Admiral Roger Keyes and Naval Operations in the Littoral Zone

A thesis presented to

the faculty of

the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts

Harrison G. Fender

May 2019

©2019 Harrison G. Fender. All Rights Reserved. 2

This thesis titled

Admiral Roger Keyes and Naval Operations in the Littoral Zone

by

HARRISON G. FENDER

has been approved for

the Department of History

and the College of Arts and Sciences by

Peter John Brobst

Associate Professor of History

Joseph Shields

Interim Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3

ABSTRACT

Fender, Harrison G., M.A., May 2019, History

Admiral Roger Keyes and Naval Operations in the Littoral Zone

Director of Thesis: Peter John Brobst

Since the second decade of the twenty-first century the littoral has been a zone of international tension. With the littoral the likely center of future naval engagements, it is important to remember that the issues of today are not new. Admiral Roger Keyes of the

Royal Navy also had to contend with operating in contested littoral zones protected by anti-access weapons. Keyes’ solution to this was the integration of the latest weapons and techniques to overcome enemy defenses. By doing so, Keyes was able to project power upon a region or protect sea lines of communication. This thesis will examine the naval career of Roger Keyes during and between the First and Second World Wars. It will discuss that, through wartime experience, Keyes was aware of the trends in naval operations which led him to modernize the Royal Navy. This thesis will also explain that, despite his foresight, the Royal Navy refused to adopt his ideas due to traditionalist strategies and budget cuts. Nevertheless, Keyes’ ideas would not only be proven correct in the Second World War, but also correlate with how we perceive naval operations in the littoral today.

4

DEDICATION

To my Mother and Father

5

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Abstract ...... 3

Dedication ...... 4

Introduction ...... 6

Chapter 1: Keyes and the Impact of Technology on Littoral Operations ...... 19

Chapter 2: Keyes and Amphibious Operations in the Littoral ...... 65

Chapter 3: Naval Operations of the Present in Contested Littoral Zones ...... 119

Conclusion ...... 151

References ...... 160

6

INTRODUCTION

The Palace of Westminster is filled with objects and works of art which symbolize centuries of Britain’s history as a kingdom and an empire. Paintings of monarchs, nobles, and Prime Ministers are reminders of the nation’s greatest leaders. The wool sack in the Lord’s Chamber is a symbol of Britain’s once most important commodity. The Commons Chamber is no different as it too is packed with art representing the history and character of Great Britain. Among the numerous examples are heraldic shields which circle the chamber above the green covered benches. The shields commemorate MPs who died during the world wars and are painted in their coats of arms. Among the shields is one with three gold keys painted over a red and black background which honors Sir Roger Keyes who died in late-1945. Although he has been honored in the Commons Chamber as an MP, his mark of distinction was as an officer in the Royal Navy.

Keyes’ service in the Royal Navy began 1885 and ended 1935 when he retired with the rank of Admiral of the Fleet. During the Second World War, Keyes was briefly brought back and, for nearly fifteen months, served as Director of Combined Operations; a branch better known as the commandos. Through over thirty years of service Keyes saw the world change rapidly exemplified by succeeding wars and conflicts using ever more destructive weapons. From the Victorian period to the 1940s Keyes would have seen battleships not only grow bigger and more powerful, but their eventual replacement by aircraft carriers.1

1 Compare the HMS Howe in 1885 which had a tonnage of over 10,000 tons to the USS Wisconsin in 1944 with a tonnage of nearly 45,000 tons. 7

Before the 1940s, battleships were the primary weapon of any first-class navy.

For many naval officers commanding a battleship, or better yet a squadron of battleships, was the highest honor. Keyes was among those not only lucky enough to command a squadron of battleships but eventually Britain’s premier fleet: the Mediterranean Fleet.

Keyes’ legacy, however, was not commanding battleships but in amphibious operations.2

The most noted operations he was associated with is the Gallipoli Campaign, the

Zeebrugge Raid, and Operation Workshop. In small circles Keyes is known for his advocacy of naval aircraft or usage of submarines at a time when they were new and untested to the trials of combat. Overall, Keyes did not have a quiet career as exemplified by his service in two world wars and his involvement in a range of weapons and operations.

Keyes preferred it this way. He was a man of action, an officer who wanted to take the war to the enemy with any and all resources available to him. His knack for action was prevalent as far back as the Boxer Rebellion where, as a young destroyer captain, he led incursions along the Peiho River against forts and destroyers. Even while commanding submarines in 1914-15, Keyes would be at the scene in one of his destroyers. Such was his desire to be where the battle was that Keyes once suggested to

Churchill that, should Britain and the United States ever clash, he would personally lead

2 British military terminology uses the term “combined operations” when referring to amphibious operations. For the purpose of this thesis amphibious operations will be used in lieu of the British term except in cases that apply, e.g. Director of Combined Operations. 8 the British fleet stating, “Nothing in the world could possibility please me more than to be in command of such an undertaking.”3

Nearly all of the operations he led or proposed personified his character by emphasizing the offensive. An example is the Dardanelles Campaign where he pressed for the navy to force its way into the Marmara to disrupt the rear of Ottoman lines. Yet

Keyes was not, as some would suggest, a man who was all dash and no brains. Keyes recognized the potentials of the latest weapons and devices as useful in overwhelming enemy defenses or maintaining the offensive in key locations. His appreciation for such weapons resulted in him emphasizing them for future use. Perhaps what most personified

Keyes’ personality is his favorite pastime, polo; a sport of organization, coordination, and aggression.

Naturally the man had his faults and shortcomings. Keyes was opinionated and strong-willed which rubbed many the wrong way. This was more apparent as he rose through the ranks with many seeing him as brash or dangerously impulsive. An example of this was during the Second World War when Keyes was Director of Combined

Operations. As he understood the title, being Director meant he did not have to answer to the Chief of Staffs nor any other figure of authority with the exception of the Prime

Minister; this was completely the opposite which eventually resulted in him being sacked

3 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Churchill, 20 January 1928,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume II, 1919-1938, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), Part II, 239. This quote, also used in Christopher Bell’s The Royal Navy, Seapower, and Strategy Between the Wars, is not to portray Keyes as anti-American, but rather the concern over a potential war between the United States and Great Britain. 9 by Churchill.4 His lack of technical or intellectual skills was sometimes a hindrance, especially compared to experts in particular fields; Keyes even labeled himself as, “a mere salt horse”.5 Despite these shortcomings, Keyes not only had an eventful career but could be regarded as being at the forefront in modernizing naval operations.

Throughout his career Keyes was involved in numerous operations where he used groundbreaking weapons or the latest strategic and tactical methods. Upon analyzing contemporary discussions, many of the weapons or methods Keyes used continue to be prevalent in naval operations. Keyes’ association with said weapons began in 1910 when he became Inspecting Captain of Submarines. Wanting to engage the German navy near its bases, Keyes implemented a policy of constructing submarines which had long range and endurance. These submarines would become essential in the first months of the First

World War whereby the German navy was engaged outside its harbors in the North Sea and Baltic. It was also during this war where Keyes saw the impact airplanes had on assaulting entrenched enemies near beachheads or supporting naval operations along coastlines. The impact of aircraft during the war not only led to Keyes’ advocacy for naval aircraft, but also his refinement of carrier-based operations while commanding the

Mediterranean Fleet.

Keyes also earned distinction for his role in amphibious operations. His appreciation for amphibious operations began during the Boxer Rebellion where, by securing the estuary of the Peiho River, ground forces were able to maneuver upriver and

4 Bernard Fergusson, The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), 52. 5 Roger Keyes, The Naval Memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Roger Keyes: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 1910-1915. (New York: E. P. Dutton & CO., 1934), 23. 10 take Peking. The Dardanelles Campaign only enhanced his awareness of the importance of amphibious landings and the difficulty they faced against well-armed and entrenched enemies. It was from the Dardanelles where Keyes was inspired to use aircraft and other devices in amphibious operations to break out of a heavily defended beachhead. This is prevalent while commanding the Mediterranean Fleet whereby exercises and war plans implemented naval bombers and landing craft as a means to support landings and project power inland. Additionally, beginning with the Zeebrugge raid, Keyes helped modernize sea-based raids where he used specialized assault craft and personnel trained in close quarters fighting. During the Second World War, Keyes helped refine the commandos with new weapons and tactics while also emphasizing raids to neutralize facilities or seize vital locations.

Although this is only a brief description of his involvement in innovative weapons and techniques, it incapsulate the types of operations which marked Keyes’ career. As will be discussed in later sections, Keyes spent an inordinate amount of time with weapons or tactics that had yet to be standardized with many traditional officers seeing them as impractical. Yet, in analyzing these operations it becomes apparent that there was another aspect of Keyes career that goes beyond mere innovation. Many of the operations he led or was attached to occurred in the littoral; this was not a coincidence. Although he never discussed it directly, Keyes recognized that the littoral was important for reasons still discussed today, such as the ease in maneuvering forces or protecting vital sea lanes.

This led Keyes to emphasize operations to seize, deny, or protect littoral zones that were important for Britain in waging war. 11

It was for these objectives that led Keyes to emphasize new weapons and tactics because the littoral was often heavily contested. Much like strategists and naval leaders of the present, Keyes had to figure out how to overcome anti-access weapons in confined spaces. Similar to contemporary ideas, Keyes believed in the necessity of air superiority over sea lanes in straits, submarine deployment off enemy seaports, and amphibious operations for quick insertions or to seize territory along vital waterways. From here the question may be asked, what is the littoral and why is it a unique zone for naval operations?

In basic terms, the littoral is the part of the ocean from the shoreline to the edge of the continental shelf. Milan N. Vego, in Naval Strategy and Operations in the Narrow

Seas, explains that this zone can have many different meanings. Among the numerous examples he lists are semi-enclosed areas, marginal or peripheral zones along the coast, inland seas, and even restricted waters where the shallow depth restricts all but the smallest vessels from entering. Regarding where navies operate in this zone, Vego explains that, “Littoral warfare will take place not only in semi-enclosed waters and enclosed seas but also in marginal seas and the waters of an ocean bordering a continental landmass.”6

In the past the littoral has been referred to as a green-water zone. The term not only relates to the perceived color of water but also to navies which could only operate as far as their territorial waters; the coast guard is an example of a green-water navy.

Compare this to riverine brown-water navies or even blue-water navies which can operate

6 Milan N. Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas. (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 7. 12 worldwide. Of the three classifications blue-water navies have the most flexibility because of their varied armaments, means to project power across vast distances, and ability to conduct operations through a network of supply ships and overseas bases.

Historically, and this remains the case today, the goal for any naval power was to protect supply lines, land/supply forces ashore, and project power inland.7 Blue-water navies move into the littoral because here they must support engagements on land through power projection or amphibious landings while also maintaining the lines of supply.

Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. Navy has remained the world’s preeminent blue-water navy and has enjoyed near unrivaled access in many littoral zones.

This is noticeable during the Korean and Vietnam wars’ where the U.S. Navy could supply ground forces and launch air strikes from the littoral. This would not have been the case had the Cold War turned hot. Had this happened the U.S. Navy would have had to engage the Soviet navy in the littoral to prevent it from breaking out and attacking supply lines. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 briefly ended the notion that the littoral would be a contested zone for the U.S. Navy.

Twenty-five years later this is no longer the case. Although the Soviet Union and its allies have all but disappeared, new regimes emerged which are destabilizing regions across Asia and Europe. Among these regimes are Russia, Iran, and China who in the past twenty years sponsored or have conducted acts of aggression against neighboring nations. This has coincided with naval buildup which is aimed at protecting and/or taking advantage of the littoral as a base to broaden their influence. They have also relied on

7 Wayne P. Hughes Jr. and Robert P. Girrier, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, Third Edition. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2018), 126-7. 13 using anti-access weapons, such as anti-ship missiles and submarines, to keep opponents out of the littoral should hostilities erupt. This has not only worried the United States but also the global community leading many to question how naval operations are to be conducted in contested littoral zones.

Predicting how such operations are to be conducted in the future is difficult because there has been a lack of major naval engagements in the littoral for over fifty years. Therefore, predictions have to be made based on trends in technology, computer simulations, or war games. History can also be used to predict future engagements because there have been cases in the past were operations occurred in contested littoral zones. A recent example is the Iran-Iraq War where the export of oil within the Persian

Gulf was targeted. The war demonstrated the lethality of mines and air launched missiles against shipping and facilities in a littoral environment. Other examples can be found in the period of the world wars because opposing navies had more to gain or lose in operating in contested littoral zones.

By using this period as a guide Keyes can be pinpointed as a source of information. Many of the weapons used today were first used by Keyes. As early as 1910

Keyes used submarines, and later naval aircraft, as weapons to overcome defenses and engage the enemy in the littoral. Keyes also understood the value of amphibious operations in destabilizing the enemy and attacking locations where resistance was least expected. In particular, Keyes combined amphibious operations with the latest weapons to give landed forces an edge in securing littoral environments. Failure to secure the littoral could lead to setbacks, as was the case in the Second World War where the Axis 14 crippled Britain’s supply lines in the Mediterranean. Keyes could therefore be seen as being at the forefront in conducting modern naval operations in the littoral for goals that continue to be relevant.

What makes this perspective unique is there are few works that focus solely on

Keyes, let alone his relationship with any particular weapon or sea space. What makes the lack of literature on Keyes more puzzling is he left behind numerous documents outlining his ideas. Most noted are his memoirs which were published in the 1930s in two volumes.

His memoirs are useful because he outlines his experiences during the First World War and his relationship with the latest weapons. Keyes also outlines the challenges he faced of working in straits or along contested coastlines, as well as how defenses here can be overcome with the latest devices. Of equal value is his 1943 work, Amphibious Warfare and Combined Operations, which also outlines his experiences with large and small landings and the lessons of them. This work is also useful in gaining an idea on how he emphasized the importance of these operations for allied victory in the final years of the war.

Keyes also left behind hundreds, if not thousands, of letters and assorted documents spanning his career. Documents such as these are valuable in that they exhibit his frame of mind at a set point of time during particular events and campaigns. They also demonstrate how he envisioned using the latest weapons in operations or why certain engagements in the littoral were vital to success. Many of his personal documents have since become published by the Navy Records Society in various collected works. Most noted are The Keyes Papers which is separated into three volumes spanning 1914 to 15

1945. Other works by the Navy Records Society, like The Submarine Service, 1910-1938 and The Mediterranean Fleet, 1919-1929, also contain letters and documents by Keyes regarding particular topics.

Despite the plethora of documents and works by Keyes there is very little in the way of secondary sources on him. Among the few, if only, works that directly focuses on

Keyes is a biography by Cecil Aspinall-Oglander. While Aspinall-Oglander covers the breadth of Keyes’ life, he closely follows Keyes’ memoirs and much else is absent or glided over. For example, in terms of Keyes’ command of the Mediterranean Fleet, the biography focuses more on the Royal Oak Affair than Keyes’ role in testing new weapons and combat methods. Beyond the biography, Keyes has sporadically appeared in a number of secondary works covering such topics as submarines, naval aviation, or, more prominently, the commandos. Among contemporary examples is James Goldrick’s

Before Jutland where Keyes appears as an active and innovative officer in the early months of World War I. Kenneth Macksey’s Commando: Hit and Run Combat in World

War II also displays Keyes as forward thinking and responsible for reforming the commandos at their lowest point. In both these works, and other like them, however,

Keyes is not the central figure. Instead he is relegated as one of many officers who implemented new ideas or streamlined particular operations within the Royal Navy.

Not every work is favorable to Keyes. Glen Barclay’s article, “Butcher and Bolt:

Admiral Roger Keyes and British Combined Operations, 1940-1941”, portrays Keyes as a traditionalist who conducted meaningless or wasteful raids; a man mentally stuck in a bygone era and who has lost touch with reality. Nicholas Lambert’s Sir John Fisher’s 16

Naval Revolution and his introduction to The Submarine Service, 1900-1938, while not as harsh as Barclay’s interpretation, also portrays Keyes as a mediocre officer. This is in regard to his tenure as Inspecting Captain of Submarines where Keyes, while not wholly damaging, had a negative effect on Britain’s submarine development through haphazard policies. There is a reason why Keyes is not heavily portrayed in literature as a central figure in modernizing naval operations. He frequently clashed with his peers which earned him a bad reputation. The height of Keyes career was a time when the Royal Navy was disinterested in experimenting with the latest weapons due to financial stringency.

Therefore, one of the goals of this work is to fill in a void in the historiography of

Roger Keyes. This thesis will center specifically on Keyes’ naval career in the littoral during the period of the world wars. In doing so it will focus on how he implemented new weapons and techniques in naval and amphibious operations. The argument will be made that, from a historic standpoint, Keyes was among the pioneers in modernizing naval operations in the littoral. This thesis will also argue that, by examining this aspect of

Keyes’ naval career, we can better understand how to conduct operations in the littoral. It should be mentioned that this thesis will not concentrate on Keyes’ political career in the

1930s or operations that occurred outside the littoral.

This thesis will be broken up into three chapters. The topic of chapter one will be

Keyes and his relationship with submarines, mines, and naval aircraft in the littoral. It will begin with a brief introduction on the dilemmas the Royal Navy faced in operating against mines and submarines in hostile littoral zones. The bulk of chapter one will focus on Keyes in the First World War and how he implemented the latest weapons to 17 overcome enemy defenses in the littoral. It will not only outline how he used submarines in 1914-15, but also how he placed mines in the Dover Strait to protect shipping against

U-Boats. This chapter will end with Keyes in the Interwar Years and how he integrated aircraft into the Royal Navy through exercises and war plans. The goal of this chapter is to show how wartime experiences and forward thinking led Keyes to adopt weapons that would become vital in modern naval operations.

Chapter two will focus on Keyes and amphibious operations. This chapter will outline that Keyes was aware of the importance of certain features in the littoral which led him to refine and enhance the Royal Navy’s ability to land forces ashore. The chapter will open with the Boxer Rebellion before discussing the Dardanelles Campaign and why it failed to implement joint-operations. This will demonstrate Keyes’ introduction and continued involvement in amphibious operations during a time when technology was evolving to hold off attempted landings. The Interwar Years and how Keyes implemented these lessons in the wake of budget cuts and the Royal Navy’s overall retreat from an amphibious mindset will also be discussed. Raids at Zeebrugge and during the Second

World War will be outlined to not only demonstrate their effect on the littoral, but also how Keyes was able to rapidly train and arm raiders for essential missions. Overall, this chapter will discuss that Keyes understood the advantages of amphibious operations in the littoral leading him to reform this type of warfare to overcome challenges presented by technology and geography.

The third and final chapter will discuss why the littoral continues to be important for naval operations today and how discussions on it are similar to Keyes’ experience. 18

Chapter three will begin by outlining why the littoral across Europe and Asia is the focal point of potential wars and why freedom of movement in this zone needs to be protected.

The second half of chapter three will outline how naval commanders and policy makers discuss ways to overcome defenses or make use of the littoral in future engagements.

Among the discussions that have relevance to Keyes will be naval aviation, amphibious landings, and mine warfare to name a few. This chapter will argue that, due to the littorals importance in several potential conflicts, commanders and policy makers could learn from Keyes who first implemented many of the weapons and tactics presently used.

It could be argued that Keyes was at the forefront of innovation and was a pioneer in how modern naval operations are conducted in the littoral. Historically, Keyes was among a set of individuals who advocated or implemented the latest weapons and tested new methods that would be essential in modern naval operations. Submarines, naval aircraft, and specially trained raiders were all things Keyes helped innovate. From a modern standpoint all of these, and other systems Keyes made use of, are still highly regarded in littoral operations. Much like Keyes, we still rely on aircraft and amphibious operations to seize or deny space in the littoral. Also, much like in Keyes’ time, the littoral needs to be a secured place where commerce can flow freely without interdiction.

This was a problem the Royal Navy faced then and the U.S. Navy faces now.

19

CHAPTER 1: KEYES AND THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON LITTORAL

OPERATIONS

Naval technology progressed rapidly during the fifty years Keyes served in the

Royal Navy. Between 1885 and 1935 a range of machinery, weapons, and devices emerged which altered the way naval operations would be conducted. Warships composing the line of battle, such as battleships, received the most attention with the latest armaments, machinery, and armor being diverted to them. Although capital ships were the center of attention, technological progress also resulted in weapons that would go on to alter operations in the littoral.

With the advent of effective naval mines, as well as submarines and aircraft of improved design, the ability to protect or deny the littoral in times of war increased.

Without warning mines or submarines could sink merchant ships or warships disrupting the movement of an entire fleet. Aircraft gave navies a flexible means in attacking naval or ground targets in and around the littoral. This is not forgetting coastal guns which, although a staple since the gunpowder age, could potentially outrange offshore gunfire.

These weapons, both new and old, could be considered the forerunners to today’s anti- access weapons because they could influence movement and engagements in the littoral.

While navies such as those in France and Russia implemented these weapons, many senior officials in the Royal Navy rejected them as being too novel or unsuited to traditional tactics.

Among the few that did recognize the merits of these weapons was Roger Keyes who would go on to use submarines, naval mines, and aircraft effectively in the littoral. 20

Beginning in 1910 as Inspecting Captain of Submarines through the late-1920s as C-in-C of the Mediterranean Fleet, Keyes actively used these weapons in both wartime operations and peacetime exercises. Unlike traditionalist officers in the Royal Navy,

Keyes understood that such weapons would give the Royal Navy a decisive edge in future operations, especially ones where enemy forces were vulnerable in contested or confined zones. Keyes, therefore, could be considered ahead of his time as he, along with other far sighted individuals like Winston Churchill and Sir John Fisher, pushed for the

Royal Navy to implement the next generation of naval weaponry.

This chapter examines Keyes between 1910 and 1928, a period where he held commands which made use of these weapons in the littoral during times of peace, war, and crisis. In doing so, this chapter argues that Keyes understood that these weapons could be implemented to bypassing enemy defenses, protect lines of communication, or support land and naval operations along the shore. He realized that submarines could allow the Royal Navy to collect intel on enemy naval movement or stealthily engage warships along patrol lines. Mines could be deployed to deny the enemy movement through confined spaces. Lastly, though still being developed, Keyes advocated that naval aircraft could sever supply lines and project power inshore or around contested waters. Through implementing the latest in naval technology, Keyes is among the first in the Royal Navy, if not the world, to effectively deploy the predecessors of weapons that continue to have an impact in the littoral.

The nineteenth century exhibited many harbingers in how technology would affect naval operations in the littoral. During the War of 1812 the United States Congress 21 passed the Torpedo Act allowing the public to engage British warships near the coast.

Among the weapons considered were torpedoes, the precursor to modern naval mines.

Around this time, experiments by Robert Fulton before the war convinced many that mines could be used to protect New York Harbor.8 It was not until the Crimean War, however, that naval mines would effectively be used as a means of defending seaports from attack. This was the case with Saint Petersburg which was defended against sea- borne attack with naval mines.

