy C.G.S. Lieutenant General John Northcott, to

Percy Spender, in which he reinforced Sturdee’s argument that the taking over of the

Independent Company training mission was not in the best interests of the army.112 Both

Britain and Australia had lost interest in 104 Military Mission.

Clearly there was an unfortunate divergence of priorities, expectations and

understanding between the Australian military authorities, Mawhood and the British military-

political establishment. The Australian Army had been caught off-guard by the arrival of 104

Military Mission. In late 1940 the army’s attention was firmly fixed on the campaign in North

Africa and the Middle East. It did not need a distraction that 104 Military Mission

represented. The Army’s initial response was to assume that this unexpected group would,

under British authority, manage itself in a manner which would conform to military norms.

This was not to be the case. Mawhood’s role was atypical, not at all what was to be expected

from a conventional Commanding Officer. In addition, the Independent Companies were to

be trained and managed in a decidedly unconventional manner which it would be assumed

111 Sturdee to Army Minister, 14 Mar1941, MP508 251/758/395, NAA; Deputy C.G.S. Northcott, 9 Jul1941, MP742/1/0 M/7/168, NAA. 112 Deputy C.G.S. to Minister, 23 Jul41, MP742/1/0 M/7/168, NAA.

given their title should have been expected, but this was not so as the Army had made no

preparations for them. This created further misunderstanding, confusion and resistance.

Despite all this, however, the Australian Army did eventually appoint an officer to

command No.7 Infantry Training Centre, the new name for the Wilson’s Promontory training

facility. This was Major William John Scott. The choice of Scott, however, raised new questions of just how serious the Army was in finding the best man for the job. Scott was a decorated veteran of the Great War, but it was his civilian activities since the war which indicated that he was not perhaps the most appropriate choice. During the 1920s Scott had become a prominent spokesman for various conservative political organisations and in the

1931 the chief of staff for the clandestine politically conservative militia known as the ‘Old

Guard’. In addition, Scott’s enthusiastic advocacy for all things Japanese during the 1930s attracted critical attention. Further, Scott’s history as a member of Military Intelligence was fraught with complaints regarding his arrogance and high handedness which caused not inconsiderable inter-departmental tensions. Yet in June 1940 Scott was appointed to command No.7 Infantry Training Centre from February.113

Scott’s appointment may well have been symptomatic of the Army’s disinterest in the

Independent Company project; what better way to employ a problematic underling than to

side-track them with a task considered of little real importance. This may have been the case at the time, but to the Army’s credit Scott’s appointment only lasted four months and in

Major Stuart Love, the officer who replaced Scott, the Army found an excellent candidate for the task. Love was a highly decorated veteran of the Great War. He had mined in Arnhem

Land in 1910, served in West Africa before the World War 1 and had a great understanding

113 Scott, William John (1888–1956) Australian Dictionary of Biography , accessed 12 Oct2016. Scott went on to command the Australian troops on Ambon after their original commander was relieved of command for pointing out the futility of the situation the troops were facing there. Scott surrendered to the Japanese invaders on 3 Feb 1942. His handing over of fellow Australians to the Japanese, while he and they were prisoners of war, was the cause of controversy and he was despised by most of his fellow prisoners.

of how to develop effective relationships with indigenous people, a significant skill

considering the environments in which the Independent Companies would find themselves

operating.114 In time Love would prove to be an inspiration to the men under him. Michael

Calvert referred to him as, ‘my great friend and hero’.115 Post war Commando associations

commended Love for his ‘old soldier practicability and inspired imagination that did so much

to form the men who had the good fortune to go through No.7 Infantry Training Centre.116

Love also provided a guiding and restraining influence on the unbridled impetuosity of 104

Military Mission trainers such as Spencer Chapman.117

Just what role the new Independent Companies were being trained to play remained a

vexed question. Even those whose task it was to train the Companies had no firm idea what

they were training to face. Spencer Chapman expressed this uncertainty, stating that the idea

of the Anzac Independent Companies was so new and shrouded in so much secrecy that no

one had any real idea what their purpose was or how they should operate.118 Michael Calvert

on the other hand seemed to have a firmer opinion of what the Independent Company role

was. His believed his task was that he was in Australia to train what he defined as ‘guerrillas’

who would use their skills to kill the enemy. He summed this up: ‘If you are going to get

behind the lines you really must be a trouble maker’.119

Contrary to the lingering idea that the Independent Companies might be used in the

Middle East or Europe, Calvert was personally adamant after the war that he had been in

114 Love’s military awards were DSO and bar, MC, Criox de Guerre avec palme, five times MID, see: 2/2 Commando Courier Vol.20. No. 188. Nov1965, p. 12, , accessed 12 Oct2016. Love was also a widely read and cultured man, being a published author of poetry, an authority on Geoffrey Chaucer, and an expert of renaissance art. 115 M. Calvert, Prisoners of Hope, Cooper, London, 1971, p. 11. 116 See: 2/2 Commando Courier, Vol.6 No.68, Dec 1952, p. 5. ; 2/2 Commando Courier, Vol.20, No.188, Nov1965, p. 12, , accessed 16 Oct2016. 117 Barker, One Man’s Jungle, p. 180. 118 Spencer-Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral, pp. 7-8. 119 Michael ‘Mad Mike’ interview, 9942 reels 3-5, IWM.

Australia to train Independent Companies to fight the Japanese, long before Pearl Harbor and

the war with Japan.120 It is possible that this post-war opinion was influenced by Calvert’s

subsequent war experiences fighting the Japanese, but it is impossible to determine if this was

so. It should be noted that Calvert’s presumption that he was training troops to fight the

Japanese was in line with the common perception of the time. David Dexter mentions that

when he joined the army in 1940 he was definitely being trained to fight a ‘Yellow Enemy’

which he was under no illusions would be the Japanese.121 Calvert was, however, aware that

there was no real idea within the Army of what to do with the Companies when they were

trained. He mentioned one fanciful notion that was doing the rounds amongst the Independent

Company volunteers, namely that the Companies had been raised by the British so they could

‘go and save Britain’, an idea which Calvert dismissed as ‘totally untrue’.122 This was

nevertheless a further example of how, at least in the military public mind, the Independent

Company project was considered to be a venture propagated for British rather than Australian

interests. Another fanciful idea coming from the Officer and NCO cadre for the 2/4th

Independent Company was that they were to be sent to China.123

On 21 May 1941 there was at last some clarification of the role to be played by the

Mission. Mawhood wrote to the C.G.S. stating that in line with Imperial War Cabinet directives para-military activities would be divided into two clearly distinct branches – Civil and Military. Following on from this Independent Companies would be composed of specially selected men, highly trained and well-armed, who would be used to raid enemy lines of communications and carry out sabotage missions. Most importantly it was to be clearly understood that Independent Companies were not to engage in fifth-column or counter

120 Ibid. 121 David Dexter interviewed by Mel Pratt for the Mel Pratt collection [sound recording] 25 Aug – 21 Sept 1976, , accessed 26 Nov2015, 122 Calvert interview, 9942 reels 3-5, IWM. 123 2/7 Commando Regiment Outline History Jun 1943, 2/4 Australian Independent Company Summary of Unit History, AWM 52/2/52 Box 44.

fifth-column activities – this would be the domain of the Civil Branch.124 That this definition

came some six months after the arrival of Mission in Australia indicates just how muddled and misunderstood the management of the Mission had been by all parties. Despite this delay, it does seem that Army Headquarters, perhaps influenced by Sturdee, was at least by now publicly supportive of the Independent Company project. Army Headquarters efforts in encouraging units to release personnel for service in the Independent Companies, examined in more detail in the following chapter, was exemplary.

The activities of 104 Military Mission ended on 25 September 1941.125 British

personnel were transferred out of Australia. Australian cadres of officers and NCOs to act as

Independent Company trainers had by now been formed and trained and were prepared to

take over that training - there was no further need of British trainers. Australian planners had

been considering such a move for some time. On 22 May 1941, four months before the

Mission was formally terminated, the Australian Prime Minister’s Department wrote to

Walter Nash, the Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand, stating that: ‘It is anticipated that

the training of any additional Australian companies which may be raised can be carried out

by Australian instructors who will have understudied the instructors included in the

Mission.’126

Although they accepted such a development, both Spencer Chapman and Calvert were

disappointed. Both had hoped that they would get an Australian Independent Company to

command, but on reflection understood that this would be politically unacceptable. This resulted in the members of 104 Military Mission departing Australia ‘under a cloud’.127

Spencer Chapman was sent to 101 Training School in Singapore. Calvert’s situation was

124 Mawhood to C.G.S., 21 May 1941, MP742/1/0 m/7/168, NAA. 125 Department of the Army to the Sec Dept of Def Co-Ord 30 Sept 41, War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission), Military Mission 104, A1608 G39/2/1, NAA. 126 PMs Dept to Acting PM New Zealand 22 May 41, War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission), A1608 G39/2/1, NAA. 127 Calvert interview, 9942 reels 3-5, IWM.

somewhat more complicated. Frustrated by being kept out of action during his time with the

training Mission he had considered deserting and joining the Australian Army under an

assumed name. He shelved such notions when he found he had been posted to the Jungle

Warfare School in Burma.128 Sergeant Stafford wished to remain in Australia, having married

an Australian woman, and serve with an Independent Company as an officer. Granting

Stafford a commission was, however, not deemed appropriate and he was posted to Rangoon

on 11 September.129 Spencer Chapman departed on 15 September, and Calvert to Ragoon on the same day. Staff Sergeant Misselbrook was sent by sea to Singapore on 25 September

1941.130

Once 104 Military Mission had been wound up the Australian Army revealed its true

attitude towards Independent Companies and abolished the program. The reason given was

that no use could be envisaged for such companies.131 Such a decision clearly illustrated that

at this point the Army did not have any concept of the value of unconventional warfare sub-

units, and thus there was little or no support for continuing any such program. Even so, three

Australian companies had been trained to varying degrees of competency. Two New Zealand

companies had also been trained but these were disbanded as soon as they returned home

from Wilson’s Promontory.132 Those Australian personnel still undergoing training when the

program was abandoned, the officer and NCO cadre of the 4th Company, were given the

128 M. Calvert, Fighting Mad, Airlife, Shrewsbury, 1996, p. 55. 129 Col. Mackenzie Director of Mil Operations 13 Aug 41 to Sigs Cipher Office, War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission), A1608 G39/2/1, NAA; Secretary Prime Minister’s department from Secretary Dept of Defence Coordination and Sec of State for Dominion Affairs London 19 Aug 1941, A1608 G39/2/1, NAA. 130 Department of the Army to the Sec Dept of Def Co-Ord 30 Sept 41, Military Mission 104, War 1939 – Special Operations Executive (Mawhood Mission), A1608 G39/2/1, NAA. 131 ATTACHMENT 1 Copy of Attorney General’s file 1955/4428: Lieutenant Colonel Mawhood – Report on Security in Australia, A1608 G39/2/1, NAA. 132 Walker, ‘History of No.7 Infantry Training Centre and the formation of the Independent Companies 1941- 1942’, p. 334-39; in regard to the lack of acceptance of the Independent Companies in New Zealand a pencil note signed by ‘Goss’ (perhaps Brigadier Leonard Goss) dated 27 Jun 1941 makes note that, ‘I have had a short talk with Lt-General Sir Guy Williams about para Military Activities and he is of the opinion that there is really no necessity for troops of this nature in New Zealand.’ See: MP508 251/758/395, NAA.

choice to return to their former units or transfer as a group to a light armoured squadron,

which most elected to do.133

In truth, the reasons for the cancellation of the Independent Company training

program were far deeper than a simple failure to envisage a use of them. From the very

beginning it was not an Australian idea. From the perspective of the Australian Army there

was no place for an innovation foisted on them by the British and by General Brudenell

White with no prior or wider consultation, and with nebulous direction once it was in place.

This was especially so when the army was engaged in an overseas campaign. The dual civil

and military priorities for the Mission added to the uncertainty, and led to pronounced

hostility from the Army’s hierarchy directed towards the mission commander Lieutenant

Colonel Mawhood. There was no tradition of unconventional warfare within the Australian

Army of 1941, and when the military aspects of the Mission were finally understood they

were of such an exceptional nature that they could not be expected to be enthusiastically

received. When considered through this prism, the Independent Company initiative seemed to

offer little gain for the Army and as a consequence it was done away with as soon as it was practical to do so. This period, far from being the beginning of the Independent

Company/Commando story, was in fact very much a false start. The seeds for future

developments were certainly sown but at the time there was no intention at all to nurture

them. It was an army unready for such an innovation.

The existential threat posed to the nation by the Japanese attack of 7 December 1941 on Pearl

Harbor, followed quickly by offensives against Malaya, Hong Kong and the Philippines in a

classic case of reactive adaptation, provided the impetus for the resurrection of the idea for

Australian Independent Companies. Faced with a paucity of organised military resources

133 2/7 Commando Regiment Outline History Jun 1943, 2/4 Australian Independent Company Summary of Unit History, AWM 52/2/52 Box 44.

within Australia to confront the Japanese threat, the Army scrambled to adapt to the new

circumstances. In the parlous situation Australia’s Army found itself in December 1941 the

Independent Companies were a military resource which could be easily tapped.134 Even

though the program had been recently terminated there were at least the remnants of a

training program, one with an organised and existing infrastructure, which could easily be

revitalised. It was a military asset in an environment where there were precious few such

assets at hand. It did not matter if there was no firm idea just what to do with the Companies

once they were reactivated and trained. Perhaps, just as the British had envisaged in the dark

days following Dunkirk, Commandos could be used to strike back at the enemy. If nothing

else they would at least provide some trained personnel who would be ready for the

inevitable challenges to come. The Independent Company training centre was thus reopened

on 25 December 1941 under the command of Major Mac Walker.135 With uncharacteristic

enthusiasm, driven no doubt by the exigencies of the moment, the Army decided to form a

further five Independent Companies as soon as possible, bringing the number of Companies

up to eight.

The reasons for the decision to increase the number of Independent Companies

remains a mystery. This author has been unable to locate any documentation explaining the

Army’s decision to do so. Given the lack of a definitive explanation of this development it is

tempting to view the sudden resurrection of the Independent Company program as something

of an epiphany for the Australian Army, the beginning of a process by the Army of

unimpeded integration of unconventional special force sub-units. Such was, however, not the

134 In Dec 1941 the Australian Army had available within Australia 132,000 full time AIF troops, and two cavalry divisions and four infantry divisions less one brigade of militia. The situation for war fighting materiel was less than satisfactory when compared to war establishment with 74% of rifle and LMG ammunition, 17% of mortar ammunition, 25% of artillery ammunition, and 1.1% of 2pdr AT gun ammunition was available. In addition, only 73% of rifles, 21% of pistols and 49% of LMGs were on hand, see: Defence of Australia and Adjacent Areas – Chiefs of Staff Appreciation, Dec 1941, AWM 124/4/105. 135 E. Walker, ‘History of No.7 Infantry Training Centre and the formation of the Independent Companies 1941- 1942’, p. 337; Lambert, Commando – From Tidal River to Tarakan, p. 14.

case. There is no evidence of a sudden manifestation of any special understanding or appreciation for the Independent Company concept within the Australian military establishment. While individuals such as Sturdee may have at one time desired that some form of ‘special’ companies be formed, there was no commensurate enthusiasm for such troops. There remained no official doctrine within the Army for the use of such troops, nor any substantial thought of how they would be deployed or once deployed, any clear concept of just what role they should play. What occurred in late 1941 was a reflex action born of desperation. Even so, the reappearance of the Companies did mark a watershed moment.

They soon became a fixture within the Australian Army, no longer an unwelcome unwanted imposition. They soon grew into recognised sub-units on the order of battle. With this the

Companies began an evolutionary process which would see their transformation from awkward appendages into key components of an Army that eventually developed an operational understanding of how to employ such troops in any number of complex and demanding tasks.

Overall the decision to form the Australian Independent Companies had been both secret and informal. The untimely death of one of the principal protagonists, the secrecy in which the private negotiations to establish the companies had been conducted, and failure to consult or even inform Australia resulted in confusion, ambiguity and resistance from within

Australia. There was certainly no thought given to accepting Independent Company operations as an important form of warfare, nor any to specialised war planning or establishing a dedicated military command structure for the Independent Companies. This failure to consult and establish a basis for why the Australian Army should accept and assimilate Independent Companies was the single most fundamental problem related to the inception of such forces in Australia. Presented with an unheralded and unwanted imposition, the Army, despite being compelled by circumstances to accept Independent Companies into

its ranks, refused to fully accept them and ended the project as soon as it was able. In the final analysis, the Army was at that time unready to accept ‘independent’ units which did not conform in any way to its culture. It was only due to the exigencies of war at a moment of national crisis and existential threat to the nation that the Companies were reactivated. The new Companies would require personnel and training, which had thus far been only reluctantly provided. Just how this was achieved, from the commencement of the

Independent Company mission in 1941 and on into 1942, will be examined in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 2

RECRUITING AND TRAINING THE INDEPENDENT COMPANIES

The training and recruitment regimes experienced by the Independent Companies and

Commandos during the years 1941 to 1945 occurred in two very distinct phases. For the

purposes of examination and discussion in this thesis, the first period 1941-1943 will be

identified as the ‘Independent Phase’, and the second period 1943-1945 as the ‘Commando

Phase’. The Independent Phase was characterised by voluntary recruitment, and a training

focus on self-reliance and operational independence. The Commando Phase on the other hand

did not permit voluntarism or encourage such independence. This chapter examines the training regime of the Independent phase. This regime remained essentially unchanged in form and content from the initial stages of training under the British 104 Military Mission training team to September 1941 and continued under the Australian instructors who followed until November 1942, when training was moved from Wilson’s Promontory to

Canungra camp in Queensland. To understand the training regime of the Independent

Companies during the period 1941-1942 it is first necessary to understand the nature of these

units and those who volunteered to join them.

The organisation of the Independent Company was very different to the standard

Australian infantry Company. In 1941 a standard Australian infantry company consisted of

eight officers and 247 other ranks. These were organised as a Company headquarters, three

rifle platoons of three sections each, a signals platoon, and an anti-aircraft platoon. The

Independent Company was larger than the standard infantry company having 17 officers and

256 other ranks. These were organised into three platoons of 60 men and then subdivided into

three sections of 19 personnel. In addition there were several attached specialist sections.

Having double the number of officers to the standard company reflects the expectation that

the Independent Company would be operating in smaller independent sub-units, often section

sized, with each requiring effective leadership. In addition, the company was intended to be

self-sufficient and in order to facilitate this independence from the Company headquarters

additional to the rifle platoons were a signals section, a medical section, and a transport

section.136

A fundamental element of the recruitment for the Independent Companies during

1941-1943 was their purely voluntary make up. Such recruitment was in keeping with the

independent ethos of the Companies and reflected the divergence of the new units from the

mainstream processes of the Army. The Army did not practise voluntary recruitment for

specific corps or functions in general; rather recruits joined the army and were assigned to

units and formations as needed.

The qualities sought from volunteers for Independent Companies were specific. They

had to be men who had volunteered for 2AIF service, who were prepared to undergo very

hard training under trying conditions, and to return to their original units if they could not

cope with the training.137 Jack Boxall of the 2/5th Independent Company recalled, ‘We had been ordered to select strong, tough types who looked as though they would have a go at anything.’138

Volunteers were expected to exhibit self-reliance, intelligence and independence and

expected to be able to operate without direct supervision if necessary. These were

unsurprisingly the same qualities sought by British Commandos, and reflected the British

influence on the origins of the Australian Independent Companies.139 The ideal was for

136 See: Appendix A, Australian Independent Company Organisation. 137 Lambert, Commando – From Tidal River to Tarakan, p. 14. 138 Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 10. 139 Papers of Major General Robert Laycock, Laycock 1/3, LHMA.

soldiers and officers to freely elect to join the companies; reality, however, quite often did not

live up to the ideal.

There was no set means by which candidates for Independent Companies were

encouraged to apply to join the companies. The Army promulgated a system of official

notices both spoken and written. Notices were posted on unit notice boards. Such notices

could be as simple as, ‘Wanted – volunteers for a “hush hush” squad to report to the Orderly

Room’.140 Others could be in the form of a questionnaire asking for men to volunteer for an

unspecified task and posing questions such as, can you swim, surf or sail a boat, can you

climb mountains, are you one hundred per cent fit?141 On occasion Army units were actively

scouted for personnel considered suitable for the Independent Companies. A report from

Military Forces Northern Command, for example, identified 22 suitable candidates from an

Armoured Regiment as being ‘Good to Fair’.142 From time to time Army recruitment officers

visited regular military training camps and asked for anyone who would be interested in a

special secretive unit that would carry out very dangerous missions.143 Volunteers were

called for when men were on parade. The less formal approach was often the case with the

recruitment of officers. Social connections, patronage and ‘the old boy network’ played its

part of the process. Andrew Hargreaves in Special Operations in World War II observed that

the British system of recruiting officers for special service units had a great deal to do with

‘the familiar school tie or membership of the right gentleman’s club’.144 It was no surprise

that the Australian experience at times imitated the British model although with an Australian

flavour. David Dexter, who served with 2/2nd Independent Company during the war,

described how he was recruited as an officer for an Independent Company by a chance

140 Geoffrey Thomas Fraser, Highly Irregular, Self-Published, Sunshine Coast, 2003, p. 21, AWM – MSS1960. 141 Ayris, All the Bull’s Men, pp. 26-7. 142 N-7 Infantry Training Centre, Military Forces Northern Command Victoria Barracks Brisbane - 23 Aug 1941, MP508 251/758/395, NAA. 143 Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 3. 144 Hargreaves, Special Operations in World War II, pp. 184-6.

contact with Captain Spencer Chapman in a Melbourne pub during which Spencer Chapman

simply asked him if he wanted to do ‘something secret’.145 Dan O’Connor became an officer

in 2/4th Independent Company. His recruitment experience was very much illustrative of the

importance of social connection and patronage. O’Connor had just graduated from Royal

Military College when he saw a line of officers waiting to be interviewed for ‘special

service’.146 Without knowing anymore, he joined the line. The major conducting the

interview recognised O’Connor from his Officer Cadet days. As a result he was accepted into

the Independent Companies as a Lieutenant and ordered to report to the training camp at

Wilson’s Promontory.147 Other officers without the social connections were sometimes

attracted by the desire to engage in some form of activity which offered the allure of a

challenge. Lieutenant John Winterflood of 2/3rd Independent Company, unhappy that he had

been posted to an Engineer unit in rural N.S.W., was told by his Commanding Officer that

there was something that sounded dangerous he could do. Winterflood accepted without

hesitation.148 Alan Thompson was a Lieutenant with the 5th Battalion (Victorian Scottish

Regiment) Australian Military Forces (A.M.F.).149 He had been told that A.M.F officers

could join the AIF but found this to be not a certain thing. He was told by a friend to ‘apply

for anything that comes along, particularly if it sounds ‘hush-hush’. 150 In July 1941 he did so,

applying for the Independent Companies and was accepted.

A common thread with the ordinary soldiers who volunteered was the desire to

engage in something out of the ordinary, anything to break the monotony of their army life.

This fact was important as it attracted a certain type of soldier to the Companies. These were

individuals with a sense of audacity, the yearning to try something out of the ordinary

145 David Dexter interviewed by Mel Pratt for the Mel Pratt collection [sound recording] 25 Aug – 21 Sept 1976, , accessed 13 Jun 2016 146 Lambert, Commando – From Tidal River to Tarakan, p. 6. 147 Ibid. 148 Lieutenant John Winterflood interviewed by Neil MacDonald, AWM S04156. 149 A militia battalion 150 Lambert, Commando – From Tidal River to Tarakan, pp. 6-7.

regardless of what others were doing - they naturally exuded ‘independence’, the cardinal

attribute fostered by the Independent Companies. Even so, the reasons soldiers volunteered

for the Independent Companies were diverse. It was evident that in each case it was a very personal choice. Rising to the challenge of doing their best to serve their country in its time of need inspired others. Some such as Alan Oakley, Jack Oddy, Stuart Muir, Alan Sutherland, and Bill Gibbs chose to join to escape the unwanted physical exertion of their army lives.

They were training with a heavy machinegun when they saw a note in their orderly room in

Darley camp near Bacchus Marsh advertising for volunteers for ‘secret and hazardous’ duties. Thinking that anything was better than lumping heavy machine guns all over the place they volunteered and were accepted into ‘No.4 Cadre of the Guerrilla School’.151 Jack

Boxall’s reasons were coldly pragmatic and recognised what he considered would be the best

way of doing what needed to be done: ‘I considered that if my country was to be disrupted, it

would be better to do it in someone else’s backyard.’152

Some motivations on the other hand appeared to have been influenced by the promise

of extra remuneration, promotion and leave. This was not unusual given the numbers who

applied and the broad pool from which they came. Victorian Jack Jones’s reasons for

volunteering were entirely motivated by personal gain. He was attending a lecture at the

Engineer training depot at Tamworth when he was sent for by the Commanding Officer who

asked him if he would feel like volunteering for some special unit which he seemed to know

absolutely nothing about. He was not interested until he was offered ten days leave at which

151 Ibid. 152 Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 4. Other numerous and diverse reasons for joining the Independent Companies can be found in the accounts of Geoffrey Fraser: Fraser, Geoffrey Thomas QX2335, Trooper, 2/4th Commando Squadron, G. Fraser, Highly Irregular, self-published, Sunshine Coast, 2003, p. 21, AWM – MSS1960; Fred Wisher: Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 16; Scotty McMillan: Scotty McMillan 2/3 Independent Company interviewed by Neil MacDonald interviewed 1985-1991, AWM SO4155; Lee Nash and Norm Odim; Astill, Commando white diamond, p. 4; Norm Nocolay: Lambert, Commando – From Tidal River to Tarakan, p. 5; R. Coyne, The First Commandos – Ralph Coyne’s wartime experiences 1942-1945, Petraus Books, Belconnen, 2009, p. 6. 152 Lambert, Commando – From Tidal River to Tarakan, p. 7.

he jumped at the chance to volunteer.153 Extra pay was also an enticement. There was a

proposal that Independent Company Privates be paid 10/- per day, when pay for a regular unit

Private was 5/- per day.154 This encouraged some Sergeants to drop their stripes and volunteer to become ‘Commando’ Privates.155 The lure of extra pay was, however,

illusionary and never actually eventuated, with rumours of extra pay for Independent

Companies being officially repudiated in late 1943.156 Offering material incentives was

another tactic used to encourage troops to volunteer for Independent Company Service.

Volunteers from Western Australia were provided with first class accommodation aboard the

train on their journey from Perth to the Eastern states and were allowed to eat in the dining

car. In contrast, ordinary troops had to contend themselves with the cattle car with minimal comfort and be fed at sidings.157

Despite the enthusiasm and varied motivations of those who did succeed in joining the Independent Companies the process often met with resistance from within army units. On

23 August 1941 the Military Forces Northern Command in Brisbane advised the Secretary of the Military Board in Melbourne that personnel for the Signals, Engineers, Service Corps and

Ordnance Corps Light Aid Detachment required for 2/3rd Independent Company were not available due to competition for the same personnel from the 1st Australian Armoured

Division.158 The same occurred with the 4th Australian Infantry Division which drew

attention to the fact that the withdrawal of specialist personnel to join the Independent

153 Ibid. 154 Army History WW2 , accessed 10 Jan 2017. 155 Interview with K. Stephens 2/3 Independent Company, Gavin Long Notebook 67, Torokina, 22 Feb 1945, AWM67 2/67. 156 J. Smailes, The Independents, Kewdale Printing Co, Perth, 1994, pp. 6-7; 2/9 Australian Cavalry Regiment Administrative Instruction No.16 3 Dec 1943, 2/9 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Novto Dec 1943, AWM52 2/2/53 Box 45. 157 Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 4. 158 N-7 Infantry Training Centre, Military Forces Northern Command Victoria Barracks Brisbane – 23 Aug 1941, MP508 251/758/395, NAA.

Companies would seriously affect the fighting efficiency of the Division.159 Some units did

not encourage their best troops to volunteer and instead attempted to order ‘volunteers’ to the

Independent Companies.160 The Army to its credit, considering its general lack of enthusiasm

for the Independent Companies, remonstrated forcibly at this practice, informing units that

they were to be ‘unselfish’ in their release of personnel for Independent Company service and

that such behaviour was contrary to the instructions it had issued in respect of enlistment for

Independent Companies.161 On 24 July 1941 all units were instructed that any personnel who

had been ‘detailed’ to Independent Companies against their will were to be returned to the

Training Depot and from there back to their unit.162 This was followed up on 27 June 1941

when all units were encouraged to cooperate with granting troops, including the best men

within units, the opportunity to volunteer for the Independent Companies.163

The quality of the men who were finding their way to the Independent Companies

was a further challenge. Only one in five of the recruits sent for instruction were found to be

suitable.164 Others though suitable could not master the requisite skills, such as Morse code,

and were removed.165 On 15 May 1942 the General Officer Commanding (G.O.C.) of the

Victoria Line of Communication Area reported that the wastage of personnel during the

training period for Independent companies was severe.166 This was at a time when with the

Japanese threat paramount, the Army was actively casting about for recruits and the

159 16 Jun 42 – LHQ Melbourne – Independent Companies 2AIF, MP729/7 37/423/96, NAA. 160 33 Training Battalion at Watsonia Barracks Melbourne ‘detailed’ men in this fashion, see: Guerrilla Warfare Foster Raising and Training of Personnal [sic] Organisation of Coys and RTFs Movement of Coys and RTFs, Selection of Personnel for Independent Coys – 21 Jul1942, MP385 106/7/789, NAA. 161 LHQ Allied Land Forces in S.W. Pacific Area 9 Jul1942, MP729/7 37/423/96, NAA; Guerrilla Warfare Foster Raising and Training of Personnal [sic] Organisation of Coys and RTFs Movement of Coys and RTFs, Selection of Personnel for Independent Coys – 21 Jul1942, MP385 106/7/789, NAA. 162 Guerrilla Warfare Foster Raising and Training of Personnal [sic] Organisation of Coys and RTFs Movement of Coys and RTFs, Selection of Personnel for Independent Coys – 21 Jul1942, MP385 106/7/789, NAA. 163 5th Division General Staff Branch Jun 1942, Independent Companies – AIF Promulgation of Information in Unit Part 1 Orders 27 Jun 42, AWM52 1/5/10/3. 164 Astill, Commando White Diamond, p. 5. 165 Fraser, Highly Irregular, p. 22. 166 Guerrilla Warfare Foster Raising and Training of Personnal [sic] Organisation of Coys and RTFs Movement of Coys and RTFs, Selection of Personnel for Independent Coys – 21 Jul1942, MP385 106/7/789, NAA.

assessment of those who were sent the way of the Independent Companies may not have been

as rigorous as it could have been. In Tidal River to Tarakan George Lambert observed that

the Army was less concerned with the quality of recruits after Japan’s entry into the war,

noting that some ‘had sought to enlist earlier but were rejected on medical grounds. They had

no problem enlisting after Pearl Harbor.’167

On at least one occasion a number of men who had volunteered decided to opt out of

training and return to their units. They did this after being told by an officer that in guerrilla

warfare circumstances would often dictate that taking prisoners would not be possible.

Disturbed by the prospect of what this might entail the men declined to serve in the

Independent Companies.168 Concerned over its ability to find adequate numbers for the

Independent Companies, on 12 May 1942 the Army cast a wider net decreeing that

volunteers could now be taken from Militia units, although preference would be given to AIF volunteers.169

Having volunteered, or found their way into the Independent Companies by other

means, trainees were despatched to No.7 Infantry Training Centre at Daly River, Wilson’s

Promontory. There their training began in earnest. The demands placed on them were intense

with lectures, exercises with weapons, demolition, signals and field-craft. Recruits were

taught the skills of scouting, concealment, ambush and infiltration as well as unarmed

combat.170 Indeed, considerable thought at the local level had been put into just what type of

167 Lambert, Commando – From Tidal River to Tarakan, p. 13; Smailes, The Independents, p. 3. 168 Lambert, Commando – From Tidal River to Tarakan, p. 13. 169 Guerilla Warfare Foster Raising and Training of Personnal (sic) Organisation of Coys and RTFs Movement of Coys and RTFs, Selection of Personnel for Independent Coys, Australian Military Forces: Victoria L. of C, Area – 12 May 42, MP385 106/7/789, NAA. Troops of the Australian Military Forces/Citizen Military Forces were known as Militia. They were not required to serve outside of Australia or Its Territories. Troops who volunteered to the Second Australian Imperial Force (2AIF) were for service outside of Australia. The received priority in supply and training; it was in cricket terms the first eleven. Using the same cricketing metaphor the Militia on the other hand were considered very much the twelfth man to be employed only when needed, and were not granted the same levels of attention for supply and training as the 2AIF. Personnel from 2AIF would be often be given priority for selection over members of the Militia. 170 Lambert, Commando – From Tidal River to Tarakan, p. 8.

training program Independent Companies should receive. One volunteer considered that his training was ‘by design’, implying that it was well-considered. This would appear to be so as

the goal of the training had been clearly identified and articulated before training

commenced.171 The preamble to the No.7 Infantry Training Centre Introductory Lecture on

Guerrilla warfare clearly identified the purpose of the training:

Before starting any form of training, it is essential to consider in detail what we are training for. We must define and classify the activities of guerrillas, then consider their potentialities today, see how the Independent Company can be used in guerrilla roles, and finally discuss the training that is necessary to produce guerrilla troops. 172

The training instructions for the Independent Company program of instruction

emphasised that there was an, ‘unlimited scope for a vivid imagination’, which was to be

expected from both the Independent Company and the personnel who belonged to it.173 Such an expectation certainly challenged the conventional military mindset. The broad concept of those concerned with training the companies was that the main role would be guerrilla warfare. For the British army this was a familiar concept thanks to its experience of countering guerrillas during its long occupation of the Indian sub-continent, and the South

African war of 1899-1901. During the World War One Britain fostered a guerrilla campaign

against the Ottomans in Arabia and were subjected to a guerrilla campaign waged against

them by the Germans in East Africa. British participation in the Spanish Civil War, while not

at all official, gave those who did so further firsthand experience in learning aspects of the art

of guerrilla warfare. That experience was available to British war planners when the World

171 Roy Burbury interviewed by Neil MacDonald, AWM S04159. 172 No.7 Infantry Training Centre Field Craft Lecture 1 – introductory – Lecture Guerrilla Warfare, AWM54 380/6/2. 173 Training Instructions Independent Companies late ca.1940, MP729/7/0 - 37/323/4, NAA.

War Two commenced.174 In 1940 when faced with the possibility of German invasion Britain formed the highly secret ‘Auxiliary Units’ which were trained to operate as guerrillas.175

Inspired as it was from British sources, the Australian Independent Company training

program gave special attention to defining the role of guerrilla warfare. Such operations fell into two distinct divisions – guerrilla raids and ‘true’ guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla raids were further subdivided into two types, the first of which was semi-independent raids and the second co-ordinated raids. Semi-independent raids were connected to a main military strategy and involved raiding enemy communications and transport to prevent supply and reinforcement. Co-ordinated raids on the other hand were synchronised with the operations of regular forces, to infiltrate enemy flanks, forward positions and/or to be dropped behind enemy lines.176 Then there was ‘true’ guerrilla warfare which involved ‘ghost’ patrols which would disappear by day and using their intimate knowledge of the terrain remain hidden except when they struck at the enemy.177 Not surprisingly, Lawrence of Arabia was often

used as an exemplar for this latter type of operation.178

Subsequently, the training program that was developed was focussed on producing

guerrilla fighters. From this emerged the understanding that the training of Independent

Companies was to be extremely practical and not unduly tied down by conventional military

174 The case of Tom Wintringham is case in point. Wintringham commanded the British battalion of the International Brigades in Spain. On his return to Britain he was sought out by elements in the British government as an authority on irregular guerrilla warfare. In 1940 Wintringham published a booklet entitled New Ways of War in which he laid out the tactics and skills required by a guerrilla fighter. He also wrote articles on waging guerrilla warfare for periodicals such as the Picture Post, spoke on BBC radio, established a guerrilla training camp for Local Defence Volunteers and took a prominent role in the initial establishment of the Home Guard. See: T. Wintringham, New Ways of War, Penguin Books, London, 1940, and H. Purcell, The Last English Revolutionary, Tom Wintringham 1898-1949, Sutton Publishing Ltd, Thrupp, Gloucestershire, 2004. 175 See: D. Lampe, The Last Ditch, Cassell, London, 1968. 176 No.7 Infantry Training Centre Field Craft Lecture 1 – introductory – Lecture Guerrilla Warfare, AWM54 380/6/2. 177 Ibid. 178 Ibid.

thinking.179 Training was to be always realistic and was never to become static; lectures should be cut to a minimum. 180

A certain skill set needed to be developed to produce an effective ‘guerrilla’. In

addition to being a skilled shot an Independent Company soldier needed to be able to handle

explosives, use offensive and defensive weapons of all types and operate a wireless. He

should also be capable of teaching what he has learned and take the lead when needed.181

Jack Arden later a member of 2/3 Independent Company described the skills that he thought a

good Independent Company soldier required:

If you were a crack shot, a good flooded river swimmer, a good cook, keen in medical gear and looking after wounded, good at explosives and blowing bridges, good at languages, a good bushman, a good horse rider, good mechanic, good hunter and living off the land. A good forward scout, good on all sorts of weapons, both your own and the enemies, good at booby traps, good at finding your way on a pitch dark night.182

Arden’s resumé of required skills may well have been enthusiastic, but it does illustrate all the aspects required of an Independent Company soldier. Field-craft emphasised individual skill, self-confidence, self-reliance and an ability to survive independently in challenging environments and circumstances. Its instruction was intended to enable the

Independent Company soldier to arrive at the right place in a fit state of mind, body and equipment so that he might most effectively engage the enemy.183 This type of training was

the perfect vehicle for inculcating the independent ethos within the volunteers. The

dominance of field-craft training was reflected by the fact that it received 87.5 hours of time

179 Ibid. 180 Ibid. 181 Ibid. 182 John PH Arden, ‘Jack’, pp. 7-8, AWM 3DRL/6766. 183 No.7 Infantry Training Centre Field Craft Lecture 1 – introductory – Lecture Geurilla Warfare, AWM54 380/6/2.

within the training cycle, as opposed to Weapons Training 73.5 hours and Demolitions 49

hours.184 The range of the skills covered in the field-craft course was extensive and diverse.

The training camp established was called the Guerrilla Warfare School, the name indicating that the goal of the training program was to produce guerrilla fighters for use by the Army.

The school’s syllabus for No.6 and No.7 Independent Companies 22-28 April 1942, for example, addressed thirty-nine subjects under the heading of ‘Fieldcraft’.185

Captain Freddy Spencer Chapman was responsible for field-craft training at No.7

Infantry Training Centre until September 1941, and he went about the task with zeal. Fellow

instructor Michael Calvert’s considered Spencer Chapman was the best teacher he had seen

for all forms of field-craft.186 Spencer Chapman’s attitude to training was uncompromising.

He was adamant that it was the state of mind of the soldier that was the crucial element in

training.187 He had no time for what he called ‘regular soldiers’ as he considered that such

individuals could not be trained for Independent Companies.188 He was not reluctant to back

up his words with deeds and during his time at Wilson’s Promontory made a point to out-run,

out-climb and out-shoot the trainees. David Dexter, who was an officer with 2/2nd

Independent Company, recalled that field-craft was a ‘fetish’ for Spencer-Chapman and that

he could not abide being beaten by anyone in anything he did.189 Indeed Spencer Chapman once climbed the 754-metre Mount Latrobe to set a two-and-three-quarter hour record. When this time was beaten by a trainee by half an hour, he climbed the mountain again this time in one-and-three-quarter hours, a record that was not matched.190

184 L.HQ. Guerilla [sic] Warfare School May - Jun 1942, Guerilla [sic] Warfare Syllabus, AWM54 34/6/1. 185 L.HQ. Guerilla [sic] Warfare School Marto Apr 1942, Guerllia [sic] Warfare School Syllabus Nos 6 & 7 Aust. Ind. Coy CAD, Weds 22 Apr – Tuesday 28 Apr 42, AWM54 34/6/1. 186 Moynahan, Jungle Soldier, p. 94; Barker, One Man’s Jungle, pp. 179-80. 187 Barker, One Man’s Jungle, p. 178; Moynahan, Jungle Soldier, p. 34. 188 Barker, One Man’s Jungle, p. 178. 189 David Dexter interviewed by Mel Pratt for the Mel Pratt collection [sound recording] 25 Aug – 21 Sept 1976, < http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-221579220>, accessed 13 Jun 2016. 190 Moynahan, Jungle Soldier, p. 94.

Spencer Chapman identified his priorities for training as inculcating an ability of

getting a party from A to B in any sort of country by day or night and arriving fit and ready to

carry out their task. He emphasised gaining knowledge of the night sky, choosing clothing

carefully, what to take and how to carry it, tracking the enemy, living off the country,

remembering routes and escaping the enemy if caught.191 Spencer-Chapman taught his trainees personal skills of survival in the wilderness of a particularly unconventional nature.

An example of this was one skill taught by Spencer-Chapman which he called ‘train the eye’.192 Trainees were taught how to read the ground, to see and assess each fold and nuance

in the terrain and spot as second nature good ambush positions. They were taught to ‘listen’;

to hear the sounds of the wilderness around them, including the noise of birds and animals

and, most importantly, the importance of the lack of the noise of birds and animals

recognising that when the animals fell silent, danger threatened.193

At first Spencer Chapman’s eccentricity worked against him. His clipped mode of

speech, continual wearing of the kilt, and frequent stories about Greenland and the Himalayas

made a poor impression on the troops who made fun of him behind his back. When he

instituted the call of the British Tawny Owl be used as the rallying call for the Company, the

reaction was ‘what the bloody hell does he think we are?’194 Nevertheless as the men got to

know Spencer Chapman and as they saw for themselves his uncanny ability to live and

operate in the wild their respect grew. One of his trainees remembered that ‘he told a good

story and told it well, but always managed to turn it into a lesson which fitted into the training

191 Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, p. 84. 192 Walker, ‘History of No.7 Infantry Training Centre and the formation of the Independent Companies 1941- 1942’, p. 336. 193 Ibid. 194 Barker, One Man’s Jungle p. 181.

schedule’.195 Another trainee recalled that Spencer Chapman’s training was ‘invaluable to the morale of the Independent Companies’.196

Practical field-craft exercises were often conducted at night during the hours of 2a.m. and 7a.m. Don Suter, a member of 2/5th Independent Company, described a common night exercise where two Sections of nine men each were separated and the men were scattered through the scrub. A lantern was lit at the end of each section. The object was to sneak through, and put the other section’s light out. After managing to douse the light a couple of times Suter was made a forward scout.197 During these exercises trainees would be shown how to stalk tactically through country, forage and live off the land and survive in environments without recourse to the normal military line of communication. One exercise in particular bore the distinctly idiosyncratic character of those managing the training. This was called ‘The Akbar’, a name attributed to Spencer Chapman because of the time he had spent in north India and the Himalayas and had thus enjoyed an imagined association with the legendary ‘Akbar the Great’. The ‘Akbar’ was a three-day exercise that involved humping heavy packs over mountains, through rivers and swamps, living on iron rations and moving constantly, no matter what. Participants were allowed only a 10 minute rest each hour.198 All this training would eventually be put to the ultimate practical test under combat conditions.

Jack Arden of 2/3rd Independent Company, who Spencer-Chapman trained, recalled that in

New Guinea the training he received saved his life and the life of his mates many times.199

For his part Dexter fondly recalled that Spencer Chapman’s unconventional training showed

195 Ibid. 196 Ibid. 197 Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 7. 198 Lambert, Commando – From Tidal River to Tarakan, p. 9. 199 Arden, ‘Jack’, p. 48.

them how to live off the land, track animals, read the stars and navigate, and that such things

were put to good use on active service.200

Plate 4: Spencer Chapman (L) and Michael Calvert (R) at Wilson’s Promontory.201

Another essential skill taught to recruits was that of demolition. While this subject was given less time that either field-craft or weapons training it was considered essential that each man be able to confidently handle explosives.202 As befitting a subject in which a

mistake could result in dramatic if not fatal consequences the attention to detail was exacting.

Subjects covered in the demolitions course included identifying various explosives,

detonating explosives, placing charges, calculating charges, booby traps and the

reconnaissance of targets.203 Independent Company trainees worked with various explosives

including Gelignite, Monobel (TBR), TNT slabs, Ammonal CTG TBR, PHE TBR, GC slabs,

200 David Dexter interviewed by Mel Pratt for the Mel Pratt collection [sound recording] 25 Aug – 21 Sept 1976, < http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-221579220>, accessed 13 Jun 2106. 201 2/2 Commando Association of Australia ‘Trainer and long term friend of the Double Reds’. , accessed 10 Jul2017. 202 No.7 Infantry Training Centre Field Craft Lecture 1 – introductory – Lecture Geurilla [sic] Warfare, AWM54 380/6/2. 203L.HQ. Guerilla Warfare School Marto Apr 1942, Guerilla Warfare School Syllabus Nos 6 & 7 Aust. Ind. Coys CAD, Weds 22 Apr – Tuesday 28 Apr 42, AWM54 34/6/1.

gunpowder, and ST (Stick Bomb) grenades. They were also taught the use of different forms

of detonators, fuses, flares, plasticine explosives, switches, trip mechanisms, and igniters.204

Michael Calvert was in charge of demolition training. He was remembered for his

infectious enthusiasm and providing the men with the chance ‘to blow things up’.205 His

methods were forthright, and rather than restrict instruction to only those such as Sappers and

Engineers, all Officers, NCOs and soldiers were intensively trained in explosives, booby

traps and sabotage techniques.206 Calvert would, without warning, often explode a stick of

gelignite in the sand nearby during a lecture. He did this to show the men that ‘noise doesn’t

hurt’. Later he would detonate the same amount of explosive packed with metal to show how

explosives when properly prepared could indeed hurt.207 Complementing Calvert’s own skills

were those of some of his trainees. Calvert acknowledged that he learned a lot about

explosives from the Australian trainees at Wilson’s Promontory, as many of them were

former gold miners who knew how to use explosives.208 To train the mind as well as the hand

trainees were taught to light a ‘plug’ of Gelignite which had a short fuse, place it in a hole in

the ground and then walk away resisting the temptation to run. They normally managed to

walk twenty paces before the ‘plug’ exploded. 209

Trainees responded enthusiastically to this regime of demolitions training. Roy

Burbury of 2/5th Independent Company recalled that trainees: ‘Blew up anything we

could’.210 Jim Smailes, of 2/2nd Independent Company, recalled he was taught how to wreck

204 Ibid. 205 Spencer-Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral, pp. 8-9; David Dexter interviewed by Mel Pratt for the Mel Pratt collection [sound recording] 25 Aug – 21 Sept 1976, , accessed 15 Jul2016. 206 Astill, Commando White Diamond, p. 5. 207 Calvert interview, 9942 reels 3-5, IWM. 208 Ibid. 209 H.F. Treichel, Commando Army Service 1941-1946, Self-Published, Wahpunga, 1994, p. 19. 210 Roy Burbury interviewed by Neil MacDonald, AWM S04159.

a railway bridge and how to fell a tree.’211 Lieutenant Michael Sheehan of 2/5th Independent

Company remembered throwing explosives around ‘as if they were bungers’.212 Yet training

with explosives was inherently dangerous. In one incident, instantaneous fuses were

mistakenly used in a night exercise, killing the soldier who set the charge.213 The deliberately

inculcated spirit of independence fostered amongst the trainees also brought with it

unanticipated consequences once they became accustomed to handling explosives. In a

decidedly irresponsible act the trainees booby trapped the unit’s Warrant Officer Latrine.

They used cortex in a ring around the bottom of the seat. It exploded and put the target

(whom no one liked) into the hospital for six months.214 They also blew up the Officer’s wet

mess. Officers had access to unlimited alcohol while the troops could only get lemonade. Six

cases of explosive were used, one on each corner and two in the middle of the room. The

Officer’s Mess was wrecked. The perpetrators were charged £15 each for damage, but they thereafter got their own wet mess.215 This clearly illustrated the temperament of the type of

men who had elected to become members of Independent Companies.

Though a valuable part of the curriculum individual training did not overly focus on

signals. Over the eleven-day course signals received ten half-hour sessions at the beginning

of each day 8a.m. to 8.30a.m. There were also seven three-and-a-half-hour sessions including

Morse code tests, which were conducted on Sundays, for a total of 29.5 hours.216 Each man

211 J. Smailes, The Independents, pp. 7-8. 212 Lieutenant Michael ‘Mick’ Sheehan, 2/5th Independent Company interviewed by Neil MacDonald, 12 Jan 1986, AWM SO41173. 213 Coyne, The First Commandos – Ralph Coyne’s wartime experiences 1942-1945, p. 8. The dangers of training in the manner was ever-present. Robert Hancock of 2/3rd Independent Company in a letter to his parents relates how two soldiers drowned during a river crossing exercise when they became tangled in their equipment. See: Hancock. R. Letter to his parents, 6 Jan 1942, AWM PR91/052. 214 Arden, ‘Jack’, p. 12, AWM 3DRL/6766. The same technique was used against the enemy during operations in New Guinea. Jack Arden in ‘Jack’, p. 9, recounts how he and his comrades booby trapped Japanese officers’ latrines. They placed a grenade that went off when the officer sat on the seat. Japanese officers liked to have their latrines separate from the men. For Arden this was perfectly legitimate as ‘anything that killed the enemy was okay.’ 215 Arden, ‘Jack’, p. 12. 216 L.HQ. Guerilla [sic] Warfare School May – Jun 1942, Guerllia [sic] Warfare School Syllabus, AWM54 34/6/1.

was required to operate wireless radio sets and Signals lamps and have a working knowledge

of Morse code.217 Failing to grasp the intricacies of Morse in particular was responsible for

some trainees abandoning the course and returning to their units.218 Overall, signalling was certainly not given as much time as the field-craft, weapons or demolitions in the individual training program. This was perhaps because each Independent Company had its own dedicated Signals Section and non-signals members, while expected to have a working knowledge, were not required to have expert knowledge.

The rationale for thorough training in all such subjects was that each soldier was

expected to learn something of the other soldiers’ duties or at least a modicum of what was required from other soldiers. Ralph Coyne, a signaller, with 2/2nd Independent Company, was

shown how to set a demolition charge and practised setting and detonating charges.219 Coyne

understood that the reason for this was that when casualties occurred sections could carry on

without a specialist. The same was true of weapons, with each soldier being able to take up any other weapon and use it if required.

Across the board the practical and physical nature of training was paramount, for physical fitness was essential.220 The focus of physical training at the Independent Company

School was to ensure that the troops developed the stamina, both physical and mental, that would keep them in the field for extended periods of time. Jack Boxall, of 2/5th Independent

Company, described the nature of the training he and his comrades endured. He mentioned

carrying out what he called ‘stunts’ over very difficult terrain, and spending up to eighteen

hours a day in the field. He thought that this toughened the men and ‘sorted them out’.221

Geoffrey Fraser’s account of his experiences illustrates just how ‘physical’ training could be.

217 Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 10. 218 Fraser, Highly Irregular, p. 22, AWM – MSS1960. 219 R. Coyne, The First Commandos, p. 7. 220 Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 7. 221 Ibid, p. 17.

Each morning the men would be run down to the beach to swim in the icy waters. After this

they would be marched back to attend lectures. One such lecture was a demonstration of

unarmed combat. The instructor was Bonnie Muir who had at one time been a world class

wrestler. Muir selected a man from the squad, told him to hit him, the man protested saying

that Muir would hit him back. Muir said he would not. The man hit Muir who then smashed

the recruit in the face. When the man complained Muir said, ‘You have all learned something

– never to trust anyone in such a position.’222 Fraser thought that the point was well-learned.

As described, and as a consequence of the concentration on the special tactics of

guerrilla warfare the focus of the training for the Independent Companies was different than

that given to the standard infantryman. Such men possessed a very different skill set from that

of standard infantrymen. This would be both a source of pride for Independent Company

soldiers and a cause for intense criticism from those within the army establishment who

considered the Independent Companies to be less than ‘properly’-trained.223 The training of a

standard regular army rifle man 1940-1941 consisted of a 112-hour course. Included in the course were training for anti-tank, bayonet, gas, field works and protective works.224

Furthermore thirty-two hours of the total of 112 hours of training for the standard infantry

recruit was spent operating as part of formations from squad to battalion level. All of this was

based on the Infantry Training Manual 1937.225 In contrast Independent Company trainees

received no training above company level, and very little of that. The Infantry Training

Manual of 1937 was certainly not used as a guide for Independent Company training. They

did not train in gas warfare, digging fieldworks, or anti-tank tactics. As guerrillas were meant

to operate by stealth there was no use for bayonet charges and bayonet training did not feature

222 Fraser, Highly Irregular, p. 21. 223 See: Brigadier Murray Moten’s criticism of the Independent Companies training as infantry in Chapter 6. 224 2 District Base Defence Scheme, Annexure 3 Training Appendix XI, XII, AWM 193 364 PART 9. 225 Ibid.

on the Independent Company training syllabus.226 Interestingly work with bayonets was

mentioned by at least one Independent Company trainee, indicating that it does appear to have

been taught, most probably on an informal basis.227 The difference between Independent

Company and regular army weapons training was pronounced. There was a heavy emphasis

in Independent Company training on handling automatic weapons. Roy Burbury from 2/5th

Independent company mentions being able to fire Thompson Sub-Machineguns and Bren

guns during training whenever they chose.228 Both Officers and NCOs underwent an intensive

course in firing and maintaining automatic weapons.229 Lieutenant Michael Sheehan of 2/5th

Independent Company recalled being exposed to, ‘lots of Thompsons, 2” mortars and Bren

guns’.230 Independent Company soldiers cross-trained on all weapons with the trainees

becoming proficient in all weapons including the Bren Light Machinegun.231 No such

exposure to automatic weapons occurred during the training of a standard infantry section

with light machine gunners being trained separately from riflemen. Unlike Independent

Company recruits there was no cross-over between the two in skill sets.232

Throughout their period of instruction the assessment of Independent Company trainees was unrelenting. The Officer instructors watched the trainees continually, to determine if they came up to the standards required. The task was to assess the men for their personal suitability as members of an Independent Company team. It was understood that trainees would be returned to their units if they were found to be unsuitable for Independent

226 Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 8 and p. 10. 227 Ibid., p. 9; L.HQ. Guerilla [sic] Warfare School Marto Apr 1942, Guerllia [sic] Warfare School Syllabus Nos 6 & 7 Aust. Ind. Coy CAD, Weds 22 Apr – Tuesday 28 Apr 42, AWM54 34/6/1. 228 Roy Burbury Interviewed by Neil MacDonald (no date), AWM S04159. 229 Astill, Commando White Diamond, p. 5. 230 Lieutenant Michael ‘Mick’ Sheehan, 2/5th Independent Company, interviewed by Neil MacDonald, 12 Jan 1986, AWM SO41173. 231 L.H.Q. Guerilla [sic] Warfare School, Marto Apr 1942, Guerilla [sic] Warfare School Syllabus Nos 6 & 7 Aust. Ind. Coy Cadres, Weds 22 Apr – Tuesday 28 Apr 42, AWM54 34/6/1. 232 2 District Base Defence Scheme, Annexure 3 Training Appendix XI, XII, AWM 193 364 PART 9.

Company training.233 They particularly paid attention to personality traits, looking for men who remained cheerful in adversity, were easy to get along with, and were able to stay the course when things got rough.234 The task of identifying those who could not cope with

physical strain and duress involved tests such as the trek to ‘Sealer’s Cove’. This involved a

full-day trek across rough country with no food, no water, no smoking and no talking. At the

end of the day the party would be met by trucks. The men were told that the trucks were there

to give a ride to any man with sore feet that thought he could not make it back to camp.

Anyone who took the offer and boarded the trucks was immediately sent back to his unit.235

Ralph Coyne recalled that trainees were told that their training would be tough, and that they

would be given a month to decide if they wished to remain with the program. They were told

that if they wished within that month they could request to be returned to their units. Such an

outcome did occur with one in five of trainees, both NCOs and private soldiers. The reasons

for this were health, lack of physical staying power or psychological unsuitability.236

By mid-1941, two Independent Companies had been trained, though one of these had

its training in guerrilla warfare somewhat abbreviated (see Chapter 1). The training of the

third company was well under way, when training of Independent Companies entered a

period of enforced hiatus with the termination of the Independent Company training program

in November 1941. When the Independent Companies were hastily resurrected in December

1941 the training regimen the Australian trainers instituted followed in the footsteps of their

104 Military Mission predecessors. A similar training and philosophical framework

continued until November 1942, when No.7 Infantry Training Centre was closed down and

training for the Independent Companies was transferred to the new Guerrilla Warfare School

in Canungra, Queensland.

233 Lambert, Commando – From Tidal River to Tarakan, p. 14. 234 Arden, ‘Jack’, p. 7. 235 Astill, Commando White Diamond, p. 3. 236 Ibid., pp. 4-5.

The reasons for moving the Guerrilla Warfare School to Canungra was to provide a tough and realistic training, in a physical environment close to what the troops would experience in New Guinea. The school was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alex ‘Bandy’

MacDonald. The new Independent Company course was an eight-week training course, double that scheduled for other troops.237 The Guerrilla Warfare School soon evolved into the Jungle Warfare Centre (JWC), which was to train troops from every branch of the army,

(except signals), in the skills required for Jungle Warfare. The new JWC comprised three sections, a reinforcement-training centre, an Independent Company training centre, and a tactical school.238 The continued allowance of a section of the school for Independent

Companies indicates that the Army did recognise that such companies were distinct.

Things did not always go well for the Independent Company Troops at Cunungra.

When the veteran 2/6th and 2/7th Independent Companies arrived at Cunungra in February

1943 for refresher training, they were treated as ‘rookies’ by MacDonald, who did not like

Independent Companies.239 Further, while the course syllabi at No.7 Infantry Training Centre had followed the independent ethos of the original training mission this did not appear to be so at Canungra. Elements of standard infantry training, such as drill and bayonet work, crept into the Independent Company syllabi.240 This illustrated perhaps the continuing uncertainty

among some elements within the Army as to the appropriateness of perpetuating

unconventional independent units.

The recruitment and training methods of the Independent Companies during 1941 and

1942 were very much the product of an independent unconventional military ethos. It was the

product of a military culture that refused to be restrained by conventional military

237 Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 229. 238 L.H.Q. Training Centre (Jungle Warfare) Canungra, QLD during WW2, , accessed 13 Jan 2017. 239 David Dexter interviewed by Mel Pratt for the Mel Pratt collection [sound recording] 25 Aug – 21 Sept 1976, , accessed 16 Jul2016. 240 Ibid.

expectations. The training goals set, curriculum established, syllabi followed and practical

exercises engaged in represented a conscious and deliberate shift away from orthodox

infantry training. The Army certainly during 1941 chose to distance itself from the

Independent Companies. When the Independent Companies were resuscitated in December

1941, this was not representative of a sudden awakening by the Army to the value of

Independent Companies. It was, in contrast, very much a case of practical necessity trumping

prejudice. The companies represented a military asset that was available and easily accessible

at a time of national emergency. In such circumstances for the Army beggars could not be

choosers. Nevertheless, the very act of resuscitating the Independent Companies established

them as units within the Army and marked the beginning of an evolutionary process towards

recognition for those units which would continue throughout the war.

From March 1941 until November 1942, the unconventional skills and independent

ethos fostered by their unique training program provided the Independent Companies with a resume of unconventional military skills. These would serve them well in the most trying circumstances during 1942 and 1943.

CHAPTER 3

‘DUMPED AND WRITTEN OFF’ – THE INITIAL DEPLOYMENT OF THE

INDEPENDENT COMPANIES

During 1941 Australia was entering its third year of war. Up until that time the war had been fought far from home. The enemies had been both German, and, from June 1940,

Italian. Australian military forces had seen action in North Africa and the Middle East. The land war had been entirely conventional in nature. While Australian authorities were aware of a growing sense of foreboding regarding the intentions of Japan no effective counter-

measures had been taken in Australia to prepare for a conflict in the Pacific. It was into this

environment that the Army deployed its first Independent Companies.

Throughout their history the operational use of the Independent Companies within the

2AIF was conducted in a most uneven manner. There was never, at any stage, a consensus

within the 2AIF of just how the Independent Companies should be employed. The history of

the companies attests to a multitude of roles and tasks allocated to them which were at one

time entirely appropriate for them and at other times equally inappropriate. The history of the

initial deployments of the first three Independent Companies in 1941 was characteristic of the

Army’s inability, at that stage, to develop a coherent or even consistent sense of how best to

employ the companies so that their unique skills could be utilized.

In mid-1941 the Army had no real idea what to do with the three Independent

Companies which had been trained. In August 1941 a memorandum entitled Employment of

Independent Companies A.I.F from the Deputy Chief of the General Staff stated that ‘No firm plan can be predetermined for the employment of Independent Companies, AIF.241

Various options were canvassed as to how 2/1st, 2/2nd and 2/3rd Independent Companies could

241 Employment of Independent Companies A.I.F, MP729/7 37/421/359, NAA.

be employed but nothing was decided other than that the 2/2nd Company would be sent to 7

Military District in the Northern Territory.242 This indecision was symptomatic of an attitude

towards Independent Companies at that time. There was at that time a very limited capacity

within the Australian military, which was engaged in its conventional war in North Africa

and the Middle East, to think beyond its immediate tactical considerations. Decisions

involving strategic considerations, such as for example where to deploy ‘commandos’ in

support of broader objectives, were invariably deferred to Britain and therefore significantly delayed.243 With no immediate tactical use for Independent Companies, and no thought given

to alternative employment for them, there was little for the Companies to do but ponder the

future.

Even though the operational focus of Australia’s military was firmly fixed upon its

commitment to North Africa and the Middle East, high level policy makers were not

oblivious to the strategic situation in Asia. Japan was seen as a potential threat.244 Concerns

of an aggressive move by Japan had been explicitly expressed as early as January 1940 by the

Australian General Staff.245 By late 1941 a war between the British Empire and Japan was regarded as probable.246 Even so, Australia, having to contend with its ongoing war against

Germany and Italy, was seemingly content to rely upon the protection promised by the

British presence in Singapore. The deployment of the Australian 8th Infantry Division to

Malaya was undertaken to bolster the British position there. On the other hand, the deployment of small garrisons of troops to unsupportable locations to the north of Australia were many ways tokens. One of the units deployed in this manner to the north of Australia in

June-July 1941 was 2/1st Independent Company.

242 Ibid. 243 D. Horner, High Command Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1982, p. 136. 244 Ibid, p. 25. 245 Draft Appreciation on the employment of the A.M.F in the defence of Australia by General Staff – 16 Jan 1940, AWM54 243/6/158. 246 Operational Planning Directive No.1, possibly written Nov 1941, AWM 243.6/5.

On 10 June 1941 the Australian Naval Board reported that an unmarked twin engine

monoplane flew over Kavieng in New Ireland. It was also reported that three large ships and

two small ships had been seen close off-shore, and that a flying boat had landed at North

Cape on New Ireland. The aircraft at least were thought to be Japanese. In addition, an

unidentified vessel had recently passed by Lorengau on Manus Island.247 On 20 June 1941

the Chiefs of the Staff determined that because of these sightings a possible foreign

reconnaissance of Rabaul and Australia’s advanced bases was being conducted. It was

therefore considered necessary to take precautionary measures to protect Royal Australian

Air Force (RAAF) airbases and seaplane sites in New Guinea, the New Hebrides and the

Solomon Islands. The 2/1st Independent Company was identified as being available to move

at once by sea to Rabaul. A reconnaissance party from the Company was sent to Rabaul on

18 June.248 On 8 July 1941 the balance of the Company arrived to bolster the garrison already

there. It must be remembered at this point that the Company had been moved out from No. 7

Infantry Training Centre before it had completed the Guerrilla Warfare phase of its training

program.249 The need to find troops to garrison the Island Barrier to Australia’s north had to precedence over an Independent Company being allowed to complete its training cycle.

On 11 July 1941 the Company was transferred from Rabaul to Kavieng in New

Ireland.250 Detachments of 25 men from the company were then sent to Manus, Buka,

Tulagai islands and Vila, New Hebrides. The balance of the Company, some 150 men, remained at Kavieng. The mission of the sections was to protect and deny to the enemy the local airfields, RAAF equipment and stores on the islands. As it was, however, this deployment stretched over an arc of more than 1000 kilometres across the northern

247 ‘Japan Moves in South Asia’, WO208/4556, UKNA. 248 No 1 Independent Coy Operations 1941-1943, Department of the Army Military Board (Chief of the General Staff) Army Headquarters, Victoria Barracks Melbourne, S.C.1. 20 Jun. 41, A.H.Q. Operation Instruction No.16, AWM MH 1/149. 249 Mawhood to Evatt, 18 Sept 1942, MP729/6 38/401/72, NAA. 250 Sturdee to Northcott, 11 Jul1941 via Lark, MP729/7 37/421/319, NAA.

approaches to Australia. Such a deployment made it impossible for the component parts of

the company to have any hope of supporting each other. Further compromising the

operational integrity of the company the instructions issued to the sections were contradictory

in nature. They were instructed to destroy the airfields if threatened by the enemy.

Confusingly this was subject to the caveat that it was to be done only under ‘certain

circumstances’.251 These circumstances were never defined. Furthermore, in a masterpiece of

doublespeak the orders them directed the sections not to destroy the airfields. The reasoning

for this being that if they did friendly aircraft could not use them, and if the enemy occupied

them they would repair them quickly anyway.252 Just what the men of 2/1st Independent

Company made of these contradictory instructions is not recorded. In addition to guarding,

destroying, or not destroying, the airfields the sections were meant to train local natives to

help defend the RAAF facilities.253

Even though the instructions issued to the Company were blatantly inconsistent there

was a pragmatic, if limited, rationale for choosing the 2/1st Independent Company for the task

they had been given, and subsequently deploying them to widely dispersed outposts. It was

recognised that the Company had been trained in demolitions and was fully equipped and qualified for that role.254 Thus it was appropriate to select the Company for the mission. In

addition, deploying such an unattached unit would be a good exercise in the principle of

economy of force as it would not impose upon resources of the mainstream army.

On 22 July 1941 Major James Edmonds-Wilson, the commanding officer of 2/1st

Independent Company, wrote an appreciation in which he emphasised the importance of the

Company’s mission. His appreciation deferred entirely to the official line stressing the

251 No 1 Independent Coy Operations 1941-1943, Department of the Army Military Board (Chief of the General Staff) Army Headquarters Victoria Barracks Melbourne, S.C.1. 20 Jun. 41, A.H.Q. Operation Instruction No.16, AWM MH 1/149. 252 Ibid. 253 Ibid. 254 No 1 Independent Coy Operations 1941-1943, Chief of the General Staff – no date, AWM MH 1/149.

financial cost of the airbases and their strategic importance to Australia’s outer defences.255

That Edmond-Wilson should respond in the way that he did at that time is understandable.

There was little real concern for any ‘enemy’ action apart from wariness about the possible

intrusion of German naval raiders in the waters around the islands.256 There was certainly no

stated concern by Edmonds-Wilson over any immediate danger from Japan. With no sense of

imminent danger, the Company settled into a routine.

Throughout this time Japanese reconnaissance of New Ireland and Kavieng took the

form of visits by small ships carrying groups of ‘students’ who would take photographs and

notes.257 Whilst this was occurring the Company spent its time working on preparations to

defend the airfield and town against possible enemy invasion.258 The sections on Manus,

Buka and Tulagai set about preparing defensive positions, and organising their stores and provisions. The section stationed in Vila, New Hebrides, had a somewhat different environment to manage. Captain Allen Goode, the officer in command at Vila, had the task of managing the civilian defence of Vila. In this role he had been appointed Commanding

Officer New Hebrides Defence Force and had command of the local French Home Guard. He reported that maintaining a working relationship with the French population on the island was most difficult, and that he could not trust many of the French civilians whose loyalties to either Vichy or DeGaulle were uncertain.259

The issue of just how much attention the Army was paying to the maintenance of the

Company was also of concern. A letter of 19 August 1941 from the Director of Personnel

Services to Sturdee, then Chief of the General Staff, stated that while the directorate was

255 Defence of the New Hebrides and role of No.1 Independent Coy and other 2AIF units in it, Operation Order No.1 – by J. Edmonds-Wilson Major – 1st Oct 41, AWM113 MH 1/149 PART 4. 256 Two German auxiliary raiders, the Orion and Komet, had stopped at Emirau island –to the north west of Kavieng - on 19 Dec 1940 and landed 514 prisoners, see: M. Murray, Escape a Thousand Miles to Freedom, Rigby Limited, Adelaide, 1965, pp. 28-9. 257 Ibid., pp. 28-9. 258 Defence of the New Hebrides and role of No.1 Independent Coy and other 2AIF units in it, Operation Order No.1 – by J. Edmonds-Wilson Major – 1st Oct 41, AWM113 MH 1/149 PART 4. 259 Ibid.

supplying 1500 personnel on Rabaul it had discovered some 234 personnel at Kavieng of

whom it had no previous knowledge.260 This oversight may have been due to the strain under

which the Army’s bureaucracy was working at the time. It is, however, symptomatic of a

repeated failure of the Army to maintain its Independent Companies once they had left

Australia which occurred throughout 1941 and into 1942. It could be deduced from this that

for whatever reasons the maintenance of Independent Companies by the Army’s bureaucracy

was a low priority. To what degree did this reflect the Army’s overall lack of interest in the

Independent Companies as such? In the case of 2/1st Independent Company this did not have

any significant affect on the company, possibly because of the discovery by the Director of

Personnel Services, but it would impact significantly upon 2/3rd Independent Company, as

discussed later in this chapter. As it was, however, through the latter months of 1941 the 2/1st

Independent Company enjoyed a relatively relaxed existence.261 All of this changed on 7

December 1941.

When Japan entered the war Australia was caught unprepared. The majority of the

AIF was outside the country in North Africa and the Middle East, or the Malay Peninsula.

The capabilities of the Air Force in Australia was limited, as RAAF resources had been used as a training echelon for the RAF and little had been done to prepare Australia’s air defences.

Those naval assets that were available were returning from the Mediterranean and Far East and were under the command of the Royal Navy, not Australia. The vast majority of the land forces that were available were Militia formations, many of which lacked equipment and training.262 In this context there was a tendency to panic amongst government and defence

260 Movement of Troops from 28th May 1941 to 6th Jan 1942, AWM123 521. 261 Defence of the New Hebrides and role of No.1 Independent Coy and other 2AIF units in it; and Consideration and Recommendations for Vila and Tulagi by Major J. EDMONDS-WILSON – 22 Jul41, AWM113 MH 1/149 PART 4. 262 The equipment on hand for AMF Militia units on 30 Nov 1941 fell far below war establishment. For example there was available at that time 74% of the requirement for .303 ammunition, 23% .45 ammunition, 17% 3” mortar ammunition, 25% 25pdr 18-pdr and 4.7” artillery ammunition. In the case of actual weapons available 73% rifles, 49% light machine guns, and 77% web equipment and so on. Ironically the number of medium

planners at this time.263 It was in these circumstances that the decision was made to maintain

the garrisons which had been placed in the so-called Island Barrier to the north of Australia,

even though they were isolated and unsupportable. One of these garrisons was 2/1st

Independent Company on New Ireland.264 The reasoning behind the deployment of these

forces was that Australia needed to show some assertiveness in the region so as to bolster

Dutch resolve in the Netherlands East Indies and to maintain what was considered to be

Australia’s forward observation line.265 That observation line had to be fought for despite the

impossibility of holding it.266 This decision sentenced those troops who were part of the ‘line’

to destruction.

The 2/1st Independent Company was fully aware that no relief would be sent to it in

an emergency and that it would be left to its own resources.267 Edmonds-Wilson was an

effective administrator and was not oblivious to the tactical situation, and he oversaw plans to

withdraw if an enemy landing made defence impracticable.268 Under his direction a survey of

the approaches to Kavieng was undertaken. The survey concluded that a frontal attack on

Kavieng would be too dangerous for an invader to attempt, and that any Japanese attack

would thus have to come from the south. Therefore priority would be given to defensive

measure from that direction.269 Unfortunately this assessment would prove to be incorrect.

