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PRACTISE »DECEIVE Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners PRACTISE to DECEIVE

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PRACTISE »DECEIVE Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners PRACTISE to DECEIVE PRACTISE »DECEIVE Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners PRACTISE to DECEIVE Written by the undisputed dean of U.S. denial and deception experts, Practise to Deceive is the most in-depth look at deception as a military strategy Barton Whaley knew the history of denial and deception across time, disciplines, and culture. For Whaley, deception was a mind game requiring imagination, deep critical thought, a profound understanding of one’s self as well as the enemy (a variation of Sun Tzu), and patience and fortitude. This book presents eighty-eight vividly descriptive case studies to serve as a handbook for intelligence and military professionals. In Whaley’s analysis, variations in guilefulness between opposing individuals or groups can be crucial in deciding who achieves vic­ tory in combat. BARTON WHALEY (1928-2013) received his bachelor of arts degree in Chinese studies from the University of California, Berkeley, before serving with the intelligence section of U.S. Army Psychological Warfare headquartered in Tokyo during the Korean War. Following the war he attended London University School of Oriental and African Studies before receiving his PhD at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was affiliated with the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and worked for the director of National Security’s Foreign Denial and Deception Committee of the Director of National Intelligence. ISBN-13: ITÄ-l-biaSl-ISE-l For more information on this and other great books, visit www.nip.org. eBook edition also available. 9 781612 519821 PRACTISE TO DECEIVE: Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners BARTON WHALEY Introduction by A. Denis Clift Edited by Susan Stratton Aykroyd Naval Institute Press Annapolis, Maryland Naval Institute Press 291 Wood Road Annapolis, MD 21402 © 2016 by U.S. Naval Institute All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. First Naval Institute Press edition published in 2016. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Whaley, Barton. Practise to deceive : learning curves of military deception planners / Barton W haley; introduction by A. Denis Clift; edited by Susan Stratton Aykroyd, pages cm Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-1-61251-982-1 (hardcover: alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-61251- 983-8 (ebook) 1. Deception (Military science) 2. Deception (Military sci­ ence)— History. 3. Deception (Military science)— Case studies. 4. Military planning. I. Aykroyd, Susan Stratton. II. Title. U167.5.D37.W53 2016 355.4'1— dc23 2015035352 © Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper). Printed in the United States of America. 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 First printing The views herein are the author's and not necessarily those o f the Foreign Denial & Deception Committee. O, what a tangled web we weave, When first we practise to deceive! — Sir Walter Scott, Marmion (1808), Canto 6, Stanza 17 But, if we practise for a while, We’ll get a wizard knack for guile. — BW, 11 Jan 2010, with apologies to J. R. Pope To J. Bowyer Bell (1931-2003) who immersed me in his real world of terrorists while I introduced him to war gaming and the theory of deception. Contents Executive Summary: Findings & Recommendations........................................xi 0.1. Discontinuities................................................................................................ xi 0.2. Planners as Individuals.................................................................................... xiv 0.3. Overall Competence.........................................................................................xv 0.4. Recomended Research................................................................................... xvii 0.5. The Planning Process in a Nutshell...............................................................xviii Introduction by A. Denis Clift...............................................................................xxi PART ONE: Introduction....................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: Intent ....................................................................................................... 2 Chapter 2: Scope ....................................................................................................... 3 Chapter 3: Sources.......................................................................... 5 PART TW O : The Case Studies ............................................................................. 7 Chapter 4: Learning to Deceive ............................................................................. 8 Cases 1-22 Chapter 5: Planners in Specific Operations....................................................... 58 Cases 23-64 Chapter 6: Selling the Commander................................................................... 127 Cases 65-76 Chapter 7: Institutional Deception Planning................................................. 148 Cases 77-88 PART THREE: Analysis & Conclusions......................................................... 179 Chapter 8: The Planning Process....................................................................... 180 8.1. The Basic Process ........................................................................................... 180 8.2. The Things Manipulated................................................................................ 182 Chapter 9: Social/Institutional Factors: Networks, Institutions, & Traditions................................................................................................................... 184 9.1. Policy Constraints and the Supreme Command....................................... 184 ix 9.2. Commanders and Their Staffs .....................................................................IBS 9.3. Intelligence or Operations?..........................................................................186 9.4. Level of Operations: The Tactical-Strategic Continuum...........................188 9.5. Enemy Capabilities & S O P ..........................................................................189 Chapter 10: Cultural Factors..................................................................................190 10.1. Ethical Constraints.......................................................................................190 10.2. Deception and National Character .............................................................191 10.3. National Military Doctrines..........................................................................191 10.4. The “Not Invented Here” Syndrome & Its Alternatives............................. 193 Chapter 11 : Personality Factors............................................................................194 11.1. The Maria Theresa Syndrome: Break the Rules to Make Your Own .... 195 11.2. The Pleasures of Deceiving: An Odd Sense of Humor.............................197 11.3. The Empathie Mind: Know Your Enemy.....................................................200 11.4. The Prepared Mind: Know Your Subject.....................................................205 Chapter 12: Selection of Deception Personnel................. ........................206 12.1. Prior Experience............................................................................................206 12.2. Selection......................................................................................................... 207 12.3. Teaching & Training.................................................................................... 209 Appendices .............................................................................................................. 210 Appendix A: “Guidelines for Deception of the Enemy,” 15 February 1941, Basic German Strategic Deception Plan for Operation BARBAROSSA (invasion o f Ru ssia )...................................................................................................211 Appendix B: Chronology of 67 Further German BARBAROSSA Deception Plans, 1 9 4 1 .............................................................................................215 Appendix C: Plan CLOAK, 25 January 1945, British Tactical Deception Plan against Japanese in Burma, February 1945 . 216 Appendix D: Checklist of Other Deception Plans........................................... 222 Bibliography...............................................................................................................224 List of C a se s...............................................................................................................241 Cases 1-88 in order presented Executive Summary: Findings & Recommendations The royal road to learning how to deceive in war has been paved with speed bumps. It is widely assumed that this learning process has been incremental, a gradual accumulation of experience in combat, lessons learned in staff studies, scholarly analysis of historical cases, the passing of knowledge from master to apprentice, and practical experience in combat. In other words, the art of military deception is generally seen as improving slowly but steadily through a long chain of theory and practice. However, the reality is very different. 0.1. Discontinuities In fact, discontinuity is the universal pattern of deception found
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