The American Civil War contained numerous cases of mines and submarines being deployed within the littoral to protect harbors or engage warships. The Confederate

Navy constructed several submarines as a means of breaking the U.S. Navy blockade off their seaports. Although their submarines were crude and often more dangerous to their crews than their targets, success was achieved in 1864 when the Hunley sank the

Housatonic off Charleston harbor. Although the Hunley managed to sink its target without being engaged, it would eventually sink a few hours later and the feat would not be repeated for the rest of the war. The Confederates also used naval mines as demonstrated by such engagements as the Battle of Mobile Bay.

The American Civil War, and conflicts preceding it, demonstrated that technology was evolving to the point where the littoral was no longer safe for surface ships.

Although plenty of battles occurred in the littoral before the advent of submarines and mines, the introduction of these weapons gave weaker nations greater opportunities in

8 Andrew J. B. Fagal, “Terror Weapons in the Naval War of 1812,” New York History 94, no. 3-4 (Summer/Fall 2013): 225, accessed October 31, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/newyorkhist.94.3-4.221. 22 protecting their shoreline. These weapons were favored because traditionally the only way to break a blockade or prevent enemy fleets from operating along the coast was with a strong fleet. Therefore, it was usually the side with the weakest navy that implemented the latest weapons rather than the side with the strongest fleet. This trend would continue for the rest of the nineteenth and into the twentieth whereby established naval powers, like Britain, continued to construct surface ships while disparaging the adoption of mines and submarines.

The Royal Navy’s Dilemma in the Littoral, 1900-1914

By the early 1900s mines and submarines had matured to the point that the Royal

Navy was feeling their impact. Improved mines and submarines convinced the British

Admiralty that its ability to conduct a close blockade off the enemy’s coast would become a hazardous undertaking. Rising maritime powers, like Germany and Italy, as well as established ones, such as France and Russia, were either adopting or improving upon the design of these weapons. With nearly all of Europe implementing these weapons the Admiralty decided to abandon a close blockade in favor of a distant one in the event of war. As naval historian Paul Halpern noted, a close blockade against submarines and mines would be “impractical, if not suicidal” for the Royal Navy.9

Technology had another drawback in relation to the construction of capital ships.

In the past, capital ships, especially battleships, were constructed at a brisk pace and one class would often have similar armament and machinery as preceding classes. But with the advent of the Dreadnought in 1906, fueled by the naval arms race against Germany,

9 Paul Halpern, A Naval History of World War I (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 21. 23 battleships were becoming more expensive with each successive class rendering previous ones obsolete. Armor, machinery, armament, and rangefinders all added to the rising cost of battleships resulting in naval budgets worldwide ballooning exponentially. The Royal

Navy was no different and it was not long before Britain’s treasury demanded that the

Admiralty balance its budget so as not to strain the nations finances any further.

This was the situation the Admiralty found itself in the years leading up to the

First World War; technology was not only forcing the Royal Navy to alter its strategy but was also straining its expenditure. This is not to argue that the Royal Navy was incapable of keeping up with the pace of technological progress, far from it. The challenge was rival navies were technologically catching up to the Royal Navy. As a result, the British had to scramble for new ships and strategies to maintain their superiority. Among senior officials willing to meet this challenge were Admiral John “Jacky” Fisher, First Sea Lord, and Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty. Both were favorable to the latest weapons and were aided by a cadre of far-sighted officers like Sydney Hall, Murray

Sueter, and Roger Keyes. With the help of these officers, the Royal Navy not only adopted weapons that aimed at balancing the budget but also at strengthening the navy with the latest weapons and devices.

Churchill especially pushed for the latest weapons having an eye for devices that not only were cheap but would not diminish the Royal Navy’s strength. He immediately favored the usage of aircraft with historian Christopher Bell explaining, “Churchill was eager that the navy was at the cutting edge of technological developments, and 24 enthusiastically fostered the growth of the new naval air service.”10 The decision to adopt aircraft into the Royal Navy received some pushback, although it was more for technical reasons than feasibility.11 Key among these was aircraft of the pre-1914 period had short range, unreliable engines, and were easily grounded due to weather. Technical limitations, however, were quickly overcome and by 1912 the Committee of Imperial

Defense concluded that an aerial section should be established for army and navy aviation needs. By July 1914, the aerial section of the navy branched off and became the

Royal Navy Air Service (RNAS).

Mines, however, had a difficult time being accepted into the Royal Navy with many believing the weapon did not suit their strategy. As historian Steven R. Dunn summarizes, “Mines were a defensive weapon and the navy prided itself on being an offensive force seeking the next Trafalgar to destroy the German High Seas Fleet in battle.”12 As a result, the Royal Navy did not invest as much of their time and resources into mine warfare which resulted in subpar mines. The Elia mines, the Royal Navy’s standard mine in 1914, had a firing device problem and many subsequently failed to detonate.13 There were also few dedicated minesweepers in 1914 which would become an

10 Christopher Bell, Churchill and Sea Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 15. 11 R. D. Layman, Naval Aviation in the First World War: Its Impact and Influences (London: Chatham Publishing, 1996), 49. 12 Steven R. Dunn, Securing the Narrow Sea: The Dover Patrol, 1914-1918 (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2017), 25-6. 13 John Roberts, “Great Britain: The Royal Navy,” in To Crown the Waves: the Great Navies of the First World War, eds. Vincent P O’Hara, W. David Dickson, and Richard Worth (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 167. 25 issue during the Dardanelles Campaign. Yet of these weapons, the submarine likely had the most turbulent time being accepted into the Royal Navy.

As early as the late-nineteenth century, the Royal Navy was hesitant and at times discouraged the acquisition of submarines. The attitude of many senior naval officers at this time, according to F. W. Lipscomb, was that the submarine was the weapon of weaker navies.14 The low opinion of submarines continued through the beginning of the

First World War, but the changing political atmosphere in Europe forced the Royal Navy to alter its stance. Kenneth Edwards would later argue, “The British Navy has never wanted submarine boats, but a share in their evolution has been of late forced upon us by other nations.”15 Among rival nations that accepted the submarine was France which was already ahead in its development. Ex-Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet goes so far to argue that it was directly because of the French that the Royal Navy decided to build a fleet of submarines. 16 Among Royal Navy officers who were aware of France’s lead in submarine development was Admiral Fisher who, in 1904, was C-in-C of the

Mediterranean Fleet and in close proximity of Toulon where the French tested their submarines. Fisher would go so far as to send agents to Toulon to gather intel on French submarines and how much of a threat they presented.17

France’s interest in submarines may have forced some in the Royal Navy to change their attitude, but it was likely the need to balance the budget that ultimately

14 F. W. Lipscomb, The British Submarine (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1954), 63. 15 Kenneth Edwards, We Dive at Dawn: Britain’s Submarines in World War I (Chicago: The Reilly and Lee Co., 1941), 51. 16 Arthur Hezlet, The Submarine and Sea Power (New York: Stein and Day, 1967), 17. 17 Nicholas A. Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 76. 26 resulted in the Admiralty adopting submarines. With the Royal Navy’s budget increasing yearly the need arose to find weapons that combined cost effectiveness with offensive power. As a result, the submarine was seen by some senior officials, like Churchill and

Fisher, as a means of maintaining the Royal Navy’s strength while also reducing its spending. Submarines were also seen as a cheaper and flexible means in protecting harbors than immobile coastal artillery.18

While submarines were initially seen as a cheap means of harbor defense, it was not long before their anticipated purpose extended beyond Britain’s coast. While

Churchill and Fisher were enthusiastic about adopting submarines, they were at odds on how it would ultimately be deployed. Upon becoming First Sea Lord in 1904, Fisher introduced the theory that the Royal Navy could protect the British Isles through a new defensive policy called the Flotilla Defense. Fisher theorized that flotillas of submarines and destroyers had supplanted the battleship as Britain’s primary means of maritime defense.19 With flotillas of submarines and destroyers protecting the British Isles, Fisher stated that Britain’s capital ships would be free to be deployed across the Empire to protect commerce.

Churchill’s policy on submarines was a complete reversal of Fisher’s idea of

Flotilla Defense. Whereas Fisher wanted Britain’s capital ships deployed throughout the

Empire, Churchill wanted to station them in the North Sea as it was here, rather than the far-flung corners of the globe, that Britain faced the strongest naval opposition.

18 Introduction to The Submarine Service, 1900-1918, ed. Nicholas Lambert (Burlington, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2001), xiv-v. 19 Ibid, xvii. 27

Submarines would therefore be deployed to secondary theaters where they were more effective in engaging weaker navies. Churchill particularly believed that submarines would be well suited in the Mediterranean where, in the event of war, they could intercept the Austro-Hungarian Navy if it ever sailed through the Strait of Otranto.20

Where the two were especially at odds was over the development of submarines.

Prior to the First World War an idea slowly gained traction that submarines could be built possessing high surface speed and thus be capable of sailing alongside battleships.

‘Ocean’ submarines, as they were called, found favor with Churchill who likely endorsed the type because it appeared to be a cheap alternative to battleships. Regarding this, Bell explains that to Churchill these submarines would allow the Royal Navy to, “achieve long-term economies in the capital-ship budget without sacrificing any of the navy’s essential capabilities.”21 Churchill, when discussing its capabilities, said that ‘ocean’ submarines were, “a decisive weapon of battle; and as such must count in partial substitution of battleship strength.”22

Fisher, on the other hand, was infuriated when he learned that Churchill wanted to develop ‘ocean’ submarines. According to Lambert, Fisher saw the pooling of resources into ‘ocean’ submarines as a gross miscalculation.23 Fisher was not alone as one of his followers, then Inspecting Captain of Submarines, Sydney Hall, was also against the development of ‘ocean’ submarines. When the Admiralty began showing interest in

20 Bell, Churchill Sea Power, 26. 21 Ibid, 45. 22 Winston Churchill, “Memorandum by Churchill on the Function of Submarines, 2013,” in The Submarine Service, 1900-1918, ed. Nicholas Lambert (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2001), Part V, 207. 23 Lambert, Introduction Submarine Service, xxviii. 28 purchasing a prototype from Italy, Hall stressed that the type had low endurance when submerged and would ultimately be a waste of funds.24

Although Churchill and Fisher may have had different opinions regarding submarine deployment and development, the two were on equal terms regarding how they would be used against Germany. With the knowledge that Britain could not sail their vital surface ships near Germany’s coastline, submarines were gradually seen as the perfect weapon to implement a blockade. In 1913, in noting the function of Royal Navy submarines, Churchill specifies that ‘overseas’ submarines were for blockading duty and that forty-eight would be sufficient to, “maintain a continuous blockade of German rivers.”25 Fisher was largely of the same opinion and expressed it as such in The Oil

Engine and the Submarine. Within, Fisher explains that, with their surface ships denied the ability to blockade the German coast, ‘overseas’ submarines would be a suitable vessel to pick up the task.26

Their belief, however, was not shared by all in the Royal Navy with Kenneth

Edwards stating that many officers, “continued to contend that the submarine was an undesirable weapon from the British point of view.”27 Senior and junior officers alike believed submarines were a novelty or a weapon suited only for coastal defense. Among the few officers who did see the submarine as a useful weapon was Roger Keyes. Unlike many of his peers, Keyes immediately saw the potentials of the submarine in taking the

24 Lambert, Fisher’s Revolution, 223. 25 Churchill, “Memorandum on Submarines,” The Submarine Service, 1900-1918, 208. 26 John Fisher, “Memorandum by Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher, May 1914,” in The Submarine Service, 1900-1918, ed. Nicholas Lambert (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2001), Part V, 218. 27 Edwards, We Dive at Dawn, 51. 29 war to the enemy’s coast and would eventually work to make this idea a reality. Both before and during the war, Keyes would share and eventually implement many of the same ideas Churchill and Fisher had in using submarines in naval operations.

Keyes as Inspecting Captain of Submarines, 1910-1914

Keyes association with submarines began in the autumn of 1910 when he replaced

Sydney Hall as Inspecting Captain of Submarines. As Inspecting Captain, Keyes was in favor of deploying submarines off Germany’s coast and, upon receiving the position, set to work in preparing the service for this objective. Under his appointment he endorsed the construction of ‘overseas’ submarines and encouraged submarine crews to train for offensive operations. Keyes work in preparing the Submarine Service for war has resulted in many historians praising him for his decisions. Arthur Marder lists Keyes as a junior officer who, like Fisher, understood the offensive value of submarines.28 James

Goldrick in Before Jutland also lists Keyes as one of the Royal Navy’s promising officers in the years leading up to the First World War.29

Keyes was appointed Inspecting Captain of Submarines by Admiral Arthur

Wilson, Fisher’s successor as First Sea Lord. Wilson was initially against the employment of submarines to the extent that in 1904 he fixed a naval exercise so that submarines would be at a disadvantage against surface ships. By 1910, however,

Wilson’s opinion changed, and he endorsed the idea of deploying a submarine blockade

28 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1900-1919: Volume I The Road to War, 1900-1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 331. 29 James Goldrick, Before Jutland: The Naval War in Northern European Waters, August 1914 – February 1915 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 24. 30 off Germany.30 Keyes later wrote that Wilson’s negative view on submarines likely changed after the 1910 naval exercise when the D1, an ‘overseas’ submarine, successfully “engaged” two cruisers thus proving to Wilson the “offensive possibilities of submarines”.31

Upon learning that he was to become Inspecting Captain of Submarines, Keyes was, understandably, confused as he had no prior experience with submarines. When asked why he was chosen the answer given was that Wilson wanted, “[a] sea-going officer who had every prospect of being a young Admiral, who could be relied upon to bring the Submarine Service into close touch and co-operate with the fleet.”32 It could be argued that Keyes succeeded in this task because by the beginning of the First World War submarines were seen as a vital arm of the Royal Navy. As Lipscomb states, “the Navy as a whole still needed convincing of the fact that the submarine had ‘arrived’, and this

Keyes was able to do.”33

Lacking technical knowledge on submarines, Keyes first task was gathering together a group of officers who had experience or knowledge of submarines to advise him on technical matters. Keyes explained that this left him free to devote his energies to training and the performance of crews.34 Paul Halpern would later state that Keyes was possibly happier in the training of crews than in the endless debates on submarine

30 Lambert, Fisher’s Revolution, 207. 31 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 23. 32 Ibid, 23-4. 33 Lipscomb, The British Submarine, 80. 34 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 25. 31 development and technical details.35 This is likely true given that Keyes encountered numerous difficulties in submarine production and development.

One of Keyes’ main priorities as Inspecting Captain was increasing production of submarines which were, “capable of blockading the enemy’s coast.”36 This was easier said than done due to Vickers having a monopoly on submarine construction for the

Royal Navy. Initially granted in 1902, the monopoly was beneficial at first but had since become a hindrance by the time Keyes became Inspecting Captain. For example, one of

Keyes’ complaints was that Vickers pace of production was falling behind and that the firm could not keep up with orders.37 Additionally, Vickers had raised the price on submarine construction citing that the latest designs were more complex than earlier variants.

Keyes, therefore, set out to break the Vickers monopoly with the goal that it would increase the rate of production by allowing more firms to construct submarines.

Keyes, in explaining the need to break the Vickers monopoly, claimed he did so, “in order to widen the field of production, introduce competition, and be in a position to develop and build any number, or type, of submarine that we might require.”38 By 1913 the Vickers contract came to an end and production of submarines shifted to several shipyards throughout Britain. Keyes also requested that production of ‘patrol’ submarines be canceled in favor of shifting resources to larger submarines; his request was never

35 Introduction to The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), xxii-xxiii. 36 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 28. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid, 29. 32 approved, although production of ‘patrol’ submarine did decrease in the years leading up to 1914.39

Keyes not only aimed at increasing submarine production but was also on the lookout for improved designs. Not long after becoming Inspecting Captain, Keyes learned that France and Italy had engine and hull designs superior to those the British possessed. With this knowledge, Keyes organized the purchase of these designs to the protest of Vickers and his predecessor, Sydney Hall. Learning of Keyes intentions, Hall wrote to his successor arguing the purchase of foreign designs, “lowered the whole of our prestige in submarine work.”40 Keyes responded claiming that the purchase was made specifically for “experimentation and comparison”.41 Keyes likely made such a move with the goal of leaping ahead of rival nations in submarine design and production. Keyes supported this decision explaining, “it was necessary to go abroad for designs as soon as possible, since…our existing designs could not be given to them [Vickers] before April

1913.”42

All the while Keyes found himself in the middle of the Admiralty’s debate on the status of ‘ocean’ submarines. Almost as soon as he became Inspecting Captain, Keyes received word from numerous sources that the Admiralty wanted ‘ocean’ submarines produced. Among those sources was naval engineer Sir Philip Watts who informed

39 Lambert, Introduction Submarine Service, xxv-vi. 40 Sydney Hall, “Hall to Keyes, 7 October 1911,” in The Submarine Service, 1900-1918, ed. Nicholas Lambert (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2001), Part IV, 172. 41 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Hall, 19 October 1911,” in The Submarine Service, 1900- 1918, ed. Nicholas Lambert (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2001), Part IV, 175. 42 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 28. 33

Keyes to begin work on designing ‘ocean’ submarines. Additionally, independent of

Keyes, the Director of Naval Construction, Tennyson d’Eyncourt, favored ‘ocean’ submarines and, with approval from Churchill, began designing a 24-knot submarine.43

As a result of pressure from above, Keyes would eventually allow Messrs. Scott of

Greenock to produce a steam-powered prototype, the Swordfish, to test the viability of the design. Fisher, learning that Keyes approved the prototype, unsuccessfully urged

Churchill to cancel the prototype.44 It is likely that Keyes was unsure of the success of

‘ocean’ submarines and sincerely wanted to test whether they would be practical through experimentation. While Churchill wanted production to begin immediately, Keyes,

Lambert claims, did not want development to proceed "too fast”.45

While Keyes has been praised for bring submarines in closer touch with the Royal

Navy, many have questioned his pre-war policies. Beginning with the decision to break the Vickers monopoly, Lambert argues that such a move had disastrous consequences when war broke out in 1914. He states that as a result submarine production was dislocated and Vickers, which had experience with submarine construction, was busy with foreign contracts.46 Lipscomb also argues that purchasing foreign designs was a mistake because when war broke out the Royal Navy found it difficult to purchase replacement parts.47

43 Lambert, Fisher’s Revolution, 292. 44 Ibid, 293. 45 Ibid, 295. 46 Lambert, Submarine Service, xxvi. 47 Lipscomb, The British Submarine, 80. 34

Although these criticisms are well founded, it should be remembered that Keyes made these decisions to increase production of ‘overseas’ submarines; the vessel he believed necessary to attack’s Germany’s shore. Lipscomb, despite criticizing the purchase of foreign designs, backs this up arguing, “What Keyes wanted was to improve the ‘Overseas’ submarine and to have more of the type.”48 Other than the type being able to enforce a close blockade, Keyes was aware that Germany was outpacing Britain’s construction of ‘overseas’ submarines and was therefore open to any option that would close the growing gap.49

Keyes was aware of his technical limitations admitting, “I do not think that materiel is much in my line.”50 Yet, where Keyes was successful was in preparing the

Submarine Service for war through exercises and an emphasis on preparing crews for offensive operations. Regarding the latter, when Keyes became Inspecting Captain the general function of submarines was for them to protect Britain’s coastline and harbors. In

1911, Keyes received a memorandum from the C-in-C of the Home Fleet emphasizing that submarines were to cooperate with destroyers in defending the coast.51 Keyes denounced this policy arguing that this order, “had no relation to the peace-time training headquarters of the submarines or the capabilities of the various classes.”52

In response to this Keyes wrote his own memorandum which he submitted to the

Admiralty on June 3, 1911. Keyes’ memorandum covers everything from training

48 Ibid. 49 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 34. 50 Ibid, 38. 51 Ibid, 41. 52 Ibid. 35 submariners’ to how submarines should engage capital ships. Yet, of significant importance is the assigned wartime role of submarines. Rather than organizing submarines to protect Britain’s coast, Keyes proposed that ‘overseas’ submarines be deployed off the enemy’s coast; suitably behind an inshore blockade. There the

‘overseas’ submarines would, “be ready to dive and attack any large vessel which might come out and drive it [inshore blockade] off.”53 Keyes did not leave Britain’s coast undefended as he assigns the Royal Navy’s ‘patrol’ submarines to protect the shore. In

August that year the Admiralty approved Keyes’ revised plans.

As Inspecting Captain of Submarines, Keyes performance was admittedly mixed given the size and rate of acquisition of the Submarine Service prior to August 1914. On the one hand, Keyes decision to spread production of submarines across Britain had lowered the pace of construction. As a result, when the First World War began Keyes only had fourteen ‘overseas’ submarines; far less than the forty-eight Churchill believed necessary for a close blockade. Yet Keyes did train his submarine crews well and, although they experienced technical difficulties, were prepared to engage the enemy far away from Britain’s coast. Additionally, Keyes, through prewar planning, was prepared to deploy his ‘overseas’ submarines off the German coast to engage capital ships and not keep them locked up near British harbors. This is exhibited as early as July 31 when

53 Roger Keyes, “Memorandum by Inspecting Captain of Submarines, 3 June 1911,” in The Submarine Service, 1900-1918, ed. Nicholas Lambert (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2001), Part IV, 182. 36

Keyes reported to Admiral Sir George Callaghan, Commodore to the C-in-C Home Fleet, that he was prepared to send two submarines into the Heligoland Bight.54

Submarine Warfare in the Heligoland Bight and Baltic Sea, 1914-15

Throughout the war Keyes would earn the reputation as an officer pushing for the offensive. This can best be demonstrated in the first six months of the war where Keyes, now appointed C-in-C of the Eighth Submarine Flotilla, proposed numerous operations off Germany’s coast. At first his submarines simply reconnoitered the Heligoland Bight but eventually they began making attacks on German warships. Unfortunately for the

Royal Navy, the Germans were using similar tactics and British warships operating near the coast were frequently torpedoed. One of the first alleged attacks by a German submarine on a British warship occurred on August 8 when the Monarch was nearly torpedoed while conducting gunnery practice near Heligoland. Regarding close calls such as this, Keyes would later write, “The [Royal] Navy as a whole was still very ignorant about submarines powers and limitations.”55

Keyes, however, was aware of the offensive power his ‘overseas’ submarines possessed and by the end of August he saw an opportunity at engaging the German navy off their coast. Goldrick summarized Keyes mindset at this time stating, “It was not enough to wait for the Germans: the British must enter the Bight to have any chance of dealing a blow.”56 Throughout August, British E and D class ‘overseas’ submarines

54 Roger Keyes, “Commodore (S) to Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet (Admiral Sir George Callaghan), 31 July 1914,” in The Submarine Service, 1900-1918, ed. Nicholas Lambert (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2001), Part VI, 265. 55 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 69. 56 Goldrick, Before Jutland, 111. 37 steadily monitored the movement of German patrols in the Bight and realized they followed a fixed pattern. With this information, Keyes, along with Reginald Tyrwhitt who commanded a force of surface ships at Harwich, devised a plan aimed at engaging

German patrols within the Bight to lure the German fleet out.