Edmonds-Wilson was described by those who served under him as not a field officer; he

machine guns and 3” mortars on hand exceeded war establishment but without ammunition they would have been of little use. See: Defence of Australia and Adjacent Areas – Chiefs of Staff Appreciation, Dec 1941, Per centage of Materiel on Hand for AMF Units – 30 Nov 41, AWM 124 4/105. 263 Horner, High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945, p. 143. 264 See: Chapter ‘The Island Barrier’ in McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau. 265 J. Robertson and J. McCarthy, Australian War Strategy 1939-1945, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1985, p. 217; Appreciation on the Defence of Australia and Adjacent Areas – by Australian Chief of Staff Dec 1941, AWM54 243/6/15. 266 Appreciation on the Defence of Australia and Adjacent Areas – by Australian Chief of Staff Dec 1941, AWM54 243/6/15. 267 Detailed Instructions for the Employment of No.1 Independent Company for the protection of Aerodromes at Lorengau, Kavieng, Namatanai, Bukka and Keita (when ordered), No 1 Independent Coy Operations 1941- 1943, AWM MH 1/149. 268 Ibid. 269 Ibid. Ironically it was just such a frontal assault that occurred when the Japanese did invade, the assault meeting no resistance.

freely admitted that he had little knowledge or participation in the mysteries of weaponry and

field-craft and that he spent much of his time tending to administrative matters delegating

combat-related affairs to his officers.270 One brutal assessment of Edmonds-Wilson suggested that he was a ‘bloody fool’.271 Post-war observations from the survivors of the Company

were that the Company were a fine body of men, but badly led.272 The rapid collapse of the

company’s defences at Kavieng, failure to demolish the airfield, minimal losses suffered by

the Japanese and ultimate destruction of the Company would tend to support such a negative conclusion.

At 6 a.m. on 21 January 1941 the war came to Kavieng. Two Japanese air raids hit the

town, the first raid lasting for about 45 minutes, and the second for 20 minutes.273 A motor vessel, the Induna Star, was strafed and five 2/1st Independent Company men were wounded,

two severely. Further Japanese bombs hit the wharf and the area near the airfield which

included an engineering shop.274 One Japanese aircraft was shot down during the engagement

and three others damaged.275 Kavieng was evacuated at 7 p.m. on the same day. By midnight

only Edmonds-Wilson and six civilians remained in the town, for no apparent reason than to

enjoy a comfortable night in their homes. A Section of soldiers remained at the airfield. One

account, which may have been influenced by the personal animus towards Edmonds-Wilson

claimed that he and his compatriots indulged in an alcohol-fuelled feast that evening and he retired to bed, despite having heard engine noises out in the harbour late that night.276

The Japanese landed at 3 a.m. on 22 January, bringing a steamer right up to the wharf

and disembarking some 1500 troops. They met no resistance. Edmonds-Wilson tumbled out

270 McNab, We Were the First, p. vii. 271 Murray, Escape a Thousand Miles to Freedom, p. 77. 272 McNab, We Were the First, p. 33 and p. vii. 273 Murray, Escape a Thousand Miles to Freedom, pp. 54-6. 274 Ibid, p. 60. 275 Ibid, p. 59. 276 Ibid., p. 74.

of bed, awakened by Peter Levi, the owner of the house he had slept in. He and Levi leaped into a car and drove through Japanese soldiers to make their escape. As they did, they picked

up local resident, Harold Murray, who leaped onto the car’s running board wearing his pyjamas and without his false teeth.277 Reaching the airfield Edmonds-Wilson cried out

‘Blow her! Blow her! The Japs are here!’278 Some demolitions were carried out, the damage

of which was presumably small given that Japanese aircraft landed on the runway later the

same day.279 While the evacuees gathered at the airfield arguing about what to do next

Japanese troops appeared at the end of the runway and began firing at them. When this happened Edmonds-Wilson shouted for everyone to go into the bush, keep together and keep moving.280 The account of the Japanese attack on Kavieng air field given in We were the

First, the unit history of 2/1st Independent Company No.1 Independent Company, relates how

the men of the company fought back fiercely killing 300 Japanese. This is not supported by

the recollections of Harold Murray who makes no reference to the Japanese seizure of the

airfield in his account of the night Kavieng was invaded.281 Japanese accounts of the capture

of the airfield make no mention of casualties, indeed seeing no enemy at all on the airfield.282

Wilson’s peremptory order for everyone to withdraw into the bush also implies a lack of resistance. Determining what did happen is fraught by the lack of sources which describe events on that night. Australian descriptions of the events of that night are from only three sources; Murray’s, the official history of 2/1st Independent Company, and an account written

by Edmond-Wilson in 1945 after his release as a prisoner of war. Murray’s account is that of

a civilian who does not hide his contempt for Edmond-Wilson and the Army’s actions at the

277 Ibid., p. 76. 278 Ibid. 279 New Ireland – Notes on Interview with Evacuees at the time of the Japanese landing 21/1/42, AWM54 616/8/11. 280 Murray, Escape a Thousand Miles to Freedom, p. 77. 281 Murray in Escape a Thousand Miles to Freedom, does not mention fighting at the airfield in his narrative of events at Kavieng during the Japanese invasion. 282 Allied Translator and Interpreter Section. Captured Documents Nos 58 + 74. Diaries of members of Kure No 3 Special Landing Party – Mar1942, Note book of Hideo Inetsugu - YANO unit, KURE No.3, S.L.P – captured at Milne Bay Sept 42, AWM54 253/5/7.

time. The official history’s account is subject to uncited references and Edmond-Wilson’s

post-war account. Edmund-Wilson’s account was written years after the event, and following

Wilson’s release from Japanese captivity and thus subject to the caveats of time and

possibility of a self-serving account.283 Complementing these is a Japanese reference to the

landing, albeit brief. It does seem that given what was in every respect a hasty evacuation

from Kavieng by Australian personnel on the night of the Japanese landing, and the Japanese

reference to that event, the claim of the number of Japanese killed was exaggerated. Murray’s

account, although biased, does provide an alternative window on the events of that night.

Aside from Edmund-Wilson there were actually some men from the company in

Kavieng when the Japanese landed. Three men had been sent back into the town the night of

the 21-22 January to carry out demolitions on the waterfront, but for whatever reason, this

was not achieved. It may have been that the three men decided to loot a local shop instead.

The Manager of the Burns Philp store caught three soldiers looting his shop during that night.

He identified these as ‘commandos’.284 The soldiers had blown the lock of the door which the

Manager says was the ‘only thing they blew up from start to finish’.285 There is no mention of

the men again and it is presumed they escaped the town. If this incident actually occurred, it

suggests that the quality of the men despatched to the harbour that evening was wanting.

Whether or not this reflected the lack of rigour of the training and discipline of the men of the

company, or the misdemeanour of a handful of soldiers, is unknown. Whatever the case it

brings back to mind the concerns expressed by Mawhood at the effect the premature

completion of the training of 2/1st Independent Company would have on the capabilities of

the company.

283 J. Edmunds-Wilson, ‘No. 1 Independent Company A.I.F at Kavieng’, Australian Army Journal, No. 197, Oct1965, pp. 30-31. 284 Interview with Waters, Planter New Ireland. Personal Records Gavin Long, AWM67 3/413. 285 Ibid.

Having hastily evacuated the airfield and trekking for two days Edmund-Wilson and a party of evacuees both military and civilian gathered at Kaut, several miles into the bush from

Kavieng. There they made contact with Port Moresby, informing them of what had occurred, using civilian radios as their military radios were broken. The orders they received in reply were forthright, if not entirely realistic. The company was to continue to resist the Japanese by fighting as a ‘stay behind’ guerrilla force.286 Unfortunately the company, due to its

abbreviated guerrilla training, possessed very little in the way of skills or knowledge of how

to wage such a war. In addition the tactical, logistical and health circumstances the company

was confronted with did not favour embarking on a protracted guerrilla campaign. The lack of

food was a major factor in determining if the force should go or stay. District Officer Bill

Kyle, part of Edmund-Wilson’s party, was aware that the number of indigenous gardens in

the hills was very rare, and any party trying to survive on foraging on this source alone food

would starve.287 Edmonds-Wilson was very much aware of his situation. He had a conference with his Medical Officer in which he discussed the health of the men. Many were suffering from fatigue, malaria, dysentery and skin diseases. Consequently, Edmonds-Wilson decided that the company’s only hope was to leave the island at once and ignore the order to stay and fight on, despite some of his officers arguing that they should remain and fight.288

Evacuation of the refugees would have to occur before the enemy discovered the

whereabouts of the Induna Star, which had been hidden nearby and was the only means of

leaving the island. Subsequently, once aboard the vessel the company departed the island on

29 January. So hasty was the evacuation conducted that food, clothing, blankets, arms,

ammunition, and general equipment was abandoned.289 In the process the civilians who had retreated to Kaut with the Company were left behind, much to their disgust. The reasons for

286 Murray, Escape a Thousand Miles to Freedom, pp. 83-92. 287 McNab, We Were the First, p. 33. 288 Ibid, p. 33. According to McNab the officers concerned were not aware of the food situation. 289 Murray, Escape a Thousand Miles to Freedom, pp. 83-92.

this abandonment are disputed with the Company claiming that the civilian District

Commissioner when told of the plan to escape refused to join the exodus saying if the

civilians were caught with the military they would be treated as spies and shot. Harold

Murray, however, made no mention of this and criticised Edmonds-Wilson for his decision.290 In any case the flight to freedom was short-lived. The Induna Star was soon intercepted by the Japanese and the company became prisoners of war. Sadly, many of them were killed on 1 July 1942 when the ship they were being transported on was sunk by an

American submarine.291

The sections of 2/1st Independent Company which had been deployed to Manus,

Buka, Tulagai and Vila fared better than their comrades on New Ireland. In the case of

Manus, Buka and Tulagai the Japanese did not descend on them until February-March 1942.

When that occurred, the tiny garrisons withdrew after successfully demolishing what they

could. Those on Manus Island booby trapped the wharf and wounded a Japanese soldier.292

On Buka and Tulagai the sections withdrew to Bougainville where several of them did valuable work as coast watchers.293 Interestingly when the Japanese landed on Buka Island

they knew exactly how many members of 2/1st Company were present. It is not known if this

information came from indigenous agents sympathetic to the Japanese, or from documents

that may have been abandoned by 2/1st Company in its hasty retreat from Kavieng.294 For the

section on Vila the Japanese were never a threat. The Vila section’s greatest challenge was to reconcile the French colonists there to being under the authority of ‘les Anglais’. The

290 McNab, We Were the First, p. 31; Murray, Escape a Thousand Miles to Freedom, pp. 83-92. 291 1st Independent Company , accessed 14 Mar2016. 292 Allied Translator and Interpreter Section. Captured Documents Nos 58 + 74. Diaries of members of Kure No 3 Special Landing Party – Mar1942, Note book of Hideo Inetsugu - YANO Unit, KURE No.3, S.L.P – captured at Milne Bay Sept 42, AWM54 253/5/7. 293 Four members of 1st Independent Company, John Mackie, Edward Otton, David Sly and Henry Wigley were to be awarded US Silver Stars for their work as Coast Watchers, : See Records of General Headquarters, South West Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, Adjutant General, General Correspondence 1942-45 200.6, Box 1731, RG496, NARA. 294 A.B Feuer (ed), Coast Watching in the Solomon Islands, Paeger, New York, 1992, p. 24.

Americans arrived in Vila in May 1942 and went on to establish a major airfield on the island of Espiritu Santo. For those of 2/1st Company who had confronted the Japanese the final tally

for those who managed to escape and make their way back to Australia was four officers and

sixty other ranks from the original 330 who had been deployed.295

The experience of the 2/1st Independent Company reveals a great deal about the

difficulties experienced by the Army at the time in dealing with a small unit such as an

Independent Company. Faced with an existential threat to the nation it is understandable that

neither Government nor Army would have found the time or resources to closely monitor a

single Independent Company. Appointing Edmonds-Wilson whose capacity to command in the field was limited, choosing the company to defend and demolish far-flung airfields and at the same time issue orders not to demolish those same airfields, and scattering the company in small isolated units across a vast stretch of ocean should all be viewed in this context.

When war did come the company achieved none of its goals, and was quickly destroyed as a sub-unit. This was the unfortunate consequence of how the Army had, in a time of national emergency, managed its first Independent Company.

The 2/2nd Independent Company was more fortunate, although its overall management by the Army was hardly any more efficient than 2/1st Independent Company. It did have the

advantage, however, of having had several months to operate as a fully trained Company

before it was deployed overseas. In December 1941 the 2/2nd Independent Company which

had been in the Northern Territory for several months, received orders to depart for Timor

and join ‘Sparrow Force’, the AIF garrison already at Kupang.296 Serious planning or detailed

instructions for the Company were once again absent. At this early stage the purpose, or even

295 Major A.L. Rose C.T. School Brisbane to ‘Lionel’, No 1 Independent Coy Operations 1941-1942, AWM MH 1/149. 296 This was Sparrow Force, consisting of 1197 personnel from 2/40 battalion, field artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, anti-tank, engineers, signals, medical and service troops, Defence of Australia and Adjacent Areas – Chiefs of Staff Appreciation, Dec 1941, AWM 124 4/105.

destination, of the deployment was not made apparent to the Company. Captain David Dexter

serving with the Company at the time, recalled the confusion that characterised the move,

with an early briefing not even mentioning Timor at all. The consequence of this was that the

officers believed that they were being sent to Zanzibar.297 That Timor was the Company’s

actual destination was only made clear in a follow-up briefing. Some maps of Timor were

provided and the officers given limited information on local climatic conditions.298

The Company embarked from Darwin on 10 December and arrived in Timor on 12

December.299 Once it arrived in Timor they were simply instructed to ‘hold’ Timor as part of

the ‘outer arc’ to defend Australia, with no firm idea of just what this meant.300 The

framework for planning actual objectives or day to day operations was given no clearer

strategic context. They were aware of a ‘probable’ role for them in defending Atamboa

airfield in the middle of the island, but this was nothing more than an idea and no orders arrived to confirm it.301 On 16 December 1941 a specific task for the Company was found and it was decided to send 155 men and some 260 Dutch infantry to Dili in Portuguese East

Timor. The balance of the Company, some fifty-five men, would follow and arrived in Dili on 22 December.302 The object of the exercise was to ‘protect’ the Portuguese colony from the Japanese and prepare the airfield at Dili for demolition. This was done, however, against the express wishes of the neutral Portuguese Government.303

Despatching 2/2nd Independent Company for such a task was logical: it was trained and equipped for demolition work and as an independent sub-unit its absence from the main

297 David Dexter interviewed by Mel Pratt for the Mel Pratt collection [sound recording] 25 Aug – 21 Sept 1976, , accessed 13 Jun 2016. 298 Ayris, All the Bull’s Men, p. 51. 299 Ibid., p. 17. 300 David Dexter interviewed by Mel Pratt for the Mel Pratt collection [sound recording] 25 Aug – 21 Sept 1976, , accessed 13 Jun 2016. 301 Ayris, All the Bull’s Men, p. 51. 302 Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, pp. 470-80. 303 Ibid., pp. 470-80.

garrison of Kupang would have only caused minimal disruption. As it turned out the

Portuguese chose not to resist the arrival of the Australian and Dutch troops and 2/2nd

Independent Company quickly set about preparing Dili airfield for demolition and reconnoitring the surrounding countryside. Unlike the Commanding Officer of 2/1st

Independent Company Major Alan Spence, commanding 2/2nd Independent Company, and

his second in command Captain Bernard Callinan, were both officers who firmly understood

the practical realities of tactics and combat. Under their guidance the Company set about

preparing food and ammunition caches in the hinterland, and mapping the or observation

posts and ambushes.

On the night of 19-20 February 1942 the anticipated Japanese invasion of Timor took

place. In the following days Sparrow force at Kupang was overwhelmed and forced to

surrender by Japanese infantry, parachutists and tanks. Japanese troops landed in Dili on the

same night and quickly occupied the town. Despite being caught off guard by the landing the

men of 2/2nd Independent Company responded quickly to the crisis. Some men who had gone

into Dili on leave were lost and the airfield was overrun, but not without losses to the

Japanese. The majority of the Company managed to withdraw in an orderly manner into the

hinterland. Rejecting Japanese demands that they surrender the Company began a guerrilla

war that would last for the next ten months.304

Timor is a long narrow island some 466 kilometres long and 99 kilometres wide

running on an east west axis. The country in the Eastern Portuguese section of the island into

304 The story of the Japanese demand that the Company surrender is both amusing and illustrative of the character of the Company. The Japanese demand was delivered as a written request explaining that as all other allied troops in Malaya, the NEI and Timor had surrendered then the company, which was now all-alone should surrender. The Company considered that their being the last allied troops to be still resisting the Japanese troops in the region was a grand thing and informed the Japanese that they would not surrender. Various version of this refusal exist. Bernard Callinan offers the polite but firm official version, David Dexter recalls that they simply told the Japanese to ‘get stuffed’ while one account in Ayris, All The Bull’s Men, p. 198, states that the officer’s reply was ‘Surrender be fucked!’ and ‘Tell the Japs to stick it up their arse’. It is certain that the latter were not sent as the official reply.

which the 2/2nd Independent Company retreated was mountainous with irregular roughly

parallel ranges which followed the islands main axis. Mount Remelau (now Foho

Tatamailau) the highest peak rose some 2,963m in the centre of a high plateau. In the north

the mountains came close to the sea while they descended more gently in the south. The

countryside varied between sandstone, slate and porous limestone formations, which was

completely infertile and along the coasts patches of lush growth as well as mangrove flats.

The eastern portion of the island was generally fertile. The vegetation varied from scrub with

scattered Eucalyptus trees, very similar to that in northern Australia although also with palm

trees. There were a number of ridges covered only in stunted grass and some tropical growth

in the wet stream gullies. The broad stony bottomed rivers ran relatively short courses and

had steep banks. During the dry season from April to November these only held pools of

water but in the wet season from December to March could transform into raging torrents.

Access to this country from the lowlands, especially in the rainy season, was particularly

difficult. Tracks were narrow and steep and not easily used. All movement in the mountains

was only by foot. Roads suitable for motor transport could only be relied on in the dry season

and were unusable during the wet season.305 Such conditions would assist the Company greatly in its guerrilla campaign.

The Company operated in isolation from the Australian army from February until 22

April 1942 when communication was established using a homemade radio. Their decision in

February to resist and engage in a protracted guerrilla campaign was not ordered by higher military authority. It was instead a tribute to the training and spirit of the Company that they were able to act on their own initiative. The establishment of communications with Australia enabled supplies and personnel to be moved to and from Timor. Directions on how to

305 AWM, AWM54 571/1/9, Report by Captain N.B. Trebeck GSOIII (O) Northern Territory Force on visit to Lancer Force, 20 Oct – 9 Nov 42, AWM54 571/1/9, AWM.

conduct the campaign were received but these were generally entirely inappropriate and

ignored by the Company.306

There was some degree of recognition within the Australian military establishment of

the Timor campaign for the achievements of Spence’s Company after it was discovered that

they were still actively resisting the Japanese. In June 1942 there was some discussion

between the Australian Commander in Chief General Thomas Blamey and The Supreme

Commander of Allied Forces in the South West Pacific General Douglas MacArthur. This

discussion concerned whether to mount an operation to seize Timor or conversely to abandon

it and withdraw 2/2nd Independent Company. Ultimately it was decided to maintain the

Company on Timor to assist in any future operations that may be conducted.307 The 2/2nd

Independent Company was a convenient holding force in this regard.

In August the Japanese mounted a serious effort to dislodge the Australians from near

Dili. The Japanese concentrated some 2,000 troops and 1,000 pro-Japanese Timorese.308 Four

columns were organised, and these moved against the Australians. Faced with overwhelming

odds the Commandos were forced to retreat further into the island’s hinterland. The Japanese

then concluded their offensive, believing they had achieved their goal of forcing the

Australians away from Dili. The nature of the war then changed with the Japanese employing

armed Timorese to harass the Australians. In September the advance parties of 2/4th

Independent Company arrived in Timor, with the remainder of the Company arriving soon

after. The deployment of a second Independent Company to Timor reflected the idea of

maintaining a presence on the island to assist any future moves to recapture it. A

supplementary reason for a second Company on Timor was the physical condition of the

2/2nd Independent Company. It had been in constant action in a tropical environment for nine

306 Ibid, p.182. 307 Historical Record Index Card GHQ SWPA G-3 Journal 3 June 42, MMA,. 308 Timor - Report on Operations, AWM, 571/4/55, AWM.

months. On Timor there was no place that the troops could recover from increasing physical

ailments such as skin complaints, tropical ulcers and recurrent malaria. Consequently, many

men were beginning to show symptoms of nervous distress. This was having a serious effect

on the number of men able to conduct operations. From a total of 330 men only 200 were

considered fit for service. Boots and clothing were in also in poor condition. Suffering from a

lack of a balanced diet chronic dysentery affected all and with only twenty of the original company not suffering with recurring malaria, the health of the troops was precarious at best.

So poor was the condition of the Company that Major General Jack Stevens the commander of Northern Territory Force described them in the best Australian vernacular as ‘rooted’ and insisted that they receive rest and medical treatment.309 As early as 7 September the Army

command considered withdrawing 2/2nd Independent Company and replacing it with 2/4th

Independent Company.310 This was at that time rejected by other elements of the command

who claimed that removing 2/2nd Independent Company would give the impression of

Australian weakness to the Timorese and consequently strengthen the Japanese hold on

Timor.311 By late in the year this had changed and it decided to withdraw 2/2nd Independent

Company and this between 10 – 16 December 1942. This left 2/4th Independent Company to

face the growing challenge of pro-Japanese Timorese, increasing Japanese numbers and the

shift of Japanese interest to the Eastern tip of the island. Over time the Japanese pushed the

Australians back into a smaller and smaller area, and on 31 December were poised to capture

the primary food producing area that the guerrillas relied upon. It was decided to evacuate

Timor which occurred on 10 January 1943.

From the Australian perspective there certainly was no strategic imperative for a

guerrilla campaign on Timor. It occurred more by accident than design. Its impact on the

309 Northern Territory Force to Land Force Melbourne, 12 Nov 42, AWM54 571/1/9, AWM. 310 Lambert, G, From Tidal River to Tarakan, p.82. 311 DCGS 17 Oct 42, AWM54 571/1/9, AWM.

enemy is hard to assess. The number of Japanese killed is invariably given as 1500 in many

sources, these being based presumably on the estimate given by Bernard Callinan.312 In

reality, however, this number is only a guess. Given the nature of the warfare in Timor, one

of raids and hit and run ambushes, it could be nothing else. Official Australian records claim

300 dead Japanese from the period March to July 1942, apart from those killed in the initial

landings.313 The same source acknowledges that following this period no estimate of enemy

casualties has been attempted, but also acknowledges that ambushes which were conducted were highly successful.314 Throughout November and December 2/4th Independent Company

fought almost exclusively against Timorese pro-Japanese militia.315 Thus it might be asked how many of those killed were in fact Timorese. One also needs to consider that the

Australian presence on Timor prevented considerable numbers of Japanese from being deployed elsewhere.

Understanding how the Army sort to manage the campaign in Timor reflects how poorly it understood the issues at stake. It is problematic just how to treat the history of the

Independent Company campaign in Timor in the context of the Armies management of its

Independent Companies. There was no management at all from February until late April 1942 and thereafter only distant management, much of which was ignored by the Company. When

Timor was reinforced it was essentially to replace the worn out 2/2nd Independent Company

and maintain an Australian presence on the island. There was no more clearly defined

operational or strategic objective, even after nine months.316

312 Callinan, Independent Company, p. xxviii. 313 Relief of 2 Ind Coy in Timor, HQ Northern Territory Force, 11 Oct 42, AWM54 571/1/9, AWM. 314 Ibid. 315 AWM, AWM54 571/4/55, Timor - Report on Operations. 316 For accounts of the 2nd Independent Company’s actions of Timor see for example: C. Ayris, All the Bull’s Men; Callinan, Independent company: the Australian Army in Portuguese Timor 1941–43; A. Campbell, The Double Reds of Timor, John Burrige Military Antiques, Swanbourne, 1995; P. Cleary, The Men who Came Out of the Ground – a gripping account of Australia’s first Commando Campaign, Hachette, Sydney, 2016; Doig, The history of the Second Independent Company; J. Hollege, Deeds that Made the A.I.F; Wray, Timor 1942.

The story of the ‘Timor Guerrillas’ as the 2/2nd Independent Company became known

would provide the basis for an important exercise in triumphalism and propaganda for

Australian newspapers. Articles such as ‘Bearded Guerrillas of Timor’, ‘A.I.F Guerrillas Pin

Japs in Timor: Lone War Against Odds’, and ‘"Lost Legion" In Timor’ are typical of the

multitude of newspaper articles which extolled the exploits of 2/2nd Independent Company.317

Notable in this exercise of propaganda was that such reports did not begin to appear in

Australian Newspapers until early 1943, after the Timor campaign had concluded, and the

Independent Companies who were there had been withdrawn. This reflected the tight control the Army maintained of information regarding operational matters.318

The third of the Independent Companies despatched from Australia in 1941 was to have

a very different experience from that of 2/1st and 2/2nd Independent Companies. It was the

good fortune of the 2/3rd Independent Company to be deployed, as ‘Robin Force’, to the

French Colony of New Caledonia, where it arrived on 23 December 1941. The Australian

Government was very much concerned about who controlled New Caledonia. The island’s strategic position, sitting astride the sea communications to the United States, and within air range of the Australian east coast and New Zealand, posed a serious dilemma if an unfriendly power should gain control of the island. That New Caledonia could fall under unfriendly influence became of particular concern following the fall of France in June 1940. Many

French colonies had openly sided with the Vichy government, and while New Caledonia had

317 ‘Beared Guerillas [sic] of Timor’, The Newcastle Sun, Friday 1 Jan 1943, p. 1; ‘AIF Guerrillas Pin Japs in Timor: Lone War against the Odds’, The Courier-Mail, Thursday 31 Dec 1942, p. 3; ‘“Lost Legion” In Timor’, Weekly Times, Wednesday 6 Jan 1943, p. 4. A search of the Trove date base for newspaper articles for the years 1943-1945 using the search term ‘Timor Guerrillas’ results in 474 hits. See: , accessed 17 Nov2016. 318 P. Dean (ed.), Australia 1942: In The Shadow Of War, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2013, p. 201.

not yet done so there was a significant Vichy presence on the island.319 Planning began

almost immediately in Australia to ensure that New Caledonia would not fall under Vichy

control. The light cruiser H.M.A.S Adelaide was detailed to proceed to Vila and take on

board Henri Sautot, a confirmed de Gaullist, and deliver him to Noumea as a replacement for the current governor who expressed Vichy sympathies.320 This was done on 19 September

1940 amidst general acclamation and direct action by the French residents to thwart an attempt to counter the move by pro-Vichy elements.321

Following this success, concerns for New Caledonia did not abate, especially as

apprehensions about Japan’s intentions increased during 1941. In February-March 1941

Australia sent a Military Mission consisting of one Army, Navy and Air Force representative

to New Caledonia. It reported back on 9 April 1941 giving a general summary of the defence

situation, the requirements of Free French forces in the area, negotiations for an Australian

expeditionary force, and the internment of local Japanese.322

The first employment of an Independent Company in relation to New Caledonia was an

indirect one. In early June 1941 Captain Paul Kneen of the 2/4th Independent Company was

sent to New Caledonia under the assumed identity of Gunner Keen. His mission was a

clandestine one, very much akin to the original internal security role of 104 Military Mission.

Kneen was to report on the local population, in regard to French activities, Japanese

activities, and local indigenous feeling. He was also to report on the possibility of local trainees for Independent Company work, and the potential scope for Independent Company

activities in New Caledonia. On 4 June Kneen reported to Captain Charles Carty-Salmon, the

319 ‘Petainist’ or Vichy sympathisers numbered some 15% of the population in Noumea and 5% in rural areas. They were mostly from the wealthy classes with some military officers, see: New Caledonia Report Captain T. Kneen – 4 Independent Company 4 Jun, 1941, 23 Oct1941, AWM 113 MH1/108. 320 Sir Paul Hasluck Official Historian – Research on New Caledonia, AWM 3DRL 8052 419/45/13. 321 Ibid. 322 War Cabinet Agenda – New Caledonia – Importance of Taking Immediate Action to Prevent it Falling into Japanese Hands, AWM 3 DRL 8052 419/45/13.

commander of the two 6” guns which had been installed covering Noumea harbour. Carty-

Salmon was aware of the subterfuge. Kneen acted as Orderly Clerk to Carty-Salmon until 24

July 41. Under that cover, Kneen set to work and eventually produced a report that ran to 36

pages and was both comprehensive and insightful. He assessed the European French and

indigenous population as friendly to the Allied cause. He cautioned that the French did not

want a permanent Australian presence, but welcomed the material support Australia offered.

He warned of Japanese activity on the island which at the time consisted of Japanese military

officers pretending to be employees of firms, watching Australian military equipment being

unloaded at the wharf, and gaining the allegiance of at least one local Gendarme. Kneen

further assessed New Caledonia as being ideally suited for Independent Company work.323

When war with Japan came in December 1941 concerns for New Caledonia’s fate

became much more focussed. In December 1941 the Chiefs of Staff determined that the

probable Japanese course of action would be to capture New Caledonia as well as other

outlying islands and use these to mount attacks on mainland Australia.324At the same time the

War Cabinet expressed its concerns, noting that New Caledonia was additionally important

because of its production of nickel and chromium, and that Japanese control of the island

would interfere with American naval forces in the region, and it was considered that under

Japanese control it would be and ‘ideal jumping off place’ for an invasion of Australia.325

Cabinet was also aware that the domestic political situation on New Caledonia could result in

a faction on the island requesting the Japanese to land and restore Vichy control.326

Recommendations were made to assist New Caledonia economically by providing loans and

financial backing, conducting visits by Australian warships and flying boats, and cooperating

323 New Caledonia Report Captain T. Kneen – 4 Independent Company 4 Jun, 1941, 23 Oct1941, AWM 113 MH1/108. 324 Defence of Australia and Adjacent Areas – Chiefs of Staff Appreciation, Dec 1941, AWM 124 4/105. 325 War Cabinet Agenda – New Caledonia – Importance of Taking Immediate Action to Prevent it Falling into Japanese Hands, AWM 3 DRL 8052 419/45/13. 326 Ibid.

with the Free French military forces on the island. If these steps were not taken New

Caledonia would fall to the Japanese within three months.327

It was in such circumstances that on 15 December 1941 the Army decided that an independent company be sent to New Caledonia as a demonstration of Australian support and to enhance the morale of the French.328 Of interest is that this decision was made one day

before the decision to embark 2/2nd Independent Company to Portuguese East Timor. Using

the Independent Companies as agents of foreign policy was obviously a consideration in the

mix at that time. A further motive for the embarkation of 2/3rd Independent Company to New

Caledonia was to place a force well-trained in demolition on the island, so as to provide a

means of destroying the nickel and chromium mines in case the Japanese landed.329 At the

time 2/3rd Independent Company, which was the sole remaining trained Independent

Company available, was aboard a train on its way to Darwin. Nevertheless, it was chosen for

the task. The train was halted, turned around and headed back to Sydney.

The Company arrived in Noumea, New Caledonia, on 23 December 1941.330 On

arrival the Company negotiated with the Free French military and assumed responsibility for

the northern portion of the island. It dispersed in sections, with each occupying one of thirteen areas. Within each of their areas the sections conducted reconnaissance and established dumps for ammunition, explosives and food. Each of the sections camps was

‘concealed’ and hidden from view. Preparations for the destruction of roads, mines, and any

327 Ibid. 328 Defence of Australia and Adjacent Areas – Chiefs of Staff Appreciation, Dec 1941, AWM 124 4/105. 329 Horner, High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945, p. 143. 330 John Lewin interviewed by Neil MacDonald AWM SO4158; Report on Operations by No.3 Indep. Coy in New Caledonia, 23 Dec 1941 to 31 Jul1942, AWM 54 565/4/1.

installations useful to an invader were made, and each section undertook the responsibility for training French militia in their area.331

Unlike their compatriots on New Ireland and Timor, the soldiers of the 2/3rd

Independent Company enjoyed a relatively relaxed life. Six month’s tinned rations had come

with the Company but these had been cached in favour of local cuisine. No further rations

were received from Australia. Pay from Australia was, however, nonexistent, and with a lack

of funds purchasing local produce was difficult. The matter was eventually resolved when

French authorities began paying the men the equivalent of 2/10p each per day in French

Francs.332 With this money local supplies could be purchased. Even with the availability of

local food it was only when the Americans arrived on the island in March 1942 that the

Company was assured of a steady supply of military rations, these from US sources.

Replacement of clothing became a serious issue as no replacement clothing had been

received from Australia, and the men began wearing US military clothing but kept their

Australian boots and continued to wear their slouch hats.333 From the point of view of the

Australian military the 2/3rd Independent Company’s sojourn in New Caledonia was

undertaken at a bargain basement price.

The Company did not squander its time on New Caledonia. A small hospital was

built, reconnaissance was conducted and preparations made to demolish the nickel mines and

to construct road blocks. Roads were also built, motor vehicles repaired and water transport

assets put to use. A communication network using radios, powered by locally-purchased car

batteries, was established allowing direct communication with Australia. Despite this, it was

331 Report on Operations by No.3 Indep. Coy in New Caledonia, 23 Dec 1941 to 31 Jul1942, AWM 54 565/4/1, AWM 54 565/4/1. 332 Ibid. 333 Garland, Nothing is Forever, pp. 32-6.

a rare event to receive any communication back from Australia.334 To not pay soldiers, to not

send rations or clothing, to hardly ever communicate with them was a major administrative

issue for the Army, most likely reflecting the immense stress the whole organisation was

under during the early days of 1942. In such circumstances it is understandable that no time

could be found to attend to the concerns of a small isolated sub-unit. Members of the

Company, however, understood the issue as an abrogation of responsibility towards the men

and quite deliberate. Lieutenant John Winterflood stated that on departure from Sydney the

company had been left with the very clear message that they had been ‘written off’ and were

not coming back.335 Reinforcing this conclusion are the recollections of Lieutenant Ron

Garland who was of the opinion that the Company had been simply ‘dumped in a foreign colony’.336

The Americans who eventually arrived on New Caledonia on 12 March 1942 were

raw inexperienced troops.337 It became apparent that they would require some tutelage in

how to operate in a tropical environment. To this end Independent Company sections were

attached to a number of US Companies as instructors. The experience proved a positive one

with training being carried out in an amiable and enthusiastic manner. At the request of the

US Headquarters a full course on guerrilla warfare was conducted for US Officers and NCOs

by the Australians. In return some 2/3rd Independent Company Non Commissioned Officers

attended a US mortar school.338

All the while the men of the Company were constantly on alert and not without

reason. During 1-4 July 1942 a four-engine Japanese flying boat had appeared over the island. Japanese submarines had been spotted close to the island and there were reports of a

334 Report on Operations by No.3 Indep. Coy in New Caledonia, 23 Dec, 1941 to 31 Jul1942. AWM 54 565/4/1; John Lewin, interviewed by Neil MacDonald, no date, AWM S04158. 335 John Winterflood, interview by Neil MacDonald, no date, AWM S04156. 336 Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 35. 337 John Lewin, interviewed by Neil MacDonald, no date, AWM S04158. 338 Report on Operations By No.3 Indep Coy in New Caledonia, 23 Dec, 1941 to 31 Jul1942, AWM 54 565/4/1.

100

‘fairly strong’ Japanese naval force in the southern Solomon Islands. An attack was expected

at any time. In May the company dispersed into its independent sections and deployed fully

to the north of the island. 339 It was understood by the Company at this time that other than

demolition of vital assets its primary role after a Japanese invasion they were to conduct a

guerrilla war against the invader and to harass them as long as possible.340 This was in marked contrast to the lack of any positive direction in this regard to the 2/1st and 2/2nd

Independent Companies. The Army had finally issued a direct instruction for an Independent

Company to act in a manner which utilized its full potential. The New Caledonia experience

came to an end for 2/3rd Independent Company in August 1942 when it was returned to

Australia. It arrived in Brisbane wearing American uniforms and carrying American carbines,

and with what appeared to be a general attitude of nonchalant indifference thanks to nine

months of living in small self-sufficient groups in a prosperous and benign environment with

minimal communication or material support from Australia.341

The manner in which the first three Independent Companies were sent to war is a

clear example of the poor understanding by the Army in 1941of how to make the best use of

unconventional military assets. Bolstering the morale of allies - flying the flag - was a primary reason to the deployment of the first three Independent Companies. The deployment

2/1st Independent Company to New Ireland and to Vila, even though nowhere near Dutch and

French forces, diplomatically supported the Dutch and French by showing Australian resolve to resist the Japanese. The deployment to Timor of 2/2nd Independent Company was as part of

a force designed in part to support the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies. The later deployment of 2/2nd Independent Company to Portuguese Timor was a strategic and diplomatic gambit. A major reason for the deployment of 2/3rd Independent Company to New

339 Ibid. 340 John Winterflood interview by Neil MacDonald, AWM S04156; Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 13 and pp. 17-18. 341 John Lewin interviewed by Neil MacDonald, no date, AWM SO4158.

101

Caledonia was to prevent that place falling under Vichy control. None of these reasons had

anything to do with utilising the unconventional military capabilities of the Companies

themselves beyond their demolition training. There was acknowledgment with 2/3rd

Independent Company of its unconventional potential, but it was the only one of the three

companies that received any such direct instruction. High level planning such as it was,

placed 2/1st Independent Company in a hopeless situation, one compounded by the issuing of

contradictory orders. In the case of 2/2nd Independent Company, high level planning was minimal apart from ensuring that the Company arrived on Timor to boost the numbers of the garrison there. There is no evidence that its move to Portuguese Timor was by any pre- planned design.

Contradictory or non-existent instructions, unrealistic expectations, and apparent indifference towards basic responsibilities for administration of the Independent Companies, are all important failings of the Army’s management of the Independent Companies during

1941, and the early days of 1942. During this period the Army, due to its limited perception of what the companies had to offer, and subsequent lack of identification of appropriate roles which the Companies could fulfil in what was an overwhelmingly conventionally orientated force, did not effectively employ the full range of skills and attributes the Independent

Companies had to offer. In the evolutionary development of how the Army managed the companies during the war this period ranks as the lowest point.

On 8 March 1942 the Japanese occupied Lae and Salamaua on the northern shores of

New Guinea. The war had come closer to Australia, and a new much more immediate threat had appeared. It was against this threat that the next stage in the Army’s evolving understanding of how to manage and employ its Independent Companies would be played out.

102

Plate 5: Independent Company’s First Deployments, 2/1st – New Ireland, Manus Is, Buka Is, Tulagai,

Vila, 2/2nd – Timor, 2/3rd – New Caledonia.

103

CHAPTER 4

KANGA FORCE – ‘The ‘RAGGED ARSED FIFTH’

The early months of 1942 was a dangerous and challenging period for Australia.

Japanese military offensives had overwhelmed Hong Kong 8-25 December 1941, Malaya 8

December 1941 – 31 January 1942, Singapore 8-15 February 1942, the Dutch East Indies 17

December 1941 - 1 March 1942, the Philippines 8 December 1941 – 8 May 1942, and Burma

beginning 14 December 1941. Australian had been attacked with a major air raid on Darwin

19 February 1942 and a submarine raid on Sydney Harbour 31 May – 1 June 1942. For all

intents it appeared that Australia would be the next victim of Japanese territorial aggression.

Caught unprepared and poorly equipped Australia’s strategic situation was grim. As former

leader of the Federal Opposition and Defence Minister Kim Beazley recently observed, ‘It is

impossible now to recreate in our minds the sense of vulnerability, shock and anxiety felt by

the political leadership in Australia and many in the population.’342 The Australian

Government, and its military high command, were making decisions on which it appeared the

fate of the nation depended. It was in this context that the Army deployed its first

Independent Company directly into an active combat zone.

As discussed in previous chapters during 1941, the Australian Army did not capitalise

on the unconventional military asset it had in the form of the Independent Companies. By

1942, however, with Australia facing an existential threat from the Japanese, circumstances

had changed, and the Army grasped at any option to assist it. One of these was to make use of

an Independent Company to harass and discomfit the enemy. Specifically, this involved the deployment of 2/5th Independent Company to Wau so that it could operate against Japanese

342 Dean, Australia 1942: In the Shadow Of War, p. viii.

104

forces in Salamaua and Lae. This deployment was significant moment in the history of the

Independent Companies, as it marked the first time that the Army deliberately utilised an

Independent Company with the primary intention of using its unconventional military skills.

On 8 March 1942, in a move to secure the southern approaches to the major Japanese

base at Rabaul, some 3,000 men of the Japanese Naval 7th Base Corps, which was part of the

Army South Sea Detachment, landed at Lae in New Guinea.343 At the same time a second

detachment landed and secured Salamaua. The Japanese did not catch the inhabitants of those

places by surprise, with all civilians being evacuated from Salamaua on 22 January following

an air raid the previous day.344 Only a small force of locally recruited New Guinea Volunteer

Rifles (NGVR) remained at Lae and Salamaua and these too withdrew, leaving one man to

observe sixteen Japanese ships sailing into Lae harbour.345 In accordance with a

predetermined ‘Plan G’, the NGVR took to the jungle from where they could observe and

report on the enemy. The plan was to remain hidden there until food supplies were exhausted

or further orders were received.346

The Japanese established a garrison of approximately 1,200 in Lae and 200-300 in

Salamaua.347 In the weeks that followed the invaders made no move to expand their foothold

on the New Guinea coast and were content to prepare the airfields at both locations for their

use. When circumstances permitted it the occasional Japanese was ambushed and killed by

NGVR troops, but for the most part they could do little more than observe the Japanese. To

assist them do so the NGVR constructed the DAWN observation post on a platform in a tree

343 Answers to Questionaire [sic] on New Guinea (Feb.42 to 22nd Jan 43) Milne Bay, Wau-Salamaua (Feb to Sept 43) + Huon Peninsula Offensive. Compiled by Japanese Officers, AWM54 779/3/119. 344 Interview with Pte. H.W. Forrester NGVR, Gavin Long notebooks, AWM67 2/1. 345 Interview with Lt. G. Whittaker ex.NGVR – Nadzab 6 Dec 43, Gavin Long notebooks, AWM67 2/33. 346 Kanga Force, Reports on reconnaissance and observation Patrols and appreciations, - 1942-1942 Lae- Markham and Salamaua areas, AWM54 741/5/15. 347 Answers to Questionaire [sic] on New Guinea (Feb.42 to 22nd Jan 43) Milne Bay, Wau-Salamaua (Feb to Sept 43) + Huon Peninsula Offensive. Compiled by Japanese Officers, AWM54 779/3/119; Interview with Pte. H.W. Forrester NGVR, Gavin Long notebooks, AWM67 2/1.

105

overlooking Salamaua. They also established the TOJO observation post close to Lae and

another close to Heath’s Plantation near Lae.348 Communicating via a system of flags,

runners, horseback riders and homemade radio the NGVR reported Japanese activity at each

location and guarded the tracks leading inland to Wau and the Bulolo Valley.349 In April

1942 the NGVR were reinforced by a platoon of 2/1st Independent Company, who by

fortunate chance had not been sent to New Ireland with the rest of their company. The

Japanese, meanwhile, remained in their Lae and Salamaua enclaves.

General Douglas MacArthur, coming from the debacle that had overwhelmed

American and Filipino forces in the Philippines, arrived in Australia by air on the night of 17

March 1942. He was welcomed by the Australian Government as something of a saviour, and

made supreme commander of all Allied forces in the South West Pacific area. In that role

MacArthur cast an eye over developments in New Guinea. On 1 May he identified Lae and

Salamaua as targets for a limited offensive against the Japanese, with the object of destroying

installations there, or possibly retaking them.350 General Thomas Blamey followed this up

with observations on the troops available for the task and recommended 2/5th Independent

Company for the job.351 MacArthur responded telling Blamey to proceed with the operation

348 Warrant Officer Peter Ryan in a 30 Nov 44 interview with Gavin Long mentions the code names for the observation posts at Lae and Salamaua, see: Records of Gavin Long, General Editor, Notebook No 117 (Fenton) – [notes on Kanga Force], Peter Allen Ryan 30 Nov 44, AWM 67 2/117; NGVR James McAdam describes construction of a platform in a tree overlooking Salamaua, Gavin Long notebooks Maj. J. McAdam ex.NGVR – Lae 19 Jul44, AWM67 2/34; Interview with Captain H. Lyon ex.NGVR describes establishing an observation post 300 yards from the Japanese at Heath’s Plantation, in Gavin Long notebooks Captain H. Lyon ex.NGVR – Lae 6 Dec 43, AWM67 2/33. For a good account of the history of the NGVR, see: I. Downs, The New Guinea Volunteer Rifles NGVR 1939-1945 A History, Pacific Press, Broadbeach Waters, 1999. 349 Records of Gavin Long, General Editor, Notebook No 117 (Fenton) – [notes on Kanga Force], CPL A.M. Wood NGVR – 9 DEC 44, AWM 67 2/117. 350 MacArthur to Blamey 1 May 1942, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), Box 190 Historical Index Cards (Actual) Record Group 3, Index 3, MMA. 351 Blamey to MacArthur, May 1942 (no date), General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), Box 189 Historical Index Cards (Actual) Record Group 3, Index 15, MMA.

106

as soon as possible once the Coral Sea situation, where it was known Japanese naval forces

were intending to launch an amphibious assault on Port Moresby, allowed it.352

Plans for an aggressive move against Lae and Salamaua proceeded accordingly. The

character of this operation was decided in a conference held in Port Moresby on 21-24 April.

At this conference Australian Major General George Vasey, the Deputy Chief of General

Staff and US Army Air Force Lieutenant General George Brett, Commander of Allied Air

Forces, Southwest Pacific Area, decided to form a guerrilla force to be known as Kanga

Force. This force was to be sent to Wau some fifty-one kilometres west of Salamaua. The

title Kanga Force was the idea of Colonel D.D. Pitt attached to headquarters New Guinea

Force.353 Kanga Force would consist of those NGVR still holding in place and the platoon of

2/1st Independent Company already in the area, an additional section of mortars and service

personnel, and the 2/5th Independent Company.

Despite Vasey and Brett’s intention for Kanga Force to be a guerrilla force this was not how MacArthur and Blamey saw its use. For these two senior commanders it was force at hand – its guerrilla training not especially relevant. This lack of consensus on the role to be undertaken by Independent Companies was an early manifestation of the lack of consistency amongst senior commanders on the role Independent Companies and later the Commandos would play, which would characterise the response to the companies/commandos throughout the war. In accordance with the dynamic use MacArthur envisaged for the force he directed that Kanga Force was to attack and recapture Lae and Salamaua, ‘making the most use of the factor of surprise’.354 On 13 April orders were issued for 2/5th Independent Company to

352 MacArthur to Blamey, 4 May 1942, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) Box 190 Historical Index Cards (Actual) Record Group 3, Index 1, MMA. 353 Maj Gen B Morris (CO NGF 42) – 23 Nov 44, in Records of Gavin Long, General Editor, Notebook No 117 (Fenton) – [notes on Kanga Force], AWM 67 2/117. 354 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 85.

107

destroy the naval gun, radio stations, aircraft, and supply dumps in Lae and Salamaua.355 It

was expected that with the fall of Lae and Salamaua both locations could be reinforced,

Allied aircraft could operate from them, and any moves against Port Moresby by the Japanese

could be delayed.356

The choice of 2/5th Independent Company for this task was not, however, a mark that

the Army had recognised the value of unconventional forces as an instrument to strike at the

Japanese. Rather it was a response to the Commander in Chief South West Pacific’s desire

for some form of timely combative action against the Japanese. As it so happened 2/5th

Independent Company was unattached and available for the task at the time. It was, however,

apparent, from the attitude of Vasey and Brett, that some in the higher echelons of the Army

by early 1942, in a marked improvement from its attitude in 1941, did at least recognise the

unique tactical, and strategic, potential of such companies.

As it happened the threat of a Japanese assault on Port Moresby delayed the

deployment of Kanga Force. This was resolved when the Japanese withdrew their invasion

and naval forces following the Battle of the Coral Sea and subsequently relieved Port

Moresby from the threat of seaborne assault. Subsequently, 2/5th Independent Company and

its attendant mortar section was flown to Wau on 23 May, the first time a significant number

of Australian troops had been airlifted into a combat zone. Kanga Force, under the command

of Major Norman Fleay, was established in Wau on 31 May.357

With Kanga Force on the ground it soon became apparent that the orders it had been

issued to recapture Lae and Salamaua were impractical. The strength of Fleay’s force at its

peak was approximately 500. Japanese garrisons in Lae and Salamaua numbered between

355 Bottrell, Cameos of Commandos, p. 142. 356 Draft memo from Col. E.L. Sheehan to A. C/S, 25 May 42, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) Box 190; From G-3 GHQ, Historical Index Cards (Actual) Record Group 3, Index 1, MMA. 357 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 89.

108

600 and 1500 depending upon the source consulted.358 The disparity in numbers between

Kanga Force and the Japanese, the physical demands of campaigning in an undeveloped

tropical environment, and the danger of local indigenous people disclosing Kanga Force’s

dispositions and intentions all conspired to render a successful surprise attack on Lae-

Salamaua unlikely.359 In addition, the Army’s high command had begun to have second

thoughts about the idea of capturing Lae and Salamaua. Blamey informed MacArthur in May

1942 that even if recaptured neither could be supplied and thus the position of any garrison in

those places would be untenable.360 When confronted with the realities of the situation New

Guinea Force, the military command unit for Australian and indigenous troops from the

Territories of Papua and New Guinea, responded with commendable flexibility and issued

Kanga Force with new orders. These abandoned the notion of using Fleay’s men as assault

troops to storm and occupy Lae and Salamaua. Kanga Force was instead to adopt the role of

guerrillas which had been the original intention of Vasey and Brett, and to harass and destroy

enemy personnel and equipment in the Markham District, which included Salamaua.361 It

was hoped that by it mere presence Kanga Force would provide the means of tying up large

numbers of enemy troops.362 This was the first time a deliberate and definite operational

instruction had been issued for an Independent Company which made use of its range of

unconventional capabilities. It was an important milestone in the Army’s growing

understanding of and management of such forces.

358 Japanese strength in Lae was 6-800 and in Salamaua as 1-200. See: General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) Box 190, Historical Index Cards (Actual) Record Group 3, Index 1. From G-3 GHQ draft memo from Col. E.L. Sheehan to A. C/S, 25 May 42. MMA; Answers to Questionaire [sic] on New Guinea (Feb.42 to 22nd Jan 43) Milne Bay, Wau-Salamaua (Feb to Sept 43) + Huon Peninsula Offensive. Compiled by Japanese Officers, AWM54 779/3/119, states that the combined Japanese force in Lae-Salamaua was 1500. 359 The indigenous people who lived along the Markham River were under close Japanese supervision. The Japanese had been spreading stories that there was scarcely a white man left in New Guinea. Under such circumstances the indigenous people naturally deferred to the occupying power, and some assisted the Japanese. See: Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 229; P. Ryan, Fear Drive My Feet, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1959, p. 91. 360 Blamey to MacArthur May 1942 (no date), General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), Box 189, Historical Index Cards (Actual) Record Group 3, Index 15, MMA. 361 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 90. 362 Kanga Force Operations Wau Salamaua 1942, AWM54 587/6/2.

109

The geographic region into which Kanga Force had been sent was most challenging.

Kanga Force was to be based in Wau, a small gold mining town established at an elevation of

1079 metres on high ground adjacent to the Bulolo Valley. The area in which Kanga Force

was to operate stretched from Lae, some seventy four kilometres to the north east to

Salamaua, some fifty one kilometres to the east. Within that region between Lae and Wau lay

the mostly unfordable Markham River and its valley, and numerous ranges of precipitous

mountains, clad in impenetrable jungle, and intersected by deep fast flowing streams. The

climate was tropical, the rain incessant and the dangers from disease extreme. When it arrived in Wau, 2/5th Independent Company began to replace the NGVR in the forward areas

retaining only a few NGVR personnel as guides.363 Thought well trained in bushcraft

operating in the New Guinea jungle was nonetheless a novel experience for the Independent

Company. It required time for the newcomers to assimilate to their new environment. Those

NGVR who remained with 2/5th Independent Company helped teach the skills needed to operate and survive in the jungle.

363 Interview with Pte. H.W. Forrester NGVR, Gavin Long notebooks, AWM67 2/1.

110

Wau-Salamaua area 2/5th Independent Company of operations.364

Throughout the first weeks of June 1942, Kanga Force conducted patrols south of the

Markham River, and south and west of Salamaua.365 At the same time plans were developed

to raid the enemy positions. It was thought that raids would serve to distract the attention of

the Japanese from other Allied activities in New Guinea, such as the construction of an

364Bloody Ridges Wau Salamaua, DVA, , accessed 18 Aug 2018. 365 Kanga Force Operations Wau Salamaua 1942, AWM54 587/6/2.

111

airfield and the infrastructure at Buna.366 To this end specific attention was paid to Heath’s

Plantation, a Japanese outpost, some fourteen kilometres from Lae and connected to it by

road.367 Eliminating this outpost would remove an obstacle in the way of a raid on Lae, if

such could be mounted.368 Salamaua with its airfield and radio station was also identified as a target for a future raid. As the days of June passed, planning to raid both Heath’s Plantation and Salamaua commenced. By the end of June reconnaissance and planning for both had

been completed.

The raids conducted by Kanga Force at Salamaua on the night of 29 June and Heath’s

Plantation on 1 July were very much operations in the classical ‘commando’ style, as

established by British Commandos during 1940-42. Kanga Force’s Intelligence Officer,

Lieutenant B. Dawson, acknowledged this when he observed that the raids would be

conducted in, ‘the true spirit in which Commando troops were conceived’.369 It was intended

for the raiders at both places to appear unexpectedly, hit hard, cause maximum mayhem to

the enemy, and just as quickly depart. As it eventuated the raid on Salamaua would be an

outstanding success and the raid on Heath’s Plantation a costly disappointment.

Salamaua had been occupied by the Japanese since they landed there on 8 March

1942. Since that time they had worked on the airfield and begun using it as a base for aircraft

in transit between New Britain and Lae. Various defences had been constructed, including

weapon pits with mortars and machineguns, on the isthmus connecting Salamaua town to the

mainland. A 6-inch naval gun had been emplaced on the peninsula.370 The Kanga Force

raiding party consisted of 56 men, made up of half 2/5th Independent Company, and half

366 General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), Box 190; Historical Index Cards (Actual) Record Group 3, Index 3, 17 Jul42, MMA. 367 Kanga Force Operations Wau Salamaua 1942, AWM54 587/6/2. 368 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 99. 369 2/5 Independent Coy, Operations in New Guin;ea 25 Oct 1942, AWM54 587/6/11. 370 Lieutenant Michael ‘Mick’ Sheehan, 2/5th Independent Company, Interview by Neil MacDonald, 12 Jan 1986, AWM SO4152 Part 2.

112

NGVR.371 The raiding party began moving from Wau on 14 June and by 17 June paused at a

site named Wireless Camp. While in this position Captain Norman Winning, the raid

commander, and NGVR sergeant and chief scout, James McAdam, conferred. The two

decided that not enough reconnaissance had been conducted of Salamaua and both set out to

remedy the situation. With the assistance of an indigenous guide the two men made their way

through the jungle, eventually finding a site to act as an advanced base camp from which the

raid itself could be launched. They then infiltrated closer to Salamaua and established

themselves in a hiding place inside a building at the west end of the airfield. Winning and

McAdam then stole into Kiela Village on the outskirts of Salamaua. From there they watched

and counted Japanese troops. On 25 June the main party moved closer to the site that had

been chosen for the advanced base camp.

Unfortunately for Kanga Force poor staff work resulted in insufficient rations for the

Salamaua party being supplied and lack of food was becoming acute. A delegation from the

raining party had returned to Mubo to arrange resupply without success. Once he had

completed his close reconnaissance Winning returned to Mubo himself to hasten the dispatch

of rations.372 The practicalities of operating in a tropical forest wilderness in which all communication had to be conducted on foot, with the associated time delays this caused, meant that even when supplies brought in by indigenous carriers reached the raiders on 26

June there was little time to distribute them.373 Nevertheless the force pressed on and by 28

371 Ibid. 372 The failure of the rations to reach the raiders was later blamed on poor staff work, an indirect criticism of the CO of Kanga Force Major Fleay whose responsibility it was to ensure that rations were available, see: I. Downs, The New Guinea Volunteer Rifles NGVR 1939-1943, p. 204. 373 The role of indigenous people in the raid is a problematic one. Lieutenant Michael Sheehan recalled that the indigenous people who were with the raiders were absolutely loyal and hated the Japanese. He reported that it was difficult to dissuade those people from joining the raid. The raiders feared that the indigenous participants would take the opportunity to massacre the Japanese with their machetes and tomahawks. Indigenous people carried ammunition which relieved that burden from the raiders. Given that the raid was intended to inflict as much damage and casualties on the Japanese as possible it is curious that the raiders did not want the indigenous people to make their contribution to killing Japanese. A possible explanation for this reticence in wishing the indigenous people to become involved in the killing was that the killing of Japanese with spears and machetes would have clearly indicated the involvement of indigenous people, and the raiders wished to avoid any post-

113

June had arrived at Butu, the site chosen as the advanced base camp. It was there that briefing

for the raid commenced in earnest. The raiding party was divided into seven groups, each

with its own objectives and responsibilities. Using a sand table model and aerial photographs

every aspect of the raid was explained carefully. Rehearsals by each group for the tasks they

were to undertake were also conducted. Zero hour for the raid was set for 3.15a.m. 29

June.374

On the eve of 28 June, the ground before Salamaua leading up to the objective was

checked for booby traps; none were found. The raiding groups then began to move. Each

group moved into place, settled and waited for the order to attack.375 As it transpired zero

hour occurred slightly prematurely. Shortly before the assigned time a Japanese sentry

meandered over to where one of the raiders was waiting in the shadows to urinate and was

killed by a burst from a raider’s Tommy Gun.376 When that happened every Tommy Gun

with a target opened up, and raiders ran forward with grenades and bombs to houses in which

Japanese were known to reside. In the words of Captain Winning this resulted in, ‘dreadful

havoc’.377 Numerous Japanese were shot down and several houses with Japanese inside

blown up. A Japanese pilot was caught and killed and a satchel he carried captured. A float

plane was sunk with a burst of Bren gun fire. One of the raiding groups with a mortar, sited

on high ground overlooking the town, lobbed bombs onto the weapon pits at the isthmus.

This chaotic attack went on for fifty-seven minutes when with Japanese resistance stiffening

battle Japanese reprisals against the local indigenous population. See: Lieutenant Michael ‘Mick’ Sheehan, 2/5th Independent Company, Interview by Neil MacDonald, 12 Jan 1986, AWM SO4152 Part 2. 374 Operation Reconnaissance + Intelligence Reports from Nos 3 + 5 Independent Company, Signed by Capt N.I. Winnng. No 2 Company report on Salamaua Raid – Jul1942. No 3 Company Report New Caledonia – Dec 41 to Jul1942, AWM54 419/1/11. 375 Ibid. 376The story of that encounter is related in Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 73. The account relates: ‘The raid commenced several minutes early when a Jap relived himself and when urinating encountered ‘Paddles’ Hatfield of 2/5th. Hatfield parried the Jap’s bayonet with his rifle barrel (not wanting to fire before the allotted time). Corporal Hunter stepped forward and fired his Tommy gun into the Jap. Thus the raid began a few minutes before its set time.’ 377 Operation Reconnaissance + Intelligence Reports from Nos 3 + 5 Independent Company, Signed by Capt N.I. Winnng. No 2 Company report on Salamaua Raid – Jul1942. No 3 Company Report New Caledonia – Dec 41 to Jul1942, p4, AWM54 419/1/11.

114

and, with Japanese machineguns becoming more dangerous by the minute, Winning ordered

a withdrawal. This was successfully achieved despite tracer fire from six Japanese

machineguns cutting the air just above the raider’s heads as they melted back into the

jungle.378

Though casualties inflicted on the Japanese could only be estimated the raid was an outstanding success. For the cost of three raiders slightly wounded Winning claimed 100 dead Japanese from his own estimates and reports he received from NGVR scouts and indigenous people in the days following.379 Japanese sources admitted to various totals with

one naval infantryman claiming sixteen of his platoon killed and eleven wounded.380 The

Naval Defence Unit in Lae reported twenty-four killed and seven wounded.381 Two local

indigenous men claimed to have seen fifty-six and thirty-eight Japanese dead respectively.382

Whatever the final Japanese casualty figure actually was the raid was an undoubted success.

An important consequence was the capture of documents contained in the dead Japanese

pilot’s satchel. It has been widely claimed that these were plans for the Japanese landings at

Buna, and plans for the Japanese assault on Milne Bay.383 This was not the case. The

document in question, which became known in Allied Intelligence circles as the ‘Kanga

Document’, was in fact a list of dates and locations at which troops from the No.14

Construction Unit and part of the No.5 Sasebo Special Naval Landing Party would land and

378 Ibid.; N.G. FORCE Intelligence Report No.35 Appendix A6. Report from G. Archer (Guide to Lieut. O’Loughlin’s Party), AWM54 419/1/11. 379 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 96; Reports from NGVR and indigenous people of Japanese bodies being carried out of Salamaua following the raid formed the basis of the claim for 100 Japanese causalities. See: Lieutenant Michael ‘Mick’ Sheehan, 2/5th Independent Company, interviewed by Neil MacDonald, 12 Jan 1986, AWM SO41173. 380 ATIS SWPA BulletinsNos 426-455 27 Sept to Oct 1943, B439 5 Oct 43, Item 14, 4705. Diary of Fireman 1st Class Wasaburo Ito, Miyata Buto Tanaka Tai Uraguchi Tai 15 Nov 40 – 21 Jul 42, AWM55 1/6. 381ATIS SWPA Bulletins Nos 526-565 24 Nov to 18 Dec 1943, B546 6 Dec 43, Item 1 7001, Mimeographed file in diary form 25 Jun 42 – 30 May 43 – 82 Defence Unit LAE (Naval), AWM55 1/9. 382 Report on Japanese Attack on Mubo Interrogation of Indigenous wounded and captured from Japanese patrols Jul1942, AWM55 1/9. 383 Lieutenant Michael ‘Mick’ Sheehan, 2/5th Independent Company, Interview by Neil MacDonald, 12 Jan 1986, AWM SO4152 Part 2. Sheehan, who took part in the raid, claims that the plans were for the attack on Milne Bay. See: Pirie, Commando Double Black, p. 78.

115

construct infrastructure (most likely airfields) beginning 16 July. These locations were

Kavieng, Guadalcanal, Lae and Eastern New Guinea. Such information was useful in that it

indicated Japanese interest in Eastern New Guinea and future intentions. It was not, however, a revelation of an imminent invasion or of a location for that invasion. Allied High Command was in fact already aware of Japanese plans to establish themselves in Eastern New

Guinea.384 Buna and Milne Bay had already been recognised as sites of strategic interest and

steps had been taken as early as June to begin preparing Milne Bay for defence and to

develop of an airbase at Buna. The ‘Kanga Document’ did, however, add to this general

concern and as a result of the document recommendations were made to assemble a force to

intercept any attempt by the Japanese to land.385 Subsequent events, particularly in the case of

the unopposed Japanese landing at Buna, were ample evidence that such recommendations

were never actioned. Thus the ‘Kanga Document’, while offering confirmation of Japanese interest in Eastern New Guinea, did not generate a consequential response from Allied planners.

384 McArthur to Blamey, 1 May 42, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) Box 190, Historical Index Cards (Actual) Record Group 3, Index 2, MMA. 385 General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) Box 190, Historical Index Cards (Actual) Record Group 3, Index 3, MMA.

116

Salamaua Raid 386

386 Pirie, Commando Double Black, p. 70.

117

On the night after the attack on Salamaua Heath’s Plantation was raided. Heath’s

Plantation was situated some 15 kilometres to the southwest of the town of Lae and connected to it by road. Since the Japanese landing at Lae the plantation been garrisoned by a

Japanese force, which from about 24 April included a light artillery gun.387 Since March,

Heath’s Plantation had been under constant observation by elements of the NGVR. On 15

June NGVR patrols conducted a close reconnaissance.388 The Kanga Force raiding party

consisted of fifty four-men mostly from 2/5th Independent Company, accompanied by several

NGVR who once more acted as guides and scouts.389 The force was under the command of

Major Paul Kneen, the Independent Company Officer who operated in New Caledonia in

June 1941, and who was by this time the Commanding Officer of 2/5th Independent

Company. The objective of the raid was to kill Japanese soldiers, destroy their equipment and capture documents.390 The bridge on the road from Lae was also to be blown up. An air attack on Lae had been promised the day following the raid to disrupt any Japanese plans to pursue the raiders.391

Unfortunately for the raiders several factors conspired to thwart their plans. The first

of these was the late return of one of Kneen’s forward scouts, who had been forced to lie

motionless beneath a log as Japanese sat on it. He only managed to return to the raiding party

at 10.30 p.m. which delayed the planned time for the raid to commence. The second was the

bright moonlight of that night. Two men whose task was to kill Japanese sentries could not

get close to their targets because of the moonlight. The third was a dog which began barking

when it sensed the approaching raiders and woke the Japanese in the plantation house and

387 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 63. 388 Ibid., p. 97. 389 Ibid. 390 Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 85. 391 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 97.

118

forced one raider group to go to ground.392 This disrupted the coordination of the assault

groups such that when the group tasked with killing the sentries attacked with fire and

grenades at 2.20a.m. it caught the delayed group by surprise. Confused firing, hampered by a

mist, ensued, during which the Japanese artillery gun began firing. As fate would have it one

of the gun’s shells struck Kneen in the chest killing him instantly.393 No provision had been

made prior to the raid for a second-in-command to assume control if Kneen became a

casualty.394 Left without a leader, and coming under increasing Japanese machinegun fire, confusion reigned and the raiders retreated.395 The disorder continued until Lieutenant

Malcolm Wylie assumed command and ordered a general withdrawal, carrying two wounded

with them and leaving Kneen’s body behind. 396

392 Ibid, p. 98. 393 Report on Operations in the Lae Markham Area – Effect of raid on Heath’s Plantation, Observation by Medical Officer, AWM54 589/7/81. 394 This was because of a dispute with the NGVR rifle contingent, prior to the raid, in which the NGVR refused to accept a 2/5th Independent Company officer as second in command, see: Downs, The New Guinea Volunteer Rifles NGVR 1939-1943, p. 211. 395 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 99; Report on Operations in the Lae Markham Area – Effect of raid on Heath’s plantation Observation by Medical Officer, AWM54 589/7/81. 396 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 99.

119

Heath’s Plantation raid. 397

The Heath’s Plantation raid failed. The physical results of the raid were inconsequential. The destruction of the artillery gun a primary objective was not achieved.

Several aspects of the raid such as the failure to nominate a second-in-command, dividing the raiding party into separate groups with no ability to communicate with each other, and not considering the problems of bright moonlight all showed the inexperience of those involved.

The raiders claimed to have killed some 41 Japanese, although this could surely only be guesswork.398 For their part the Japanese 82 Defence Unit LAE (Naval) reported that ‘16

enlisted men killed in action in the LAE area’ on 1 July. It also reported that four had been

despatched to the base hospital aboard ship.399 It is not certain that this refers to the raid on

397 Pirie, Commando Double Black, p. 86. 398 Observation Reports Kanga Force, Lae Jul1942, AWM 54 511/7/2. Fleay reports ‘at least 41’ Japanese killed in the raid, this number was later changed to 43 which has become the standard claim for casualties inflicted in the raid. See for example McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 99, and Bottrell, Cameos of Commandos, p. 142; It was recognised, however, that such claims could not be substantiated. The History of Kanga Force Account of the activities of New Guinea Volunteer Rifles an Kanga Force from, Mar1942 to Jan 1943, AWM 54 578/9/1, states that, ‘There is no basis for numbers of enemy claimed to be have been killed at Heath’s.’ 399 ATIS SWPA Bulletins, Nos 526-565, 24 Nov to 18 Dec 1943, B546 6, Dec 43, Item 1 7001, AWM55 1/9.

120

the plantation but the date matches and ‘Lae area’ does indicate this to be so. In his official

history First Year: Kokoda to Wau Dudley McCarthy casts the raid in a positive light by

observing that, ‘Nonetheless an unexpected blow in the guerrilla tradition had been struck at

the invaders.’400 McCarthy’s comment is very much in the tradition of when all else fails to

fall back on the argument that ‘we struck a blow’. It is difficult to identify any positive

outcomes from the raid. The raid certainly did not compromise or discomfort the Japanese

occupation of Lae, or even Heath’s Plantation, in any way. Perhaps the only positive outcome

was that the raid provided invaluable combat experience.

In response to the Salamaua raid the Japanese bombed Mubo and Komiatum, two

significant features between Salamaua and Wau. They also conducted air raids on Wau and

Bulolo. Japanese aircraft flew low over the mountain trails, and a patrol of 90 men was out

into the foothills. Kela village, adjacent to Salamaua, was converted into a strongly held

position. Some 200 reinforcements were brought over from Lae, and by 16 July it was

estimated that the Salamaua garrison has increased to 400-500.401 More pointedly the

Japanese took out their vengeance on hapless indigenous people who happened to venture

near Salamaua, shooting a group who had paddled their canoes into the waters nearby, and

bombing and strafing other canoes.402 A short while later a Japanese patrol led by indigenous guides moved towards Mubo, which lay halfway between Salamaua and Wau. The patrol was ambushed by elements of 2/5th Independent Company and a number of Japanese and their

guides were killed.403 The Japanese subsequently began to mount patrols with increasing

frequency, restricting the free movement of Kanga Force patrols through the area. The

Japanese also became reluctant to venture out from their defensive prepared positions at

400 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 99. 401 Ibid. p. 100; A. Walker, The Island Campaigns, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series Five Medical, Volume III, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1957, p. 129. 402 Report on Japanese Attack on Mubo: Interrogation of Indigenous wounded and captured from Japanese patrols, Jul1942, AWM54 587/7/20; N.G. FORCE Intelligence Report No.35 Appendix A3 (4-11 JUL42). To C.O. Kanga Force Ex Sgt. McaDAM. J.B., AWM54 419/1/11. 403 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, 1959, p. 100.

121

Salamaua unless they were in significant numbers. This made it difficult for Kanga Force to

strike at them, other than by sniping.404 Such developments were seen by some as a

counterproductive outcome of both the raids.405 The Japanese conducted air attacks on the

tracks bomb tracks leading out from Heath’s Plantation.406 Other air attacks were made

against the Ngasawapum and Nadzab areas which were further inland.407 One consequence of

these air attacks was that it frightened the indigenous carriers who deserted in large numbers, creating a major supply problem for Kanga Force.408

Despite the problematic practical outcome of the raids they did offer a moment of

optimism for the Allied cause. The Salamaua raid was the first occasion in which Allied

ground forces had mounted a successful offensive against the Japanese in the South West

Pacific area. Consequently, it provided the basis for a morale boost for both Allied

headquarters and the general public. The Australian press drew parallels between the

Salamaua raid and the raids by British Commandos, and argued that the action signified a

change of the fortunes of the Allied cause since the fall of Singapore.409 The raid received

international attention with the editorial of the New York Times hailing the raid as a possible

precursor to an offensive against the Japanese.410 There were even suggestions that such raids should occur on a grand scale and that by doing so, ‘the Allies could smash the enemy and seize control of all of New Guinea’.411 Such aspirations were in reality nothing more than

404 2/5 Independent Coy, Operations in New Guinea 25 Oct1942, Lieut. B. Dawson 2/22 Bn and I.O. Kanga Force, AWM54 587/6/11. 405 Interview with Maj. J. McAdam ex.NGVR – Lae 19 Jul44, Gavin Long notebook 34, AWM67 2/34. McAdam was convinced that with a few more men the raiders could have captured Salamaua, and by failing to capture Salamaua it only incited the Japanese to increase their activities, resulting in the inability of Kanga Force to conduct effective reconnaissance patrols. 406 Interview with Captain H. Lyon ex.NGVR – Lae 6 Dec 43, Gavin Long notebooks, AWM67 2/33. 407 Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 96. 408 Downs, The New Guinea Volunteer Rifles NGVR 1939-1943, p. 211. 409 ‘Salamaua Raid is Omen of Greater Offensives to Be’, Maryborough Chronicle, Wide Bay and Burnett Advertiser, Friday 3 Jul1942, p. 2. 410 New York Times Editorial, ‘Raid a Beginning’, reprinted in Cairns Post, Friday 3 Jul1942, p. 4. 411 ‘Too Soon for a Major Move From Australia - Bigger U.S.A. Force Essential’, Sunday Mail, Sunday 5 Jul1942, p. 2; examples of other articles related the story of the Salamaua raid can be found in ‘Jungle Heroes.

122

hyperbole, and there was no indication that the Army’s high command was about to embark

on a campaign of mass raiding against the Japanese. In fact just the opposite seemed to be the

case. There were several Independent Companies available by mid 1942 and the Army made

no use of them. Indeed through May until August 1942 all but 2/5th Independent Company,

and 2/2nd and later 2/4th Independent Companies on Timor, sat idle in Australia. It was only

in August that one company, the 2/6th Independent Company, was released for service along

the Kokoda track.

