Admiral Roger Keyes and Naval Operations in the Littoral Zone A

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Admiral Roger Keyes and Naval Operations in the Littoral Zone A Admiral Roger Keyes and Naval Operations in the Littoral Zone A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Harrison G. Fender May 2019 ©2019 Harrison G. Fender. All Rights Reserved. 2 This thesis titled Admiral Roger Keyes and Naval Operations in the Littoral Zone by HARRISON G. FENDER has been approved for the Department of History and the College of Arts and Sciences by Peter John Brobst Associate Professor of History Joseph Shields Interim Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 ABSTRACT Fender, Harrison G., M.A., May 2019, History Admiral Roger Keyes and Naval Operations in the Littoral Zone Director of Thesis: Peter John Brobst Since the second decade of the twenty-first century the littoral has been a zone of international tension. With the littoral the likely center of future naval engagements, it is important to remember that the issues of today are not new. Admiral Roger Keyes of the Royal Navy also had to contend with operating in contested littoral zones protected by anti-access weapons. Keyes’ solution to this was the integration of the latest weapons and techniques to overcome enemy defenses. By doing so, Keyes was able to project power upon a region or protect sea lines of communication. This thesis will examine the naval career of Roger Keyes during and between the First and Second World Wars. It will discuss that, through wartime experience, Keyes was aware of the trends in naval operations which led him to modernize the Royal Navy. This thesis will also explain that, despite his foresight, the Royal Navy refused to adopt his ideas due to traditionalist strategies and budget cuts. Nevertheless, Keyes’ ideas would not only be proven correct in the Second World War, but also correlate with how we perceive naval operations in the littoral today. 4 DEDICATION To my Mother and Father 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract ................................................................................................................................3 Dedication ............................................................................................................................4 Introduction ..........................................................................................................................6 Chapter 1: Keyes and the Impact of Technology on Littoral Operations ......................... 19 Chapter 2: Keyes and Amphibious Operations in the Littoral .......................................... 65 Chapter 3: Naval Operations of the Present in Contested Littoral Zones ....................... 119 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 151 References ....................................................................................................................... 160 6 INTRODUCTION The Palace of Westminster is filled with objects and works of art which symbolize centuries of Britain’s history as a kingdom and an empire. Paintings of monarchs, nobles, and Prime Ministers are reminders of the nation’s greatest leaders. The wool sack in the Lord’s Chamber is a symbol of Britain’s once most important commodity. The Commons Chamber is no different as it too is packed with art representing the history and character of Great Britain. Among the numerous examples are heraldic shields which circle the chamber above the green covered benches. The shields commemorate MPs who died during the world wars and are painted in their coats of arms. Among the shields is one with three gold keys painted over a red and black background which honors Sir Roger Keyes who died in late-1945. Although he has been honored in the Commons Chamber as an MP, his mark of distinction was as an officer in the Royal Navy. Keyes’ service in the Royal Navy began 1885 and ended 1935 when he retired with the rank of Admiral of the Fleet. During the Second World War, Keyes was briefly brought back and, for nearly fifteen months, served as Director of Combined Operations; a branch better known as the commandos. Through over thirty years of service Keyes saw the world change rapidly exemplified by succeeding wars and conflicts using ever more destructive weapons. From the Victorian period to the 1940s Keyes would have seen battleships not only grow bigger and more powerful, but their eventual replacement by aircraft carriers.1 1 Compare the HMS Howe in 1885 which had a tonnage of over 10,000 tons to the USS Wisconsin in 1944 with a tonnage of nearly 45,000 tons. 7 Before the 1940s, battleships were the primary weapon of any first-class navy. For many naval officers commanding a battleship, or better yet a squadron of battleships, was the highest honor. Keyes was among those not only lucky enough to command a squadron of battleships but eventually Britain’s premier fleet: the Mediterranean Fleet. Keyes’ legacy, however, was not commanding battleships but in amphibious operations.2 The most noted operations he was associated with is the Gallipoli Campaign, the Zeebrugge Raid, and Operation Workshop. In small circles Keyes is known for his advocacy of naval aircraft or usage of submarines at a time when they were new and untested to the trials of combat. Overall, Keyes did not have a quiet career as exemplified by his service in two world wars and his involvement in a range of weapons and operations. Keyes preferred it this way. He was a man of action, an officer who wanted to take the war to the enemy with any and all resources available to him. His knack for action was prevalent as far back as the Boxer Rebellion where, as a young destroyer captain, he led incursions along the Peiho River against forts and destroyers. Even while commanding submarines in 1914-15, Keyes would be at the scene in one of his destroyers. Such was his desire to be where the battle was that Keyes once suggested to Churchill that, should Britain and the United States ever clash, he would personally lead 2 British military terminology uses the term “combined operations” when referring to amphibious operations. For the purpose of this thesis amphibious operations will be used in lieu of the British term except in cases that apply, e.g. Director of Combined Operations. 8 the British fleet stating, “Nothing in the world could possibility please me more than to be in command of such an undertaking.”3 Nearly all of the operations he led or proposed personified his character by emphasizing the offensive. An example is the Dardanelles Campaign where he pressed for the navy to force its way into the Marmara to disrupt the rear of Ottoman lines. Yet Keyes was not, as some would suggest, a man who was all dash and no brains. Keyes recognized the potentials of the latest weapons and devices as useful in overwhelming enemy defenses or maintaining the offensive in key locations. His appreciation for such weapons resulted in him emphasizing them for future use. Perhaps what most personified Keyes’ personality is his favorite pastime, polo; a sport of organization, coordination, and aggression. Naturally the man had his faults and shortcomings. Keyes was opinionated and strong-willed which rubbed many the wrong way. This was more apparent as he rose through the ranks with many seeing him as brash or dangerously impulsive. An example of this was during the Second World War when Keyes was Director of Combined Operations. As he understood the title, being Director meant he did not have to answer to the Chief of Staffs nor any other figure of authority with the exception of the Prime Minister; this was completely the opposite which eventually resulted in him being sacked 3 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Churchill, 20 January 1928,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume II, 1919-1938, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), Part II, 239. This quote, also used in Christopher Bell’s The Royal Navy, Seapower, and Strategy Between the Wars, is not to portray Keyes as anti-American, but rather the concern over a potential war between the United States and Great Britain. 9 by Churchill.4 His lack of technical or intellectual skills was sometimes a hindrance, especially compared to experts in particular fields; Keyes even labeled himself as, “a mere salt horse”.5 Despite these shortcomings, Keyes not only had an eventful career but could be regarded as being at the forefront in modernizing naval operations. Throughout his career Keyes was involved in numerous operations where he used groundbreaking weapons or the latest strategic and tactical methods. Upon analyzing contemporary discussions, many of the weapons or methods Keyes used continue to be prevalent in naval operations. Keyes’ association with said weapons began in 1910 when he became Inspecting Captain of Submarines. Wanting to engage the German navy near its bases, Keyes implemented a policy of constructing submarines which had long range and endurance. These submarines would become essential in the first months of the First World War whereby the German navy was engaged outside its harbors in the North Sea and Baltic. It was also during this war where Keyes saw the impact airplanes had on assaulting entrenched enemies near beachheads or supporting naval operations along coastlines. The impact of aircraft during the war not only led to Keyes’ advocacy for naval aircraft, but also his refinement of carrier-based operations while commanding the Mediterranean Fleet. Keyes also earned distinction for his role in amphibious operations.
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