The plan called for Tyrwhitt to deploy his destroyers, composed within the First and Second Flotillas, against German patrols in the Bight while Keyes would deploy two lines of submarines to attack the sortieing German fleet. Rear Admiral Archibald Moore, commanding the battlecruisers New Zealand and Invincible, would provide backup should German capital ships slip past Keyes’ and Tyrwhitt’s forces. One of the advantages of the plan were for unsuspecting German capital ships to stealthily be engaged by submarines the moment they left their anchorages. Unlike an operation in the middle of the ocean, where the enemy could be anywhere, the Germans could only be coming from one location – the estuaries. Keyes explains the advantage of this to the

Admiralty stating, “The submarines might take up a position close to the enemy’s port…when they might rise and be in a position to attack the enemy’s cruisers…or vessels returning which may have escaped.”57

The Battle of Heligoland Bight, fought on August 28, was a success, albeit a close one. While Keyes and Tyrwhitt were sortieing for the operation, the Admiralty decided to have Admiral David Beatty and the Grand Fleet sail towards the Bight to support the operation. Keyes and Tyrwhitt, unaware of the Admiralty’s decision, were initially

57 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to the Chief of the War Staff, 23 August 1914,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part I, 10. 38 confused when the Grand Fleet arrived believing they were the German fleet. It was not until the last moment that Keyes recognized that they were British. Despite the initial confusion the British successfully sank three German cruisers in return for minor losses.

The victory at Heligoland Bight was celebrated throughout Britain. Halpern summarizes the battle saying, “The British had won a naval victory, their first in the war, and they won it right on the doorstep of the enemy.”58 Beatty and Tyrwhitt were heroes, yet Keyes simmered at their lost opportunity. Writing to William Goodenough not long after the battle, Keyes stated bluntly, “I think an absurd fuss was made over that small affair.”59 Years later Keyes explained that, had he known the Grand Fleet was present, the British could have reorganized their forces which could have devastated the German fleet.60

Despite the lost opportunity, Keyes did recognize that the battle had an impact on the German navy.61 Keyes was a correct as the victory rattled the German navy to its core. As Halpern explains, the Kaiser, fearful of losing additional capital ships, requested that only he could give permission for the fleet to sortie.62 The victory also encouraged the Germans to ramp up their naval strategy, Kleinkrieg, to whittle down the British navy enough with mines and submarines to give the High Seas Fleet numerical advantage. The war for the German navy continued to deteriorate when, on September 13, the Hela was

58 Halpern, Naval History, 32. 59 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Goodenough, 5 September 1914,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), Part I, 19. 60 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 92. 61 Ibid, 97. 62 Halpern, Naval History, 32. 39 torpedoed and sunk off the Jade River by the E9. This prompted the German navy’s C-in-

C, Friedrich von Ingenhol, to move the High Seas Fleet’s exercise area from the

Heligoland Bight to the Baltic Sea.63

Germany’s naval setbacks did not last long and they quickly capitalized on the

Royal Navy’s lack of precaution along the coast of northern Europe. Since the war began the Royal Navy stationed its obsolete Bacchante-class cruisers on patrol along the Broad

Fourteens off the Dutch coast. Their purpose was to deter German minelaying operations, but they were vulnerable due to their slow speed and the fact that they were operating near German naval facilities.64 For some time, Keyes, as well as Tyrwhitt, were aware of their vulnerability to submarines and promptly warned the Admiralty. The response they were given was that the British had always patrolled the Broad Fourteens and would not break with protocol. Churchill, according to Keyes, did eventually understand their vulnerability but was unable to prevent their destruction.

On September 22, the U.9 intercepted the Cressy, Hogue, and Aboukir off the

Dutch Coast and sank them one by one. Keyes would remark on the ease the U.9 had in sinking the cruisers stating it was, “about as simple an operation for a submarine captain as the stalking of a tame elephants, chained to trees, would be to an experienced big- game hunter.”65 Over one-thousand were lost and the Admiralty was left scrambling for a solution to protect their capital ships. Jellicoe moved the Grand Fleet’s anchorage from

63 Goldrick, Before Jutland, 142. 64 Cecil Aspinall-Oglander, Roger Keyes: Being the Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Keyes of Zeebrugge and Dover (London: The Hogarth Press, 1951), 97. 65 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 110. 40

Loch Ewe to Loch na Keal and Lough Swilly.66 When asked what the navy could do to counter the submarine threat Keyes recommended that well-defined patrols be abandoned.67

By October the Germans were beginning to learn from their mistakes and had increased their defenses within the Heligoland Bight. With Germany taking greater care in protecting their capital ships British submarines found few targets. With few opportunities for his submarines around Heligoland, Keyes began to focus on the Baltic where the Germans were conducting naval maneuvers. As early as September, while attending a conference aboard the Iron Duke, Keyes recommended that submarines be sent into the Baltic Sea explaining later that it provided, “a wider and more profitable field for submarine activity than the Heligoland Bight.”68 Keyes idea garnered support and it was quickly decided that enquiries were to be made for the likelihood of success.

At this time, according to Goldrick, sending submarines was the only “practical means” the British had at putting pressure on the Germans in the Baltic.69

By early October, Jellicoe questioned the feasibility of the plan leaving Keyes to outline the operation. First, Keyes pointed out that German cruisers, following patrol lines, near the entrance of the Baltic were vulnerable explaining, “a Submarine attack on

66 Halpern, Naval History, 33. 67 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet, 23 September 1914,” in The Submarine Service, 1900-1918, ed. Nicholas Lambert (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2001”, Part VI, 273. 68 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 105. 69 Goldrick, Before Jutland, 224. 41 these vessels presents no great difficulty.”70 Keyes then explained that British submarines in the Baltic could threaten Germany’s trade with Scandinavia. He also explained that the

Baltic was the new training ground for the German navy which increased the possibilities of engaging capital ships.71

At first the operation was planned to be a short one with the submarines entering and leaving the Baltic in the span of a few days. As the operation gained traction at the

Admiralty the submarines planned duration in the Baltic increased. With such enthusiasm, by mid-October, Keyes wrote to Jellicoe suggesting, “three submarines should proceed to Baltic and use Libau as base for some weeks.”72 This was approved by the Admiralty and on October 15 the E1, E9, and E11 departed for the Baltic. Of the three the E11 had to abandon the operation after it ran into heavy German patrols. By October

17 the presence of British submarines in the Baltic was made aware when the E1 unsuccessfully torpedoed the Viktoria Luise.

The presence of two British submarines in the confines of the Baltic had an immediate effect on the German navy. According to Halpern, the Germans quickly ordered all their capital ships back to port once the British submarines were sighted.73

Goldrick explains that their presence created an extreme case of “submarinitis” in the

70 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Jellicoe, 10 October 1914,” in The Submarine Service, 1900- 1918, ed. Nicholas Lambert (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2001), Part VI, 275. 71 Roger Keyes and John Jellicoe, “Copies of Telegrams between Keyes and Jellicoe, 13- 16 October 1914,” in The Submarine Service, 1900-1918, ed. Nicholas Lambert (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2001), Part VI, 277. 72 Ibid. 73 Halpern, Naval History, 188. 42

Baltic to the extent that German patrols chased after phantom submarines.74 Not long after Keyes received a message from Jellicoe which changed the mission for the E1 and

E9. Jellicoe stated that the Admiralty wanted the submarines to remain in the Baltic,

“There is certainly a more likely field for them than in the Heligoland Bight, which is boycotted by larger ships.”75

Keeping these submarines in the Baltic was a bold move considering Keyes originally envisioned them to be deployed there for a few weeks. British submarines would eventually become a force to be reckoned with in the Baltic, but in their first year they encountered nothing but setbacks. For one, Russia was never informed of the move and so were unprepared to rearm or maintain them. The British attaché in Petrograd wrote to the Admiralty explaining that Nikolai von Essen, Russia’s naval C-in-C in the

Baltic, was happy to receive the submarines but would have appreciated prior warning in order to prepare for them. Additionally, the British submarines found that Libau was not suited as a base because the Germans were close to capturing the port.

For the remainder of the year, the E1 and E9 would have few successes due in part to the lack of spare parts as well as the oncoming winter which would freeze over their new anchorage near Petrograd. As Halpern explains, “The handful of submarines could not accomplish miracles, and it would have been erroneous to have expected them to radically transform the situation in the Baltic.”76 The next year would not only see the

74 Goldrick, Before Jutland, 225. 75 John Jellicoe, “Telegram from Jellicoe to Keyes, 25 October 1914,” in The Submarine Service, 1900-1918, ed. Nicholas Lambert (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2001), Part VI, 279. 76 Halpern, Naval History, 190. 43 arrival of three more ‘overseas’ submarines, but also the initiation of raids on German commerce. As a result, Keyes’ plan on sending his ‘overseas’ submarines into the Baltic did eventually pay dividends; the Germans were harassed in their own waters, their iron trade threatened, and their warships had to act cautiously all along their coast. Historian

Michael Wilson, though questioning why Russia was not informed of the operation, summarizes the submarines success saying, “He [Keyes] was correct in assuming that their presence would cause the Germans some concern.”77

For the remainder of 1914, Keyes deployed his submarines in routine operations along the Bight or, during invasion scares, the British coast. In November Keyes and his submarines attempted unsuccessfully to intercept a squadron of German cruisers which had bombarded the city of Yarmouth. The Royal Navy would strike back with raids on the zeppelin sheds at Cuxhaven. These sheds were important because the zeppelins they housed conducted reconnaissance patrols over the Bight and North Sea revealing the movements of the Royal Navy. Keyes, who was partially responsible for the raid’s implementation, deployed his submarines throughout the Bight to rescue downed RNAS pilots. These raids likely had an impact on Keyes because he would have been aware that naval aircraft were capable at striking targets inland which could have an impact on operations at sea.

In February 1915, Keyes command of the Eight Submarine Flotilla ended after he was appointed to become Admiral Sackville Carden’s Chief of Staff in the Dardanelles

Campaign. There is no doubt that Keyes left a lasting impression on the Submarine

77 Michael Wilson, Baltic Assignment: British Submarines in Russia, 1914-1919 (London: Leo Cooper, 1985), 41. 44

Service in emphasizing offensive action off the enemy’s coast. During his five years with the Submarine Service, Keyes was always pushing for development of submarines capable of taking the war to distant waters. It is likely he did this because he recognized that it was better to engage the enemy off their coast than wait for an engagement in

British waters. The Dardanelles Campaign would continue to demonstrate the power of technology on naval operations in the littoral. Perhaps here more than any other campaign did Keyes learn the hazards and advantages that could be gained in using submarines, mines, and aircraft in the littoral.

Denying Movement in Confined Waters: The Dardanelles, 1915

Among the weapons that had the most impact during the Dardanelles Campaign were naval mines. The British initially believed that mines could easily be cleared once the Ottoman guns positioned along the Dardanelles were silenced. Once the mines were swept an Anglo-French naval force could sail into the Sea of Marmara, lay off

Constantinople and force the Ottomans to terms. At first all went well after the Ottoman forts at the mouth of the Dardanelles Strait were destroyed with ease. Moving into the confines of the Dardanelles, however, allied warships discovered the difficulty in sweeping well-protected minefields. Admiral Guido von Usedom, when organizing the defense, emphasized defending the minefields with artillery as they were the only obstacle preventing the fleet from sailing into the Marmara.78

The Royal Navy’s greatest weakness during the operation, and one that Keyes later tried to rectify, was the quality of the minesweeping force. Rather than using

78 Aspinall-Oglander, Keyes: Being the Biography, 115. 45 purpose-built minesweepers, or at the very least destroyers equipped with minesweeping equipment, the Royal Navy used North Sea trawlers crewed by civilians. Among the problems in using trawlers was that they were not powerful enough to work against the currents found in the Dardanelles. The trawlers were also easy targets for Ottoman guns lining the Strait and were destroyed with minimal effort. Such was the deficiency of this hastily assembled force that Halpern argued that they were the “Achilles Heel” of the entire naval operation.79 Within a month of the campaign, the minefields, especially those near Kephez Point, were slowing down the Anglo-French Fleet’s movement up the Strait.

As Keyes bluntly explained to his wife, “The Germans have not wasted their time these past few months – and the concealed guns and their fire – and the minefields are the devil!”80

The full devastation of the minefields would occur on March 18 when an Anglo-

French fleet, led by Keyes, attempted to force the Dardanelles. The plan called for battleships to use their firepower to suppress Ottoman artillery along the Strait allowing the minefields to be swept. Unbeknownst to the allies, the Ottomans had laid a string of mines parallel to the shore which sank three battleships and damaged another three during the attack. During the operation the minesweepers were unable to clear the minefield as they encountered heavy artillery fire from the shoreline. Keyes would later

79 Halpern, Naval History, 114. 80 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to his Wife, 8 March 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), Part II, 104. 46 report how the defenders allowed the minesweepers to sail into the middle of the minefield before opening fire on them.81

The action on March 18 was a disaster and would ultimately lead to the decision to land soldiers on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Yet, the decision to land the army was not immediately apparent after the attack and there was still a belief that the Dardanelles could be forced. Among those who shared this belief was Keyes who wrote, “I am spoiling to have at it again. Only this time it must be on an onslaught on the minefield – the forts we can always dominate – but the minefield is the devil – and I am making it my own.”82 Not long after, Keyes received permission from the new naval C-in-C, Admiral

John de Robeck, to reorganize the minesweeping force.

Keyes first decision was for the civilians to return home and replace them with naval volunteers. Finding replacements was not difficult as survivors from the sunken battleships volunteered to man the minesweepers. The trawlers were also discarded in favor of destroyers that were specially fitted with minesweeping equipment. Unlike the trawlers, destroyers could not only absorb firepower but could also work against the currents in the Strait.83 By the time this force was ready the decision was made to land the army on the Gallipoli Peninsula rather than force the Strait a second time. Keyes would insist for the remainder of the campaign that the new minesweepers by deployed, but his request was rejected.

81 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to his Wife, 15 March 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), Part II, 106. 82 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to his Wife, 21 March 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), Part II, 113. 83 Halpern, Naval History, 115. 47

The presence of well defended minefields in the Dardanelles was a decisive factor in preventing the Anglo-French Fleet from entering the Sea of Marmara. Yet, the role of the Royal Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign did not end with the March 18 action, nor was it limited to shore bombardments. Throughout the campaign on the Gallipoli

Peninsula the Royal Navy regularly employed aircraft and submarines against the

Ottomans. Although Keyes was not in direct command over any squadron or submarine flotilla during the campaign, he was aware of the impact these weapons were having on the ground war at Gallipoli.

Naval aircraft were involved in the Dardanelles Campaign from the very beginning with the seaplane carrier Ark Royal providing reconnaissance for the fleet. As early as February, Keyes highlights the navy’s ability to locate concealed guns in the

Dardanelles with the aid of the Ark Royal’s seaplanes.84 Weather conditions or mechanical breakdowns, however, frequently grounded flights meaning that aerial reconnaissance was not always available. The consequences of reconnaissance flights being grounded was not lost on Keyes who often noted the groundings to letters back home. At one point he mentions how the failure for their seaplanes to conduct reconnaissance flights forced a landing party of marines to be delayed because Admiral

Carden insisted on having information on enemy formations before the landings.85

Reconnaissance was not the only duty of naval aircraft during the campaign. After the army landed on Gallipoli, the navy used their aircraft to attack Ottoman positions on

84 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to his Wife, 28 February 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), Part II, 96. 85 Ibid, 95. 48 land as well as their supply lines in the Sea of Marmara. On August 12, the RNAS conducted the first ever attack using an aerial torpedo. Although the ship was reportedly grounded and thus not actually sunk, it proves that the Royal Navy was willing to innovate and use the latest weapons. Although the Royal Navy routinely used aircraft against Ottoman supply ships, their overall success was far less when compared to submarines. Submarines nearly severed the Ottoman supply lines at sea while naval aircraft only managed to sink a few dozen ships during the whole of the campaign. Yet, as Arthur Hezlet explains, the number of ships sunk in the Marmara by aircraft was more than those sunk by ship-based gunfire.86 Although the Dardanelles Campaign did not achieve its objectives, the use of naval aircraft was groundbreaking with R. D. Layman arguing that it was during this campaign where aircraft, “exerted influence not merely on battle or theater strategy but on grand strategy.”87

While aircraft was vital in extending the reach of the Royal Navy over the

Gallipoli Peninsula and into the Marmara, it was submarines that were most successful in engaging Ottoman supply lines. Much like the British, the Ottoman army on the Gallipoli

Peninsula was primarily supplied by sea as their overland routes were not up to the task in handling the vast amounts of supplies and reinforcements. With the Ottoman’s logistics heavily linked to the sea, the Royal Navy, and later the French navy, tasked their submarines in sinking Ottoman supply ships in the Marmara. One of the first submarines to infiltrate the Marmara was the Australian submarine AE.2. When news spread that the

AE.2 was in the Marmara and was engaging Ottoman supply ships, Keyes reported, “The

86 Arthur Hezlet, Aircraft and Sea Power (New York: Stein and Day, 1970), 36. 87 Layman, Naval Aviation First World War, 152. 49

Australian submarine had done the finest feat in Submarine History, was going to torpedo all the ships brining reinforcements, provisions, ammunition, etc., making for

Gallipoli.”88

Keyes would continue to praise the exploits of Britain’s submarines throughout the campaign; especially because they were achieving more compared to the deadlock on land. Such was the impact of British submarines in the Marmara that Keyes wrote on

August 17, “The submarines have undoubtedly made the supply by sea of the Turkish

Army a most difficult matter.”89 By this point in the campaign, Keyes was using the submarines’ exploits to push for a renewed assault on the Strait. Although the submarines were making resupply for the Ottoman army difficult, they could not win the campaign on their own.90 By January 1916 the Allies had evacuated the Gallipoli Peninsula and the campaign came to an end.

The failure of the Dardanelles Campaign was an important moment for Keyes and would have a large impact on how he would conduct future operations in similar environments. One of the immediate effects the campaign had on Keyes was that for the duration of the war he would urge the navy to do anything possible to support the army.

He also argued that the navy needed to fight its own battles and should not rely on the army as it had done in the Dardanelles. It is also likely Keyes saw the impact aircraft and

88 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to his Wife, 26 April 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), Part II, 128. 89 Roger Keyes, “Proposal by Keyes for a Renewal of the Naval Attack on the Dardanelles and De Robeck’s Comments, 17 August 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), Part II, 191. 90 Halpern, Naval History, 119. 50 naval mines had in affecting operations in the littoral. Both weapons were successful in bringing pressure on an opposing army through engaging their supply lines as well as, in the case of Ottoman mines, frustrating the movement of a fleet. Keyes would use the lessons he learned in the Dardanelles for the rest of his life. One of the first commands that he was able to implement some of these lessons was the Dover Patrol.

The Dover Strait, 1917-18

The Dover Patrol was established in October 1914 and was initially under the command of Rear-Admiral Horace Hood. From the beginning the Patrol’s initial purpose were to sweep mines, ensure that the supply of men and material to France was not disrupted, and to maintain the blockade and check neutral ships for contraband.91 Admiral

Hood was not in command for long and was replaced by Vice-Admiral Reginald Bacon who would remain in command until December 1917. To prevent U-Boats from entering the English Channel, Bacon laid an extensive barrage between Goodwin Sands and Outer

Ruytingen. The barrage, which was completed in April 1916, consisted of anti-submarine nets and tethered mines. Initially the barrage seemed to be effective because few U-Boats were sighted near the Dover Strait. As a result Bacon was convinced that his measures were successful.92

This was not the case, however, and U-Boats either passed through the barrage at night or simply cut through the netting.93 The failure of the barrage went unnoticed until

February 1917 when Germany reintroduced unrestricted submarine warfare. With the

91 Dunn, Securing the Narrow Sea, 233. 92 Aspinall-Oglander, Keyes: Being the Biography, 211. 93 Halpern, Naval History, 250. 51

Dover Strait practically undefended U-Boats had easy access toward Allied shipping lanes west of the British Isles. By the summer of 1917, Allied merchant losses were increasing at an alarming rate and many were concerned that Germany could potentially cut off the flow of men and materiel to France. Keyes was among those fearing this outcome stating, “German submarines were passing through the Straits…threatening the very life of our country and our ability to maintain our armies in the field.”94 Although the convoy system was an effective answer, it did not protect merchant ships which dispersed near the British coast to sail independently to their destinations.95 It has been estimated that in 1917 the Allies lost over six million tons compared to two million tons of shipping the previous year.96

As a result of these losses, the Allies scrambled to find a solution to quell the staggering losses. In September Admiral Beatty suggested that a mine barrage should be laid across the northern half of the North Sea between Scotland and Norway.97 This idea was proposed because at the time many believed that the Dover Patrol was effective and that the U-Boats were primarily going around Scotland to reach their hunting grounds.

Yet, not all were convinced at the Dover Patrol’s effectiveness and many in both the government and Admiralty began questioning Bacon’s barrage. Chief among those was

Rosslyn Wemyss, Deputy First Sea Lord, who requested that the incoming Director of the Plans Division, Roger Keyes, form a committee and investigate the Dover barrage.98

94 Roger Keyes, The Naval Memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Roger Keyes: Scapa Flow to the Dover Straits, 1916-1918 (New York: E. P. Dutton & CO., INC., 1935), 117. 95 Halpern, Naval History, 405-6. 96 Dunn, Securing the Narrow Sea, 153. 97 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: Scapa Flow to the Dover Strait, 114. 98 Dunn, Securing the Narrow Sea, 155. 52

In October 1917 Keyes left the Grand Fleet to become the Admiralty’s Director of the Plans Division. Almost as soon as he obtained the position Keyes was tasked by

Wemyss and Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty, to investigate the Dover Patrol.

By now Keyes was aware that U-Boats were not deterred by the barrage based on information received from the Naval Intelligence Division (NID). From captured documents, the NID informed Keyes that that German submarines were passing through the Dover Strait on a near nightly basis.99 With this information Keyes, as chair of the newly established Barrage Committee, began to revise the defense of the Dover Strait to make it impassable to U-Boats.