When the Japanese landed at Gona and Buna on 21 July 1942 and began their

overland campaign aimed at Port Moresby, Allied High Command was forced to respond

with all its strength to that threat. All thoughts of operations outside the immediate Papuan

area were pushed to the side. Kanga Force, being located at Wau, far from the primary theatre

of operations, was understandably relegated to a sideshow. Consequently for Kanga Force the

six months following the raids on Salamaua and Heath’s Plantation, which coincided with the

period of the Papuan campaign, were characterised as months of frustration. During this

period Kanga Force could do little more than defend its own supply lines and try and coax the

enemy to stretch his own lines of communication, by so doing opening himself to attack.412

The Japanese refusal to expose their troops and lines of communication following the

Salamaua raid, forced Kanga Force into becoming essentially observers.

Kanga Force had in fact killed many more Japanese than it had lost itself. Yet such

numbers meant little to the troops in the second half of 1942, as most Japanese casualties had

been inflicted in the first month of Kanga Forces operations, with few since.413 The inactivity

Salamaua Raids. Guerillas [sic] Return. Stories of Fighting’, The West Australian Wednesday 7 Oct1942, p. 3; ‘Japs Outclassed at Lae and Salamaua’, Maryborough Chronicle, Wide Bay and Burnett Advertiser, Wednesday 7 Oct1942, p. 3; ‘Commandos Tell Of Salamaua Raid’, The Daily News Monday 12 Oct1942, p. 3. 412 Lieut. B. Dawson 2/22 Bn and I.O. Kanga Force, 2/5 Independent Coy, Operations in New Guinea 25 Oct1942, , AWM54 587/6/11. 413 Ibid.

123

rankled with the personnel of the Company, who were unable to engage in offensive action

and certainly not able to employ anything like the offensive tactics for which they had been trained.414 The waiting through July and August for an opportunity to strike was compounded

by problems with health and logistics, the perennial bane of troops operating in tropical

jungles. The cumulative strain of operating in such an environment, poor and insufficient

food, and having to be constantly alert for the enemy wore the men down.415 There was a 98

per cent incidence of malaria in the Company. Septic sores from infected scratches were

common. Captain ‘Bill’ Stout, the Medical Officer for 2/5th Independent Company, reported that the lack of dry clean clothes to change into was resulting in an epidemic of contagious skin conditions. Morale suffered accordingly.416 By 31 August only 181 men of the original

303 were fit for service, a loss rate of forty-four per cent.417 In October gastritis and diarrhoea

brought on by a diet mostly of bully beef with very little vegetables and fruit caused further

problems.418 The medical situation had a significant impact on Kanga Force operational

capacity with the number of officers and NCOs who succumbed to illness forcing those men

in the ranks who remained relatively fit to take on extra responsibilities. This resulted in some

forward patrols being commanded by corporals and privates.419

Logistics for Kanga Force remained an acute problem. In the context of the major

campaign to halt the Japanese offensive down the Kokoda Track, it was considered by some

elements in the Army to be unimportant and low on the list of priority to receive anything but cursory attention.420 Such an attitude was not born out of any specific malice directed at

Kanga Force, but was a consequence of the very real strain the logistical infrastructure of the

414 Ibid. 415 Walker, The Island Campaigns, p. 129. 416 Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 217; 2/5 Independent Coy, Operations in New Guinea 25 Oct1942, Lieut. B. Dawson 2/22 Bn and I.O. Kanga Force, AWM54 587/6/11. 417 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 104; Walker, The Island Campaigns, p. 131. 418 Walker, The Island Campaigns, p. 131. 419 Pirie, Commando Double Black, pp. 233-34. 420 Kanga Force Operations Wau Salamaua 1942, AWM54 587/6/2.

124

Australian Army was suffering under at the time. A review of the transport assets available to

New Guinea Force reveals why this was so. There were at the commencement of the Papuan

Campaign only 30 transport aircraft in all of Australia. Of these only half were serviceable at any one time. The requirement to supply Allied forces in Papua was 50,000 lbs per day, and for Kanga Force 5000 lbs per day. New Guinea Force wanted to build up a reserve of 20 days materiel for Papua. 421 Air-dropping was the primary means of delivering supplies to troops on the Kokoda Track. The normal payload of a C47, the most common type of transport aircraft, was 5,000 lbs, although in an emergency it could carry 7,000 lbs.422 Wastage of supplies that were air-dropped, could be as high as sixty per cent, thus requiring multiple extra flights to ensure that the required amount of supplies could be delivered.423 With the limited number of transport aircraft available this would ensure that those which were available would prioritise their sorties to resupplying the main force. The number of transport aircraft available would improve with time, but it becomes readily apparent that in the latter half of 1942, there would be very few aircraft available to service a secondary theatre such as Kanga Force at Wau. The situation was therefore straight forward; in the competition for aircraft to carry supplies Kanga Force would be trumped every time by the requirements of the Papuan campaign.

Supplementing the physical lack of transport aircraft, another impediment to the use of aircraft to supply Kanga Force was the attitude, expressed at the highest levels, that the supply by air for Kanga Force was only to be used in an emergency. In the meantime

Alternative supply methods, by which was meant indigenous carriers, should be used.424

Indigenous carriers had to negotiate the route to Wau along the Bulldog track. Negotiating this track was both physically difficult and time-consuming. In addition simply securing the

421 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 100. 422 C 47 Aircraft, , accessed 9 Mar2018. 423 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 308. 424 MacArthur made this point to Blamey. See: McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 197.

125

services of adequate numbers of indigenous carriers, many of who were wary of Japanese

patrols and aircraft, was a constant challenge and limited the operational reach of Kanga

Force.425 A further contributing factor to the logistical shortcomings faced by Kanga Force,

was the less than adequate staff work managing those supplies by Kanga Force Headquarters.

This problem was not entirely the fault of Kanga Force as there were never enough personnel

available to conduct efficient staff work. This was acknowledged by New Guinea Force, who

declined to assist, offering only that nothing could be done about it because no one was

available to send.426 At no stage did New Guinea Force manage to send a senior officer to

advise or assist Kanga Force in its administrative operations.427

Supplying Kanga Force troops in forward areas thus soon became a major challenge.

One of the main problems was the time it took for supplies to reach troops in forward areas.

All distances had to be covered on foot at speeds no faster than terrain and weather conditions

permitted. This often meant a two-week round trip from supply dumps at Wau to the most

forward positions. Further adding to the shortage of food several reserve food dumps were

discovered by the Japanese.428 The consequences for those troops in the forward areas were

severe. At once stage 72 men had to subsist on eleven cans of soup, and seven pounds of rice,

with no tea or sugar.429 What food there was, had to be supplemented by eating sweet potato

425 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 544; ‘Headquarters Kanga Force Report on the situation that brought about change in the role of Kanga Force, and the occupations of the present positions Sept 1942’, AWM54 578/7/5. Included in this report is that ‘Natives deserted when they heard the Japs were coming – hampering movement of stores’ and that ‘Natives disinclined to operate in forward areas’; Kanga Force Operation and Patrol Reports 1942; Report on Raid on Salamaua Jun 1942 AWM54 741/5/15 reports that ‘Natives will not go close to the Japanese and troops have to carry. In the MARKHAM MUBO area ‘this is too severe for Europeans’. Operations are limited to the amount of food and ammunition a man can carry himself. Three days is considered the longest men can do this. Thus no patrol based from the present advanced bases can penetrate much further forward than HEATHS or MUBO.’ 426 Maj Gen B Morris (CO NGF 42) – 23 Nov 44, Records of Gavin Long, General Editor, Notebook No 117 (Fenton) – [notes on Kanga Force] , AWM 67 2/117. 427 Ibid. 428 Walker, The Island Campaigns, p. 129. 429 Ibid.

126

taken from indigenous gardens.430 In November 1942 Lieutenant Michael Sheehan wrote that

the meat they were eating was very poor, and that the biscuit ration was inadequate. He was

concerned that his men were not receiving an adequate amount of food per week and

subsequently were unfit for hard work.431 At one stage the only vegetable that was available

was cabbage which led Private Lyn Noakes of the NGVR to recall that ‘Everyone stank –

farting.’432 Private Tommy Tucker remembered when he received a serve of cheese which

consisted of a small portion and two army dog biscuits. This was meant to last the whole

day.433 Rice was available, but in limited amounts. Lieutenant John Kerr, writing in

December 1942, stated that he had 40lbs of rice left, and that was all there was, and it was not likely that there would be any more. 434 There was no salt or sugar, which in itself was not a

decisive imposition, but did result in meals being decidedly mundane. 435 In one uncharacteristic moment of largesse several thousand cans of ‘fruit’ arrived, which on inspection all turned out to be carrots.436 The supply of tobacco, which was considered

essential, was also inadequate.437 For some eight months razor blades were unavailable, nor

had there been any scissors to cut hair, and many members of the 2/5th sported ‘magnificent

beards’.438

The availability of medical supplies was also a pressing issue. Quinine was available

but it was at Wau, of little use to men in forward positions for whom a march to the airstrip at

Wau for medical evacuation if necessary would take five days.439 Mail was delivered

430 Lieutenant Michael ‘Mick’ Sheehan, 2/5th Independent Company interviewed by Neil MacDonald, 12 Jan 1986, AWM SO4152 part 2. 431 Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 228. 432 Lyn Noakes, NGVR, interviewed by Neil MacDonald, 12 Jan 1986, AWM SO4152 part 2. 433 Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 209. 434 Ibid, p. 231. 435 Ibid, p. 324. 436 Interview with an Independent Company soldier (Ray Burbury?) by Neil MacDonald (no date), AWM SO 4161. 437 Pirie, Commando Double Black, p. 231. 438 Ibid., p. 324. 439 Lieutenant Michael ‘Mick’ Sheehan, 2/5th Independent Company interviewed by Neil MacDonald 12 Jan 1986, AWM SO4152 part 2.

127

erratically if at all. At Christmas 1942 the men in the forward areas received no parcels and no mail to help them celebrate the day.440 At other times there was no provision to answer mail, no post office and no stamps.441 Added to this was the maladministration by Kanga

Force headquarters of mail when it did appear. One section had not received any mail for ten weeks. In September they found their mail ‘strewn all over the place’ at a location they had never been to before.442

Another major logistical problem was the pillaging of supplies before they reached the frontline troops. Major General Basil Morris, Commander of New Guinea Force, stated that in early 1942 that the problem of supply for troops in Wau was caused by theft and pillaging.443 Lieutenant Littlejohn, of 2/5th Independent Company, echoed Morris’s concerns and was most bitter about the theft of tobacco by rear area troops which resulted in the company receiving none.444 The supply of iodine was not good and complaints were made that what did get through had often been ‘ratted’ by those in the rear areas. 445

A combination of the lack of transport resources to deliver adequate supplies, difficulty and time expended in carrying those supplies to forward areas, theft in rear areas, and inadequate staff work, ensured the logistical situation for Kanga Force remained precarious throughout 1942. Unaware of the all the factors that affected their overall situation members of 2/5th Independent Company felt that they had been ‘dumped’. Many believed that Port Moresby had simply ‘wiped its forehead’ and forgotten them. It was unsurprising

440 Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 225. 441 Ibid., p. 235. 442 Ibid., p. 149. 443 Maj Gen B Morris (CO NGF 42), 23 Nov 44, Records of Gavin Long, General Editor, Notebook No 117 (Fenton) – [notes on Kanga Force], AWM 67 2/117. 444 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 103. 445 Pirie, Commando Double Black, p. 231.

128

therefore that the members of the company came to describing themselves as the ‘Ragged

Arsed Fifth’.446

While Kanga Force endured their situation, activity on the Salamaua front did not

remain static. On 21 July, the same day that Japanese troops landed at Gona and Buna, the

Japanese moved aggressively out from Lae and Salamaua. The force from Lae pushed up the

Markham Valley, and that from Salamaua advanced to Mubo, about half way between

Salamaua and Wau. By the end of August some 900 Japanese troops occupied the Mubo

area.447 The sudden upsurge of Japanese activity incited an extraordinary response from

Kanga Force. Convinced that a superior Japanese force intended to capture both Wau and the

Bulolo Valley, and aware that he was unable to halt or even delay such a move, Norman

Fleay, who had been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, decided to abandon and destroy the buildings and infrastructure of both Wau and the Bulolo Valley. This decision was made despite a patrol led by Norman Winning informing Fleay that accounts of any so-called

Japanese build up were nothing but unsubstantiated indigenous rumour.448 Winning’s

message was reinforced by a report from an independent Army Intelligence Bureau (AIB)

patrol which had been operating in the Markham Valley without Fleay’s knowledge. This

patrol determined that there was no evidence of aggressive Japanese movement in the

Markham Valley area.449 Fleay ignored both reports, indeed ordering that the AIB patrol be

arrested because it had been operating without reference to his authority.450 Subsequently

Wau and the Bulolo Valley were evacuated, and the buildings and infrastructure either destroyed or damaged.

446 Ibid, pp. 235 and 304. 447 Kanga Force Operation and Patrol Reports 1942; Report on Raid on Salamaua Jun 1942, AWM54 741/5/15. 448 McCarthy, South West Pacific Area – First Year, pp. 105-7. 449 A. Powell, The Third Force – ANGAU’s New Guinea War, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2003, p. 33. 450 Ibid.

129

The evacuation of Wau and the Bulolo Valley by Kanga Force was conducted in a

hasty manner, earning the sobriquet ‘Bulldog Derby’ by those who took part in it.451 In a

mark of the ongoing inadequate staff work that characterised Kanga Force Headquarters,

several patrols, including Winning’s, did not actually receive the instruction to withdraw, and

were left behind. As it was, the Japanese never made a move on Wau or the Bulolo Valley, and by the end of September Kanga Force had returned to the battered remnants of Wau.

Fleay’s actions at the time were controversial and have remained so since.452

Having returned to Wau, Kanga Force revisited its desire to inflict the maximum

possible harm on the Japanese. The opportunity to do so came in October when a raid against

Mubo, led by Winning, was conducted. Unlike the original raid on Salamaua, the October

raid on Mubo, the first of two against this target which would be conducted, was a failure.

The reasons for this had much to do with the role of Fleay who accompanied the raid, as an

observer rather than Commanding Officer. No explanation has been found for Fleay making

the decision that he did. In consequence Winning commanded the raid. As the raiders moved

towards Mubo Fleay, however, after a booby trap had wounded one man, Fleay reverted to

his rank and ordered that the party withdraw. Winning, who was still the raid commander,

countermanded the order. A short time later another booby trap exploded. With this Fleay began shouting for the men to retreat. In response Winning shouted for the men to continue.

Confusion reigned and subsequently orders were issued to retreat.453 It was only in October

when reinforcements in the form of the 2/7th Independent Company finally reached Kanga

451 Pirie, Commando Double Black, p. 150. 452 Pirie, Commando Double Black, devotes a chapter ‘Burning of Wau and Bulldog Derby’ pp. 143-154, to the demolition of Wau and evacuation, with numerous firsthand critical accounts of what occurred; P. Bradley, The Battle For Wau, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2008 is also critical of Fleay’s decision to evacuate and demolish Wau. 453 Private Danny Jones, had been ordered to accompany Fleay. His account of the incident stated that Fleay ‘took off’ and went into the jungle. Jones followed him. Fleay, according to Jones, was convinced that the raiding party had been wiped out and that he and Jones were the sole survivors. See: Pirie, Commando Double Black, p. 206. The command of Kanga Force by Norman Fleay and the influence this had upon the relationship with the troops under his command will be examined in a Chapter 7.

130

Force that plans could be made to strike back at the Japanese. Once again Mubo was chosen

as the target. This raid which was conducted to distract Japanese attention away from the

Australian 17 Brigade’s planned move to the Nadzab region occurred on 11 January 1943.

This time Fleay did not accompany the raid which was successfully conducted and resulted in many Japanese casualties.454

The 2/5th Independent Company served in the tropical jungle and mountains

unrelieved from the end of May 1942 until late April 1943, eleven months, service in an

extraordinarily hash and taxing environment. Such an extended period physically ruined the

men of the Company. It was accepted that after one month of service in tropical jungle men would lose physical conditioning, and that after ninety days units so deployed needed to be relieved.455 The surprising thing was that the Company managed to survive such an extended

term, even if it was in an extremely debilitated condition when it was finally withdrawn.

When assessing Kanga Force’s role in New Guinea the original intent of the force, later modified, and the degree to which they achieved its intended objectives needs to be

evaluated. Kanga Force was unable, due to its strength relative to that of the enemy, to

achieve its original objective of storming and occupying Lae and Salamaua. When its mission

was changed to that of harassing Japanese forces in the Markham area it was only able to do

so effectively for a period of about one month at the end of June and early July 1942. In an

appreciation of the situation in the Lae-Salamaua area written on 27 October 1942 Major

General George Vasey noted that Kanga Force activity had resulted in the Japanese ‘facing inland’ rather to the sea, but then goes on to say that this has not distracted the Japanese from their seaboard defences. In effect Vasey was indicating that Kanga Force had very little

454 Operational Plans, Wau – Lae – Salamaua Appreciations of Situation in North east Area – Oct 1942 – Jan 1943, AWM54 583/6/4. 455 Diary No.3 Gavin Long Official History, 9 Nov1943, AWM67 1/3.; Bidwell, The Chindit War – Stillwell, Wingate and the Campaign in Burma, p. 68.

131

impact on the Japanese deployments at Lae-Salamaua.456 On 20 September 1942 Lieutenant

General Sydney Rowell, commander of New Guinea Force, reported that Kanga Force, ‘…is

performing a valuable task in that it is engaging the attention of a considerable enemy force

and is ensuring a flow of valuable information.’457 In the official history McCarthy observed

that the force ‘posed a constant threat to the Japanese at Lae and Salamaua … which could

have threatened Port Moresby’.458 He also noted that when all was considered despite their

disappointments and hardships, Kanga Force had in the final analysis ‘did what they were

sent to New Guinea to do.459

Both Rowell and McCarthy’s assessments are overly generous. It is a moot point

whether Kanga Force ‘engaged’ considerable numbers of enemy. By ‘engaging the enemy’

the presumption was that there was some intention by the Japanese to aggressively move out

from Lae and Salamaua and that Kanga Force was preventing this from occurring. Indeed, fears that just such a move was planned were expressed at the time. An intelligence situation report of 27 May reports Japanese landing troops by air in the rear of Wau and Salamaua as part of a plan for an overland assault on Port Moresby.460 In fact Japanese numbers in Lae

and Salamaua never varied much from the initial landings in March 1942 until January 1943

when numbers did increase in preparation for the planned offensive against Wau. Before that

time there never were any serious aggressive moves made by the Japanese, apart from

occupying Mubo in August 1942, which was nothing more than a move to secure the

approaches to Salamaua. The warning of an impending Japanese offensive from Wau to Port

Moresby was made in May 1942. Rowell’s praise for Kanga Force was in September. In the

456 Operational Plans, Wau – Lae – Salamaua Appreciations of Situation in North east Area – Oct 1942 – Jan 1943, Appreciation of the Situation Lae Salamaua Area – 27 Oct 42, General Vasey GOC 6 Div, AWM54 583/6/4. 457 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 536. 458 Ibid., p. 544. 459 Ibid. 460 General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), Box 189, Historical Index Cards (Actual) Record Group 3, Index 2, MMA.

132

five months between May and September the Japanese had shown no sign carrying out such a

move. Observation reports from Kanga Force itself for the period July to November 1942

reveal no evidence of any Japanese preparations or activity intended to mobilise their troops

for any aggressive move out from Lae of Salamaua.461 Rowell’s praise for Kanga Force

‘engaging’ the enemy, while acknowledging Kanga Force’s resilience in remaining in the field, was thus in reality little more than a hollow compliment.

Following its raids on Salamaua and Heath’s Plantation, Kanga Force’s record was uninspiring. Apart from a brief moment during the second raid on Mubo on 11 January 1943,

Kanga Force, after the third week of July 1942, was unable to damage the enemy in any significant way. The force had been compelled by its situation to adopt a relatively low profile. Members of Kanga Force were aware of the situation and devised explanations for what was happening. Lieutenant Michael Sheehan rationalised the passive role of Kanga

Force as a deliberate ploy, designed so as not to provoke the Japanese and incite them to make a push against Wau.462

Even if unable to inflict significant harm on the enemy Kanga Force was nonetheless able to observe and report. This was in its own way a useful contribution, but even this contribution needs to be assessed in the context of the quality of the information provided by

Kanga Force relative to the period in which it was dispatched. The claim that Kanga Force sent ‘valuable information’ depends on the period which is considered. From March until

July a great deal of information on Japanese troop, shipping and air movements was sent back to New Guinea Force first by the NGVR, and later by Kanga Force. The ‘Kanga Document’ captured during the Salamaua raid provided timely, if not crucial, intelligence. This information was dispatched in a period before the beginning of the Papuan campaign and no

461 Headquarters Kanga Force Report, Sept 1942, AWM54 578/7/5; Kanga Force Operation and Patrol Reports 1942, AWM54 741/5/15; General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), Box 189, Historical Index Cards (Actual) Record Group 3, Index 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, MMA. 462 Pirie, Commando – Double Black, p. 229.

133

doubt given more attention than it would have been in the months following the Japanese

landings at Gona and Buna. Indeed during the period from July until November 1942 reports

from Kanga Force were all of a routine nature, with no significant revelations of Japanese numbers, dispositions or movements. During this period the quality of Kanga Force’s information, being related to mundane matters, from a theatre of operations of no interest to the main force, could not be considered to have been ‘valuable’.463

That Kanga Force ‘did what they were sent to New Guinea to do’, is also debatable.

Just what the Force had been sent to New Guinea to do is open to interpretation depending on

what period of their deployment to New Guinea one examines. They were initially sent to

New Guinea to protect Port Morseby, a role that in no way required them to use

unconventional warfare skills. Their role changed in May 1942 when they were tasked with

capturing Lae and Salamaua, and changed again in early June when they were ordered to

harass the Japanese. In October 1942 that role was refined to include defending the airfields

in the Bulolo Valley.464 The Company certainly did its part to defend Port Moresby. It did not

recapture Lae or Salamaua. It did harass the Japanese for a short time in June-July 1942. It

observed the Japanese and conducted minor harassment of the enemy throughout its time at

Wau. From October, reinforced by 2/7th Independent Company it defended the airfields in the

Bulolo valley.

It could be argued that Kanga Force failed in its mission. It was unable to achieve a

great deal of its originally intended objectives and spent most of its time passive and of little

danger to the enemy. Although technically the case this would be too harsh a judgment. In the

final analysis Kanga Force failed in its mission due to the consequences of inadequate

numbers, poor supply, debilitating health, and being cast as an unimportant sideshow by a

463 Headquarters Kanga Force Report. Sept 1942 AWM54 578/7/5; Kanga Force Operation and Patrol Reports 1942 AWM54 741/5/15; General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), Box 189, Historical Index Cards (Actual) Record Group 3, Index 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, MMA. 464 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 538.

134

high command whose attention was firmly fixed on the Papuan Campaign. It was given a task

and then essentially abandoned, being left with little chance of achieving significant success.

Perhaps the best assessment of just how well the company did what it was meant to do

is to consider its role as a demonstration of Australian resolve. Kanga Force was certainly an

Australian presence in the Lae-Salamaua area, indeed the only presence, even if it was not a

particularly worrisome presence for the enemy. McCarthy points out that from May to July

1942 Kanga Force was, ‘a very small group of men who, alone in the whole of the South-

West Pacific Area, except for those on Timor, were actually facing the Japanese invaders on

the ground.’465 This assessment is, however, very much a fall-back position attempting to

salvage something of value from what was essentially a deployment which achieved very

little.

On 23 September 1942 a document titled ‘Training Notes Tropical and Jungle

Warfare’, gives Kanga Force’s raid on Salamaua as an exemplar of how to conduct

operations in the jungle. One of three examples cited, the others being the fighting on the

Kokoda Track-Milne Bay and the campaign in Malaya, Kanga Force was signalled out for special mention.466 The paper at least acknowledges one action of Kanga Force as a positive example to the wider Army.

Kanga Force’s experiences also marked a significant milestone in the evolution of the

Independent Companies. Unlike 1941, the experience of 2/5th Independent Company in 1942

was that for the first time such a sub-unit had been selected for a specific task in keeping with

the full range of its training, and the role originally intended for Independent Companies. The

Company’s original orders had been succinct and unambiguous: to assault and capture

specific strategic objectives, and then to harass the enemy by using guerrilla tactics. As part

of Kanga Force 2/5th Independent Company did the best it could in the circumstances it found

465 Ibid, p. 588. 466 ‘Training Notes Tropical and Jungle Warfare Nos 1 and 2 First Australian Army training Instruction No 3 – 23 Sept 42’, AWM54 937/3/37.

135

itself in and in so doing exhibited commendable resilience and perseverance, which was in

the final analysis perhaps, its greatest achievement.

The guerrilla campaign waged by Kanga Force in the Lae – Salamaua region was not

the sole experience of the Independent Companies in New Guinea in 1942. Another

company, 2/6th Independent Company, embarked on its own campaign in the mountains, jungles and coastal flood plains of Papua. This would be a campaign that would be dramatically different in both role and practice from that of the 2/5th Independent Company.

136

CHAPTER 5

KOKODA-BUNA

The year 1942 was one in which the Army managed its Independent Companies in a very uneven manner. The previous chapter examined how this manifested itself in relation to

2/5th Independent Company as part of Kanga Force. What follows is an examination of the employment of the 2/6th Independent Company during the Papuan Campaign. The manner in which this was done was notably different from that which characterised the management of

Kanga Force. Rather than the minimal engagement with higher command, 2/6th Independent

Company was employed on a number of important tasks that were directly related to the centre of gravity of ongoing operations. There were still issues concerning the maintenance of the Company, but overall the recognition by New Guinea Force of its value, and ability to perform diverse tasks in direct support of higher formations, was much more focussed than with 2/5th Independent Company. The employment of 2/6th Independent Company during this period represented an institutional movement, albeit involving only one Company, towards a more fully developed appreciation for the value of Independent Companies within the wider

Army.

The 2/6th Independent Company arrived in Port Moresby on 7 August 1942. It received no specific orders, but was told to be ready to move by aircraft at one day’s notice to reinforce Kanga Force.467 This did not occur because the aircraft to be used for the move were damaged on the airstrip during a Japanese air raid, and Kanga Force Headquarters made

467 2/6 Independent Company War Diary, 8 Aug 42, AWM52 25/3/2.

137

it clear that it was in no condition to maintain another sub-unit.468 While this was occurring,

the unfolding crisis situation in Papua, as Japanese troops pushed down the Kokoda track in

the direction of Port Moresby, continued to deteriorate. Subsequently, on 27 August 2/6th

Independent Company was assigned as a mobile reserve for the Australian 7th Division, which was then engaged with the Japanese along the Kokoda Track.469

The manner in which 2/6th Independent Company was employed by 7th Division marked a significant step forward in the Army’s appreciation for the value and versatility of

Independent Companies operations. The tasks allocated to 2/6th Independent Company were both appropriate to the company’s training and of immediate importance to the strategic and tactical situation. One feature of Independent Companies which remained constant was that when engaged on operations they seldom did so as a complete company-sized unit. Rather, components of the company were sent off to perform varied tasks. The experiences of 2/6th

Independent Company were no different. Throughout September-October the company was

divided into four sections, each to carry out different tasks, distant from the other.

On 19 September the threat to the Australian left flank on the Kokoda Track was increasing and it was imperative to discover the enemy’s intentions in this area. Consequently

2/6th Independent Company was ordered to search out ‘valuable information’ on enemy

activities to the North West of Kokoda paying special attention to any possible flank

approaches the Japanese might exploit towards Port Moresby.470 The nature of the

intelligence required was specific, with the Company instructed to patrol tracks, report if the

468 2/6 Australian Independent Company War Diary General Report, 9 Sept 42, AWM52 25/3/2; A report by Lt. B. Dawson 2/22 Bn I.O. Kanga Force 2/5 Independent Coy, Operations in New Guinea 25th Oct 1942, AWM54 587/6/11, this requests that no reinforcements be sent to Kanga Force because Kanga Force did not have the resources to maintain extra personnel. The date of this request is somewhat obscure. Dawson’s message reached LHQ on 7 Nov 42 but it must have been written before this date. 2/7th Independent Company arrived in Wau in late Oct42. One assumes that Dawson’s reference to not wanting reinforcements must have predated that. 469 2/6 Independent Company War Diary, 27 Aug 42, AWM52 25/3/2; 2/6 Independent Company War Diary 2/6 General Report, 9 Sept 42, AWM52 25/3/2. 470 2/6 Independent Company War Diary, 4-10 Sept 42, 19 Sept 42, AWM52 25/3/2.

138

enemy was using the Mambrare or Yodda rivers to transport stores, and to prevent enemy

penetration from the Yodda Valley.471 Further the Company was to determine if there were

any enemy movements in those areas and do so as quickly as possible.472 For 7th Division,

then fighting to halt the Japanese advance along the Kokoda Track, discovering if there was

an enemy presence on its left flank was of primary importance. It was also important to

discover the nature of the terrain and topography in that area. A first-hand examination was required as the maps which were available were generally found to be ‘hopelessly inaccurate’.473 Formations such as the Australian 16 Brigade were especially concerned that

they could not conduct effective operations due to the faulty information on the maps being

used.474 Indeed, some maps had large blank spaces on them stamped with, ‘no information

available’, and more disturbingly, ‘suspected cannibals’!475 It was acknowledged that without

accurate maps infantry patrols could only move at their ‘peril’, larger formations could not

move without risk of ambush, and that the lines upon which an enemy might move would

remain unknown.476 A proper understanding of terrain was thus imperative. An Independent

Company trained in reconnaissance, and capable of operating without undue maintenance in

otherwise inhospitable and remote terrain, offered the ideal instrument to employ for such a task.477

In a mark of the unique operational style of the Independent Companies, the patrolling

process to the left flank of the Kokoda track was conducted in as clandestine a manner as

471 2/6 Independent Company War Diary NGF Operational Instruction No. 33, 26 Sept 42, AWM52 25/3/2. 472 2/6 Independent Company War Diary 7 Division Operational Instruction No. 8 of 5 Sept 42, AWM52 25/3/2. 473 Australian Military Forces Army headquarters and unit history diaries, 1939-1945. Bena Force, AWM 54 1/5/42; Interview with Captain Owens NGF ex.NGVR – Lae 20 Jul44, Gavin Long notebook 34, AWM67 2/34. 474 Australian Imperial Force and Commonwealth Military Forces unit war diaries, 1939-1945 War, 16 Infantry Brigade Oct1942, AWM52 8/2/16. 475 Stephen Murray-Smith, Stephen Murray-Smith interviewed by Hazel de Berg in the Hazel de Berg collection [sound recording] 1961 , accessed 23 Jul2016. 476 Observations of the New Guinea Campaign by William Courtenay British War Correspondent, WO106/4841, UKNA. 477 Tropical Service of an Independent Coy Based on experience of 2/5 Australian Independent Coy. Kanga Force – 1943 Written by INT Sgt W.A. Chaffey 2/5 Indep Coy, 20 Jul1943, AWM54 583/7/4.

139

possible. To avoid detection by the enemy, and as a means of approaching their objective

indirectly, ‘A’ Patrol boarded a lugger and sailed to Yule Island, 100 kilometres west of Port

Moresby. From there it crossed to the mainland and trekked to Ononge, from which the patrol embarked on their mission to examine all the tracks in the Chirima and Yodda River Valleys, and penetrate the Japanese-held area around Kokoda.478 This covert approach was rewarded,

when on the morning of 25 October, taking advantage of the early morning fog, a three-man

patrol operating from a base camp one-and-a-half hours walk out of the small gold mining town of Yodda, entered Kokoda. The patrol did not in fact realise at the time it was Kokoda.

They encountered no Japanese sentries or guards and lay watching Japanese gathered around a camp fire. Moving out they crossed what they later determined to be the Kokoda airstrip, overgrown and obviously not being used. Continuing in the direction of Efogi, the patrol encountered intermittent mortar and small arms fire at a relatively close range. Pressing on they were fired at from a position on top of a nearby ridge. It was only then that they realised that they had penetrated the Japanese front line. With this ‘A’ patrol pulled back, and by the night of 26 October had returned to Yodda.479 This mission illustrated just what a well- handled Independent Company patrol could achieve. The patrolling by 2/6th Independent

Company to the left flank of the Kokoda Track continued, and resulted by the end of

September in the Company being able to confidently report that there was no evidence that the Japanese were moving in strength to the Western flank of the Kokoda Track.480

While the deep patrol by ‘A’ Patrol to the left flank of the Kokoda Track was

progressing, other patrols pushed deep into the country immediately to either side of the

track. This resulted in unexpected dividends. Australian soldiers from the 2/14th and 2/27th

Battalions who had been cut off and lost in the jungle since the fighting around Isurava were

478 Trigellis-Smith, The Purple Devils, pp. 17-19. 479 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 480 Ibid., p. 21.

140

re-discovered and reunited with their units.481 Other 2/6th Independent Company patrols

pushed deep into the jungles to the left flank of the Australian 21 Brigade at Ioribaiwa.482 On

11 September ‘E’ Patrol was detailed to join a grouping known as Honner Force, commanded

by Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Honner of the 39th Battalion. Honner Force consisted of one

company from each of the 39th, 49th and 55th Battalions, some 500 men in all.483 The role of

Honner Force was in effect to act as an ersatz Independent Company, and support the move

by 25 Brigade to halt the Japanese advance and gain control of Kokoda through to Deniki.

Honner Force was to move around the enemy right flank and into their rear and cut their line

of communication. They were also to protect the left flank of the Australian main force. The

‘E’ Patrol contingent was to act as scouts and forward troops for the force.484 As it was

Honner Force, many of whose members were unfit, failed to achieve any of its intended

functions.485 Subsequently, the men of ‘E’ Patrol could offer only limited assistance, being

reduced in many cases to be able to do little more than ‘look on’.486 Using Honner Force for

Independent Company tasks indicates that the Army had accepted that the use of mobile

lightly equipped forces, intended to conduct guerrilla like raids and harassment of the enemy

rear areas, was a viable tactic to use in the jungle. Yet it remains unclear as to why the Army

chose to employ untrained and ill-prepared standard infantrymen in this role when both 2/8th

Independent Company and 2/7th Independent Company remained in Australia.

Despite its experience with Honner Force 2/6th Independent Company was kept busy

during September with 7th Division instructing the company to conduct protective patrols on

the formations left flank. The Company was instructed to mount offensive patrols forward

towards Efogi, harass the enemy, and act as guides for regular formations if the enemy should

481 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 593 and 597; Powell, The Third Force – ANGAU’s New Guinea War, p. 52. 482 2/6 Independent Company War Diary, 10 Sept 42, AWM52 25/3/2. 483 2/6 Independent Company War Diary 7 Division Operational instruction No.10, 19 Sept 42, AWM52 25/3/2. 484 2/6 Independent Company War Diary, 11 Sept 42, AWM52 25/3/2. 485 2/6 Independent Company War Diary, 12 and 14 Sept 42, AWM52 25/3/2. 486 2/6 Independent Company War Diary 16 Sept 42, AWM52 25/3/2.

141

break through.487 The Company was also issued orders at this point to conduct a

reconnaissance of the Mount Asquith area, locate enemy movements in the vicinity, capture

prisoners, destroy any enemy found there, and keep watch on an important creek junction.488

By instructing 2/6th Independent Company to protect the flank of the Division, act as guides

and patrol aggressively forward, 7th Division commander, Major General Arthur ‘Tubby’

Allen, demonstrated that he understood how to effectivley employ an Independent Company in support of his operations.

The collection of accurate terrain intelligence requiring the collection of all information possible was the primary purpose of Independent Company patrolling.489 The

reports generated by these patrols were comprehensive and detailed investigating every

aspect of topography, human environment and operational criteria.490 In a mark of the

importance of such work these reports were sent directly to both New Guinea Force as well

as 7th Division.491 Such patrols nonetheless sometimes required aggressive action. In keeping

with allowing Independent Companies maximum of individual initiative patrols had

permission to attack without asking permission, which they did, on one occasion killing

twelve Japanese who had been firing an artillery piece at Australian forces.492

The work done by 2/6th Independent Company on the left flank of the Kokoda track

was of significant strategic value. Along with the contribution noted there were other implied

contributions. Victory in the battle of Oivi-Govari, which occurred 10 November 1942, was

487 2/6 Independent Company War Diary 11, Oct 42, General Report, AWM52 25/3/4. 488 2/6 Independent Company War Diary, 22 Sept 42, Operational instruction to Lt Bullock, AWM52 25/3/2. 489 Tropical Service of an Independent Coy Based on experience of 2/5 Australian Independent Coy. Kanga Force – 1943 Written by INT Sgt W.A. Chaffey 2/5 Indep Coy, 20 Jul1943, AWM54 583/7/4. 490 For example the 16 Sept 1942 report of Lieutenant Nichols ‘D’ Patrol illustrated this. Nichols’s report focussed on the subject headings of: tracks; villages; streams; local supplies; area dumping; aerodromes; drinking facilities; chance of obtaining native porters; attitude of natives; accuracy of maps; movement of troops; food; boots; blankets; medical; wireless communication conditions and clothes, see: 2/6 Independent Company War Diary, 16 Sept 42, Report of “D” Patrol By LIEUT NICHOLS, AWM52 25/3/2 . 491 2/6 Independent Company War Diary NGF Operational Instruction No. 27 11 Sept 42, AWM52 25/3/2. 492 2/6 Independent Company War Diary 2/6 Operational Instruction to Captain R.S. Belmer (not date but most likely late Sept 42), AWM52 25/3/2; 2/6 Independent Company War Diary, 25 Sept 42, AWM52 25/3/2.

142

achieved by Australian forces when the Japanese defenders were outflanked and

enveloped.493 ‘D’ Patrol of 2/6th Independent Company operating in the Oivi-Govari area at

the time was perfectly placed to secure and provide topographical and terrain intelligence. In

The Purple Devils, the published unit history of 2/6th Independent Company, the company

commander, Major Harry Harcourt, claimed after the war that information provided by this

patrol, ‘was partly responsible for the successful outflanking of the Jap positions by 16

Brigade’.494 Hacourt’s claim is difficult to verify, but this does not mean that he is necessarily

mistaken. It is possible that Harcourt’s recollections were influenced by hindsight, but when

the activities of 2/6th Independent Company patrols at the time are examined it does suggest

that Harcourt’s claims are correct. It was the case that on 6 October, 7th Division ordered ‘D’

Patrol of 2/6th Independent Company to move to Sirorata which lies along the Kokoda track

north of Kokoda and in the area in which the Oivi-Gorari battle occurred.495 The patrol conducted reconnaissance of the area and reports were made directly to Headquarters 7th

Division.496 Unless these reports were ignored, which is unlikely, they must have contributed

to the planning made by the division for the assault on Oivi-Govari.497

Operating along the Kokoda Track was not the only task for 2/6th Independent

Company during the Papuan campaign. From October to December 1942 elements of the

Company were attached to the U.S. 32nd Infantry Division, and in that role participated in the

battle for the Buna beachhead. During this time the Company demonstrated its adaptability,

resilience, and consummate skills of reconnaissance and communication in a foreign military

493 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, pp. 317-30. 494 Trigellis-Smith, The Purple Devils, pp. 32-3. 495 7 Division General Staff Branch Oct1942 Part 2 Appendices, 6 Oct 42, AWM52 1/5/14/31. 496 Message Form B64 2025 4 To D PATROL 6 Ind Coy – rptd 6 Aust Div – 7 Aust Div – 32 US Div (no date); Message 8141/1230/42 Message Passed to NGF by 7 Aust Div, Messages and reports relating to 2/6 Independent Company Patrol – Sept 1942, AWM54 577/7/11. 497 The report of one element of ‘D’ Patrol, from which three of the four men in the patrol went missing presumed killed, attests to danger of the work being done. See: Independent Company War Diary, Nov 42, Short Report by NX86139, Sig. McIntosh of ‘D’ PATROL of Lieut. W.H. Nichols (Oi/c ‘D’ PATROL) Last Patrol Before He Was Reported “Missing”, AWM52 25/3/6/5

143

milieu. Just how the Company came to be attached as an integral sub-unit to U.S. forces is worthy of a digression. On 8 October 1942 a component of 2/6th Independent Company was

attached to what was known as Hatforce, at Wanigela, on the east coast of Papua.498 The

intention was to eventually raise Hatforce to brigade strength by despatching the Australian

18 Brigade to Wanigela. This, however, did not happen because 17 Brigade which was to

replace 18 Brigade at Milne Bay had not yet arrived, and the Air Force preferred to fly troops

to and from Port Moresby rather than directly to Milne Bay. Thus it was decided that the U.S.

128 Infantry Regiment, which was in Port Moresby and thus more conveniently transported

by air, would provide the troops sent to Wanigela.499 The 1st Battalion of the 128 Infantry

Regiment (1/128) and the 3rd Battalion (3/128) as well as the headquarters of the regiment

were flown to Wanigela. Once there, the troops came under the command of U.S. Brigadier

General Hanford McNider. Under McNider, Hatforce metamorphosed into Warren Force,

named after the home county in Ohio of Major General Edwin Harding, the commander of

the US 32nd Division.500 The Australian Army, rather than withdraw and redeploy the 2/6th

Independent Company personnel already at Wangeli, conceded to the practicality of the

situation and formally attached the company to Warren Force.

To this end 2/6th Independent Company troops acted as guides and a flank guard for

the American battalions as they made their way along the coast to Buna. As it transpired, the

rugged terrain and the flooding of the Musa River inland from Wanigela conspired to

dissuade the U.S. troops from venturing too far into the wilderness and on 22 October they

498 ‘Records of the Army Staff Center of Military History ‘Victory in Papua’ Interviews –Folder: New Guinea Operation Instruction #7. NG FORCE Op Instruction No.35 – 8 Oct 42’, RG 319 Bulk File #3 to Victory in Papua – Milner, Box 5, NARA. 499 Records of the Army Staff Center of Military History ‘Victory in Papua’ Interviews –Folder: New Guinea Force Operation Instruction #7. NG Force Op Instruction No.38 – 8 Oct 42, RG 319 Bulk File #3 to Victory in Papua – Milner, Box 5, NARA; Intelligence Folder 1; ‘Studies in the History of General Douglas MacArthur’s Commands in the Pacific “Establishment of the Southwest Pacific Area and the Papuan Campaign 7 Dec 1941 – 22 Jan 1943”, MMA. 500 Headquarters 32nd Infantry Div APO 32 March1945, Public Relations – History of 32nd Division, 32ndinf Div, Box 885, DDEA.

144

retreated to the coast where they awaited transport by sea.501 This isolated the 2/6th

Independent Company which had pushed ahead to the far side of the flooded Musa. The

withdrawal of 3/128 back to Wangeli complicated the Company’s supply situation, as that

battalion had been responsible for the logistics chain to the company, and subsequently

rations for the company ran short.502 U.S. Forces, aware of the company’s situation, made

every effort, however, to ensure it remained supplied. Messages exchanged between the

3/128 and Warren Force Headquarters arranged for supplies to be air dropped to the company

including desperately needed boots and socks.503

Even though the Japanese were withdrawing by this point there was still a perceived

threat to the left flank of Warren Force. The task of covering that flank was given to 2/6th

Independent Company.504 The Company performed this task while gathering intelligence at

the same time. Working with the ‘Intelligence Cell’ and patrols of the U.S. 126 Infantry

Regiment the company scouted ahead to locate any Japanese as well as sites for airfields.505

By 5 November 2/6th Independent Company had reached Pongani, a village further along in

the direction of Buna. Here the company received orders from Lieutenant Colonel Robert

McCoy, commanding officer of 3/128, to patrol the tracks to the north and to place outpost

501 General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) Box 190 Historical Index Cards (Actual) Record Group 3, Index 7, MMA. 502 Trigellis-Smith, The Purple Devils, p. 86. 503 Journal of 1st Bn 128th Infantry, Sept – Nov1942 (incomplete), Miller to McNider 20 Oct, McNider to Miller 20 Oct, Box 1348, DDEA; Journal of 1st Bn 128th Infantry, Sept – Nov1942 (incomplete), Miller to Harcourt 21 Oct, McNider to Miller 20 Oct; Box 1348, DDEA; Trigellis-Smith, The Purple Devils, p. 86; Interviews –to Intelligence and Supply –Basic Report, G-3’, 32nd Inf Div, Incl to Lre Lt. Col. Erwin P. Beyer AC od S G-3, 32nd Inf Div to CG 32nd Inf Div, Apr 27, 1943, “Report of activities, G-3 Section during Papuan (New Guinea) Campaign.” Records of the Army Staff Center of Military History Victory in Papua 32nd Division Reports – Bulk Package #2 In Opr Br AGO Files, RG 319 Bulk File #3 to Victory in Papua – Milner, Box 5, Bulk File #3, Box 4, Entry 53, NARA; War Diary of 2/6th Independent Company Nov1942, General Report, 2-6 Nov 42, AWM52 25/3/6. 504 Field Order #4, 0800L, Records of the Army Staff Center of Military History Victory in Papua G-3 Reports – Sept 1942 to G-3 Reports Dec 1942, RG319 Box 7 ARC 1D 2205874 P Entry 53, NARA. 505 WWII Operations Reports, 1940-48 32nd Infantry Division 332-INF (126) – 0.7 DEC 1945 TO 332-INF (126) – 0.9, “Reports on Trail Operations” Buna (Papuan) Campaign 17 Oct – 8 Nov 42, BOX 8805 Folder: 332-INF (126) – 09 (3422) 126TH CT-5-2 S-3, NARA.

145

groups on those tracks.506 The company continued to do so until 12 November when orders

were issued for it to prepare to move by boat to a point on the coast to the east of Buna. The

relationship between the Company and Warren Force was still very new and the liaison between the two was uncoordinated. The ordered move by boat was one example of this, and

despite Harcourt and his second-in-command attending a meeting at Headquarters Warren

Force for instructions on 15 November, both left with what they described as, ‘absolutely no

information obtained’.507

Rather than ‘wasting time while waiting for orders’ the company began Bren and

Thompson sub-machinegun recapitulation training.508 Eventually the situation resolved itself

and on 17 November Harcourt received orders to take the force that had gathered at Pongani

and move overland to Buna, all thoughts of the proposed move by boat having apparently

been cast aside.509 The constitution of the Pongani force was significant in two ways. Firstly it was a mixed force of Australian and U.S. troops consisting of 117 men of 2/6th Independent

Company as well as A Company, part of C Company, and part of Headquarters Company of

U.S. 126 Infantry Regiment.510 Second, Harcourt, an Australian officer, was given command

of the force. Placing U.S. troops, who far outnumbered Australians in the Pongani force,

under foreign command, was an uncommon occurrence for U.S. Forces. Such an appointment

suggests that McNider trusted Harcourt, which says much for Harcourt’s personal attributes

as well presumably for his diplomatic skills. Harcourt’s force arrived at Buna on 20

506 Journal of 1st Bn 128th Infantry, Sept – Nov1942 (incomplete), Box 1348, DDEA. 507 War Diary of 2/6th Independent Company, Nov1942, General Report, 15 Nov 42, AWM52 25/3/6. 508 War Diary of 2/6th Independent Company, Nov1942, General Report, 16 Nov 1942, AWM52 25/3/6. 509 Major Harry Gladwyn Harcourt was a highly experienced officer. He had been awarded DSO and Military Cross during his World War 1 service, Imperial Russian awards for his service against the Bolsheviks in North Russia in 1919. He would later be awarded a bar to his DSO and the US Silver Star for his service with 2/6th Independent Company in New Guinea, see: Papers of Maj Harry Harcourt DSO & Bar, MC, OBE, AWM PR87/224. 510 Records of the Army Staff Center of Military History Victory in Papua G-3 Reports – Sept 1942 to G-3 Reports Dec 1942 , Col Horne to Maj Harcourt 2/6 Ind Co 17 Nov 42, Journal 1st Bn, 128th rgt. 332-70.3 Nov 19, Box 1348, RG319, Box 7, ARC 1D 2205874 P Entry 53, NARA; Journal of 1st Bn 128th Infantry, Sept – Nov1942 (incomplete), Box 1348, DDEA.

146

November and joined Warren Force, which had already arrived by boat, as reinforcements.511

From that moment 2/6th Independent Company became intimately engaged in the fight for

Buna.

Japanese forces had constructed an intricate series of well-prepared fortified positions to defend Buna. These took full advantage of the nature of the terrain and were sited to channel any attack into prepared ground covered by machinegun fire. Faced with this situation the assaulting US Forces found themselves with little room for tactical subtlety or finesse.512 Subsequently 2/6th Independent Company found itself thrown directly into the

fight, at first operating in the conventional unaccustomed and unpopular role of infantry.

Gradually though, as they acclimatized to the task confronting them, the role of the Company began to change. The work that the Company began to do for Warren Force was varied and diverse, very much determined by the tactical necessities of the moment. At one time it could be patrolling, at another ensuring flank security, at another maintaining a link between separated U.S. Battalions, at another assaulting Japanese defences. Of these patrolling was the most valuable contribution the company made to the operations of Warren Force.

Harcourt observed that virtually all of Warren Force’s patrols were done by his Company.513

The reasons patrolling was particularly important at Buna were twofold. Buna was a

battle in which the Japanese had skilfully concealed themselves from view, and could quite

literally only be discovered by stumbling upon them. Many U.S. soldiers lamented that they

‘sure did wish they could see the yellow bastards so they could shoot them’.514 The problem

which confronted Warren Force and which had a direct impact on the conduct of their

511 Journal of 1st Bn 128th Infantry, Sept – Nov1942 (incomplete), Box 1348, Box 1348, DDEA. 512 S. Milner, Victory in Papua, Center of Military History United States Army, Washington, D.C, 1957, pp. 196-97. 513 Interview with Maj. Harcourt 2/6th Independent Company, Cairns Jul 43, Gavin Long Notebook 8, AWM67 2/8. 514 Report of Col. Harry Knight “Observation of the Battle of Buna”, p. 4, Records of the Army Staff Center of Military History Victory in Papua 32nd Division Reports – Bulk Package #2Interviews, RG 319 Bulk File #3 to Victory in Papua – Milner, Box 5 to Intelligence and Supply – Bulk File #3, Box 4, Entry 53, NARA.

147

operations was the very poor capacity of U.S. infantry to conduct effective patrolling. U.S.

commanders acknowledged this, commenting that their troops lacked the fundamental

requirements of such operations. They openly lamented that their patrols brought back

meagre and inaccurate information and that it was hard to accomplish missions if the ‘scouts’

were poor.515 Compounding this problem was that there was a lack of adequate maps and

aerial photographs. Consequently, U.S. patrol leaders did not know where they had started,

and where they had been once they finished their patrols. The reality was that U.S. troops

only gained information about the enemy when they actually came into contact with them.516

Major General Edwin Harding, the Commander of 32nd Division, summed up his Division’s

inability to patrol when he admitted that his troops were ‘weak in patrolling and self

reliance’.517 In such a situation the efficient, systematic reconnaissance offered by 2/6th

Independent Company was invaluable. Patrol reports from the company were detailed and

precise. Enemy positions were located and described in detail. One such report described

great detail the manner in which Japanese bunkers had been constructed, and the nature of

their camouflage.518 A reconnaissance report of 23 November 1942 from Harcourt to

McNider further illustrates the quality of such reports [see Plate 6]. In his report, which was

accompanied by a detailed sketch, Harcourt indicated the location of enemy machineguns,

adding that those who discovered them were attempting to silence them. He went on to report

on vegetation, movement of enemy and the position of an observation post that the company

515 Records of the Adjutant General’s Office WW11 Operations Reports, 1940-48 32ND Infantry Division 332- 3.2 NOV 42 TO 332-3.2 PAPUAN DEC 1942, Message 2684 9 Dec To C.O. Urbana Force Rpt Warren Force, RG407 BOX 7885 ENTRY 427 HMFY 2007, NARA; Report of Col Herbert B. Laux “Report of Military Observer in Southwest Pacific”; Records of the Army Staff Center of Military History Victory in Papua 32nd Division Reports – Bulk Package #2Interviews – Bulk File #3 to Victory in Papua – Milner, RG 319 Box 5 to Intelligence and Supply – Bulk File #3, Box 4, Entry 53 NARA; Summary of Lessons Learned 126th Regt After Action Reports (no date), Box 1342, DDEA. 516 Basic Intell Report 32nd Division Papuan Campaign, Records of the Army Staff Center of Military History Victory in Papua 32nd Division Reports, RG 319 Bulk Package #2 Interviews – Bulk File #3 to Victory in Papua – Milner, Box 5 to Intelligence and Supply – Bulk File #3, Box 4, Entry 53, NARA. 517 L. Anders, Gentle Knight The Life and Times of Major General Edwin Forrest Harding, The Kent State University Press, Kent, 1981, p. 255. 518 2/6 Independent Company War Diary, 30 Nov 42, AWM52 25/3/4.

148

had established. The flow of information on enemy activities, locations, and infrastructure

from the company back to Warren Force headquarters was constant and carried by runners as no radios were available.519

Inevitably different operating styles and military cultures led to a degree of friction

between 2/6th Independent Company and U.S. troops. The first such incident occurred during

the very first day of operations on 21 November. Harcourt surmised that the positions that

1/128 battalion had marked for itself on their operational maps were in fact incorrect, as they

showed the battalion positions some 200-300 yards north of the eastern end of the ‘New

Strip’, an airstrip built as a ruse by the Japanese and located to the east of the more

established ‘Old Strip’. Harcourt, who conducted a personal reconnaissance of the position,

advised 1/128 that they were in fact not occupying the positions they thought they were. He

was ignored, and the subsequent offensive launched by the battalion misfired because of its

map reading mistake.520 On the same day Warren Force as a whole moved against the New

Strip. The Force’s advance was a bitterly contested exercise. The terrain was such that

swamps channelled all moves and Japanese machineguns, skilfully camouflaged in bunkers,

dominated every approach. The attack soon bogged down and halted. Just what role

incorrectly marked maps had in this failed assault cannot be proven, other than it is certain

that they could not have helped the situation.

519 WWII Operations Reports, 1940-48, 32nd Infantry Division 332-3.2 Nov 1942- 332-3.2 Papuan Dec 1942, Box 7885, NARA. 520 2/6 Independent Company War Diary, 21-2 Nov 42, General Report, AWM52 25/3/6.

149

Plate 6: Patrol report Harcourt to McNider 23 November 42.521

521 Records of the Army Staff Center of Military History Victory in Papua G-3 Reports – Sept 1942 to G-3 Reports – Dec 1942. RG319 Box 7 ARC ID 2205874 P Entry 53, NARA.

150

This situation caught the 2/6th Independent Company, which had intended to advance and

protect the flank of the attacking U.S. troops forward of the main U.S. line, in a difficult

position. It was exposed to both Japanese and U.S. fire. Isolated and between both sides the

company went to ground and did not move. In another incident U.S. troops complained that

the company’s habit of hunting Japanese snipers was ‘stirring up the Japs’ and asked for it to

stop.522 The Company frequently found itself in such exposed positions because, much as on

the first day’s fight at New Strip, U.S. units did not manage to advance as far as expected.523

Harcourt was under no illusions of the role his Company had to play in relation to U.S.

troops. He knew that it was for the Company to prepare the way and that his men needed to

use their initiative and take risks so that they could open avenues through which U.S. troops

could advance.524

Despite such difficulties 2/6th Independent Company’s interaction with U.S. troops

was generally positive. U.S. senior officers certainly seemed to appreciate what the company

had to offer. An instruction issued by Warren Force for all officers to visit Harcourt’s

Headquarters to get up-to-date information illustrated this clearly.525 Harcourt was awarded the U.S. Silver Star for his work at Buna. The primary component of the citation for the award stated that Harcourt was ‘able to secure information of great value to the commander of the force’.526 The company’s unit history, The Purple Devils, claims that Harcourt ‘was

regarded with much respect by senior American commanders and staff and whatever he

suggested was not questioned’.527 Harcourt, a company commander, often attended

522 Interview with Maj. Harcourt 2/6th Independent Company, Cairns Jul 43, Gavin Long Notebook 8, AWM67 2/8. 523 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 378. 524 Ibid, p. 376. 525 Journal of 1st Bn 128th Infantry, Sept – Nov1942 (incomplete), DDEA Box 1348. 526 General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area General Orders No.7 Jan 15, 1943, Records of General Headquarters, South West Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, Adjutant General General Correspondence 1942-45 200.6, RG496 Box 907, NARA. 527 Trigellis-Smith, The Purple Devils, p107.

151

conferences of senior 32nd Division officers, implying that his opinion was sought after.528 A further indication of the value U.S. forces put on the services of 2/6th Independent Company

was evident in their rejection on two occasions of a request for the return of the Company to

Australian command.529 By this time the company’s strength had fallen to twenty seven- effectives, but obviously these were a highly regarded remnant.530

In addition to the reconnaissance role another important task of 2/6th Independent

Company was as it had been on the Kokoda Track, to secure the flanks of U.S. units.531

Complementary to such flank protection was acting as a communication link between U.S.

battalions.532 In the tangled environment of Buna it was often difficult for units to judge

where their flanks were, and impossible to know what lay just beyond them. Ensuring the

security of flanks and the communication between battalions was an important task for

Harcourt’s Company. To facilitate this the Company was posted in the space between 1/128

Battalion and 1/126 Battalion [see Plate 7]. Operating in small patrols it was able to keep both battalions informed of their positions, provide a secure communications link and protect the flanks of the battalions.

The contribution of the Company to the campaign to destroy the Japanese force at

Buna was studiously ignored by both official U.S. and high level Australian sources. The official U.S. report on the battle for Buna makes no mention of 2/6th Independent Company

528 Report of the Commanding General, Buna Forces on the Buna Campaign, 1 Dec 1942-25 Jan 1943, Box 21, File #1, Collection of 20th Century Military Records, 1918-1950, Series II Library Reference Publications, DDEA. 529 WWII Operations Reports, 1940-48 32nd INFANTRY DIVISION 332-3.2 NOV 1942- 332-3.2 PAPUAN DEC 1942, Box 7885, NARA . 530 WWII Operations Reports, 1940-48 32nd INFANTRY DIVISION 332-3.2 NOV 1942- 332-3.2 PAPUAN DEC 1942, BOX 7885, NARA. 531 Records of the Army Staff Center of Military History Victory in Papua G-3 Reports – Sept 1942 to G-3 Reports Dec 1942, Box 7, ARC 1D 2205874 P Entry 53, Field Order #4, 0800L, NARA. 532 WWII Operations Reports, 1940-48 32nd Infantry Division 332-3.2 NOV 1942- 332-3.2 PAPUAN DEC 1942, RG319 Box 7885, NARA.

152

in its text despite having the Company marked on the maps that accompany the report.533

This may have been because Eichelberger, who was known not to recoil from embellishing

his own reputation, perhaps considered that the contribution of a non-U.S. sub-unit to the

success of U.S. forces under his command did not serve the interests of his reputation.534 In

the Australian case it indicates the relative low importance the Australian high command

ascribed to Independent Companies in the broader scheme. Indeed, Blamey expressed his low

opinion of 2/6th Independent Company to Herring on 10 December 1942 when he wrote,

‘I am glad to see that 6 Ind Coy is coming over to

your command. I will not insist on its return if you

desire to keep it. Would you let me know what your

determination in the matter is? As you know I have

not a very high opinion of it and would like you to

have some period of closer command of it to judge it

fairly.’ 535

Such an opinion may have coloured official Australian attitudes towards the Company.

533 Report of the Commanding General, Buna, Forces on the Buna Campaign, 1 Dec 1942 - 25 Jan 1943, FILE #1, Collection of 20th Century Military Records, 1918-1950, Series II Library Reference Publications, Box 21, DDEA. 534 Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland to Major Gen. Ward, Chief Military History – 6 Apr 1951, RG 319 Records of the Army Staff Center of Military History Victory in Papua Interviews – Bulk File #3 to Victory in Papua – Milner, Box 5, Entry 53, NARA. 535 Blamey to Herring, 10 Dec 1945, AWM 3DRL/6643.

153

Plate 7: Position of 2/6 Independent Company between two US Battalions during the fighting

at Buna as marked on the official U.S. report of the battle.536

In any case the Company was relieved from its duties with 32nd Division on 10

December and moved back to under command of 7th Division.

Despite prior claims made by New Guinea Force when recalling the Company that a

suitable role had been found for it no immediate task was allocated. This would have come

no doubt as a welcome relief to the battle worn remnants of the Company. So too 7th Division

would have had little insight into what the Company had achieved at Buna. The conventional

nature of the battles for Gona and Buna hid what the company had to offer, especially as the

tasks the Company had performed at Buna were not witnessed by any Australian commander.

As elements of ‘A’ and ‘D’ patrols re-joined Major Harcourt’s men spent their time clearing up and going through its stores. Meanwhile, mundane tasks were allocated such as guarding prisoners of war, protecting a supply dump from Japanese marauders, scouting a tank route to

536 Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific Adjutant General General Correspondence 1942-1945 , RG496. 200.6 Box 907, NARA.

154

Soputa, and patrolling quiet back areas for signs of the enemy. More interestingly on 20

December a phone call from 7th Division requested that the Company send a patrol behind enemy lines to blow up enemy stores, dumps and guns, a true Independent Company task.

Preparations were made, explosives prepared and passwords issued. The raiding party set forth on the night of 22 December without Harcourt who was ordered to stay behind. As it unfolded the raiding party spent a very wet night in impassable swamps and achieved nothing, apart from gathering native rumours that the Japanese were short of food and shells for their guns. On 24 December the company’s time on the front line in Papua came to an end, and it was flown back to Port Moresby.537

The experiences of 2/6th Independent Company during 1942 illustrates a growing

realisation, within New Guinea Force at least, of the strategic and tactical value of

Independent Companies. Prior to this the only other deployment of an Independent Company

that showed evidence of any serious planning was that of 2/5th Independent Company to Wau

in May 1942. That 2/5th Independent Company was then because of the strategic situation

essentially forgotten is beside the point. It was fortunate for 2/6th Independent Company that

it was engaged in a campaign which held the centre of the Army’s attention at that stage of

the war. This ensured that the Company’s role would receive due consideration and that those

tasks allocated to it would be designed to support ongoing operations. Various patrols

performed diverse tasks, the value and importance of which varied, with the most significant

contribution made the Company being the confirmation of no Japanese presence on the left

flank of 7th Division during the Kokoda Campaign. The work of Harcourt’s men at Buna

alongside U.S. forces provided those forces with a valuable asset to enable them to conduct

more effective operations.

537 2/6 Independent Company War Diary, Dec 42, AWM52 25/3/5.

155

Overall the Army did much better with its management of 2/6th Independent

Company than it had with any preceding Independent Company. The company’s activities

were conducted over a widely dispersed geographic area and conducted concurrently,

indicating that the Army was capable of managing such a deployment. There was no example

of any tactical misuse of the Company during the Papuan campaign. The Company was allowed to contribute its skills of reconnaissance and patrolling to its best ability.

If there was one weakness with the Army’s management of 2/6th Independent

Company it was in the area of maintenance. Supplying the Company was still handled in an uneven manner. This was an ongoing weakness in staff work related to Independent

Companies which, while not decisively debilitating to the company’s operations, well-

illustrated that there was improvement to be achieved in that area. At the same time it was

true, at least, that in general the maintenance of the various elements of 2/6th Independent

Company was handled more effectively than that of 2/5th Independent Company and certainly

infinitely better than had been that of 2/3rd Independent Company on New Caledonia.

The experience of 2/6th Independent Company during the 1942 Papuan Campaign was evidenced the Army’s growing development of an appreciation for how to best employ

Independent Companies. Unlike the earlier experiences involving the use of such troops the

Army demonstrated an understanding of how to exploit the company’s skills in support of

higher formations. As a consequence the Company contributed significantly to both the

Kokoda Track campaign and the support of Allied forces at Buna. This evolving ability to

manage Independent Companies would mature in 1943, and lead to the most effective

employment of the Independent Companies at any time during the Second World War.

156

CHAPTER 6

JUNGLE CAVALRY 1943

The Japanese threat to Papua and the Solomons had been reduced greatly by the end

of 1942. The following year would see an Allied focus on pushing back the Japanese from

areas in New Guinea they had thus far seized. Australia was not, however, the master of its

own destiny in this regard, with overall strategy being determined by Washington and

London. The focus of these two was firmly fixed on the war with Germany with what

occurred in the South West Pacific was very much of secondary concern. Australia, as a

junior allied partner, had no option but to comply with what was decided in Britain and the

United States.538 The initial aspiration for the South West Pacific campaign as envisaged by

MacArthur had been as an Allied counter offensive to recapture Rabaul, but due to a lack of

resources allocated this was changed to lesser objectives confined to New Guinea and the

Solomons.539 As part of this campaign the intention was to break the barrier between the New

Guinea mainland and New Britain presented by the Japanese occupation of the littoral zone

of the Dampier and Vitiaz Straits. Doing so would isolate Rabaul. To this end plans were

made to capture airfields on Kiriwina and Woodlark islands and capture both Lae and

Salamaua.540

Australia was designated to provide the majority of troops for these operations. The

Japanese, however, interrupted these plans when they launched an offensive against Wau in

January 1943, but when this was defeated the Allies were able to move over to the offensive.

The subsequent ‘Operation Postern’ designed to capture Lae and Salamaua would involve the

Australian 3rd Infantry Division moving against Salamaua and the Australian 9th and

538 Peter J. Dean (ed.), Australia 1943: The Liberation of New Guinea, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, 2014, pp. 29-33. 539 Ibid., p. 32. 540 Ibid., p. 54.

157

Australian 7th Infantry Divisions against Lae. Following the capture of Lae and Salamaua,

Allied forces planned to push on on up the Markham and Ramu River valleys towards

Madang.541 The Japanese were aware of the threat and had resolved to defend Lae and

Salamaua. The looming campaign promised to be hard fought.542 Further, unlike the conflict

in 1942 which had predominantly seen Allied battles fought to defeat the Japanese offensive

into Papua, 1943 brought with it broader objectives such as control of the coasts between

New Guinea and New Britain, and also reclaim territory lost to the Japanese in 1942. This offensive focus would see the employment of Independent Companies in a number of roles that were eminently suited to their training.

As noted in Chapter 5 1942 had been a year of mixed returns for the Independent

Companies in New Guinea. The Army had managed the companies with a mixture of astuteness in the case of 2/6th Independent Company and, because of strategic circumstances,

indifference in relation to 2/5th Independent Company. By the beginning of 1943, elements

within the Army had developed the confidence and competence to employ the

unconventional Independent Companies in a manner commensurate with their training.

During the year the Army would employ Independent Companies as strategic and tactical

assets. It would grant them autonomy and materiel support. Throughout this period the

Companies found themselves engaged in a series of activities and actions that would

encompass every aspect of their capabilities, both conventional and unconventional. This

then was the apogee of the Independent Companies service during the war.

It was not certain that 2/3rd Independent Company would be of any significant future

use when it returned to Australia from its sojourn in New Caledonia in August 1942. The

Company arrived back in Australia wearing American uniforms as a ragtag-looking bunch

541 Dean, Australia 1943, presents a concise yet comprehensive account of this crucial year. 542 Ibid., p. 84; Yoshihara, T. (trans Heath, D), Southern Cross: account of the Eastern new Guinea Campaign, pp. 41-2, AWM063813.

158

thanks to the Army’s failure to maintain it adequately.543 Further, nine months living in small self sufficient groups in New Caledonia had undermined whatever unit discipline had been present. Lieutenant John Winterflood recalled, ‘We were rabble of 240 men spoiled by NC

French and wine’.544 The picture of his new command incited the wrath of their new commander Major George Warfe. Warfe, a veteran of the Middle East and Greece, was an idiosyncratic, charismatic, tough, uncompromising soldier who soon stamped his personality onto the Company. Under Warfe’s tutelage months of relentless training followed, during which discipline, morale and self-confidence was restored.545 By October 1942 the Company was ready for deployment and found itself attached to 17 Brigade bound for the battlefield at

Wau.

In January 1943 the Japanese offensive in Papua had failed, and the remnants of the

Japanese army, which had landed in Papua in July 1942, were being systematically eliminated from what remained of their Sanandana-Buna beachhead fortifications. With the threat to Port Moresby removed the focus of Allied attention shifted westward towards Lae and Salamaua. Just as in early 1942 New Guinea Force still harboured plans to seize Lae and identified 17 Brigade, then in Milne Bay, to move to Wau to undertake the task. Elements of the brigade began to arrive in Wau in mid-January. This was fortuitous as in the last week of

January 1943 the Japanese Army launched an offensive against the town. The Japanese assault against Wau consisted of some 3500 men of the Okabe Force, named after the commander General Okabe. Japanese forces moved out from Salamaua and Mubo on 31

January. They were shadowed by elements of 2/5th and 2/7th Independent Companies who were still in the area. Luckily for the defenders of Wau, 17 Brigade had by that time been able to move 2/6th Australian Infantry Battalion into the town. Elements of that battalion were

543 Scotty McMillan, 2/3rd Independent Company, interviewed by Neil MacDonald, 1985-1991, AWM SP4155. 544 Lieutenant John Winterflood interviewed by Neil MacDonald (no date), AWM S04156. 545 Winterflood went as far as to say of Warfe at this time, ‘Bless him we all loved it – sent from heaven’, see: Lieutenant John Winterflood interviewed by Neil MacDonald (no date), AWM S04156.

159

able to confront the Japanese on the tracks leading from Mubo, and in a series of hard-fought

engagements slow the Japanese advance. This delay of the Japanese offensive allowed the

remainder of 17 Brigade to be flown into Wau, included amongst which was 2/3rd

Independent Company.546

When, as part of 17 Brigade, 2/3rd Independent Company arrived in Wau it did so in the middle of an ongoing battle. Japanese snipers who had worked their way to the edge of the airfield fired at the men of the company as they disembarked from their transport aircraft.

With no time to spare Brigadier Murray Moten, the commander of 17 Brigade, threw the company into combat, with little concern at all what type of sub-unit 2/3rd Independent

Company represented. As a consequence the company fought its first action against the

Japanese as conventional infantry, in an assault on a feature known as Woody Island.

Woody Island was a copse of trees distinct from the jungle scrub that surrounded it.

The Japanese had fortified themselves at this location and posed a threat to the flank of the

Australians resisting the Japanese push on Wau, as well as protecting the flank of the main

Japanese force. The fight for Woody Island took three days. On the first two days Warfe

assaulted, with his company working in small groups as per their training. The Japanese

repelled each assault, despite Warfe and his headquarters personnel joining in the attack on the second day.547 On the third day, unimpressed with the company’s failure to capture

Woody Island. Major General Frank Berryman, the Chief of Staff of New Guinea Force, who

was in Wau at the time, instructed Moten to send the company in again. This was done,

according to Berryman ‘in order to show them how easily it could be done if properly

prepared’.548 Warfe, acting on his new instructions, changed tactics. Following an intense

artillery bombardment, the company attacked in what was to be the only full-strength

546 Bottrell, Cameos of Commandos, p. 139. 547 Lieutenant John Lewin, interviewed by Neil MacDonald (no date), AWM 204158. 548 T/LT Gen. F.H. Berryman [PART 2], AWM67 3/30.

160

company attack by 2/3rd Independent Company of the campaign. Formed into formal assault

lines the company advanced with fixed bayonets and captured the position, for the loss of

three officers and thirty three soldiers.549 For the men of the company it was an unexpected baptism of fire, one participant describing the experience as being akin to being used as storm troops and another that instead of ‘commando’ tactics it had been like an attack during World

War 1.550

From this inauspicious beginning Brigadier Murray Moten, emerged as an example of

the uneasy nature of the relationship that existed between some elements of the mainstream

Army and the Independent Company concept.551 It was a relationship which Robert Hancock,

a captain with 2/3rd Independent Company, encapsulated in a letter to his parents in January

1943. Hancock wrote ‘We are a good working combination and everyone understands each

other. Unfortunately this does not go higher.’552 Moten’s attitude towards the Independent

Companies reflected Hancock’s misgivings. A very conservative commander Moten

scathingly referred to Independent Companies as ‘incorrectly trained. The “bearded gentry” –

hit and run, mostly run.’553 Moten further claimed that he was forced to retrain the

Independent Companies under his command in elementary infantry tactics.554

On arrival in Wau, Moten assumed command of Kanga Force which had expanded to

include 17 Brigade as well as the units which had composed the original Kanga Force. With

this, and in addition to 2/3rd Independent Company, Moten inherited both 2/5th and 2/7th

Independent Companies. Moten’s feelings on the matter were clear. He expressed concern

549 Ibid, pp. 62-3. 550 Arden, ‘Jack’, p. 18; Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 70. 551 Moten was an officer noted for his ‘coolness and smooth efficiency’, see: W.B. Russell, There Goes a Man – The Biography of Sir Stanley Savige, Longmans, Melbourne, 1959, p. 276. He had been awarded the DSO and mentioned in dispatches for gallantry, and was an experienced infantry commander having led 2/27th Battalion in the Middle East and taken over 17 Brigade from General Stanley Savige on 17 Dec 41, when Savige moved on. 552 R. Hancock, AWM PR91/052. 553 Records of the War 1939-45 Brig. M.J. Moten, AWM93 50/2/23/387. 554 Ibid.