The Barrage Committee first met on November 17 and concluded its investigations twelve days later with information received from Room 40, the NID, and on-sight inspections.100 Among the findings was that the Dover Strait, not the North Sea, was the primary route for U-Boats with an estimated 253 passages made in 1917.101 With this information, the Committee recommended a variety of methods, ranging from established weapons to experimental devices, at making the Dover Strait, “a more absolute barrier.”102 Among the methods recommended was to illuminate the entire minefield at night with flares and searchlights. Lighting up the surface, it was realized, would force the U-Boats to dive into the minefield. Bacon was against this idea arguing

99 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: Scapa Flow to the Dover Strait, 117. 100 Dunn, Securing the Narrow Sea, 156. 101 Roger Keyes, “Interim Report of the Channel Barrage Committee, 29 November 1917,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), Part IV, 419. 102 Ibid, 420. 53 that illuminated ships would be easy targets.103 The Committee also recommended that the minefield constantly be patrolled by armed surface craft. This move was done both to engage U-Boats found on the surface and protect the barrage from minesweepers and surface ships.

In December the Admiralty forced Bacon to implement some of the Committee’s recommendations. As a result, a new minefield was laid between Folkstone and Cape

Gris-Nez, a narrower point than the previous minefield, and vessels bearing searchlights and flares were placed above the new barrage. Despite the Admiralty’s orders, Bacon was slow in introducing these changes which frustrated Keyes who, in a letter to Beatty, explained, “We will make Dover unhealthy for submarines, but Bacon’s presence adds to our difficulties.”104 Keyes did not have to wait long for proof that his measures were effective. On December 20, a U-Boat was sunk when it dove into the minefield after being caught on the surface by searchlights. Keyes praised the success of the new measures and predicted that Bacon’s fate was sealed.105

On January 1, 1918, Keyes, now with the rank of Vice Admiral, became the new commander of the Dover Patrol. The moment Keyes obtained command he immediately began work in sealing the Dover Strait knowing how vital it was in protecting the Allies lines of communication. As early as December 23 he issued a statement on the strategic importance of fortifying the Strait saying, “When the enemy meets with determined resistance to his war against commerce…he will make a determined attack at the point of

103 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: Scapa Flow to the Dover Strait, 123. 104 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Beatty, 5 December 1917,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), Part IV, 423. 105 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: Scapa Flow to the Dover Strait, 143. 54 resistance.”106 Keyes accepted that the Dover Strait would be the point of resistance and even welcomed the prospect of German raids against the patrol. When stating the effects of not strengthening the Strait he argued that it would be commerce, rather than the patrol, that would be threatened.107

Keyes had a variety of weapons at his disposal that ranged from warships of various types, to marines, to aircraft; he would task them all in closing the Strait. One of

Keyes first priorities was to lay more mines in the Strait at varying depths “until the odds were against the submarine”.108 Keyes also ordered that the waters above the new barrage be continually patrolled. These measures are nearly identical to those at the Dardanelles; in both cases minefields were laid at the narrow points of important passages.

Additionally, Keyes likely learned that it was advantageous to protect the mines against minesweepers and warships which was not always done by Britain in the past. Early in the war British anti-submarine minefields laid in the Heligoland Bight were easily swept by the Germans.109

Keyes not only increased the defenses of the barrage but also encouraged offensive action against German naval facilities along the Belgian coast. One of those, which will be covered in the second chapter, was an effort to block the harbors at

Zeebrugge and Ostend through an amphibious raid. Among other means at taking the war to the Germans was laying mines off Zeebrugge and Ostend which often resulted in

106 Roger Keyes, “Memorandum by Keyes, 23 December 1917,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), Part IV, 438. 107 Ibid. 108 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: Scapa Flow to the Dover Strait, 157. 109 Aspinall-Oglander, Keyes: Being the Biography, 211. 55 skirmishes between surface ships.110 Keyes, having command over the 5th Air Group of the RNAS, used aircraft to bomb the submarine pens at Bruges as well as conduct anti- ship and submarine operations near the Strait. Keyes also implemented the latest technologies such as a specially made naval mine that would cease to detonate after eight hours. These were primarily used before the raids on Zeebrugge and Ostend to mislead the Germans into believing that the British would not be sending vessels into the area.111

The measures implemented by Keyes in 1918 had immediate results with Halpern arguing, “The new effectiveness of the Dover Strait barrage was an unpleasant development for the Germans, particularly the Flanders Flotilla at Bruges, for it ended the geographic advantage of this forward base.”112 Keyes’ goal was not to simply sink

German submarines but to deny them an easy passage to their hunting grounds.113 In this

Keyes was successful because German submarines were forced to go around Scotland into the Irish Sea and English Channel thus increasing their time in transit. Dunn estimates that U-Boats only had four days in their “hunting grounds” before needing to return to their bases.114 There is no doubt that this was due to Keyes leadership which emphasized the need to capitalize on the defense of a vital waterway. In doing so Keyes used his experience from past operations as well as taking advantage of weapons, such as

110 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Beatty, 7 February 1918,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), Part IV, 451. 111 Roger Keyes, “Plan for Operation Z.O. and Remarks by the Sea Lords, 25 February 1918” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), Part IV, 467. 112 Halpern, Naval History, 407. 113 Ibid. 114 Dunn, Securing the Narrow Sea, 234. 56 mines and aircraft, to harass the enemy’s movement by denying German submarines a quick passage towards the Allies lines of communication.

Keyes and Naval Aviation in the Interwar Period, 1924-26

As briefly mentioned, aircraft were vital to Keyes while commanding the Dover

Patrol. They could provide aerial intelligence over targets, bomb facilities, and intercept

German warships. But in April all the Royal Navy’s aircraft and aviation personnel were transferred to the newly established Royal Air Force (RAF). The roots of the Royal Air

Force originated as early as 1915 when Germany initiated a strategic bombing campaign against Britain; first with zeppelins and later fixed-wing aircraft. For the first time

London and other urban areas were vulnerable to an enemy beyond their shores. The damage caused by the air raids was minor, but the public was unnerved and demanded the government organize an efficient means of aerial defense.115 The resulting government action came about in the Smuts Report which called for an independent branch of the military focused strictly on aerial operations. This led to the creation of the

RAF on April 1, 1918 which unified the Royal Flying Corps and RNAS into a single branch.

Many officials in the Royal Navy did not immediately protest the arrangement,

Beatty accepted the move, but before long many realized the ramifications. Not only did the Royal Navy lose control over all its aircraft, and the operations they could conduct, but also over aviation enthusiasts within the branch.116 Keyes was affected when he

115 Anthony J. Cumming, The Battle for Britain: Interservice Rivalry Between the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, 1909-1940 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015), 22. 116 Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy between the World War Vol I: Period of Anglo- American Antagonism, 1919-1929 (London: Collins, 1968), 241. 57 learned he could no longer conduct high intensity bombing raids against German naval bases in Belgium. He bitterly complained years later that without full control over bombers he was unable to engage German warships docked in Burges.117 This led to

Keyes becoming a staunch supporter for the reestablishment of the Royal Navy’s aviation section. Beginning with the end of World War I and into the 1930s when he became an

MP, Keyes would fight for the reintegration of the Royal Navy’s aviation section using military connections and first-hand experience in his arguments.

Keyes was not alone. Between 1918 and the mid-1920s the Admiralty made repeated complaints to the Air Ministry regarding the RAFs poor handling of its naval section. Among their complaints was that resources were diverted away from naval aircraft towards the production of land-based aircraft; especially bombers. The Admiralty also complained that aviation personnel attached to their fleets were unfamiliar with naval procedure, doctrine, or operations; particularly carrier operations. This led, the

Admiralty claimed, to more time being spent training pilots to land on carriers that would otherwise have been spent on “advanced exercises”.118 Their complaints did gain some attention, the Balfour Committee was organized to investigate their grievances, but little was done to satisfy the navy.

At the same time Royal Air Force fought hard to maintain control over its naval wing, now renamed the Fleet Air Arm by the Balfour Committee. Sir Hugh Trenchard,

Marshall of the Royal Air Force, especially fought hard to maintain the naval branch as he wanted to preserve the idea of “unity of the air”. Additionally, as historian Stephen

117 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: Scapa Flow to the Dover Strait, 305. 118 Hezlet, Aircraft Sea Power, 114. 58

Roskill argues, it is likely that Trenchard did not trust the Royal Navy.119 John Slessor, future Marshall of the Royal Air Force and Trenchard’s protégé, supported this statement remarking on the RAF’s struggle against the navy’s lobby stating, “We were up against human nature and Naval tradition – two very powerful influences.”120

The RAF’s case was strong at this time which partially allowed them to retain control over the Fleet Air Arm. Regarding their combat record during the First World

War, RAF advocates claimed that their branch had done more to defeat the Germans than the Royal Navy. Additionally, the RAF could argue that they were a cheaper branch to maintain and operate compared to the navy; a strong claim at a moment when Parliament was slashing the military budget. The RAF could also claim that, unlike the navy, they could police the whole of the Empire. Backing up this line of argument, RAF advocates pointed to conflicts on the Northwest Frontier of India and Iraq where air power seemed to be decisive in thwarting rebellion. Lastly, the RAF used the argument of Italian

General Giulio Douchet who claimed that future wars were decided by the air force which could fly over fleets and armies and attack cities and centers of production.121

Despite the arguments made by the Royal Air Force, many in the Royal Navy continued to push for the reintegration of the Fleet Air Arm. Keyes was one of the navy’s most prominent supporters going so far as to bluntly state to Beatty, “It is essential that the Navy should have a sufficient and efficient Air Service, which we will never get

119 Roskill, Naval Policy Vol I, 384. 120 John Slessor, The Central Blue: The Autobiography of Sir John Slessor, Marshall of the RAF (New York: Fredrick A. Prager, 1957), 187. 121 Hezlet, Aircraft Sea Power, 112. 59 under the present regime.”122 Improved results were finally made in 1924 when Keyes was asked to work with Trenchard, his brother-in-law, on an agreement that would satisfy both parties. The result was the Trenchard-Keyes Agreement which was approved by

Parliament in July 1924 and seemed to settle any and all grievances. As Roskill argues, the agreement came at a crucial time as the Royal Navy would require more aviators as two of their carriers, the Glorious and Courageous were nearly completed.123 Cummings, however, argues that the agreement was more likely a truce because the Royal Navy had dual control over the Fleet Air Arm and not full control.124

Cummings was correct because many in the Royal Navy continued to complain well after the agreement was finalized. Among those was Keyes who, although a primary contributor to the terms of the agreement, continued to protest over having to share the

Fleet Air Arm with the RAF. His argument increased after 1925 when he became C-in-C of the Mediterranean Fleet. After five months commanding the Mediterranean Fleet he wrote to the Secretary of the Admiralty on the state of the Fleet Air Arm. Among his chief complaints was that RAF pilots had no knowledge of naval doctrine and were under orders by the RAF wing commander rather than the carrier’s captain.125 Keyes also mentions that many RAF personnel were unhappy with fleet work as they reportedly loathed serving two “masters” and were unlikely to attain a higher rank than their

122 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Hall, 20 February 1922,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume II, 1919-1938, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), Part I, 72. 123 Roskill, Naval Policy Vol I, 394-5. 124 Cumming, Battle for Britain, 48. 125 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 16 November 1925,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume II, 1919-1938, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), Part II, 145. 60 counterparts on land.126 Keyes concludes by arguing for the necessity in an all naval air wing by stating how naval tactics were changing to the point that enemy fleets could be spotted sooner and that Admirals needed the confidence and understanding of all aviation personnel to succeed in operations.127 Keyes’ statement did not lead to any results but it does demonstrate his concern over the effects a divided Fleet Air Arm could have on naval operations.

Despite his concern, and the problems of dual control, Keyes continued to conduct exercises to simulate naval operations against potential aggressors. Among these was Exercise M.U. conducted in August 1925. Exercise M.U. simulated a war with Japan and the challenges the fleet would face when sailing through the Strait of Malacca. Keyes gave the aggressor fleet a carrier and a submarine flotilla believing that the Japanese navy would have a greater reliance on these weapons. As Keyes would later report, Exercise

M.U. demonstrated the effects of aircraft in naval operations; particularly those confined to narrow waters. During the exercise an aggressor squadron of torpedo bombers were able to cripple the British fleet because they were initially mistaken for reconnaissance planes.128 As a result of this, Keyes specifies that the fleet should have a squadron of fighters air borne when crossing the Strait to protect the fleet from enemy bombers.129

Additionally, harkening back to the Dardanelles Campaign, he recommends that

126 Ibid, 147. 127 Ibid, 148. 128 Roger Keyes, “Memorandum by Keyes on Exercise ‘MU’, 15 December 1925,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume II, 1919-1938, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), Part II, 153-4. 129 Ibid, 154. 61 minesweeping operations be conducted during daylight hours as this would cause less disorganization than during night.

Keyes would never have to deploy the Mediterranean Fleet in war, but there were times when war seemed likely. The most noted instance occurred around late-1925 when

Turkey protested the border it shared with British Iraq. Among complaints, Turkey claimed that the region around Mosul belonged to them. Hearing Turkey’s demands, the

British began to prepare its military for hostilities in the Near East. Keyes rapidly organized the Mediterranean Fleet by drawing up plans on how the fleet would be deployed. Keyes admitted that the navy would not be able to affect the fighting in Mosul, but he did believe that the navy could seize the Dardanelles and Sea of Marmara to bring pressure onto Turkey.130 One of the core components of Keyes’ war plan was the usage of amphibious landings to seize the Dardanelles and various islands to secure the passage of the fleet.

Another vital component to his plan was the usage of naval aircraft to not only protect the fleet while it passed through the Dardanelles but also to engage the Turkish deep within Anatolia. As Exercise M.U. demonstrated, naval aircraft would be deployed to protect the fleet while it sailed through the Dardanelles. Two of the primary carriers, the Hermes and Eagle, needed in the Marmara, would not have been able to conduct aerial operations while passing through the Dardanelles. Keyes therefore tasked the

Furious and Argus to act as the primary carriers in providing air cover for the fleet while

130 Roger Keyes, “Memorandum by Keyes, 21 December 1925,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume II, 1919-1938, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), Part II, 157. 62 it sailed through the Strait.131 As Keyes planned, when the fleet entered the Marmara it would initiate operations against Turkey’s lines of communication and infrastructure.

Surface ships would engage enemy vessels and targets close to shore, while naval aircraft would strike at targets deep inland.132 The war plan as a whole emphasizes Keyes knowledge and experience with naval aircraft in the littoral. He realized that aircraft were vital in not only protecting the fleet in the Dardanelles but also in their ability to strike at targets in Turkey’s interior.

In the end war with Turkey never transpired, yet Keyes, through war plans and exercises, nonetheless showed the value in operating naval aircraft in the littoral. In June

1928, Keyes appointment as C-in-C of the Mediterranean Fleet ended and he was sent back to Britain where he became C-in-C of Portsmouth before retiring in 1935. After retiring Keyes entered politics becoming the Conservative MP for Portsmouth North, an office he would hold through the Second World War. Although he loathed public speaking and politics, Keyes was vocal in his support for rearmament and increasing the size of the navy as well as the RAF relinquishing control of the Fleet Air Arm. In 1937

Parliament finally decided that the Royal Navy would have complete control over the

Fleet Air Arm, though not Coastal Command. Although control had been reestablished, the navy not only discovered the Fleet Air Arm in poor condition, but also their budget was soon overshadowed by the RAF. The effects of dual control over the Fleet Air Arm was problematic for the Royal Navy, yet its mission, as exhibited through Keyes, did not

131 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Admiralty, 2 January 1926,” in The Mediterranean Fleet, 1919-1929, ed. Paul Halpern (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), Part IV, 474. 132 Keyes, “Memorandum by Keyes, 21 December 1925,” Keyes Papers II, 158. 63 stagnate and was able to use aircraft as a means of protecting and extending a fleets firepower.

Throughout the Second World War the impact of aircraft, mines, and submarines were just as great in the littoral as they were during the First World War. Although battles between fleets were decisive in changing the balance at sea, the effects of mines, submarines, and aircraft were just as decisive in the littoral where they whittled away navies and merchant fleets. Nowhere is this more obvious than around Japan where the

U.S. Navy sank dozens of warships and hundreds of merchant ships within the Japanese littoral with these weapons. As a result, Japan was starved for resources and their navy routinely lost capital ships before they could sail to battle.

Few naval officers at the beginning of the twentieth century could have realized the full impact these weapons would have on the littoral. Yet, as demonstrated, Roger

Keyes was one of the few who realized the impact submarines, mines, and aircraft would have on naval operations in the littoral. Although many were new and untested, Keyes recognized that these weapons could not only influence movement in the littoral, but also that they were a means to bypass enemy defenses off their coast. Keyes was therefore able to accomplish three objectives in using the latest weapons in the littoral between

1910 and 1928. First, the enemy was forced to divert resources to protect their coast and limit or cease the movement of their navy in waters known to have submarines and mines. Second, operations on land and at sea could be altered in the littoral where commerce, military facilities, or fleets could be engaged thereby reducing the enemy’s fighting capabilities. Lastly, though the enemy attempted to protect their waters with 64 submarines and mines, Keyes was able to overcome these with similar weapons to attack desired targets. By using mines, submarines, and naval aircraft in the littoral, Keyes was not only able to protect Britain’s commerce and its ability to wage war, but also led operations that forced the enemy to fight in locations where they were vulnerable.

65

CHAPTER 2: KEYES AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN THE LITTORAL

The conduct of amphibious operations, much like the usage of submarines and aircraft, underwent considerable changes during Keyes’ career. Around the turn of the last century amphibious operations were highly regarded by the Royal Navy; it was one of the fundamental building blocks of the British Empire. Amphibious operations were favored because it allowed Britain to capitalize on its mastery of the sea to land and supply its army in any contested location worldwide. By the second decade of the twentieth century, however, changes in military technology, such as those covered in the previous chapter, appeared to indicate that amphibious operations were relegated to a bygone era. Nowhere was this more apparent than at Gallipoli where beachheads were heavily defended by machine guns and artillery leading to a stalemate and, later, evacuation.

Gallipoli was a testament of the problems any amphibious operation in the modern era would face. Many in Britain were unsettled by the Gallipoli experience and turned towards air power as a way to bypass beachheads to attack armies or cities. With the Gallipoli experience still fresh, and with its budget shrinking, the Royal Navy conduct few amphibious exercises during the Interwar Period. Yet there were forward thinking individuals who realized that there was still value in conducting amphibious operations.

Among those was Roger Keyes who, through wartime experience, realized that amphibious operations were still practical if done correctly and implemented with the latest devices and training methods. 66

Keyes’ appreciation for amphibious operations stems from a career’s worth of experience in the field; beginning during the Boxer Rebellion and lasting through the

Second World War. There was not a decade between these two wars where Keyes was not involved with amphibious operations, or at the least writing about them. What makes

Keyes unique is not only his perpetual involvement, but also because he was involved in both large-scale landings and hit-and-run raids throughout a variety of environments.

Nearly all of these operations were conducted in littoral zones, such as the Belgian coast or Mediterranean, because it was here where events on land or at sea could be decisively altered.

It should be noted that Keyes never spoke of the ‘littoral’ or even used the term

‘green water’ in his dispatches or publications. Yet this does not ignore the fact that

Keyes was aware of the importance in conducting amphibious operations in this zone; he did, however, speak of the importance of the ‘narrow sea’, the English Channel in conducting operations.133 Though the types of operations and environments differed,

Keyes was aware that large or small-scale landings could accomplish a wide range of objectives such as securing vital locations, like straits, where sea lanes were vulnerable due to the confined space. Keyes also recognized that defenders along a beachhead could be outmaneuvered and outgunned through the combination of naval maneuverability and military firepower. Maneuverability, maximum firepower, and seizing vital locations are among the benefits of amphibious landings that Keyes recognized. His first experience in understanding this was during the Boxer Rebellion.

133 Roger Keyes, Amphibious Warfare and Combined Operations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1943), 7. 67

The Boxer Rebellion, 1900

At the beginning of the twentieth century, China, once Asia’s dominant power, was a shadow of its former self. Internal conflicts and lack of industrialization had allowed Great Powers to establish spheres of influence throughout the Chinese mainland.

By 1900, supported by the Dowager Impress, Chinese nationals, called ‘Boxers’, began assaulting European and other foreigners as protest against outside interference.134 By

May the British Minister in Peking, Sir Claude Macdonald, was so alarmed by the violence that he, as well as several other foreign ministers, requested an armed force for protection. Within days Great Britain and several other nations assembled a fleet off the

Peiho River at Taku.135 Among the ships assembled was the Fame, a Royal Navy destroyer captained by Roger Keyes.

Commanding the assembled fleet was British Vice-Admiral Edward Seymour. On

June 6, Seymour received a telegram from Macdonald that reinforcements were needed to protect the Foreign Legations at Peking. Three days later another telegram stated that the ministers and their staff were barricading themselves at the British Embassy. Upon receiving this news, Seymour began to assemble a force from the assembled fleet to liberate the Legations at Peking. While this was occurring, Keyes was transporting soldiers to Tientsin, an important hub for rail and river traffic, which was already beleaguered by Boxers.136 The Fame was important in the movement of soldiers because,

134 For further information on the Boxer Rebellion, its background and course, refer to David J. Silbey’s The Boxer Rebellion and the Great Game in China or Diana Preston’s The Boxer Rebellion. 135 Among the other nations that contributed naval and ground forces were France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, Japan, and the United States. 136 Aspinall-Oglander, Keyes: Being the Biography, 41. 68 unlike the many warships assembled off Taku, the Fame was one of the few with a shallow enough hull to sail up the river.

Keyes eventually transported Vice-Admiral Seymour to Tongku where the latter planned on using the railway, rather than the river, to send the relief force to Peking.

Seymour decided to use the railway because he believed it was largely intact and that any sections sabotaged could quickly be prepared.137 Seymour and the relief force were not able to reach Peking because not long after leaving Tientsin they were halted. The track was damaged and scouting parties sent to protect the line were ambushed by Boxers.138

By June 12, Seymour and the relief force were stranded and besieged at Langfang.

Seymour’s decision to go by rail was a costly mistake. As David J. Silbey states, “The more the column of trains had to stop to repair tracks, the more chances the Boxers would have to mount more ambushes.”139

On June 14, telephone and telegraph lines to Tientsin were cut. At this time Keyes was traveling overland back to Tongku where he observed columns of Imperial Chinese soldiers on the march. Upon reaching the fleet at Taku Keyes learned that formations of

Imperial Chinese units were descending on Taku and Tientsin.140 Although China was not officially at war, it was no secret that many in the Chinese court supported the

Boxers. Keyes and other officers believed that the Chinese units would likely support the

Boxers and cut off the coalition by seizing Tientsin and reinforcing the forts off Taku.141

137 Ibid, 43. 138 David J. Silbey, The Boxer Rebellion and the Great Game in China (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012), 87. 139 Ibid, 90. 140 Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, 20-1. 141 Ibid, 21. 69

Such was the threat to these locations that Silbey argues, “If Tianjin [Tientsin] fell to the

Chinese and the Western powers were unable to capture the forts, the military requirements of a campaign against China would skyrocket.”142

The Imperial Chinese units on the march were not the only threat facing the assembled fleet. The Taku forts were heavily defended and armed with the latest artillery pieces. Stationed near the forts were four brand-new Chinese destroyers which could prevent movement upriver. With these threats, Keyes, as well as other officers, were concerned that the Chinese would prevent the fleet from rescuing Seymour and the

Legations. With the likelihood of Imperial Chinese forces joining the Boxers, and the need to secure Tongku and Tientsin, senior officials at the fleet decided to conduct amphibious landings to capture the Taku forts and the destroyers to protect the movement of soldiers and supplies along the river.

To capture the forts, ship-based gunfire would keep the defenses down allowing a landing force to storm the ramparts from behind. While the forts were being engaged,

Keyes would lead a small force upriver to capture the destroyers before they could interfere with the landings. Responding to a surrender request, near midnight on June 17, the forts began firing on the assembled fleet damaging, as far as Keyes could tell, a gunboat.143 With their ultimatum rejected the various warships began shelling the forts.

While the forts were being bombarded Keyes, commanding the raiding parties on the destroyers Fame and Whiting, stealthy docked alongside the Chinese destroyers. Their work was quick, and the Chinese sailors were quickly overcome. Not long after seizing

142 Silbey, The Great Game in China, 91. 143 Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, 25. 70 the destroyers supply-laden gunboats began to sail up river. By morning the estuary of the Peiho River secured.

Although Taku and Tongku were now protected, the Chinese had another fort up river between Tongku and Tientsin. Keyes realized, with the railway cut, that this fort,

Hsi-Cheng, could severe the movement of forces moving upriver to Tientsin. His requests were rejected with many believing that taking the fort was “impractical” and that the loss of men would be too high.144 Keyes eventually did receive permission to “reconnoiter” the river and, with a force of thirty-two men, sailed toward Hsi-Cheng. They disembarked near the fort preparing for an engagement only to discover that the fort was virtually abandoned. Not wanting Hsi-Cheng to be reinforced by the Chinese, Keyes detonated its magazine, destroying the fort, and removed the last remaining threat on the Peiho River.

With the fort removed the river was open. Not long after the fort’s destruction Seymour’s force was relieved.145 A new relief force was assembled at Tientsin which was able to march on Peking where, on August 14, the Legations were liberated.

The Boxer Rebellion reveals the advantages of conducting amphibious operations along the littoral. The assembled fleet, taking advantage of its maneuverability and firepower, was able to overwhelm a numerically superior enemy, establish a base of supply and move inland. Diana Preston, in The Boxer Rebellion, points out the fleet’s stunning success stating, “With only nine little ships, the allies had secured the route into

144 Aspinall-Oglander, Keyes: Being the Biography, 50-1. 145 Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, 29. 71 northern China at relatively modest cost.”146 Compare this to the overland route, which

Vice-Admiral Seymour used, which met stiff resistance and halted any progress toward

Peking. For Keyes the Boxer Rebellion left a lasting impression on the inherent advantages of amphibious operations in a coastal environment, “Command of the water- way, which could be used to insure their [Coalitions] communications, was of vital importance, since land communications were poor and very difficult to maintain.”147

Although the Boxer Rebellion demonstrated the advantages of amphibious operations within the littoral, there were flaws beneath the surface. The most striking were logistical problems, especially at Taku where, despite being an ideal base of supply, harbor facilities were unable to accommodate large supply ships.148 Often these same supply ships were haphazardly packed resulting in time wasted rearranging the necessary supplies. There were also command problems and rivalries between senior commanders which slowed the pace of operations. Keyes picked up on this eventually writing that for amphibious operations to succeed their needed to be strong and decisive leadership.149

Many of the problems of the Boxer Rebellion would resurface fifteen years later at

Gallipoli.

Amphibious Operations (or their failure) in the Dardanelles, 1915

It was in the Dardanelles where the course of the First World War could have been altered had victory prevailed. Seizure of the Dardanelles could have knocked the

146 Diana Preston, The Boxer Rebellion: The Dramatic Story of China’s War on Foreigners that Shook the World in the Summer of 1900 (New York: Walker and Company, 1999), 112. 147 Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, 33. 148 Sibley, The Great Game in China, 173. 149 Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, 32. 72

Ottoman Empire out of the war, opened up an ice-free route to Russia, and influenced

Romania and Bulgaria towards the Allied camp. Yet this is all speculation because what started as an operation that relied on naval power quickly evolved into a ground war that rivaled the Western Front. The failure of the Dardanelles Campaign was the result of many factors ranging from terrain that favored the defense to poor logistics.

Yet, perhaps the greatest failure was that the British never followed up their plan to conduct joint army-navy operation. Rather than using both to off-balance the defense offensives were launched which emphasized one over the other. In the spring it was a pure naval strategy which, after March, transitioned to an all army strategy which lasted until the evacuation in January 1916. Among those that realized this was the Royal

Navy’s Chief of Staff during the campaign, Commodore Roger Keyes. Throughout the campaign, Keyes recognized that using both services would not only have exhausted the

Ottomans on land but would also cut off their sea-based supply lines. Yet Keyes was not in a commanding position, and senior officials in both London and the Dardanelles prevented a campaign that could have been a stunning strategic victory.150

The campaign in 1915 was not the first time the British encountered difficulties in the Dardanelles. In 1807, at the height of the Napoleonic War, Admiral Duckworth led a naval squadron through the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmara. Much like in 1915,

Duckworth’s objective was to force the Ottomans to terms, but the dignitaries in

150 Christopher Bell’s Churchill and the Dardanelles provides the most up-to-date version on how the campaign began and how events in London coincided with indecision at the Dardanelles. Rhys Crawley’s, Climax at Gallipoli, also provides a contemporary interpretation on the military situation and why the final British offensive in August 1915 failed. 73

Constantinople stalled the British. While the Turkish were prolonging negotiations,

French engineers installed fortifications along the Dardanelles to seal the squadron in the

Marmara. Duckworth, realizing his force was about to be trapped, decided to force the

Strait whereby the squadron escaped sustaining light casualties on the way. Duckworth’s failure, and the relevance it had in 1915, was not lost on Keyes who later remarked,

“Admiral Duckworth’s failure…should have warned us of the folly of entering the

Dardanelles with ships alone, and the hazard of withdrawing, if our mission failed.”151

As in 1807, the initial plan in 1915 relied on using naval power to force the

Ottomans to terms. There were a variety of reasons why the British chose to launch a naval only operation in the Dardanelles in the spring of 1915. The Royal Navy was

Britain’s main branch and conveniently had several bases within short distance of the

Ottoman Empire. As Jeremy Black states, by using their navy the British would not have to match the German army in France.152 Additionally, a naval attack on the Dardanelles would place the British in command rather than the French who dominated decisions on the Western Front.153 Lastly, it was highlighted by officials that attacking the Dardanelles with the navy would not require a substantial investment by Britain’s armed forces; if the attack failed the British could simply leave.

When Keyes arrived in February 1915 the Royal Navy was already bombarding the outer forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles. Keyes was initially optimistic and believed that the navy could force the Strait. Summarizing his optimism years later, he

151 Keyes, Amphibious Operations, 34. 152 Jeremy Black, Combined Operations: A Global History and Airborne Warfare (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2018), 109. 153 Halpern, Naval History, 109. 74 writes, “I felt absolutely confident that…the enemies forts and batteries could be dominated by heavy fire from ships which were out of range.”154 His positive outlook towards success did not last long, however. Keyes gradually became aware that, although marines could knock out the mobile batteries on shore, pre-landing bombardments alerted the Ottomans as to where the British were going to attack. After weeks of repeated attacks the Ottomans could predict where marines would land based on where ship-based gunfire was concentrated. Such was the mounting difficulties that in mid-March Keyes wrote, “We are going to make a success, but it is an infinitely harder problem than the

Admiralty or anyone out here ever imagined.”155

The War Council in London, alarmed that mines and artillery were slowing down the fleet, thought so too. From mid-February through March, the War Council advised that the 29th Division, stationed in Egypt, should be deployed to the Dardanelles to assist the navy. Initially only half the division was deployed until the decision was made in late-

March when the full force was mobilized – too late to be of immediate assistance.156 At this time, Admiral Carden, suffering from stress and sleeplessness, was replaced by

Admiral John de Robeck. Upon his arrival, de Robeck decided that an Anglo-French fleet of pre-dreadnoughts and minesweepers force the Strait under the cover of darkness. On the night of March 18 the fleet entered the Straits but was forced to retreat after several ships were lost to mine and gunfire.

154 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 193. 155 Roger Keyes “Keyes to his Wife, 15 March 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part II, 107. 156 Halpern, Naval History, 111. 75

Four days later, on March 28, de Robeck gathered senior army and navy commanders aboard the Queen Elizabeth to discuss the next course of the campaign. The failure on March 18 set de Robeck on edge and would repeatedly question the practicality of sailing the fleet through the Strait. Of particular concern for de Robeck was the safety of the supply ships which would be easy prey for the Ottoman guns along the Strait.157

From the failure, Sir Ian Hamilton, the chief army officer, was convinced that the army should have a greater role in assisting the fleet through. De Robeck agreed with Hamilton and the decision was made to land the army on shore before sailing the fleet through the

Strait.

Keyes had welcomed the prospect of military involvement in the Dardanelles. On

February 28, for example, he wrote home with the news that General Sir William

Birdwood, along with the army, had arrived commenting that everything was pointing towards “a big combined operation”.158 Yet, Keyes was livid when he heard that the navy would abandon its attack until April when the army was landed. Not only had Keyes been organizing a new force to attack the Strait, but he believed that the respite would be beneficial to the Ottomans. He later wrote, “It seemed folly to wait and give the enemy time to organize his defense.”159 Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss, the Royal Navy’s commander on Lemnos, concurred stating, “The chance of surprise – to my mind an

157 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 268-9. 158 Roger Keyes “Keyes to his Wife, 28 February 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part II, 96-7. 159 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 257. 76 absolute necessity for the success of such an enterprise – had vanished. The enemy was thoroughly on his guard.”160

Keyes opposed de Robeck’s change in strategy not because they were going to involve the military but because it went against the principle of the original plan.

Originally the army was to land on shore either when the fleet entered the Marmara or when all efforts to force the Strait failed.161 Keyes believed that the navy had not exhausted its options but eventually acquiesced after realizing that the new minelayers would not be ready until early April.162

In mid-April, after five weeks of preparation, the army was ready. The plan called for the British to land on the tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula, Cape Helles, while ANZAC forces would land further up the peninsula. French forces would land on the Asiatic side to divert Ottoman reinforcements away from the British landings. The objective of the landings was to secure the high ground in the middle of the peninsula, especially the peak dubbed Achi Baba. As the plan also stated, the Anglo-French Fleet was kept in a state of readiness to force the Strait once the army was firmly on shore.163 As in February, Keyes was fairly optimistic but was already thinking long-term, “we must succeed in the end…and the Government must see us through with re-informants of ships and men.

There can be no turning back from our purpose.”164

160 Rosslyn Wester-Wemyss, The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1927), 43. 161 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 224. 162 Ibid, 257. 163 Ibid, 278. 164 Roger Keyes “Keyes to his Wife, 23 April 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part II, 126. 77

The landings began on April 25, and nearly everywhere the army encountered stiff opposition. Many of the beaches were heavily defended with barbed wire and machine guns leading to high casualties. Keyes wrote, “Wire entanglements were everywhere, even on the beaches…One felt so safe and so unhappy not to be able to do more to help.”165 Being at the scene, Keyes displayed an eye on how amphibious landings were to be conducted. Among the beaches the British were sustaining heavy losses was V

Beach, on Cape Helles, where heavy fire was preventing the soldiers from moving forward. Aware that reinforcements would be landing on V Beach, and encounter the same difficulties, he suggested they be sent further up the coast to Y Beach which was already secured.166 Going to de Robeck, Keyes explained this but was rejected and informed that this was for the military, not the navy, to decide.

Later that morning, Sir Ian Hamilton ordered that reinforcements for V Beach be sent to ones that were secured. Among those beaches, Keyes states referencing

Hamilton’s published diary, was Y Beach.167 Later that day, General Hunter-Weston informed senior commanders that Y Beach had linked up with X Beach to the immediate south.168 While inspecting the beachheads, however, Keyes discovered that soldiers on Y

Beach were not pressing the assault but were evacuating. The decision to press the attack

165 Roger Keyes “Keyes to his Wife, 25 April 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part II, 128. 166 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 296. 167 Ibid, 298-9. 168 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 302-3. 78 at Y Beach was out of his hands, however, and he later wrote, “It seemed to us that we were giving up a wonderful flanking position without a fight.”169

The landings, to Keyes at least, had achieved their purpose which he later wrote,

“By nightfall on the 26th the Army was established on the Gallipoli Peninsula…the Turks were never in a position to drive us out.”170 Although the beachheads were secure, there were missed opportunities on the first day which resulted in stagnation within the first few weeks. Yet, at the time of the landings, Keyes was confident that the navy would soon force the Strait. On the evening of April 25, in a letter home, he writes, “We are not out of the woods yet, but the spirit of everyone is splendid – and we mean to get through.”171

His optimism was once again short lived. The lack of preparations prior to the landings, logistical problems, and failure to push inland created a stalemate on the peninsula. With fighting at a standstill, Keyes believed the time had arrived for the navy to intervene. As Keyes later argued, although the army had not taken the heights it was firmly on shore thus allowing the next phase of the operation to begin – the naval attack on the Strait.172 On May 10 he wrote home explaining, “The army has made a most desperate fight for the last 3 days for ACHI BABA, and has made very little progress.

Personally I have come to the momentous conclusion which I put to the Admiral last

169 Ibid, 306. 170 Ibid, 309. 171 “Keyes to his Wife, 25 April 1915,” Keyes Papers II, 128. 172 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 324. 79 night.”173 The last part is in reference to Keyes calling for the navy to force the Strait and enter the Marmara. His proposal was rejected but de Robeck, pressed by Keyes, did pass on the suggestion to the Admiralty. The suggestion could not have come at a worse time.

Italy was about to enter the war and the Royal Navy would need to reorganize the

Mediterranean Fleet to protect Italian shipping.174 On May 13 the Admiralty issued a statement denying the request to attack the Strait.

Nonetheless, Keyes was adamant that the fleet enter the Marmara which is expressed in a letter on June 13, “My plan – since the army can’t break through, and are losing enormously in every fight for a small advance – was to make another attack with the ships behind destroyers and fleet sweepers.”175 Keyes believed that, if the fleet entered the Marmara, Ottoman supply lines to the peninsula would be severed. The army would then be able to overcome the weakened Ottoman army. Though Keyes was confident of success, he ends the letter explaining that the time was not right to press the issue and would wait until the time was right.

A month after writing this, the navy received several monitors suited for operations in the Strait. Also received were X Craft, purpose built landing craft that were armored and self-propelled. Sir Ian Hamilton also received reinforcements in the form of five fresh infantry divisions. All this was received for a new offensive aimed at ending

173 Roger Keyes “Keyes to his Wife, 10 May 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part II, 135. 174 Halpern, Naval History, 117. 175 Roger Keyes “Keyes to his Wife, 13 June 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part II, 149. 80 the deadlock on the peninsula. The new plan would start with an attack on Cape Helles to draw the Ottomans away from the actual objective, Suvla Bay. At Suvla Bay, further up the peninsula, another landing would be made from which the army would push across the peninsula cutting the Ottomans in half. It would be a war of maneuver, one that

Hamilton and the army had faith in.176 The navy was relegated to supporting the army and, once again, was ordered to hold off an attack until the army achieved its objective.

The landings at Suvla Bay began on August 6 and, as in April, was able to establish a beachhead but unable to move inland. The landings were divided into three beaches spread in and around Suvla Bay. At B and C Beach everything went according to plan, but at A Beach it was anything but. With the landings occurring at night, the landing craft bound for A Beach either got lost or were grounded on rocks. Those that did land at A Beach encountered stubborn resistance. Much like at V Beach in April, reinforcements bound for A beach were held up due to heavy fighting. Six battalions were scheduled to land at A Beach, but it was decided to send them to the distant, but secure, B and C beach.

Keyes, however, realized that by sending them farther south they would not be able to secure their objective at A Beach. To do this, he proposed that the reinforcements be landed to the immediate north where it was not only undefended, but was also a mile away from their objective. Summarizing his mindset, Keyes asked, “Why march men all the way round under shrapnel fire if they could be landed within a mile of their objective

176 Rhys Crawley, Climax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014), 23. 81 unmolested?”177 Although his suggested landing site was largely undefended, the reinforcements were landed on B Beach. At the end of the day beachheads were established near Suvla Bay, but as was done earlier, the army failed to exploit its success and, upon advancing a few miles, dug in.178

With fighting once again at a standstill Keyes renewed his request that the navy force the Strait. On August 17, Keyes issued a statement to de Robeck arguing that forcing the Strait, “is the only solution of the problem before us, and that it has every prospect of success.”179 In reference to this, he points out that, unlike in April, they now had better minesweepers, monitors capable of attacking fortifications, and “[an] efficient air service” for reconnaissance.180 Should the attack fail, he cited, it would not change the fighting on land arguing that losses sustained would not be anywhere near those the army had sustained. De Robeck, however, was not convinced, asking how a few ships in the

Marmara would alter the campaign concluding, “Is Constantinople to be bombarded & trust to surrender to the Turks? A very doubtful matter.”181

By this time Keyes was not alone in requesting a renewed naval attack. Many naval officers realized that, by forcing the Strait, not only would the Ottomans on the peninsula be cutoff but they could be assisted by the army. Captain Godfrey, on

September 13, made this point to de Robeck explaining that the army, launching a small

177 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 390. 178 Halpern, Naval History, 120. 179 Roger Keyes “Proposal by Keyes for a Renewal of the Naval Attack on the Dardanelles and De Robeck’s Comments, 17 August 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part II, 188. 180 Ibid, 190. 181 Ibid, 191-2. 82 offensive, could distract Ottoman artillery from the Strait thus allowing the fleet to pass.182 Admiral Wemyss, who was at first hesitant for a renewed attack, was now backing Keyes believing that, if the fleet enter the Marmara, Ottoman supply lines would,

“be at the mercy of our forces”.183 Despite their requests, de Robeck was not swayed to renew the attack.

By autumn the Dardanelles Campaign was in jeopardy. By now the British had landed in Salonika which was diverting men and supplies away from Gallipoli. Bulgaria had also entered on the side of the Central Powers and, with Serbia close to defeat, a direct route between Berlin and Constantinople was imminent. With direct access established, supplies and reinforcements would be able to flow into the Ottoman Empire and subsequently the Dardanelles. Rumors began to spread that Gallipoli would be evacuated. When Keyes heard of this he travelled to London to press for another naval assault. In his diary Keyes stated that the army, “can’t do it by itself”, believing that a joint offensive, with the army attacking the Ottoman army and navy attacking its supply lines, the campaign would be salvaged.184

To his disappointment the British government refused to allow the navy to attack unless the army launch an offensive at the same time, something that could not be done.

With lack of support Keyes’ proposal was rejected. By the time Keyes returned to the

182 Captain William Godfrey “Correspondence relating to Captain Godfrey’s Plan for a renewed attack on the Dardanelles, 13 September 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part II, 200. 183 Wemyss, Navy in the Dardanelles, 176. 184 Roger Keyes “Diary of 17 October to 10 November, 3 November 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part II, 224. 83

Dardanelles, Hamilton’s replacement, General Charles Munro, was already issuing orders for an evacuation. General Munro, as Keyes explained, believed that the main fight was in France and that soldiers at Gallipoli were needed on the Western Front.185 Not long after Keyes’ return it was decided that all positions but Cape Helles were to be evacuated, but then the decision was made for full withdraw. Although the entire campaign was marked by setbacks the evacuations went surprisingly to plan. Keys stated that the evacuations were a prime example of cooperation between the two branches, in particular the work of General Birdwood and Admiral Wemyss, who replaced de Robeck.186 The evacuations took place on December 18-19 and January 8-9, 1916.

Since the last soldier left on January 9 there has been much debate on why the

Dardanelles Campaign was a failure. After all, the British have a long history of conducting amphibious operations in environments similar to those at Gallipoli. Among the failures of the campaign that have been highlighted was the logistical problems.

Halpern points out that Lemnos was unsuited as a base of supply because ships had to be turned away due to inadequate docking facilities.187 Keyes experienced similar problems noting that the beaches were equally insufficient to handle resupply operations due to shell holes, lack of piers, as well as misplaced supplies and red-tape.188 Others have analyzed the tactics of the campaign and claim that the British army failed to capitalize on successful beachheads. In 1934, U.S. Navy Captain E. P. Jessop analyzed the landings

185 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 477-78. 186 Ibid, 498. 187 Halpern, Naval History, 112. 188 Roger Keyes “Keyes to his Wife, 22 July 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part II, 165. 84 and came to the conclusion, “Here we have a force landed at a most important point, in that it took the enemy in the rear, and landing without resistance, scaling the heights, and then ‘just lying around smoking’.”189 Jeremy Black shares the same opinion, arguing that, while the British were able to establish beachheads, they failed to press the attack which resulted in them being contained by the Ottomans.190 This is particularly noticeable at Y

Beach in April where, despite facing minimal opposition, the British decided to evacuate rather than press on.

Yet, what is arguably one of the greatest blunders of the campaign was that the

British never capitalized on their ability to conduct a joint amphibious operation. Despite plans in February, April, and August calling for both the army and navy to conduct joint operations, this was never achieved. Throughout the course of the campaign plans called for either the army to support the navy or vice versa. There were those in the navy who supported this, but many did not voice their concerns until after April or near the end of the campaign.

Among those who did argue for the operation to involve both branches from the very beginning was Keyes. Even as early as February Keyes was aware that, although confident that the navy could fight through the Strait, the army would be needed. In July, as the causalities on the peninsula increased, Keyes wrote home explaining that this could have been avoided had Admiral Carden listened to his and Captain Godfrey’s request for army involvement. He states, “we [Keyes and Godfrey] insisted that large military

189 Captain E. P. Jessop, “Failure at Gallipoli,” Proceedings 61, no. 2 (February 1935): 168, accessed January 1, 2019, https://www.usni.org/document/jessop-earl-1935-61-2- 384/magazine_article=41728. 190 Black, Combined Operations, 110. 85 operations must be undertaken, that this must be realized, and arrangements must be made – took two days to get through C. [Carden] (22nd Feb. to 24th) before we took the outer forts.”191 Later that month, Keyes would mention the topic again arguing that the best plan of action would have been landing the army after seizing the outer forts. Had this been done, he predicts, the campaign would have ended in a month.192

By summer there was another opportunity to force the Strait while the army had the Ottomans occupied. Here again Keyes was aware of the opportunity that lay ahead. In

August, when Captain Godfrey demanded the navy attack, Keyes supported him stating,

“If a small portion of our available force could succeed in getting into the Marmara the enemy in Gallipoli would very soon would be completely cut off by the sea.”193 Keyes also iterates that, by attacking above and below the Strait, the army and navy would

“cripple the defenses” with the army along Strait and the navy in the Marmara.