161

that 2/5th Independent Company was unreliable, and that its officers lacked basic infantry training. He considered the discipline in the company to be poor, that they straggled on the march and lacked the basic skills of hygiene and sanitation.555 In Moten’s opinion the

commander of the company, Major Norman Winning, was ineffective and that the Company

needed a strong commander to weld them into an effective team.556 Moten in the process seemed to take little account that the company was at the end of an extremely arduous and physically ruinous term of service in the jungle.557 He ignored concerning medical reports on

the Company, considering them exaggerations.558 Consequently he ordered 2/5th

Independent Company to spend three weeks with 2/7th Battalion to rest and be ‘retrained’ a

process that was completed to Moten’s satisfaction on 25 March.559

Moten’s attitude to 2/3rd Independent Company was similar. He initially dismissed the company as being ‘just as bad’ and believed it, too, needed to be retrained. He was of the opinion that he, ‘had to make them or break them.’560 The process by which Moten ‘made

them’ required him to work with George Warfe. Warfe possessed an innate regard for

discipline and superior authority but in every other respect his command style and personality

were the opposite of Moten’s. Warfe was impetuous, charismatic and spontaneous, in stark

contrast to the stiff and conservative Moten.561 Moten did, however, concede that in spite of

555 If Moten’s observations regarding the poor hygiene and sanitation standards of 2/5th Independent Company are accurate, and not coloured by his antipathy towards Independent Companies, it may help explain the health issues which affected the company during 1942. 556 Moten, Murray John (Brigadier b.1899 d.1953), AWM PR91/002, FOLDER 4 – 28. 557 Walker, The Island Campaigns, pp. 137-8. Walker states that the General Health of 2/5th Independent Company was the subject for investigation at the time. 114 Officers and men examined and classified 8 as fully fit, 27 as partially fit, 56 as temporarily unfit and recommended that 12 be evacuate or sent for medical board, 11 were left for a later decision. The cause of this was 18 months’ service in tropical conditions (which includes the Company’s time in Port Moresby prior to deployment to Wau), the impact of endemic disease, dietary deficiency, boredom, and the constant threat and tension due to superior enemy numbers. 2/5th Independent Company when it returned to Australia from New Guinea, was declared a B class unit and attached to 3 Militia Division. See: H.F. Treichel, Commando Army Service 1941-1946, Wahpunga, 1994, pp. 15-16. 558 Moten, Murray John (Brigadier b.1899 d.1953), AWM PR91/002, Folder 2 of 28, AWM PR91/002. 559 Ibid. 560 Records of the War 1939-45 Brig. M.J. Moten, AWM93 50/2/23/387. 561 Warfe was very much the extrovert. He was described by those who knew him as possessing ‘incredible daring confidence’ and being, ‘like a pirate on the high seas searching for loot and plunder’, see: Lieutenant

162

their differences ‘one could not help liking the blighter.’562 It is perhaps this wary respect on

Moten’s part, and Warfe’s innate compliance to higher authority, which allowed two such

disparate personalities to work with each other.

Nevertheless, applying restraints upon Warfe was a feature of Moten’s relationship

with his impetuous subordinate. In its own way this was a microcosm of the relationship

between the mainstream Army and the Independent Companies in general. After the enemy

offensive on Wau had been defeated, and the Japanese retreated back along jungle tracks

towards Mubo, it was time to pursue the beaten enemy. As part of this pursuit, 2/3rd

Independent Company was divided into three sections, each covering a different track leading

out from Wau. In due course the company’s pursuit became a tangle of sub-units intermixed

with the enemy.563 Even so the Company continued to pursue the Japanese. It was during this

period that Moten’s tolerance of Warfe must have been severely tested. In one incident for

example, Warfe personally took a group out ‘marauding’ and was absent from the Company

and incommunicado for several days; this infuriated Moten, but there were no

consequences.564 If nothing else the relationship between Moten and Warfe illustrates the

John Lewin, interviewed by Neil MacDonald (no date) AWM S04158; Russell, There Goes a Man, p. 96. Warfe’s prowess as a combat officer was summed up by one officer who observed that, ‘He would make your blood go cold at his superlative courage and cool savagery’, see: P. Bradley, Hell’s Battlefield - The Australians in New Guinea in World War II, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 2012, p. 215. Warfe was never reluctant to take on any task, fight any fight and to tell anyone who would listen when he achieved success, of which he was accused of exaggerating at times, see: Russell, There Goes a Man p. 276, and Records of the War 1939-45 Brig. M.J. Moten, AWM93 50/2/23/387. Despite this Warfe was a stickler for battalion discipline, see: Lieutenant John Lewin, interviewed by Neil MacDonald (no date), AWM 204158. One aspect of Warfe’s temperament that diminished the image of the consummate warrior to a degree was over-confidence which at times verged on arrogance. This trait did assist him to create a charismatic persona, but it did have its drawbacks. An example of this occurred on 6 July 1943 when Warfe, who held the Japanese in contempt, ignored warnings that a move of the Company he had planned could be observed by the Japanese. The consequences of this was that the Company was ambushed and lost all of its reserve food and ammunition, two Vickers guns, one 3 inch mortar, its medical supplies and its war diary. Warfe’s soldiers were aware of this trait in their commander and even though they respected him greatly, were inclined not to always accept everything proposed by Warfe without a degree of scepticism, their attitude being that they ‘had been conned by George before’, see: Garland, Nothing is Forever, pp.161-81; 2/3 Independent Company War Diary, 7 Jul 43, AWM52 25/3/3/11; Garland, Nothing is Forever, p.159. 562 Records of the War 1939-45 Brig. M.J. Moten, AWM93 50/2/23/387. 563 Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 73. 564 There were suspicions within the company that Moten planned to relieve Warfe of command because of his insubordinate impetuosity. It was thought that Moten was preparing a dossier of Warfe’s indiscretions to use to

163

complex relationship which existed between two very disparate elements of the Army, with

each recognising, however reluctantly, the value of working together for their mutual benefit.

Reflecting this ability to utilise the idiosyncrasies of the Independent Companies

against his inclinations for the greater good, Moten’s handling of 2/3rd Independent Company

appears on balance to have been both professional and prudent. The instructions he issued

were both appropriate for an Independent Company and realistic.565 One example of this was

the deployment of the company during April out to the far left flank of 17 Brigade to a

position where it could threaten Japanese lines of communication, a task eminently suited to

Warfe’s force.566 Moten’s handling of 2/3rd Independent Company at this point demonstrates

a degree of tolerance, at least among some frontline combat officers, towards the Independent

Companies. This was certainly an improvement from the dismissive attitudes of 1941, and

built upon the growing appreciation for the qualities of the Independent Companies which

had manifested themselves in 1942. Just how influential key individuals, such as Warfe, were

in determining the nature of his company’s tasks at this time is unknown. Warfe was certainly

not above suggesting tasks to his superiors, and was acknowledged by none other than

Lieutenant General Edmond Herring as being, ‘full of good ideas’.567 The working

relationship established between Moten and Warfe was effective and had by 22 April,

resulted in 2/3rd Independent Company killing 257 Japanese and wounding many others.568

On 23 April 1943 Kanga Force was disbanded. Major General Stanley Savige, with

3rd Division, assumed command on the Wau-Salamaua front. At last 2/5th Independent

secure Warfe’s relief of command, see: Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 88. This may have been the case, but an examination of Moten’s extensive personal papers reveals no evidence of any such dossier. 565 Moten, Murray John (Brigadier b.1899 d.1953), Folder 2 of 28, AWM PR91/002. 566 McCarthy, First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 585. 567 David Dexter interview with Herring - 6 Apr 1951. Herring suggested that the idea of the attack on Bobdubi Ridge in May 1943 may have been Warfe’s, AWM 172/10. 568 Analysis of operations (or lessons learnt) Report on Doublet T. (Salamaua.) Report by 2/6 Bn on action Lababia Ridge 20/24 Jun. – Report on operations in the Mubo Area by 2/7 Australian Infantry Battalion 13th Apr to 2nd Jun 1943, AWM54 587/6/2.

164

Company was finally relieved and sent back to Australia for much-needed rest and

recuperation. Meanwhile 2/7th Independent Company was redeployed to operate as part of

Bena Force on the Bena-Bena Plateau, which will be examined later in this chapter. This left

2/3rd Independent Company, as the sole Independent Company in the Wau-Salamaua area.

Critically Savige appeared from the outset to possess a finely tuned appreciation of how to use the unconventional attributes of an Independent Company to support larger formations.

His appointment proved to be a turning point for the operational contribution 2/3rd

Independent Company would make to the campaign to capture Salamaua.

Major General Savige’s conception of unconventional warfare owed much to his

World War 1 experiences. His experiences on the Western Front had taught him the futility of

frontal attacks and as a consequence he often sought the indirect approach to defeat his foe.

During 1918 he had been a member of Dunsterforce during which he and a party of five

officers and fifteen non-commissioned officers operated independently in northern Iran to

protect 80,000 Assyrian refugees from the depredations of Kurds and Ottoman troops. Such

an experience likely gave him a personal experience of and appreciation for the nature of

small scale unconventional operations.569 In an interview with Gavin Long on 16 July 1944,

Savige summarised his concept of the indirect approach and how it was to be used against the

Japanese. He stressed there should be no frontal attacks because of the certainty of heavy

casualties to the attacker; instead forces should pin down the enemy and find his flanks

because the Japanese would invariably ‘bolt’ when they were surrounded or partially

surrounded.570 The indirect approach was perfectly applicable to the Independent Company concept of striking at the enemy rear.

569 For a detailed account of Savige’s experiences with Dunsterforce, see: Russell, There Goes a Man, pp. 101- 118. 570 Gavin Long Notebook 40, AWM67 2/40.

165

Alone amongst all senior Australian field commanders during World War 2 Savige

wrote down his thoughts on the use of unconventional forces in the jungle. On 29 April 1943

he produced an appreciation that stated that the Independent Companies fulfilled the role of

cavalry in the jungle. They did this by securing forward areas, harassing the enemy’s line of

communication, and retarding enemy advances. He urged the use of Independent Companies

in such a manner.571 By 1945 Savige went further and formally codified his ideas for the use

of unconventional forces in the jungle. His Tactical and Administrative doctrine for jungle

warfare applicable to all formations under command 2 Aust. Corps (2AIF) included a section

specifically addressing ‘commandos’. In this Savige continued his correlation between

commandos and cavalry and their usefulness to scout, outflank and harass the enemy. He

concluded by stating that in the jungle ‘cavalry’ was even more valuable to a commander than

in Europe or the Western Desert.572

In due course, this idea of the Independent Companies being cavalry became firmly

fixed in the mind of the Companies themselves. During its operations in the Ramu Valley in

late 1943, 2/6th Independent Company referred to itself as such.573 While Savige’s

appreciations were his own, his senior rank and field command responsibilities, made sure

that his ideas became de facto doctrine for those under his command. It was Savige’s

understanding of the value of Independent Company operations in the jungle that would provide the context in which 2/3rd Independent Company would operate during the Wau-

Salamaua campaign.

From the first Major General Savige began to utilise 2/3rd Independent Company in a

strategic role. Rather than simply support the operations of a larger formation, which had been

571 Australian Division General Staff Branch (3 Aust Div GS Branch) May 1943 Part 1, Appreciation of the Situation by GOC 3 Aust Div at 0300 hrs 29 Apr 43, AWM52 1/5/4 3. 572 S. Savige, Tactical and Administrative doctrine for jungle warfare applicable to all formations under command 2 Aust. Corps (2AIF), HQ 2 Aust. Corps (2AIF) (New Guinea): N.G. Press Unit, 1945, p. 38. 573 2/6 Commando Squadron War Diary Novto Dec 1943, AWM52 2/2/58.

166

the case for 17 Brigade, the Company was allocated tasks which directly contributed to the

capability of the Division as a whole. Part of the reason for the use of the company in this way

was the makeup of 3rd Division itself. For want of a better description, 3rd Division was an

‘unbalanced’ Division. It consisted of two Brigades, 15 Brigade and 17 Brigade. 17 Brigade was a fully formed veteran AIF brigade; on the other hand 15 Brigade consisted of only two

battalions, the 24th and 58/59th, both inexperienced untested militia battalions.574 Savige deployed 17 Brigade against the fortified Japanese positions at Mubo and used 15 Brigade out to his left flank to cover the approaches from the Markham River Valley. Needing to screen the tracks leading from Markham resulted in the 24th Battalion being split into company sized

groups and ordered to patrol those tracks. The distance from 3rd Division also meant that 15

Brigade would have no artillery support, and as such was described as something of a

‘toothless tiger’.575 This left just the 58/59th Battalion as the sole force available to cover the

immediate left flank of the Division. To bolster 58/59th Battalion Savige attached 2/3rd

Independent Company to 15 Brigade, and deployed the Company to Missim, a dominant point

on the left flank. From there the Company, acting as a ‘cavalry’ flank guard, could counter

any Japanese moves in that direction, conduct offensive raids against the Japanese line of

communication between Salamaua and Mubo, and gain information of enemy strengths,

dispositions and movements.576 Savige knew Warfe from his time in the Middle East. He understood Warfe’s aggressive temperament and temptation for Warfe to ‘fight the whole Jap force’.577 By stationing 2/3rd Independent Company at Missim, some distance from the main

force and relatively free to act, Savige gave Warfe a degree of autonomy and the chance to

fight the war in whatever manner he saw fit. Once at Missim, the Company immediately

574 G. Keating, The Right Man for the Right Job – Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Savige as a Military Commander, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2006, p. 100. 575 Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 200. 576 Report on Operations of 3 Australian Division in Salamaua Area from 22 Apr 1943 to 23 Aug 1943, AWM 54 587/7/12, Part 2, p. 5. 577 P. Bradley, To Salamaua, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2010, p. 54.

167

embarked on patrols, during which numerous Japanese were encountered and killed, including

one group surprised while they were swimming and sunbathing.578 The Japanese certainly

became aware that a force was stalking them and took steps to protect themselves. Japanese

soldiers were instructed to keep on the alert for the slightest sound and to watch not only the

front but the rear. They were further warned to be alert so that they could stamp out the

‘guerrilla’ activities of the enemy.579

By late April 1943, 2/3rd Independent Company patrols had determined that Bobdubi

Ridge, a significant feature that ran from the west of Mubo virtually all the way to Salamaua,

was lightly held by the Japanese.580 Warfe was concerned that his company be employed

aggressively before health issues reduced its effectiveness to do so, and suggested that his

force attack occupy the position.581 Such a move would directly threaten the Japanese lines of

communication and possibly result in them abandoning their positions at Mubo. Warfe’s plan

was to employ all of 2/3rd Independent Company to capture Bobdubi Ridge and at the same time make use of two companies of 24th Battalion to advance through the nearby Malalo area.

Savige agreed with the suggestion to attack Bobdubi, but placed a limit of one platoon of

2/3rd Independent Company to attack, although he allowed Warfe to make use of elements

from his headquarters.582 Warfe accepted the restraint assuming that it was due to Savige’s concerns over having to divert resources to maintain a larger attacking force.583

578 Report on Operations of 3 Australian Division in Salamaua Area from 22 Apr 1943 to 23 Aug 1943, p. 5, AWM 54 587/7/12, Part 2. 579 Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, South West Pacific Area Bulletins 1943, ‘Instructional Reference – approach manoeuvres in the jungle’ MOTO 2803 BUTAI – stamped OTAKE 28 Apr 1943, Bulletin 255 26 Jul 1943, Item 2776. AMW55 1/3. 580 Report on Operations of 3 Australian Division in Salamaua Area from 22 Apr 1943 to 23 Aug 1943, AWM 54 587/7/12, Part 2, p. 6. 581 Warfe to Gavin Long 6 Dec 1956 from Jungle Training School Cunungra, Records of the War 1939-1945, AWM93 50/2/23/489. 582 Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 118. 583 Warfe to Gavin Long, 6 Dec 1956, from Jungle Training School Cunungra, Records of the War 1939-1945, AWM93 50/2/23/489. The origin of the idea for the attack on Bobdubi Ridge on 4 May is the subject of some disagreement. Savige in a 10 Apr 1951 interview by David Dexter, AWM 172/10, claimed the idea was his.

168

On 3 May, a date that coincided with 3rd Division plans to move against Mubo, 2/3rd

Independent Company attacked Bobdubi Ridge. Warfe was determined to give the Japanese a

‘bloody nose’ and employed the tactics of encirclement by attacking from three directions,

with feints to the enemy front and flanks.584 While this occurred a force that had earlier

infiltrated behind the Japanese attacked. By 9 May the Japanese had been driven completely

from many positions, including the important Old Vickers machinegun position which

overlooked the Komiatum track, the main line of communication between Salamaua and

Mubo. In order to deal with the Japanese who remained on the ridge, the Company decided to

indulge in some very unconventional tactics. On the night of 9 May a ‘terror type raid’ was

carried out on the last Japanese defenders. This tactic involved creeping up on the Japanese at

night and inflicting a barrage of noise on them. ‘Flares, lots of screaming and yelling’, as well

as grenades and small arms fire assaulted the senses of the entrenched Japanese.585 In doing so the company was imitating the Japanese tactic of ‘firing and shouting’ at night time.586

Patrols the next day detected no movement from the enemy, and on 11 May it was found that

the Japanese had abandoned their positions and departed, thus surrendering all of Bobdubi

Ridge.587 Warfe, typically, had ignored Savige’s admonition to restrain the numbers he

employed and eventually in addition to the allowed platoon employed engineers, signallers,

medical and members of the transport section in the assault.588 He was not reprimanded for

this, no doubt because the mission was successful. Bobdubi Ridge had been captured in an

Herring in an interview with David Dexter, AWM 172/10, stated that he was unsure who suggested it but would not have been surprised if it had been George Warfe. 584 Garland, Nothing is Forever, pp. 116, 118. 585 Ibid., pp. 122-23. These tactics became known as ‘Nerve Tactics’ and were promulgated throughout the army as one means of discomfiting the Japanese, see: Tactical Directive No.7, The Development and use of “Nerve Tactics” in Jungle Warfare, AWM54 937/3/4. 586 ATIS South West Pacific Area Bulletins Nos 446-490 14 Oct to 3 Nov 1943, ASA No.2086 Force, Takeo Ono, ‘Directive on ending instructions based on experience in combat’, Bulletin 484 30 Oct 43, Item 17, 5917, AWM55 1/7. 587 Garland, Nothing is Forever, pp. 122-23; 2/3 Independent Company War Diary May to Jun 1943, 9-11 May 43, AWM52 25/3/3/9. It is possible that as there was no Japanese response when the raid was occurring that they had evacuated their positions prior to the terror raid. 588 Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 119.

169

operation that Headquarters 3rd Division staff acknowledged to be as unconventional as it

was effective.589

Once firm on Bobdubi Ridge, 2/3rd Independent Company did not hesitate to make its

presence felt further afield. It was very much the case of ‘he who holds the ridges, holds the country’ and from 5-13 May the Komiatum Track was repeatedly raided and 68 Japanese were killed.590 By this stage the Company possessed Vickers machineguns, even though they

were not officially part of their table of equipment. In a not uncommon example of initiative

by troops in the field the guns had been ‘acquired’ by the company during its sojourn on New

Caledonia and never handed back. These Vickers guns later proved to be valuable assets in many of the company’s engagements.

The presence of 2/3rd Independent Company on Bobdubi Ridge created a strategic

threat to the Japanese forces occupying Mubo at this point, endangering the Japanese line of

communication to Mubo, and consequently threatened the ability of the Japanese to secure

their reinforcement and supply line to that position. One practical outcome in this regard was

that the aggressive action by the Company along the Japanese line of communication led to

the desertion of indigenous carriers from Japanese service, forcing Japanese troops to carry

their supplies to their forward positions, no small imposition in the jungle.591 The Japanese responded to the challenge forcefully. On 14 May, they counter-attacked Bobdubi with a battalion-sized force supported by heavy machineguns, mortars and artillery.592 Never

589 3 Australian Division General Staff Branch (3 Aust Div GS Branch) May 1943 Part 1, AWM52 1/5/4. 590 Battle of the Ridges, The Australian Army at War, Brochure Number Three, Army Directorate of Public Relations, Alfred Henry Pettifer Acting Government Printer, 1944, p. 6; Report on Operations of 3 Australian Division in Salamaua Area from 22 Apr 1943 to 23 Aug 1943, AWM 54 587/7/12, Part 2, 591 Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 131. 592 Analysis of operations (or lessons learnt) Report on Doublet T. (Salamaua.) Report by 2/6 Bn on action Lababia Ridge 20/24 Jun. – Report on operations in the Mubo Area by 2/7 Australian Infantry Battalion 13th Apr to 2nd Jun, 1943, AWM54 587/6/2; The Japanese Counter attack was made by: 10 army troops, 50 Naval troops (from Salamaua); 200 men from YAMAGATA force; 130 men 1st infantry company (1LG) from Markham garrison who arrived 10 May and went into action immediately; a total of 390 men. See: Allied Translator and Interpreter Section South West Pacific Area – Enemy Publications No. 145 Part I, Jul1944 –

170

intending to hold the ground, and under orders from 3rd Division not to risk casualties the

Company broke contact with the enemy and withdrew.593

The impact of the seizure of Bobdubi Ridge by 2/3rd Independent Company should not be underestimated. Capturing this position, even temporarily, had delivered a significant strategic blow against the Japanese defenders facing 17 Brigade at Mubo. The tactical decisiveness of the Company’s assault on the ridge and their subsequent pressure against the

Komiatum track had convinced the Japanese that a battalion of Australians had occupied the

ridge when in fact only a Company had done so.594 Such numbers, even though unknowingly

exaggerated, could not be ignored. Even when they recaptured the ridge the Japanese

assumed that 300-400 Australians were lurking in the jungle nearby.595 The ability of

Independent Companies to create an illusion of greater strength than they actually

represented, was a consistent feature of their operations. In the case of Bobdubi, the result

was that the Japanese diverted a considerable force from the front line to deal with the threat.

The capture and then withdrawal from Bobdubi Ridge was then an excellent example of the

use of economy of force to strike behind enemy lines in support of the strategic objectives of

the main force, a tactic entirely in keeping with the operational concept of ‘Jungle Cavalry’.

It is tempting to become distracted by what on the surface appear to be two of the

2/3rd Independent Company’s most significant achievements of the campaign. These were the

defence of Ambush Knoll on 19-20 July 1943 and the capture of Timbered Knoll on 28-29

July 1943. Ambush Knoll was a position to the immediate west of Mubo sitting between 15

and 17 Brigades. The Japanese occupied the knoll on 12 July threatening to drive a wedge

Intelligence Reports, maps and Sketches Operations in New Guinea Apr 43 to Aug 43 in Moten Murray John (Brigadier b.1899 d.1943) folder 19-28, AWM PR91/002. 593 2/3 Independent Company War Diary, May to Jun 1943, 14 May 43, AWM52 25/3/3/9. 594 Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, South West Pacific Area Bulletins 8 Aug – 14 Sept 1943, Bulletin 332 5 Sept 43, Item 7, 3428, AMW55 1/4. 595 Allied Translator and Interpreter Section South West Pacific Area – Enemy Publications No. 145 Part I, Jul1944 – Intelligence Reports, maps and Sketches Operations in New Guinea Apr 43 to Aug 43. Intelligence Record No.98 16 May 43, in: Moten Murray John (Brigadier b.1899 d.1943) folder 19-28, AWM PR91/002.

171

between the two Australian formations. This would have effectively cut 3rd Division in half and thus compromised operations against Mubo.596 As the nearest unit on hand, 2/3rd

Independent Company was given the task of ejecting the Japanese from the Knoll. This it did

on 14 July despite having only forty per cent of its men available due to casualties and

sickness.597 Having captured the knoll the 52 men of the Company were then subjected to

repeated counter attacks over a three day period. During this time the Company, supplied by

a carrier line of every other man the Company could find, repulsed 20 determined Japanese

attacks.598 The defence of the knoll was an outstanding success. Even more so, it proved to

sceptical regular army units that Independent Companies could if required hold ground

against determined enemy pressure.

The fight for Timbered Knoll similarly proved to such doubters that 2/3rd Independent

Company could effectively engage in conventional operations and operate as ‘proper

infantry’ if need be. Timbered Knoll was a heavily defended feature covering the flank of the

Mubo feature. Once again 2/3rd Independent Company was given the task of capturing it. ‘A’

Platoon of the Company, under the command of Lieutenant John Lewin, assaulted the

Japanese position. In doing so the Company demonstrated tactical flexibility and the ability to

improvise on the spur of the moment. The first assault on the knoll, which had attempted to

capture the position from the right flank, failed. The attack was then without a pause quickly

switched to the left flank. Caught off-guard the Japanese were defeated and the knoll

captured.599

596 Report on Operations of 3 Aust. Div. in Salamaua Area From 22 Apr 43 – 25 Aug 43, AWM54 587/7/12 Part 1. 597 Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 181. 598 During the defence of Ambush Knoll the defenders were supplied by a carrier line of troops using a track the Japanese had not discovered. This carrier line included war photographer and correspondent Damian Parer who was attached to 2/3rd Independent Company at the time. Parer carried ammunition to the men of 2/3rd who were defending the knoll, see: N. McDonald, Kokoda Front Line, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1994, pp. 292-3. 599 For the most comprehensive account of the battles of Ambush Knoll and Timbered Knoll, see: Garland, Nothing is Forever, pp. 186-269.

172

Exceptional as these two incidents were, they were conventional fights, fought in a

traditional ‘infantry’ manner, even if the sudden change in the direction of the attack at

Timbered Knoll was a decidedly nimble and impulsive move. These actions were not

exemplars of the primarily irregular character of Independent Company operations nor did

they correspond to their primary function of reconnaissance and harassment. They thus offer

little, apart from evidence of resilience and capacity for combat, to help understand the

unique operational qualities of the Independent Companies. It is for this reason that they

receive only a brief mention in this dissertation.

The nature of the war against the Japanese in New Guinea is often characterised for

the frequent brutality and merciless behaviour of all its participants. Such behaviour was the

product of a conflict in which men were faced with constant danger from an unseen enemy,

and forced to live and operate in a forbidding environment in which the slightest indiscretion

could lead to disablement or death. This was compounded for the combatants by having to

face an enemy who were racially and culturally distinctive and whose military ethos was in

many ways an anathema. Within this broader context it is unsurprising to find that the

Independent Companie’s attitude towards their enemy was ruthless and unforgiving. Tom

Lewis in Lethality in Combat: a study of the true nature of battle and Mark Johnston in

Fighting the enemy: Australian soldiers and their adversaries in World War II attest to the

frequently pitiless manner in which Australian troops dealt with their Japanese enemy.600

Those participating in the conflict fully realised the nature of the war of which they were part.

Savige alluded to the type of war that would be fought by unconventional forces in the

jungles of New Guinea as being one that would of necessity be different to how it was done

600 M. Johnston, Fighting the enemy: Australian soldiers and their adversaries in World War II, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000; T. Lewis, Lethality in Combat: a study of the true nature of battle, Big Sky Publishing, Newport, 2012.

173

in ‘civilised countries’.601 Brigadier Heathcote Hammer, the Commander of 15 Brigade,

described it as ‘murder war’. Hammer pointed out that the Japanese would kill wounded

Australians and anyone who attempted to aid them; his response was that the only answer

was to be equally relentless.602

In such a war, where resources and numbers were limited and constantly vulnerable to

enemy and environmental threat, utilising any means possible to inflict as much harm on the

enemy as possible became the norm for the Independent Companies. It was accepted that any

means could be employed to do this.603 For example one method of killing Japanese officers

was to steal into Japanese camps under cover of darkness and booby trap the toilet seats on

the officer’s lavatory. Japanese officers did not share the same latrine as the soldiers and the

camp would be watched carefully until the location of the Japanese officer latrine could be

established. When an officer visited he would be killed.604 Such tactics were considered to be

perfectly legitimate by Independent Company troops.

The intimacy of killing the enemy was another notable characteristic of the

Independent Company. Johnston estimates that 75 per cent of Australian soldiers in constant action had never seen an enemy.605 In contrast the Independent Company troops frequently observed the Japanese from close range. Contact with the enemy was normally by ambush and raid in which the killing would be conducted within a few metres. Such a close proximity tended to generate intensely personal responses. Peter Pinney, with 2/3rd Independent

Company, celebrated his 21st Birthday during the Salamaua campaign. Pinney recounted how as a birthday present he requested from Warfe that he be allowed to go out on a one man

601 Russell, There Goes a Man, p. 260. 602 P J. Dean (ed.), Australia 1943 The Liberation of New Guinea, Cambridge University press, Port Melbourne, p. 204. 603 Arden, ‘Jack’, p. 9. 604 Ibid. 605 Johnston, Fighting the Enemy, p. 77.

174

patrol so that he could ‘bag a Jap’.606 Warfe refused him permission which disappointed

Pinney greatly. Captain Peter Tancred, in a letter to his parents related how he got the thrill of

his life when he ‘pipped his first Jap’.607 Indeed killing Japanese became regarded as

something of a sport.608 That killing was frequently pitiless. Warfe would habitually kill

wounded Japanese with a Japanese bayonet he carried with him.609 Pinney attempted to

explain the reasons for this merciless attitude by the Independent Companies in his partially

autobiographical The Barbarians, A Soldier’s New Guinea Diary, when he described the

Japanese as ‘not fair dinkum humans’, and that there was a ‘compelling greed’ amongst his

comrades for their total elimination.610

At the same time there was, however, alongside the gratuitous brutality, a lingering sense amongst some of the Independent Company personnel of the inappropriateness of their behaviour. This sometimes led them to modify their actions. Warfe desisted killing wounded

Japanese with his bayonet when war photographer Damien Parer was with the company for several months during 1943, and Roly Good the medical orderly for the Company, made of point of refusing to kill wounded Japanese even though he recognised that by not doing so he was condemning those men to a lingering death in the jungle.611 Nevertheless, the dominant

ethos was one of destroying the enemy by any means, and it is this which most accurately

characterises the actions of the Company during this period.

Meanwhile, Independent Company operations continued and 2/3rd Independent

Company was to act in the role of Savige’s ‘Jungle Cavalry’, to provide the eyes and ears or

his division. The ability of the company to infiltrate areas held by the Japanese was

606 Pinney to Mother and Father, 10 Jun 1943, Papers of Peter Pinney Box 13, UQFL288, UQFL. 607 R. Hancock, Letter to Parents, 14 Feb 43, AWM PR91/052. 608 Operations of 2/3 Independent Company, subsequent to the battle of Wau, and pursuit of Japanese Forces to Mubo, covering the period March, Apr, May and Jun, 1943, AWM 54 583/7/11. 609 Macdonald, Kokoda Front Line, p. 290. 610 Pinney, The Barbarians, pp. 124-5. 611 Macdonald, Kokoda Front Line, p. 85.

175

considered even by the Japanese to be ‘quite remarkable’.612 Lieutenant Colonel H.G. Quinn

of 3rd Division Staff recorded that, ‘Patrols provided by 2/3 Indep Coy were excellent and gained valuable information as to enemy’s strength and disposition.’613 Reports provided by

the Company, were valued as reliable and accurate, unlike reports from, for example, 58/59

Battalion which had a reputation for exaggerating enemy numbers.614 The number of such

patrols mounted by 2/3rd Independent Company was extraordinary. In the first two weeks of

September 1943 the company conducted 63 in total. In comparison 2/7th Battalion, a force

three times the size of the Independent Company, conducted 21 patrols in the same period.615

If it is assumed that each 2/3rd Independent Company patrol during September operated over a two-day period, a conservative estimate at best, then as an aggregate in the first two weeks of

September the company conducted 126 days of patrolling.

The importance of such patrolling was paramount. Major General George Vasey

made the point that commanders in the jungle were often forced to execute plans ‘on the most

nebulous information’, due to lack of information, and that the only way of securing that

information was by infantry patrols.616 To this end post-war Japanese accounts made a point

of referring to the Australian infiltration into the valleys to the East of Mt. Tambu and to the

west of Komiatum village.617 This was in the area which was extensively patrolled by 2/3rd

Independent Company. Savige was keenly interested in the patrol activity of the units under

his command, and read every patrol report that was submitted.618 He acknowledged 2/3rd

Independent Company’s value in this regard when he identified the Company as the

‘outstanding’ unit of the campaign, an extraordinary accolade for a single company from

612 K. Tanaka, Operations of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces in the Papua New Guinea Theatre During World War II, Japan Papua New Guinea Goodwill Society, 1980, p. 166. 613 Patrol Records 2/3 Australian Independent Coy routine patrols Salamaua 1943, AWM54 587/7/16. 614 Ibid. 615 Ibid; 2/7 Battalion War Diary - Sept - Dec 1943. AWM52 8/3/7/37. 616 Military Training Pamphlet No 23 Jungle Warfare, comments on draft by Maj Gen G.A. Vasey, AWM54 937/3/33 p. 2. 617 Tanaka, Operations of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces in the Papua New Guinea, p. 166. 618 Russell, There Goes a Man, p. 268.

176

within an entire division. Savige further stated that the information the company had provided

gave him the confidence to conduct the campaign as he did.619 Such praise confirmed the

value of an Independent Company if it was employed in the manner for which it was

intended.

In the closing days of August 1943, the Japanese found themselves defending an increasingly confined perimeter in the defence of Salamaua. It was during this period that the nature of the land campaign for Salamaua began to change, an eventuality which would have a decisive impact on the operations of 2/3rd Independent Company. In the early days of the campaign contacts with the enemy had in general been at platoon-and-company level, often fought against a dug-in and unseen foe, with minimal support from artillery or air. What was required to achieve success in this form of warfare was independent initiative by small groups. This was the type of warfare at which an Independent Company could excel. As the year progressed the logistical profile of allied forces improved. Reliance on small unit tactics began to give way to the employment of overwhelming firepower, and more set-piece larger scale operations. Targets would now be saturated with airpower rather than be subjected to piecemeal attacks.620 The war diary of 2/6th Independent Company records on 10 May 1943

that U.S. Army Air Force General George Kenney announced that he would ‘blow the Japs

out of New Guinea by Christmas’.621 The war diary of 2/6th Commando Squadron (formerly

2/6 Independent Company) during the later months of 1943 made numerous references to

large numbers of Allied aircraft flying overhead, ten Marauder and forty Mitchell bombers

escorted by P38 and P40 fighters on one day alone.622

619 Gen. Stanley Savige interview with David Dexter, 10 Apr 1951, AWM 172, 10. 620 3 Australian Division General Staff Branch, 1943 Part 8 General Staff appendices, AWM54 1/5/4. 621 2/6 Commando Squadron War Diary Novto Dec 1943, 10 Oct, AWM52 2/2/58. 622 2/6 Commando Squadron Diary Novto Dec 1943, AWM52 2/2/58.

177

The tonnage of bombs dropped on the Japanese in the Salamaua area increased

dramatically from July 1943. During the months of February to June 1943 the average

monthly tonnage of bombs was 77.86. This increased dramatically from July until September

with an average monthly tonnage of bombs of 850.6 with 1238.9 tons in the month of July

alone.623 On 29 July, American artillery which, along with the U.S. 41st Division, had landed

at Nassau Bay south of Salamaua, and fired 4000 shells at a Japanese position. In another attack the Japanese 115th Regiment was shelled by Australian artillery for twenty-four

hours.624 The weight of firepower directed against them was described as ‘terrible’ by one

Japanese soldier and contributed to forcing the Japanese to abandon their defensive positions

at Mubo and withdraw closer to Salamaua.625 On 1 August 1943 the commander of the

Japanese 51st Division, seeking a way to protect his troops from the enemy artillery and aerial

bombardment, issued an order to construct deep strong points robust enough to withstand the

bombardments. By concentrating his forces in heavily defended positions he compelled

Allied forces to conduct set piece assaults on them. This changed the nature of the campaign

from clashes of small units of infantry, to one of heavily supported close assaults on well-

prepared Japanese positions.626

With such Japanese withdrawals into prepared positions there were fewer

opportunities for 2/3rd Independent Company to operate on the flanks and in the rear of the

enemy. In such a tactical environment, the uses for ‘Jungle Cavalry’ gradually diminished.

On 27 August, a conference determined the future employment of 2/3rd Independent

Company, and two days later the Company became the 15 Brigade reserve. In a mark of the

623 Tonnage of bombs dropped 43 Wau-Salamaua area, in Moten, Murray John (Brigadier b.1899 d.1953.) Folder 22-28, AWMPR91/002. 624 Tanaka, Operations of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces in the Papua New Guinea, pp. 159-74. 625 Diary of unnamed member of WAKU unit in NAKAMURA Battalion. 28 Dec 42 – 11 Aug 43, AWM55 1/8 ATIS Nos 492-525 B493 4 Nov 43, Item 14 – 6944; Tanaka, Operations of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces in the Papua New Guinea, pp. 159-74. 626 Commander 51st Division 17 Jul43 on the construction of positions at the time of defence of Salamaua, issued 1 Aug 43 by MO Force Operation Sec, AWM55 1/8 ATIS Nos 492-525 B493 4 Nov 43, Item 12 – 6067.

178

diminished requirement for an assertive autonomous Independent Company, George Warfe,

who personified those attributes, was relieved of command of the Company in late August

and transferred to command 58/59th Battalion. The company continued to patrol and engage

the enemy but effectively its unconventional independent contribution to the campaign had

ended.627

A comparison of relative casualty figures suffered by 2/3rd Independent Company is illustrative of the degree of its commitment by 2/3rd Independent Company to the campaign.

From the period 23 April until 13 September 1943 the company lost 8 officers and 105 other

ranks. In comparison the highest losses for a battalion engaged in the campaign was 2/7th

Battalion which lost 19 officers and 209 other ranks. Other battalion losses were 2/5th

Battalion 9 officers and 120 other ranks, 2/6th Battalion 6 officers and 125 other ranks, 24th

Battalion 5 officers and 34 other ranks, 57/60th Battalion 3 other ranks, and 58/59th Battalion

17 officers and 194 other ranks.628 That a company-sized unit exceeded the casualty rate for two battalions, was only marginally less for one battalion and was exceeded by only two battalions from an entire division indicates the level of contact with the enemy the Company engaged in during the period.

627 Action Diary HQ 15 Australian Infantry Brigade, Operation Doublet attack on Bobdubi Ridge, during Salamaua Campaign 1943, AWM54 587/7/11. 628 Unit Casualties Wau – Salamaua 23rd Apr to 13th Sept 1943 Australian Military Forces – New Guinea, AWM54 171/2/28.

179

Plate 8: Australian and Japanese disposition Wau-Salamaua April-Sept 1943. Note the area in which 2/3rd Independent Company operated.629 While 2/3rd Independent Company was engaged on the Wau-Salamaua front, other

Independent Companies were contributing to ongoing operations elsewhere. Having returned

629 Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p.35.

180

from its service on Timor, 2/4th Independent Company then spent several months training at the Canungra Jungle Warfare School in Queensland. From there the Company was sent to join 9th Division in its forthcoming move to capture Lae in September 1943. During this campaign, in a role similar to that of 2/3rd Independent Company with 3rd Division, the company provided flank and reconnaissance support for 9th Division. They did this with little trouble despite unfavourable weather, difficult terrain and the occasional clash with small parties of Japanese.630 Ironically the Company suffered its heaviest casualties during this operation not from its activity on the ground, but aboard landing craft heading for the beach near Lae on 4 September 1943. Japanese aircraft attacked and bombed the landing craft killing 28 men with six more declared missing in action.631

Following the capture of Lae the Company then took part in the campaign to take

Finschaffen, acting once again as the flank guards and reconnaissance element of 9th

Division. Following the capture of Finschaffen the Company, now officially a ‘commando’ squadron, was engaged in some patrolling but spent more time on a variety of mundane tasks around the main base such as digging a bunker for the Divisional Commander and providing working parties to unload stores.632 It seemed to the men of the squadron, having been sidetracked into such menial tasks, that the division had lost interest in how to utilize its talents.633 From there, however, the Squadron, as it now was, moved onto reconnaissance work on the Huon Peninsula, in which the Commandos discovered evidence of Japanese diggings and camp sites. Contact with the enemy was, however, infrequent and although some Commandos were wounded the Squadron did not engage in any major clashes with the

Japanese.

630 2/4 Independent Company War Diary, AWM52 25/3/4/5. 631 Lambert, Tidal River to Tarakan, p. 267; 2/4 Independent Company War Diary, 4 Sept 43, AWM52 25/3/4/5. 632 Lambert, Tidal River to Tarakan, p. 298. 633 Ibid.

181

Meanwhile, 2/2nd and 2/7th Independent Companies were contributing to ongoing

operations elsewhere, as part of a group known as Bena Force. Bena Force was established to

secure and protect the airfields on the Bena-Bena plateau 100 kilometres to the west of Lae.

There were several old airstrips in the area and the flat topography, good climate and general

conditions on the plateau made it suitable for the conversion of these small airstrips into

larger airfields. These improved facilties would provide an alternative to the Bulolo Valley

airfields if the latter were lost, and also provide a point from which supplies could be

distributed.634 The Japanese were aware of the importance of the plateau and their

intelligence reports from June 1943 mentioned the construction of airfields by Australians at

Goroka, Hagen, Wilhelm and Bena-Bena.635 It was important that Australian forces prevent

the Japanese from interfering with those airfields. This situation set the stage for the

deployment of Independent Companies to disrupt any enemy intentions to threaten the

Plateau.

The beginnings of Bena Force were modest. Established on 23 January 1943 it

originally consisted of 56 men of 2/7th Battalion whose task was to establish defensive

positions at the site of the Bena-Bena airstrip. By the end of April this group had conducted

patrols and with the assistance of indigenous labourers constructed an impressive

infrastructure around the airfield.636 In May 2/7th Independent Company, now no longer part

of Kanga Force, was deployed to Bena-Bena.637 It had been originally intended to deploy a

battalion to the plateau, but it was soon decided that there were not enough aircraft available

to fly in such a force, and once there it would not have been possible to maintain a force of

634 Operational Plans, Wau – Lae – Salamaua Appreciations of Situation in North east Area – Oct 1942 – Jan 1943, Appreciation of Situation in N.E. Area for GOC New Guinea Force as at 11 Jan 43, AWM54 583/6/4. 635 Enemy Publications No. 145 Part II, Jul1944 – Intelligence Reports, maps and Sketches Operations in New Guinea Apr 43 to Aug 43; in Moten, Murray John (Brigadier b.1899 d.1953) folder 20-28, AWM PR91/002. 636 The list of work was impressive and included weapons pits, heavy-type pill Boxes, a bomb-proof HQ, an RAP, dug-in dispersal dumps for food and ammunition, clearing kunai grass, digging drains, graded the airstrip, constructed an aircraft dispersal bay, barrack huts, hospital disguised to look like a indigenous village and a YMCA for off-duty personnel, see: AWM 54 1/5/42, Bena Force. 637 Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 238.

182

that size. Thus an Independent Company was chosen for the task.638 On arrival the

Company's instructions were to secure the Bena-Bena airfield, deny the Japanese freedom of movement, and harass them at every opportunity.639 Furthermore, the company was to report

directly to New Guinea Force, not 3rd Division which had by that time been established at

Wau and was the closest senior Army formation to the plateau.640 This meant that New

Guinea Force would take responsibility for managing the company, and that it seemed

comfortable with that less than regular role. By June Bena Force had grown to include 2/2nd

Independent Company (less one platoon), one platoon of 2/7th Battalion, and one machinegun

section from the same battalion. The two Independent Companies were deployed to two

locations; 2/7th at the Garoka airstrip and 2/2nd at the Bena airstrip.641

Soon after their arrival New Guinea Force issued a new instruction requiring Bena

Force to protect all the airfields on the plateau, and prevent the enemy from crossing the

Ramu River and penetrating to the plateau. In addition the Companies were to construct a

road and provide highly detailed maps of the terrain.642 This was quite a task. The span of

frontage that Bena Force was made responsible for a patrol frontage of approximately 200

kilometres, all of it undeveloped, uncontrolled, unmapped wilderness.643 Adequately

covering such an area would have required a significant deployment of regular troops and

would require an equally significant effort to maintain them. The 550 Independent Company

personnel now on loction on the Bena-Bena plateau were a much more economical means of

638 Ibid. 639 Bena Force, New Guinea Force Op Inst No. 82, 27 May 43, AWM 54 1/5/42. 640 Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 238. 641 Bena Force, New Guinea Force Op Inst 12, 25 Jun 43, AWM 54 1/5/42. 642 Ibid. 643 Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 241.

183

securing the plateau.644 It was also a task for which the autonomous, independent, small-unit,

innovative qualities of the Independent Companies were eminently suited to conduct.

The two Independent Companies of Bena Force immediately set to patrolling the

wilderness. In keeping with typical Independent Company practice the finding and mapping

of useable tracks was of primary importance. Patrol reports for July detail the passage over a

number of tracks varying in description from ‘absolutely the worst seen to date’, to ‘very level

all the way’.645 The detail contained in these reports was remarkable, covering geological,

physical and botanical subjects.646 With such information a comprehensive profile of the

region was soon established. Many patrols resulted in no contact, or indications that the

Japanese had recently departed, which in itself was useful information. In August there was

concern that the Japanese might launch a parachute infantry attack to seize the Bena and

Garoka airstrips.647 Obstructions were placed on Bena, Mount Hagen and Ogelbeng airstrips,

and an operational order was issued which stated that in event of an attack by enemy

paratroops that ‘no withdrawal will be accepted.’648 No such attack occurred, however, and

incessant patrolling continued through October.

On 26 September Bena Force came under the command of Major General George

Vasey’s 7th Division. Vasey began to use Independent Company patrols to gain information

on areas far too distant for regular units to patrol. One such mission was to an area known as

Josephstaal. The patrol to Josephstaal consisted of six men from 2/2nd Independent Company,

five indigenous police and thirty-two indigenous carriers. Tasked with detecting a Japanese

presence in the area and determining the viability of an existing airstrip the patrol was

644 Bena Force, Australian Military Forces New Guinea Force Headquarters Bena Force 9 Nov 43 Closing Report, gives the numbers for both 2/2 and 2/7 Cavalry Commando Squadrons as they were then titled, AWM 54 1/5/42. 645 Bena Force, patrol reports AWM 54 1/5/42. 646 See for example: Bena Force, patrol reports, LCpl E. Evens 2/7 Aust Indep Coy, Geological, Physical and Botanical Report on Bena Plateau, 7 Jul43, AWM 54 1/5/42. 647 Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 243. 648 Ibid; Bena Force Operational Order No.14, AWM 54 1/5/42.

184

conducted over a 30-day period.649 Successfully conducted, the Josephstaal patrol was in

many ways a typical reconnaissance mission undertaken by Independent Company personnel

during the Bena-Bena Campaign.

Other Independent Company Bena Force patrols illustrated the long-range

reconnaissance capabilities of the Companies. The Japanese were building a road from

Bogadjim to the Ramu Valley which would provide them with a reliable overland line of

communication to the Bena plateau, and if extended, to Lae. On 13 July 1943, a two-man

party made up of a corporal and an indigenous policeman undertook a patrol to observe this

construction work. To do so they had to pass through unmapped wilderness and avoid enemy

patrols and unfriendly indigenous areas.650 The patrol reported 4,000 ‘coolies’ working on the

road, 1,000 ‘coolies’ carrying stores, sixty motor vehicles and a tank at Bogadjim. Ships were

also seen unloading at night.651 Four more two-man patrols to Bogadjim were mounted

through August to October.652

In addition to reconnaissance patrols, Bena Force mounted fighting patrols. These had

been part of Bena Force’s repertoire since its inception. The Japanese threat to the plateau had

not diminished. On 10 August documents were recovered from a crashed Japanese aircraft

that indicated the enemy intended to attack the Bena Plateau during September or October

with three battalions of infantry and a battalion of mountain artillery.653 On 26 September, the

day he assumed command of Bena Force, Major General Vasey, wishing to blunt the

anticipated Japanese offensive, gave Bena Force permission to cross the Ramu River and

649 Patrol Report Sepu to Josephstaal Lieut G I Green – 2/2 Aust Cav (Commando) Sqn 28 Oct43 to 26 Nov 43, AMW54 592/2/5. 650 Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 247, refers to ‘truculent’ indigenous personnel posing a threat to one patrol to the Bogadjim road. 651 Bena Force War Diary Jun-Jul1943, AWM52 1/5/42. 652 Bena Force Aug-Nov1943, patrol reports do not mention the inclusion of any indigenous police in the patrols, AWM52 1/5/42. 653 Bena Force, Interpretation of Translation of Documents taken from crashed Japanese plane at Tsili Tsili 10 Aug 43, AWM 54 1/5/42.

185

engage the Japanese.654 Encouraged to ‘act vigorously with all speed’, patrols fanned out searching for the enemy.655 One such patrol was that commanded by Captain David Dexter of

the 2/2nd Independent Company. Encouraged by his Company Commander, Major Geoff

Laidlaw, to take advantages of every chance to harass the enemy, Dexter did just that.656 On

29 September 1943, crossing to the opposite bank of the Ramu River by swimming Dexter’s

patrol set a trap for the Japanese. The character of that ambush illustrated how Independent

Companies employed guile and firepower to achieve their aims. Three men were sent down

the track to a known Japanese base to act as a lure. Once they were sighted by the Japanese

they ran back to the patrol which had taken up position in a semi-circle astride the track. Soon

after approximately 60 Japanese, led by two armed indigenous guides, came down the track in

pursuit of the three decoys. As they approached the Japanese were talking and gesticulating,

obviously completely unaware of the presence of the Australians. The patrol waited until the

Japanese were within 20 metres before opening fire. The patrol’s automatic fire was reported

to have cut into the Japanese like a ‘reaper’s scythe’.657 A further large group of Japanese

came up to counter-attack the ambushers, firing into the patrol killing one and wounding

Dexter. Then in true guerrilla style the patrol ‘disappeared silently and rapidly’.658 The

ambush resulted in 45 Japanese being killed and many wounded. It was an operation which

employed deception, cunning, skill and daring and an excellent example of the nature of the

war Independent Companies waged.

From May to November 1943 Bena force killed 230 Japanese, and successfully

prevented any enemy penetration onto the Bena-Bena plateau. Bena Force’s War Diary claims

that every Japanese patrol that crossed the Ramu River was driven back with casualties, and

654 Bena Force War Diary, AWM 54 1/5/42. 655 Bena Force War Diary Aug-Nov1943, 1 Oct43, AWM 54 1/5/42. 656 Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 234. 657 Ibid, p. 435. 658 Ibid.

186

that every determined attack was repulsed with heavy casualties. While this may or may not

have been so, it was the case that the Japanese did not seriously threaten the plateau during

this period.659 Bena Force also deceived the Japanese into thinking that the Bena-Bena plateau

was occupied by significant numbers of Australians.660 This deception was achieved by

ceaseless patrol activity throughout the region and aided by the operation of 23 radio stations transmitting from the plateau as well as the construction of four large marked hospitals. The

Japanese subsequently planned to employ 6,000 troops to attack the plateau indicating that they had been deceived into presuming that the plateau was held by a large force. As a result of the Allied capture of Lae this attack never eventuated.661 What it illustrates, however, as

with 2/3rd Independent Company on Bobdubi Ridge, was the ability of Independent

Companies to deceive the Japanese into believing that they represented much larger forces

than they actually were. Bena Force maintained its ‘denial’ patrol activity from May until

September 1943. That it could deceive its enemy for such an extended period of time says a great deal for the mobility, versatility and autonomous independence which characterised the force’s operational style.

One source of ongoing concern for Bena Force was the relationship with the indigenous people in the Bena-Bena region. While the loyalty of some indigenous people had been an issue during the Wau-Salamaua campaign, the large number of Allied troops relative to the indigenous population never made indigenous relations more than a peripheral issue.

Such was not the case on the Bena-Bena plateau. Bena Force numbered at its best no more than 1,105 personnel, much less than the indigenous population in the region.662 The Chimbu

people alone provided 3,000 carriers and labourers for Bena Force; this does not take into

659 Bena Force War Diary Aug-Nov1943, AWM 54 1/5/42. 660 Ibid. 661 Reports on Japanese Operations New Guinea Ramu Valley Campaign, Sept 1943 – Apr 44, AWM54 595/7/19. 662 Bena Force War Diary Aug-Nov1943 states the total personnel for Bena Force as 1105, AWM 54 1/5/42.

187

account the families of those carriers or other groups of indigenous people who lived in the

region, especially along the Ramu River valley.663 Establishing and maintaining a working relationship with the indigenous population was thus a primary concern. Yet that relationship

was to be a complicated one, determined very much by colonial-era patronising and racist

attitudes, perceived threats from indigenous cooperation with the Japanese, and the attitudes

of specific groups of indigenous people.

The Chimbu who lived in the high country in the direction of Mount Hagen were in

almost all cases friendly and accommodating to Bena Force. They provided most of the

carrying parties and labourers. This was not the case, however, with the indigenous people

who lived along the Ramu River. Patrols in that area frequently reported locals to be hostile

and in the opinion of Australian sources, ‘treacherous’.664 There was a spirit of unrest through

the district and clashes occurred with Australian troops in which indigenous people were killed.665 On 11 July, for example, two Australians were killed and mutilated by an enemy

patrol consisting of Japanese and Kaigulin people. It was suspected by the Australians that

the Kaigulin were responsible for the mutilation.666 Retaliation against the indigenous people

was harsh, such as for example when the villages of indigenous people who had stolen rifles

from the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU) were burned down.667 The

commander of Bena Force, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas ‘Fergus’ MacAdie, advocated the

public hanging of any indigenous people caught guiding the Japanese.668 Further the

663Bena Force, War Diary Jun to Jul1943, Appendix 7 to War Diary 30 Jul43, AWM 54 1/5/42. 664 Bena Force, patrol reports, AWM 54 1/5/42; Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 241. 665 Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 241; Bena Force war diaries Jun to Nov43 recount several incidents when patrols fired killing and wounding indigenous personnel, such as for example as reports of 12 Aug, 18 Sept and 20 Sept. Reports such as that of 30 Jul 43 in which it was stated that ‘any kanaka seen was shot immediately’ and Dexter’s comment that he shot first and asked questions later implies that killing indigenous personnel was far more common than recorded in the War Diary records, AWM 54 1/5/42. 666 Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 244. It was presumed that the indigenous personnel with the Japanese had mutilated the dead, not the Japanese. 667 Bena Force, patrol reports, AWM 54 1/5/42; Bena Force, Jun to Jul1943, 30 Jul43, AWM 54 1/5/42. ANGAU was a civil administration organisation responsible for the administration of the populations of Papua and the mandated territories of New Guinea. During the war is member held military rank. 668 Bena Force, Jun to Jul1943, Progress Report Bena Force 21 Jul43, AWM 54 1/5/42.

188

treatment of indigenous people outside the immediate control of Australian forces was

fundamentally unlawful, with some being shot first, with questions asked later. This was at

the time thought to be the most effective means of curtailing any indigenous desire to assist

the Japanese.669 The brutal treatment of indigenous people by Australian troops has been

well documented by Ken Inglis in ‘War, Race and Loyalty in New Guinea, 1939-1945’,

Emma Rogerson in ‘The “Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels”: looking beyond the myth’ and

‘Remembering Australia’ Wars: Hangings of Papua New Guineans by Australian Soldiers in

WWII Complicate our National Narratives’ by and Kirstie Stead. 670 It is noteworthy that

Inglis, Rogerson and Stead indicate that the behaviour of the Independent Companies in this

regard was not unique.

On 5 September 1943 a U.S. parachute infantry force dropped onto Nadzab securing the site for the expansion of airfields. This enabled 7th Division to begin flying in troops for the assault on Lae. As noted, this forced the Japanese to abandon any plans to attack the

Bena-Bena plateau and brought to an end the denial phase of the Bena Force operation. The focus for Bena Force then changed to that of providing probing reconnaissance and flank security in support of 7th Division, as it began to move on the Japanese in the Markham and

Ramu River Valleys. The subsequent campaign of the Commandos (as the Companies were

retitled in October 1943), in the Ramu River Valley was one in which they operated in the role of ‘Jungle Cavalry’. Patrolling ceaselessly, 2/2nd, 2/7th and later 2/6th Commando

Squadrons protected 7th Division line of communication from Japanese interference.

Sometimes required to adopt a static role, such as occupying a prominent feature, the

669 Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 246; Bena Force, Jun to Jul1943, Appendix 7 to War Diary 30 Jul43, AWM 54 1/5/42. 670 K.S. Inglis, ‘War, Race and Loyalty in New Guinea, 1939-1945’, pp. 503-30 in Inglis, K.S (ed.), The History of Melanesia - 2nd Waigani Seminar, The University of Papua New Guinea-The Research School of Pacific Studies The Australian National University, 1968; E. Rogerson, ‘The “Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels”: looking beyond the myth’, Australian War Memorial, SVSS paper, 2012; K.C. Stead – B. a. V, ‘Remembering Australia’ Wars: Hangings of Papua New Guineans by Australian Soldiers in WWII Complicate our National Narratives’, , accessed 12 Dec 2017.

189

companies nonetheless searched constantly for signs of the enemy.671 These patrols were

both ‘extensive and deep’ and paid particular attention to topography, especially timbered

areas’ that might conceal small parties of the enemy. Japanese troops were encountered at

times, especially in December when ‘C’ Troop of 2/6th Commando Squadron was attacked

repeatedly by strong Japanese forces.672

Plate 9: The Central Highlands 1943, the red line showing the areas in which Bena Force

operated. The map also indicates Kaiapit.673

A mapping of the experiences of Independent Companies during 1943 cannot conclude without mention of the actions of 2/6th Independent Company on the Bena-Bena

671 2/6 Commando Squadron Diary, Oct to Dec 1943, AWM52 2/2/58. 672 2/6 Commando Squadron Diary, Dec 1943, AWM52 2/2/58. 673 Map: Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p.235.

190

plateau from January to June 1943, and at Kaiapit on 19-20 September. In both instances, thus

sub-unit clearly reflected the operational dexterity and versatility of the Independent

Companies. On 24 December 1942, shortly after the Company had emerged from its trials at

Buna 12 men were detailed to proceed to the Bena Bena plateau. Their mission was to hunt

down and apprehend ‘alien’, that is German, missionaries who had been assisting the

Japanese in the area. The patrol was to operate alone and did so for six months. During this

extended deployment the patrol lost one man killed in action, betrayed by a German

missionary to the Japanese. In addition to its main task 2/6th Independent Company’s Bena-

Bena patrol provided New Guinea Force with valuable track reports and information on the

movement of Japanese troops in the area.674 The Bena-Bena Patrol was an example of how an

Independent Company sub-unit, trained in patrolling techniques with the capacity to operate

autonomously and efficiently in a jungle environment, could operate effectively and

independently. This was something that could not be expected from a conventional unit in the

conditions and circumstances in which the operation occurred.

The battle of Kaiapit, 19-20 September 1943, was an example of how an Independent

Company, as a self-sufficient and autonomous sub unit, could be detached from the main

force, and sent out some distance from that force as a spearhead to capture a strategic

objective. At this time 2/6th Independent Company was attached to 7th Division. The divisional plan was to seize a disused airstrip at Kaiapit which lay ahead on its axis of advance to the Markham and Ramu River Valleys. Once secured, Kaiapit would act as a concentration point for 21 and 25 Brigades, and provide a jumping-off point for the division’s move into the Markham Valley.675 The commander of 7th Divison, Major General Vasey, had told the Company he intended to use it as ‘Cavalry’, to capture the airfield at Kaiapit, and

674 Trigellis-Smith, The Purple Devils, pp. 127-42; 2/6 Independent Company War Diary, 26 Dec 42, AWM52 25/3/6/5, 675 7 Australian Division General Staff Branch (7 Aust Div GS Branch) Sept 1943, 7 Aust Div Operation Instr No.6, AWM52 1/5/14.

191

then under the guidance of an American engineer officer who would be flown in by light

plane, to repair the 1,200-yard airstrip.676 It was to be a classic ‘bite and hold’ operation to seize and secure a strategic objective. The role it was to play was well understood by 2/6th

Independent Company, aware that by succeeding regular infantry battalions within the

division would be relieved.677

The planning for the attack was speculative. There was no real knowledge at 7th

Division of Japanese forces in the area. Nonetheless 2/6th Independent Company was to be

sent out far in front of the main force, beyond artillery range and the ability of any other unit

in to support it. A sense of urgency prevailed, however, and although Vasey would later

concede he had acted impetuously, he issued orders and the company set forth.678 On 17

September, after waiting three frustrating days in Port Moresby for the weather to clear, the

Company was flown to Leron, sixteen kilometres from Kaiapit.679 There it linked with a

Company of a Papuan Infantry Battalion that had moved to the area with orders to come

under the command of the Company.680 With each man carrying 60lbs of equipment, as well

as ammunition, the Company undertook an arduous ten-hour march to Kaiapit, arriving in the

afternoon of 19 September.681 At Kaiapit the combined Australian-Papuan force found that there were 65 Japanese troops in Kaiapit, being a mixture of headquarters troops and

infantry.682 Further Japanese troops had been ordered to Kaiapit to prepare to attack Allied

676 Ibid. 677 2/6 Commando Squadron War Diary, 1943 – 1944, AWM52 2/2/58. 678 Vasey stated after the action at Kaiapit that he had made a mistake sending 2/6th Independent Company out so far in front of the main force. He took this as a lesson learned, and noted not to do such a thing again, see: Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 426; Dexter on the same page makes the point that if the advance of the Japanese 78 Infantry Regiment towards Kaiapit had been known 2/6th Independent Company and its attached PIB platoon would not have been despatched on the mission. 679 Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, pp. 414-15; 2/6 Commando Squadron War Diary, Aug to Sept 1943, 5 Sept, AWM52 2/2/58. 680 7 Australian Division General Staff Branch (7 Aust Div GS Branch) Sept 1943, 7 Aust Div Operation Instr No.6, AWM52 1/5/14. 681 2/6 Australian Independent Coy Report on action Kaiapit 19, 20, 21 Sept 1943, AWM54 595/7/14. 682 ATIS SWPA Bulletins Nos 426-455 27 Sept to 13 Oct1943, Bulletin 434 13 Oct 43, Item 3, 4825, AWM55 1/6.

192

forces at Nadzab, part of the anticipated three-pronged major attack against the Bena-Bena

Plateau, but these had not yet arrived.683

Kaiapit was in fact made up of three villages, titled on maps and in all correspondence

related to the battle as No.1, No. 2, and No. 3 Village. This was all overlooked by the high

ground of what was called Mission Hill, because of a Lutheran Mission hut in this location.

At 3.50 p.m. 19 September a platoon of 2/6th Independent Company, under the command of

Captain Gordon King, commenced its attack. In a short, sharp fight that lasted about 10 minutes the Japanese defenders were overcome with 30 killed and the survivors fleeing.684

By 5 p.m. the rest of the company had come up and a defensive perimeter had been

established. During the night, six to 10 more Japanese were killed as they attempted to probe

the company’s perimeter. An indigenous man carrying a note to what he thought was the

Japanese garrison of Kaiapit was also killed.685 At approximately 6.30 a.m., on 20

September, the Japanese launched a coordinated counter-attack with an estimated 500 troops

on the North West perimeter of Company’s position.686

Throughout the assault the Japanese came on with ‘a hell of a lot of firing … and

shouting’. 687 Despite the noise generated by the Japanese, Australian accounts noted that there was very little offensive spirit exhibited. It was later speculated that this was because

683 The Japanese attack on the Bena Plateau and Nadzab was to be conducted by three battalions, one from the East at Kaiapit, one from the North and one from the North East. The defeat at Kaiapit ruined the plan. See: ATIS SWPA Bulletins Nos 426-455 27 Sept to 13 Oct1943, Bulletin 432 29 Sept, Item 1, 4420, AWM55 1/6; 2/6 Commando Company War Diary Aug to Sept 1943, AWM52 2/2/56. 684 2/6 Australian Independent Coy Report on action Kaiapit 19, 20, 21 Sept 1943, AWM54 595/7/14; 2/6 Commando Squadron War Diary 1943-1944, AWM52 2/2/58. 685 The note carried by the indigenous man was written in Japanese and of no immediate use to 2/6th Independent Company. When translated later it read, ‘we believe there are friendly troops in Kaiapit, if so how many and what units’. See: 2/6 Australian Independent Coy Report on action Kaiapit 19, 20, 21 Sept 1943, AWM54 595/7/14; 2/6 Commando Squadron War Diary Aug to Sept 1943, AWM52 2/2/58. 686 The Japanese force which attacked Kaiapit consisted of 8 and 9 Companies of the 3rd Battalion 78 Infantry Regiment, one machinegun platoon, one section of signals and one platoon of 37 Independent Engineer Company, see: AWM54 423/4/33; Captured documents – Translations Japanese Operation Order (Literal Translation) notes on translation – Gazatteer [sic] of place names mentioned. Captured Kaiapit – revealed the intentions of 78 Regt 20 Division to attack Allied Forces in Nadzab Area; 2/6 Commando Squadron War Diary, Oct1943, AWM52 2/2/58. 687 2/6 Australian Independent Coy Report on action Kaiapit 19, 20, 21 Sept 1943, AWM52 2/2/58; 2/6 Commando Squadron War Diary Oct1943, AWM54 595/7/14.

193

the Japanese had just finished an exhausting night march, and that they were ignorant of the

country in which they found themselves.688 Whatever the cause, this lack of drive by the

Japanese was countered by the Company employing what it called ‘decisive offensive

tactics’.689 ‘C’ Platoon immediately counter-attacked driving the Japanese back on No. 3

Village. Meanwhile ‘A’ platoon pushed the Japanese in front of it out into the Kunai grass

surrounding Kaiapit. At the same time ‘C’ Platoon, temporarily held up at No.3 Village due

to a shortage of ammunition, was soon resupplied with munitions carried forward by Papuan troops.690 The platoon then broke through Japanese positions and drove them back into the

Kunai and Pit Pit grass.691 During this assault, which covered some 300 metres, it is

estimated that 100 Japanese were killed, including their commander, Major Yonekura. While

this fighting had been going on a section from ‘A’ Platoon had made its way up onto Mission

Hill overcoming more Japanese encountered on the way. The section now with an

uninterrupted view proceeded to assist and direct the efforts of ‘A’ and ‘C’ Platoons.

The battle had been going for about half an hour when ‘C’ Platoon overran three

Japanese machinegun posts and pushed on to link up with ‘A’ Platoon to their right flank. ‘B’

platoon, which had been in reserve, was then released and cleared the area around the airstrip,

and from the airstrip to the villages, killing 40 more Japanese without loss to themselves.692

By that time the Japanese had become completely demoralised and they fled, dumping their

gear in an attempt to crawl away through the Kunai.693 Such was the impact of 2/6th

Independent Company’s ‘decisive offensive tactics’ that a Japanese sergeant present at

688 Ibid. 689 2/6 Commando Squadron War Diary 1943-1944, AWM52 2/2/58. 690 Kunai is waist-high wild grass. 691 Pit-Pit is very tall wild grass. 692 Trigellis-Smith, The Purple Devils, pp. 161-184, gives a comprehensive blow-by-blow account of the battle at Kaiapit. 693 2/6 Australian Independent Coy Report on action Kaiapit 19, 20, 21 Sept 1943, AWM54 595/7/14; Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 421.

194

Kaiapit, and captured later, said that Japanese troops fled from what they feared was a flank

attack by 300 paratroopers.694 By 10 a.m. only dead and dying Japanese remained.

In keeping with the tight schedule that had been conceived for 2/6th Independent

Company’s operation, at 12.50 p.m. the expected U.S. Army Engineer arrived by light plane

and began work on the airstrip, which had to be ready by 11 a.m the next day. Throughout

the afternoon several Japanese were killed when they entered Kaiapit apparently with no

knowledge of what had occurred. For the total loss of 13 killed and 23 wounded, 2/6th

Independent Company had killed some 143 Japanese, with indications that at least fifty more

had fallen. A very large amount of Japanese documents, weapons and equipment was

captured also. Kaiapit had been secured, and 2/6th Independent Company had won an

outstanding victory, demonstrably assisting 7th Division achieve a strategic objective. The

victory of 2/6th Independent Company was a decisive point in both the progress of 7th

Division’s move on Lae, and Japanese plans to capture the Bena-Bena Plateau. The quick

capture of Kaipit enabled 7th Division to fly its troops forward and hasten its advance

towards Lae and the Markham Valley.695 On the other side of the coin the Japanese force

destroyed at Kaiapit had been one part of the planned Japanese offensive against the Bena-

Bena plateau and its defeat had ruined those plans. The defeat also caused the Japanese to

abandon defensive positions which had been established to delay 7th Division’s advance

towards Lae.696 The commander of US Fifth Air Force, General George Kenney, was so

pleased with the Company’s capture of Kaiapit that he offered the company a plane load of

anything they wanted. Lists were subsequently made up and sent.697 The action at Kaiapit

694 2/6 Australian Independent Coy Report on action Kaiapit 19, 20, 21 Sept 1943, AWM54 595/7/14. 695 Dean, Australia 1943: The Liberation of New Guinea, p. 238. 696 Bottrell, Cameos of Commandos, p. 45; M. Uren, A Thousand Men at War – A History of the 2/16th Australian Infantry Battalion 2AIF, Australian Military History Publications, Loftus, 2009, p. 198; Frank Sublet in F. Sublet, Whatever Man Dares, Kokoda Press, Surry Hills, 2013, p. 190, mentions finding Japanese defensive positions abandoned and credits this to the Japanese having been thrown off balance by 2/6th Independent Company’s victory at Kaiapit. 697 2/6 Commando Squadron War Diary, Aug to Sept 1943, AMW52 2/2/58.

195

illustrated the versatility of what an experienced and well-led Independent Company could achieve, as well as the valuable role such a company could play in the broader aspects of operations.

Taken in total the year 1943 was the apogee of the ‘Independent Phase’ of the

Independent Companies during World War 2. At no other time during the war were the

Companies tasked with missions that were as strategically significant as those they were given during 1943. At no other time during the war, with the single exception of 2/8th

Commando squadron on Bougainville in 1945, were the companies granted the degree of autonomy to operate commensurate with the manner in which they had been trained. The operations of 2/3rd Independent Company through late April to August along Bobdubi Ridge and the Japanese lines of communication during the Salamaua campaign, were the classic example of an Independent Company being allowed the latitude it needed to achieve its objectives. In so doing the Company contributed decisively to the overall strategic objectives of main force operations. Additionally the Independent Companies of Bena Force, operating on circa 100-kilometre front with only 500 personnel, was very much a classic case of economy of force. This was in line with the Army’s strategic policy of the time to commit

‘the minimum number of troops in forward areas’.698 With this relatively small force Bena

Force protected a vital strategic asset thus contributing to the overall strategic objectives of the Army in New Guinea during 1943. At the same time the use of 2/6th Independent

Company to ‘bite and hold’ Kaiapit was an astute, even if impetuous, use of an autonomous sub-unit to seize a strategically important feature. All three cases illustrated how, by 1943, the Army was prepared to discard preconceived ideas, to adapt to the tactical and environmental realities that confronted it, and to acknowledge that Independent Companies provided a solution to some of the challenges it faced.

698 3 Australian Division General Staff Branch (3 Aust Div GS Branch), AWM52 1/5/4.

196

This mature, astute and perceptive understanding was a far cry from the clumsiness

which characterised the management of the Independent Companies during 1941, and the

uneven management of 1942. Despite these achievements, however, and despite elements

within the Army having grown attuned to the potential for employing Independent

Companies, 1943 also represented a time when the beginning of the end of the ‘Independent

Phase’ of operations began to manifest itself. Reacting to the changing nature of the war to

one of massed firepower and conventional assault, the Army’s overall interest in autonomous

unconventional sub-units waned just as they were proving their value. This changing military milieu would in 1944-45 result in a fundamental and radical reassessment of the Independent

Companies and lead to their transformation, and a new phase of the Australian ‘Commando’ experience.

Plate 10: Independent Company Operations New Guinea - Timor 1942-1943.

197

CHAPTER 7

ATHERTON

By 1944 the strategic situation facing Australia had changed dramatically. The threat

of a Japanese invasion of the mainland had long since passed, and US forces under the

command of General MacArthur had begun to plan and prepare for the invasion of the

Philippines. Australian forces, however, were not to participate in MacArthur’s return to the

Philippines, leaving the Australian army searching for a meaningful role to play. Thus during

1944 the majority of the Army, including all but one of Australia’s Commando Squadrons,

was relegated from front line service to the training grounds of the Atherton Tablelands, in

Northern Queensland. It was during this period of enforced passivity that the Army moved

away from the Independent Company model and redefined its concept of ‘commando’. In

doing so it formulated a set of guidelines for the use of commandos and employed these

operationally. It would be another key moment in the Australian Army’s Independent

Company/Commando experience.

During 1944 and through 1945, while the Army never formally announced it had a commando doctrine, and no field manuals were produced, considerable thought had gone into formulating a theory of the functions of commandos within the Army. The conclusions were written down and promulgated in official correspondence. The redefined concept was thus in

every respect a meaningful new doctrine and it was a radical departure from the previous

absence of any such set of guidelines and the manner in which the Independent Companies

had operated in 1943.

At their inception the Independent Companies had been characterised by voluntary

enlistment, unorthodox tactical training, adaptive small and very small unit tactics, and very

limited formal contact with other Army sub-units. The ‘commando doctrine’ of 1944 ended

198

voluntary enlistment, concentrated on orthodox combined arms tactics at troop and squadron

level, and maintained close liaison with other army sub-units. The first step towards this

change occurred when in September 1943, the Army decided that the Independent

Companies would officially be retitled ‘Commando’. On 3 July 1943 an instruction was

issued which changed the name of the Independent Companies to Commando Squadrons,

although the actual change did not occur officially until 17 February 1944.699

During 1942 and 1943, the term ‘commando’ had been used more and more to describe the actions of the Independent Companies.700 Indeed the term Commando was a

much-used epithet in Australian newspapers during early 1942 in relation to the activities of

the Independent Companies.701 Multiple press releases referred to 2/2nd Independent

Company on Timor, for example, as commandos.702 In March 1942, the Commander-in-

Chief of the Australian Army, General Thomas Blamey, had referred to a ‘certain amount of commando training’ being instituted to inculcate an offensive spirit into the Army.703 Further

recognition in this direction was indicated by Independent Company soldiers on leave in

Australia being permitted to wear the title ‘Commando’ on their shoulder.704

699 2/7 Commando Regiment War Diary Jan to May 1944, 2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regiment Routine Orders, 17 Feb 44, AWM 52/2/52 Box 44. 700 Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 566fn. 701 Numerous Australian newspaper articles referred to the Australian Army training of ‘Commandos’ for example see: The Newcastle Sun, Tuesday 10 Feb 1942, p. 1; The Telegraph, Tuesday 10 Feb 1942, p. 3; The Advertiser, Wednesday 11 Feb 1942, p. 3; The Argus, Wednesday 11 Feb 1942, p. 2; Cairns Post, Wednesday 11 Feb 1942, p. 4; The West Australian, Wednesday 11 Feb 1942, p 4; Advocate, Wednesday 11 Feb 1942, p. 2. The Raid on Salamaua in Jun 1942 provided further opportunity for newspapers to popularise commandos with numerous articles such as ‘Commandos Attack Japs in New Guinea Raid’, Adelaide News, Wednesday 1 Jul1942, p. 1, and ‘Commando Swoops on Salamaua’ The Armidale Express and New England General Advertiser, Wednesday 1 Jul1942, p. 4. 702 Damien Parer’s journey to Timor to film commandos was mentioned in ‘Filming the Timor Commandos, Cameraman's Story of Visit to Island’: The Age, Monday 4 Jan 1943, p. 3. The Timor commandos became a favourite with the press. Numerous reports extolled their activities, for example: Perth News Thursday 31 Dec 1942, p. 3; The Sydney Morning Herald, Thursday 31 Dec 1942, p. 4; National Advocate, Thursday 31 Dec 1942, p. 1; Warwick Daily News, Thursday 31 Dec 1942, p. 4; Lithgow Mercury, Thursday 31 Dec 1942, p. 5; The Age Thursday 31 Dec 1942, p. 3; The Argus, Thursday 31 Dec 1942, p. 12. 703 ‘General Blamey. A Stern Message."We Live or Die As Nation."’, The West Australian, Monday 30 Mar1942, p. 6. 704 Pinney to his Mother, Father and Maura, 13 Aug 1943, Papers of Peter Pinney Box 13, UQFL288, UQFL.

199

In the wider and public imagination free-ranging ‘commando’ units held a special appeal

with such groups celebrated for their ‘rapier like thrusts at the enemy.’705 In a reflection of

the extent to which the ideal of the ‘commando’ had permeated the popular consciousness by

1943 a piece in the Hobart Mercury commended Berger Paints for their ‘Commando

Toughness’ and for being ‘tough, weather fighting paint’.706 Another article in the Bowen

Independent referred to Queensland Boy Scouts instructing Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC)

members in their Boy Scout skills to assist the VDC in their ‘commando warfare’.707 Indeed by September 1942, some elements of the Australian Press were clamouring to have all soldiers trained as ‘commandos’.708 Blamey rebutted such notions dismissively retorting that

‘wars are not won by guerrilla bands’. General Blamey was not unaware of the work done by

unconventional units. He acknowledged the presence of such forces, for example Wingate

and the Long-Range Desert Group in North Africa. In the Australian context he was

supportive of commando forces for the Special Reconnaissance Department (SRD) and of the

formation of Kanga Force.709 It was thus apparent that Blamey discerned the capacity of such

units, yet this was not reflected in his attitude to Independent Companies within the AIF. His

statements regarding such units were critical and he did not exhibit an appreciation for their

tactics stating that guerrilla bands, the tactical style most associated with Independent

Companies, did not win wars. It is understandable that such an attitude could be expected

from a commander at Blamey’s level where his concerns were for the overall effectiveness of

the Army as a conventional organisation. Considering the value Independent Companies

705 ‘Commandos for Striking Power’, The Sun, Wed 9 Sep 1942, Page 4. 706 Mercury, Friday 12 Feb 1943, p. 5. 707 Bowen Independent, Friday 27 Mar1942, p. 4. 708 The Argus, Tuesday 8 Sept 1942, p. 2; The Telegraph, Tuesday 8 Sept 1942, p. 4; The Newcastle Sun, Tuesday 8 Sept 1942, p. 3; The Argus, Wednesday 9 Sept 1942, p. 2; The Telegraph, Monday 14 Sept 1942, p. 2; The Argus, Saturday 19 Sept 1942, p. 1; Western Mail, , p. 10; The Macleay Chronicle, Wednesday 25 Nov1942, p. 4. 709 Horner, D.M., Blamey The Commander in Chief, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1998, p.150; MacCarthy, South West Pacific Area First Year, p.86.

200

could add to the tactical conduct of operations does not appear to have been a consideration.

Such an attitude suggested the shape of things to come for the Independent Companies.710

Despite its popularity there was no consensus on the interpretation of the title

‘commando’. It could be used to mean either a unit or an individual soldier.711 Some understood that ‘Commando’ referred to a specially trained military force that cooperated with the navy but fought on land, very much the British model.712 Alternatively captain

David Dexter of the 2/2nd Independent Company considered that ‘Commando’ in the

Australian context was akin to the Boer Commandos, with their collective spirit, living and

sharing everything, skill with arms and casual reference to rank, rather than the formalised

British Commandos conception.713

The title ‘Commando’ had a decided negative undertone for others, especially those

intimately affected by the title change. Dislike of the term was not a new phenomenon. In

January 1942 several newspapers reported that the name ‘commando’ was not popular with

Australian troops as it was considered that what ‘commandos’ did was what typical

Australian troops did as part of their normal duties.714 Opposition to the term ‘commando’ was particularly strong within the Independent Companies themselves. The opinion within the Companies was that the name commando was ‘unfortunate’, a polite euphemism for what was in fact significant resentment.715

The reasons for this were mixed. On one hand, there was a perception that the name commando implied an elite soldier. Such an idea apparently offended the egalitarian

710 ‘General Blamey’s Report’, The Sydney Morning Herald, Wednesday 16 Sept 1942, p. 6. 711 American Speech, Vol. XIX, Apr 1944, Number 2, p. 90. American Speech was a journal published during the 1940s. 712 ‘Francis Drake Would have Loved Them: Exploits of Commandos: Nicknamed Churchill's Marines’, The Australasian, Sat 5 Sep 1942, p. 10. 713 David Dexter interviewed by Mel Pratt for the Mel Pratt collection [sound recording] 25 Aug – 21 Sept 1976, , accessed 14 Jul2016. 714 The Mercury, Friday 9 Jan 1942, p. 1; The Age, Friday 9 Jan 1942, p. 1; The Sydney Morning Herald, Friday 9 Jan 1942, p. 8. 715 Report on Operations – Covering period Sept 1943 to Mar1944 2/6 Aust Commando Sqd Markham – Ramu Valley Campaign Part 1, AWM54 595/7/13.

201

sensibilities of Australian Independent Company soldiers who saw themselves as ‘merely a

cross section of the Australian army’.716 This feeling was overlayed contradictorily with the perception amongst at least some Independent Company soldiers that they were indeed

‘elite’.717 Some Independent Company members described their image of the commando as

‘a blatant, dirty, unshaven, loudmouthed fellow covered with knives and knuckledusters’.718

Dexter, in a more reflective mood, commented that the problem was that the term

‘commando’ was alien to the Australian Army.719 Underlining this was that there was in fact

a difference between British Commando operational practice and its Australian equivalent.

Jack Arden of 2/3rd Independent Company recognised this, stating that the operational style

of commandos of the British type was to inflict as much damage as possible and withdraw

immediately, which was certainly true up until early 1943. Arden compared this to

Independent Companies which remained in the field operating within the same general area

and continued to harass the enemy.720

While the Army managed with varying degrees of effectiveness the diverse

operational requirements of the Independent Companies during 1942 and 1943, it did so

without much evidence of any ongoing assimilation of the lessons of unconventional warfare

at an institutional level. At the local level, among a limited number of senior commanders

such as Savige during the Salamaua campaign, also Lieutenant General Iven MacKay who as

Commander of New Guinea Force until May 1943 with Bena Force, and Vasey at Kaiapit,

716 Ibid. 717 John Arden, ‘Jack’, p. 39, infers the elite status of the Independent Companies by comparing the management of other elite forces with what he deemed the ‘rough’ handling of the Independent Companies; Ron Garland, a Captain with 2/3rd Commando Squadron, recalled that during the Squadron’s time training on the Atherton Tableland it was only the thought amongst the veteran commandos that ‘other units were worse off … when it came to combat experience’, which assisted them to endure the routine and tedium. This attitude indicated that despite their protestations that they were ‘merely a cross section of the Australian army’, they did indeed think of themselves as superior to other troops. See: Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 330. 718 Report on Operations – Covering period Sept 1943 to Mar1944 2/6 Aust Commando Sqd Markham – Ramu Valley Campaign Part 1, AWM54 595/7/13. 719 Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 565. 720 Arden, ‘Jack’, p. 46.

202

there was an understanding of how to best employ Independent Companies. This, however,

was not reflected in wider operational doctrine of the Army. While valid during 1943 the

appropriateness of such appreciations, supported as they were by the opinions of individual

commanders, became, from the Army’s perspective, arguably less practical as the war

progressed. As noted in Chapter 6, by 1944 the war in New Guinea had physically moved out

of the forbidding forested mountain ranges of the hinterland, which favoured small unit

actions, and was being fought along the coast where the country was much less forbidding. In

this environment manoeuvring large formations supported by the heavy use of artillery, air

power and tanks became the new standard. The war became one of employing overwhelming

firepower rather than a war of small units, platoons and companies. In this new context the

Army determined that there was no place for small independent sub-units.721 Blamey articulated this attitude when he determined in May 1945 that partisan warfare, as he called it, was the preserve of Allied Intelligence Bureau and ANGAU, not regular Australian Military forces.722

The newly defined doctrine for the commandos stated that it was to be one of close

reconnaissance for the infantry division.723 The functions of Commandos were to be, dismounted reconnaissance in support of larger formations, seizing ground and holding for limited periods, long range Independent patrols, and special missions724 Commandos were

721 Keating, The Right Man for the Right Job, p. 99; An example of how the Army’s concept of war had evolved is the Mar1945 planning for Operation Seagull. In this Operation, which despite the voluminous amount of staff work it generated never did occur, the Army planned to allocate 216,000 artillery shells, 121 combat aircraft, amphibious tanks, a parachute battalion and a naval bombardment to achieve its ends, see: Operational Seagull, AWM54 945/7/1 Part 1 and Part 14. 722 Blamey to Chifley, 18 May 1945 – Appreciation on Operations of the AMF in New Guinea, New Britain and the Solomon Islands – 13 May 45, AWM 3DRL/6643. The Allied Intelligence Bureau was a multi-service joint United States, Australian, Dutch and British intelligence and special operations agency. Its role was to gather intelligence, conduct guerrilla warfare behind Japanese lines, often by recruiting local people, and conduct limited commando raids. 723 Organisation of Indep Coys, 2 Aust Corps 20 Jun 43, AWM 52/2/52 BOX 44; 2/7 Commando Regiment Outline War Diary Jun to Dec 1943, Australian Military Forces, Organisation - A Cav Commando Regt, 2 Aust Corps, 19 Jul43, MP729/6 37/401/1714, NAA. 724 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary, 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary, Aug to Sept 1944 in 2/6 Cav Commando Regiment Appendices, AWM 52/2/51 Box 40.

203

also required to train in sabotage and ‘commando’ tactics.725 The reference to ‘Long Range

Independent Patrols’, ‘Special Missions’ and ‘commando tactics’ indicates that there was still

a residual appreciation of the unique attributes of Commandos.

In practice, however, these references meant nothing. The Army no longer had any intention of allowing its commandos to embark on missions that were not under the direct control of higher authority. Apart from a single squadron during the Bougainville Campaign of 1945, the Army did not engage the Commandos in any long-range independent patrols,

special missions or commando tactics during 1944-1945. Commandos were rather employed

as well-trained light infantry; designed to provide close support, reconnaissance, vanguard

and flank protection to larger formations.

The British army had a long tradition of employing light infantry to support larger

formations, and the role of light infantry was a well understood within the British, and thus

Australian, military milieu.726 Thus it was not difficult for the Australian Army to assimilate

the concept. A mark of the Army’s approval of the new Commando idea was that in late 1943

it increased the number of Commando Squadrons from eight to eleven. The reason for this

expansion in numbers of the squadrons is not apparent due to the lack of documentary

evidence explaining it. It can be surmised that the increase in numbers was to allow an

allocation of three squadrons to each of the re-organised Jungle warfare infantry Divisions.

Even this though is problematic as two squadrons, the 2/2nd and 2/8th were not allocated to

infantry Divisions. A further aspect of the increased commando numbers, was that by using

the term ‘commando’ the Army had in fact created an illusion that it was fostering special

forces, while simultaneously redefining the role of Commandos away from a specialist

unconventional role. This was in effect a subterfuge, which presented an image, which

725 2/7 Commando Regiment Outline War Diary Jun to Dec 1943, O.C. Coys 2 Aust Corps L.H.Q/ (Via) 2 Aust Corps Training 19 Jun 1943, AWM 52/2/52 Box 44. 726 See: D. Gates, The British Light Infantry Arm c.1790-1815, B.T. Batsford Ltd, London, 1987.

204

certainly had a positive public appeal, but had in reality very little connection with the

Army’s unconventional warfare capabilities.

A further signpost that the Army was finished with the Independent Company ethos by 1944 was that the practice of voluntary enlistment for the Independent Companies was ended. Voluntarism had been a fundamental aspect of the original Independent Company recruitment process, but this would not be under new Commando conceptions. On 23

February 1944 Army Headquarters posted a notice that stated: ‘Reinforcements will not be provided by Volunteers but provided in the normal manner.’727 It was also stated that the

number of reinforcements for the Commando Squadrons would not exceed 50 per month.

Significantly, the decision to do so was made by Blamey himself and indicated that at the highest levels the practice of Independent Company/Commando voluntarism found no

favour.728

The reasons for this were not necessarily any deep-seated antipathy to the idea of voluntary recruitment, but instead reflected the practical necessities of the time. The management of the allocation of manpower to service the various needs of the military and the national economy was an ongoing challenge throughout the later war years. At the time

Australia’s total manpower pool was 3,200,000.729 Of these 1,000,000 were directly engaged

in the war effort either as members of the military or services directly associated with

maintaining the military.730 During 1943 the Army was required to recruit 10,000 per month to maintain its operational capabilities.731 This was however not being achieved with

727 Reinforcement Training Indepenant [sic] Companies Aust Cav Commando Trg Sqn & Aust Cav Commando Regt, MP742 96/1/814, NAA. 728 Ibid. 729 S.J. Butlin, C.B. Schedvin, War Economy 1942-1945, Australia in the War 1939-1945, Civil, Series 4, Vol. IV, Australian War Memorial, 1977, p. 348. 730 Ibid. 731 Ibid., p. 355.

205

recruitment being one third below the target by June 1943.732 By the end of 1943, at the time

when the Independent Companies had transformed into Commando Squadrons, the Army,

against its wishes, continued to be compelled by the Federal Manpower directorate to release

personnel for the civilian economy.733 The pressure this created during the later war years

was relentless, with 18,128 troops being lost to the civilian economy by June 1944 and a

demand for a further 40,000 in October 1944 only being prevented by Blamey’s determined

protests.734

The reduction in Army manpower from October 1943 until April 1945 amounted to

78,000 through normal releases and 44,000 due to Manpower Directorate requirements. In

that period overall Army manpower reduced by 25 per cent.735 Blamey linked the

maintenance of the Army’s manpower directly to strategic policy, and strongly resisted every

attempt by the Manpower Directorate to reallocate Army personnel to the civilian

economy.736 In such circumstances it is unsurprising that voluntary enlistment for the

Commandos, which by its very nature directly competed with the capacity of the Army to

allocate its diminished manpower resource as it wished, was ended. Individuals who were

part of the replacement pool could still volunteer for Commando service subject to the

limitation on volunteer recruitment numbers, but the original system of volunteering from

outside the official Army recruitment system no longer applied.

Ending voluntary recruitment ensured that the management of Commandos would

remain firmly under the Army’s administrative control; it did little, however, to ensure that

replacements for Commando squadrons were suitable. Many of those who came to the

Squadrons for Commando training disappointed ‘the old guard’ who considered such

732 Ibid., p. 357. 733 Ibid., p. 381. 734 Ibid., p. 387; P. J. Dean (ed), Australia 1944-1945, Victory in the Pacific, Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 19. 735 Long, The Final Campaigns, p. 391. 736 Dean, Australia 1944-1945 Victory in the Pacific, p. 19.

206

personnel to be mere passengers and an impediment to their operational capacity.737 Recruits

arrived with no knowledge of the units they were joining.738 The medical status and level of

basic training and capacity of such recruits to look after themselves both in the field gave

cause for concern.739 Some suspected that a number of recruits were more interested in the

associated glamour of the name ‘commando’ than in actually serving in that capacity.740 Peter

Pinney of 2/3rd Independent Company alluded to this when in a letter to his parents he wrote,

‘we are now officially called Commandos, but it’s just a farce to get the suckers to come in as reinforcements.’741 Despite the difficulties it imposed on the Commando Squadrons the new

recruitment process persisted. It well demonstrated that Commandos were now

unquestionably part of the wider Army and were to be managed and administered no

differently from any other unit. The exceptionalism of the Independent Companies was ended.

The organisational structure of the Independent Companies/Commandos also altered

with the formation of Cavalry Commando Regiments. On 4 April 1943 General Officer

Commanding the 7th Division Major General George Vasey received instructions to disband

the 7th Division Cavalry Regiment, for which there was no use in New Guinea, and to raise

the 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment. The idea was to create an administrative centre to

manage future Commando Squadrons. Vasey’s capacity to do so was well established. Vasey

had in the past supported the establishment of Independent Companies and his appreciation

for unconventional operations was demonstrated when he helped to establish Kanga Force

and set up the Northern Australia Observer Force in early 1942.742 The date of April 1943 is

significant. It illustrates that official moves to end the Independent Companies were in place

737 Report on Operations – Covering period Sept 1943 to Mar1944 2/6 Aust Commando Sqd Markham – Ramu Valley Campaign Part 1, Section II – Lessons Learned During the Campaign, AWM54 595/7/13. 738 Ibid. 739 Ibid. 740 Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 566fn. 741 Pinney to Mother, 9 Oct1944, Papers of Peter Pinney, UQFL288 Box 8, UQFL. 742 Horner, D.M, General Vasey’s War, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1992, p.173-174.

207

in the early months of 1943, which implies that planning for such must have begun earlier.

The Army had never been comfortable with the concept of autonomous independent units.

The cancellation of the Independent Company training program back in 1941 attested to that.

In 1942 the only reason such companies existed was that in the desperate days of early 1942

they provided a pool of trained infantry to contribute to the defence of Australia. By the end

of 1942, however, the strategic situation had changed. The direct Japanese threat to Papua

had been defeated. As 1943 began the attention of the Army turned to taking the offensive to

the Japanese in New Guinea. In line with similar moves in Britain, at the same time to reduce

the independent character of their commandos, the Australian Army began to move towards

doing the same with its Independent Companies.743 Any changes which would be made

would not occur until late in 1943, but the initial moves to begin the process certainly began

prior to April 1943.

When 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment was formed there were at the time seven

Independent Companies, the 2/1st Independent Company not being reformed after its capture

in 1942. It was intended that the new regiment would be the home for three Commando

Squadrons, but as it transpired all seven Independent Companies, now Squadrons, were allocated to it. This was a premature and ad hoc decision. It soon became apparent that a single Regimental Headquarters could not possibly cope with seven Squadrons. This was the

equivalent of asking a single infantry battalion headquarters to manage seven rifle companies.

David Dexter, himself an officer in 2nd Commando Squadron, observed that ‘the situation

was very confused’.744 Two more Commando Regiments would eventually be raised, the

2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment on 2 December 1943, and the 2/9th Cavalry Commando

743 Minutes of Fourth Commanding Officers Conference Held at Brigade Headquarters, 15th Jan 43, The Papers of Major General Robert Laycock, Laycock 1/3, LHCMA. 744 Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 566n.

208

Regiment on 29 November 1943. The prefix ‘Cavalry’ denoted the heritage of the regiments

which had been formed from the administrative components of former cavalry regiments.

There, however, fortunately, was one bright spot amidst the confusion. The Army did

recognise that it needed to address the special requirements of the Commando Regiment. To

facilitate this, on 11 February 1944 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas ‘Fergus’ MacAdie was

appointed as General Staff Officer II Commando 1st Australian Corps.745 MacAdie had commanded Bena Force with distinction and was thoroughly conversant with special operations and the needs of commando-type formations. MacAdie’s role was to liaise with the Commando Regiments, when they were established, discuss issues with them and relay subsequent decisions and recommendations to his superiors. MacAdie’s appointment

indicated that the Army was aware that the knowledge and experience required to manage a

special force such as the Commandos required a degree of distinctiveness, and thus needed to

be managed accordingly. It was a move that paid a small acknowledgment to what the British

had understood from the beginning, i.e. that Commandos actually required a separate

command and coordination organisation. MacAdie’s appointment was as close as the

Australian Army would every get to the British model.

While their title had been changed to Commando, the squadrons still thought of themselves as Independent Companies. In August 1943 Lieutenant Colonel Hector Bastin,

Commanding Officer of 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment, gave a lecture in which he

referred to how the attributes of the Independent Company (and he used that term) reflected

the role and attributes of cavalry. Bastin listed the characteristics of cavalry as mobility,

dispersion, sword and surprise. He linked each characteristic directly to Independent

745 2/7 Commando Regiment War Diary Jan to May 1944, AWM 52/2/52 BOX 44.

209

Companies.746 It was apparent that men such as Bastin continued to apply the Independent

Company attributes to the formation he commanded, even though it was now formally a

Commando unit. The lingering identification with their Independent Company identity

presented challenges for the veteran Independent Company soldiers as they acclimatised to

their new status as Commandos.

Commando training within the Cavalry Commando Regiments reflected the

redefinition of the role of the Commandos within the Army. Gone was any concentration on

the unorthodox training that had characterised the training of the Independent Companies.

The new aim was to create a force of specially trained infantry capable of fighting as part of a

combined arms team in the line of battle, and to fulfil the role of close reconnaissance for

infantry divisions.747 The training programme was designed to concentrate on conventional

military skills, notable amongst which was drill and ‘smartness’.748 Nothing could more

emphasise the difference between the spirit of the Independent Companies and the

Commandos than this reversion to this traditional military milieu.

Drill, of course, constituted only part of the training regime. A three-week syllabus for the training of the Commando Squadron illustrates the other skills considered necessary. The first week involved weapon training, field craft (which bore no relation to the field craft training of earlier times), assault courses, route marching and swimming. The second week involved shooting on the range, section-level tactical training, river crossing, night patrols, compass reading and navigation by the stars. The third week involved more tactical training, patrolling and river crossings opposed and unopposed.749 The particulars of training which

received the most attention were shooting, with emphasis on the Bren gun, grenades,

746 2/7 Commando Regiment Outline War Diary Jun to Dec 1943; 2/7 Aust. Cav. (Commando) Regt. War Diary. Aug. Appendix 3. Functions of Cavalry. Lecture by CO, AWM 52/2/52 Box 44. 747 2/7 Commando Regiment Outline War Diary Jun to Dec 1943, O.C. Coys 2 Aust Corps L.H.Q/ (Via) 2 Aust Corps Training, 19 Jun 1943, AWM 52/2/52 Box 44. 748 Ibid. 749 2/9 Cavalry Commando Regiment Jan to May 1944, 2/9 Aust Cav (Commando) Training Instruction No.10 9 May 44, AWM52 2/2/53 BOX 45.

210

defending a perimeter, setting ambushes and hygiene/sanitation.750 Bayonet fighting was a

significant feature of the new syllabus, emphasising once again the reversion to the more

traditional combat style expected of the commandos.

The prior experience of the Independent Companies was considered by some to be a

disadvantage in regard to Commando training. The experience of 2/7th Commando Squadron

illustrates this well. According to Headquarters 16 Brigade, 2/7th Commando Squadron’s

tactical ability was not equal, in fact inferior, to other Commando Squadrons within the

Regiment.751 It is possible that after extensive independent service 2/7th Commando

Squadron, which had been on active service since October 1942, had lost its edge, but to

consider its tactical ability inferior to the novice 2/9th and 2/10th Commando Squadrons, is extraordinary. Such a judgment, however, needs to be assessed within the context of the new

Commando regime. Within that regime the expectations of Commandos bore no relation to the techniques which 2/7th Commando Squadron would have practised as an Independent

Company. It was thus necessary to retrain the squadron and bring it up to what was now

considered to be the appropriate military standard for a Commando squadron. The training

regime that was imposed on the squadron to achieve this included drill, route marches,

obstacle course, weapon training, training at section and troop level, and jungle training.752

Just what the Squadron could have been taught in regards to the skills of jungle warfare is

problematic, considering its extensive experience fighting in the jungles of New Guinea

throughout the latter months of 1942 and all of 1943. There are no specific details of just

what jungle training 2/7th Commando Squadron received as part of its remedial activties. A

jungle warfare centre had been established at Canungra, but Commando Squadron veterans of

750 2/9 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Jan to May1944, 2/9 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt Training Instruction No.7 13 Jan 44, AWM52 2/2/53 BOX 45. 751 2/6 Cav (Commando) Regiment Diar, 16 Aust Inf Bde Training Instruction No 9 of 26 May 44, AWM52/2/2/51. 752 2/6 Cav (Commando) Regiment Diary, 16 Aust Inf Bde Training Instruction No 9 of 26 May 44, AWM52/2/2/51.

211

the jungle considered that the training there was of little value, due to the fact that many of

the trainers had no or limited experience of jungle warfare.753 A jungle training school was

set up at Danbula by Lieutenant General Savige, which did employ jungle warfare veterans as

trainers, one of who was Garland, but the training at this centre was restricted to militia

battalions.754 Neither of these would have been much use to 2/7th Commando Squadron.

Typical of the crosscurrents within the Army with attitudes towards Commandos, the prior experience of Commando Squadrons was considered to be useful and valuable by some.

The 2/9th Cavalry Commando Regiment was composed of the newly raised 2/11th and 2/12th

Squadrons, neither of which had seen active service. In April 1944 they were joined by the

veteran 2/4th Commando Squadron. The Regimental Commanding Officer welcomed the new

Squadron, stating that the presence of the experienced officers and men would help

considerably with the training of the ‘foot cavalry’.755

A further example of the Army recognising the inherent experience and skills of the

veteran Commando Squadrons occurred on 23 September 1944, when 2/3rd Commando

Squadron was detailed to conduct a demonstration ambush for the command staff of 7th

Division. Present to witness the demonstration was the divisional commander, Major General

Edward Milford, his three brigadiers, and every battalion commander in the division. In this

exercise the Commandos fired live ammunition from one Bren gun and five Owen guns, and

used half-sticks of gelignite to simulate grenade explosions. Major General Milford expressed

complete satisfaction with the ambush and the principles demonstrated in conducting it.756 In

a later incident 2/7th Commando Squadron, now rehabilitated, was used as the ‘enemy’ for

753 Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 319 and p. 319; Ayris, All the Bull’s Men, pp. 390-1. 754 Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 319 and p. 330. 755 2/9 Cavalry Commando Regiment Jan to May 1944, C.O.’s Report and Comments on Month May 44, AWM52 2/2/53, Box 45; 2/9 Cavalry Commando Regiment Jun 1944, War Diary entry Jun 44, AWM52 2/2/53, Box 45. 756 2/3 Commando Squadron War Diary Sept to Oct1944, 23 Sept and OC Troop Orders 13 Sep 44 (Lake Euramoo Ambush), AWM52 2/2/55.

212

the novice 2/9th and 2/10th Squadrons to operate against.757 Further on 15 January 1945 2/5th

Commando Squadron conducted an ambush exercise for the ‘platoon command cadre’ of 21

Infantry Brigade. The object of the exercise was ‘to show the audience how it was done’.758

During training in May 1944, 2/4th Commando Squadron had provided instructors for the

other squadrons, advising them how to carry loads in the field.759 The type and degree of training that squadrons received was also influenced by their prior experience. In August

1944 Squadrons of 2/9th Cavalry Commando Regiment trained in how to conduct a section

attack. The novice 2/11th Squadron undertook two training sessions, the equally

inexperienced 2/12th Squadron three training sessions, and the veteran 2/4th Squadron only

one training session.760

Even though the idea of autonomy and independence was officially no longer part of

the Commando concept, squadrons were theoretically granted a degree of independence in

regards to conducting their own individual and tactical training. The rationale for this was that

as Regimental Headquarters were deemed to be non-operational, the headquarters would never deploy to command troops in the field. As such they would have nothing to offer the squadrons in this regard. The reality was, however, somewhat different. As in all armies superior headquarters feel compelled to issue orders, and subordinate units must comply with them. This was no different for the Commando Regiments. Regimental Headquarters issued numerous instructions for training and sports activities, and the redeployment of officers and non-commissioned officers which always superseded and disrupted squadron plans.761

757 2/6 Cav (Commando) Regiment Appendices Jul1944, 2/10 Commando Sqn War Diary Jul1944, AWM52/2/2/51 Box 39. 758 2/5 Commando Squadron War Diary Jan to Feb 1945, 21 Aust Inf Bde Pl Comd Cadre T.E.W.T and Ambush Demonstration 7 Jan 45, AWM52 2/2/57. 759 2/9 Cavalry Commando Regiment Jan to May 1944, 2/9 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt Training Instruction No.10 9 May 44, AWM52 2/2/53 Box 45. 760 2/9 Cavalry Commando Regiment Julto Aug 1944. 2/9 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt Training Instruction No.13 1 Aug 44, AWM52 2/2/53 Box 45. 761 Trigellis-Smith, The Purple Devils, pp. 213-15.

213

Various other impositions also interrupted the program of Commando Squadron

training. Work parties affected all the Regiments, often to the point of supplanting training

altogether. There was the necessity to construct camps and in these cases the only labour

available for that task was the Commandos themselves. During May 1944, 2/9th Commando

Squadron spent 23 days on such work parties building various parts of their camp. During this

time only a limited amount of commando training occurred, and only for those few not

engaged on work parties. On 11 May the squadron war diary, with an air of frustration

recorded: ‘Work parties as usual’.762 Church Parades and numerous sports days did at least

punctuate the work party tedium.763 On 7 May the troops of 2/6th Cavalry Commando

Regiment attended the cinema to watch three films; ‘On Parade’ which dealt with the benefit

of good drill; ‘Shoot to Kill’ which showed the value of holding one’s fire until the last moment; and ‘Jungle Warfare’ that showed the training at Canungra which all had experienced. Just what was learned from these films is questionable, with a note made by the

Regiment following the ‘Shoot Kill’ film stating that the first contact procedure shown in the film was incorrect, and therefore would not be used by the Regiment.764 A further challenge

for the Regiments that significantly affected the ability to conduct meaningful training was

that many personnel were on home leave during May 1944. The Army’s leave policy granted

24 days’ recreational leave to all personnel who had served twelve months in New Guinea.

Accumulated leave separate from and in excess of twenty-four days was also permitted. In

April 1944 a considerable number of Commando soldiers had such accumulated leave.765 It

762 2/6 Cav (Commando) Regiment May 1944, AWM52/2/2/51 Box 39. The training that did occur involved several sessions of bayonet training, map reading; sub-machinegun and Bren gun training; compass marching; mock combat between parties; and Observation Post reports. 763 During May 1944 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment played 9 Hockey games, 8 Australian Rules football games, 4 Rugby games and 1 Boxing match. See: 2/6 Cav (Commando) Regiment May 1944, AWM52/2/2/51 Box 39. 764 2/6 Cav (Commando) Regiment May 1944, AWM52/2/2/51 Box 39. 765 Leave Policy, AWM449/4/4.

214

was not until the end of June 1944 that 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment was returned to

near full strength.766

Distractions impacted directly on the number of Commandos available to train. At one

point, for example, 2/6th Commando Squadron had only 8 soldiers able to train while 116

were otherwise engaged.767 In a further and quite remarkable distraction some Commandos

were called out help the local farmers bring in their corn crops.768 Ceremonial parades at

divisional and brigade level also consumed significant amounts of time, with troops

rehearsing and being inspected prior to them. During July 1944 General Blamey visited the

Atherton Tableland, during which time he reviewed both the 6th and 9th Divisions at formal

ceremonial parades. The war diaries of 2/10th Commando Squadron and 2/9th Cavalry

Commando Regiment reported significant amounts of time being spent preparing prior to

General Blamey’s parades.769 Ceremonial parades also interrupted specific training programs.

On 21 June 1944, 2/9th Commando Squadron cut short a field training exercise by two days so it could return to camp and prepare for a brigade ceremonial parade.770 Regimental duties,

something new and in most cases unwelcome for the former Independent Company troops,

were a constant and frustrating distraction throughout this period.

A further factor which impacted on the value of the time devoted by the Commando

Squadrons at Atherton to training was the nature of the training exercises. The field exercises

conducted were often inconsistent in their intention and application. Some did not run for

766 2/6 Cav (Commando) Regimental War Diary May 1944, AWM52/2/2/51 Box 39. The 2/9th Cavalry Commando Regiment was unable to train effectively during Feb and Mar1944 because most of its personnel were on home leave and when the troops did return in Apr they were put onto work parties to erect buildings in the camp. See: 2/9 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Jan to May 1944, AWM52 2/2/53 Box 45. 767 Trigellis-Smith, The Purple Devils, 2008, p. 215. 768 Pirie, Commando Double Black, p. 352. 769 2/6 Cav (Commando) Regiment Jun 1944, 2/10 SQN War Diary Jun 1944, AWM52 2/2/53 Box 45; 2/9 Cavalry Commando Regiment Julto Aug 1944, Appendix No vi to War Diary Exercise 10-20th July, AWM52/2/2/51; 2/6 Cav (Commando) Regiment War Diary 39 Jul1944, AWM52/2/2/51 Box 39. The parade for Blamey was followed the next day by a Regimental parade and the day after by a Rodeo. 770 2/6 Cav (Commando) Regiment Jun 1944, 2/9 Cdo Sqn War Diary Jun 1944, AWM52/2/2/51 Box 39.

215

their planned number of days, while others involved non-military activities. One such

exercise was Exercise ‘Windward’, held 9-26 April 1944. ‘Windward’ involved 18 Brigade with 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment attached. The role of 2/7th Cavalry Commando was

to act as the advance guard for 18 Brigade, seize a ridge, harass the ‘enemy’ from there, and

then advance towards specified bluffs. One phase of the exercise involved a brigade attack

with artillery support. The exercise was intended to offer a sound tactical experience for all

the troops involved. The reality was somewhat different. Troops found themselves trekking

over a fixed route moving from one place to another, and spending a great deal of time resting

and playing sport.771 The limited value of such training, especially for veteran troops, was

obvious.

Route marching was a major feature of the Commando training program at this point.

Long marches with full packs, rations, extra boots strapped to their packs, with short-halts,

conducted tactically with all round defence, were common occurrences.772 It quickly became

apparent that marches achieved very little, other than imposing tedious physical hardship on

the troops.773 Captain Ron Garland of 2/3rd Commando Squadron made the point that it took a

long time ‘for the penny to drop’ in relation to excessive route marching, implying that there

was not a great deal of attention being paid at higher levels for a considerable time, to the

quality and value of the training that the Commandos were receiving.774

Commando Squadrons, while at Atherton, often found themselves cast as the ’enemy’.

In such exercises this role was heavily scripted with every movement, location, contact, and

post-contact reaction being determined in advance. There was no place allowed for the

771 2/7 Commando Regiment War Diary Marto Apr 1945, AWM 52/2/52 Box 45. 772 Trigellis-Smith, The Purple Devils, p. 216; Ayris, All the Bull’s Men, p. 468; 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary Jan to Jul1944, AWM52 2/2/56, details how on 4 Jul1944 2/7 Commando Squadron route marched some 20 miles at the end of which they were ordered to dig trenches. The squadron was then marched 45 miles on 10 July. 773 Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 330. 774 Ibid, p. 330.

216

‘enemy’ to make decisions which might impact upon the situation in the field, and hence no

chance to exhibit any initiative. The instruction for Exercise ‘Rampant’, conducted in

December 1944, was a good example of this. In this exercise 2/7th Cavalry Commando

Regiment provided the ‘enemy’. It was clearly stated in the instructions issued for the

exercise that enemy tactics would be strictly conducted in accordance with an issued

sequence of events, and that the sequence could not be altered without approval by the

director of the exercise or its chief umpire.775 In this manner the Commandos were in effect little more than props in a pre-determined play. The response from the Commando veterans to

this imposed impotence sometimes led to friction with regular units. When acting as the

‘enemy’ during ‘Rampant’, 2/6th Commando Squadron engaged in a series of unscripted night

actions. During these the squadron stole rifles and jeeps from the battalion it was working

with. Tent ropes and telephone wires were cut. The victims did not take it kindly and the

battalion repaid the debt by returning to camp by truck without telling the squadron and

forcing the Commandos to walk 15 kilometres home.776 It was further doubtful just how useful such training was for preparing the Commandos for the role they were meant to play on active service. During April 1944, 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment deployed to play

both ‘friendly’ and ‘enemy’ for 18 Brigade in Exercise ‘Westward’. During this exercise, the

Regiment made use of vehicles including on 3 December 1944 some 46 three-ton trucks – it is difficult to conceive just how such a vehicle-heavy force was meant to operate as

Commandos.777

Of course, not all of the Atherton Tableland Commando training program was uninspiring. In January 1945, 2/2nd Commando Squadron embarked on a training activity

775 2/5 Commando Squadron War Diary Dec 1944, Instructions for Enemy Exercise “Festive” Dec 45, AWM52 2/2/7. 776 Trigellis-Smith, The Purple Devils, p. 220. Interestingly the ‘enemy’ force to which the commandos were attached for Exercise Rampant was known as the ‘Fuji Pyjama’ Division, which at least indicates that someone at Divisional Headquarters had a sense of humour. 777 2/7 Commando Regiment War Diary Octto Dec 1944, AWM 52/2/52 Box 45.

217

designed and managed by itself. During this exercise, the Squadron was to act as the advance

guard for an imaginary brigade. Eight ‘situations’ had been devised for the troops to

overcome. During the exercise, live rounds from Bren Guns were fired into the ground

nearby. It was universally agreed amongst the participants that the exercise was the nearest

thing to actual warfare which could be achieved in the circumstances. The Squadron voted

the exercise as the most interesting method of training.778 Such training was only possible

because 2/2nd Commando Squadron was not at that moment attached to, and thus not

answerable to, any Commando Regiment and thus able to administer its own affairs. It was

also the case it had remained relatively unscathed by postings out of original personnel, and

transfers of its original officers. It was thus able to function as a tightly knit cohesive unit,

which enabled it to conduct testing and complex exercises. The Suqadron was fortunate in

this regard, because a practical if somewhat cynical means of managing problematic issues

arising from the resistance of old Independent Company men to the new Commando regime

was to transfer out the original Independent Company personnel and replace them with fresh

troops. The unit History of 2/6th Commando Squadron recalled ruefully that January and

February of 1945 saw the face of the Squadron changing with many of the old hands being

marched out or discharged and their places taken by fresh reinforcements. Established

officers were also moved on and new officers, most with no experience of Commandos or unconventional jungle warfare, replaced them. In this manner 2/6th Commando squadron lost

60 per cent of its original members.779

Other aspects of the general training did offer some worthwhile experiences for the

Commando Squadrons. One of the subjects covered was tactical cooperation with aircraft.

This was new to the squadrons, and of definite value in the field. As with much of the

Commando training during this period such training with aircraft was not administered in a

778 2/2 Commando Squadron War Diary Jan to Apr 1945, AWM52 2/2/54. 779 Trigellis-Smith, The Purple Devils, pp. 221-22.

218

consistent manner across all the Commando Regiments. The 2/6th Cavalry Commando

Regiment trained with aircraft frequently, while 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment only did

so briefly, and 2/9th Cavalry Commando Regiment not at all. Nevertheless, when it was

conducted such training did prove to be effective. When working with RAAF Boomerang

aircraft, 2/10th Commando Squadron practised supply dropping from the air, recovering 100

per cent of the supplies dropped.780 Radio communication with aircraft, message dropping

from the air, deploying marker panels, and identification of objects from air and ground all

featured in the training.781 Troops on the ground, at least in 2/6th Cavalry Commando

Regiment, improved their capacity to work with aircraft markedly.782

From August until November 1944, training also involved the squadrons from 2/7th

and 2/9th Cavalry Commando Regiments travelling to Trinity Beach, Cairns, to practise loading and embarking from landing ships.783 The squadrons of 2/6th Cavalry Commando

Regiment did not participate in this training as the regiment had been sent to Aitape in New

Guinea in October 1944. In another sign of the new role for commandos within the Army, on

22 August 1944 all the available officers of the 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment attended

a course held in the Regimental Chapel. Present at the meeting was a signals officer and an

officer from a tank attack regiment. These two gave instructions on various aspects of their

own individual roles. The presence of a tank attack officer, whose role was anti-tank warfare, at a meeting of commando officers, illustrated how the Commando role was changing into one that was integrated much more closely with other heavy combat elements.784

780 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Aug 1944, 2/10 Aust Commando Sqn War Diary Aug 44, 1-3 Aug 44, Appendix 2a, Air Cooperation, AWM 52/2/51 Box 40. 781 Ibid; 2/7 Commando Regiment War Diary Jan to Feb 1945, AWM 52/2/52 BOX 45. 782 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Aug 1944, 2/10 Aust Commando Sqn War Diary Aug 44, 1-3 Aug 44, Appendix 2a, Air Cooperation, AWM 52/2/51 Box 40. 783 2/3 Commando Squadron War Diary Nov1944 is mostly devoted to Exercise Octopus, AWM52 2/2/55. 784 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Aug 1944, AWM 52/2/51 BOX 40.

219

Even with these more interesting distractions the overall training experience of the

Commandos at Atherton was not a happy one. Troops resented being taught to ‘be soldiers

again’, with one Commando lamenting ‘Why we had to be retrained I will never know.’785

Maintaining morale was not easy and the troops were itching to get back into action again.786

Endless and monotonous training which did not challenge the commandos became a serious

morale issue.787 The editorial of the newsletter of the 2/3rd Commando Squadron expressed

the frustration of many at being kept from action when it wrote ‘We would like to be in the fun and games, Doug, even if tho’ we are such a trivial little crowd … so please Doug, would you let us go in first just once.788 The ‘Doug’ referred to was General Douglas MacArthur.

In an attempt to maintain the interest and morale of the Commandos while at

Atherton, sport of all types was relentlessly pursued.789 This approach had some success and

sport was popular. Jack Duncan, of the 2/3rd Commando Squadron, said that ‘on the Atherton

Tablelands they just trained and trained. The only real pleasure I got out of it was playing

rugby with 2/3 team.’790 The Medical Officer of 2/5th Commando Squadron reported in

785 Ayris, All the Bull’s Men, p. 390 786 Trigellis-Smith, The Purple Devils, p. 223. 787 Bill Powell from 2/3rd Commando Squadron recalled that the squadron was getting completely fed up with the endless training. See: Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 325; Jack Boxall of 2/5th Squadron summarised the frustration felt by the veteran Independent Company troops by pointing out that the conventional training was very hard for the New Guinea guerrilla veterans to take. He said that drill on the parade ground was ‘abhorrent’ to men who had proved themselves in the primary task of killing Japanese. See: Pirie, Commando Double Black, p. 353. Ossie Osborne a Trooper with 2/6 Commando Squadron remembered his time on the Atherton Tablelands as the worst period of time he spent in the army. Osborne said that it was a waste of well-trained experienced troops when there was a war going on. He said that the boredom had a bad effect on discipline. See: Trigellis-Smith, The Purple Devils, p. 221; Ron Garland, now a Captain with 2/3rd Commando Squadron expressed similar concerns, ‘I felt sorry for 2/3 as their level of frustration, resulting from a great desire to get back into action, was a real problem’. Garland went further and stated that the Atherton experience was appalling, and that the men felt both frustrated and betrayed because with ‘so many Japs to be beaten’, the squadron was stagnating on the tablelands. See: Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 324 and 331. 788 2/3 Commando Squadron War Diary Jan to Mar1945, 2/3 Broadcaster Vol.1 Copy 5 Thursday 8, March, 1945, AWM52 2/2/55. 789 Sporting activities included: Australian rules football, Rugby League, Rugby Union, Soccer, Basketball, Softball, Cricket, Baseball, Hockey, Lacrosse, Tennis, Tug o’ War, Swimming, Boxing, Running, Jumping, see: 2/3 Commando Squadron War Diary Jan to Mar1945, 2/3 Broadcaster Vol.1 Copy 5 Thursday 8, March, 1945, AWM52 2/2/55; Pirie, Commando Double Black, p. 383. 790 Garland, Nothing is Forever, p. 315.

220

September 1944 that the cessation of the football season might cause some unrest.791 Other distractions such as the cinema, concert parties and infrequent local leave all provided a chance to alleviate the boredom of life in a static camp.

Some indication of the effect on the mood of the Commando squadrons can be found in a report on the state of squadron lines in May 1944. The report noted a ‘shocking state’ of untidiness with gear and rubbish strewn all over the site. It was, the report went on to demand, it be the personal responsibility of every non-commissioned officer, to ensure that correcting these failings receives immediate attention.792 Blamey did indicate he was aware of

the malaise afflicting the troops at Atherton by telling a parade of the 6th Division he

addressed on 17 July 1944 that they would have to make the best of it.793 The commander of

7th Division, Major General Edward Milford, acknowledged in his 1944 Christmas message

to his troops, that he had hoped they would have been in action by now, but that he did not

think that such an opportunity would be long delayed.794

Morale was also not helped by changes in command. On 9 February 1944 Lieutenant

Colonel Hector Bastin retired, relinquishing his command of 2/7th Cavalry Commando

Regiment to Lieutenant Colonel Norman Fleay. Fleay was, on the surface, a logical choice

for such a command. He was an experienced Independent Company commander, having

commanded Kanga Force during its time at Wau-Salamaua from May 1942 until January

1943. Fleay had been awarded the DSO for his command of Kanga Force, and he had the

public endorsement of Blamey who lauded Fleay as possessing ‘vision, enthusiasm, and the

791 2/5 Commando Squadron War Diary Aug to Sept 1944, 2/5 Aust Commando Squadron Report on the Health of 2/5 Commando Sqn for Month of Sep 1944, AWM52/2/7. 792 2/6 Cav (Commando) Regiment May 1944, Routine Orders 31 May, AWM52/2/2/51 Box 39. 793 Ibid. 794 2/5 Commando Squadron War Diary Dec 1944, 2/5 Commando Squadron Routine Orders 23 Dec 44, AWM52 2/2/7.

221

utmost determination’.795 Others spoke well of his bravery, ability and leadership qualities.796

Official Army circles recognised Fleay as an authority on unconventional warfare, engaging

him to deliver lectures on Commando operations at the Atherton training area in April

1944.797 Fleay’s appointment to command was, however, a less than astute move by the

Army, due to the previously unsettled relationship he had with the units he was now to

command, especially 2/5th Commando Squadron (see Chapter 4).

Many of those who had been under Fleay’s command or had worked closely with him

held him in poor regard. One NGVR soldier described Fleay as ‘a big youthful looking guy

… but I don’t think there was much between the ears.’798 Another more pointedly declared

that Fleay was a ‘shocking leader … the bastard should be in Hollywood not here’.799 Similar

derogatory opinions were expressed by others.800 Major General Basil Morris commander of

the 8th Military District and previously of New Guinea Force had described Fleay’s

appointment to command Kanga Force as a mistake which he had argued against.801

Fleay’s relationship with his troops had been difficult. During the evacuation of Wau

in September 1942, Fleay had accused some of the men of 2/5th Independent Company of

cowardice and desertion and ordered them to be brought back to him under armed guard.

Captain Hugh Marsden, the Medical Officer of 2/5th, was despatched to bring back the

795 2/5 Commando Squadron War Diary, Oct1943, AWM52 2/2/57; Honours and Awards, AWM 191 301/954 Box 6. 796 Maj Gen B Morris (CO NGF 42) – 23 Nov 44, Records of Gavin Long, General Editor, Notebook No 117 (Fenton) – [notes on Kanga Force], AWM 67 2/117; Lt. Bob Dawson Intelligence Officer of the 2/22nd Battalion, 2/5 Independent Coy, Operations in New Guinea 25th Oct 1942, AWM54 587/6/11. 797 Neil MacDonald interview, 2/3rd Independent Company interviewee – no name of interviewee, no date of interview, AWM SO4160. 798 Powell, The Third Force, p. 33. 799 Ibid. 800 Jack Boxall of 2/5th Commando Squadron and former member of 2/5th Independent Company observed that Fleay’s ‘ineptitude, ego, and self protection caused untold hardships and misery on all members of the Fifth Coy in New Guinea’, and went on to recall that Fleay, ‘appeared to have a particular dislike for the Fifth, and these feelings were reciprocated by the men’. See: Pirie, Commando Double Black, p. 353. See: Maj Gen B Morris (CO NGF 42) – 23 Nov 44, Records of Gavin Long, General Editor, Notebook No 117 (Fenton) – [notes on Kanga Force], AWM 67 2/117. 801 Maj Gen B Morris (CO NGF 42) – 23 Nov 44, Records of Gavin Long, General Editor, Notebook No 117 (Fenton) – [notes on Kanga Force], AWM 67 2/117.

222

‘deserters’.802 When Marsden found the men in question, he realised that the reason for their

separation from the main body of Kanga Force was due to an order for ‘every man to look

after themselves’ that had reached them during the ‘total confusion’ that accompanied the

precipitate withdrawal from Wau. After the situation was explained to them the ‘deserters’

obediently complied with Marsden’s orders and moved forward again.803 In a self-serving

move Fleay ordered that the signal ordering the men to be brought back under arms not be

recorded in 2/5th Independent Company records. Major General Morris, did however, see it, even though he conceded that he was not supposed to.804

In May 1943 details of Fleay’s activities with Kanga Force were released by the Army

to the press. Fleay’s heroic exploits were reported as including personal infiltration of Lae

and counting the Japanese there, and conducting a similar reconnaissance of Salamaua the

night before the raid in June 1942. Fleay’s participation in the October 1942 Mubo raid was

described as selfless and heroic, when he had deliberately acted as a decoy for the Japanese

so that his men could withdraw, subsequently leading the Japanese on a hunt for him through

the Jungle for days.805 Such claims were in fact fantasies that bore absolutely no relationship

to reality. As noted in Chapter 4, Fleay never went anywhere near Lae, and had only a

marginal influence on the Salamaua raid. It was Winning, not Fleay, who conducted the

reconnaissance of Salamaua the night before the raid. Fleay’s involvement in the October

Mubo raid was anything but heroic, with his panicked bellowing for every man to look after

himself just before he ran off into the jungle, causing confusion and chaos. Predictably such

press reports infuriated those who knew what had actually occurred. Captain Peter Hancock,

802 Pirie, Commando Double Black, p. 152. 803 Ibid. 804 Maj Gen B Morris (CO NGF 42) – 23 Nov 44, Records of Gavin Long, General Editor, Notebook No 117 (Fenton) – [notes on Kanga Force], AWM 67 2/117. 805 Digest of Digests Sept 1943 – ‘Mubo Land of Ambush’, Papers of Peter Pinney, UQFL288 Box 6, UQFL.

223

who at the time was second-in-command of 2/3rd Independent Company, was scathing of

Fleay, writing to his parents on 23 June 1943,

There is only one flaw in the press reports and that is any reference to the exploits of Fleahy [sic] himself. He is not a trained commando and his name has a distinct odour amongst our predecessors here – to say the least. His own accounts of himself are so widely different from others I have heard that I am inclined to think that he is an absolute imposter and if so I only hope he is properly exposed.806

The fact that Fleay was an entirely manufactured hero was not lost on those who knew him

and the men he had commanded. The 2/5th Commando Squadron War Diary states that

Fleay’s award of the DSO was based on a false claim, and that Fleay had taken the credit for the service of other officers and men while ‘sitting in comfort in Wau’.807 The scorn in which

the troops held Fleay manifested itself when the men of 2/3rd Commando Squadron came

within earshot of Fleay’s new regimental headquarters. When they did so they would loudly

sing ‘I don’t want to set the world on fire’.808 They did this because Fleay had, in their

opinion, as well as the opinion of many others, unnecessarily burned down Wau in 1942.

Fleay’s poor reputation elicited a very personal response from at least one of his

peers. In April 1944, Fleay had been giving lectures on Commando warfare in the Atherton

area. During these lectures he had publicly referred to 2/5th Independent Company as

‘rabble’, and 2/3rd Independent Company as ‘Warfe’s Mob’. George Warfe, now a Lieutenant

Colonel, and equal in rank with Fleay, was at Atherton at the time and heard about this. He

determined that he would confront Fleay outside the officer’s mess for insulting 2/3rd

Commando Squadron. Fleay heard about Warfe’s threat and was seen to depart Atherton in a

806 Hancock to Parents, 23 Jun 1943, AWM PR91/052. 807 2/5 Commando Squadron War Diary Oct1943 Appendix “J”, AWM52 2/2/57. 808 Neil MacDonald interview, 2/3rd Independent Company interviewee – no name of interviewee, no date of interview, AWM SO4160.

224

jeep, not to return there again until Warfe had left.809 Such disquiet was associated with

Fleay’s record that Daniel Mulcany, a Labor member of Federal Parliament, formally

requested the Army Minister Francis Forde to conduct an investigation into Fleay. In

response to Mulcany, Blamey publicly praised Fleay in the press for his gallantry, vision,

enthusiasm and determination. Forde consequently dropped any idea of an investigation and

no more was heard of the matter.810 Back at Atherton, however, Fleay’s unsettled relationship with the personnel of the squadrons he commanded would result in some notable breaches of discipline.

Maintaining military discipline with the veterans of the Independent Companies was always problematic. While acknowledging the need for a formal chain of command, such troops were not adverse to expressing their opinions or taking action to protect their interests when they felt them to be abused or threatened. Such attitudes manifested themselves regularly during the commando’s time on the Atherton Tableland but the worst of these occurred under Fleay’s command. One such incident occurred in November 1944 when a group from 2/5th Commando Squadron refused to mount Regimental Guard duty, and were

charged and convicted of mutiny. The troops concerned were angry that their regimental duty

had been extended to allow another squadron to conduct a dance. The Independent Company

veterans would take just so much of the newly imposed ‘regular’ military discipline, and no

more. A significant factor contributing to the incident was its mishandling by Major Ian Kerr,

the squadron commander and Fleay as Regimental Commander. Major General George

Vasey, the Divisional Commander, conceded as much when he criticised the whole process of

charge and court martial, saying that the troops were simply ‘jacking up’ and a good officer

809 Ibid. The date for this may have been early Apr 1944 as 2/3 Commando Squadron War Diary Jan to Apr 1944, AWM52 2/2/55, notes on 1 Apr 44 a visit to the Squadron by Warfe. 810 2/5 Commando Squadron War Diary Oct1943 Appendix “J”, AWM52 2/2/57.

225

would have handled it in a much less confrontational manner.811 It is also worthy of note that

the sentence of 90 day’s field punishment was the least severe sentence for mutiny, and that

the court gave Major Kerr a ‘hard time’, indicating it was sympathetic to the troops

concerned.812

This incident was illustrative of the lack of understanding and rapport between the

veteran Commandos and some of their newer officers while at Atherton. Many of the original

Independent Company officers for whom the troops had great respect had been posted out of

the Commando Squadrons, and new untried officers replaced them. The relationship between

these new officers and the men was trying. This led to numerous incidents of indiscipline as

for example, in March 1945 when Trooper Alan Enchell of 2/3rd Commando Squadron went

absent without leave. When he was caught and paraded before Fleay, he said directly to Fleay:

‘I am sick of the army. Sick of you, and you are a fucking possum, get fucked.’813 Numerous

other examples of profane insubordination as well as men striking officers within 2/7th

Cavalry Commando Regiment occurred.814 The malaise affecting the troops at this time went

deep. The case of two soldiers of 2/3rd Commando Squadron, George Head and ‘Rusty’

McEwan, both veterans of the Middle East and the Wau-Salamaua Campaign, clearly

illustrates this. Head and McEwan decided that because of the endless boredom imposed on

them at Atherton they would desert. Both packed their belongings and said goodbye to their

friends. They also formally said goodbye to the squadron commander, Captain Peter Tancred,

811 Ibid, p. 374. 812 Ibid, pp. 374-75 813 2/7 Commando Regiment War Diary Marto Apr 1945, 28 Mar1945, AWM 52/2/52 BOX 45. 814 See: 2/7 Commando Regiment War Diary Jan to May 1944, 2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regiment Routine Orders 17 Feb 44, AWM 52/2/52 Box 44; 2/7 Commando Regiment War Diary Jan to May 1944, 2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regiment Routine Orders 14 Apr 44, AWM 52/2/52 BOX 44; 2/7 Commando Regiment War Diary Octto Dec 1944, 2/7 Routine Orders 10 Oct 44, AWM 52/2/52 BOX 45; 2/7 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Octto Dec 1944, 2/7 Cavalry Commando Regiment Routine Orders 14 Nov 44, AWM 52/2/52 Box 45; 2/7 Commando Regiment War Diary Octto Dec 1944, AWM 52/2/52, BOX 45; 2/7 Commando Regiment War Diary Marto Apr 1945, 8 Mar45, AWM 52/2/52 Box 45. 814 2/7 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Octto Dec 1944, 2/7 Cavalry Commando Regiment Routine Orders 14 Nov 44, AWM 52/2/52 Box 45.

226

who liked them both, and was himself a veteran of the Wau-Salamaua Campaign. They then

just simply disappeared. Tancred understood why Head and McEwan did what they did and

took no action against them.815

All the Commando Regiments experienced the same sense of frustration caused by the

Atherton experience. It was very much a period characterised as ‘the Doldrums of War’.816

Even so, similar incidents to what occurred in 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment are not

recorded by 2/6th or 2/9th Cavalry Commando Regiments. There were of course concerns

expressed but these tended to be relatively trivial, such as admonishing the troops for not

folding their greatcoats in the regulation manner, and leaving their dry clothing on clothes

lines inviting theft.817 Unlike 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment the officers of 2/6th and 2/9th

Cavalry Commando Regiments appeared to maintain a working relationship and degree of

decorum with their troops. Unique amongst the Commando Regiments, 2/7th Cavalry

Commando Regiment made a point of publishing explicit details of court martial cases in

Regimental routine orders, perhaps as a deterrent to dissuade further offences, although this

obviously did not work.818 It does seem that extreme cases of indiscipline were confined to that Regiment. The reasons for this were the enforced relationship between the exceptionally individualistic veteran Independent Company troops, their regimental commander with whom many had a troubled history, and inexperienced officers who lacked the respect of their troops, and the personal skills necessary to alleviate the situation.

To its credit the Army was not unaware of the unsatisfactory relationship between officers and soldiers within 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment. Vasey himself had

commented on the poor man-management by officers within the regiment. The cancellation

815 Garland, Nothing is Forever, pp. 326-7. 816 Trigellis-Smith, The Purple Devils, p. 216. 817 2/6 Cav (Commando) Regiment Appendices Jul1944, 2/9 Commando Sqn War Diary Jul1944, AWM52/2/2/51 Box 39. 818 No other Commando Regiment published explicit Court Martial procedures in Routine Orders to the extent that 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment did.

227

by Vasey of a seventy-mile route march ordered by Fleay to suppress the ‘unrest amongst the troops’ indicated that there was some concern for the welfare of the men under Fleay’s command.819 In late 1944 the Army took an important step to alleviate the situation and

appointed Major Harry Harcourt as second-in-command of the Regiment.820 Harcourt had

commanded 2/6th Independent Company with distinction during 1942 and the early part of

1943. He was a deeply experienced and highly decorated Commando officer with an

exemplary reputation. Harcourt was 51 years old when he was appointed to 2/7 Cavalry

Commando Regiment, a clear sign that even though he was not meant to command in the

field his presence would be of value.821 By inference, it is clear that the Army hoped that his

presence within the regiment would go some way to appease the negative attitudes of those who had little respect for their current officers. An added bonus would be that as second-in-

Command of 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment he would renew his relationship with his

old Independent Company, now a Commando Squadron within the Regiment.

Two Commando Squadrons, the 2/2nd and 2/8th, were not included in the Commando

Regimental organisation during the Atherton period from 1944-1945, and were not

answerable to any regimental headquarters.822 These squadrons were entirely independent

and not subject to direct higher control over their affairs. Even so, they were not immune

from the impositions of the outside authority. An example of this occurred when the Army

refused to recognise the battlefield commissions awarded to men of the 2/2nd Commando

Squadron during their service on Timor in 1942. The Army insisted that if the awardees

wished to retain their commissions that they must complete a formal Officer Cadet course.

This was not an extraordinary demand in itself, as all those promoted to commissioned rank

819 Bottrell, Cameos of Commandos, p. 165. 820 Ibid, p. 168. 821 Papers of Maj Harry Harcourt DSO & Bar, MC, OBE, AWM PR87/224. 822 The author has found no explanation why these two squadrons were not attached to Regiments. It can be presumed that the Army wanted two independent units it could use for special tasks if such arose, but such conclusions can only be speculative.

228

were required to attend Officer Cadet School. It was, however, a demand that was met with

scant enthusiasm by the squadron. In a style very typical of the independent personalities they

were, the two members of the squadron caused a great deal of trouble at the Officer Cadet

School. The result was that both were sent back to the squadron, with a note that the Officer

Cadet School would no longer accept candidates from the squadron. The Army, however, in a

mark of acknowledgement of the quality of the two soldiers concerned, allowed the

battlefield commissions to stand.823

The 2/8th Squadron was commanded by Major Norm Winning, the commander of the

1942 Salamaua raid, and 2/5th Independent Company from July 1942 until September 1943, when he was transferred to the command the 2/8th Commando Squadron. Winning wanted to

bring his squadron up to strength and appealed for volunteers to the veterans of 2/5th

Commando Squadron, who held him in the highest regard. Almost every ‘old hand’

volunteered, but such a mass exodus was forbidden by the 2/5th Squadron Commander Major

Ian Kerr, and Regimental Commander, Fleay. Nonetheless, Kerr and Fleay did take the

opportunity to shift those men they found difficult to control to Winning’s squadron.824

Overall the period the Commandos spent on the Atherton Tableland was a time that both transformed and challenged them. As the Army instituted its Commando doctrine and trained its Commandos in the methods and standards of that doctrine, it required the veteran

Independent Company members to abandon the lessons and attitudes learned from their

previous experiences. This many of them found difficult to do. Adrian Threlfall characterises

the Atherton Tableland training for the mainstream Australian Army as leaving Australian

soldiers ‘much better prepared of the challenges of jungle warfare than had previously been

the case.’825 This may well have been the case for regular troops, but it is debatable where the

823 Ayris, All the Bull’s Men, p. 391. 824 2/5 Commando Squadron Aug to Sept 1944 reports that 23 ORs moved out to reinforce 2/8 Commando Squadron, AWM52 2/2/57. 825 A. Threlfall, Jungle Warriors, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2014, p. 207.

229

Commandos are concerned. Just how better prepared Commandos were for the challenges of

jungle warfare, after their training at Atherton, depended very much on the prior experience

of the squadrons and the individual soldiers. It is certainly true that the newly raised

Commando Squadrons - 2/9th, 2/10th, 2/11th and 2/12th - had no prior experience of jungle

warfare, indeed no prior experience of combat of any kind. For those squadrons it would be

perfectly valid to claim that the training at Atherton assisted them to prepare for jungle

operations. On the other hand, it would be a dubious claim that the training at Atherton

improved the preparedness for jungle warfare of the veteran Independent Company

personnel. Such veterans were past masters at operating effectively in the jungle. That they

had done so in an unconventional and independent manner and not the manner that Atherton

was teaching is beside the point.

There was, however, one aspect the training at Atherton did prepare commandos for

the type of jungle warfare they would engage in. One element of the Independent Company

operational style which was absent was their ability to integrate and fight alongside of, and as

part of, a larger formation. This was well addressed by Commando training. It was the

intention that Commandos were in future to operate in close support of higher formations, and to take their place in the line of battle as infantry if required. They were subsequently

taught how to operate as part of larger groups and formations. This was something the

veterans of the Independent Companies were not accustomed to. In this way the Atherton

training did prepare the Commandos for jungle warfare, albeit a very specific and limited

interpretation of what that entailed.

What was the overall value of the Atherton Tableland experience for the Commandos,

and where does it fit within the evolutionary history of Australia’s World War 2

Commandos? From the perspective of many of the veteran Independent Company personnel

who underwent training on the Tableland it was a waste of time, and very much a regression

230

in how they perceived their worth and value to the Army as a whole. From the perspective of

the Army, however, the Atherton period was essential to transform the Independent

Companies, for which there was no longer any perceived use, into Commando Squadrons, for

which there was now a defined place within the operational structure of higher level

formations. In this sense the evolution of the Army’s appreciation for Commandos had come

full cycle from a base where there was literally no official policy, to one where there was a

firm set of guidelines for the tactical employment of Commandos. What the time at Atherton

did do for the Commando squadrons was to acclimatise them, both as individuals and as

units, to the requirements of their new function. If viewed in this context the Atherton

experience was a success.

The ability of the Commandos to carry out their new role would be put to the test in

the latter part of 1944 and into 1945, when the Commandos would, after a very long hiatus, be sent into action again.

231

CHAPTER 8

COMMANDOS AT WAR 1944-1945: AITAPE-WEWAK

The strategic situation facing Australia in 1944 was one in which political rather than military factors dominated decisions made to deploy Australian forces. In this context it was imperative for Australia to demonstrate a military a role in the defeat of the Japanese.

Foremost such action would help ensure Australia had a credible voice at post war peace talks. There had been some debate as to just how such campaigns should be fought, especially given the clear strategic ‘backwater’ status of the South West Pacific Area due to

MacArthur’s thrust toward Manila. Blamey was of the opinion that the Japanese should be driven from the areas to Australia’s immediate north in which they were sustaining themselves and be destroyed. This should be done by aggressive patrolling and offensive operations with small forces. Such a campaign would be suited to Commando-style operations.826

826 Robertson and McCarthy, Australian War Strategy 1939-1945, pp. 410-11.

232

Commandos were employed in all the campaigns conducted by the Australian Army

during 1944-5. The existence of guidelines on Commando doctrine in this period, unlike

earlier in the war, provided a standard formula for their employment in various theatres of

operation. It is worthwhile at this point to restate the Army’s official functions for the

Commandos. These were the conduct of dismounted reconnaissance for larger formations, to

seize ground and hold it for limited periods, to conduct long-range patrols and to undertake special missions as directed.827 In addition, it is not to be forgotten that Commandos were now trained as infantry for cooperative all-arms operations under jungle conditions.828 There

is insufficient space or need with this thesis to provide a detailed account of every campaign

Commandos were involved in 1944-5. Instead a survey of Commando activities in this period

will suffice to gain an understanding of the role they played.

Commandos supported 6th Division in the Aitape-Wewak campaign in New Guinea

from October 1944 until August 1945. They did the same for 9th Division at Tarakan from

May 1945 until August 1945, and Labaun Island from July 1945 until August 1945. They

supported 7th Division at Balikpapan from July-August 1945, and operations on Bougainville

in support of 3rd Division from November 1944 until August 1945. From November 1944

until August 1945 Commandos also operated in support of the Australian 5th Infantry

Division on New Britain. The experiences of the Commando Squadrons varied according the

campaign.

In the Tarakan, Balikpapan and Lauban Island campaigns, Commandos operated

essentially as light infantry. On Tarakan the 2/4th Commando Squadron engaged in

essentially infantry operations suffering significant casualties. It was only in the later stages

827 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary, 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary Aug 1944, Aug – Sept 19442/6 Cav Commando Regiment – Appendices, AWM 52/2/51 Box 40. 828 2/7 Commando Regiment Outline War Diary Jun to Dec 1943, O.C. Coys 2 Aust Corps L.H.Q/ (Via) 2 Aust Corps Training 19 Jun 1943, AWM 52/2/52 Box 44.

233

of the campaign when it began to patrol in the expected manner of light infantry.829 The other

two Commando Squadrons of the 9th Infantry Division, the 2/11th and 2/12th, were engaged in

the liberation of Labaun Island during which saw little action.830

New Britain, and Rabaul, its main town and Port was occupied by the Japanese in

January 1942. It was quickly developed into a major air and naval base and headquarters of

the Eight Area Army functioning as the centre of operations for the Japanese in the South

West Pacific area. Allied planning during 1942 sought to assault and recapture Rabaul, but it

soon became apparent that the resources needed to undertake such a task did not exist. In

addition the Japanese offensive in Papua as well as fighting in the Solomon Islands absorbed

Allied resources and prevented any move against Rabaul. By mid-1943 it had been decided

that Rabaul could be bypassed and by the end of 1943 direct communications between

Rabaul and Japan were severed. Instead the town was subjected to repeated bombing raids

which continued on a regular basis until the end of the war. Despite being isolated the

Japanese garrison of Rabaul was considerable, some 53,000 army troops and 16,000 navy troops. It was important to ensure that these did not threaten the straits of Vitiaz which lay between New Guinea and the western tip of New Britain and thus disrupt Allied moves into

Western New Guinea. To this end American forces landed on the western end of the island at

Arawe in December 1943 and Cape Gloucester in January 1944. U.S. forces also landed at

Talasea in March 1944. There was some heavy fighting at Cape Gloucester before Japanese

forces there were overcome. Australian forces replaced U.S. Forces in October 1944 landing

at Jacinquot Bay. These Australian troops pushed out to occupy a line from north coast to

south coast forming a cordon across the island. The Japanese presuming that a serious assault

directly on Rabaul was inevitable, retained their forces in the town and made no effort to

challenge this containment line. A primary reason for the Japanese reluctance to launch an

829 See: Blake, G, Jungle Cavalry, pp.254-63. 830 Ibid, p.263.

234

offensive against the Australians was the nature of the terrain on the island. The country between Rabaul and the Australian line was very rough and utterly undeveloped, dotted with volcanic mountains and covered in thick tropical rain forest. This made the movement of any significant number of troops virtually impossible. Even though there was some heavy fighting around the Waitavalo–Tol area with Japanese forces who were already there, once

this was concluded Australian forces were not challenged by the Japanese again.