Nonetheless, de Robeck was adamant that the navy not attack until the situation on Gallipoli favored one. Rhys Crawley, in Climax at Gallipoli, argues that de Robeck was correct in not wanting to attack in August. Crawley points out that the fleet, although bolstered by additional ships, was in no position to enter the Marmara as the bulk of the fleet was suffering from mechanical failure.194 That said, Crawley does argue that de

191 Roger Keyes “Keyes to his Wife, 2 July 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914- 1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part II, 153. 192 Roger Keyes “Keyes to his Wife, 30 July 1915,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part II, 170. 193 “Correspondence relating to Captain Godfrey’s Plan, 13 September 1915,” Keyes Papers I, 202. 194 Crawley, Climax at Gallipoli, 96. 86

Robeck likely had no plan for the navy to force the Strait had the army’s offensive succeed.195

At Gallipoli the British had one of the best opportunities to bring about a swift end to the war in the East through the usage of naval and amphibious forces. As Keyes argues, “This operation would have cut the communications – which were sea-borne – of any Turkish armies, either in Gallipoli or on the Asiatic side, and would have led immediately to a victory, decisive upon the whole course of the war.”196 Once the army was on shore by April, however, and the Ottoman defense enhanced thereafter, it is difficult to assess whether forcing the Strait, or sustaining a fleet in the Marmara, was possible.

What is certain is that throughout the campaign Keyes believed that the army and navy could have worked together to allow the fleet to enter the Marmara. He makes this case in his memoir stating, “A combined naval and military attack alone could have achieved victory, and to that end I devoted myself body and soul until the final evacuation.”197 The Dardanelles experience was not a total defeat for Keyes. The campaign had taught him the importance in making quick and decisive decisions during amphibious operations. He also took away the inherent advantage it offered in moving large formations quickly along a front. Keyes also understood the importance in seizing the shoreline for continued movement of naval forces. Two years later Keyes would have

195 Ibid, 115-16. 196 Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, 51. 197 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 407. 87 another opportunity to conduct an amphibious operation to secure a strategic point in

Britain’s lines of communication.

Striking the “Root of Evil”: The Zeebrugge Raid, 1918

Not long after the Dardanelles Campaign ended Keyes returned to Britain and was assigned to the Grand Fleet. Keyes received a new assignment in 1917 where, with

Germany conducting unrestricted submarine warfare, he was sent to the Admiralty to combat this threat. As discussed in chapter one, Keyes realized that the bulk of U-Boats were going through the Dover Strait leading to introduction of new defensive measures.

So effective were Keyes measures that in 1918 he was given command of the Dover

Patrol.

Although Keyes was successful in strengthening the physical patrol, he was determined to take the war to the enemy and, “strike at the root of evil”.198 The “root of evil” he was referring to was the German naval base at Bruges where the Flanders Flotilla was stationed. The Flanders Flotilla was one of the German navy’s most important units due to its location near Allied shipping routes as well as its size; Keyes estimated it was composed of thirty submarines and thirty-five torpedo boats.199 Keyes also calculated that, with the flotilla being within easy range of sea lanes and Allies seaports, it was responsible for 25% of Allied losses.200

198 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: Scapa Flow to the Dover Strait, 199. 199 Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, 58. 200 Roger Keyes “Keyes to Beatty, 5 December 1917,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part IV, 423. 88

Attacking Bruges to neutralize the U-Boat threat was an important objective.

Another reason why Keyes wanted to attack Bruges was to eliminate the threat posed by

German torpedo-boats and destroyers stationed there. When Bacon was commander of the Dover Patrol the threat these ships presented was not apparent. Keyes, unlike Bacon, maintained a heavier patrol which meant German surface ships off Belgium had more targets to engage. Bacon also prohibited bombing raids on German ships and facilities to prevent retaliation raids on the patrol.201 As a result, under Bacon German surface ships largely maintained standard patrols and did not harass Allied ships. With Keyes in charge, and with the Patrol becoming more effective, the Germans had a reason to become more active at Dover.

When Keyes was at the Admiralty he recognized the threat the Flanders Flotilla had on the security of Allied forces in the Dover region. In December, Keyes wrote to

Admiral Beatty explaining that, with the Germans maintaining a strong surface fleet off

Belgium, both the Patrol and the flank of the Allied army was vulnerable.202 Keyes was also aware at this time that guarding the Patrol from German raids was a drain on destroyers which were needed for anti-submarine duties elsewhere. Another difficulty was his ships had to continually stay on patrol while the Germans could attack on their terms. Keyes makes this statement when he became Vice-Admiral of the Dover Patrol,

201 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: Scapa Flow to the Dover Strait, 162. 202 “Keyes to Beatty, 5 December 1917,” Keyes Papers I, 423. 89

“At present it is an awful strain on my flotilla to keep up this constant watch on the Z destroyers who have so many and such easy objectives within a short steam.”203

The threat of the surface units of the Flanders Flotilla was not exaggerated as demonstrated by its activity in early 1918. On the night of February 14-15, destroyers from the Flanders Flotilla launched a surprise attack on the Dover Patrol. The attack was a success with the British losing nine patrol craft with several others sustaining damage, the Germans, meanwhile, escaped unscathed. None of the British surface units could engage in the action either due to miscommunication or because many were undergoing maintenance. Keyes believed that the attack on February 14-15 exposed the flaw of staying on the defensive in the Dover Strait. He argues, “The enemy could leave his base fresh…whereas our people were bound to be tired and stale towards the end of dark periods.”204

The engagement in February was not the only time the surface units of the

Flanders Flotilla went on the offensive. In March, the Flanders Flotilla launched a raid on

Dunkirk to coincide with Ludendorff’s Spring Offensive. On the night of March 21, nine destroyers and six torpedo-boats, attacked the left-flank of the Allied front by targeted railyards and work depots near the city.205 Unlike the attack in February, the destroyers of the Dover Patrol were active and, aided by the French navy, drove the German surface ships back to Ostend which left minimal damage.

203 Roger Keyes “Keyes to Beatty, 18 January 1918,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part IV, 447. 204 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: Scapa Flow to the Dover Strait, 177. 205 Ibid, 194. 90

Between the attacks in February and March, Keyes introduced measures to combat the German surface units; some were based off the Gallipoli experience.

Monitors were trained to fire at quick intervals against land-based targets and wireless transmitters were distributed to ease communication between units at sea. These measures, however, could not permanently neutralize attacks made by the Flanders

Flotilla. This was partially attempted by launching bombing raids on Bruges, but the submarines were protected by fortified pens and the surface ships were often at sea.

Keyes therefore decided that, if the flotilla could not physically be eliminated, the best option was to trap it at Burges. This would be done by launching an amphibious operation in the form of a raid to blockade the ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge. These two ports were important because it was here where canals led from the sea to Bruges in the interior.

Keyes was not the first to suggest that the canals at Zeebrugge and Ostend be blocked. In November 1916, Captain Bayley suggested that a combined army and navy assault be conducted to seal the ports.206 Days after his proposal, Commodore Tyrwhitt also submitted a plan to blockade the canal’s entrances. After consideration by the

Admiralty and Admiral Bacon, their plans were rejected in favor of Bacon’s plan to destroy the canal locks through long-range bombardment.207 The long-range bombardments, however, were not successful in destroying the locks because, as German

206 Ibid, 128. 207 Ibid. 91 naval captain Karl Schultz later explained, German coastal batteries could easily outrange any ship conducting bombardments.208

As early as December, while still Director of Plans, Keyes believed that the only way to seal the canals at Zeebrugge and Ostend was through an amphibious operation using blockships. At this time, however, Keyes’ priority was in stopping U-Boats from sailing through the Dover Straits and did not press Admiral Bacon for such an operation.

It was not until Keyes became Vice-Admiral of the Dover Patrol that he was able to initiate plans for blocking Zeebrugge and Ostend. By then the need to neutralize the naval base at Bruges was more urgent, especially in light of attacks made on the Patrol and

Dunkirk.

Keyes plan was to launch a joint attack whereby aircraft and warships would bombard Ostend and Zeebrugge thereby covering the approach of the blockships. At

Zeebrugge the blockships would need to go around a large mole that jutted out into the sea before entering the canal lock. Ostend, on the other, appeared to be easier to block because its lock was facing the sea. The blockships would need to be large and difficult to remove, so obsolete cruisers were acquired and filled with cement. Keyes, explaining his plan to the Admiralty, believed that, in the right position, the blockships would cause

208 Captain Karl Schultz, “The British Assault on the German Bases Ostend and Zeebrugge,” Proceedings 55, no. 7 (July 1929): 573, Assessed January 1, 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1929-07/british-assault-german-bases- ostend-and-zeebrugge. 92 silt to accumulate in the locks which would prevent ships from going through and also hinder salvage operation.209

Between the two ports, Zeebrugge was going to be the most challenging. Aerial photos showed the presence of guns on the mole which could sink the blockships.

Therefore, the mole would have to be seized by raiders before the blockships arrived.

Initially this was a difficult task because there were no ships equipped to land raiders onto the mole and Keyes lacked men specially trained for such a mission. Keyes refused to use soldiers because he saw this as a navy operation and did not want soldiers sacrificing themselves for a naval mission.210 In January he began requesting marines and ratings from the Grand Fleet to volunteer for the operation; many agreed wanting to escape the monotony of fleet work. They were added to Keyes’ existing force of six hundred marines with the entire raiding force eventually being trained in close quarters fighting and equipped with the latest weapons like flamethrowers.211

With the raiders being trained Keyes turned his attention to the landing craft. As the British did not possess the necessary vessels, like assault ships, Keyes and his engineers decided to convert several warships to carry out the task. Among those converted were the monitors General Craufurd and Sir John Moore which were fitted with hinged platforms. The main landing craft was the cruiser Vindictive which was fitted with extra armor, armed with machine guns and flamethrowers, as well as platforms to

209 Roger Keyes “Plan for Operation Z.O. and Remarks by the Sea Lords, 25 February 1918,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part IV, 463. 210 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: Scapa Flow to the Dover Strait, 204. 211 Ibid, 241. 93 land men onto the mole.212 Several obsolete submarines were also acquired and were filled with explosives. Their purpose was to ram and destroy a viaduct to prevent reinforcements from reaching the mole.

Keyes outlined his plan, codenamed Operation Z.O., to the Admiralty on

February 25 for approval. He outlined the goal for blockading the ports stating, “several units [submarines and torpedo-boats] would be lost to the enemy so long as the harbours remained closed.”213 Keyes further elaborates explaining that by doing so the Royal Navy could divert destroyers from the Dover Strait to engage in anti-submarine operations elsewhere. Keyes also explains that mine, aircraft, and naval vessels could co-ordinate to sink patrol craft and divert attention elsewhere.214 The sea lords recognized the difficulty of the operation, yet approved it writing, “the objects to be achieved are considered to be worth the risk.”215 Rear-Admiral George P. W. Hope, commented, “If successful, the operation may have far-reaching political & moral effect.”216

Operation Z.O. was originally slated to be launched in mid-March but bad weather led to it being postponed to April. After further delays, on April 22, St. George’s

Day, the operation was launched. Between the two ports, Ostend ended in failure with the blockships failing to correctly position themselves inside the lock. Comparatively,

Zeebrugge was more successful, although the operation here had setbacks as well. On the mole, the raiders encountered stiff resistance and failed to capture the guns. Their fight

212 Ibid, 209-10. 213 “Plan for Operation Z.O., 25 February 1918,” Keyes Papers I, 461. 214 Ibid, 467. 215 Ibid, 475. 216 “Plan for Operation Z.O., 28 February 1918,” Keyes Papers I, 477. 94 could have been worse if the viaduct had not been destroyed. Although the British made use of smoke machines to hide their movements, the German used star-shells which,

Keyes later testified, illuminated everything in the area.217 Despite the stubborn resistance, the blockships were able to enter the lock.

On May 9, Keyes made another attempt at blocking the lock at Ostend which ended in failure. In the end Operation Z.O. achieved only half of its results due to only one of the two ports being blocked. Through reconnaissance photos Keyes believed that

Zeebrugge was fully blocked and would make this point throughout his life. In making his case he claimed that, with Zeebrugge blocked, a large portion of Germany’s submarines and surface ships were stuck in Bruges as late as June.218 Keyes also argues that the blockships at Zeebrugge could not have been raised by the Germans stating that it took the British a year to raise them with the most up-to-date equipment.219

Since the end of Operation Z.O. there have been many accounts that either question his argument or support it. During the interwar years Captain Schultz, of the

German navy, argues that the operation was unsuccessful because the raiders were beaten back before their objective was achieved.220 Around the same time, Captain H. H. Frost, of the U.S. Navy, makes the assessment that, from a material point of view, the attacks accomplished little.221 Doubt on the operations success in achieving all of its goals

217 Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, 69. 218 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: Scapa Flow to the Dover Strait, 319. 219 Ibid, 319. 220 Schultz, British Assault, 573. 221 Commander H. H. Frost, “The Attack on Zeebrugge,” Proceedings 55, no. 3 (March 1929): 189, accessed January 1, 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1929-03/attack-zeebrugge. 95 continues in the present. Halpern has pointed out that for Z.O. to have been successful both locks needed to be blocked.222 He also explains that, at Zeebrugge, the space between the blockships was wide enough for small vessels to get through.

Despite the overall success of the operation being questioned, there has been few doubting its success in boosting British morale. Admiral Beatty was the first to make this case soon after the operation ended stating, “It shook the Hun and improved the morale and outlook of the British Navy”223 Captain Frost, though critical of the operational success, also makes a similar point stating the losses, “Were a cheap price to pay for its immense moral effects…the heroism of British seamen and marines in those gloomy days created a tremendous impression in Allied and neutral countries.”224 Halpern similarly argues that, with the onset of the Spring Offensive, the Allies needed some kind of victory.225

Ultimately, however, Operation Z.O. was not able to achieve its primary objective due to the fact that Ostend was never blockaded. This would remain the case until months later when it was abandoned after it was in range of Allied artillery. Although Z.O. did not accomplish all of its objective, it was arguably successful in boosting Allied morale at a moment of setbacks on the continent. It could also be said that, whether because of the raid or military defeats in 1918, Germany no longer attacked the Dover Strait like it did in February. For the rest of the year, the Flanders Flotilla largely sat inactive refusing to

222 Halpern, Naval History, 415. 223 Admiral David Beatty “Beatty to Keyes, 23 April 1918,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part IV, 484. 224 Frost, Attack on Zeebrugge, 189. 225 Halpern, Naval History, 414. 96 go near Allied patrols. Lastly, it could be argued that Z.O. demonstrated that the Royal

Navy, through creativity and determination, could physically take the war to the enemy.

There are many people who are responsible for this which ranges from Tyrwhitt and Bayley, who initially pushed for such an operation, to Beatty, who assisted in getting it approved. Yet perhaps the most influential person of the operation was Keyes who not only pressed that it be arranged but also had a prominent role in organizing the force. On the one hand, Keyes pushed for the operation because he realized the need to eliminate an opposing naval base close to Britain’s sea lines and ports. Blocking access to Burges would also secure Allied sea routes near the Dover Strait from German surface ships based in Belgium. Through Z.O., as well as Gallipoli, Keyes learned the value, and the difficulties in conducting amphibious operations. From Z.O. even small-scale raids could shift the balance of power in a specific region. This would be repeated during the Second

World War whereby Keyes proposed similar raids. The Interwar Years also saw Keyes emphasize amphibious operations in exercises and war plans to acquire strategic locations within the littoral.

The Mediterranean Fleet and the Return to the Dardanelles, 1925-26

Once the First World War ended the Royal Navy’s interest in amphibious operations began to wane. Wartime experience and a declining budget were influential factors, so too was changes in military technology. As Mark D. Mandeles explains, improvements in artillery, aircraft, and machine guns, as well as mechanization of armies were important in the neglect of amphibious operations in the Interwar Years.226 On top

226 Mark D. Mandeles, Military Transformation Past and Present: Historic Lessons for the 21st Century (Westport: Praeger Military International, 2007), 53. 97 of this were advocates of air power who argued that future wars were decided by bombers which could attack beachheads. Lastly, Britain’s days of “empire-building” were over, and so, beyond for reasons of defense, there was apparently no need to land forces in contested territory.227 It also did not help that the Royal Navy in the Interwar

Years was trying to manage a dwindling budget and obtaining land craft was low on their list of priorities.

This is not to argue that the British completely neglected amphibious operations during the Interwar years. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Admiralty conducted a series of paper projects on how amphibious operations were to be conducted in a mechanized conflict. Yet, beyond paper projects and individual exercises, the Royal

Navy did not strengthen its amphibious capabilities because it could not see how it would be valuable in aiding carrier operations or the battle line.228 Their decision coincided with the general belief that the Royal Navy’s highest goal in wartime was for trade interdiction, either by blockade or intercepting merchant ships on the high seas.229 Yet, naval commanders did have the freedom to conduct exercises with their commands. An example of this is Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, C-in-C East India, who carried out an amphibious operations exercise in 1924 to simulate a Japanese attack on Singapore.230

227 Christopher M. Bell. The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy Between the War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 126. 228 Allan R. Millett, “Assault from the Sea: The development of amphibious warfare between the wars: The American, British, and Japanese Experiences,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period ed. William Murray and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 54. 229 Bell, Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 134. 230 Roskill, Naval Policy Vol I, 538. 98

Keyes also conducted amphibious operation exercises after he became C-in-C of the Mediterranean Fleet. In the summer of 1926, Keyes conduced Exercise N.A. on the

Greek island of Dragomesti. Keyes outlined that the exercise was to simulate establishing a beachhead with marines for the purpose of securing a base for the fleet in enemy territory.231 The operation was rudimentary in its conception yet did make use of new technologies. During the landings aircraft from the carrier Eagle conducted reconnaissance flights to gather intel for the fleet and landing force.232 Later that year,

Keyes issued final notes on the exercise stating it was a success yet warns, “in operations of this nature, mistakes, and lack of initiative may be attended with the most serious results particularly if made at the commencement of operations.”233

Unlike Exercise M.U., which simulated an engagement in the Strait of Malacca, it is not indicated whether N.A. also had the Far East in mind. Certainly one of the objectives of the operation was to establish a base and move inland towards an enemy

“capital”, but its intended geographic was unstated. Turkey may have been the intended target because it was in the fleets operational area and had been making threats to take

Mosul from British Iraq. Nonetheless, Exercise N.A. indicates that Keyes had a role in maintaining Britain’s ability to conduct amphibious operations during a period of stringency and uncertainty. Perhaps what sets Keyes apart in this period was not that he conducted amphibious operation exercises, but that they were a vital part in his war plans

231 Roger Keyes, “Memorandum by Keyes, 24 June 1926,” in The Mediterranean Fleet, 1919-1929, ed. Paul Halpern (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), Part IV, 493. 232 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Admiralty, 10 December 1926,” in The Mediterranean Fleet, 1919-1929, ed. Paul Halpern (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), Part IV, 507-8. 233 Ibid, 509. 99 against Turkey. Within the plans Keyes not only includes lessons from 1915, but also was aware that amphibious operations along Turkey’s coastline would inflict the most pressure on strategic targets.

As discussed in chapter one, throughout the 1920s Turkey repeatedly demanded that its border with British Iraq needed to be redrawn. Among the areas that Turkey claimed territory around the city of Mosul. In December 1925, Turkey rejected a mandate by the League of Nations which stated that Mosul rightfully belonged to Iraq. As a result of Turkish threats the Admiralty warned Keyes, who had had taken command not months prior, to prepare for hostilities. Upon receiving these orders, Keyes immediately prepared the Mediterranean Fleet to force the Dardanelles to use the fleet’s guns and aircraft to force Turkey to terms. Yet, Keyes was not going to force the Dardanelles in the same fashion that was done in March 1915. Instead, Keyes planned on conducting landings all along the Dardanelles to allow the fleet to sail through.

On December 21, not long after he received orders to prepare the fleet, Keyes messaged the Admiralty on proposed naval operations against Turkey. From the beginning, Keyes believed that it would not be difficult to send battleships or cruisers through the Strait.234 His primary concern, however, was the safety of his lighter units, especially his supply ships. Even if the battleships got through they needed ammunition and fuel to continue operations in the Marmara. Should the Dardanelles be occupied by

234 Roger Keyes, “Memorandum by Keyes, 21 December 1925,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume II, 1919-1938, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), Part II, 155. 100 the Turkish, Keyes stressed, then the fleets supply ships, as well as the minesweepers, would be vulnerable to shore-based gunfire.235

Keyes’ concern over his lighter units, especially his store ships, mirrors similar concerns by de Robeck in 1915. During the height of Dardanelles Campaign, when

Keyes was pressing for another attack on the Strait, de Robeck rejected him citing the hazard store ships would face under shore-based gunfire. It could therefore be assumed that, nearly a decade later, Keyes had reason to agree with this line of thinking and wanted to protect his store ships to maintain a continual presence in the Marmara.

Additionally, perhaps wanting to prevent another Duckworth scenario, he wanted to secure the rear of his fleet to ensure it would not be trapped. As Halpern states, there was a need for military action on the Strait, “The fleet, in order to avoid a humiliating evacuation, would require a military occupation of the Gallipoli peninsula in order to sustain itself indefinitely in the Marmora.”236

Other than securing his supply lines into the Marmara, Keyes also believed that joint army-navy operations would exert pressure on Turkey. By using the guns and aircraft of the fleet, Keyes argued that he could engage Turkish infrastructure and disrupt its communications. He was, however, aware that this alone would not force Turkey to terms knowing that he needed a force on land to back up the fleets message. In his statement to the Admiralty he explains this, “I cannot believe that a demonstration unaccompanied by Military action can possibly achieved what is desired.”237

235 Ibid, 156. 236 The Mediterranean Fleet, 1919-1929, ed. Paul Halpern (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), Part IV, 458. 237 “Memorandum by Keyes, 21 December 1925,” Keyes Papers II, 161. 101

In February 1926, Keyes issued another statement as a follow-up to the previous one. In it he reaffirmed his belief in seizing the Straits and conducting amphibious operations throughout the Marmara. He explains that by conducting joint army-navy operations in the Marmara Turkey would be under greater pressure than operations elsewhere, like Iskanderun or Smyrna. By attacking around the Marmara, Keyes argues, the most pressure would be brought to bear on Turkey because it was here where its communication networks and main sources of revenue was located.238 In comparison, he argues, operations in Iskanderun or Smyrna would be of minimal military value because they were not important areas for Turkey.