Before the Australian landing at Jacquinot Bay a small number of 2/2nd Commando

Squadron personnel had been used to provide security for advanced reconnaissance of the

landing beach. This task involved no fighting. Following the landing of the main Australian

force 2/2nd Commando Squadron was tasked with patrolling the fringes of the Australian

line. The enemy sent out small reconnaissance patrols but made no attempt to contact the

Australians. The most notable event of the Squadron’s time on New Britain was a patrol that

penetrated the jungle up to the outskirts of Rabaul. This twenty-four-day patrol was noted for

the extreme conditions it encountered; it rained torrentially every day and night. The patrol

determined that the terrain between Rabaul and the Australian lines was so bad that no

Japanese force of any size could cross it. On 6 August a radio message announced the atomic

bombing of Hiroshima and on 9 August the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. Five days later

Japan Surrendered. The war for 2/2nd Commando Company on New Britain was over. It was

a war which they described as a ‘more leisurely war’.831

Allied planning to invade Japanese occupied Borneo came under the umbrella of

Operation Oboe. The invasion of Tarakan island was designated Oboe 1, Oboe 2 was the landing and occupation of Balikpapan, Oboe 3 the assault on Bandjermasin, Oboe 4 the capture of Surabaya. Oboes 5 and 6 would be to clear the remainder of the Netherlands East

831 Ayris, All the Bull’s Men, p.467; Blake, Jungle Cavalry, pp.252-53.

235

Indies including the British protectorates of Labaun Island and Brunei. As events transpired only Oboes 1, 2 and 6, (the latter only partially).

Oboe 1, the capture of Tarakan Island, was the first of the assaults on Borneo to occur. Tarakan is an island off the North West coast of Borneo. The island is twenty four kilometres long and 18 kilometres long. Its shores are muddy and tangled with Mangroves.

Inland the island was a wild jumble of hills and small steep gullies, all covered in a dense rain forest.832 The island as with all of Borneo was part of the Netherlands East Indies and had since early 1942 been occupied by Japan. Tarakan was a source of oil, producing some

500,000 tons per annum is peacetime. Strategically Tarakan was of uncertain merit neither the oil produced there, or the airfield on the island were essential to the allied war effort. On

21 March MacArthur instructed Lieutenant General Leslie Morsehead, the commander of the

1st Australian Corps, to use 26 Brigade Group, commanded by Brigadier David Whitehead, to capture the island. The primary object of the operation was to capture the Tarakan airfield for use by the First Tactical Air Force.833

Whitehead’s 26 Brigade Group was approximately 12,000 men strong. The Brigade group included three infantry battalions 2/23rd, 2/24th and 2/48th. All of these were battle hardened formations having served since 1939. In addition were artillery, engineers and the

2/4th Commando Squadron. The Japanese garrison on the island was estimated to be roughly

1,800.834

Australian forces assaulted Tarakan on 1 May 1945. Attempting to surprise the

Japanese was not part of the equation and the landing was conducted as an exercise of sheer brute force. The landing was preceded by a heavy naval and air bombardment and infantry

832 Long, The Final Campaigns, p.407. 833 Ibid, p.406. 834 Long, The Final Campaigns, p.409.

236

were carried ashore in American Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT). Japanese resistance to the

landing was negligible although it did increase considerably, most notably as the Australians

approached the town of Tarakan itself. The experience of 2/4 Commando Squadron on

Tarakan was one where the Squadron was used as infantry, with it patrolling in the

Commando fashion only very late in the campaign. The Squadron suffered significant

casualties on Tarakan especially during its capture of Tarakan Hill and later fighting for

features such as Agnes and Freda. This caused some hard feelings within the Squadron and

led to the medical evacuation of its Commander. The 2/4th Commando Squadron on Tarakan

was included as something of an afterthought. Because the Squadron was part of 2/9th

Cavalry Commando Regiment which was a component of the 9th Division it was attached by default to 2/6 Brigade Group. Nothing in the planning for the assault on Tarakan addressed employing a Commando Squadron, in any Commando related role. Due to the requirements

of the campaign, limitations imposed by the terrain, the requirement to overcome enemy

resistance within a limited timeframe, and the limited manpower available to achieve this, the

Commandos of 2/4th Commando Squadron found themselves employed as infantry with no

chance to employ their unique resume of skills.

The experience of the other two Commando Squadrons of 9th Division during the

Oboe 6 phase of the Borneo campaign, to capture Labaun Island and Brunei, was another

example of commandos being supernumerary to the main force. As with 2/4th Commando

Squadron both 2/11th and 2/12th Commando Squadrons as components of 2/9th Cavalry

Commando Regiment belonged to 9th Division. It was 9th Division’s task to not only provide

26 Brigade group to assault Tarakan but to also assault and capture Labuan Island and

Brunei. As such 2/11th and 2/12th Commando Squadrons would participate in the campaign

to do so. The forward planning to employ the Commandos during this campaign was

uninspiring. While 2/11th Commando Squadron was given a relatively active role, it saw

237

very limited contact with the enemy. Reflecting the lack of any concept to employ the

Commandos in anything like an effective manner 2/12th Commando Squadron spent the bulk of the campaign sitting aboard ship as the Divisional reserve. Eventually 2/12th Commando

Squadron would be sent ashore, to conduct a topographical survey of the island. The decision of the Division not to utilise its Commandos for anything more challenging remains unexplained.835

The Oboe 2 phase of the Borneo Campaign would see 7th Division land at the oil port town of Balikpapan and push inland to secure the region. This campaign was opposed by

Blamey who considered it a waste of resources and lives, yet under MacArthur’s direction and fully supported by the Australian Government it would occur. The landing at Balikpapan was to be conducted as a full-scale amphibious assault. The 2/7th Cavalry Commando

Regiment, attached to 7th Division, was composed of 2/3rd, 2/5th and 2/6th Commando

Squadrons, with Lieutenant Colonel Norman Fleay in command. Its role was to support regular infantry formations.

Air and naval bombardment preceded the assault troops. The amount of firepower employed was formidable and in the words of one soldier who witnessed ‘We had everything backing us up going into Balikpapan. Ships firing rockets and aeroplanes going over dropping bombs, everything was weighted our way … we blew the hell out of the place’.836

The landing then went ahead with the troops being carried in a mix of landing craft and

LVTs.

The role of the Commandos was to land after the first wave of infantry and move through them. They were then to operate as an advance guard and scout ahead for the enemy operating very much in the role of light infantry. The Squadrons performed these functions

835 Blake, Jungle Cavalry, pp.251-63. 836 Dean, 1944-1945 Victory in the Pacific, p. 55.

238

with the 2/3rd and 2/5th Squadrons supporting 21 Brigades advance along the coast on the

Vasey Highway and 2/6th Squadron supporting 25 Brigade in its advance inland along the

Milford Highway. As the campaign progressed and the men acclimatised to conditions 2/6th

Commando Squadron, which still retained some personnel from the Indepdnent Company era, began to recall the operational style they had earlier practised. The Japanese had begun conducting a series of ambushes and infiltration along the Australian line of communication.

To counter this, 2/6th squadron began to range out to hunt the enemy and conduct aggressive patrols. The objective of these patrols was to keep the enemy off balance and to gain as much information as possible about Japanese movements. The campaign on Balikpapan lasted for only seven weeks before the war with Japan ended. During this time the Commandos were used as light infantry. They provided flank guards and acted as forward scouts. They performed their role efficiently and effectively. It was apparent that from the point of view of

Divisional command there was no intention to allow the Commandos any form of unconventional or irregular operations. Perhaps if the campaign had gone on longer the regression to an Independent Company operational style by the Commandos would have become more pronounced. This was, however, not to be.837

For the purpose of analysing the operational styles of the Commandos during 1944-45 this chapter and the following chapter will examine the Aitape-Wewak Commando campaign and the Bougainville campaigns. These two models have been chosen for specific reasons.

The first of these is the length of each campaign, and in both cases Commandos were engaged in active operations against the enemy for extended periods. The second is that the operational styles of commando activities in each campaign are radically different from each other, and thus provide an important contrast of methods employed during the period. This illustrates how the Army, even at that late stage of the war, still struggled to implement a

837 See: Blake, G, Jungle Cavalry, pp.264-69.

239

consistent application of its Commando ideas and doctrine. None of these criteria apply to

any of the other 1944-45 campaigns in which Commandos are involved.

The three squadrons of the 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment 2/7th, 2/9th and 2/10th

Commando Squadrons trained at the Atherton Tableland from December 1943 until October

1944 in the case of 2/9th and 2/10th Commando Squadrons, and from January to October 1944 in the case of 2/7th Commando Squadron.838 Of the three Squadrons only the 2/7th had

previous service experience, having begun an Independent Company operating in New

Guinea from October 1942 until December 1943. During their time at Atherton all three

squadrons assimilated the operational expectations for Commando squadrons inherent within

the Army’s new Commando doctrine.

The 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment arrived at Aitape in New Guinea on 21

October 1944, as the vanguard of 6th Division. This role was one for which the Commandos

had been repeatedly trained during their time at Atherton. While the Regiment was on route

to Aitape, the Australian 1st Army issued an operational instruction clearly setting down the

tasks for the Regiment. These were to relieve US troops, support and assist ANGAU, scout

for a site for a forward base, prevent Japanese infiltration, report the presence of Japanese and

all Japanese movement, and destroy all enemy encountered.839 Brigadier James Martin,

commanding the Australian 19 Brigade, writing on 5 October before to the arrival of his

formation at Aitape, concluded that the best use of the Commandos was to establish a reserve

on the right flank of his brigade which could defend the inland track in depth.840 This demonstrated a good understanding of just how to employ Commandos as light infantry, to scout out the country, and protect the flank of 19 Brigade. Of note is the reference to

838 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary Jan-Jul1944, AWM52 2/2/59. 839 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Octto Dec 1944, Fist Aust Army Operation Instruction No 48 to CO 2/6 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt, 17 Oct 44, AWM 52/2/51 Box 41. 840 Appreciation of the Situation at Driniumor River on 5 Oct by Brig JEG Martin, Commanding 19 Bde, Sixth Australian Division Report on Operations – Aitape-Wewak Campaign 26 Oct 1944 ~ 13 Sep 1945, HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde, Oct 44, AWM54603/7/27 Part 1.

240

establishing contact with ANGAU, which of necessity would anticipate some interaction with

the indigenous population.

When it arrived, the regiment was the only Australian unit present and consequently

came under the command of the U.S. 43rd Division, which was then garrisoning Aitape.

During 27 to 28 October, the Commandos relieved U.S. troops in a number of forward outposts, and with the prospect of active service eagerly anticipated, began patrolling.841

Eleven patrol routes were established, five being daily patrols, one every two days, four twice

weekly, and one weekly.842 The first contact with the enemy occurred on 3 November, during

which one Japanese soldier was killed and two were captured. The next day the first

Commando casualty was suffered, with one trooper of 2/10th Commando Squadron wounded

by a Japanese light machinegun. During this ‘patrol phase’ a considerable number of captured

Japanese documents were forwarded to the Headquarters of U.S. 43rd Division.843

When 6th Division arrived in October it deemed patrolling to be of ‘every

importance’. To facilitate this, the Commandos were instructed to gain information to enable

the Division to extend operations in the future.844 During November 1944 to February 1945,

the first months of the Aitape operations, 150 Commando patrols were conducted. Of these

100 were reconnaissance patrols to contact indigenous people, report on terrain, observe and

contact the enemy, correct and add to maps, locate lines of communication routes as well as

possible camp sites. There were 13 clearance patrols, designed to clear an area of the enemy

and 30 fighting or harassing patrols, whose purpose was to locate and attack any enemy

found. Further, seven patrols were to contact other units, provide local security and protection

841 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Nov1944, War Diary 2/10 Cdo Squadron Summary of Suain-Luain Operations Nov 44, AWM 52/2/51 Box 41; 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Oct1944, AWM 52/2/51 Box 40. 842 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Nov1944, 2/6 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt 9 Nov1944 Intelligence Summary No.1, AWM 52/2/51 Box 41. 843 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Nov1944, AWM 52/2/51 Box 40. 844 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Nov1944, 2/6 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt to OC 2/10 Sqn 4 Nov 1944, AWM 52/2/51 Box 41.

241

for other parties.845 In a decidedly non-military action, but one that fulfilled the requirement

to liaise with ANGAU, 2/9th Commando Squadron despatched one patrol to check on a

complaint that indigenous houses had been destroyed.846 Not all patrol actions conducted

during this period are listed in the squadron war diaries. In January 1945, for example, 2/10th

Commando Squadron was caught in a flash flood of the Danmap River, three men were

drowned and all the Squadrons stores and records for the month, which included the record of

all patrols, were lost. Nevertheless, those patrols that were recorded do assist to provide a

quantitative overview of patrol activity, which from the record was extensive. The duration of

the patrols reflected the Commando doctrine to provide ‘close’ support to neighbouring

conventional units. Unlike in the past, where patrols would often extend over a number of

days or even weeks and range far from any other formation, those patrols conducted during

November 1944 to February 1945 were one-day activities. This ensured that Commandos did

not venture too far from the ‘main force’ and also that they could be kept under close control.

The patrols for the novice 2/9th and 2/10th Squadrons were mostly of section strength or

larger, not patrols of five or less which had been characteristic of earlier times.847 This, however, was not echoed by the vastly more experienced 2/7th Commando Squadron, which

frequently sent out patrols of only a few, and at one time only a single man.848

In November, a further objective was added to the list of Commandos tasks at Aitape.

This was to act as a vanguard and clear all enemy from west of the Danmap River area, ahead

of the 6th Division’s move in that direction. The Commandos did so, killing an average of six

845 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary Novto Dec 1944 and Jan to May 1945, AWM52 2/2/59; 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary Novto Dec 1944 and Jan to May 1945, AWM52 2/2/62. In the war diaries, the purpose of patrols is stated directly, but in some cases, this has had to be inferred from the description of the patrol’s object. 846 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Nov1944, AWM 52/2/51 Box 40. 847 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary Novto Dec 1944 and Jan to May 1945, AWM52 2/2/59; 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary Novto Dec 1944 and Jan to May 1945, AWM52 2/2/62. 848 The War Diary of 2/7th Commando Squadron is excellent in listing the numbers of soldiers included in each patrol. These numbers are often quite small, at one time only one man. Such numbers hearken back to the days of the Independent Companie’s operating style. Hardly surprising when one considers that 2/7th Commando Squadron was a veteran Independent Company, AWM52 2/2/59.

242

to eight Japanese per day as they advanced toward the river.849 During this period 67

Japanese were killed and seven captured for the loss of one Commando killed and another wounded.850 In a sign of the parlous state into which Japanese forces had deteriorated due to

problematic supply and sickness, it was reported that the Japanese who were encountered were disorganised, suffering poor morale, scattered in small groups, and short of food and arms.851 At this point ‘Cole Force’ an ANGAU patrol, named after its commander Captain

Robert Cole, came under the command of 2/10th Commando Squadron. This complied with

the instructions to establish a direct link between the commandos and ANGAU.852

By the closing days of November the aggressive vanguard role of the Commandos

was curtailed, and two troops were deployed as the mobile reserve of 17 Brigade. In this case

commandos were to be used as infantry, in order to fill a momentary shortage of such troops

with 17 Brigade. The role of this mobile reserve was to defend the brigade’s line of

communication and to be prepared to launch a counter-attack on short notice if required.853

While this did not make use of the Commando’s unique skills or attributes, it was nonetheless

within official guidelines established for the employment of Commandos.854 In January 6th

Division informed the Commandos that they were only to conduct short patrols for local

protection. Their reconnaissance role was over.

849 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Nov1944, “A” Aust FS Det at Baibiang GIII (i) 6 Aust Div 21 Nov 44 Copy to 2/6 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt, AWM 52/2/51 Box 41. 850 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Nov1944, 2/6 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt for action 43 US Div for information 6 Aust Div also 71 Wing RAAF 21 Nov 44, AWM 52/2/51 Box 40. 851 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Nov1944, 2/6 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt 22 Nov1944 CO’s Observations 2/10 Commando Sqn 18-21 Nov1944, AWM 52/2/51 Box 41. This assessment was confirmed by numerous interviews with Japanese Prisoners of War who spoke of severe deprivation and hardship suffered by Japanese troops. See: 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Nov1944, Prisoner of War Interrogation Report, AWM 52/2/51 Box 41. 852 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Nov1944, “A” Aust FS Det at Baibiang GIII (i) 6 Aust Div 21 Nov 44 Copy to 2/6 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt, AWM 52/2/51 BOX 41. Cole Force consisted of 2 Officers, 1 OR, 2 US Signallers, 18 indigenous police officers and 60 indigenous carriers under the Command of Captain Cole and Capt Fienberg, see: 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Oct to Dec 1944, First Aust Army Operation Instruction No 48 to CO 2/6 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt 17 Oct 44, AWM 52/2/51 Box 41. 853 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Nov1944, 17 Aust Inf Bde Op Instr No.2, 27 Nov 44, AWM 52/2/51 Box 41. 854 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Nov1944, 6 Aust Div Operation Order 1, 27 Nov 44, AWM 52/2/51 Box 41.

243

Throughout this period the style of operations the Commandos reflected conformity to

army doctrine, and did not exhibit any great aspiration for a more independent approach -

such was the impact of the Atherton indoctrination on the squadrons. In December 1944

Major Allen Goode, the commanding officer of 2/7th Commando Squadron (and the officer

who commanded the 2/1st Independent Company section in Vila in 1942), wrote that it was

the objective of the squadron to dominate the enemy lines of communication with utmost

economy of manpower. To do this would require the maximum use of air power.855 Goode

later added: ‘Artillery and Mortars could neutralise all surrounding areas and control tracks

leading from them.’856 In a demonstration of the determination of the squadron to maximise the use of such firepower, 17 airstrikes were called in during the first 22 days of March 1945 alone.857 Such a heavy reliance on conventional firepower ensured that the Commandos

conformed to the Army’s overall objective to minimise the risk of taking casualties, but also

illustrated how ‘conventional’ the Commando ideas had become.

Through December 1944, 6th Division continued to employ the commandos as light infantry, in immediate support of higher formations. During this time the tasks for the commandos remained to support ANGAU, prevent Japanese infiltration, report all Japanese movement and destroy any Japanese encountered.858 By mid-December, the Commando troops killed more than half the enemy casualties inflicted by the whole of 6th Division,

indicating both their capacity to do so and their high levels of activity.859

855 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary Dec 1944, Appreciation of the Situation by Major A.L. Goode O.C. 2/7 Aust Commando Squadron 14 Dec 44, AWM52 2/2/59. 856 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary Dec 1944, Addition to Appreciation of Tong Sector 16 Dec 44, AWM52 2/2/59. 857 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary Jan to May 1945, Mar1945, AWM52 2/2/6. 858 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Octto Dec 1944, First Aust Army Operation Instruction No 48 to CO 2/6 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt 17 Oct 44, AWM 52/2/51 BOX 41. 859 Sixth Australian Division Report on Operations – Aitape – Wewak Campaign 26 Oct; 1944 ~ 13 Sep; 1945. 6 Division had killed 136 enemy, 71 of these had been killed by the commandos, AWM54 603/7/27 Part 1.

244

As 6th Division began its push forward towards the Danmap River in January 1945, the role of 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment changed from that of an advance guard to

protecting the right flank of 19 Brigade. To do this the Regiment occupied the village of

Walum and patrolled the area around it.860 As part of this operation extensive topographical

reconnaissance was conducted by 2/7th Commando Squadron. The Squadron moved along the

Japanese line of communication and up to the banks of the Danmap River. During this time it

contacted and killed numerous Japanese including one notable engagement on 12 January

when 38 Japanese were killed.861

This aggressive patrolling experience was not, however, shared by every squadron, demonstrating that 6th Division, in keeping with the directed objective to minimise the

exposure of Australians to harm, had no intention of unleashing its commandos wholesale upon the enemy, in a campaign which could not be closely monitored and controlled. The less experienced 2/9th Commando Squadron found itself restrained to act as a flank guard and for providing forward reconnaissance for 2/8th and 2/3rd Battalions. At the same time two

troops of 2/10th Commando Squadron were given the role of 19 Brigade reserve, effectively

neutralising them as Commandos.862 While this occurred, infantry battalions were sent out to

conduct reconnaissance. On 10 January 2/7th Battalion was sent on a patrol to survey a new line of communication and to assess its suitability for motor vehicle traffic. On 17 January 6

Division created ‘Jock Force’ from 2/2nd Battalion and sent it on a two-week patrol to report

on enemy strengths and movements. During January 2/5th Battalion was sent on a deep patrol

to the south with the object of cleaning up enemy pockets who were within striking distance

860 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Jan 1945, AWM52 2/2/59; 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary, Jan to Feb 1945, AWM 52/2/51 Box 41. 861 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Jan 1945, AWM52 2/2/59; AWM52 2/2/59 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary, Jan to Feb 1945, AWM 52/2/51 Box 41. 862 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Jan 1945, 19 Aust Inf Bde Op Instr No 5. 6 Jan 45 to 2/6 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt, AWM 52/2/51 Box 41. It is not possible to deduce what the uncommitted Troop of 2/10 Squadron was doing during Jan as the unit’s records for the month were lost when the Danmap River catastrophically flooded on the night of 27/28 Jan, drowning three members of the squadron and washing away Squadron Headquarters and all of its records.

245

of the main force.863 There was no specific reason given by 6th Division for its use of infantry

battalions instead of Commando Squadrons to conduct these long-range reconnaissance

missions, however, the personal attitude towards the campaign of the Commanding officer of

6th Division, Major-General Jack Stevens, could explain such a curious deployment. Stevens

considered the campaign as a ‘heartbreaking’ needless exercise, which would contribute

nothing to the successful outcome of the war, and only result in needless casualties for those

under his command.864 Consequently he had resolved that it was his task to accomplish the

mission he had been given, ensuring that in so doing, his command would suffer the

minimum casualties.865 Given the potential harm which could be inflicted on smaller

Commando patrols, Stevens’ considerations may explain why 6th Division deployed larger

infantry formations to carry out what were essentially commando tasks.

During February 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment came under the command of 17

Brigade. The Commanding officer of 17 Brigade was Brigadier Murray Moten. Moten’s

distrust of commandos has been documented earlier in this thesis (see Chapter 6).

Consequently, he restricted the range at which Commandos could operate by insisting that

patrols were not to go beyond the range of mortar support, a short 2,600 metres. Moten

employed his Commandos to clear the enemy from specific areas, to cover his lines of

communication, to conduct limited patrols forward to get information about the enemy, and

to cover Walum village.866

Moten instructed that when enemy positions were found they were to be attacked by

the Commandos. One such action occurred on 20 February, when 2/10th Squadron staged a

deliberate attack on a fortified Japanese position at Kualagem. The attack failed with the loss

863 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Jan 1945, 6 Aust Div Operation Order 3, 17 Jan 45, AWM 52/2/51 Box 41. 864 Dean, Australia 1944-1945: Victory in the Pacific, pp. 228-9. 865 Ibid. 866 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Feb 1945, 17 Aust Inf Bde Op Instr No 10, 21 Feb 45, AWM 52/2/51 Box 42.

246

of two officers killed and two men wounded. Max Luff, a trooper with 2/10th Commando

Squadron who took part in the attack, described it: ‘Rotten show today. The Little Bastards were dug in to stay.’867 Kualagem was attacked for a second time on 22 March but once

again, the attack failed, despite the repeated bombing of Kualagem by aircraft. It was only

then that it was discovered 120 Japanese held the position, which presented a major

challenge, as the attacks being made by 2/10th Commando Squadron numbered only from

nine to twelve men.868 The attacks on Kualagem conducted as conventional infantry assaults,

albeit with limited numbers underscored that Commandos were expected to operate as

standard infantry when required to, in line with the Army’s guidelines. Following the

unsuccessful attacks on Kualagem the squadron continued to patrol the immediate area. This

patrolling resulted in further clashes with the Japanese. One result of these encounters was

the rescue of a small number of Indian prisoners of war, drafted by the Japanese to act as porters. The squadron found them in very bad condition, emaciated and mistreated by the

Japanese. The state of the Indians made the Officer Commanding the squadron as ‘mad as a hatter’ and he declared ‘open slather’ on the Japanese from that day on.869 Such a decree

harked back to the nature of the war that was fought by the Commandos in 1942-1943. In a

continuation of the type of ruthless ‘no quarters war’ which had been waged by the

Independent Companies in earlier times. Very few Japanese prisoners were taken by 2/6th

Cavalry Commando Regiment in New Guinea, only 23 against 778 Japanese killed.870 The

reasons for this can only be speculated – but they likely included a mix of personal and

cultural motivations, that primarily included revenge for Japanese atrocities, and the reaction

of troops forced to deal with Japanese troops who continued to resist beyond the point when

867 George MacAfie 'Max' Luff Diary: service with 7 Section 2/10 Commando Squadron, 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment, 6 Australian Division 1 Feb – 5 Oct1945, 9 Feb-9 Mar1945. 868 Luff Diary, 9 Feb-9 Mar1945. Luff explains how one of the indigenous scouts told the commandos that there were, ‘10 fella 12 Japan Man there’, which translated as 120 Japanese, or in Luff’s words, ‘a lot of angry men’. 869 Luff Diary, 23-24 Feb 1945. 870 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Aug 1945, AWM 52/2/51 Box 44.

247

all resistance was futile.871 This was more than simple overt racism, as the Commandos did

not exhibit similar attitudes to Chinese or Indians, and the attitude towards indigenous people

varied according to those people’s support or not for the Japanese. Japanese troops on the

other hand were to be killed without remorse.

One feature of Commando operations in the Aitape region that did not change from the time of the Independent Companies was that the squadrons seldom operated as a unified

entity. Unlike the companies of a standard infantry battalion, smaller elements within the

squadrons of the Commando Regiment would be allocated diverse tasks, which meant that

they operated at some distance from each other. The same applied for the squadron’s

relationship to other squadron’s within the regiment. While 2/10th Commando Squadron was

fighting it battles around Kualagem, 2/9th Commando Squadron was under the command of

2/3rd Battalion. Its role was to prevent enemy infiltration, protect the beach maintenance area

at Torokina, and prevent the enemy moving across the front of 16 Brigade. This eventually

changed to clearing the enemy within an area forward of the brigade, and to patrol forward

areas up to the air force ‘bomb line’.872 This work was conducted offensively, with 16 of the

35 Patrols conducted for the month being fighting patrols that resulted in destroying several

enemy stragglers, and small parties.873 Though little is known of what 2/7th Commando

Squadron was doing during February as the squadron War Diary for that month is missing,

and the regimental War Diary makes no mention of the squadron at that time, it can be

surmised that most likely the squadron was patrolling.

871 Johnston, Fighting the Enemy, and Lewis, Lethality in Combat both offer numerous examples of such attitudes from Australian soldiers. The papers of Peter Pinney UQFL288 are replete with derogatory and hateful references to the Japanese. Even non-military observers such as war correspondent Damien Parer shared a profound hatred of the Japanese referring to them as ‘vermin’, see: N. Macdonald, Kokoda Front Line, Hachette Australia, Sydney, 2012, p. 293. 872 The line on the map inside of which Allied aircraft would not bomb ground targets. 873 2/9 Commando Squadron War Diary, Feb1945 Part 1, AWM52 2/2/61; 2/9 Commando Squadron War Diary, Feb1945 Part 2 (i), AWM52 2/2/61.

248

As noted, during February 2/10th Commando Squadron had engaged the enemy the

unsuccessful conventional battle at Kualagem. These engagements, while frustrating and

costly for the squadron, had given the Japanese some idea of just what they were facing in the

area. Judging from the limited numbers which had attacked them, the Japanese assessed that

Australian strength in the area was weak.874 Indeed, 2/10th Commando Squadron was depleted in numbers. From the full squadron strength of 263, there were now only 13 officers and 203 other ranks fit for battle. As the squadron’s war diary put it: ‘There was in all cases too much to be done and too few to do it.’875 The consequences of this were that the squadron

frontage was stretched thin with detachments being too distant from each other to provide

mutual support.

In March the Japanese took advantage of the situation and pushed hard into the area

patrolled by 2/10th Commando Squadron. This brought on a major clash at Mapobma Creek,

where for three days ‘B’ Troop repulsed attack after attack. The Japanese also threatened ‘C’

Troop, but made only one serious attack, which was repulsed. Meanwhile ‘A’ Troop

experienced nothing out of the ordinary, thanks to the distance between the troops.876 As

memorable as the fight at Mapobma Creek may have been, it was in every way a

conventional action, owing nothing at all to Commando Training.

The conventional nature of the war enveloping the Commandos was not confined to

2/10th Commando Squadron alone. On 4 March 1945, 2/9th Commando Squadron unsuccessfully attacked a well dug-in Japanese position, in which three troopers were killed.

An airstrike called in the next day hit the Squadron instead of its target wounding five, and

encouraging the Japanese to attack when the air strike had concluded. A further unsuccessful

attack on the same Japanese position on 7 March resulted in another commando killed.877 On

874 2/9 Commando Squadron War Diary, Jan to May 1945, Mar1945, AWM52 2/2/61. 875 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary Jan to May 1945, Mar1945, AWM52 2/2/6. 876 Ibid. 877 2/9 Commando Squadron War Diary, March1945, AWM52 2/2/61.

249

9 March 1945 artillery harassed the Japanese position for half an hour followed by an

airstrike. The commandos, working alongside troops from 2/3rd Machine Gun Battalion, then

occupied the Japanese position without opposition. A follow-up patrol by 2/9th Commando

Squadron killed four more Japanese.878 More and more, the 6th Division commandos were

finding themselves adopting the role of conventional infantry.

Active operations for 2/9th Commando Squadron ceased on 14 March, and on 23

March the Squadron was shipped to Pogreta Bay at Aitape, where it went into camp and

spent its time on construction duties and playing sport.879 Patrolling occupied 2/7th

Commando Squadron in the first ten days of March, but unlike 2/10th and 2/9th Commando

Squadrons, the squadron was not engaged in any deliberate conventional actions. On 19

March the squadron was shipped to Aitape where it too went into camp.880 The 2/10th

Commando Squadron joined the other Squadrons at Aitape by the end of the month.881

Despite resisting the Japanese offensive effort in March, the actual amount of work

the Commandos were called upon to undertake during February and March was limited.

Trooper Max Luff of 2/10th Commando Squadron remembered only six days during February

when he was engaged in active duties: two days attacking Kualagem, one day on a

reconnaissance patrol, and three days on an ambush. March was slightly more active with

twelve days involving some type of action, ranging from an ambush, assaulting a position

known as ‘Housecopp’, an observation post patrol, a reconnaissance patrol and harassing the

Japanese lines of communication. The remainder of the time he spent tramping about the

jungle from one point to the other for what seemed to Luff for no apparent reason, or

878 2/9 Commando Squadron War Diary, March1945, 9 Mar 45, AWM52 2/2/61. 879 2/9 Commando Squadron War Diary, March1945, 14 Mar 45, AWM52 2/2/61; 2/9 Commando Squadron War Diary, March1945, AWM52 2/2/61. 880 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary, Marto Apr1945, 19 Mar 45, AWM52 2/2/59. 881 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary, Jan to May1945, AWM52 2/2/62.

250

escorting officers and wounded. In fact in the two months of February and March 1945 Luff

recalled that he was involved in only 18 days of active service.882

All of April for 2/9th and 2/10th Commando Squadrons was spent in camp. Likewise

2/7th Squadron spent most of April in camp, although towards the end of the month two

troops were sent out on to patrol a relatively safe area, another was placed in 19 Brigade

reserve. The reason for the stay in camp in April was to prepare the Commandos for the role

they were to play in the offensive against Wewak, set to occur in May. This offensive would

consist of two parts. The first was an amphibious assault against Dove Bay, some 16

kilometres east of Wewak. The second was an overland advance along the coast toward

Wewak itself. The Commandos would participate in each. The role of the 2/9th and 2/10th

Commando Squadrons was to be with Farida Force, as the landing force was called, where

they would be ‘assault troops’ ordered to seize and hold a perimeter on the Dove Bay

beachhead.883 The role of 2/7th Commando Squadron was to accompany 19 Brigade as it

advanced along the coast towards Wewak.

On 11 May Farida Force landed its troops at Dove Bay, preceded by a heavy naval

bombardment and airstrikes.884 The troops came ashore but as with most landings not

everything went smoothly and 2/10th Commando Squadron found itself wading into a swamp

consisting of chest-deep water, matted vines and rotting logs.885 Despite this, the squadron soon established a beachhead and dug in. Just how this was done in a swamp was never explained other than, ‘One just had to ly(sic) down in it & stick it Out.’886 The 2/9th

Commando Squadron avoided the swamp, pushed inland for 182 metres and it too dug in.

Whatever light opposition that was encountered was dealt with by the Commandos or

882 Luff Diary 26-27 Mar1945. 883 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary May 1945, Farida Force O.O. No.1, 9 May 45, AWM 52/2/51 Box 42. 884 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary, May 1945, 11 May, AWM52 2/2/62. 885 Ibid. 886 Luff Diary, 27-28 May 45. Luff confuses his dates with this entry but the details nonetheless are accurate.

251

silenced by naval gunfire.887 For the next 15 days the Commandos carried out local patrols

and called in naval gunfire support when they considered it necessary. During that time there

was no attempt to significantly expand the perimeter beyond what had been seized on the first

day.888 By the end of the month some 23 Japanese had been killed by the two squadrons for

the loss of one of their own.889 One likely reason the Commandos remained in place during

that time and did not attempt to push out may have been that 2/10th Commando Squadron was

significantly down on numbers. The squadron’s strength was nine officers and 146 other

ranks - which was 108 short of its full war establishment.890 By 26 May 19 Brigade had

reached Dove Bay after advancing along the coast. At that time 2/10th Squadron was moved

to the Mandi Creek beachhead where it dug in and immediately commenced patrolling.891

Meanwhile 2/7th Commando Squadron was engaged in a campaign of a very different

type. Attached to 19 Brigade, as the Brigade’s advance guard, the squadron patrolled

aggressively forward of the Brigade, clearing the enemy as it went.892 In keeping with a mode

of operations for 6th Division Commandos that had become common, the squadron found

itself committed to deliberate infantry assaults on prepared enemy positions. The most

notable of these was the assault upon the three Sauri Villages where the Japanese had

established a rear-guard covering their withdrawal from Wewak.893 In a series of

conventional assaults the squadron captured the three villages one by one. To do so they

employed mortars, air strikes, artillery and flamethrowers. In such circumstances the standard

887 2/9 Commando Squadron War Diary, May1945, AWM52 2/2/61. 888 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary, May1945, 12-18 May, AWM52 2/2/62. 889 2/9 Commando Squadron War Diary, May1945, AWM52 2/2/61. 890 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary, May1945, 11 May, AWM52 2/2/62. 891 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary, May1945, 25 May, AWM52 2/2/62. During the period at Mandi Creek, 2/10 squadron killed one Japanese but lost one Commando killed and one wounded in contact with the enemy, and one Commando killed, one died of wounds, and two wounded when the Japanese shelled their camp with artillery on 27 May. During the period 27-31 May the squadron lost 4 killed and 3 wounded, see: 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary, May1945, 27 May; AWM52 2/2/62 and 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary, May1945, 31 May 45, AWM52 2/2/62. 892 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary, May 1945, 11 May 45, AWM52 2/2/59. 893 Long, The Final Campaigns, p. 347.

252

operating procedure for the Army at that time was to employ massive firepower to

overwhelm the enemy. The commandos were, quite naturally, not inclined to forego such support, and not reluctant to make use of the firepower available to them.894 The capture of

No.3 Village, by ‘B’ Troop, decisively illustrates this. A frontal assault was considered to be

too exposed to enemy fire so, while the rest of the squadron raked the village with fire, ‘B’

Troop, guided by an indigenous policeman, took two flamethrowers and made a half circuit

around the village. Approaching the village from the rear the troop attacked with the flame

throwers. The morale of the Japanese defenders shattered, and many of them killed

themselves with their grenades.895 ‘B’ Troop then took the village without any significant

casualties. The use of flamethrowers supported by overwhelming firepower illustrated the

overwhelmingly conventional nature of commando tactics with 6th Division at the time. The

squadron then went on to cut the main road leading from Wewak inland.896 Reduced to 12

officers and 117 other ranks, the squadron subsequently continued its advance, repelling

several Japanese infiltration attempts.897 It continued in this role until 19 Brigade reached

Dove Bay. There, the squadron was released from brigade command and took over responsibility for the Dove Bay beachhead perimeter.898

Back at Madi Creek, 2/10th Commando Squadron continued to be used in a

conventional role. The squadron was instructed to bring artillery and mortar fire to bear on

any enemy it encountered. There was no intention or attempt to employ any other tactical

method.899 The squadron set to doing so and on 3 June 1945, following an artillery barrage of

800 rounds delivered within ten minutes, it overran a Japanese bunker position.900 The

894 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary, May 1945, 11 - 20 May 45, AWM52 2/2/59. 895 Bottrell, Cameos of Commandos, p. 261. 896 Walker, The Island Campaigns, p. 5. 897 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary, May 1945, 23-25 May 45, AWM52 2/2/59. 898 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary, May 1945, 30 May 45, AWM52 2/2/59. 899 Patrol Report 27 May 45, 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary, May 1945, AWM52 2/2/62; 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary, May1945, 29-30 May 45, AWM52 2/2/62. 900 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary Jun 1945, 3 Jun 45, AWM52 2/2/62.

253

maximum use of artillery persisted when on 18 June a patrol contacted Japanese near

Koanumbo village, withdrew and called down artillery fire. On the same day a patrol to

Parom Village engaged the enemy and withdrew before calling down artillery fire.901 On 23

June the Squadron again attacked Koanumbo, capturing the position after an artillery

barrage.902 By this time the squadron had been reduced to 10 officers and 67 other ranks,

helping to contextualise its use of artillery fire power so as to avoid intimate combat with the

enemy in its weakened state.903 In an infrequent example of a Commando raid, one notable

success came on 23 June when a patrol attacked an enemy bivouac and killed fifteen

Japanese. In an ambush on 13 January 2/7th Commando Squadron killed 38 Japanese who

were caught utterly by surprise and did not fire a shot in reply.904 These successes did not,

however, come without a cost. The Japanese had begun using buried aerial bombs as

command detonated mines, and in two incidents four troopers were killed.905 In contrast 2/9th

Commando Squadron remained essentially unengaged at Dove Bay.

During June the campaign for Wewak entered its final stage with the Japanese being

progressively driven away from the coast and into the mountains.906 Two squadrons of the

Commando Regiment subsequently moved out from Dove Bay and operated on the right

flank of 6th Division in an area just beyond the forward line of the division.907 Active

patrolling saw both 2/9th and 2/10th Commando Squadrons maintain contact with the enemy

throughout the month, but they engaged in no significant actions. As for 2/7th Commando

Squadron, its task was to secure the beach perimeter area at Karawop Cape, and it spent most

901 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary Jun 1945, 18 Jun 45, AWM52 2/2/62. 902 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary Jun 1945, 23 Jun 45, AWM 52/2/62. 903 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary Jun 1945, AWM 52/2/62. 904 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary June 1945, 23 June 45, AWM 52/2/62; 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary January 1945, 12 Jan 45, AWM 52/2/59. 905 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary Jun 1945, 24 and 30 Jun 45, 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Jun 1945, AWM 52/2/51 Box 43. 906 Long, The Final Campaigns, 354. 907 6 Div INT Summary No 26 Map, 7 Jun 45, 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Jun 1945, AWM 52/2/51 Box 43.

254

of June in camp with very little activity.908 In June two Japanese raiding parties began to

harass Australian units in the hope of drawing attention away from the main Japanese force.

The 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment was given the task of hunting down these groups.909

By July the nature of the campaign had changed to one of slowly grinding down the remnants of the Japanese forces in the area. Once more the overwhelmingly conventional nature of this campaign was illustrated by an action fought on 14 July to capture a Japanese defended position known as The Blot. One company of the 2/8th Battalion, supported by an

artillery bombardment of 3,500 shells, assaulted this position. Those Japanese who survived

the bombardment abandoned it.910 There was, in such a military setting, no practical use for

the Commandos, other than as standard infantry. Subsequently the task allocated the

Commando Regiment was to garrison and hold the Dagua-Hawain area.911 The most prominent feature in the area was the Jikkoku Pass, which was considered to be of prime importance and the squadrons were instructed to hold the pass ‘at all costs’.912 Just why the

order to hold the pass had been phrased in such an unyielding manner is unclear, as the

Japanese had been driven back into the hinterland and posed no serious threat.

Settling in to their essentially static role, the commandos operated for the first time as

a complete regiment with all squadrons in the same area, patrolling the pass and its environs.

Some enemy forces were still active in the area with night-time harassment, but they were considered to be no real threat.913 In fact, the physical patrol regimes of all the squadrons

were reduced markedly. In due course ANGAU took over the patrolling area of 2/10th

Commando Squadron. Patrols for 2/7th Commando Squadron took on the character of local

908 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary, Jun to Aug 1945, AWM52 2/2/59; 2/9 Commando Squadron War Diary Jun to Aug 1945, AWM52 2/2/61; 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary Jun 1945, AWM52 2/2/62. 909 Long, The Final Campaigns, p. 381. 910 ibid. 911 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary, 6 Aust Div Operational Order No.7 of 4 Jul1945, AWM52 2/2/62. 912 2/9 Commando Squadron War Diary Jun to Aug 1945, 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment Operation Order No.1, 14 Jul1945, AWM52 2/2/61. 913 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary, Jul1945, AWM52 2/2/62.

255

reconnaissance and artillery spotting, and for 2/9th Commando Squadron patrols were of the escort and local security type only.914 Indigenous troops were used more and more for longer

range patrols, with the Commandos patrolling much closer to home.915 The idea of ranging

out to find and destroy the enemy was no longer part of the equation. All was not totally inactive, however, and there were some moments of action. In one incident on 3 July 1945,

2/10th Commando Squadron unsuccessfully attacked a Japanese position, losing one trooper

missing in action. Similarly on 24 July ‘A’ Troop of the squadron assaulted a strong Japanese

position at Machoun, during which four troopers were killed. Australian artillery shelled

Machoun two days later and the Japanese evacuated the position.916 Apart from these

assaults, July 1945 proved to be a generally sedentary time for the commandos. Tactical

reconnaissance for the purpose of bringing down harassing artillery fire on the enemy

continued, but generally the troops ensured the security of their posts and, in compliance with

instructions, avoided unnecessary casualties. The Commando camp steadily grew into a

permanent one of barbed wire defences, with booby traps set to instantaneous fuses, and

stockpiles of stores, ammunition and rations.917 The squadrons continued in this manner until

mid-August when Japan surrendered and the war came to an end.918 By the time hostilities ceased, 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment had killed 778 enemy troops, found 363 of them

already dead and captured 23 prisoners of war. This was accomplished for the cost of 58

commandos killed and 119 wounded.919

914 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary, Jun to Aug 1945, AWM52 2/2/61; 2/9 Commando Squadron War Diary, Jul1945, AWM52 2/2/59. 915 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary, Jun to Aug 1945, AWM52 2/2/59. 916 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary, Jul1945, AWM52 2/2/62. 917 2/7 Commando Squadron War Diary Jun to Aug 1945, 2/6 Cav (Commando) Regt 10 Jul45 Conference Agenda, AWM52 2/2/59. 918 During Aug indigenous patrols took over the patrol work of the Commandos who remained in camp only venturing out for immediate security patrols or on the occasional reconnaissance for an artillery mission. 919 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Aug 1945, AWM 52/2/51 Box 44.

256

The employment of the Commandos by 6th Division was an exercise in adapting the role of the Commandos to the guidelines which had been established by the Army for their employment. In this context the Commando Squadrons operated as light infantry reconnaissance and flank protection, assault troops, or conventional infantry. All roles made their appearance and at different times. In managing its Commandos 6th Division did not step

outside the Army’s accepted guidelines, which were suitably broad to encompass every task

the Commandos were assigned. In this context, it is clear that the division understood how to

employ such troops. During the opening stages of the campaign, Commandos were employed

to carry out the scouting and advanced guard function. This was a role they were particularly

suited for. This lasted for as long as the division perceived the need for such activity.

Following this the ‘special’ role of commandos diminished, and they were employed as flank

guards, and then as conventional infantrymen. In this role they were used to assault enemy

positions, or hold positions against enemy attacks. By 1945 the Army was firmly was

resolved to use its overwhelming firepower to contain and destroy the Japanese. In this

context there was no place for free-ranging Commandos. It was also the case that 6th Division

as a formation was facing significant manpower shortages, and in this context the

Commandos represented a resource that could be utilised to plug whatever gaps appeared in

the order of battle. This is what occurred when commandos were posted as brigade reserves,

and when they, and not regular formations, were used to garrison Jikkoku Pass.920 Any ideas

that the refusal of 6th Division to employ its commandos in a more aggressive unconventional

manner was due to a lack of imagination or conservative disdain for employing commandos

would be mistaken. The division certainly appreciated how such troops could be used for

reconnaissance tasks, and employed them effectively as such. Major General Stevens’s

resolve to avoid unnecessary casualties was, however, an overriding reason which militated

920 Long, The Final Campaigns, p. 354.

257

against using commandos more assertively. When viewed in this context it is easy to

appreciate why he preferred tasks for his Commandos which would not expose them to risks

he could not manage. By ensuring such were under direct command, and engaged on missions that were conducted in a controlled manner, and covered at all times by significant firepower, he could minimize their chances for casualties.

Whether or not a more assertive use of commandos in an unconventional role by 6th

Divison would have assisted the campaign to reach a speedier conclusion is a debatable point.

Senior Japanese commanders who faced 6th Division thought that this might have been the

case.921 Unaware that a primary Australian objective was to minimize casualties, these

commanders criticised Australian forces for not employing the tactics which they had

encountered during the Salamaua campaign, when unconventional forces harassed Japanese

rear areas while the main attack came from the front. The staff of the Japanese XVIII army

considered it ‘unbelievable’ that such tactics, which had from their point of view proven to be

very successful, had not been used.922 Governed by strategic imperatives which forbade

commanders from taking actions that might risk casualties, and by the personal goal of the

division commander to ensure that such did not occur, there was never any chance that 6th

Division’s Commandos would be employed in such aggressive indirect actions. It is

nonetheless tempting to speculate that if such operations had been conducted, the Aitape-

Wewak campaign could have been concluded earlier. In the long run, however, such criticism

was of little consequence as 6th Division, operating competently and successfully, secured its

primary objective of Wewak. In the process it took from the enemy an important strategic

objective and succeeded in doing so without suffering undue casualties.

During the Aitape-Wewak campaign the Commandos efficiently carried out the

diverse roles 6th Division allocated to them. It mattered little that many of those roles had

921 Johnston, Fighting the Enemy, p. 369. 922 Long, The Final Campaigns, p. 369.

258

very little to do with the style of operation their title ‘Commando’ naturally implied. They

carried out each task competently and efficiently according to the guidelines established by

the Army. These guidelines were the final stage of a transformative process away from the

Independent Company ethos which had, by the first months of 1944, at least in theory,

become the common protocol for the employment of Commandos as integral sub-units within

the wider structure of the Army. Operating according with such protocol the Commandos made their contribution to the final successful outcome of the Aitape-Wewak campaign.

259

CHAPTER 9

‘SPREADING THE GOSPEL’ – COMMANDOS ON BOUGAINVILLE

The commando squadron which operated on Bougainville, 2/8th Commando

Squadron, was a unique case, something of an anomaly within the 1944-45 Australian

commando establishment. As such it presents an excellent alternative model of Commando

operations to that of 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment at Aitape-Wewak. There are several reasons for this uniqueness. Alone among the Commando squadrons, 2/8th Commando

Squadron was not posted to the Atherton Tableland, and did not undergo the training regime

of 1944-5 designed to ‘modify’ the Australian Commando Squadrons. The squadron had been formed in July 1942, as 2/8th Independent Company, and was the last to be trained under the original Independent Company regime at Wilson’s Promontory. Following that training, it was posted to the Northern Territory, originally to reinforce 2/2nd Independent Company on

Timor, and when this proved impracticable tasked to patrol between Darwin and the Adelaide

River. It carried out this monotonous duty from 1942 until the first half of 1944.923 This

changed in July 1944 when the Company, redesignated a Commando Squadron, was ‘without

regret’ moved to Townsville and then sent directly to Lae in New Guinea.924

Having bypassed the Atherton Tableland training experience the squadron retained much of its Independent Company character. Indeed the squadron considered itself an

Independent Company throughout the war, and never a Commando squadron.925 Reinforcing

the maintenance of this independent spirit were the personnel who made up the squadron.

The Squadron’s commander was Major Norman Winning, formerly of 2/5th Independent

Company, and leader of the 1942 Salamaua raid. As soon as he assumed command of the

923 Lt. General Savige, Stanley George; Papers: Bougainville 2 Corps Report on Operations 2/8 Commando Sqn Nov 1944-Aug 1945, p. 3, 3 DRL 2529 Item 78. 924 Ibid. 925 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Sept to Nov1945, 18 Sept 1945, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 58.

260

squadron in June 1944 he set to building up the numbers in the squadron which was under

strength.926 Winning deliberately seeded the squadron with like-minded individuals like himself, attracting Independent Company veterans from 2/3rd, 2/5th and 2/6th Commando

Squadrons.927 He attracted kindred spirits such as Peter Pinney from 2/3rd Commando

Squadron, and drew to him highly experienced Independent Company officers such as

Captain Claude Dunshea from 2/7th Commando Squadron.928 The 2/8th Commando Squadron

was seen by such individuals as, ‘nobody’s baby, liable to go anyplace + do anything’.929

Every aspect of what became the squadron’s operational style reflected this outlook. The

willingness to strike at the Japanese at any time and any place, avoidance of costly set piece battles, long-range patrolling and extraordinary field prowess in the jungle environment, all characterised its approach to operations. In addition, the intimate understanding and relationship with the indigenous population, and relative operational independence and self- reliance, marked it as a unique force within the Australian Army in 1945. Even the squadron’s voluminous, articulate, frequently witty, and irreverent correspondence and war diary, reflected a very different spirit from that evident within the other Commando squadrons. A fundamental aspect of 2/8th Commando Squadron, which certainly fostered the

independent spirit, was that it was not placed under the command of any Cavalry Commando

Regiment, and thus remained an autonomous sub-unit. Of the eleven commando squadrons

only the 2/2nd and 2/8th Commando Squadrons retained such status.

Bougainville is part of the Solomon Islands, not part of New Guinea, and had been

administered by Australia under a League of Nations mandate before the outbreak of the

926 Lt. General Savige, Stanley George; Papers: Bougainville 2 Corps Report on Operations 2/8 Commando Sqn Nov 1944-Aug 1945, p. 3, 3 DRL 2529 Item 78. 927 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Jan to Jul1944, AWM52 2/2/60; Lt. General Savige, Stanley George; Papers: Bougainville 2 Corps Report on Operations 2/8 Commando Sqn Nov 1944-Aug 1945, p. 3, 3 DRL 2529 Item 78; Pirie, Commando Double Black, p. 354. 928 Dunshea was a member of 2/7th Independent Company during 1942-3. He was awarded the Military Cross and bar for his service in New Guinea. 929 ‘Pinney to Mother’, 13 Oct1944, Papers of Peter Pinney Box 13, UQFL288, UQFL.

261

Pacific War.930 Australia thus had a dominant pre-war presence on Bougainville and the

physical and human terrain there was known. Australian troops arrived at Torokina,

Bougainville, on 15 October 1944 to relieve U.S. troops, who had been present there since

November 1943. In an injudicious start when 2/8th Commando Squadron disembarked they

found their stores had been pilfered at some stage during their journey with boxes and cases

opened and locks sawn off sealed containers. U.S. forces at Torokina stepped in to supply the

squadron with rations.931 On 18 October Winning and Claude Dunshea, keen to get a feel for the country they would patrol, flew in a reconnaissance aircraft over the squadron’s area of operations.932 At the same time Winning established contact with ANGAU and the local

representatives of the AIB, both of who managed the indigenous population.933

Not wanting to announce its presence prematurely to the enemy, the first Commando

patrol went out on 24 October accompanying U.S. troops, dressed and armed as U.S. troops,

to maintain security.934 While 3rd Division headquarters elements had been present on

Bougainville from 6 October, it was not until mid-November that the Australian 7 Brigade

was ready for operations, and 22 November that Australia formally relieved U.S. forces on

the island. By 12 December, Australian forces had replaced all U.S. forces.935

Understandably, during this time of changeover and administrative adjustment, the squadron

received few instructions from 3rd Division, to whom it was attached.936 Without such

guidance the squadron could only wait. On 30 October the squadron received orders from 3rd

Division. This was an undemanding task to conduct a topographical survey, with patrols

930 Papua, New Guinea and Bougainville were all under Australian authority. Papua was administered separately as a Territory under the Papua Act of 1905. New Guinea and Bougainville were managed under a League of Nations Mandate. 931 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Sept to Oct1944, 15-17 Oct 45, AWM52 2/2/60. 932 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Sept to Oct1944, 18 Oct 45, AWM52 2/2/60. 933 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Sept to Oct1944, 20 Oct 45, AWM52 2/2/60. 934 Ibid. 935 H.A. Gailey, Bougainville 1943-1945 – The Forgotten Campaign, University of Kentucky Press, Lexington, 1991, p. 191. 936 Pinney personal diary, 29 Sept 1944, Papers of Peter Pinney, Box 16, UQFL288, UQFL.

262

beginning on 6 of November. Unlike Aitape-Wewak where Commandos began their

reconnaissance and clearance tasks as soon as they landed, Commandos on Bougainville

began their experience by doing very little of consequence.937

November 1944 for the squadron was a month of patrolling to Kuraio Mission, the

Reini-Tekessi Sector and Cape Moltke, areas where there was little chance of encountering

Japanese. Instructions for the squadron’s patrols were to destroy or capture any enemy found,

obtain information from indigenous people, and record all relevant track information.938 As

predicted the month passed quietly. On 27 November the commander of 3rd Division, Major

General William Bridgeford, visited the squadron to confer with Winning. There is no record

of what was discussed, but the consequence of the visit was that the squadron was relieved of

its responsibilities for the ‘quiet areas’ it currently patrolled and given authority to range out

to conduct reconnaissance and search for the enemy.939 It seems that Bridgeford at least had

recognised that his Commandos could be employed in a more active role. In December the

squadron killed its first enemy soldiers, when two unarmed Japanese stragglers were

encountered in an unnamed village, approximately two kilometres from the mouth of the

Toru River.940

In January 1945 the squadron redeployed to the Jaba River area, where Japanese

activity was more pronounced. The squadron relieved 42nd Battalion in this area and began to

patrol, despite complaining that the infantrymen had left them very little useful information

about the tracks in the country over which they were to move, and which the Japanese were

937 Major General Bridgeford, the commander of 3rd Division admitted that there were ‘teething troubles’ at the beginning of his Division’s relationship with 2/8th Commando Squadron, but never elaborated in what those troubles were; 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Sept to Nov1945, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 58. 938 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Jan 1945, Report on Operations Patrols: Cape Moltke-Kuaraio Mission Area by 2/8 Commando Squadron from 7 Nov 45 to 10 Dec 45, AWM52 2/2/60. 939 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Novto Dec 1944, 27 Nov 45, 11 Dec 45, AWM52 2/2/60. 940 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Novto Dec 1944, 9 Dec 45, AWM52 2/2/60.

263

using extensively.941 Winning was keen for those infantry battalions nearby to understand

and coordinate their activities with the Commandos. To facilitate this, on 13 January 1945 he

met with the Commanding Officer and Intelligence Officer of 61st Battalion, along with the

senior signals and operations staff of 3rd Division.942 This meeting was to ensure that the

commandos were able to operate with minimal chance of entanglement with other friendly

formations. On 25 January, the squadron established its base camp at Sovele Mission, far out

to the left flank of 7 Brigade. Supplied by air due to the distance from the main force, this

gave the squadron a secure, remote and autonomous base from which it could dominate the

adjacent country.943

Australian commanders on Bougainville had been ‘spoiling quite laudably, for an all

in fight’ and it was only natural that the Commandos would mirror this.944 Unlike at Aitape-

Wewak, where the Commandos were very much kept on a leash, 2/8th Commando Squadron

was permitted to range out to strike at the enemy. Contact with the Japanese was frequent and

ambushes were conducted in areas distant from the front lines.945 On 27 January, a Japanese

bivouac was attacked by Winnings men and 11 Japanese killed.946 Three days later, eight

Japanese were killed as they slept in a well-cultivated garden they had been tending.947 On 21

March, a party of Japanese were followed from a garden and ambushed when they went for a

swim in a river. Four were killed and the remainder fled.948 In early June 18 Japanese were

killed as they slept beside huge stacks of garden produce.949 The willingness to hunt down the

941 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Jan 1945, 9 Jan 45, AWM52 2/2/60. 942 ibid, 13 Jan 45, AWM52 2/2/60. 943 ibid, 25 Jan 45, AWM52 2/2/60. 944 Horner, High Command Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945, p. 400. 945 Numerous reports of such ambushes can be found throughout the 2/8th Commando War Diary. See: AWM52, 2/2/60. 946 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Jan 1945, 27-28 Jan 45, AWM52 2/2/60. 947 ibid, 30 Jan 45, AWM52 2/2/60; 2/8 Commando Squadron Narrative and list of Events, AWM52 2/2/60. Box 58. 948 ibid, Mar1945, 21 Mar 45, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 55. 949 ibid, Jun 1945, 3 Jun 45, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 57; Papers of Peter Pinney, Box 6, UQFL288, UQFL.

264

Japanese, and strike at them in their supposedly safe areas, was characteristic of 2/8th

Commando Squadron’s operational style.

Winning’s personal attitude to hunting down and destroying the enemy was

uncompromising. His orders tasked patrols to ‘seek and destroy’ and ‘annihilate’ the

enemy.950 On 8 March in response to a group of Japanese crossing the Puritata River and

moving to threaten the squadron’s line of communication, Winning ordered: ‘destroy all

enemy at all cost’, reinforcing this later with, ‘This party must be DESTROYED’, the

capitals being Winning’s.951 The attitude to carrying out such bloody tasks was reflective of the ruthless approach the squadron displayed. In a mark of the degree to which the

Commandos had become desensitised by their environment, the killing of Japanese was seen

as ‘claiming scalps’ and something to be celebrated.952 Winning congratulated one patrol for

killing 18 Japanese and ‘bumping’ the squadron score ‘over the century’.953 Such triumphalism was not confined just to Commandos, it was shared by others. On 8 June 1945

Lieutenant Colonel Francis Hassett, the General Staff Officer Grade I of 3rd Division, wrote to Winning, ‘Your recent bag of 44 in one day was quite a highlight. We are looking forward to similar successes in the future.’954

The manner in which this killing was discussed was, however, often less

conventional. One such case, for example, was an exchange between squadron headquarters

and 7 Section when the section requested permission to ‘do’ a group of enemy that

950 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Feb 1945, 18-19 Feb 45, 22 Feb 45, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 55; Winning to Lt. Col. Farger 3 Div Sigs 12 Feb 45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Feb 1945 Appendices, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 55. 951 Saint to Tiger, 8 Mar 45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Mar1945, 8 Mar 45, AWM52, 2/2/60, Box 55; 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Mar1945, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 55. 952 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Feb 1945, 23-25 Feb 45. The actual quote for 23 Feb mentions hunting Japanese and ‘claiming scalps’ and for 25 Feb states, ‘moved out in hope of claiming 2 further scalps’, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 55. 953 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Apr 1945 Appendices, Patrol Report 9-12 March, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 55. 954 F.G. Hassett to Maj. N. Winning OC Raffles Force, 8 Jun 45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Jun 1945, Appendices (2), AWM52 2/2/60 Box 57.

265

indigenous people had reported. Squadron headquarters replied with, ‘O.K. – have a

smack’.955 At another time the order to one patrol was simply, ‘find and kill them’.956 In

February, Winning prepared a provisional time table of squadron operations in which he

noted one of the objectives was to inflict as many casualties as possible.957 Always striving to

strike out and operate more independently, Winning wanted infantry battalions operating

adjacent to the squadron to assume responsibility for the areas which had been allocated to

the squadron to patrol. This would further free the squadron to range out and inflict as many

casualties on the Japanese as they could. 958 In March Winning wrote to the General Staff

Officer III Intelligence 3rd Division, asking that his squadron be allowed to, ‘spread our

gospel and throw him [the Japanese] into confusion’.959 The Squadron’s officers were of the

same opinion, with Dunshea instructing one patrol after an ambush in February to continue to

‘institute further bastardry’ on the Japanese.960 Winning’s appeals were successful and on 8

April the squadron was allotted a specific role of ‘reconnaissance and harassing the enemy’.961

A significant factor in the operational style of 2/8th Commando Squadron was the

teaming of its aggressive spirit with an astute understanding of the physical environment in

which it was operating. The sway of the many veteran Independent Company members within

the squadron fundamentally influenced the manner in which the squadron embarked upon its

duties. In February a special scout group was formed within the squadron.962 This group was

955 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary, Jun 1945, 8 Jun 45, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 57. 956 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary, Jun 1945, 10 Jun 45, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 57. 957 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Feb 1945, Appx G to WD Provisional Time Table Feb 45, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 55. 958 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Feb 1945 Appendices, 12-13 Feb, AWM52, 2/2/60. 959 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Mar1945, Adv HQ 2/8 Aust Cdo Sqn to Capt. MacMichael 3 Aust Div 23 Mar1945, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 55. 960 Dunshea to Winning, 18 Feb 45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Feb 1945 Appendices, AWM52, 2/2/60. 961 Savige, Stanley George, Papers: Bougainville 2 Corps Report on Operations 2/8 Commando Sqn Nov 1944- Aug 1945, p. 17, 3 DRL 2529 Item 78. 962 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary, Feb 1945, 9 Feb 45, AWM52 2/2/60.

266

made up of members who could speak pidgin fluently, who understood indigenous people,

and who were expert bush-men. The scout group answered directly to Winning and came

under the immediate command of Dunshea. The task of the scouts was to go out ahead of

patrols in pairs, reconnoitre the terrain, find the enemy, and report their numbers and

position.963 The scout group also created a direct link to the indigenous population, which

provided a source of information that was otherwise difficult to obtain or simply

unavailable.964

Illustrative of the combat techniques practised by the squadron, stealth was recognised

as an important attribute. A ten-day reconnaissance patrol sent out 23 June – 2 July was given

special instructions that it was to ‘NOT’ [the capitals were in the order] to allow the enemy to

be aware of their presence in the area.965 In April, following an ambush when four Japanese were killed, the bodies were buried and all traces of the ambush removed, the object being for the patrol to ‘remain invisible in the jungle’.966 So attuned were the Commandos to the need

for silence, that even the muffled sound of a signaller generator in its deep dugout caused

concern.967 Searching silently for the enemy was a fundamental technique. Main tracks were

not used, instead ‘kanaka’ (indigenous) tracks were utilised, or troops would break-bush,

which was to move through virgin jungle.968 When seeking the enemy the preferred method

used was to send out scouts in pairs to locate the enemy. These two man teams would move

stealthily, so much so that in one incident the Japanese came within two metres of Trooper

963 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Mar1945, Appendices, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 55. 964 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary, Feb 1945, 17 Feb 45, AWM52 2/2/60. 965 2/8 Aust Cdo Sqn Patrol Instr No 11 2 Jun 45, Raffles Force Patrol Instr No2, 3 Jun 45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Jun 1945, Appendices (2), AWM52 2/2/60 Box 57. 966 Contact Report Panakai Area, 23 Apr 45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Apr 1945, Appendix K, AWM52 2/2/60. 967 Astill, Commando White Diamond, p. 87. 968 Savige, Stanley George, Papers: Bougainville 2 Corps Report on Operations 2/8 Commando Sqn Nov 1944- Aug 1945, p. 30, 3 DRL 2529 Item 78.

267

Jack Guerin without seeing him.969 Once an enemy party had been found the scouts would

conduct preliminary very close reconnaissance of the enemy position, often wearing only

socks or greenhide sneakers – made from soft leather with no sole pattern so as to leave no

recognisable prints.970 Once this had been done either the patrol they accompanied, or just as

often a fighting patrol from some distance away, would be immediately despatched with

instructions to ‘annihilate’ the enemy.971 Any confirmed report of enemy movement including

from indigenous people would be responded to in the same way. For example, a 6 April a

report from indigenous people that 10 Japanese carrying bags of garden produce had been

spotted, resulted in the immediate despatch of fighting patrol to intercept them

successfully.972 The use of such tactics well demonstrated the ability of the Commandos on

Bougainville to adapt intelligently, quickly, autonomously and effectively to the challenges they faced.

Unlike their Aitape-Wewak counterparts, who spent a significant amount of time in camp and subsequently out of action, 2/8th Commando Squadron were active at all times

throughout their campaign on Bougainville. This ensured that constant pressure was

maintained on the Japanese, who as a consequence, were denied any sense of safety or security. The impact of these tactics was apparent. Japanese troops began to concentrate their numbers so as to frustrate ambush tactics. They shifted their bivouacs every two or three days, and frequently halted vehicles to scout ahead. Streams rather than tracks were used as transit routes so as not to leave tracks, and the jungle was cleared back from important communication routes. One of the major tracks in the area ceased to be used by the Japanese

969 Sydney Sun and Guardian, 24 Jun 1945, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Aug 1945 Appendices, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 58. 970 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary, Apr 1945, 29 Apr 45, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 55; Patrol Report Falcon 30 Apr 45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary, Apr 1945, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 55; Savige, Stanley George, Papers: Bougainville 2 Corps Report on Operations 2/8 Commando Sqn Nov 1944-Aug 1945, p. 30, 3 DRL 2529 Item 78. 971 Winning to Lt. Col. Farger 3 Div Sigs 12 Feb 45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Feb 1945 Appendices, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 55. 972 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Apr 1945, 6 Apr 45, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 55.

268

altogether. In a sign of the increasing nervousness of Japanese troops they would often open

fire for no apparent reason, and shoot indiscriminately into the surrounding area.973 Japanese

acknowledged the impact the tactics of 2/8th Commando Squadron was using against them by mimicking it. Later in the campaign a Japanese force managed to insert itself along 3rd

Division’s line of communication and conduct ambushes. The Japanese colonel in command of the force took the trouble to write a note to Winning, in which he thanked the Australian for the lesson in how to conduct guerrilla raids Winning had given him when his troops were successfully raiding the Japanese.974

It was certainly easier for 2/8th Commando Squadron to strike out at the enemy than for the regular units on Bougainville encumbered by logistics, motor transport and all the clutter of conventional war. Commandos were supplied by air, and their logistical needs were much less than a regular sub-unit. Poor weather did however adversely affect the ability of

the Commandos to carry out their tasks, but only as a consequence of other units, meant to

support them; being unable to fulfil that function. Due to torrential rainfall in July the supply

routes for the infantry battalions became bogged down.975 This slowed the rate of advance of

the main force which resulted in the squadron having to suspend its plan to push forward.

This was particularly the case with 61st Battalion, which was operating in an area adjacent to

the squadron. The battalion’s sluggishness delayed the Squadron’s plans to advance by ten days in January-February 1945.976

973 Stuart to Raffles, 25 Jul45, Raffles Force to 3 Div 29 Jul45, 2/8 Commando Squadron 1945 Raffles Force Messages, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 58; 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Apr 1945, 4 Apr 45, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 55; 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary May 1945, 7 May 45, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 56; Astill, Commando White Diamond, p. 67. 974 ‘A week has passed’, 6 Sept 1945, Papers of Peter Pinney Box 8, UQFL288, UQFL. 975 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Feb 1945, Jul1945, 24 July, AWM52 2/2/60; Gailey, Bougainville 1943-1945 – The Forgotten Campaign, pp. 202, 209. 976 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Feb 1945, AWM52 2/2/60; 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Narrative and List of Events – Sovele Mission, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 58. If the squadron had advanced it would have created an open area on the flank of 3 Division. 61 Battalion was suffering severe morale problems during the Bougainville campaign which resulted in a significant loss of capacity from the battalion. This is discussed in Chapter 9.

269

The relationship between the Commandos and their higher formations was another element of divergence between the Aitape-Wewak and Bougainville deployments. The

crucial difference related to the organisational placement of the Commandos within the

administrative framework of their relative forces. The three commando squadrons under 6th

Division’s command at Aitape-Wewak were managed as a group entity, under the command

of 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment. As such, their individual actions were dictated by the

requirements of the regiment, which itself was responding to instructions it had received from

division. The method of management of 2/8th Commando Squadron was notably different.

There was no regimental organisation controlling the squadron. It did have to comply with

instructions received from 3rd Division, but in every other way it was an autonomous entity

entirely responsible for administering and directing itself. As an independent sub-unit it

communicated directly with higher formations. Winning frequently wrote or spoke directly

with brigade, division and corps representatives. For example in two letters he wrote to

Headquarters 3rd Division, one of which was 19 pages long, he gave detailed advice on future

deployment of the division.977 No doubt such presumption annoyed some staff officers and

no communication in the opposite direction was forthcoming. Further, no staff officer visited

the squadron between 21 March and 3 April. When a brigade liaison officer did appear he was ill-informed and unable to tell the squadron anything useful.978 This left the squadron

without any direction. Determining the squadron’s operational activities was thus left entirely

to Winning. In this respect the squadron’s ‘Independent Company’ heritage put it in good

stead.

977 Adv HQ 2/8 Aust Cdo Sqn to Capt. MacMichael 3 Aust Div, 23 Mar1945, Winning to G.O.C 3 AUST DIV, 1 Feb 1945, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Feb 1945, AWM52 2/2/60; 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Mar1945, AWM52, Box 55, 2/2/60. 978 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Apr 1945, 3 Apr 45, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 55.

270

Despite this, Winning continued his correspondence which occasionally found fertile

ground at divisional level.979 That a squadron commander chose to communicate in this way

illustrates the relationship which existed directly between Winning, and by association the

Commandos, and the staff of higher commands. Indeed, the amount of communication

emanating from 2/8th Commando Squadron to its higher headquarters was extraordinary.

During the week ending 3 June 19,369 radio messages had been passed between the

Squadron headquarters and other formations including to and from the squadron’s own

patrols. In the month of May 71,000 radio messages were passed.980

On 23 May 1945 3rd Division on Bougainville established Raffles Force. This consisted of 2/8th Commando Squadron, an ANGAU representative and one company of the

Papuan Infantry Battalion, all under the command of 2/8th Commando Squadron. Raffles

Force task was to obtain information on enemy movements, strengths dispositions and topographical material. It was also to harass the enemy constantly by raids and ambushes.981

To assist Winning’s new force to extend its range of activities and strike at the enemy more

efficiently, it was informed that it no longer had to operate within the range of supporting

artillery.982 The autonomy given to Raffles Force was absolute, provided it operated within

the geographic boundaries set for it and complied with operational instructions issued by the

division. This autonomy would not, however, come without causing some aggravation to

regular units. The extensive range over which Raffles Force patrols were permitted to operate

caused some concern for 3rd Division, which found its freedom to deliver artillery in support of infantry brigades curtailed, because Commando patrols would frequently be found to be in the target areas. The problem was solved by direct negotiation between 3rd Division and

979 Lieutenant Colonel Francis Hassett, and Captain MacMichael of 3 Division staff frequently corresponded with Winning. 980 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Jun 1945, 10 Jun 45, AWM52 2/2/60, Box 57. 981 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary May 1945 Appendices, 3 Aust Div Op Instr No 36, 23 May 45, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 56. 982 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary May 1945, 2 May 45, 25 May 45, AWM52, Box 56 2/2/60.

271

Winnings headquarters.983 Winning managed Raffles Force until the end of July when it was wound up.

As with Aitape-Wewak Commando operators, a major role for 2/8th Commando

Squadron was topographical surveys and reports. Many such reports were voluminous and covered every aspect of the terrain examined. The importance of reconnaissance as the priority purpose of missions was recognised and emphasised by the squadron when, for example, it issued an instruction to Dunshea that he was not allowed to attack the enemy until after his reconnaissance mission had been completed.984 Such patrols also had a direct

influence on the planning made at divisional level. On April 3 1945, 3rd Division

complimented the squadron for the ‘most valuable’ patrol work it had been doing.985 In June

the division congratulated Winning on the squadron’s ‘splendid’ patrolling in the enemy rear

which had greatly assisted operations.’986 In another instance an operation order issued by 3rd

Division was ‘almost a reproduction’ of the information supplied to the division by the

squadron.987 On 8 June, the squadron was instructed to send out patrols to do a topographical

survey of a specific area so as to determine the feasibility of conducting local outflanking

moves against the enemy.988 Such patrols continued throughout the whole nine months of the

Bougainville campaign. This was in marked contrast to the experience of the Aitape-Wewak

Commandos, whose reconnaissance role, while of vital importance in the first two months of

983 2/8 Commando Squadron messages include entries related the issue of commando patrols and artillery support for infantry formations, 2/8 Commando War Diary Jun 1945 Appendices, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 58; 2/8 Commando War Diary Aug 1945, AWM52 2/2/60, Box 57; 2/8 Commando War Diary Aug 1945. AWM52 2/2/60 Box 58. 984 Patrol instructions issued by 2/8 Sqn to Captain C.J.P. Dunshea OC Eagle 2/8 Cdo Sqn 20 Apr 45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Apr 1945 Appendices, AWM52 2/2/60. 985 3 Div to 2/8 Cdo Sqn 26 Apr 45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Apr 1945, AWM52 2/2/60. 986 3 Div to Raffles 30 Jun 1945, 2/8 Commando Squadron Diary Jun 1945 Appendices, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 57. 987 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary May 1945, 15 May 45, AWM52 2/2/60, Box 56. 988 F.G. Hassett to Maj. N. Winning OC Raffles Force, 8 Jun 45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Jun 1945, Appendices (2), AWM52 2/2/60 Box 57.