In the same statement Keyes also states that he was in the midst of preparing the fleet for hostilities and preparing for amphibious operations. Among the preparations he lists are conducting bombardment practice, landing Marine Strike Forces, and protection for exposed personnel.239 Such was the intensity of preparations that, in an unrelated message, Keyes requested that X-Lighters be sent to the fleet explaining that he only had two available. In the message he makes it clear that their value in amphibious operations was already proven during the Dardanelles Campaign of 1915.240

In the end Turkey never declared war over Mosul and the Mediterranean Fleet went back to routine operations. Nonetheless, Keyes’ preparations indicate the high regard he had for amphibious operations as evident by his plans against Turkey. While he

238 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Secretary of the Admiralty, 6 February 1926,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume II, 1919-1938, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), Part II, 172. 239 Ibid, 169. 240 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Admiralty, 8 January 1926,” The Mediterranean Fleet, 1919- 1929, ed. Paul Halpern (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), Part IV, 475. 102 did state that the navy would have an important role in the conflict, he recognized that the navy could not do everything thus needing the army’s involvement. By conducting amphibious operations Keyes was confident that this would provide the most flexible means at engaging Turkey where it was most vulnerable. As he stated in February 1926,

“With the assistance of the Navy and Air Force the Army can occupy any part of Turkish

Territory for as long as H.M. Government sees fit.”241

From the perspective of geography, Keyes laid out a solid reason why amphibious operations were necessary. The Royal Navy would have command of the sea during the conflict and could move forces all along the Turkish coast where its infrastructure, commerce, and communications were vulnerable. From the Marmara the British could not only engage these targets but, with carriers, conduct raids further inland near Angora

(today’s Ankara). Regardless, these plans were never put into motion and, in 1928, Keyes left the Mediterranean for Portsmouth. At the time it appeared that Keyes’ involvement with the navy, apart from support in the Commons, was over. The rise of Nazism and subsequent outbreak of war in 1939 pulled Keyes out of retirement. His service in the

Second World War was a culmination of not only his experience with amphibious operations, but also their value in the littoral

Keyes and the Commandos, 1940-41

Despite the exercises Keyes and Richmond conducted, as well as paper projects by the Admiralty, the Royal Navy was ill equipped to conduct amphibious operations in

1939. Fortunately for the British, Germany had also neglected its ability to conduct

241 “Keyes to Secretary of the Admiralty, 6 February 1926,” Keyes Papers II, 170. 103 amphibious operations leaving them unprepared to invade Britain after the Fall of France in 1940.242 Unlike the Germans, the British were able to make up for lost time which, combined with the United States, allowed them to liberate Nazi-occupied Europe. Keyes played an important, albeit brief role, in preparing Britain for this through his appointment as Director of Combined Operations (DCO); an organization better known as the commandos. Although he held the position for sixteen months, Keyes not only acquired better equipment and vessels, which would become important in future engagements, but also planned for operations in littoral areas to disrupt enemy operations or protect Britain’s sea lanes.

One of the first operations of the Second World War that Keyes planned for occurred during the German invasion of Norway in 1940. Although still an MP, in April

Keyes proposed the seizure of Trondheim through an amphibious operation before the

Germans had a chance to reinforce the area. Resistance was believed to be light, “It is unlikely the Germans will have had time to erect defenses powerful enough to cause serious damage to a cruiser.”243 Keyes, ever a man of action, proposed to lead the force himself which would not only consist of battleships and carriers, but also two infantry battalions carried in landing craft. Keyes sent his proposal to Churchill explaining that controlling Trondheim was the key to Britain’s presence in Norway.244 Later, in 1943, he

242 Kenneth Macksey, Commando: Hit-and-Run Combat in World War II (Chelsea: Scarborough House, 1990), 1. 243 Roger Keyes, “Keyes’s Plan for Assault on Trondheim, 23 April 1940,” The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), Part I, 27. 244 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Churchill, 24 April 1940,” The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), Part I, 31. 104 wrote that, had Trondheim been secured, Britain would have had access to nearby airbases thus cementing its position in Norway.245 His plan was rejected by the Admiralty and the success of the operation, had it been launched, are unknown. Nonetheless, this was only the beginning of Keyes involvement in Second World War amphibious operations.

By the middle of 1940 the British were on their own. France had fallen, the

Luftwaffe was bombing Britain, and Italy was preparing to invade Greece and Egypt.

Even though Britain was on the defensive, government and military officials desired to maintain pressure on Germany. As Stephen Bull explains their position in Commando

Tactics, “To appear weak and supine at such a critical juncture was politically and diplomatically unacceptable. Those who doubted the nation’s survival…required evidence of the British will to continue the fight.”246 Among the first to suggest that raiders be used against Germany was General Ismay who suggested that “specially- trained troops of the hunter class” be inserted using flat-bottomed boats.247 Brigadier-

General Dudley Clarke suggested that Britain employ soldiers trained in the tactics of

Boer Commandos; thus originating the word commando.248 These ideas appealed to

Churchill who, not content on Britain remaining on the defensive, organized a new branch to deal with these operations.

245 Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, 79. 246 Stephen Bull, Commando Tactics: The Second World War (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2010), 1. 247 Aspinall-Oglander, Keyes: Being the Biography, 380. 248 Ibid, 380-1. 105

Soon after, on June 14, Lieutenant-General Alan Bourne, of the Royal Marines, was appointed Commander of Raiding Operations. Bourne was only able to conduct two operations while holding the position. Although both were failures, it was Operation

Ambassador, on the island of Guernsey, that had the most impact. On night July 15-16, a small team of men landed on Guernsey with the goal of capturing enemy soldiers; a demonstration raid with minimal impact. The men selected were poorly trained and many of their boats broke down on their way to the beach. Those that did make it to the island landed in the wrong spot as their compasses were not adjusted.249 At the end of the night none of the objectives were achieved and the men had to swim to their pickup ship.

The failure of Ambassador convinced officials, particularly Churchill, that new leaderships was needed to reorganize the commandos. Bourne, as Charles Messenger explains, wanted out because of conflicting orders issued by the Cabinet as well as balancing his duties as a Royal Marine and as Commander of Raiding Operations.250

Churchill wanted an individual who both had experience in conducting amphibious operations and who would not be in a junior position in the Admiralty. His choice rested on Keyes and on July 17 Churchill appointed him Director of Combined Operations.

There was likely a political reason why Keyes was chosen. During the Interwar

Years, Keyes was among Churchill’s most loyal supporters, and in the leadup to the

Second World War, spoke out against Britain’s passive stance towards Nazism. As Bull states, this was Churchill’s way to payback Keyes for years of “support and loyalty”.251

249 Macksey, Commando: Hit-and-Run, 13-4. 250 Charles Messenger, The Commandos, 1940-46 (London: William Kimber & Co. Limited, 1985), 35-6. 251 Bull, Commando Tactics, 22. 106

There were, however, practical reasons why Keyes was selected for this position. Keyes already had experience in such organizations through operations like Zeebrugge. Also,

Keyes, more than anyone else in Britain, had the most experience in not only implementing raids, but in reorganizing and strengthening units in almost no time.

The appointment delighted Keyes, now in his 60s, with Halpern stating he, “was overjoyed at finally finding an outlet for his energies which might make use of his past experience.”252 Keyes would have to devout all of his skill and energy into the organization which at this time was in a near dilapidated state. As Aspinall-Oglander calculates, in July 1940 there was only one thousand men in the organization with, “no

“suitable ships to take them and their landing-craft to the vicinity of a distant objective.”253 Acquiring additional landing craft was a challenge because most of

Britain’s shipyards were building merchant ships or warships. Writing to Admiral Sir

Walter Cowan, Keyes explains, “I am having an interesting time, but there is little equipment – and all the kind of craft I want were lost in Norway or at Dunkirk”254

Despite the bombing raids and pressure mounting in the Atlantic and

Mediterranean by Axis forces, the commandos were able to expand under Keyes’ leadership. From nearly one thousand soldiers in July, by September Keyes had nearly eight-thousand of which five hundred were paratroopers.255 At the same time, designs for

252 The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), Part II, 77. 253 Aspinall-Oglander, Keyes: Being the Biography, 384-5. 254 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Admiral Sir Walter Cowan, 28 July 1940,” The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), Part II, 90. 255 Macksey, Commando: Hit-and-Run, 20. 107 landing craft of various sizes were made and tanks and aircraft were slowly acquired.

Although shipyards were full, Keyes was able to secure the purchase of nearly two hundred assorted landing craft and ships.256 Although the organization was progressing under Keyes, there was resentment over its growth. The army’s C-in-C Home Force,

General Sir Alan Brooke, as well as his successor, General Sir Bernard Paget, argued that critical men and material were diverted to the Commandos. Paget would later write that the commandos were “a wasted effort”.257

Keyes likely found building his command less challenging compared to the difficulties he had with the Chief of Staffs and other senior officials. One of the first major operations where Keyes’ commandos would have been involved was at Dakar.

Most of French Africa had voiced allegiance to de Gaul’s Free French forces except the garrison at the naval base in Dakar. On the face of it this was not a threat until considering that a portion of the French fleet was there including the Richelieu, France’s latest battleship. Churchill considered using the commandos to capture the garrison, but the Chief of Staffs failed to consult Keyes. Keyes later wrote that, had he been involved, he would have either convinced the French admiral to surrender or would have ensured the fleets destruction.258 Against his wishes, Operation Menace was launched on

September 23 without the commandos and ended in defeat for the Anglo-Free French forces.

256 Fergusson, The Watery Maze, 57. 257 Messenger, Commandos, 1940-46, 59-60. 258 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Churchill, 24 August 1940,” The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), Part II, 93. 108

While Dakar could have been the first operation that seasoned Keyes’ rebuilt force, more opportunities were on the horizon. Under Bourne’s direction, operations were small and carried out by a few dozen men. After his replacement, Churchill envisioned the commandos to conduct large-scale raids, rather than “pin pricks” against the

Germans. Ideally, as Messenger points out, he wanted raids as large as ten-thousand men to land where populations were friendly.259 Keyes would later debate sending large raids across the Channel, but it was in the Mediterranean where he believed the most results could be gained. Here there appeared to be more opportunities to conduct amphibious operations in a contested region against a less challenging enemy.

One of the first places Keyes planned on seizing was Pantelleria, an Italian island located between Tunisia and Sicily. Italy had spent the Interwar Years building up the island by constructing airfields and underground hangers; the hangers reportedly could accommodate nearly two hundred bombers and fighters.260 By the autumn of 1940 the island had become strategically important because of its location within a choke point in the Mediterranean, the Strait of Sicily. From Pantelleria, the Italian Air Force could bomb

British convoys and warships that had to cross the Strait to get to either Malta or Egypt.

Keyes, therefore, proposed that the island be captured which would solidify Britain’s command over the Central Mediterranean.

Keyes’ first proposal to take the island was made on October 30 in a statement to the Chiefs of Staff. In it he calculates that the commandos available would be able to take

259 Messenger, Commandos, 1940-46, 25-6. 260 Roger Keyes, “Proposal by Keyes for the Capture of Pantelleria, 30 October 1940,” The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), Part II, 95. 109 the island. Although there was believed to be at most a battalion on the island, Keyes believed that the garrison would be surprised by an immediate landing.261 Upon taking the island, British aircraft could quickly be sent from Malta, which was only 140 miles away, and use the island as a base. The strategic importance of seizing Pantelleria was not lost on Keyes who stated that it could be used for aircraft heading to the Middle East, as well as controlling the Strait of Sicily, attacking Italy and Sicily, and curbing Vichy

French influence.262 Keyes estimated that the force needed to capture Pantelleria would be ready by November 30.

The plan to capture Pantelleria, codenamed Workshop, languished for weeks after being submitted. All the while the war in the Mediterranean continued with Italy, backed by Germany, on the advance in North Africa and Greece. Weeks after the Italian invasion of Greece, Keyes advocated attacking Italy with his commandos to Churchill stressing,

“There could be no effective way of aiding Greece in her hour of peril.”263 With

Workshop still undecided, Keyes recommended deploying the commandos to the Eastern

Mediterranean where Crete would be used as a staging ground. From Crete the commandos could attack the Italian Dodecanese islands which, unlike Pantelleria, Keyes believed would influence both Greece and Turkey.264 At the same time, he was calling for

Workshop to be given the green light believing that Italy was distracted on events elsewhere.

261 Ibid. 262 Ibid. 263 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Churchill, 14 November 1940,” The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), Part II, 98. 264 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Churchill, 15 November 1940,” The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), Part II, 99. 110

By December the prospects of Workshop being approved appeared likely.

General Wavell, in Operation Compass, had not only halted the Italian advance in Egypt but was pushing them into Libya. In mid-December, with Compass still ongoing, the

Admiralty and Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, the C-in-C of the Mediterranean Fleet, discussed Workshop. The Admiralty believed that, although the task hazardous, the commandos would have no difficulty going against “Italian sedentary troops”.265 The

Admiralty also dismissed the effectiveness of Italian air strikes stating that they would have trouble identifying friend from foe. Much like what Keyes stressed earlier, the

Admiralty also believed that by seizing Pantelleria the situation in Mediterranean would be altered. To Cunningham, the Admiralty stated that Workshop would, “give good air command of the most used lines of communications with Libyan army and also increased measure of air protection for our convoys and transports passing so-called Narrows.”266

While the Admiralty saw the advantages in the operation, both in the initial operation and its strategic opportunities, Cunningham was hesitant to approve. He replied that Workshop would strain his resources which he describes as being taxed supplying the army in Egypt.267 Although Cunningham does agree that command of the air during

Workshop would not be a problem, he does claim that supplying Pantelleria would become a problem later on. Cunningham later explained to Keyes that his opposition to

265 “Exchange of Signals between the Admiralty and Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean concerning Operation Workshop, 11 December 1940,” The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), Part II, 125. 266 Ibid, 125-6. 267 “C.-in-C. Mediterranean to Admiralty, 12 December 1940,” The Keyes Papers III, 126. 111

Workshop was mainly for this reason, that supplying and maintaining Pantelleria would have been nearly impossible after its capture.268

Despite Cunningham’s opposition, Workshop was approved by the Admiralty explaining that with their “situation in the Middle East temporarily secured” the operation seemed feasible.269 Workshop was to begin in January, ideally before Germany could bolster Italy. Before Workshop was underway, however, the Germans deployed several squadrons of Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers in Sicily. Their presence ultimately led the

Admiralty to cancel Workshop fearing that the landing ships would be easy targets.

Keyes attempted to revive Workshop, even writing to Air Chief Marshall Portal that the threat of dive bombers was exaggerated.270 Despite his pleas, Workshop remained shelved indefinitely.

Workshops cancelation, however, was not the end of commando operations in the

Mediterranean. Over the succeeding months several small raids did occur across the region; although many were experimental and not meant to change the balance of power in the region. One such operation, Colossus, which occurred on February 10, entailed a few dozen men to land on the Italian coast to destroy an aqueduct leading to the naval base at Taranto. Colossus was experimental in that the men were parachuted into enemy territory, and, supported by bombers, knockout enemy infrastructure before being picked

268 Andrew Cunningham, “Admiral Andrew Cunningham to Keyes, 10 March 1941,” The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), Part II, 158. 269 “Exchange of Signals between Admiralty, 11 December 1940,” Keyes Papers III, 127. 270 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Portal, 25 January 1941,” The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), Part II, 143-4. 112 up at sea. Historian Glen Barclay labels the operation, “the most mishandled operation in the unhappy history of combined operations” because the men were either killed or captured and the aqueduct, though damaged, was eventually repaired.271 Regardless, the operation was planned as nothing more than an experiment, not a war winner, and, as

Macksey explains, the operation was good for morale and diverted Italian soldiers into an otherwise unimportant zone.272

Another operation that saw commandos sent into enemy territory, this time by sea, were operations in French Syria. By June the British had been pushing the Vichy

French out of their foothold in the Middle East. On June 9, while an Australian unit was advancing towards the Litani River, a group of commandos landed behind French lines.

Although one commando group got disorientated and landed in the wrong spot, the commandos were able to seize a battery and disrupt the rear of the French lines. As a result the Australians were able to cross the Litani River unmolested and advance into

Syria.273

It was in Norway, however, where the commandos would conduct their most noteworthy mission under Keyes’ leadership. Norway seemed to offer fresh possibilities with economic minister, Hugh Dalton, recommending attacks on fish oil plants while

Churchill wanted to spread terror in German occupied territory.274 Operation Claymore’s objective was disrupting production of fish oil, used in the manufacturing of explosives,

271 Glen St. J Barclay, “‘Butcher and Bolt’: Admiral Roger Keyes and British Combined Operations, 1940-1941,” Naval War College Review 35, no. 2 (March-April 1982): 24, accessed January 19, 2019, https://digital-commons.usnwcs.edu/nwc-review/vol35/iss2/4. 272 Macksey, Commando: Hit-and-Run, 47. 273 Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, 91-2. 274 Bull, Commando Tactics, 29. 113 as well as capturing German soldiers and Quislings. On March 9 eight-hundred commandos landed on the Lofoton Islands and succeeded in destroying 800,000 tons of fish oil and 18,000 tons of shipping. Although Barclay argues, “It was unfortunate that the full propaganda value of the affair was impaired by the difficulty of making fish-oil sound serious,” the operation did have important intelligence success.275 The commandos not only brought back dozens of German prisoners but also code books and Enigma ciphers. These were important given this was a time when the Battle of the Atlantic was at its height. Andrew Hargreaves states that it was the ciphers and codebooks that made

Claymore so significant as it aided the “evolution of Ultra”.276

Despite the success of Claymore, as well as the growth and development of the commandos, Keyes protested that the they were not being utilized to their full potential.

Throughout his time as DCO, and especially by 1941, Keyes wrote regularly to Churchill asking that the commandos be given more opportunities to fight. For example, in

February 1941 Keyes wrote to Churchill on their lack of assignments, “You put a ban on pin pick raids…I was fully in agreement with this policy, and I hoped before long to mount amphibious strokes…but I have been sadly disillusioned.”277 Keyes was also frustrated that his proposals for operations not only had to be approved by the Chiefs of

Staff, but they also could be scrutinized and rejected by any of the Inter-Staff

Committees. Keyes increasingly criticized the dense levels of bureaucracy he had to go

275 Barclay, Butcher and Bolt, 25. 276 Andrew L. Hargreaves, Special Operations in World War II: British and American Irregular Warfare (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013), 216. 277 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Churchill, 4 February 1941,” The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), Part II, 147. 114 through arguing that such difficulties were not present when he planned and led the

Zeebrugge Raid, or even as early as the Boxer Rebellion.278 In those operations, he argued, decisions were swiftly made and he was able to wage offensive operations against the enemy.

Tensions between Keyes and the Chiefs of Staff reached a head later that summer.

On September 27 the Chiefs of Staff issued a statement outlining the future of amphibious operations. One of the articles stated was that in the future the Chiefs of Staff would be responsible for planning future amphibious operations. The Chiefs of Staff also specified that the Director of Combined Operations would be relegated to an advisory position.279 Churchill acquiesced to the Chiefs of Staff and promptly informed Keyes that he was to become an advisor. Keyes protested leading to a series of messages being sent between him and Churchill throughout October on the future of his position. Unwilling to convince Keyes to accept an advisory position, Churchill removed Keyes on October 27 and replaced him with Commodore Mountbatten. Unlike Keyes, Mountbatten was willing to follow the advice of the Chiefs of Staff and avoided clashes with peers.

Keyes was greatly disillusioned by his removal as DCO but was still adamant that the Mediterranean was where victory would be achieved. He makes this point in a letter to General Ismay not long after his removal, “There are such golden opportunities for amphibious strokes in the Mediterranean now, if our splendid striking force is properly

278 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Churchill, 2 September 1941,” The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), Part II, 187-8. 279 “Memorandum by Chiefs of Staffs, 27 September 1941,” The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), Part II, 199. 115 directed and courageously used.”280 Keyes was largely right because it was in the

Mediterranean where the United States and Britain concentrated on attacking the Axis first. One such operations was Husky whereby the Allies landed on Sicily in their first step to invade the Italian Peninsula. Supporting Husky was Operation Corkscrew which was launched on June 11, 1943. Corkscrew’s objective was to capture the island of

Pantelleria which the Allies deemed necessary to secure their flank from air attack. After a series of massed aerial bombardments the Italian garrison of nearly twelve thousand surrendered to landers with reportedly one casualty caused by a mule bite.281

Corkscrew is only one example of an operation the commandos conducted after

Keyes’ removal. A prime example of the sort of strategic accomplishments raiders could make is Operation Chariot, or the raid on St. Nazaire. Launched on March 28, 1942,

Chariot’s objective was to blockade a massive dry dock in St. Nazaire harbor which had been used to accommodate the French ocean liner, SS Normandie. The British, fearing the dry dock could be used to repair German warships, like the Tirpitz, ordered the commandos to destroy the dock with an explosive filled ship. The operation was a success and, despite suffering heavy casualties, succeeded in neutralizing the dry docks use for the rest of the war.

Although Keyes’ leadership of the commandos barely lasted two years, he nonetheless left an impact on Britain’s ability to conduct raids. As Macksey argues, the success of the commandos later in the war can be traced to Keyes, “His [Keyes]

280 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Ismay, 30 October 1941,” The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), Part II, 218. 281 Fergusson, Watery Maze, 239. 116 critics…forget that the foundation of the organization Mountbatten took over were laid by Keyes.”282 It was under Keyes where the commandos not only received the necessary equipment for future operations, but his call for action provided them with valuable experience and skills. Although the commandos were not conceived as war winners, they could aid in winning the war through high-intensity mission along the coast to harass the enemy or to assist larger operations through specific pinpoint operations. Operations like

Claymore, Chariot, and Corkscrew all exhibit the advantages in using raiders in confined waters.

For the rest of the war Keyes remained a firm believer in amphibious operations arguing that it was the primary means at defeating the Axis. In 1943, as part of

Cambridge University’s Lee Knowles Lecture, Keyes, using his beliefs and experiences, argued that amphibious operations was how the war would be won, “We have the means to launch attacks, on a scale which should eventually drive Germany and Japan out of the countries they have seized and bring about final victory.”283 Keyes witnessed one such operation in 1944 while touring the Pacific where he was invited to observe an American amphibious assault on the Philippines. From the command ship Appalachia Keyes was witness to how different systems, ranging from aircraft and offshore bombardment, made the U.S. Marines task of storming the beaches easier. Writing to Churchill after the event, he summarized the achievement saying, “Fifteen hundred miles from the U.S. Naval and

Air Bases, right into the heart of enemy occupied territory with powerful Japanese Naval

282 Macksey, Commando: Hit-and-Run, 210-11. 283 Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, 100. 117 and Air Forces at large.”284 A year after writing this letter Keyes passed away and was buried in the same cemetery where the casualties of the Zeebrugge raid were rested.