272

campaign, eventually diminished to the point whereby by July 1945 they ceased to conduct

any serious patrolling.

In nine months of operations on Bougainville 2/8th Commando Squadron killed 282

Japanese with a possible 30 more.989 The peak month was June in which 64 were killed

including on one day, 3 June, when in three separate engagements 46 were killed.990 In

almost every case these enemy casualties were the result of guerrilla raid or ambush, unlike

the experience of the Commandos at Aitape-Wewak a force three times the size whose

aggregate enemy casualties scores were similar to those of 2/8th Commando Squadron, but

where many of their enemy were killed in conventional battle. This disparity again reiterated that the war being waged by 2/8th Commando Squadron was that of the classic guerrilla

fighter, as opposed to the more traditional infantry war being fought by the commandos of

2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment.

989 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Aug 1945 Appendices, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 58. 990 Message Raffles Force to 3 Division, 3 Jun 1945, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Jun 1945, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 57.

273

Plate 11: Commando Operations 1944-45 New Guinea and Bougainville.

274

CHAPTER 10

CONFLICTING MODELS OF COMMANDO WARFARE: AITAPE-WEWAK AND

BOUGAINVILLE

In 1944-5 there was no formal military command structure within the Army whose

task was to authorise, coordinate or oversee commando operations. Rather than establish an

autonomous overarching body, such as the British Combined Operations Headquarters, to

manage the operations of Australian commandos, such forces were placed firmly within the formation structure of the army. They were attached directly to divisions. The employment of

Commandos attached in this way governed by the immediate tactical requirements of the

Division and Brigades. There was no attempt to employ commandos outside the immediate objectives of their parent division. Practical considerations, such as identifying strategic targets in the vast South West Pacific area, and lack of transport to facilitate such missions, may have influenced this limitation on the under employment of commandos. It was also the

case that autonomous special forces, Z and M Force, did in fact exist, and these operated

independently of the Army, and often in support of limited strategic objectives. Yet grander

objectives, such as for example, attempting to liberate prisoners of war from camps, such as

for example at Sandakan, were beyond the resources of Z and M Force but may not have

been beyond the remit of the Commandos has their situation been different.991 Commandos were, however, not considered for such a role. By 1944 the Army had redefined the concept of commando, to one which directly serviced the needs of other formations in the army. It was not, however, indicative of the Army recognising Commando warfare as important in any distinctive way. Rather, the Commandos were expected to behave as conventional

991 An operation titled ‘Kingfisher’ was planned to rescue the prisoners of war at Sandakan, but this was to involve the Australian parachute battalion, not commandos. The operation did not occur. See: A3269 A22/B, NAA.

275

infantry, a role they most frequently did play, rather than specialist forces. As such,

Commandos contributed useful, even if not always distinctively different, service to regular

operations.

These Army guidelines of 1944-1945 for Commando operations were meant to standardise the employment of such forces across the Army. Yet, the campaigns of Aitape-

Wewak and Bougainville demonstrated that there was, in fact, no consistent practice within

the Australian Army for the employment of Commando forces during 1944-5. At Aitape-

Wewak Commandos were used as close support for regular formations and engaged more

often than not as conventional infantry. On Bougainville, on the other hand, Commandos

were granted autonomy of action and engaged in the role of an unconventional orientated

guerrilla force. In many ways this contradiction at this stage of the war, illustrates that, how

little the Australian Army’s overall management of commandos had actually progressed. A

further analysis of the similarities and differences between the commando operations at

Aitape-Wewak, and on Bougainville, reveals just how dissimilar these concurrent Australian

Commando operations really were during 1944-45.

Relative tactical and logistical circumstances influenced how Commandos were

employed in both campaigns. Tactically, on Bougainville the main campaign on the southern

portion of the island was conducted with one flank resting on the coast and one open to the rugged hinterland (see plate 11). There was still a significant Japanese presence in the hinterland which could potentially strike at the coastal force. In such circumstances, a highly mobile Commando squadron was posted to operate on the inland flank of the main divisional advance, its role to be to disrupt any Japanese moves from that direction. This was clearly understood by Savige, the overall commander on Bougainville who, employing his own doctrine of Commando operations in the jungle, always conceived of that Commandos were

276

to operate as ‘flanking cavalry’.992 They were to disrupt the enemy by sudden raids deep into

enemy territory, ambush enemy lines of communication and secure intelligence. In terms of

means, they were to employ surprise and stealth to achieve their aims. 993 Logistics played its

part in the employment of Commandos on Bougainville. Due to a lack of shipping, the main

supply line for 3rd Division on Bougainville was entirely overland, resulting in delays caused

by the challenge of building and maintaining a viable system of tracks and roads that could

take motor transport, in particular the three-ton trucks vital to bringing supplies forward.994 In

this the weather played a crucial role, with torrential rains, resulting in water logged roads,

washing away bridges, and causing the halt of traffic for weeks at a time. This was

particularly the case throughout July and into the first week of August 1945.995 This resulted

in the troops of 3rd Division effectively halting their advance for significant periods of time

and not pursuing the offensive. When regular formations were forced to sit tight, guerrilla

harassment was one means to ensure that pressure was kept on the enemy. In such

circumstances commandos were most useful.

992 Savige. S, Tactical and Administrative doctrine for jungle warfare applicable to all formations under command 2 Aust. Corps (AIF), HQ 2 Aust. Corps (AIF) (New Guinea): N.G. Press Unit, 1945. 993 Lt. General Savige, Stanley George; Papers:Bougainville 2 Corps Report on Operations 2/8 Commando Sqn Nov 1944-Aug 1945, p. 5. AWM 3 DRL 2529 Item 78. 994 Gailey, Bougainville 1943-1944: The Forgotten Campaign, p. 209. 995 ibid.

277

Plate 12: Bougainville Campaign996

The physical environment and logistical situation at Aitape-Wewak was never as restricted. There was negligible Japanese threat from the hinterland flanking the coastal advance. It was therefore unnecessary to employ a covering force (see plate 12). Commandos were thus used in the role of forward reconnaissance, but only for a limited period. As noted in Chapter 8, the use of airpower to strike at Japanese rear areas replaced to some degree the necessity for Commandos to perform a similar function. While airpower was used effectively on Bougainville it never supplanted the role of the Commandos to strike behind Japanese lines.

996 Gailey, Bougainville 1943-1945: The Forgotten Campaign, p. 200.

278

One important aspect of the two campaigns that differed was the attitudes of the commanders to the campaign. It has been seen that Major General Stevens had his doubts about conducting the Aitape-Wewak campaign, and this influenced how he conducted it. The

reluctance by Stevens to risk his men’s lives appears to have played a significant part in the

decision of how to employ his Commandos. There is no evidence that such considerations

influenced the decisions of commanders on Bougainville. Indeed, the commanders on

Bougainville were ‘spoiling quite laudably, for an all-in fight with the resources at their

disposal’ and even though they were restrained for a time by Blamey, they were eventually

‘let off the leash’.997

Plate 13: Aitape-Wewak Campaign.998

997 Horner, High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945, p. 400. 998‘Australia and the Second World War, The Long Green Shore’, , accessed 1 Feb 2018.

279

The consequence of this divergence in attitudes was that at the Aitape-Wewak

Commandos were not given tasks which required them to operate independently, outside the control of their immediate higher formation. By doing so control and management of them was made much easier, and the potential for them to become engaged in what could be costly engagements minimised. On Bougainville, the exact opposite eventuated. Commandos were given absolute autonomy as ‘Raffles Force’. They were deliberately sent out to reconnoitre and harass the enemy.

Commandos had always made use of automatic weapons. During 1942 and the first half of 1943 the Thompson sub-machinegun, the Tommy Gun, was a favourite weapon.

These weapons feature in many accounts of actions, for example in accounts of the Salamaua

Raid, and David Dexter’s ambush on the Ramu River.999 When describing the tactics

employed by his section when defending Ambush Knoll in July 1943 Ron Garland referred to

allowing the enemy to advance to within twenty yards and then unleashing a broadside of

automatic fire on them. This tactic was repeated time and time again until the Japanese

ceased attacking.1000 The extraordinary expenditure of ammunition during the battle of

Ambush Knoll as a result of such tactics can be gleaned from the figures for ammunition

usage for 15 Brigade to whom 2/3rd Independent Company belonged for the period 16- 22

July 1943. During this period some 16,050 sub-machine gun rounds were fired. In

comparison for the seven days following the battle 4764 sub-machinegun rounds were

fired.1001 Luckily for the Commandos of 2/3rd Independent Company, the logistics system

employed by 3rd Division was up to the task.

999 Mal Bishop, interviewed by Dr. Peter Williams 26 Jun 2004; Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 234. 1000 A comprehensive account of the defence of Ambush Knoll can be found in Garland, Nothing is Forever, pp. 208-22. 1001 Report on Operations of 3 Australian Division in Salamaua Area from 22 Apr 1943 to 23 Aug 1943 Part 2, AWM 54 587/7/12.

280

Automatic weapons being used by Australian commandos are also mentioned in

Japanese accounts. Japanese soldiers were warned not to move individually or in columns

when on roads to avoid guerrilla attack and taking heavy casualties to enemy automatic

fire.1002 The Japanese were also reluctant at times to engage the commandos because of their firepower, with one Japanese soldier admitting that the ‘men in the long gaiters and green berets’ had been allowed to walk through Japanese ambushes because the Japanese had been afraid to open fire due to the ‘terrific’ fire power the commandos possessed.1003 For the

Commandos in 1944-1945 the average strength for a fighting patrol was one section, of ten to twelve personnel, armed with two Bren guns, no more than two rifles, with three to four men carrying Owen guns.1004 This gave Commando patrols a significant weight of automatic fire.

In the Wewak Sauri village operation, of the 160 commandos of 2/7th Commando Squadron employed, there were only eight rifles used, all of which were fitted with grenade launchers.

All other weapons were either Owen or Bren guns.1005 It was openly acknowledged at the

time that the Owen gun gave the Commandos an advantage over the Japanese who lacked

such weapons.1006 The Owen gun at close range was devastating. Pinney recalled one ambush

when, ‘in about 2 seconds at least a dozen nips were shot to pieces in a withering blast of

fire.’1007 Overwhelming firepower was a consistent feature of commando operations for both

the Aitape-Wewak and Bougainville campaigns.

1002 Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, South West Pacific Area Bulletins 1942-1943, Bulletin 2915, Item 13, 2915, AMW55 1/1; Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, South West Pacific Area Bulletins 8 Aug – 14 Sept 1943, Bulletin 288 17 Aug 43 Item 1, 3098, AMW55 1/4. 1003 ‘Letters to Mother, 3 Jun 1945’ and ‘Well it looks as if I have made a blue’, 3 Jun 45, Papers of Peter Pinney, UQFL288 Box 8, UQFL. 1004 Savige, Stanley George, Papers: Bougainville 2 Corps Report on Operations 2/8 Commando Sqn Nov 1944- Aug 1945, p. 31, AWM 3 DRL 2529 Item 78. 1005 Bottrell, Cameos of Commandos, p. 257. 1006 2/8 Commando War Diary Aug 1945 Appendices, Sydney Sun and Guardian 24 Jun 1945, AWM52 2/2/60, Box 58. 1007 ‘With the 2/8th Independent Company Bougainville Nov’44 – Nov’45, 27-5-45’, Papers of Peter Pinney, UQFL288 Box 11, UQFL. A contributing factor to the devastation inflicted may have been because the commandos were using dum-dum bullets. Pinney mentions using dum-dum bullets in this reference.

281

A fundamental feature of Commando operations both at Aitape-Wewak and

Bougainville was the relationship such troops established with their operational environment,

both physical and human. An intimate knowledge of the terrain was a prerequisite for the

management of Commando operations. Equally, the management of the relationship between

personnel, both within units and among the indigenous population, ensured both productivity

and efficiency. The very first task for Commandos when arriving in a new area of operations

was invariably to locate and map tracks. Not doing so could result in an enemy appearing

unexpectedly or slipping past undetected. Knowing the tracks also assisted in planning the

movement of patrols and the limitations and possibilities of such movement. Reporting on

terrain for higher formations was also important. The creation, correction and collection of

maps and reports to amend maps became second nature to the Commando squadrons. The

first two months of the Commandos experience at Aitape was consumed with reconnaissance,

aimed at mapping the area into which 6th Division would move. On Bougainville, 2/8th

Commando Squadron devoted a great deal of its time to conducting terrain surveys. The

importance of a solid understanding of the terrain in which they and other formations had to

operate remained a fundamental element shared by commandos both at Aitape-Wewak and

Bougainville.

Of equal importance was the ability of the squadrons to understand and manage the

human environment they operated within. The human environment had two aspects, squadron

personnel and the indigenous population. Maintaining a stable working relationship within the

squadron was essential to ensure that it would function efficiently and effectively.

Maintaining a working relationship with the indigenous population ensured the safety of the

squadron, the ability to collect valuable and timely intelligence, and the availability of carriers

and labour when necessary, which was essential to maintaining a force in the field.

282

A fundamental attribute of the Commandos was an intimate knowledge and

understanding between members of the unit. An example of this was the despatch of

unencrypted messages in the clear that were written in a manner which only the recipient

could understand. One such message was sent by Winning to Lieutenant Keith Stephens. It

read,

Message Saint to Steve Jaguar 8 May 45 0587 Secret sensible nonsense. Hunch and ops haywire. Have your GG --- Young. Waste not want not return your fodder by line. All JB till noon. Bash highway anytime. Collect spoils and come home to mum. JB bully beef may vamoose by hungry Xing. Balls to his Winklestein. If Kanda and MUDA would call to accept my hospitality they are cordially welcome. Don’t go south darling.1008

The meaning of the message is obscure to the casual reader, as intended, but that such

messages could be sent with the expectation that the receiver would be able to understand the

hidden meaning indicates just how well both the sender and the receiver understood each

other.

One factor, which set the Commandos apart from the infantry of some of the battalions, was their resilience. From the evidence it appears that the combat effectiveness of some infantry units in the jungle environment wore down quickly. Keating argues that this was certainly the case on Bougainville.1009 He identified a number of factors which

contributed to these failings: these being a lack of experienced NCOs, the difficult terrain

encountered, the nature of the warfare faced with unseen enemy firing from only a few

metres away, and extended periods spent without relief. Of the battalions with which 2/8th

Commando Squadron had close contact, 61st Battalion in particular exhibited behaviour

1008 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary May 1945, Appendices (5), AWM52 2/2/60 Box 56. 1009 G. Keating, A Tale of Three Battalions Combat morale and Battle Fatigue in the 7th Australian Infantry Brigade, Bougainville, 1944-1945, Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2007, p. 28.

283

which seriously affected its combat ability. Within this unit, there were incidences of combat

refusal by individuals and whole sub-sections of the battalion. Officers failed to provide

leadership, with many pleading for transfer back to Australia. The situation in combat for the

battalion was no better with troops retreating in disorder from engagements with the enemy.

Patrols of 61st Battalion sometimes avoided their duties by sitting in the jungle and not

moving. The battalion’s tactical preparation was also poor. In February a patrol of 2/8th

Commando Squadron entered the perimeter of 61st Battalion using an unguarded track. When

the local 61st Battalion company commander was informed of the track he ‘cheerfully’ replied that another nearby track was covered. The patrol simply shrugged and decided ‘Who are we to argue’.1010 Such was the state of the battalion that its own Commanding Officer

wrote that it was, ‘incapable of moving forward’.1011 All this indicated a serious collapse of morale, fighting spirit and command within the battalion. The 61st Battalion was a militia

battalion which had fought efficiently at Milne Bay in August 1942, but had seen no further

action until Bougainville. In Bougainville a combination of losses from disease, casualties,

combat fatigue, and poor leadership led to a state of poor morale. While the case of 61st

Battalion was not indicative of all the infantry battalions on Bougainville, it was the battalion

with which 2/8th Commando Squadron was expected to work with.

The Commandos on Bougainville did not suffer this scale of reduction in

effectiveness. This was despite their facing exactly the same physical conditions as the

infantry, the same combat environment, and seldom being granted leave. Whilst individual

Commandos no doubt enjoyed being relieved from front line duty, too much leave was

considered by the 2/8th Commando Squadron to hamper its ability to conduct operations.

When 3rd Division instituted a compulsory period of two weeks leave for shifts of twenty

personnel from the squadron to go to Torokina and rest, the squadron resisted the move

1010 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Feb 1945, 26 Feb 45, AWM52 2/2/60. 1011 G. Keating, A Tale of Three Battalions, p. 28.

284

considering that the reduction in numbers would hamper its ability to give, ‘the Nip some

“curry”’.1012 There is no record of any pressure from within the Squadron to take the leave 3rd

Division was insisting on, indeed much the opposite, with one Commando writing proudly

how commandos remained at the front without a break while infantry worked in forty two

day shifts. 1013

There appeared several reasons why the Commandos on Bougainville were more

resilient than standard infantry units in the jungle environment. The first was the quality of the

leadership, which at officer and non-commissioned officer level was in most cases highly

experienced, capable, understanding and stable; an important factor in the small unit warfare.

Battalions did not always have this advantage. The second reason was the nature of the tasks

carried out by the Commandos. These consisted of independent reconnaissance, raids and

ambushes planned and conducted by the unit, the success or failure of which was ascribed to

individuals or the unit and no outside force. Such independent operations, especially when

successful as they often were, could only build confidence and resilience in those conducting

them. Peter Pinney identified this independence as a strength of the Commandos, when he

wrote, ‘our role was easier than that of plain infantry … because of our mobility +

hideouts’.1014 Battalion infantry could not hope to achieve such a degree of independence or

self-reliance. A third reason was, perhaps, the personal character of a significant number of those in 2/8th Squadron’s ranks. These were veterans of the Independent Companies, long

experienced in small unit jungle warfare and inured to the isolation, hardships, frustration,

brutality and very individual nature of such warfare. Very few members of the infantry

battalions on Bougainville would have enjoyed such a legacy. A fourth reason, which was

1012 2/8 Commando War Diary Jun 1945, 8 Jun 45, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 57. 1013 ‘Letter to Mother, 29 Aug 1945’, ‘A week has passed’, 6 Sept 45, Papers of Peter Pinney Box 8, UQFL288, UQFL. 1014 ‘Letters to Mother, 6 Jun 1945’; ‘A week has passed’, 6 Sept 45, Papers of Peter Pinney, Box 8, UQFL288, UQFL.

285

common to all Commando units, including those at Aitape who were not granted the

independence of 2/8th Commando Squadron, was the strength of personal relationships, easy to achieve in small units. Max Luff in his diary gives some indication of the bond which existed between the commandos of 2/10th Squadron when towards the end of the war he

wrote:

One never realises the attachments or rather the strength of Comrade attachments until it is time to sever one; as you (crossed out – indecipherable) look back over all you’ve been through together it seems as though you’ve been sharing; eating, sleeping, fighting, dying, fear & laughter with these people for 6000 years just as if there has been nothing else to do in this big wide world, but just that. Then as suddenly as it all began; it terminates! (indecipherable – crossed out) leaving one with the feeling of having a limb or other very important part of the body severed & as you walk away from them, all the time a voice seems to be screaming at you to stop & go back to them.1015

Throughout 1944-45 the morale or resilience of commandos in either Aitape-Wewak

or Bougainville was never in question. This was not surprising considering the character of

the Squadrons, the relative material and logistical superiority enjoyed by Australian troops at

the time, and that the enemy, despite persisting, was known to have been well and truly

defeated.

The role played by indigenous people, and the relationship established between

indigenous people and Australian Forces during the campaigns in New Guinea and

Bougainville was always of fundamental importance. A cooperative indigenous population

made the conduct of operations vastly more efficient and effective, while an uncooperative

indigenous population would result in the opposite effect. The Commandos at Aitape-Wewak

and Bougainville both had significant contact with the indigenous populations of those places,

1015 Luff Diary, 10 Aug 1945.

286

yet their responses to that contact and the relationship they established with the indigenous

people were very different.

The Army recognised the importance of establishing a relationship with indigenous

populations. The first item on the 1st Army Operation Instruction of 17 October 1944 to 2/6th

Cavalry Commando Regiment as it embarked for Aitape was to support and assist ANGAU

patrols, and thus to work with the indigenous people.1016 Despite this the war diaries of 2/7th,

2/9th and 2/10th Commando Squadrons mention indigenous people infrequently. The war diary

of the former alludes to ‘indigenous reports’ in December 1944, and ‘indigenous patrols’ in

July 1945, but makes no other reference to indigenous people. The diary of 2/9th Commando

Squadron makes no mention of indigenous people until July 1945, when ‘indigenous patrols’

are referred to.1017 The 2/10th Commando Squadron is more forthcoming, noting in February

1945 how indigenous support and information on enemy movements, and providing guides

was invaluable.1018 In March 1945 the Squadron comments on the antipathy felt by

indigenous people towards ANGAU due to ANGAU’s uncompromisingly authoritarian

attitude in relation to the management of indigenous people. Later in the month the squadron

pays a compliment to the indigenous people on the reliability of their information and how

they had warned patrols of enemy ambushes.1019 These are, however, the last references to

indigenous people, who are not mentioned again by 2/10th Squadron. Alternatively, the War

Diary of 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment mentions ANGAU’s Cole Force in October

1944, but then makes no other comment on the subject.1020 Cole Force is also mentioned by

2/10th Commando Squadron in November 1944, with a note that seven members of the

1016 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Octto Dec 1944. First Aust Army Operation Instruction No 48 to CO 2/6 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt 17 Oct 44, AWM 52/2/51 Box 41. 1017 2/9 Commando Squadron War Diary, Nov1944 to Aug 1945, AWM52, 2/2/61. 1018 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary, Feb 1945, AWM52, 2/2/62. 1019 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary, Mar1945, AWM52, 2/2/62. 1020 2/6 Cavalry Commando Regiment War Diary Appendices Octto Dec 1944. First Aust Army Operation Instruction No 48 to CO 2/6 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt 17 Oct 44, AWM 52/2/51 Box 41.

287

squadron accompanied Cole on a six-week patrol.1021 Chaplain Arthur Bottrell recalls that during the Wewak campaign, the lack of indigenous guides accompanying Commando patrols made it difficult to ‘smell out’ Japanese, with the result that Japanese ambushes were often not detected.1022 It is apparent that for all the Squadrons that indigenous people were not a high priority and although they were acknowledged this is done only briefly. The situation with 2/8th Commando Squadron in Bougainville differed markedly.

On 12 February 1945, 2/8th Commando Squadron formed an indigenous scout group to operate as an integral part of the squadron.1023 Armed with Japanese weapons these scouts would perform the same role as the Commando scouts. The creation of such a group indicates that a firm working relationship had been established between the squadron and at least some of the indigenous population. A main player in the establishing of a working relationship with the indigenous people was Captain Ray Watson of ANGAU.1024 Unlike the experience at

Aitape, ANGAU, at least under Watson, managed relations with indigenous people in a more considerate manner. It was Watson’s task to ensure that the indigenous people who came into contact with the squadron were managed in a manner which both ensured local wellbeing and that indigenous people could contribute to the Allied war effort. Watson was also directly responsible for the establishment of a network of indigenous agents throughout Japanese occupied territory. While such a policy was not entirely unique to Bougainville, with

ANGAU doing much the same at Aitape, the difference, however, was that while at Aitape

ANGAU managed it agents in isolation, on Bougainville the agents became an integral part

1021 2/10 Commando Squadron War Diary, Nov1944, 2-3 Nov 44, AWM52 2/2/62. 1022 Bottrell, Cameos of Commandos, p. 251. 1023 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary, Feb 1945, 12 Feb 45, AWM52, 2/2/60. 1024 Watson is first mentioned in the 2/8 Commando Squadron war diary on 2 Feb 1945 interrogating a number of indigenous people regarding Japanese dispositions and the state of local Japanese forces, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary, 25 Feb 1945, AWM52 2/2/60.

288

of 2/8th Commando’s planning and conduct of operations.1025 They kept the Squadron

informed of Japanese dispositions, movements, and numbers. They ambushed and killed

isolated Japanese, and marked targets for air strikes - the latter at considerable risk to

themselves. They even provided the names of those Japanese soldiers who were inclined to

surrender if the right offer could be made to them.1026 The case, for example, of Sergeant

Tanaka illustrates the value of the agent network established by squadron. Tanaka had been

the indigenous liaison officer with his unit. In that role he had become friendly with two

indigenous men and confessed to them that he had no desire to die in Bougainville, and thus

would like to surrender if it could be arranged. Tanaka’s indigenous friends arranged for

Tanaka’s ‘capture’, and he was handed over to 2/8th Commando Squadron who sent him on

to 3rd Division. Tanaka proved to be most cooperative and did not hold back in telling his

captors everything he knew about Japanese plans. Such plans included the dispatch of seven

raiding parties, known in Japanese as ‘Tais’, to attack Torokina. One of these parties had

been tasked with finding and killing the corps commander, Lieutenant-General Stanley

Savige.1027 Thanks largely to the warning, none of the raiding parties succeeded in

penetrating the Torokina perimeter. A clash between a 2/8th Commando Squadron patrol and a group of Japanese led to the discovery of detailed maps and aerial photographs of Torokina, indicating that the group killed may well have been one of the raiding Tais.1028

Maintaining faith with the indigenous agents was an ongoing concern. One example

of just how careful the management of indigenous people had to be occurred in March, when

1025 Sixth Australian Division Report on Operations – Aitape-Wewak Campaign 26 Oct; 1944 ~ 13 Sep; 1945, ANGAU Cooperation, AWM54 603/7/27. 1026 2/8 Aust Commando Sqn to Lt. Col. Hassett 3 Aust Div, 11 May 45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary May 1945, Appendices (5), AWM52 2/2/60 Box 56. The list provided named 48 Japanese soldiers who it was thought would be susceptible to surrender if approached by indigenous agents. 1027 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Mar1945, 11 Mar 45; AWM52, BOX 55, 2/2/60; 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Mar1945 Messages, 13 Mar 45, 7 Bde to 2/8 Cdo Sqn; Draft Preliminary Interrogation Report No 30 3ADP035 Second Lieutenant Masaru Sannomiya, HQ 3 Aust Div Language Detachment 16 Apr 45, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 55. 1028 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Apr 1945, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 55.

289

the squadron was told that no aircraft were available for an air strike which had been planned.

Indigenous agents at great risk to themselves had placed white lap laps on trees to mark the

target. The squadron did not hesitate to inform Headquarters of 2nd Australian Corps that it

was imperative that faith be kept with the agents and that a strong air strike should be made

as soon as possible.1029 The alternative was to break all important trust and expose those agents to extreme danger. The Squadron worked hard to convince senior officers of this.1030

Facilitating the operation of the network of indigenous agents was also of paramount

importance, and anything which might threaten it was always of concern. In April, Watson

expressed his concerns at a program to drop propaganda leaflets over the area where the

Siwai people lived. His concern was that dropping leaflets would incite the Japanese to extra

watchfulness and that this would place his agents in danger. He thought it was best to lull the

Japanese into a false sense of security so his agents could operate unimpeded.1031 In a related

case in July Winning decided not to send ‘European’ patrols into one patrol area for a time.

This was to avoid exciting Japanese vigilance in that area and thus allowing indigenous

agents to work more effectively among the local population. Some of these were sympathetic

to the Japanese, and it was hoped that they could be persuaded to come over to the Allied

cause.1032 That Watson, whose role was to work intensively with indigenous people, held a

position within the squadron where he worked alongside Winning, indicates the importance

with which the squadron viewed establishing and maintaining relations with indigenous

people.

1029 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Mar1945, 18 Mar 45, AWM52 2/2/60. 1030 ibid. 1031 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Apr 1945 Appendix E, ANGUA ADO 2/8 Cdo Sqn Subject Indigenous Tai Tai area middle Siwai, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 56. 1032 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Jul1945, 21 Jul 45, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 57. Issues related to inter tribal rivalries, perceptions amongst indigenous people of Japanese dominance and the nature of contact with Australian forces all influenced the attitudes of the indigenous people to which side they would defer their support to.

290

It must be noted, however, that the relationship between Commandos and indigenous people was never that of equals. It was a relationship born from an era of colonial administration and reflected colonial attitudes of race and the relative position of the indigenous and ‘white master’.1033 ANGAU’s manner with the indigenous people was very

much a colonial one. Indeed, some rank and file commandos thought that ANGAU was

inclined to employ ‘stand over’ tactics when dealing with indigenous people.1034 Winning, whose civilian career had been as a planter, possessed similar colonial attitudes towards indigenous people. He was of the opinion that the only way to impress them was to

‘immediately lay down the law and initiate punishment and reprisals as the voice of the

Govt’.1035

Nevertheless, even though steeped as it was in the colonial attitudes of the time the

relationship was also a very pragmatic one, with attitudes and responses modified according

to the situation at the time. When indigenous people proved loyal and cooperative they were

treated well, if paternalistically, and their contributions to the cause acknowledged. When

faced with a situation in which the indigenous were not demonstrating sufficient loyalty or

enthusiasm for the Australian cause, Winning thought nothing of describing them as ‘a rotten

untrustworthy crowd’, ‘miserable B-S’ and ‘crazy coons’.1036

Due to Japanese dominance in certain areas, and subsequent obedience and deference

demanded of them, along with tribal rivalries, some indigenous people supported the

Japanese. As well as scouting for the Japanese indigenous people provided detailed

1033 Winning’s correspondence for example is replete with references to indigenous people which place them firmly at a subservient level to Europeans see for example: Winning to Stephens, 5 Jul45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Aug 1945, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 58, and Winning to Hassett, 7 Jul45, Winning to Stephens 5 Jul1945, Winning to Pimpernel ‘Jottings Disconnected’, 25 Jul1945, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Aug 1945 Appendices, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 58. 1034 ‘Letters to Mother’, 29 Aug 45, ‘Hiya’, 29 Aug 45, Papers of Peter Pinney UQFL288 Box 8, UQFL. 1035 Winning to Stephens, 5 Jul45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Aug 1945, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 58. 1036 Winning to Hassett, 7 Jul45, Winning to Stephens 5 Jul1945, Winning to Pimpernel ‘Jottings Disconnected’, 25 Jul1945, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Aug 1945 Appendices, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 58.

291

information on terrain and track systems. Such people were seen as a serious threat to

Commando operations and identified as prime targets for elimination. Watson wrote that any

Siwai person who actively consorted with the enemy would be ‘exterminated by his peers’.1037 Removing indigenous people from Japanese influence and control was thus an ongoing quest and exercised a great deal of the energy of ANGAU and the Commandos. One such case was in July 1945, when Winning considered the sexual activity of the Japanese in relation to the indigenous population. In a letter to Hassett he wrote:

Many moons ago when the indigenous and the Nip in this area were friendly the indigenous below catered to the Nips sexual lust and supplied him with concubines. Now by virtue of these concubines, the Nip holds a certain proportion of the indigenous population in thrall. As long as the Marys are there the Nip is loath to leave.

Therefore by hook and mainly by crook I’ll have to remove the concubines and the indigenous….Have lightly sounded those who the Nip holds in bondage and I think it can be done by guile.1038

This extraordinary network of agents, and the intimate interaction between the indigenous population and 2/8th Commando Squadron, was not replicated by any other Commando sub- unit during 1944-1945.1039

One aspect of 2/8th Commando Squadron’s relationship with indigenous people, albeit not local indigenous people, was its association with the troops of the Papuan Infantry

Battalion (PIB) who were attached to Raffles Force. The relationship was never a comfortable one. Winning only cautiously accepted the attachment of PIB to his squadron. He considered

PIB reports on enemy strength, disposition and the results of engagements with the enemy to

1037 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Apr 1945 Appendices, Appendix E ANGAU ADO 2/8 Cdo Sqn Subject Indigenouss Tai Tai area middle Siwai, AWM52, 2/2/60 Box 56; Bottrell, Cameos of Commandos, p. 102. 1038 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Aug 1945, Appendices, AWM52, 2/2/60 Box 58. 1039 Whereas 2/10th Commando Squadron did have ANGAU’s Cole Force attached to it for a time there is no record of any close relationship developing between Cole Force and 2/10th Squadron.

292

be unverifiable until confirmed by Commando patrols.1040 Pinney, who accompanied PIB patrols, considered the PIB to be ‘just a ruddy nuisance’.1041 Contributing significantly to this

uneasy association was the poor relationship the PIB had with the local indigenous people. As

Papuans the PIB shared no affinity to the people of Bougainville, and the association between

the two was a troubled one; local guides would not cooperate with PIB.1042 The practical

result of this was that without reliable local guides, PIB could not patrol out into unknown

territory, which severely limited their operational versatility. In response to this, Winning

allotted the PIB to guarding the Raffles Force line of communication, a role in which they did

valuable work.1043

The management of the indigenous people in the forward areas on Bougainville was

not solely the preserve of Raffles Force. Operating parallel in this area of responsibility with

Raffles Force was the local AIB. The relationship between Raffles Force and AIB was also a

troubled one. On Bougainville the AIB was commanded by Pilot Officer Robert Stuart. AIB

operations contributed to the war effort by organising indigenous people to oppose the

Japanese in areas outside of Army control.1044 On Bougainville, Stuart managed a camp far

forward of the main Australian lines. From this camp he recruited local indigenous people

some of who he formed into a spy network to operate in Japanese occupied areas, and some of

whom he used for occasional guerrilla attacks on the Japanese. Being isolated, Stuart

managed his affairs in a decidedly idiosyncratic manner. His style and the manner in which he

chose to manage those indigenous people under his control was a pointed bone of contention

between himself and Raffles Force. According to Dunshea who visited Stuart’s camp Stuart,

1040 Message 15 Bde for info Adv 2/8 Cdo Sqn 17 Jun 45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Jun 1945 Appendices (1), AWM52 2/2/60 Box 57. 1041 ‘Letter to Mother 29 Aug 1945’, ‘Hiya’, 29 Aug 45, Papers of Peter Pinney UQFL288 Box 8, UQFL. 1042 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary, 12 Jul 45, AWM52 2/2/60, Box 57. 1043 Raffles Force Patrol Instr No 15, 9 Jun 45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Jun 1945 Appendices (2), AWM52 2/2/60 Box 57. 1044 See: D. Horner, ‘Australia and Allied Intelligence in the Pacific during the Second World War’, Working Paper, Australian National University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra Oct1980.

293

‘has never moved beyond his latrine. He lives like a King swathed in parachute silk clothing.’1045 Whether Dunshea’s opinion was coloured by his personal dislike of Stuart or

not it reflected the disdain in which the Commandos held Stuart.1046 As Winning saw it Stuart,

because of his isolation and small numbers, was forced to ‘soft soap’ the indigenous people

and appease them, by for example giving them lap laps made from parachute material.1047

Raffles Force could not equal this largesse. Security was another issue which caused concern,

with Winning accusing Stuart of not being sufficiently careful to prevent indigenous people

with Japanese sympathies from infiltrating his group.1048 Despite Stuart claiming the credit for

persuading the Siwai people to back the Allied cause Winning was adamant that the influence

of the AIB ‘spoiled’ the indigenous people. Winning’s attitude here was perhaps coloured by

his colonialist outlook in that Stuart had established a consistent relationship with the indigenous people, without retaining the appropriate distance between the ‘white master’ and

‘native’. Winning considered that this confused the indigenous people and made it difficult for them to decide on their loyalties.1049

As far as Winning was concerned the competition between Raffles Force and AIB for

the loyalties of the indigenous was insoluble.1050 Stuart was always ready to tout AIB’s

achievements, referring often to his numerous successes in disrupting Japanese outposts and

capturing prisoners. Yet he did acknowledge tension between himself and 2/8th Commando

1045 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Mar1945, Appendices. AWM52 Box 2/2/60 Box 55. 1046 A contributing factor to Dunshea’s low opinion of Stuart may have been having a patrol led by Dunshea refused admittance to Stuart’s camp after an arduous trek through the jungle to reach the camp. Dunshea’s patrol had to bed down in the jungle, much to Dunshea’s disgust. See: 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Mar1945, Appendices. AWM52 Box 2/2/60 Box 55. 1047 Winning to Hassett, 7 Jul45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Aug 1945, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 58; 2/8 Commando Sqn to Hassett, 6 Jul45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Aug 1945, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 58. Despite this Stuart’s own reports refer to disloyal indigenous personnel as ‘swine’ and the shooting of people found to be disloyal as ‘fortunate’. See: Report by Pilot officer R Stuart RAAF (AIB) on coverage of Siwai- Buin Areas from 17th Feb 1944 to 12th Sept 1944, B3476, 83 NAA. 1048 2/8 Commando Sqn to Hassett 6 Jul45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Aug 1945, AWM52 Box 58 2/2/60. 1049 Stuart makes it abundantly clear he considers his work to have been solely responsible for the Siwai to change allegiance to the Australians, see: Report by Pilot officer R Stuart RAAF (AIB) on coverage of Siwai- Buin Areas from 17th Feb 1944 to 12th Sept 1944, B3476, 83, NAA. 1050 Winning to Hassett, 7 Jul45, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Aug 1945, AWM52 Box 58 2/2/60.

294

Squadron, stating that when Winning’s squadron moved into the area he was currently

operating Winning and ANGAU ‘will want control of the coons so there won’t be room for

all of us.’1051 Stuart was an experienced operator, having been with AIB since June 1943, and

operated independently in the jungle with U.S. Forces on both Guadalcanal and Bougainville.

Australian authorities thought well of him, awarding him the Military Cross for his work with

AIB on Bougainville, his citation emphasising his effectiveness working with indigenous people and organising reconnaissance to guide air strikes.1052 The subsequent tension between

2/8th Commando Squadron and Stuart’s AIB operation was unfortunate, but in the context of

the human environment in which operations were occurring it was understandable. The root

cause was the contest between Raffles Force and AIB to dominate the indigenous people.

Added to this was a fundamental clash of style in dealing with the indigenous people with

Winning and ANGAU representing more traditional attitudes and Stuart was more laissez-

faire. The consistent complaints of 2/8th Commando Squadron regarding Stuart need to be viewed in this context.

Overall, the models of Commando operations employed by the Australian Army

during the Aitape-Wewak campaign and on Bougainville could not have been more different.

On one hand at Aitape-Wewak the Commandos were tightly managed and given little

autonomy. In that campaign apart from an initial period of reconnaissance operations

Commando operations were characterised by a focus on conventional infantry work. On the

other hand Bougainville Commandos operated as an Independent Company, a decided

aberration from the standard format for Commando operations as established by Army

guidelines. There were several reasons for this disparity. The 2/8th Commando Squadron had

not been exposed to the Army’s Commando training program centred at Atherton. Second,

1051 Report by Pilot Officer R Stuart RAAF (AIB) on coverage of Siwai-Buin Areas from 17th Feb 1944 to 12th Sept 1944, NAA: B3476, 83. 1052 Military Cross citation for Pilot Officer Robert Stuart, 7th and 9th Division Periodicals, AWM119 248/14 Part 14.

295

the squadron was not attached to a Cavalry Commando Regiment, and was left to its own

resources. Thus the primary influence within the squadron was Winning, its commander.

Winning was a highly experienced Independent Company commander. He deliberately

seeded his squadron with Independent Company veterans. By doing so he retained the

Independent Company spirit within the squadron. This set it apart from any other Commando

squadron and created a platform for a fundamentally different style of commando operations.

In an echo of Major General Steven’s of 6th Division, Winning, personally considered

that the campaign on Bougainville was a futile one. Consequently he resolved not to risk his

men’s lives unnecessarily and saw guerrilla warfare as the best means by which his men would be the least exposed to the attentions of the enemy, and thus less likely to become casualties.1053 Fortunately for Winning the decisions made by the local senior commanders enabled him to operate in the manner which he preferred. There was nothing in the career background of the commander of 3rd Division, Major General William Bridgeford, which suggested he possessed an astute understanding of unconventional Commando operations, or reason not to follow the Army’s guidelines for such troops. In this perhaps Bridgeford was influenced in his management of his commandos by his immediate superior, Lieutenant

General Stanley Savige, the commander of 2 Corps. As noted in Chapters 6 and 9 Savige possessed a well-honed understanding of jungle Commando warfare, and was an advocate for unconventional Commando operations.

While Savige was one level removed from immediate influence over 2/8th Commando

Squadron he was certainly attuned to making the most of his Commando’s skills. An

operational instruction from 2 Corps of 28 June 1945 emphasised that the ‘special and

peculiar’ services of the Commandos should be ‘exploited fully’.1054 In Savige’s papers for

1053 Extract, Papers of Peter Pinney, UQFL288 Box 11, UQFL. 1054 2nd Australian Corps Operations Instructions Nos1 to 20 – Bougainville 1944 to 1945, AWM54 613/4/15.

296

the Bougainville campaign there is a substantial typed booklet that deals in detail with 2/8th

Commando Squadron’s activities during the campaign.1055 No other unit received this level of attention from him. During the campaign Savige carefully noted the activities of the

Squadron, taking the trouble to deliver congratulations to members of the squadron when they received awards, on one occasion having a personal note of congratulation dropped from an aircraft.1056 The extensive use of 2/8th Commando Squadron in the role of independent

autonomous guerrillas, is reminiscent of the use of 2/3rd Independent Company during the

Salamaua campaign, which Savige managed.

In contrast, during the Aitape-Wewak campaign Commandos were employed strictly

in accordance with the immediate requirements of 6th Division, according to the Army’s

prescribed guidelines for Commando operations. This involved Commandos in at first

engaging in extensive reconnaissance and clearance operations, then conventional assault and

self-defence operations, and finally static garrison duty. Subsequently, there was no

consistency from 6th Division in the type of role it employed its Commandos to undertake.

Commandos were employed, or not, for whatever task the moment required. One task they

were not given was to harass enemy rear and ‘safe’ areas. It has been noted that this may have been because the divisional commander had no desire to risk his men’s lives in what he considered to have been a pointless campaign. In that context no real criticism can be made of the manner in which 6th Division’s Commandos were employed, other than to suggest that

a unique resource was underemployed. In the final analysis the Commandos during the

Aitape-Wewak campaign conformed to whatever was the need in accordance with Army

guidelines.

1055 Lt. General Savige, Stanley George; Papers: Bougainville 2 Corps Report on Operations 2/8 Commando Sqn Nov 1944-Aug 1945, p. 3, AWM 3 DRL 2529 Item 78.. 1056 Sydney Sun and Guardian, 24 Jun 1945, 2/8 Commando Squadron War Diary Aug 1945 Appendices, AWM52 2/2/60 Box 58.

297

The 1944-45 Aitape-Wewak and Bouganiville campaigns both provided Commandos with the opportunity to contribute their attributes and skills to operations. That those attributes and skills was radically different demonstrated that even though the Army had established guidelines for the employment of Commandos these guidelines were not inviolable and continued to be subject to the designs of individual commanders. In this regard the Army demonstrated that, despite efforts to standardise, its management of Commandos had not fundamentally progressed very far. Despite its best efforts to create a method of control and coordination over its Commandos, the actual process by which the Army managed such troops had in fact not changed since 1943. In reality the changes made during

1944-1945 were, given they could be ignored whenever desired, little more than window dressing. The decision on how commandos were to be employed still lay firmly within the jurisdiction and personal preferences of the local senior command.

What, therefore, in overall terms was the value of the contributions the Commandos to both the Aitape-Wewak and Bougainville campaigns? The primary campaigns in both cases were conventional ones conducted by large formations enjoying overwhelming firepower against isolated enemy positions. In this context it could well be argued that

Commandos were very much akin to the trimming on the cake, useful as far as it goes, but not a fundamental ingredient to achieving victory. There is no doubt that in both campaigns the Japanese would have been ultimately defeated with or without the contribution made by the Commandos. Perhaps, in the case of Aitape-Wewak, the time taken to complete the campaign may have been shortened if Commandos had been used more assertively, but ultimate victory was still assured.

In the case of 3rd Division the activities of Commandos did add value to the main operations. This was recognised by 2 Corps who acknowledged that the harassing raids of

2/8th Commando Squadron diverted the enemy to guard and sentry duties on his lines of

298

communication, forced them to patrol rear areas and had a demoralising impact.1057 It was

also recognised that the reconnaissance patrolling of the squadron was most important to

ongoing operations, even more so than the harassment work of the squadron.1058 The work of

Commandos, along with ANGAU, helped to minimise Japanese influence over the

indigenous population on Bougainville, and re-establish Australian authority over them.

Commandos had provided an economical means of maintaining pressure on the enemy when

regular formations were forced to halt offensive operations, due to problems with logistics

and weather. The commando experience on Bougainville suggests that if used assertively,

and with some imagination, Commandos could add value to the ongoing operations of mainstream forces.

1057 Lt. General Savige, Stanley George; Papers: Bougainville 2 Corps Report on Operations 2/8 Commando Sqn Nov 1944-Aug 1945, p. 5, AWM 3 DRL 2529 Item 78. 1058 Ibid.

299

CHAPTER 11

AUSTRALIA’S COMMANDOS IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The Australian Army’s experience with commandos during the World War 2 did not

occur within a vacuum. Australia was not alone amongst the Allied nations in raising

specialist unconventional forces during the war, with both Britain, who led the way, and the

United States raising significant numbers of specialist unconventional units during 1939-

1945. It is the purpose of this chapter to compare and contrast selected examples of these

Allied commando forces, that most related to Australia’s Independent

Company/Commandos. By doing so the manner in which Australia raised, managed and employed its commandos can be assessed against its peers, and a determination of the relative efficacy of Australia’s management of its commandos can be gleaned from the comparison.

The first of the Allied commando groups to be examined are the British Commandos, because it was from these that the inspiration and ethos to raise the Australian Independent

Companies came. The second group to be studied are the United States Marine Corps

Raiders, which operated in the South West Pacific area during 1942 and 1943, the main area of operations for Australia during the Pacific War.1059 For the purposes of this Chapter, to

assist both the flow of the narrative, the term ‘commando’ will frequently be used when

referring to the personnel of the Australian, British and United States specialist formations

examined. Hargreaves and Thomas’s criteria for judging the effectiveness of the employment

1059 A note needs to be made here of the reason why units such as Australian Z and M Force special service units, the U.S. Army’s 6th Ranger Battalion, and the U.S. 6th Army’s 6th Special Reconnaissance Unit, ‘The Alamo Scouts’, have not been included in this comparison. While possessing all of the required specialist characteristics of commandos, Z and M Forces operated not as part of the Australian Army and engaged in decidedly specific and individually directed types of missions, thus providing no basis for assessment against Australian Army commandos. The U.S. 6th Rangers which were raised and trained in Port Moresby and the ‘Alamo Scouts’ who were raised on Ferguson Island New Guinea, both began their service later in the war and operated outside the area of Australian Army operations.

300

of commando forces, alluded to earlier in this dissertation, will be used to assess the relative

effectiveness of the use of commandos in each case.

There is a common thread present in the inception phase of British, Australian and

United States commando units, i.e. this is the anxiety generated at a time of national

emergency and crisis. For Britain this was following the defeat of British forces on mainland

Europe, their evacuation back to Britain at Dunkirk and the looming threat of German

invasion in June 1940. For Australia it was the seemingly unstoppable Japanese offensive

down through South East Asia, and the South West Pacific, which appeared to directly

threaten the Australian mainland. For the United States it was the desire to strike back at the

Japanese after their attack on Pearl Harbor, at a time when the United States military

resources were still developing and disorganised. These were responses driven by the

exigencies of the moment, understandably coloured by the desire for retribution in the U.S.

case and desperation in the British and Australian cases. It was in this context that commandos were conceived.

The British, energised by their perilous situation in mid-1940 established the

Commandos in June. The manner this was done was reflective of the unconventional nature of the proposed force. The initial idea for Commandos did not come from amongst the military establishment; instead it came from what was described as the fertile imagination of

Prime Minister Churchill assisted by a number of gifted officers.1060 Churchill wanted troops

of what he called the ‘hunter class’, who could inflict what he hoped to be a reign of terror

along the enemy-occupied coast of France and the Low Countries, and leave ‘a trail of

German corpses behind’.1061 The role Churchill played in the formation of the British

1060 Thomas, ‘The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939-1982’, p. 694. 1061 J. Wukovits, American Commando – Evans Carlson, His WWII Raiders, and America’s First Special Forces Mission, Caliber, New York, 2009, p. 22.

301

Commandos was fundamental. His determination was to find some way to strike back against

Germany. The same cannot be said of the Australian experience.

General Dill was supportive of Churchill’s desire to create Commandos to strike at the Germans and working with his assistant Brigadier Dudley Clarke, a noted advocate of unconventional warfare, established the groundwork for the Commandos. In May 1940

Clarke proposed small amphibious raiding parties and suggested this to Dill on 5 June as he was observing the troops being evacuated from Dunkirk. Churchill approved the idea the next day. With that Clarke established department MO9 which was responsible for recruiting soldiers who would later become Commandos.1062 At first the idea in London was to form a

5000 strong ‘Barrage Force’, with no clear explanation of just what this meant. When this idea proved impractical ‘striking companies’ were considered. This idea soon gave way to

‘raiding companies’.1063

These raiding companies, not to be confused with the commando raiding companies which eventually developed, were solely intended as a response to the anticipated German invasion. They were to provide a well-armed, highly mobile reserve with which to strike behind the lines at the German invaders. When the threat of invasion receded, the ideas for the use of raiding companies evolved into one more closely resembling Churchill’s original intent of employing them to raid the German-occupied European west coast. The initial objectives for such raids were modest. It was conceded that such small forces could not inflict any significant harm on the enemy. A more subtle reason was envisaged which was not specifically military at all. By striking back at the enemy, when for all intents Britain was on its knees, Commando raids were perceived as a means to boost national and civilian morale at

1062 Holt, T, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War, Scribner, New York, 2004, p.11; Rankin, N, Churchills Wizards: The British Genius for Deception, 1914-1945, Faber and Faber, 2008, pp.219-24. 1063 Messenger, The Commandos 1940-1946, p. 26.

302

home. By taking aggressive action commando raids were also seen as a means by which

some sense of the tactical initiative could be restored to the British military.1064

There was at first no clear idea of just how the British commandos would achieve

these objectives, with a range of novel ideas on just how commandos should be employed being put forward. A landing by commandos in Brittany, to incite a revolt against the

Germans, was just one fanciful suggestion.1065 One thing was eventually determined,

however, and that was that such parties were intended only for what was euphemistically

called ‘smash and grab’ missions.1066 There was no intention for them to linger in enemy-

occupied territory. Despite this, there was at the highest levels an intention to formalise the

coordination and employment of the such forces. By the beginning of July 1940 a raiding

policy had been drafted and agreed to by Churchill. On 17 July Churchill appointed Admiral

Sir Roger Keyes as head of the Combined Operations Organisation (COO).1067 The COO’s

function was to coordinate Commando operations, and to plan for any means by which the

enemy could be attacked using such formations. A Memorandum for a combined operations

plan from the Chiefs of Staff was sent to Churchill on 22 July.1068 The formation of COO and

the planning that accompanied it established a formal military command structure whose

focus was unconventional warfare. This was the first time such an organisation had been

formed and emphasised how seriously the British considered their unconventional military prospects at that time. Under the direction of COO several raids were carried out, and even though these achieved very little of military value it was thought they did fulfil the goal of

1064 Thomas, ‘The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939-1982’, p. 694. 1065 Messenger, The Commandos 1940-1946, p. 35. 1066 Note from D.M.O. & P, 20 Jun 1940, WO 193/384, UKNA; Commando Training Instruction 15 Aug 1940, WO 33/1668, UKNA. 1067 Messenger, The Commandos 1940-1946, p. 35. Messenger refers to a Combined Operations Organisation. It is, however, suggested the title may have been Combined Operations Headquarters. 1068 Ibid.

303

inspiring the public and boosting the self-esteem of the army.1069 In October 1941 Keyes,

who had never had a good relationship with the Chiefs of Staff, was removed and replaced by

Lord Louis Mountbatten.1070 Under Mountbatten’s patronage the Commandos increased in

number and relative military importance.

The Australian Army’s experience of forming its Commandos came some eighteen

months after the British. As described in Chapter 1 the initial formation of the Independent

Companies in Australia was fraught with problems. These difficulties stemmed from the initial idea to establish the companies being the consequence of a decision made without formal Australian Army oversight or approval. Very much as had been the case in Britain

with Churchill, the inspiration for Australia’s commandos came without consultation, and

was very much the consequence of the desire of one individual, General Brudenell White.

Thus, caught off guard, the Australian Army during 1940 and 1941 was not prepared to

assimilate anything as radically unconventional as the Independent Companies. The

consequence of this was the abandonment of the commando training program in November

1941.

With the Japanese aggression of December 1941 and a direct threat to national security, however, this opposition evaporated and the Commando training program was

hastily revived. This response to a looming national catastrophe was an echo of the British

reasons for establishing its own commando force. It was, however, at this point that the

Australian and British experiences again diverged. The level of direct interest and support the

Australian Army was prepared to grant its Commandos did not equal the British. There was

no attempt by the Australian Army to develop a formal military command structure to

coordinate Commando operations. Nothing like the COO was ever established in Australia.

1069 C. Mann, ‘Combined Operations, the Commandos and Norway 1941-1944’, The Journal of Military History, Apr 2009, p. 474; Messenger, The Commandos 1940-1946, p. 34. 1070 Mann, ‘Combined Operations, the Commandos and Norway 1941-1944’, p. 474.

304

There were no Commando planning directives or memoranda generated by the Australian

Chiefs of the General Staff. There was never any thought of employing other services such as

the navy and air force to assist the Commandos. Australian commandos remained autonomous sub-units managed solely by the army, and bereft of any central coordinating and planning authority.

The inception of specialist unconventional units within the United States military to some degree followed both the British and Australian patterns. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941 the United States sought any means available to strike back at the Japanese. In late January 1942 Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander-in-chief,

United States Pacific Fleet, requested ‘commando units’ for speedy and surprise demolition

raids against isolated lightly defended Japanese island bases.1071 President Franklin Roosevelt

had been influenced by Churchill’s advocacy of such operations and, encouraged by those

such as his son James, a serving Marine Corps officer and keen promoter of the commando

concept, resolved that the United States should possess a similar capability.1072 To this end

Roosevelt ordered the United States Marine Corps to establish two ‘commando’ battalions.

This directive met with stiff resistance from the Marine Corps High Command, but faced

with the fait accompli of a Presidential directive the Marine Corps had no option but to

comply.1073 Subsequently, two commando battalions titled ‘Raider Battalions’ came into

existence in January and February 1942. The moment of inception for the Marine Raiders

shared much in common with both the British and Australian Commando experience. All

were inspired at a time of national crisis. Just as in Australia, however, there was no attempt

1071 J.H. Alexander, Edson’s Raiders, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2001, p. 29. 1072 Oral History Transcript, Major General Omar T. Pfeiffer U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), Mr. Benis M. Frank, Interviewer, History and Museums Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps Washington D.C. 1974, p. 198, USMCA. 1073 D.J. Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory – Thomas Holcomb and the Making of the Modern Marine Corps, 1936- 1943, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2011, pp. 124-25.

305

by the United States to establish any formal organisation to manage its Commando

operations. The Raiders were to be the sole preserve of the Marines.

One common feature of all three Commando services was the resistance and

opposition they met from their regular mainstream military establishments. It was to some

degree inevitable that there would be a notable lack of enthusiasm for the idea of

Commandos from regular military circles, as such troops did not conform to any standard of

organisation with which regular commanders had been familiar. In Britain during 1940 the

opposition came as a normal consequence of Commandos taking the best troops from units at

a time of national emergency, and given the infrequency of Commando operations at this

time the feeling the Commandos were not ‘earning their keep’.1074 There was also some

resentment at the Commandos being portrayed as the harbinger of Britain’s offensive spirit at

the expense of the army.1075 Mountbatten accused both Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and

Lieutenant General Harold Alexander of ignoring his advice on the best way to manage commandos.1076 Senior officers amongst the Commandos were frequently of the opinion that there was a complete lack of knowledge of the characteristics and capabilities of Commando

troops amongst the General Staff.1077 These criticisms may well have been self-serving, but

what it did highlight was the tension which existed between Commandos and high level

commanders in relation to the use of unconventional troops.

The history of the resistance to commandos within the Australian Army shares

features of the British experience. During 1941 there was very little interest or support for

Commandos within the army. The termination of the commando training program in

November 1941 attests to this. This changed in December 1941, but only as a means to

1074 Messenger, The Commandos 1940-1946, p. 407. 1075 Ibid, p. 408. 1076 Mountbatten to Col. A.H. Head, 11 Mar43, Laycock 5/25, LHCMA. 1077 Colonel Will Glendining to Laycock, 9 Jan 1943, Laycock 5/27, LHCMA; Laycock to ‘Tom’, 11 Mar1943, Laycock 6/16, LHCMA.

306

ensure trained military personnel became available for the war against Japan. In this context

the official attitude to Commandos became one of encouraging their enlistment, even if the

Army remained reticent to employ them. Only three Independent Companies were deployed

in combat during 1942, from the eight companies that by the end of 1942 had been trained

and were available.

Throughout the war the attitude of Australian Army officers towards its Commandos

was inconsistent. One faction, represented by such as Moten, dismissed them as of little use.

Another faction, represented by Stevens and the commanders at Tarakan, Balikpapan and

Labuan Island, used them predominantly as conventional or light infantry. A third,

represented by Savige, Herring and Vasey were happy to utilise Commandos in an

unconventional style. The army attempted to resolve this inconsistency by issuing its

guidelines for commandos in 1944-1945. What these guidelines did was to essentially

officially eliminate the unconventional aspects of the Commandos. As it transpired the

guidelines were ignored by those who had other ideas, but this was beside the point as what

the guidelines illustrated was that there remained within the Army a deep-set opposition to an

unconventional style of warfare.

As an institution the Australian Army never truly accepted Commandos.

Opposition to the United States Marine Raiders occurred from the very beginning,

and from the very top of the Marines command hierarchy. Establishing a commando force as

part of the Marine Corps was seen as danger to the integrity of the Marine Corps.1078 There was also a deep antipathy to establishing an elite within was what already seen by its members as an elite.1079 Raiders were considered no more capable of Commando operations

1078 Major General Chas F.B. Price to Maj. Gen. Thomas Holcomb, 16 Jan 1942, Thomas Holcomb Series 1.1 Correspondence, Dec 1941 - Jan 1942, USMCA. 1079 Study 11988, 17 Dec 43, USMCHD; This antipathy was expressed as late as 2011 when the Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Jim Amos refused to rename the modern USMC special operations force MARSOC

307

than a well trained Marine unit, and thus it served no useful purpose to create such a unit.1080

None other than Major General Thomas Holcomb, the Commandant of the Marine Corps,

expressed his opinion that Commandos as a separate entity within the Marine Corps would be

inappropriate and bitterly resented by Marine personnel.1081 This antagonism towards the

Raiders is likely to have have affected their operational employment. An argument put to this author by one historian at the United States Marine Corps History Division was that the

Raiders achieved very little because the Marine high command did not want them to. The high command had no interest in seeing the Raiders succeed and by not utilising them as much as they could have they were able to use this as evidence that there was no use for them.1082 Opposition to the Raiders never dissipated and would eventually lead to their

disbandment.

Any examination of the recruitment and training regimes of the British, Australian

and United States commandos must consider that over time these changed. There was,

however, especially in the period 1940-1942, similarities between the manner in which the

three services recruited and trained its Commandos. During the period 1940-1942 the

common feature of each service was the preference for independence - both individually from

those who served and operationally for Commando forces. For the British the emphasis on

the unconventional was a fundamental requirement for the volunteers who applied for

(Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command) ‘Raiders’ after the WW2 Raiders. Justifying his decision Amos said, ‘your allegiance, your loyalty … is to the Marine Corps … we’re Marines first.’ See: Marine Corps Times, Feb 28, 2011. It seems, however, that due to ongoing pressure from MARSOC to adopt the title ‘Raiders’ that the title was granted to MARSOC on 6 Aug 2014. 1080 Document 30906: 24 Dec 1943, Memo for Assistant Chief of Staff, USMCHD. 1081 Holcomb to Samuel W. Meek 19 Jan 1942, Thomas Holcomb Series 1.1 Correspondence Dec 1941 - Jan 1942, USMCA. 1082 Conversation with Annette Amerman, Historian, United States Marine Corps History Division, 17 May 2016.

308

Commando service. Such individuals were to be aware that from the moment they were

accepted they were irregular soldiers, and that they were required to be self-reliant.1083

This insistence on an independent spirit was also a fundamental tenet of the training

of Australian commandos. Unlike the British commandos which were organised as battalions

Australian commandos were organised at a company-level. The personnel who made up such

companies needed to possess the personality to integrate harmoniously with such a small

group, as well as the independent resilience to enable them to operate autonomously for

extended periods of time and achieve success. The requirement to maintain these qualities for

extended periods of time while in the field, was a variation to that of the British Commando,

whose active service would invariably be for only a short period of time. Another difference

between Australian and the British Commando was the respective training programs. The

British Commandos were required to comply with the formal governors of military group

behaviour such as drill and strict adherence to personal turnout.1084 While Australian

Independent Company volunteers appreciated the need for discipline and personal hygiene, there was never any requirement for them to engage in drill or any similar activity. This avoidance of traditional military disciplinary fare was a marked departure from the British experience, and very much a product of the self-governing philosophy of the original

Independent Company training mission team in Australia. With the conversion of the

Australian Independent Companies into Commandos from late 1943, this changed and a more formal military culture was instituted for Australian Commandos.

The importance and understanding of ‘independence’ within the Marine Raiders depended very much on which battalion is considered. While self-reliance and personal

1083 The Personal Characteristics of Recruits for Commando Training, The Papers of Major General Robert Laycock, Laycock 1/3, LHCMA. 1084 Commando Training from Lt. Col. R.E. Laycock 10 Jan 42, The Papers of Major General Robert Laycock, Laycock 2/8, LHCMA.

309

initiative were required in both battalions, the concept of independence was emphasised far

more in the 2nd Raider Battalion than in the 1st Raider Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Evans

Carlson commanded the former. Carlson was an officer whose ideas were decidedly contrary

to the mainstream. His career had been anything but standard. He had served two years with

Chinese Communist guerrillas fighting the Japanese during the late 1930s, and this had

influenced his military ideas markedly. Central to Carlson’s philosophy of command was

what he called the ‘Gung Ho’ spirit. Taken from the Chinese for ‘working together’, ‘Gung

Ho’ underlined every aspect of how Carlson commanded his battalion.1085 ‘Gung Ho’

required the subordination of self-interest to the collective. Carlson admitted that such a

philosophy ran counter to the American culture in which ‘greed and rugged individualism

predominated’.1086 Nevertheless he persisted. Carlson was dismissive of what he called

‘chicken shit authority’.1087 This radical approach led to significant scepticism and opposition

from within the mainstream Marine Corps.

One common feature shared by all the Commando services of each nation was the

importance of voluntary enlistment for those who wished to join, at least in the early years.

The importance of voluntary enlistment for British Commandos was considered to be fundamental.1088 British Commandos and Australian Independent Companies volunteers

could come from any units within the army. In contrast, Raider volunteers could come only

from within the Marines. The manner in which these volunteers were processed was another

feature each of the three services had in common, albeit with individual variations to the

1085 Another meaning for ‘Gung Ho’ may have been that it was a corruption of ‘Gongye Hezhoushe’ or ‘Industrial Cooperative’ with the emphasis on the first syllabus of the first and last words. It is, however, generally accepted that Carlson’s interpretation of Gung Ho as working together is how the term should be understood. See: Rottman, G, Carlson’s Marine Raiders Makin Island 1942, Osprey, Oxford, 2014, p. 9fn2. 1086 Address of the Commanding Officer Marine Raider Battalion Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson on the Occasion of the First Anniversary of the Organisation of the Battalion, PC56/COLL3146, Box 2, Carlson Evans F, BFEN, p. 2, USMCA. 1087 Folder: Raiders: 2nd Marine Raider Battalion – Carlson, USMCHD. 1088 Maj. Gen. Charles Haydon to Maj. Gen, J.S. Steele Director of Staff Duties, The War Office, 13 Oct1943, WO 32/10417, UKNA.

310

theme. In the British and Australian models a personal interview for each applicant was an

important feature. In the period 1940-1942 British Commando leaders would personally

select their troop leaders, Troop leaders would then personally select the members of their

troop.1089 During 1941-1942, Australian volunteers were individually interviewed by

selection boards or Independent Company recruitment officers. The Raider’s processing of

volunteers differed due to the nature of each Raider battalion. There are no records of the

procedure for how volunteers for Lieutenant Colonel Merrit Edson’s 1st Battalion were

processed. Edson was a straight-down-the line Marine officer and it is assumed that this was

done in an orderly and organised manner, according to the standard Marine procedure. The

2nd Battalion had been raised less formally, and Carlson was obsessive about the personnel

who wished to join his battalion. He refused to take men would did not know why they were

fighting the war. He would only accept volunteers who expressed a clear reason why they wished to fight.1090 Carlson personally interviewed every applicant demanding from them

answers to such questions as, ‘can you cut a Jap’s throat without flinching?’, and, ‘can you

choke him to death without puking?’1091 Carlson’s processing of volunteers was definitely

not according to mainstream practice.

All three Commando services faced the issue of unsuitable personnel finding their

way to the commandos. In Britain this manifested itself in men volunteering when they had

no idea what they were volunteering for, and many being unfit both physically and mentally

for the role. As in Australia a request was made that army units not hinder commando

recruitment and release suitable personnel.1092 Early chapters have demonstrated how army

units and the recruiting process both were resistant to and uncooperative with Australian

1089 Memorandum by the D.M.O. & P. on the employment of Irregular Commandos now being raised in the United Kingdom, 13 Jun 1940, WO 193/384, UKNA. 1090 D. Shultz, Evans Carlson, Marine Raider, p. 41. 1091 Ibid. 1092 Colonel E.R. Herbert Director of Organisation to the War Office Cheltenham, 23 Apr 1941, WO 33/1668, UKNA.

311

efforts to recruit volunteers for the Independent Companies, and how men were detailed to

Independent Companies against their will. The United States Marine Raiders fared no better,

with the 1st Battalion complaining at one time that the replacements were apathetic,

indifferent and uninterested. The battalion made the point that it was regrettable no system

had been established to procure volunteers when their enthusiasm was at its peak.1093 As for

the 2nd Battalion, Carlson’s personal grilling of every recruit appeared to have weeded out

any types considered to be unsuitable, although the determination of just what unsuitable

meant was very much a personal decision made by Carlson. In Britain and Australia where

Commandos remained in existence, the adherence to voluntary enlistment faded with time, and eventually disappeared as the war progressed, but at the inception of each nation’s

Commando experience it was an ideal that was highly valued.

Organisationally British Commandos were structured as battalions, squadrons, troops

and sections. The British Commando battalion organisation fluctuated during the war. The

terminology also changed from the battalion being called a Commando, then a Special

Service battalion and once again a Commando. The original organisation of the Commando

was a Headquarters and ten troops each of three officers and 62 other ranks. These numbers

were specifically chosen so that a troop could fit within a standard landing craft. In 1941 the

organisation was changed to a Headquarters and six troops, a motor transport group

consisting of a command car, 12 motorcycles six with sidecars, two 15-hundredweight trucks

and one three-ton truck. Vehicles were intended for training and administration only not for

operations. In 1943 the organisation changed again. This time the headquarters groups was

reduced in size and there were five troops. A heavy weapons troop consisting of a 3 inch

Mortar and Vickers machineguns was added as well as a signals platoon. The transport group

was expanded to include a command car, fifteen motorcycles, ten 15-hundredweight trucks,

1093 Griffith to Cmd Gen First Marine Amphibious Corps, First Marine Battalion in the Field - 26 Feb, 1943, Folder: Raiders: 1st Marine Raider Battalion – Edson, USMCHD.

312

three 3-ton trucks, one jeep for each troop and headquarters. These vehicles were intended to

be used on operations.1094

Within the Commando battalion the relationship between the component parts was

different from that of a standard infantry model. Within the standard infantry battalion each

company and platoon was a component part of the whole, designed to offer mutual support to

the others and to operate as a whole. This was not so within the Commando battalion. In a

Commando battalion each component was capable of being an independent entity designed to operate autonomously if required. They were also capable of operating as a battalion if

required. This organisational structure suited small sub-unit operations as well as larger

raiding force organisation. Similarly, throughout the war Australian commandos operated in

company/squadron-sized units. The only exception to this was in 1945, when there was one

occasion when more than one Australian commando squadron was tasked to the same

mission.1095 From 1943 onwards British commandos found themselves deployed in battalion

and brigade groups. The Marine Corps model varied from both the British and the Australian.

The Raiders were organised as battalions with each battalion operating in distinctly different

styles. The 1st Battalion with only one exception always operated as a full battalion, while the

2nd Battalion only ever operated in groups of companies.

The physical training of the British, Australian and United States commandos shared

a common expectation of physical hardship, individual challenge and psychological

resilience. The details of the training varied from nation to nation, although the objective of

each was to produce a hardened individual capable of operating effectively in all conditions.

British Commandos training involved extreme physical demands, as well as the requirement

1094 Moreman, Timothy Robert, British Commandos 1940–46, Osprey Publishing, London, 2006.

1095 The Jikkoku Pass mission for 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment.

313

to master weapons and a variety of skills, ranging from motorcycle riding to swimming.1096

British commandos were required to maintain an offensive spirit; self motivate, act alone and

use initiative.1097 Courses such as ‘The Death Ride’, a toggle rope crossing of the Arkaig

river at the Achnacarry training camp in Scotland, with live rounds being fired and live

grenades thrown at the participants, characterised what was asked of British commando

trainees.1098 In contrast to the Australian model, British commandos did not receive any more

than cursory training in demolitions. Each commando troop had a trained demolitions section

and it was thought that training those not belonging to that section in demolitions was a waste

of time and resources.1099 In another variation to the Australian pattern, the attitude of the

senior British commando staff towards automatic weapons was ambivalent at best. While individual soldiers of any rank were keen to get hold of such weapons, the official British commando policy was that for officers and senior non-commissioned officers to use such

weapons encouraged them to get ‘carried away with gangster ideas’ and to forget their duties

as leaders. Thus it was decreed that no one senior in rank to a corporal should be allowed to

touch a Tommy Gun.1100

Australian Independent Company volunteers experienced similar physical demands to

the British trainees. There was nothing equivalent to the ‘Death Ride’, but nevertheless the

physical strain on volunteers was relentless. Australians were expected to master weapons

and other skills which emphasised field-craft, self-reliance, and stamina. Exercises such as the ‘Akbar’ which involved a three-day exercise humping heavy packs over mountains, rivers and swamps, moving constantly and living on iron rations, with only 10 minutes rest each

1096 British Commandos, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington, 1942, pp. 12-13. 1097 Commando Training From Lt. Col. R.E. Laycock 10 Jan 42, Papers of Major General Robert Laycock, Laycock 2/8, LHCMA; Training Dec 1940, Papers of Major General Robert Laycock, Laycock 2/3, LHCMA. 1098 D. Gilchrist, Castle Commando, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburg, 1960, p. 78. 1099 Commando Training From Lt. Col. R.E. Laycock 10 Jan 42, Papers of Major General Robert Laycock, Laycock 2/8, LHCMA. 1100 Ibid.

314

hour, were representative of the demands put on the volunteers.1101 The focus of Australian

physical training was to ensure that the troops develop the stamina, both physical and mental,

that would keep them in the field for extended periods of time. Unlike in Britain, demolitions

training, was given intense individual attention, with all ranks being given extensive

opportunities to practise with explosives. The official attitude to automatic weapons was also

manifestly different. Automatic weapons such as the Thompson and later the Owen sub

machinegun and Bren gun were given full attention by all ranks, including officers.1102 There

was also a notable competitive aspect to the training, especially when that was conducted by

the original British training team in 1941. Racing Spencer Chapman to the summit of Mount

Latrobe illustrated the competitive ingredient injected into the training program.

The training received by the United States Marine Raiders cannot be easily characterised, as the two battalions were trained in radically different ways. It is worth a digression to examine just how this came about. The 1st Raider Battalion which was stationed

at Quantico, Virginia, under the eyes of the Marine Corps high command, and commanded

by Edson, a conventional officer, received standard Marine rifle battalion training with

elements of ‘raiding’ attached. The 2nd Raider Battalion stationed at Fort Ellis, on the west coast of California, thus remote from official scrutiny, and commanded by Carlson followed an alternative path. When Roosevelt ordered the raising of the Raider battalions he appointed

Carlson as the commander of one of the battalions, with approval to manage it as he saw fit.1103 Drawing on his Chinese guerrilla experience Carlson created a unique battalion. There

were no ranks, private soldiers were encouraged to speak their minds, and non-commissioned

officers and officers, while acknowledged as leaders, were given no special privileges or

deference. Training was strenuous but conducted on a purely individual basis. Physical

1101 Lambert, Commando – From Tidal River to Tarakan, p. 9. 1102 Astill, Commando White Diamond, p. 5. 1103 Shultz, Evans Carlson, Marine Raider, pp. 19-30.

315

conditioning, hand-to-hand combat, judo, knife throwing, crouch shooting, and marksmanship were practised. Very little time was devoted to tactical small unit training.1104

The ‘Gung Ho’ philosophy dominated every aspect of training. Every day all ranks of

Carlson’s battalion would gather for a ‘Gung Ho’ session. These were forums for anyone to speak their mind regardless of status or rank, and for a group consensus to be arrived at.

Carlson considered that such sessions developed a spiritual ethos amongst his troops which would assist them to endure and fight.1105 Carlson’s methods certainly flew in the face of traditional Marine methods.1106

The operational employment of British, Australian and United States Commandos exhibit similarities, but also marked differences. British Commandos began their career in small teams, raiding the German-occupied European coast. While activities such as the 4

March 1941 Operation Claymore, against the Lofoten Islands in Norway, and the 28 March

1942 Operation Chariot against St. Nazaire, achieved lasting results, most raids achieved very little of significance. A standard British Commando mission during 1940-1942 would be to land, from boat, ship or submarine, proceed to the objective, carry out whatever function had been decreed for the mission, return to the transport and depart. Such a raid was normally planned to not last longer than twenty-four hours before the raiding party was withdrawn.1107

There is no specific reason given for the short duration of British Commando raids. It is specified that Commando raids were not to last longer than twenty four hours.1108 Presumably this was to conserve resources and to ensure that highly trained personnel were not lost by maintaining contact with the enemy any longer than absolutely necessary. This role began to transform at the beginning of 1943 with the changing strategic situation, by which time the

1104 COLL/1 378, Land Charles T, 17-18 Aug 1942. Makin Raid, USMCA. 1105 Wukovits, American Commando – Evans Carlson, pp. 265-6. 1106 COLL/1 378, Land Charles T, 17-18 Aug 1942. Makin Raid, USMCA. 1107 ‘Formation of Irregular Commandos 1940 Jun to 1942 Sept’, WO199/1849, UKNA. 1108 Memorandum by D.M.O. & P. on the employment of irregular commandos now being raised in the United Kingdom 13 June 1940, Combined Ops 2 Independent Companies 20 Jun 20 – 7 Dec 40, WO 193/384, UKNA.

316

opportunities, and the indeed need for raiding the enemy had diminished. When this occurred

British Commandos were reorganised with the addition of 3-inch mortars and Vickers

machineguns, indicating a move away from the lightly equipped short-term raiding modus operandi.1109

During the 1943 Italian campaign British Commandos were used instead to spearhead

landings and advances, capture coastal objectives, and seize strategic features. Small unit

raiding was not entirely ignored, and during December 1943 a series of reconnaissance raids

along the French coast were conducted.1110 Yet larger operations were now the focus.

Operation Overlord, 6 June 1944, saw two brigades of Commandos act as spearheads for the

Normandy landings. Commandos undertook a similar role for Operation Dragoon, the Allied landings in southern France on 15 August 1944. Through the remainder of 1944 and 1945

British Commandos undertook a number of roles all of which were essentially conventional in nature. There was a brief interlude in the closing days of the war in Europe in which the old spirit of the Commando raid returned, when such forces were detailed to Operation

Plunder, in which they had to escort teams of technical experts ahead of the main Allied forces, and raid German sites to secure documentation and equipment before they could be destroyed or removed by the retreating enemy.1111 The role the Commandos undertook in the

Far East during 1944 and 1945 involved some amphibious spearhead work, but was

essentially conventional in nature utilising heavy weapons and tank support.1112

The employment of the Marine Raiders was both similar to, and very different, from

that of the British and Australian experience. As already noted, there were two distinct

models operating within the Raiders. The 1st Battalion was trained as a standard rifle battalion

1109 Messenger, The Commandos 1940-1946, p. 191. 1110 Ibid, pp. 251-255. 1111 Ibid, pp. 316-19. 1112 Ibid, pp. 383-406.

317

with ‘raider’ attributes, and the 2nd Battalion as a radically organised guerrilla force. The

experiences of each reflected these different characteristics. The first employment of the 1st

Battalion was to land on Tulagi Island on 7-9 August 1942. Together with two other Marine

rifle battalions the Raider battalion cleared the island of Japanese. The 1st Battalion then went

on to Guadalcanal where it played a decisive role in the battle for Edson’s Ridge on 12-14

September, and the crossing of the Matanikau River, 7-10 October 1942. In all these actions

the 1st Battalion operated in a conventional manner. There was one moment when the 1st

Battalion broke the conventional mould and conducted a raid. This occurred when two

companies landed on the north coast of Guadalcanal at Tasimboko, on 8 September 1942.

There they captured and destroyed a radio station, as well as a major Japanese supply dump

and captured documents warning of a forthcoming offensive by the Japanese. The 1st

Battalion was withdrawn from combat in December 1942, and after an eleven month hiatus

returned to active service on 1 November 1943 at Cape Torokina Bougainville, in which it

assaulted Japanese beach defences. In January 1944 it was again withdrawn from combat and

did not return to service as a Raider battalion.1113

The 2nd Battalion’s experiences were markedly different. Having sent two companies

to Midway Island as a garrison in May, a decidedly non-Raider task, the other half of the

battalion landed from submarines to raid Makin Island, the northern most of the Gilbert

Islands, on 17 August 1942. The raid was mismanaged. Historian Gordon Rottman delivered a harsh tactical analysis of the Makin raid, pointing out the basic tactical and operational errors committed by Carlson and his raiding party during the raid.1114 This first sortie of the

Carlson’s Raiders was officially described as a raid with ‘mixed results’, but in reality it

achieved very little.1115 None of the objectives of the raid; to capture prisoners, documents,

1113 Folder – Raiders” 1st Marine Raider Battalion – Edson, USMCHD. 1114 Rottman, Carlson’s Marine Raiders Makin Island Raid 1942, pp. 75-7. 1115 Folder – Raiders” 2nd Marine Raider Battalion – Carlson, USMCHD.

318

destroy facilities and equipment, distract Japanese resources from Guadalcanal, and disrupt

Japanese plans to assault further south were achieved.1116 Nevertheless, as one of the first

strikes back by U.S. land forces at the Japanese since Pearl Harbor, the Makin Island raid

provided the fodder for a propaganda bonanza, with the raid being presented in newspapers,

magazines and even a Hollywood movie as a great victory.1117

The next foray for the 2nd Battalion was when it embarked on a trek across

Guadalcanal Island, from 6 November to 4 December 1942. Ostensibly intended to cut off

any Japanese retreating from combat with the main Marine force, Carlson’s mission required

his force to operate in a jungle environment for 29 days. When the trek finished Carlson

claimed to have killed 488 Japanese. The cost, however, was debilitating: from a total force

of 316 only 57 of Carlson’s Raiders remained fit for duty when the mission finished, 16 had

been killed and 18 wounded by the enemy, in addition there had been 225 non battle

casualties from illness.1118 In an environment in which Australian Independent Companies

operated efficiently for months on end, Carlson’s Raiders were essentially destroyed in only

29 days. The Makin and Guadalcanal expeditions marked the only significant actions of the

2nd Raider Battalion.

Two more United States Marine Corps Raider battalions were raised during 1943, with the 3rd Battalion seeing service on Bougainville. By January 1944 the Marine’s war had

become one of ‘amphibious blitzkrieg’ against increasingly fortified enemy islands.1119 The

1116 Rottman, Carlson’s Marine Raiders Makin Island Raid 1942, pp. 56-7. 1117 A search of Newspapers.com accessed 20 Jun 2017, for Makin Island raid reveals 39,682 hits. While not all of these will be contemporary to the raid it does indicate the extent to which the press played up the raid for propaganda purposes. The movie portraying the Makin Island raid was ‘Gung Ho’, Walter Wagner Productions, Universal Studios released 20 Dec 1943, starring Randolph Scott. The movie was a Box office success. See: , accessed 1 Aug 2017. 1118 Headquarters Second Marine Raider Battalion First Marine Amphibious Corps, Subject: Report of the operations of this battalion on Guadalcanal between 4 Novand 4 Dec, 1942 – Dec 20, 1942, Folder: Raiders: 2nd Marine Raiders Battalion - Carlson, USMCHD. 1119 Hargreaves, Special Operations in World War II, p. 280; Alexander, Edson’s Raiders, p. 308.

319

number of specialised landing ships had increased allowing amphibious assaults by any

number of units. Marine Battalions had become multi-mission forces with sub-units trained in

raider tactics and skills. The scope of amphibious warfare had thus outgrown them.1120 Under

this new reality there was simply no reason to maintain the Raiders. The Marine Corps high

command, which had never approved of the Raiders, especially Carlson’s unit, deactivated the Raider Battalions, the 1st Battalion on 1 February 1944 and the 2nd Battalion 31 January

1944.

The Australian Commando experience was an evolutionary one and mirrored aspects

of both the British and the Unites States experience, moving from capricious deployments, to

well-conceived independent operations, and on to a final more conventional role of close

tactical support for higher formations. It was, however, the case that a truly distinctive style of Australian Commando warfare did indeed develop in New Guinea during 1942 and 1943 and on Bougainville in 1944-1945. This Australian approach was characterised by accomplished jungle field craft, relentless harassment of the enemy in their rear areas, constant intelligence gathering by reconnaissance and stealth, close liaison with the strategic and tactical objectives of higher formations, and most notably extended periods of remaining in the same operational area where they continued to harass the enemy. The 2/2nd

Independent Company remained in the field for eleven months, as did 2/5th Independent

Company, 2/6th Independent Company for six months in Papua and a further six months from

Kaiapit and into the Ramu Valley. During the Salamaua campaign 2/3rd Independent company was in the field for eight months, and the Bena Force companies for eight months with one of those companies, 2/7th Independent Company, which was at Wau-Salamaua and

Bena Force, being in the field for an extraordinary fourteen months. This characteristic

certainly distinguished them markedly from their British or U.S. Commando peers. This

1120 Alexander, Edson’s Raiders, p. 303.

320

distinctiveness was transitory, however, and only manifested itself during 1943 with the

Independent Companies in New Guinea, with the one exception of 2/8th Commando

Squadron on Bougainville. Apart from that squadron, the distinctive Australian commando

style disappeared when the Army transformed the Independent Companies into Commandos

during 1944-45.

Did higher strategic planning or special planning play any part in commando

operations in Britain, Australia and the United States? It is certain that British strategic

planners considered Commandos as a strategic asset during 1940-1942, if for no other reason

than to maintain national morale. From 1943 onwards, however, the relative importance of

British Commandos receded in the minds of higher level planners, although they continued to

play an important role in operations, being used in a variety of roles such as spearhead,

storming and flank guards.

In the Australian context, Commando operations feature at both the strategic and

tactical levels of war planning. The very first deliberate deployment of Commandos to Wau

in May 1942 was for strategic reasons. The order to do so had come from the highest level of

strategic planning, being issued by MacArthur and administered by Army Headquarters. The

original objective, to recapture Lae and Salamaua was strategic. When this was rescinded and

changed to harassing the enemy, the goal was operational, in the hope that it would distract

the Japanese from using the troops they had in Lae and Salamaua from intervening elsewhere

in New Guinea. The very presence of Commandos at Wau also played a key role in that it indicated Australian resolve to the enemy that Australian territory would not be easily surrendered.

In 1943 Australian Commandos were deployed to the Bena-Bena Plateau. This deployment was for operational reasons, with the objective of denying the important plateau

321

to the enemy. The employment of Commandos for this task was authorised by New Guinea

Force, demonstrating the inclusion of Commando capabilities at the most senior planning

level in New Guinea. Tactical planning on the other hand saw the employment of 2/3rd

Independent Company during the Salamaua campaign. In this role Commandos conducted

deep reconnaissance, and harassed enemy rear areas, thereby distracting enemy troops from the front lines. The role of intelligence gathering by Commandos in this campaign was crucial, and acknowledged as such by the overall commander at the time Major General

Savige. The activities of 2/8th Commando Squadron on Bougainville, especially when they

operated as Raffles Force, was another effective tactical use of Commandos. In that role

Raffles Force protected the left flank of 3rd Division, gathered valuable intelligence, and

continually disrupted the enemy.

For the Marine Raiders the only example of strategic/operational-level planning

involving a commando operation was the Makin Island Raid. The intention of the raid was to

capture prisoners, and by revealing to the Japanese the vulnerability of their island outposts

hopefully get them to redeploy troops away from the Solomon Islands.

Whether or not Commandos were ever really important for the Australian war effort depends very much what is meant by important. If defined as offering something unique and of value, which provided some advantage to the overall war effort, then it is certainly the case in the early stages of the war that British and the United States commandos were important elements. They did this by bolstering public morale, as well as indicating to the military at large that there was some way to strike back at the enemy. In the Australian experience, this aspect of commando service was not so pronounced, although the Independent Company on

Timor did receive a great deal of attention from the press and in this perhaps contributed to maintain national morale. In the same way the Salamaua raid received a brief moment of acclamation.

322

To claim that Commandos forces made an important contribution to the war fighting

capacity of Allied forces is, however, more problematic. David Thomas in ‘The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939-1882’, for example, makes the claim that no Commando operation has ever made an indispensable contribution to the tactical and strategic success of the regular army in any battle.1121 On reflection this is the case in relation

to British and U.S. commandos. The early period of British raiding along the European coasts offered nothing to mainstream military operations, then unfolding in North Africa. It is true

that as the war progressed British Commandos did achieve local successes, in raiding and

seizing defended enemy points, but nothing which fundamentally altered the outcome of any

larger operation. When mainstream operations were considered Commandos were not a high priority for high levels British command.

The experience of the Marine Raiders mimicked that of Britain. The Raiders provided

effective conventional infantry and were used as such on Guadalcanal. In this role they did

provide an indispensable contribution to the tactical success of regular formations, especially

at Edson’s Ridge. They did this, however, as conventional infantry not Commandos. When

used as Commandos, the Raiders offered a propaganda bonus for national consumption, even if their success as such was far from satisfactory and contributed no substantive advantage to the tactical or strategic success of regular formations.

A fundamental factor in the development of Commando forces and the degree of importance given to it was the level of resources, both intellectual and physical, devoted to them. The British decision to raise a Commando force was one driven by a strategic imperative to create a force that could take the war to the enemy when there was no other way to do so. Consequently, the British devoted considerable resources both at the planning level and in supply of equipment and transport to their Commandos. For the same reason the

1121 Thomas, ‘The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939-1982’, p. 698.

323

United States provided the Marine Raiders with considerable logicistcal and transport support, even if there was no genuine desire by the Marines to further the development of the

Raiders. In Australia’s case the situation was based upon the relatively limited base of logistical support available to the Army. The allocation of resources had, of necessity, to be focussed on ensuring the delivery of the most effective outcomes. The guerrilla fighting on

Timor had demonstrated that an unconventional force operating in a natural environment which provided it with cover, concealment and local support could maintain an effective campaign against a much larger enemy force. Such operations when managed well could engage significant numbers of enemy troops in a far more economic manner than mainstream operations. This lesson was, however, never embraced by the Australian Army. Following

Timor, no effort was made to officially develop any form of significant unconventional operational capacity. As discussed General Thomas Blamey was convinced that guerrilla bands could not win battles. The reasons for this were not as unimaginative as they might seem. Australia’s Army was relatively small and committed to a fierce contest with the

Japanese in New Guinea. To divert the Army’s limited manpower and coveted resources from this struggle to a form of warfare did not guarantee victory would have been asking too much.

As it transpired the perceived importance of commando warfare to the Australian

Army was entirely localised. There were senior commanders who recognised the ‘special and peculiar’ services commandos had to offer, but the employment of Commandos in such roles was only ever achieved within the jurisdictional area of those commanders. It did not represent the institutional outlook of the Army.1122 When Commandos became an adjunct of larger formations in 1944-45, the definition of Commando became so broad as to encompass every aspect of soldiering. Such troops were during this period employed in any number of

1122 2nd Australian Corps Operations Instructions No.1 to 20 – Bougainville 1944 to 1945, AWM54 613/4/15.

324

roles, being used more often than not as conventional infantry, and never, at least as far as the majority of the Army went, being permitted to operate independently or unconventionally. In that sense any attempt to identify any importance related to a unique Commando style within the Australian Army, becomes meaningless.

A common feature for Britain, the United States and Australia was that the perceived importance of commando warfare depended very much on the stage of the war. For Britain and the United States in the early stages the importance of commando warfare was high for propaganda more than military reasons. As the war progressed and the enemy were first contained, and then forced onto the defensive, the importance of Commando warfare for both nations diminished. In this sense, Australia tended to follow the British pattern although with distinctively Australian aspects. There was no great propaganda celebration of Australian commandos as occurred in Britain and the United States although the Timor commandos and

Salamaua Raid did receive attention. In contrast to Britain and the US, Australian

Commandos did perform unique operationally and tactically significantly important roles during 1943, but by 1944-45 their opportunities to do this, in all but one case, had disappeared. The importance of Commando warfare for Britain, the United States and

Australia was thus a very transitory phenomenon.

Determining the overall value added by commando operations is problematic. In this sense Thomas’s claim that no commando has made an ‘indispensable’ contribution to the success of the regular army in any battle needs to be addressed.1123 If by ‘battle’ Thomas is limiting his appraisal to one event, a single battle, then his assessment may well be the case.

Such an appraisal is limited, however, and does not reflect the contribution made by

Commandos in the wider sense, especially if we consider entire campaigns. It is a fact that the war against the Japanese would have been won without the contribution of Commando

1123 Thomas, ‘The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939-1982’, p. 698.

325

troops. In this raw sense Commandos were not ‘indispensable’, and Thomas’s argument is

valid. What commandos did manage, however, was to add value to the Allied effort, enabling

campaigns and battles to be resolved more efficiently, and effectively, than if they had not

been involved. Four examples of this, all Australian, illustrate how this was so. The first is

the contribution made by 2/6th Independent Company to the outcome of the Kokoda

Campaign, the second is the contribution made by 2/3rd Independent Company in reconnaissance and harassment of the enemy to the campaign to recapture Salamaua, the third is the denial of the Bena Bena Plateau to the Japanese by 2/2nd and 2/7th Independent

Companies, and the fourth is the capture of Kaiapit by 2/6th Independent Company. In each

case Commandos contributed greatly to the successful outcomes of these respective

campaigns. Similar claims for British commandos and Marine Raiders are more difficult to

make; they nonetheless contributed in their own way.

In this context, were the manpower and resources devoted to Commandos by Britain,

the United States and Australia well spent? For his part, Lieutenant General William Slim,

commander of the 14th British Army, dismissed special service units as a waste of manpower

and resources.1124 Slim’s observations came from the school of thought that wars were not

won by ‘super soldiers’ but by the average quality of standard units.1125 His observation was

also made in the context of significant amounts of coveted manpower and resources being

diverted, against his will, from his 14th Army to the Chindit specialist formations of Major

General Ord Wingate. Nevertheless, his caveat regarding Special Forces diverting resources away from mainstream units resonates. It can be argued that British Commandos, especially in the early raiding period, did not give a worthwhile military return for the resources expended on them. Commando raids which required the use of sea and land assets required

1124 W. Slim, Defeat into Victory, The Reprint Society London, London, 1957, pp. 529-31. Slim did acknowledge that there was a place for small units trained to carry out specific special tasks. 1125 Ibid, p. 529

326

significant resources to mount, for this expenditure mere ‘pin pricks’ were achieved.1126

Britain’s military land forces were recovering from a major military defeat in 1940.

Throughout 1940 and into 1941 Britain was under imminent threat of both land invasion and

air assault. All of the nation’s military resources needed to be focused on defending against

these threats. Expending military resources on Commandos for negligible military returns can

thus be seen as questionable. While the propaganda value of the Commando raids was

significant, in a military sense they were inconsequential, and in an environment where there was intense competition for limited resources such ineffectiveness seems not at all cost-

effective.

The cost-effectiveness of the Marine Raiders is questionable. Apart from boosting

public morale, the resources allocated to the Raiders do not appear to have delivered

commensurate returns.1127 The 1st Raider Battalion, with only one exception, operated as a

standard infantry battalion, negating any meaningful assessment of its cost effectiveness as a

commando unit. The 2nd Raider Battalion, which did act as a purely Commando force, was

supplied with special equipment in the form of boats, outboard motors, special weapons,

transport submarines and surface transport. Despite the allocation of such resources, in the

opinion of Major General Thomas Holcomb, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the 2nd

Raider Battalion accomplished virtually nothing during its service.1128 Once again, the

resources expended on the Marine Raiders did not appear to return results commensurate

with the cost of doing so.

Determining the ‘value for money’ of the Australian Independent Companies during

1941 is less clear. No doubt there were quibbles by some as to the cost of the establishment

1126 C. Mann, ‘Combined Operations, the Commandos and Norway 1941-1944’, p. 474. 1127 Brigadier N.M. Ritchie to Lt. Gen. R.H. Harding, 10 Jul1940, WO 33/1668, UKNA; Alexander, Edson’s Raiders, p. 307. 1128 Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory, p. 125.

327

of the No. 7 Infantry Training Centre, although this was never officially expressed. It was the

case, however, that Independent Companies were small in size and did not draw significantly

upon wider Army resources. In fact due to lack of transport and administrative oversights, the

Army was notably ineffective in supplying isolated companies during 1941 and 1942.

Consequently the Independent Companies caused little strain on Army resources at that time.

It was certainly the case that the maintenance, or actually utter lack of maintenance, of 2/3rd

Independent Company on New Caledonia imposed absolutely no strain at all on Army

resources.

As the war progressed, and the capacity of the Army to supply isolated units

improved, it is easier to determine the cost effectiveness of Australian Commandos. The

operations of 2/6th Independent Company in Papua during 1942 posed little strain on Army

resources, and provided good returns in the guise of strategically valuable information and

support of Allied formations, for the resources expended. During 1943 the value of

Independent Companies to operations increased, with operations at Salamaua, Bena Bena and

Kaiapit. In these cases, the Independent Companies represented a valid return for resources allocated to them. During 1944-45 the Army’s logistical base had developed to a point where it wanted for nothing, and commandos, operating in squadron-sized units, could be resourced without any undue strain. Andrew Hargreaves argues that overall specialist forces provided ‘a proportionally low cost’ solution to strategic challenges, and were cost effective in regard to the damage they inflicted on the enemy.1129 If by ‘damage’ what is meant is consistent

intelligence gathering, as well as effectively harassing the enemy’s lines of communication, and by doing so disrupting the enemy’s ability to smoothly conduct their operations, then the cost of Australia’s Commandos was a proportionally low and cost effective.

1129 Hargreaves, Special Operations in World War II, pp. 265 and 269.

328

The length of time in Commandos were maintain as specialised units provides a

further comparison between the way in which such units were managed by Britain, the

United States and Australia. Britain and Australia maintained their Commandos until the end

of the war, even though the nature of this service changed and adapted as the war continued.

In contrast, the United States Marines disbanded and disposed of the Raiders, converting the

Raider battalions into infantry battalions. The reasons for Britain and Australia maintaining

their commandos remain obscure. There was no pressing military necessity to do so. The

nature of the role Commandos played had changed from their original inception, and became

much more conventional, to the extent that their operations were more often than not akin to

standard infantry. Retaining the Commandos may have been, in the British sense, in

deference to their earlier status and renown. In Australia’s case there had been no such

special status for its Commandos whereas in fact the official adoption of the title

‘Commando’ by the Australian Army in late 1943 an attempt to milk something of the

glamour of the ‘Commando’ name.1130 It was also the case that in creating its Commandos

the Australian Army actually increased the number of them indicating that there was a

perceived use for them, even if their previous unique unconventional role not loner applied.

With respect to British, Australian and United States commando experiences there

were in each case a set of common reasons behind their establishment based upon the

exigencies of war. There was also, in the case of Australia and the United States Marines a lack of consultation with the organisation expected to be the host Commandos units. A

common thread throughout was the expectations and objectives for those individuals who

volunteered to be Commandos, and that voluntary enlistment was initially highly prized.

Training, while varying in detail, in each case was designed to produce resilient, self-reliant individuals who could prevail in the most demanding situations.

1130 Dexter, The New Guinea Offensives, p. 566fn.

329

The operational history of the British and Australian Commandos followed a similar

path. Both commenced their service operating in small unconventional units and ended the

war fighting essentially as conventional infantry.1131 The British used their Commandos in larger formations than the Australians but the work they did was essentially the same.

Meanwhile all three commando services faced opposition from elements within their respective forces. The Australian experience in this case was no different to the British or

Marine Corps, with the exception that in the case of the Marines opposition was intense and ultimately resulted in action being taken to terminate the Raiders. It is in the higher

organisational context of their respective Commando Forces that distinct differences appear.

There was never at any time a move made by Australia, or the Marines, to adopt the British

COO system. Australia in this sense did not follow the British model.

There was certainly a distinctive Australian style of Commando operations, in

particular during 1943. The Australian Commando during 1942 and 1943 evolved a

distinctive character and operational style, unlike their British and United States Marine

peers. This distinctiveness was reliant very much on the unique physical nature of their

theatre of operations. The hinterland of New Guinea and Bougainville was a primitive

wilderness characterised in New Guinea by jungle-clad mountains, razor-backed ridges, swift flowing rivers and streams, thick swathes of head-high grass, brutally barbed thorn bushes, and the tangled rotting detritus of the tropical forest. Bougainville, while not having the precipitous mountain ranges of New Guinea, shared all the other characteristics. There were no roads, no communication infrastructure, and few structures of any consequence within the area of operation in either place. It was virgin territory of the most extreme kind.

1131 With the notable exception of Australia’s 2/8 Commando Squadron.

330

Within this environment Independent companies, acting autonomously in small highly

mobile groups, and without fixed lines of communication or supply, were able to operate in a

manner which concealed their location from the enemy and masked, indeed magnified, their

strength. This unique operational environment provided them with the perfect setting in which to practise their skills for which they had been trained. Whether they would have been

able to do so in surroundings where terrain was not so forbidding, where there was an

established network of roads and efficient communication, and more concentrated and

numerous populations is not so certain. Nevertheless, within the context of the environment

in which they served, and despite inevitable inconsistencies and missteps, the employment of

Australian Commandos was, at least during 1943 in particular, more active and effective than

it had been for the British Commandos and certainly to that of the United States Marines’

Commandos at the same time.

It can be argued that the primary lesson to be learned from a study of Australia’s

commandos during the World War 2, is how not to introduce and subsequently manage

special-forces units. The failure to consult at the stage of inception was a serious fault. Both the Australian and Marine Corps Commandos never developed an agency to specifically administer and manage special-forces, and lacked any clearly identified strategic or tactical purpose. This lack of direction and understanding led in the case of Australia in the first year of its Commando experience to the loss of one company, the isolation of another, and the utter neglect of a third. In the case of the Marines it resulted in the underemployment of its commando battalions. The Australian Army in 1940-1941 never took the time to consider how Commandos were to be employed. The Marines did decide on a commando function for their 2nd Raider battalion at least, even though this was mismanaged. The disbandment of the

Raiders at the end of 1943 removed them from any further comparison with Australia’s

commandos. It was not until 1944 that the Australian Army devised its commando

331

guidelines, a de facto doctrine, which while establishing a set process for the employment of

Commandos, diminished significantly the unconventional nature of the commandos. This doctrine significantly reduced the unconventional characteristics of Australia’s Commandos, and underlined that the Australian Army’s institutional attitude towards Commandos throughout the war was that it never saw the unconventional aspects of commandos as a

critical capability. In this respect Australia essentially mimicked what occurred with the

British commandos at the same time. Prior to that, however, the Australian Commando

experience from 1941 to 1943, unlike the British, provides a template of what in many ways,

is what not to do when raising such a force.

When assessing Australia’s management of its Commandos against those of its Allies,

the similarities outweigh the differences. Australia adopted Commandos at a time of national

crisis, just as had Britain and the United States. There was significant opposition from within

the Australian military establishment to the creation of commandos in Australia, as there had

been in Britain and in the Marine Corps. The Australian experience of recruiting Commandos

replicated the British model, but in not instituting a central authority to manage Commando

operations the situation for Australia was akin to that in the United States. In converting its

unconventional Commandos to more conventional infantry, Australia followed the British

pattern. Indeed, in most ways the Australian Army’s commando experience replicates the

British Army’s experience, with the exception of the period in 1942-1943 and more by

default than design. This concurrence is hardly surprising given the deeply entwined cultural

and military relationship that existed between the two.

332

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has examined the history of the Australian Independent Companies/

Commandos from their inception in July 1940 until the end of the World War 2 in August

1945. The examination has followed themes which define the various stages of the

Commando story.

The first of these themes saw the establishment of Commandos within an Army that was unprepared for such and initiative, resulting in significant resistance to the idea.

Fundamental to understanding this resistance was the failure to consult, or even inform, the

Army of the intention to establish such Independent Companies within the organisation. This resistance was not unexceptional. The Australian Army was an established institution with an entrenched ethos. When such an institution is confronted with a totally unexpected requirement to accommodate a radically different element, it was always likely to resist. That resistance took various forms, from simple lack of interest in the Commando concept, which led to the failure to supply the Independent Company training team with the resources it required, to extreme animosity. The ultimate act of rejection of the Independent Companies came with the abrupt cessation of their training programme altogether. The Army was unready at that time for the concept of the Independent Companies.

The theme of ‘reactive adaptation’ also featured. The Japanese entry into the war in

December 1941 caught the Australian military unprepared. Consequently, it grasped at anything that assisted in meeting the immediate challenge that it, and the nation, faced. To do this it was willing to overturn decisions previously made regarding the Independent

Companies and reinstate them. Even though it was solely due to the exigencies of war, the

Australian Army in December 1941 demonstrated that it was capable of being elastic enough

333

in regard to the Independent Companies.1132 In the same manner the initial deployment of an

Independent Company directly into combat in May 1942, illustrated that the military high command recognised that an Independent Company provided it with a unique resource which could respond to Japanese aggression without any undue impact upon the capacity of the regular military forces. In this case the Army adapted its concept of operations to one which supported the Independent Companies. This process of operational adaptation was sustained throughout the Papuan campaign in which Independent Companies were used to conduct autonomous long-range reconnaissance patrols to resolve strategic concerns, and to work alongside Allied forces. Such adaptation continued into 1943 with the companies adopting different roles to suit different unconventional operational requirements. That these adaptations were localised in character, relying entirely upon the intervention of individual senior commanders to implement, did not diminish their value.

Perhaps the most significant example of such elasticity occurred when the Army, as an institution, turned its attention towards its commandos in late 1943 and into 1944. When this occurred the Independent Companies were transformed into Commandos. This saw the

Army consciously and deliberately adapt an existing type of unconventional sub-unit, which in its opinion had outlived its usefulness, into one which could function as an integrated element within the mainstream Army, even if this transformation diminished the unconventional character of the Commandos. Throughout the history of the Independent

Companies/Commandos the Army adapted their role and character according to what it required.

1132 J.F.C Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1996 (reprinted from the 1926 original), p. 254. Fuller observed that an army’s doctrine should remain elastic enough to adapt to the changing circumstances; in this regard the Australian Army fulfilled Fuller’s requirement.

334

The theme of the ‘unconventional’ versus the ‘conservative’ resonates throughout the dissertation. From the very first the conservative nature of the Army found itself struggling with the unconventional nature of the Independent Companies. It was a contest between established procedures and the radical military culture commandos initially represented. For a time the unconventional was allowed some headway exemplified by the activities of 2/5th

Independent Company at Wau, 2/6th Independent Company in Papua and in the activities of the Independent Companies operating in the 1943 Salamaua and Bena Bena campaigns. This was not to last, however, and by late 1943, with the war transforming into one that emphasised the manoeuvre of large formations and the expenditure of ordnance to crush the enemy, the justification for small unconventional autonomous sub-units was superseded.

During 1944 and 1945 the role of the Commando was altered by the Army to one which conformed to regular military requirements. In many ways then the story of the Australian commando experience during the World War 2 was very much one of the precocious and perhaps overly creative child, being ultimately brought to heel and made to conform to the strict edicts of the stern parent.

The theme of initiative is a further prominent feature of this narrative. This was both at unit and higher formation levels. It was the case that every time the Independent

Companies or Commandos operated autonomously it was because of the initiative, and indulgence, of a local senior commander. Stanley Savige as Major General and commander of 3rd Division at Salamaua and as Lieutenant General and commander of 2nd Australian

Corps on Bougainville is a prime example of this. Major General Edmund Herring, as commander of New Guinea Force at the time, in deploying Bena Force, and Major General

George Vasey, commanding 7th Division, in sending 2/6th Commando Squadron ahead to seize Kaiapit are two other examples. At unit level, Commando tactics followed no prescribed pattern, instead what was practised was adopting what worked best, and this

335

changed as often as the physical environment, mission and nature of the enemy did. It was a clear example of small unit imitative. The impulsive switch from right to left flank attack at the battle for Timbered Knoll by Lieutenant John Lewin of 2/3rd Independent Company, also demonstrated this. The idiosyncratic, yet eminently successful management of 2/3rd

Independent Company by Major George Warfe during the Salamaua campaign is another example. Individuals such as Major Norman Winning, Major Harry Harcourt, and Captain

Claude Dunshea were as inventive as they could be in finding solutions to the multitude of challenges that confronted them. That this initiative was an inherent characteristic of those who made up the Independent Companies and at least one of the Commando squadrons, is a fundamental feature of the Australian Commando story.

The place of Australian Commandos alongside their peers in Allied forces is also examined. This established both commonality and distinctiveness. In terms of inception, voluntary enlistment and training the Australian Commandos shared common ground with their British and Marine Corps compatriots. In terms of operational employment there was, until 1944, no such common ground. Until mid-1943 British Commandos were used for generally small-scale hit-and-run raids, and Marine Raiders either used as conventional infantry or in a very limited way to conduct raids similar to the British model. Australian

Commandos did not operate in this manner, except for the Salamaua Raid which was the only example of the classic commando ‘smash and grab’ raid mounted by Australian Commandos.

In every other case the Australian Commandos operated in the harassment and intelligence - gathering mode. A fundamental characteristic of this style of warfare was that Australian

Commandos remained in the area of operations for considerable periods of time, often in close contact with the enemy. They would continue to ambush and harass the enemy, as well as gather valuable intelligence on the enemy and topography. Such a style of Commando warfare was distinctively Australian and set Australian commandos apart from their Allied

336

peers. This distinctiveness disappeared in 1944, with the exception of 2/8th Commando

Squadron on Bougainville. It was the case that in this stage of the Australian Commando experience their operational style essentially replicated that of the British counterparts, albeit on a much smaller scale. Even so, the uniqueness of Australian Commandos during the earlier stages of the war was pronounced and distinctive.

A further theme is that of resilience of Australian commandos. They consistently exhibited extraordinary endurance over extended periods of operational deployment in the most trying of conditions. The ‘Ragged Arsed’ 2/5th Independent Company subsisting on minimal rations in the jungle between Wau and Salamaua, was one useful example. The 2/6th

Independent Company, thrown into the maelstrom of the battle for Buna and having to assimilate to the military procedures and culture of their U.S. Allies, was another, as were the two companies that made up Bena Force and operated autonomously and in relative isolation for months. Unlike some regular Army infantry formations the Commandos were able to maintain their cohesion, momentum and morale for extended periods of time in the tropics, even if at times they were sorely tested.

The question of to what extent commandos added any value to Australian Army operations during the Second World War is more vexed. They were not indispensable to the war effort. It was the case, however, that when used assertively and with some imagination, and their operations were linked to the wider objectives of the main force, Commandos could add significant value to mainstream operations. The case of 2/3rd Independent Company during the Salamaua campaign is the prime example of this. The operation of Bena Force preventing the Japanese dominating the Bena Bena plateau is another, as were the operations of 2/8th Commando Squadron which worked consistently to disrupt and harass the Japanese.

By so doing Commandos directly supported the main regular Australian force. Commandos, when used with vigour and imagination, could add real value to the wider operational effort.

337

It was, however, the case that the Army, especially in the last two years of the war, did not as

a whole recognise this and chose not to employ its Commandos in this manner.

A general theme of inconsistency in relation to the Army’s management of its commandos is clear. There was never any consensus at any time by all elements of the

Australian Army, as to how Commandos should be employed. The very first deployments of

Independent Companies in 1941 were conducted by an organisation that had no idea what to do with its Commandos, and consequently sent them away on forlorn missions or on missions with inconsistent instructions, or in which they were essentially forgotten. This inconsistency continued throughout 1942 and 1943 in the sense that the Army ceding the operational control of Commandos to local commanders, who essentially did what they wished with such troops. Even when a de facto doctrine for Commandos was devised in 1944-45, the Army’s jurisdiction over the manner in which Commandos were to be employed was challenged by one senior commander in the case of 2/8th Commando Squadron on Bougainville. It is a basic

characteristic of the Australian Army’s management of Commandos during the World War 2

that the Army, as an institution, never established a universal agreement as to how its

Commandos were to be utilised.

A final note is to consider the observations of historian Peter Stanley, who contended

that Commando squadrons represented one of the few innovative Australian Army

organisational solutions of the World War 2.1133 The initial conception for the Independent

Companies was not an Australian idea. There is certainly no evidence that the idea originated

within Australia. It was in fact a suggestion of the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

It can be justifiably argued that the manner in which the Independent Companies developed

into a distinctively Australia style of commando was innovative, but such innovation was the

1133 P. Stanley, Tarakan an Australian Tragedy, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1997, p. 38.

338

prerogative of individual senior officers who allowed them to evolve in a manner driven by

their own training and independent ethos. The Army as a whole played no part in this.

If we narrow our focus to the Australian commando squadrons, which came into

effective existence in early 1944, then there is certainly a change occurring in the

organisational structure of Commando units as well as that of Divisions to accommodate

them. This is not, however, original in its outcome. In effect what were created, were highly-

trained light infantry sub-units. The idea of light infantry was a well-established one and had

been practised by the British Army since the late eighteenth century.1134 The Australian Army merely adapted this technique to its own requirements in the jungle. There is an argument that the Australian Army has never been an innovative organisation, and that even though its tactical ability has never been questioned, it has never exhibited a marked capacity to create anything truly new or different.1135 In the case of Commandos during the World War 2, when

such units are considered from the perspective of the Army as a whole, this seems to have

been the case.

The challenge in writing this dissertation has been unravelling the collective history of

Australia’s Commandos. There are no prior works on the topic. Those published references

that do exist are parochial unit histories, many self-published, or generalised secondary

sources. While the parochial sources have been valuable for fixing points in the story to focus

on, it has been archives here and overseas that have been the source for the most useful

material in this dissertation. Collecting the material required has thus necessitated casting a

very wide net and extensive travel.

1134 See: Gates, The British Light Infantry Arm c.1790-1815, B.T. Batsford Ltd, London, 1987. 1135 Brigadier Chris Roberts AM, CSC, Commanding Officer Special Air Service Regiment, Director of Special Action Forces, Commander Headquarters Special Forces - email conversation 6 Feb 2018.

339

Examining the Independent Companies/Commandos has also raised two issues which

would benefit from further study. The first of these is to examine the incidence of true

innovation within the Australian Army throughout its history, and the Army’s capacity to

generate and implement new ideas and concepts derived from independent inspiration. The

second issue is that of the Australian military’s actions in regard to the treatment of

surrendered enemy, non-combatants and indigenous people during the Pacific War, an issue

brought to the fore by the Independent Companies and Commandos. How appropriate was

the treatment given to these groups in relation to the rules of war and circumstances of the

time?

The Independent Companies/Commandos are acknowledged today within the

Australian Defence Force as setting the example and as the foundation for Australia’s modern

Special Forces.1136 In reality, however, this presumed lineage and association is more

emotional than actual. The Commandos were all disbanded by the beginning of February

1946 and forgotten by the Australian Army until 1955 when two CMF Commando were

formed. The commander of one of them being Major Mac Grant a veteran Commando from

the Second World War. These two formations did have a historical connection with the

Second World War Commandos but were not direct lineal descendants of them. In 1957 the

Army formed a Special Air Service Company in 1957, and the Special Air Service Regiment

in 1964. The modern relationship between the Australian Army and the Second World War

Australian Commandos is one which draws on the record of the practitioners of the art during

1941-1945 as an inspiration for the special warfare ethos of the modern Australian Army.

1136 Major General Jeff Sengelman, Special Operations Commander Australian Army, address, BAE Theatre AWM, 2 Aug 2016.

340

Australian Independent Companies/Commando Squadrons were unique formations.

The tactics they employed, time spent on active operations and autonomy they enjoyed, were not replicated by any other unit within the Australian Army nor by any other Allied

Commando force. This thesis aims to fill a gap in the historiography of Australia’s military experience. It is the author’s hope that this dissertation, in some small way, has contributed to a more nuanced understanding of the history of the Australian Independent

Companies/Commandos during the World War 2.

341

APPENDIX A

Australian Independent Company Organisation

17 Officers.

256 Other Ranks.

Company Headquarters, One Major, One Captain, One Company Sergeant Major, Company Quarter Master Sergeant, Other Ranks 9 Personnel.

Three 60 man platoons designated A, B, C.

Each Platoon of three Sections of 19 personnel, each Section numbered 1-9.

One Engineer Section of 21 personnel.

One Signals Section of 34 personnel.

One Medical Section of six personnel.

One Transport Section of four personnel.

The Company was commanded by a Major, with a Captain as second in Command. Each Platoon was commanded by a Captain. All Sections were commanded by a Lieutenant. The Medical Section was commanded by a Captain.

Company totals

One Major

Five Captains

Eleven Lieutenants

256 Other Ranks.1137

1137Structure of an Australian Independent Company, 1942, accessed, 10 June 2018.

342

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Australia

Australian Defence Force Academy Library

D767.7 R46 1945 B/C 438011 Report on Operation Oboe 1 Tarakan Borneo May 1945.

MS 341 Keating, G., Research papers.

National Archives of Australia

Series:

A571 Correspondence files.

A1241 Diaries of Sir Cyril Brundenell White as (1) Chief of the General Staff and (2)

Chairman of the Public Service Board.

A12383, Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security, correspondence files.

A1608, Correspondence files.

A2670, Reference set of War Cabinet agenda with minutes.

A2680, Advisory War Council Agenda files.

A2684, Advisory War Council Minute files.

A5954, The Shedden Collection – Records of Sir Frederick Shedden.

A6390, Registration and Movement cards, correspondence files.

A7665, Master set of Army Training Films.

B883, Second Australian Imperial Force Personnel Dossiers, 1939-1947.

B3476, Coast-watching files.

B6390, Routine Orders Part 2.

MP385/5, Security classified (Secret) correspondence.

MP508, General Correspondence files.

MP729/7, Secret Correspondence files.

343

MP742, General and civil staff correspondence files and Army personnel files.

MP917/2, Casualty registers of Australian servicemen in the war 1939-45.

SP300, ABC Talk Scripts.

Australian War Memorial

Series:

52, 2AIF Unit War Diaries.

54, Written Records, 1939-1945 War.

55, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATS) publications.

63, 2nd 2AIF Headquarters (Middle East), registry records.

67, Official History, 1939-45, Records of Gavin Long, General Editor.

93, Australian War Memorial files – First Series.

113, Records of the Military Section (Army)

124, Naval Historical Collection.

172, Official History, 1939-45 War, Series 1 (Army) Volume VI, Records of David Dexter.

193, Eastern Command ‘G’ Branch registry files.

243, Inter-service Demobilisation Committee Records.

315, Australian War Memorial registry files – second series.

361,Official Records Microfilm Collection.

DRL, Private Records, Donated Records List:

AWM 3DRL/6766 Arden, John PH ‘Jack’.

AWM 3 DRL 2529 Item 78; Lt. General Savige, Stanley George; Papers:Bougainville 2

Corps Report on Operations 2/8 Commando Sqn Nov 1944-August 1945.

AWM 3DRL 8052 419/45/13, Sir Paul Hasluck Official Historian – Research on New

Caledonia.

344

AWM 3 DRL 8052 419/45/13, War Cabinet Agenda – New Caledonia – Importance of

Taking Immediate Action to Prevent it Falling into Japanese Hands.

AWM 3DRL/6643, Blamey to Herring, 10 Dec 1945.

AWM 3DRL/6643, Blamey to Chifley, 18 May 1945 – Appreciation on Operations of the AMF in New Guinea, New Britain and the Solomon Islands – 13 May 45.

Manuscripts: MSS1960 Geoffrey Thomas Fraser., Highly Irregular; 063813 T. Yoshihara,

Southern Cross: account of the Eastern new Guinea Campaign.

SO4152, Neil MacDonald recorded interviews with members of the Independent Companies.

University of Queensland Freyer Library

UQFL288, Papers of Peter Pinney.

United Kingdom

National Archives Kew, London.

Series:

WO199, War Office: Home Forces Military Headquarters Papers, Second World War.

WO208, War Office Directorate of Military Intelligence and Directorate of Military

Intelligence, Ministry of Defence Intelligence Staff. Files.

HS8, Records of Special Operations Executive (SOE), Headquarters Records.

Imperial War Museum Research Centre, London.

Series: 9942 audio recorded interview Michael Calvert

Liddell Hart Military Archive – King’s College, London.

Series:

Papers of Field Marshal Sir John Dill.

Papers of Major General Sir Robert Laycock.

United States

Archives Branch Historical Division U.S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Virginia

345

Oral History Transcripts.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Journal of 1st Bn 128th Infantry, September – November 1942 (incomplete), Series II Library

Reference Publications.

MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia

Historical Index Cards (Actual) Record Group 3.

‘Studies in the History of General Douglas MacArthur’s Commands in the Pacific

“Establishment of the Southwest Pacific Area and the Papuan Campaign 7 December 1941 –

22 January 1943”’

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

Series:

RG 319, Records of the Army Staff.

RG407, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office.

RG496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army

Forces, Pacific (World War II)

Records of the Army Staff Center of Military History – Victory in Papua.

U.S. Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, Virginia

Series: PC56, Folder - Raiders: 1st and 2nd Marine Raider Battalions.

Secondary Sources

Alexander, J.H., Edson’s Raiders, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2001.

Alexander, L., Shadows in the Jungle – The Alamo Scouts Behind Japanese Lines in World

War II, Nal Caliber, New York, 2009.

Ambon and Timor Invasion Operations, Military History Section Headquarters Army Forces

Far East, Office of the Chief of the Military History Department of the Army, 1953.

346

Anders, L., Gentle Knight the Life and Times of Major General Edwin Forrest Harding, The

Kent State University Press, Kent State, Ohio, 1981.

Anderson, N., To Kokoda, Australian Army Campaigns Series, Australian Army History

Unit, Big Sky Publishing, Sydney, 2014.

As You Were 1948, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1948.

Astill, D., Commando White Diamond: Memoir of Service of the 2/8 Australian Commando

Squadron, Australia and the South-West Pacific 1942–1945, Loftus, Sydney, 1996.

Astley, J.B., The Inner Circle: A View of War at the Top, The Memoir Club, Stanhope, 2007.

Ayris, C., All the Bull’s Men: No.2 Australian Independent Company (2/2 Commando

Squadron), published by 2/2 Commando Association, Hamilton Hill, Western Australia,

2006.

Ball, R., Torres Strait Force 1942-1945: The Defence of Cape York – Torres Strait and

Merauke Dutch New Guinea, Australian Military History Publications, Sydney, 1996.

Barker, R., One Man’s Jungle: A Biography of F. Spencer Chapman, Chatto & Windus,

London, 1975.

Bidwell, S., The Chindit War: Stillwell, Wingate and the Campaign in Burma: 1944,

Macmillan, New York, 1979.

Blake, G., Jungle Cavalry, Helion & Company, Warwick, 2019.

Bottrell, A.E.E., Cameos of commandos: Memories of Eight Australian Commando

Squadrons in New Guinea and Queensland, A.E.E. Bottrell, Daw Park, S.A. 1971.

Boxall, J., Story of the 2/5 Australian Commando Squadron 2AIF, Metropolitan Printers,

Lakemba, NSW, 1961.

Bullard, S., Japanese Army Operations in the South West Pacific Area – New Britain and the

Papua Campaign, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 2007.

347

Brown. C.A (ed)., The Official History of Special Operations – Australia, 3 Vols,

Organisation, SOA Books, Lexington Kentucky, 2011.

Butlin, S.J., Australia in the War of 1939-194, Series Four CIVIL, Volume III, War Economy

1939-1942, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1955.

British Commandos, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington, 1942.

Bradley, P., Hell’s Battlefield - The Australians in New Guinea in World War II, Allen and

Unwin, Sydney, 2012.

______To Salamau, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2010.

______The Battle for Wau, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2008.

P. Brune; The Spell Broken: exploding the myth of Japanese invincibility: Milne Bay to Buna-

Sanananda 1942-43, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1998.

______Those Ragged Bloody Heroes: from the Kokoda Trail to Gona Beach 1942, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1991.

Callinan, B., Independent Company: The Australian Army in Portuguese Timor 1941–43,

Heinemann, Richmond, Vic, 1984.

Calvert, M., Prisoners of Hope, Cooper, London, 1971.

Campbell, A., The Double Reds of Timor, John Burrige Military Antiques, Swanbourne,

1995.

Charters, D. and Tugwell M. [ed]., Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict, Brassey’s Defence

Publishers, London, 1989.

Churchill, W.S., The Second World War Vol.2 Their Finest Hour, Cassell & Co Ltd, London,

1949.

Cleary, P., The Men who Came Out of the Ground – a gripping account of Australia’s first

Commando campaign, Hachette, Sydney, 2016.

348

Collins, L., New Guinea Narrative – The Round trip 1942-1943, self published, Blairgowie

Victoria, 2001.

Collins, P., Strike Swiftly: The Australian Commando Story, Watermark Press, Sydney, 2005.

Coyne, R., The First Commandos: Ralph Coyne’s Wartime Experiences 1942-1945, Petraus Press, Belconnen, 2009.

Dean, P (ed.)., Australia 1942 – In the Shadow of War, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2013.

______Australia 1943 The Liberation of New Guinea, Cambridge University Press,

Melbourne, 2014.

______Australia 1944 – 45 Victory in the Pacific, Cambridge University Press,

Melbourne, 2016.

Dennis, P. and Grey, J (eds.)., The Foundations of Victory: The Pacific War 1943-1944,

Australian Army History Conference, 2004.

Derham, R., The Silence Ruse: Escape from Gallipoli – A Record and Memories of the Life of

General Sir Brudenell White KCB KCMG KCVO DSO, Cliffe Books, Armadale, 1998.

Dexter, D., The New Guinea Offensives, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series One

Army, Volume VI, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1961.

Doig, C.D., The History of the Second Independent Company, C.D. Doig, Perth, 1986.

Downs, I., The New Guinea Volunteer Rifles NGVR 1939-1945: A History, Pacific Press,

Broadbeach Waters, 1999.

Duffy, J.P., War at the End of the World – Douglas MacArthur and the Forgotten Fight for

New Guinea, Nal Caliber, New York, 2016.

Elting, E.M., Men, Machines, and Modern Times, The M.I.T Press, Cambridge

Massachusetts, 1966.

Feuer, A.B. (ed)., Coast watching in the Solomon Islands – The Bougainville Reports,

December 1941-July 1943, Praeger, New York, 1992.

349

Fitzsimons, P., Kokoda, Hachette, Sydney, 2008.

Foot, M.R., SOE - The Special Operations Executive 1940-1946, British Broadcasting

Corporation, London, 1984.

Fraser, G., Highly Irregular, self-published, Sunshine Coast, 2003.

Gailey, H.A., MacArthur Strikes Back – Decision at Buna, New Guinea 1942-1943, Presidio

Press, Novato, 2000.

______Bougainville 1943-1945 – The Forgotten Campaign, University of Kentucky

Press, Lexington, 1991.

Gamble, B., Darkest Hour: the True Story of Lark Force at Rabaul, Australia’s Worst

Military Disaster of World War II, Zenith Press, St. Paul Minnesota, 2006.

Garland, R., Nothing is Forever: The History of 2/3rd Commandos, self published, Malabar

Heights, NSW, 1997.

Gates, D., The British Light Infantry Army c.1790-1815 Its creation, and Operational role,

B.T. Batsford Ltd., London, 1987.

Gilchrist, D., Castle Commando, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1960.

Gray C.S., Explorations in Strategy, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1996.

______Modern Strategy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.

______The Strategy Bridge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.

P. Ham., Kokoda, ABC Books, Pymble, 2004.

Hargreaves, A., Special Operations in World War II: British and American Irregular

Warfare, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2013.

Hogan, D.W., U.S. Army Special Operations on World War II, Center of Military History

Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1992.

350

Hoffman, J.T., From Makin to Bougainville: Marine Raiders in the Pacific War, Marines in

World War II Commemorative Series, Director of Marine Corps History and Museums,

Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, 1995.

Hollege, J., Deeds that Made the AIF, Hortwitz Publications, Sydney, 1961.

Holt, T., The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War, Scribner, Newe

York, 2004.

Horner, D.M., Blamey The Commander in Chief, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1998.

______General Vasey’s War, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1992.

______High Command Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945, Allen and Unwin,

Sydney, 1982.

______SAS : Phantoms of the jungle : a history of the Australian Special Air Service,

Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1989.

Inglis, K.S (ed.)., The History of Melanesia - 2nd Waigan Seminar, The University of Papua

New Guinea-The Research School of Pacific Studies The Australian National University,

1968.

Japanese Army – Notes on Characteristics Organisation Training etc., General Staff Army

Headquarters Melbourne, Arbuckel Waddell Pty Ltd, Melbourne, 1942.

James, C., ANGAU One Man Law, Self Published, Riverwood, 2005.

James, K., The Hard Slog – Australians in the Bougainville Campaign 1944-45, Cambridge

University Press, Port Melbourne, 2012.

______Double Diamond: Australian Commandos in the Pacific War, Australian War

Memorial, Canberra, 2016.

Johnston, G., War Diary 1942, Collins, Sydney,1984.

351

Johnston, M., Fighting the Enemy – Australian Soldiers and their Adversaries in World War

II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.

______The Silent 7th – An Illustrated History of the 7th Australian Division 1940-1946,

Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2005.

Jungle Warfare – With the Australian Army in the South West Pacific, Australian War

Memorial, Canberra, 1944.

Keating, G., A Tale of Three Battalions: Combat Morale and Battle Fatigue in the 7th

Australian Infantry Brigade, Bougainville, 1944-1945, Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra,

2007.

Keogh, E.G., South West Pacific 1941-1945, Grayflower Productions, 1965.

Khaki and Green – With the Australian Army at Home and Overseas, Australian War

Memorial, Canberra, 1943.

King, M.J., Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II, Leavenworth Papers,

Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,

Kansas, 1985.

Laffin, J., Raiders Great Exploits of the Second World War, Thrupp-Stroud,

Gloucestershire,1999.

Ladd, J., Commandos and Rangers of World War II, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1978.

Lambert, G.E., Commando, From Tidal River to Tarakan: The Story of the No. 4 Australian

Independent Company 2AIF Later Known as 2/4th Australian Commando Squadron 2AIF,

1941–45, 2nd/4th Commando Association, Melbourne, 1994.

Lampe, D., The Last Ditch, Cassell, London, 1968.

Larsen, C.R., Pacific Commandos – New Zealanders and Fijians in Action - A History of

Southern Independent Commando and First Commando Fiji Guerrillas, A.H. and A.W.

Reed, Wellington, 1946.

352

Liddell Hart, B., The Future of Infantry, Faber and Faber Ltd, London, 1933.

Linderman, A.R.B., Rediscovering Irregular Warfare: Colin Gubbins and the Origin of

Britains Special Operations Executive, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2016.

Long, G., The Final Campaigns, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series One Army,

Volume VII, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1963.

Macksey, K., Commando: Hit-and-Run Combat in World War II, Jove Books, New York,

1991.

Medcalf, P., War in the Shadows, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 2000.

Messenger, C., The Commandos 1940-1946, William Kimber & Co. Ltd, London, 1985.

Meyers, B.F., Swift Silent and Deadly – Marine Amphibious Reconnaissance in the Pacific

1942-1945, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2004.

Miller, R., Commandos, Time-Life Books, Alexandria, 1981.

Milner, S., United States Army in World War II – Victory in Papua, Office of the Chief of

Military History Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1957.

McCarthy, D., First Year: Kokoda to Wau, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series One

Army, Volume V, South West Pacific Area, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1959.

McDonald, N. and Brune, P., Kokoda Front Line, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1994.

Mc Nab, A., We Were the First: The Unit History of No.1 Independent Company

Military History Publications, Sydney, 1996.

Mathews, R., Militia Battalion at War – The History of the 58/59th Australian Infantry

Battalion in the Second World War, published by 58/59th Battalion Association, Sydney,

1951.

Moynahan, B., Jungle Soldier: The True Story of Freddy Spencer Chapman, Quercus, London, 2009.

Murray, M., Escape a Thousand Miles to Freedom, Rigby Limited, Adelaide, 1965.

Noonan, W., The Surprising Battalion: Australian Commandos in China,

353

Bookstall Co, Sydney, 1945.

O’Leary, S., To The Green Fields Beyond: The Story of 6th Australian Division Cavalry Commandos, Sydney: Sixth Division Cavalry, Unit Historical Committee, 1975.

Pirie, A.A., Commando Double Black: An Historical Narrative of the 2/5th Australian Independent Company, Later the 2/5th Cavalry Commando Squadron, 1942–1945, Australian Military History Publications, Sydney, 1996.

Pinney, P., The Barbarians, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1988.

______The Glass Cannon, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1990.

______The Devils Garden, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1992.

Powell, A., The Third Force: ANGAU’s New Guinea War, Oxford University Press,

Melbourne, 2003.

Prados, J., Islands of Destiny: The Solomons Campaign and the Eclipse of the Rising Sun,

Nal Caliber, New York, 2012.

H. Purcell., The Last English Revolutionary: Tom Wintringham 1898-1949, Sutton

Publishing Ltd, Thrupp, Gloucestershire, 2004.

Reconquest - New Guinea 1943-1944, The Australian Army at War, The Director General of

Public Relations, Arbuckle Waddell Pty Ltd, Melbourne, no date.

Rankin, N., Churchills Wizards: The British Genius for Deception, 1914-1945, Faber and

Faber, 2008.

Rems, A., South Pacific Cauldron: World War II’s Great Forgotten Battlegrounds, Naval

Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2014.

Robertson, J., and McCarthy, J., Australian War Strategy 1939-1945, University of

Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1985.

Robins, D., Proud To the Third: Personal Recollections, Photographs and a Biographical

Roll of the 2/3rd Australian Independent Company/Commando Squadron in World War Two, self published, 2007.

Rottman, G., Carlson’s Marine Raiders Makin Island Raid 1942, Osprey, Oxford, 2014.

354

Russell, B., The History of the Second Fourteenth Battalion, Angus and Robertson, Sydney

1949.

Russell, W.B., There Goes a Man: The Biography of Sir Stanley Savige, Longmans,

Melbourne, 1959.

Ryan, P., Fear Drive My Feet, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1959.

Savige, S., Tactical and Administrative doctrine for jungle warfare applicable to all

formations under command 2 Aust. Corps (2AIF), HQ 2 Aust. Corps (2AIF) (New Guinea):

N.G. Press Unit, 1945.

Schultz, D., Evans Carlson, Marine Raider: The Man Who Commanded America’s First

Special Forces, Westholme, Yardley Pennsylvania, 2014.

Share, P. (ed.), Mud and Blood: “Albury’s Own” Second Twenty Third Australian Infantry

Battalion Ninth Australian Division, Heritage Books Publications, Frankston, 1991.

Slim, W., Defeat into Victory, The Reprint Society, London, 1957.

Smailes, J., The Independents, Kewdale Printing Co., Perth, 1994.

Special Forces in the Desert War, Public Records Office, Kew, 2001.

Spencer-Chapman, F., The Jungle is Neutral, Chatto and Windus, London, 1949.

Stanley, P., Tarakan: an Australian Tragedy, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1997.

Sublet, F., Whatever Man Dares: The Second World War Memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel

Frank Sublet DSO MC, Kokoda Press, 2013.

______Kokoda to the Sea – A History of the 1942 Campaign in Papua, Slouch Hat

Publications, McCrae, 2000.

______Whatever Man Dares, Kokoda Press, Surry Hills, 2013.

Tanaka, K., Operations of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces in the Papua New Guinea

Theatre During World War II, Japan Papua New Guinea Goodwill Society, Tokyo, 1980.

355

The Australian Army at War - The Battle of Wau, Brochure Number One, Department of the

Army, 1943.

The Australian Army at War - Jungle Trail, Brochure Number Two, Alfred Henry Pettifer

Acting Government Printer, 1944.

The Australian Army at War - Battle of the Ridges, Brochure Number Three, Alfred Henry

Pettifer Acting Government Printer, 1944.

Threlfall, A., Jungle Warriors, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2014.

Thompson, J., War Behind Enemy Lines, Imperial War Museum, Sidgwick & Jackson,

London, 1998.

Thorne, C., Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War against Japan, 1941-

1945, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1978.

Treichel, H.F., Commando Army Service 1941-1946, Wahpunga, 1994.

Trigellis-Smith, S., The Purple Devils: A History of the 2/6 Australian Commando Squadron,

Formerly the 2/6 Australian Independent Company, 1942–1946, published by 2/6 Commando

Squadron, Melbourne,1992.

Ulbrich, D. J., Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb and the Making of the Modern

Marine Corps 1936 – 1943, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2011.

Updegraph, C.L., U.S. Marine Corps Special Units of World War II, History and Museums

Division Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. 1972/1977.

Uren, M., A Thousand Men at War: A History of the 2/16th Australian Infantry Battalion

2AIF, Australian Military History Publications, Sydney, 2009.

Walker, A., Middle East and Far East, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series Five

Medical, Volume II, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1953.

______The Island Campaigns, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series Five Medical,

Volume III, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1957.

356

Walker, F., Commandos: Heroic and Deadly ANZAC raids in World War II, Hachette,

Sydney, 2015.

Walker, R. and Walker, H., Curtin’s Cowboys: Australia’s Secret Bush Commandos, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1986.

Warby, J., The 25 Pounders Campaigns in Syria, Kumusi River, Salamaua, Lae, Finschafen and Balikpapan, 2/6 Field Regiment Association, Pymble, 1995.

Wartime Translations of Seized Japanese Documents – Allied Translator and Interpreter

Section reports 1942-1946, Bibliography, Congressional Information Service Inc, Bethesda,

Maryland, 1988.

Wartime Translations of Seized Japanese Documents – Allied Translator and Interpreter

Section reports 1942-1946, Indexes, Congressional Information Service Inc, Bethesda,

Maryland, 1988.

Wigmore, L., The Japanese Thrust, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series One Army,

Volume IV, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1957.

Wigzell, F.A., New Zealand Army Involvement, Special Operations Australia – South West

Pacific World War II, The Pentland Press, Edinburgh, 2001.

Wiles, T., Forgotten Raiders of 42: The Fate of the Marines Left Behind on Makin, Potomac

Books Inc., Washington, D.C., 2007.

Wintringham, T., New Ways of War, Penguin Books, London, 1940.

Wray, C.H., Timor 1942: Australian Commandos at War with the Japanese, Hutchison

Australia, Hawthorn, 1987.

Wukovits, J., American Commando Evans Carlson, His WWII Marine Raiders, and America’s First Special Forces Mission, Caliber, London, 2009.

Wynter, H.W., The History of the Long Range Desert Group June 1940 to March 1943, Public Records Office, Kew, Surrey, 2001.

Zedric, L., Silent Warriors of World War II – The Alamo Scouts Behind Enemy Lines, Pathfinder Publishing of California, Ventura, 1995.

357

Journals and Papers

Andrews, E.M., ‘Mission 204 Australian Commandos in China, 1942’, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, No.10 (1987), pp.11-19.

Bradley, P., ‘The “Jap Track’: The Japanese Route to Wau’, January 1943, Sabretache Vol XLIX No.2 – June 2008, pp.25-29.

Cavalry News, Official organ of 6th Div. Cav. Commando. Regt. Association. [NSW].

CDO NEW BRITAIN, Vol 1:1, 11 July ’45.

Despatch, Monthly Journal of the New South Wales Military Historical Society, Vol. XII

No.12, June 1977.

Digest of Digests, September 1943.

Dobbie, E.V.K., ‘The Word Commando’, American Speech, Volume XIX, April, 1944,

Number 2, pp.81-90.

Edmonds-Wilson, J., ‘No. 1 Independent Company A.I.F at Kavieng’, Australian Army

Journal, No. 197, October 1965, pp. 33-1.

Garland, R., ‘Ambush Knoll: A Classic Defence’, Australian Army Journal, No.195, August,

1965, pp.5-16.

James, K., ‘Double Diamonds’, Wartime, Issue 76, Spring 2016, pp.58-60.

______,‘Uncle Stan and the Staff Corps’, Sabretache, Vol XLV No.2, June 2004, pp.5-9.

Mann, C., ‘Combined Operations, the Commandos and Norway 1941-1944’, The Journal of

Military History, April 2009, pp.471-495.

Marine Corps Times, February 28, 2011.

Parkin. R., ‘The Sources of the Australian tradition in irregular warfare, 1942-1974’, Small

Wars & Insurgencies, 20:1, Canberra Directing Staff, 08 April 2009, pp.118-40.

Richmond, K., ‘Some Logistical Challenges for the Japanese in the New Guinea Campaign’,

Sabretache, Vol XLVI No.2, June 2005, pp. 31-42.

358

Rogerson, E., ‘The “Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels”: looking beyond the myth’, Australian War

Memorial, SVSS paper, 2012.

The 2/4-THER, published by the 2/4th Australian Commando Association.

Thomas, D., ‘The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939-1882’,

Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 18, No.4, October 1983, pp. 689-717.

‘Salamaua Siege’, The Australian Army at War, Brochure Number Four, Alfred Henry

Pettifer Acting Government Printer, 1944.

Walker, E., ‘History of No.7 Infantry Training Centre and the formation of the Independent

Companies 1941-1942’, Despatch, Vol. XII No.12, June 1977, p.334-39.

Williams, Peter D., and Nakagawa, N., ‘The Japanese 18th Army in New Guinea’, Wartime,

Australian War Memorial, Canberra, October 2006, pp.58-63.

Theses

Bentley, J., ‘Champion of ANZAC: General Sir Brudenell White, the First Australian

Imperial Force and the emergence of the Australian Military Culture 1914-1918’, PhD thesis,

School of History and Politics, University of Wollongong, 2003.

Glover, C.L., ‘Storm in a Teacup - An analysis of four Australian Behind the Lines Guerrilla

Operations Against the Japanese during World War II’, B.A. (Honours) thesis, Department of

History University College The University of New South Wales Australian Defence Force

Academy, 1994.

Howard, J.T., ‘Raiding the Continent – The Origins of the British Special Service Forces’,

M.A. thesis, Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas 1980.

Mallet, R. A., ‘Australian Army Logistics 1943-1945’, PhD thesis, School of Humanities and

Social Science, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, 2007.

359

Moreman, J.C., ‘A Triumph Of Improvisation – Australian Army Operational Logistics and the Campaign in Papua, July 1942 to January 1943’, PhD thesis, School of History,

University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, 2000.

Nixon, J.C. ‘Combined Special Operations in World War II’, M.A. thesis, Faculty of the U.S.

Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1993.

Stevenson, R.C., ‘The Anatomy of a Division: The 1st Australian Division in the Great War,

1914-1919’, PhD thesis, School of Humanities and Social Science, University of New South

Wales, 2010.

Threlfall, A., ‘The Development of Australian Army Jungle Warfare Doctrine and Training,

1941-1945’, PhD thesis, School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Education and Human

Development, Victoria University, June 2008

Unpublished Manuscripts

George MacAfie 'Max' Luff Diary: service with 7 Section 2/10 Commando Squadron, 2/6

Cavalry Commando Regiment, 6 Australian Division 1 February – 5 October 1945.

AWM063813, Yoshihara, T., translated Heath, D., Southern Cross: account of the Eastern new Guinea Campaign, loose leaf manuscript.

Hocstrasser, L., They Were the First – The Story of the Alamo Scouts, MacArthur Memorial

Record Group 15, Box 90.

Interviews

Bishop, Mal., 2/5 Independent Company, interviewed by Dr. Peter. D. Williams, 26 June

2004.

Dexter, David., interviewed by Mel Pratt for the Mel Pratt collection, 1976,

, consulted 10 August 2015.

360

Murray-Smith, Stephen., interviewed by Hazel de Berg in the Hazel de Berg collection, 1961,

, accessed 9 August 2015, 23 July 2016.

Major Masao Horie, staff officer of 51st Division and later staff officer, 18th Army

Headquarters, 1943-45. Interviewed by Dr. Peter. D. Williams and Naoko Nakagawa, March

2006.

Major Takahisa Okamoto, staff officer in 41st Division, 1943-45. Interviewed by Dr. Peter.

D. Williams and Naoko Nakagawa, March 2006.

Lt. Colonel Masuo Shinoda, battalion commander, 66th Infantry Regiment, 41st Division, from 1943 to 1945. Interviewed by Dr. Peter. D. Williams and Naoko Nakagawa, March

2006.

Captain Kokichi Nakamura. Platoon then company commander, 66th Infantry Regiment, 41st

Division. 1943-1945. Interviewed by Dr. Peter. D. Williams and Naoko Nakagawa, March

2006.

AWMSO4158 - John Lewin, officer 2/3rd Independent Company. Interviewed by Neil

Macdonald, no date.

AWMS04164 – Ron Garland, officer 2/3 Independent Company. Interviewed by Neil

Macdonald, no date.

AWMS04156 – John Winterflood, officer 2/3rd Independent Company. Interviewed by Neil

Macdonald, no date.

AWMSO4160 – Neil Macdonald interview with 2/3rd Commando Squadron member, no name, no date.

AWMSO4161 – Neil MacDonald interview with 2/5th Independent Company member, no

name, no date.

IWM 9942 Michael ‘Mad Mike’ Calvert reels 3-5, consulted 8 September 2016.

Conferences

361

Australian Army Amphibious Operations in the South West Pacific 1942-1945, Australian

Army History Conference 15th November 1994, Army Doctrine Centre, 1995.

Newspapers

Australian

Adelaide News

Bowen Independent

Cairns Post

Kalgoorlie Miner

Lithgow Mercury

Maryborough Chronicle, Wide Bay and Burnett Advertiser

Mercury

National Advocate

Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners' Advocate

Sunday Mail

Warwick Daily News

Tweed Daily

The Advertiser

The Age

The Argus

The Armidale Express and New England General Advertiser

The Australasian

The Courier Mail

The Daily News

The Macleay Chronicle

The Newcastle Sun

362

The Sun

The Sydney Morning Herald

The Weekly Times

The West Australian

United States

New York Times

Websites

1st Independent Company , accessed 14 March 2016. 2/2 Commando Association of Australia ‘Trainer and long term friend of the Double Reds’ , accessed 10 July 2017. 2/2 Commando Courier Vol.20. No. 188. November 1965, p.12, , accessed 12 October 2016. 2/2 Commando Courier, Vol.6 No.68, December 1952, p.5. , accessed 16 August 2016. Australian Dictionary of Biography , accessed 18 May 2017. Australian War Memorial image 027400 , accessed 14 June 2016.

C 47 Aircraft, , accessed 9 March 2018. Dexter, David. and Pratt, Mel. David Dexter interviewed by Mel Pratt for the Mel Pratt collection [sound recording] 1976 , accessed 26 November 2015 Gung Ho! (1943 film), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gung_Ho!(1943_film)#Plot, accessed 1 August 2017.

363

L.H.Q. TRAINING CENTRE (JUNGLE WARFARE) CANUNGRA, QLD DURING WW2, accessed 13 January 2017. Special Operations Australia , accessed 14 July 2016. ‘Remembering Australia’ Wars: Hangings of Papua New Guineans by Australian Soldiers in WWII Complicate our National Narratives’, , accessed 12 August 2016. Scott, William John (1888–1956) Australian Dictionary of Biography , accessed 12 October 2016. The history of SS. Rimutaka: , accessed 3 March 2017.

364