It could be observed that Keyes’ career and reputation was built on his experience with amphibious operations. It was, after all, from the Boxer Rebellion, the Dardanelles, and Zeebrugge where he garnered the most notoriety. The few works on Keyes during and after his lifetime highlight these operations more than any others; his experience with aircraft and submarines are often relegated to mere mention. Therefore, by 1940,

Churchill had a good reason to select Keyes as DCO. According to Halpern, Keyes seemed to be an excellent fit for Churchill, no less due to their experience during the

Dardanelles Campaign.285 Through nearly forty years of experience, Keyes understood how to plan and organize amphibious operations of various sizes and in a variety of environments. This is best demonstrated during the Second World War whereby Keyes quickly reformed the commandos and implemented missions against high value targets throughout Europe.

As discussed throughout this chapter, the conduct of amphibious operations changed with every succeeding war. The Boxer Rebellion may have revealed the advantages of amphibious operations, but the Dardanelles Campaign highlighted its drawbacks. Keyes, who was present in both campaigns, understood well the pros and cons of these and many other amphibious operations. It was from this understanding that led him to reform Royal Navy amphibious operations through integration of technology

284 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Churchill, 8 November 1944,” The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), Part III, 294. 285 The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), Part II, 77. 118 and refined training methods. Keyes also learned that landings, whether big or small, conducted in narrows or coastal-like environments could boost engagements further afield through the establishment of bases of supply, neutralizing facilities, or simply protecting sea lanes. While these ideas were not new, Keyes’ impact was the integration of modern weapons and techniques which continued to have a role in amphibious operations well past his time.

119

CHAPTER 3: NAVAL OPERATIONS OF THE PRESENT IN CONTESTED

LITTORAL ZONES

When Keyes died on December 26, 1945 the world was in a period of transition.

Keyes lived in a time of empire, and where a bomb could only go as far as the aircraft that could carry it; jet-powered aircraft, rockets, and computers were, until the mid-

1940s, unreliable or the stuff of science fiction. After his death empires slowly fractured into independent states spanning across all the settled continents. The Cold War came and went leaving in its wake a trail of proxy wars, coups, and revolutions that toppled numerous governments. Missiles and smart bombs evolved to where they have the means to strike buildings, vehicles, and ships with pinpoint accuracy. With such technological and geographic changes it may be difficult to think of Keyes as a relevant figure in today’s world. Yet, upon scrutinizing his career and beliefs, spanning over a period of forty years of rapid change, reveals that Keyes continues to be relevant. Not only has the importance of the littoral remained the same, but discussions parallel Keyes’ decisions and ideas. The result is that from him we can understand how to use similar methods, albeit with the latest weapons, to fight in a contested littoral zone.

Much as it was in Keyes’ time, the littoral continues to be important due to the interconnectedness of global commerce. In the era of the world wars most of Britain’s maritime commerce went through the littoral. Its most important sea lanes passed through straits in the Mediterranean and along Britain’s coastline where they coalesced around its numerous seaports. Part of the littorals importance for Keyes was in protecting these sea lanes either by keeping areas open or denying them to the enemy. Today, policy makers 120 have similar ideas in keeping the littoral open to international commerce, especially locations like the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Malacca. The issues facing policy makers today is that aggressive states are within proximity of the littoral and, through naval or anti-access warfare, can to shut down important sea lanes. Today, as in Keyes time, the littoral will likely be the primary zone in which naval operations will be conducted in order to keep open lines of communication, maneuver forces, and project power across a region.

Correlating with this last line, Keyes is also relevant because, much like today, he had to conduct naval operations in locations brimming with anti-access weapons.

Submarines, naval mines, and artillery all prevented surface ships from operating in contested littoral zones. Keyes, however, discovered that the anti-access weapons of the day could be countered either by implementing similar weapons or by adapting the latest in military technology. Submarines and mines denied the littoral to enemy fleets while naval aircraft could project power onto land-based targets. Today similar weapons would be used in the same way. Mines and submarines would be used to bypass anti-access weapons, while the latest technologies, like missiles and VTOL aircraft, could be used to project power from safe distances.

Within contemporary discussions, amphibious operations would be conducted for reasons Keyes would have been familiar with. For him, amphibious operations were a means to secure or make use of the littoral either by massed landings or raids. In current discussions massed landings are deemed difficult due to such weapons as standoff missiles and nuclear weapons. Yet, some regard them as necessary as a last resort to gain 121 control of spaces along vital sea lines of communication. Using special forces from the sea is still highly regarded as a means to stabilize allies, destroy enemy infrastructure, off-balance the enemy, or suppress “gray” combatants.

Therefore, the relevance of Keyes is because from him we can understand how to conduct operations using similar methods in the littoral. It is from the littoral where, both as he understood it and how we currently perceive it, naval operations are conducted to disrupt enemy movements, project power, and protect sea lanes. The weapons may have changed but the ways in which they are used has not. Most importantly, the littoral remains the same geographically and continues to be where the bulk of global commerce flows through. By securing the littoral not only can trade continue, but, in the event of hostilities, the flow of naval and ground forces can quickly move to hostile locations. The littoral, and operations that may be occurring in it, are as relevant today due to it being the zone of contention among military and government officials. Among aggressive states, three stand out because of their presence near the most important littoral zones as well as the strength of their naval arsenals.

Present Conflicts in Littoral Zones

Since the end of the Cold War there have been many threats to international commerce popping up in the littoral. Off Somalia and within Strait of Malacca pirates have intercepted numerous vessels along important shipping lanes causing concern among shipping and insurance companies. The response has been an increased naval deployment by several nations into these waters to protect commerce. Terrorists also pose a threat to sea lanes, especially those passing through the littoral around the Middle East. 122

Yet, the most immediate threats along the littoral are not by non-state actors but by regimes who in the past decade have set their sights on the littoral and regions beyond.

The most prominent are, as Wayne P. Hughes identifies in the third edition of Fleet

Tactics and Naval Operations, Russia, China, and Iran which he states need to be countered in the littoral.286 Despite their different ideologies and ethnic makeup, all three countries are similar in that the littoral has been the focus of military and political encroachment. Their navies, though once neglected, have witnessed a resurgence in national importance and have slowly, or in the case of China substantially, grown. The purpose of renewed emphasis on their navies is no less than to make use of the littoral as a base to expand power abroad. A goal that is not new for policy makers in Moscow.

After the overthrow of the Romanov Dynasty, and subsequent neglect of the

Imperial Russian Navy, the Soviets relegated their navy as a coastal force. Although this policy wavered under Stalin, who later desired a blue-water fleet, up unto the mid-Cold

War period the Soviets favored a fleet for operations in the littoral. By the mid to late-

Cold War, and especially under the guidance of Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, the Soviet navy arose to become one of the largest and most powerful in the world. Working from the littoral around Eurasia, the Soviet navy had the ability to project power worldwide through a variety of vessels and aircraft. Aiding them was a string of bases in such friendly countries as Cuba, Vietnam, and South Yemen. With the rise of the Soviet navy, the United States and its allies had to protect their sea lanes by preventing a Soviet breakout from the littoral.

286 Hughes and Girrier, Fleet Tactics Third Edition, 2. 123

The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, eliminated this threat and the U.S.

Navy and its counterparts in Europe and Asia saw decreased funding and the size of their fleets reduced. The newly formed Russian navy also dramatically reduced in size and capabilities with many of its yards, navy bases, and maritime populations now in sperate countries.287 Throughout the 1990s, the Russian navy received the least amount of funding and little to no attention from Moscow. At the time the problems Russia faced were internal, such as a dwindling economy and fighting in Chechnya, and beyond maintain its nuclear deterrent the Russian navy as a whole seemed redundant. As a result its navy rusted away or suffered breakdowns; the Kursk disaster illustrates just what state the Russian navy was in.

Russia’s decade of naval decline ended with Putin who began to rebuild the navy.

Although the Russian navy is nowhere near the size of its Soviet predecessor, it is still a dangerous force whose aim is to help Russia secure its regional objectives. This is noticeable by its increased acquisition of weapons and warships over the last two decades. Both its surface and submarine fleets have been bolstered by new vessels such as Yasen-class attack submarines, Borei-class ballistic missile submarines, and Admiral

Gorshkov-class frigates. Russia has also been developing anti-ship missiles, such as the

3M54 Kalibr (SS-N-27 Sizzler) cruise missile, which can be deployed on warships and submarines. Perhaps most alarming, given its territorial ambitions in the littoral, is the buildup of its amphibious forces. It has already built two of the projected five Ivan Gren- class landing ships and had attempted to acquire Mistral-class helicopter carriers from

287 Jeremy Black, Naval Warfare: A Global History since 1860 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 201. 124

France, although Paris eventually blocked this deal due to Russia’s takeover of Crimea.

Regardless, Russia has a credible amphibious warfare fleet and can conduct landings in the Black and Baltic Seas and potentially Pacific.288

With the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and increased activity in Europe since, there is speculation that sooner or later the Baltic, especially the Baltic States, will be the next area of Russian expansion. The exact method which Russia would seize one or all of the Baltic States is speculated to range from an outright invasion to encouraging “gray” militants.289 There are credible strategic reasons why Russia has its sights set on the

Baltic. As Estonian naval officer, Lieutenant-Commander Ott Laanemetes, explains in an article in Proceedings, Russia wants to either seize islands or capture territory in the

Baltic to enhance its air-defense network.290 Among the most important areas of real estate for Russia to seize is the Swedish island of Gotland and the Estonian islands.

Seizing either would fill the air-defense gap between Kaliningrad and Saint Petersburg.

Lieutenant-Commander Laanemetes also speculates that Finnish islands in the Baltic could potentially be seized by Russia to protect its access into Saint Petersburg. Bruce B.

Stubbs, in a separate Proceedings article, also speculates that Russia has designs on the

Baltic, particularly one or all of the Baltic States. Both Stubbs and Laanemetes believe that, although military action is not out of the question, Russia will likely take one or all

288 Ibid, 238. 289 Bruce B. Stubbs, “U.S. Sea Power has role in the Baltic,” Proceedings 143, no. 9 (September 2017), accessed January 22, 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-09/us-sea-power-has-role-baltic. 290 Lieutenant-Commander Ott Laanemetes, “Solve the Baltic’s Geography Problem,” Proceedings 144, no. 3 (March 2018), accessed February 7, 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-03/solve-baltics-geography-problem. 125 of the Baltic States through forceful means. Regardless of where Russia may strike at in the Baltic, it is clear that by doing so it would unbalance NATO with the benefit of securing its northern flank.

Unlike the Baltic, Russia has already been in the process of securing its southern flank along the Black Sea. This is evident by its annexation of Crimea and the use of force or coercion against neighboring states. By seizing Crimea, Russia gained an important foothold through the acquisition of additional warships, as well as air bases and naval yards. With these vessels and facilities the means for Russia to project power throughout the Black Sea has substantially increased. Russia’s backing of Transnistria, a breakaway state on Ukraine’s western border, is evident of Russia’s aims in securing its position in the Black Sea through disorder. As Stephen Black explains, the Black Sea is important because it is a “springboard” for Russia to project power into the

Mediterranean, Balkans, and Middle East.291

On its east coast, Russia’s Pacific Fleet, though its function has remained reduced since the collapse of the Soviet Union, remains a powerful force. In particular, it continues to have the means to engage in operations in the littoral around Japan and the

Korean peninsula.292 In recent years Russia has deployed a significant portion of its submarine fleet in Vladivostok. Most noted are Yasen and Kilo-class attack submarine as well as Borei-class ballistic missile submarines. On the contested Kuril Islands at the

291 Stephen Black, “The Black Sea and Beyond,” Proceedings 141, no. 10 (October 2015), accessed February 6, 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015- 10/black-sea-and-beyond. 292 Igor Delanoe, “Russia’s Navy in the Pacific: A Forgotten Fleet?,” Proceedings 144, no. 7 (July 2018), accessed February 2, 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazine/proceedings/2018-7/russia’s-navy-pacific-forgotten-fleet. 126 entrance to the Sea of Okhotsk, Russia has deployed S-400 Triumf (SA-21 Growler) missiles.

Much like Russia, Iran also has its sights set on the littoral and is increasing its maritime capabilities through naval buildup. Like the Russian navy, the Iranian navy also has a history of growth followed by decline before being built-up in recent years. In the

1970s, while Iran was ruled by the Shah, the Iranian navy was in the midst of a vigorous buildup. Among its most noted purchases were four modified Spruance-class destroyers, several Dutch frigates, and a British oiler. The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, however, ended Iran’s naval buildup and it, combined with the Iran-Iraq War, took a toll on its navy. Today, Iran is once again rebuilding its navy through foreign purchases, like

Chinese and North Korean hardware, and domestic shipbuilding. The goal of Tehran is to use its navy to secure the Persian Gulf, especially the Strait of Hormuz, from which it can project its influence across the Islamic world. Evidence of this is Tehran’s backing of militants in Yemen, partially as a way to control the Bab el-Mandeb; the Red Sea’s narrowest points.293

Yet, among these nations, it is China that is most determined to construct a blue- water fleet and take advantage of the littoral in the Indo-Pacific region. Like Russia and

Iran, China’s navy has also seen a determined buildup from neglected roots. From the

Chinese Civil War up into the 1980s, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) was a coastal force. Apart from 1953, when there were plans on invading Taiwan through an

293 Commander T. J. Gillmore, “Iran Owns the Gray Zone,” Proceedings 144, no. 3 (March 2018), accessed February 6, 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-3/iran-owns-gray-zone. 127 amphibious operation, China largely focused on interior expansion; Mao particularly desired not to antagonize the United States at sea.294 As a result, the Chinese navy focused on being a coastal navy acquiring submarines and torpedo boats. Regardless of its approach, the navy was, compared to the army, a neglected force which was made worse by the Sino-Soviet Split and subsequent Cultural Revolution.295

Beginning in the 1980s, and gaining strength in the 1990s, Chinese naval officers, and government officials alike, began calling for a blue-water navy. There calls coincided with economic growth and expanding commercial networks worldwide. Chinese naval advocates were aided by businessmen and scholars who endorsed the construction of a blue-water navy. Businessmen and economically minded officials believed that China’s sea lanes which provide access to markets and raw materials was vulnerable. All, however, stressed that China was somehow vulnerable and should be protected by its own navy, rather than relying on a foreign one like the United States.296 This corresponds with the threats Beijing currently faces which, with its borders largely secure, are located at sea; particularly from the U.S. Navy, but also the Japanese and Indian navies.297 Like

Russia, China has also been increasing its ability to conduct amphibious operations in the littoral through the construction of landing ships. Although China currently lacks the

294 Bernard D. Cole, “More Red than Expert: Chinese Sea Power during the Cold War,” in China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformations in Comparative Historical Perspectives, ed. Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Carnes Lord (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 322. 295 Ibid, 328. 296 C. Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), 122. 297 Robert S. Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response,” International Security 34, no. 2 (Fall, 2009): 66, accessed March 26, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40389213. 128 personnel to conduct amphibious operations, it has sought to mitigate this by increasing the amount of personnel trained in seizing contested islands.298

The goal of Beijing is to expand its power into the Pacific and Indian oceans to protect its sea lanes and spread its influence. The key to this goal is to secure the littoral around the Chinese coast which it has been doing for some time. One of the primary areas China has involved itself is the South China Sea where it has steadily claimed the area as part of its territory. This began in the late-1940s when it declared the nine-dash line later followed by the annexation of the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in the 1970s.299

In recent decades China has regularly constructed missile bases and airfields on islands, both real and artificial, to cement its claim over the South China Sea. China has also deployed naval vessels into the region to chase off foreign warships and fishing vessels from neighboring nations to further its claim. As U.S. Navy Admiral, Richard Macke states, “China knows its claims conflict with international law, but it continues to push to establish legitimacy based on custom. In other words, if the Chinese coerce other nations to accede to their excessive claims, those claims will become recognized over time.”300

To this end, Beijing’s claims on the South China Sea overlap claims made by neighboring nations such as Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Although denouncing Beijing’s claims over the South China Sea, their protests are difficult to make

298 Black, Combined Operations, 206. 299 Admiral Richard Macke, “Deal with China From a Position of Strength,” Proceedings 144, no. 6 (June 2018), accessed February 7, 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-06/deal-china-position-strength. 300 Ibid. 129 due to the size of the Chinese navy and the fact that China has the power to veto resolutions in the United Nations.301

Another area in the Southeast Asian littoral that China has set its sights on, though not on the same level of intensity as the South China Sea, is the Strait of Malacca. Since the early-2000s China has cited the “Malacca Dilemma” to further naval buildup and expansion into this waterway. The “Malacca Dilemma” states that China’s access to petroleum from the Middle East, raw materials from Africa, and markets in general could be cutoff in the Strait of Malacca.302 While there have been suggestions that a pipeline across Thailand would circumvent this problem, the end solution for Beijing is to expand its maritime reach into the Strait of Malacca to protect this vital waterway for Chinese interests.

China has also expanded its maritime influence as far afield as the Indian Ocean, not only by making its naval presence felt in its littoral by establishing bases throughout the region. These bases, dubbed China’s “String of Pearls”, stretches across the Indian

Ocean with construction occurring in such nations as Bangladesh, Myanmar, and

Pakistan. Most of these bases can accommodate Chinese warships despite Beijing’s claims that these facilities are for commercial purposes.303 Unlike its aggressive stance against neighbors in the Western Pacific, in the Indian Ocean China has been fostering relations with several nations through economic or military aid to gain access to bases.

301 David Scott, “Conflict Irresolution in the South China Sea,” Asian Survey 52, no. 6 (November/December 2012): 1022, accessed March 26, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/as.2012.52.6.1019. 302 Mohan, Samudra Manthan, 121. 303 Ibid, 128. 130

For example, since 2010, Chinese warships have regularly docked in Pakistani and Sri

Lankan seaports.304

Closer to its coast, the Chinese navy has also focused on establishing itself along the Western Pacific’s littoral. Other than the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait is of immediate concern for the Chinese navy and has been an area of tension since the beginning of the Cold War. By deploying its warships near the Taiwan Strait, China’s goal is to deter Taipei from declaring independence through intimidation.305 Although

Taiwan is the main focus in the Western Pacific, the Japanese, combined with the United

States, is also of concern. Much like the Strait of Malacca, and various islands in the

South China Sea, Beijing fears that Japan or the United States could use their bases in the

Western Pacific to prevent the Chinese navy from breaking out. As a result, Beijing has been eyeing up various Japanese islands, like the Ryukyu Islands, which it needs to hold to gain access into the Pacific.306 With this in mind, China has deployed its warships off

Japan’s islands and has even sent research vessels to gain intel on the Ryukyu Islands and

Tsushima Strait.

Today, much as it was during Keyes’ time, the littoral is important in aiding land- based operations. For Keyes, and the British in general, the littoral allowed for power to be projected ashore and supplies to be quickly sent to ground forces in far off locations.

In contemporary history this is relevant because Russia, Iran, and China all want to

304 Black, Naval Warfare: A Global History, 237. 305 Eric A. McVadon, “China’s Navy Today: Looking Toward Blue Water,” in China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformations in Comparative Historical Perspectives, ed. Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Carnes Lord (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 376. 306 Ross, China’s Naval Nationalism, 74. 131 secure the littoral to protect movement and project power into distant regions. Whether it be in the Black Sea, the Persian Gulf, or Strait of Malacca, securing these spaces eases the flow of their military traffic. There are also economic reasons why they want to control the littoral. For example, according to Lieutenant-Commander Laanemetes, nine percent of global commerce is handled within Baltic seaports; additionally, forty percent of Europe’s natural gas flows through the Baltic from Russia.307 Shipping lanes in the

Persian Gulf are naturally important due to the flow of petroleum to the outside world; no less to the United States and China. In March 2018, Commander Gillmore estimated that thirty-four percent of the world’s petroleum comes from the Persian Gulf, with three million barrels going through the Red Sea on a daily basis.308 Lastly, regarding the South

China Sea, Jeremy Black cites the Financial Times in estimating that over five billion dollars in 2014 alone went through these waters.309

Therefore, with states like Russia, Iran, and China aggressively expanding their power, the littoral will likely be as important today as it was for Keyes. An example of this is, that many nations in Europe and Asia are building up their navies to enforce their territorial waters or defend themselves should the need arise. Examples include Japan,

India, and the United States who all have focused on their navies to protect sea lanes and engage aggressive regimes; primarily in the littoral. As a result, Keyes is important because he serves as a guide in how successful military operations can be conducted in the littoral. With increased hostilities and naval buildup by Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing,

307 Laanemetes, Solve the Baltic. 308 Gillmore, Iran Gray Zone. 309 Black, Naval Warfare: A Global History, 235. 132 the U.S. Navy is developing new methods to conduct operations in the littoral. Ideas, many of which can be found in Proceedings, range from implementing the latest weapons to rearranging tested methods like amphibious and joint operations. As will be discussed, although the weapons have changed, they are implemented in ways similar to Keyes.

Fighting Fire with Fire: Technology in Littoral Operations

While the physical geography and commercial significance of the littoral has not changed, the weapons that secure or deny it has. Missiles and sensors now make it even more hazardous for warships to operate in a contested littoral zones. Even swarms of missile boats make even the smallest maritime power a threat to a technologically advanced navy within confined waters. Yet, although the weapons are as powerful and as accurate as ever before, their impact remains the same since Keyes was in the Royal

Navy. The effect is that a naval power, particularly second or third-rate navies, can deny their opponents the littoral by inflicting severe damage on their opponents’ fleets. This can be achieved by using the latest weapons, such as laser-guided bombs, to traditional ones like naval mines. As discussed in chapter one, Keyes was no stranger to this problem because he too had to overcome similar anti-access weapons in the littoral. Yet, by implementing similar systems, Keyes was able to overcome this dilemma. By using submarines, mines, and eventually aircraft, he was not only able to attack his adversaries in waters protected by anti-access weapons, but they also allowed him to deny the littoral to his enemies.

In the second volume of his memoirs, Keyes argues that there existed two schools of thought regarding naval warfare: a materiel school and a scientific school. The 133 materiel school, he explains, desired to avoid risking the fleet while the scientific school,

“welcomed the help of every possible scientific or physical aid”; Keyes identified himself as being part of the latter school.310 He understood that for a navy to do nothing and not take risks the advantage was given to the enemy. Success depended on taking risks when necessary, but ones that were aided with technological innovations. Arguably, his line of thinking correlates with current discussions whereby action is required in the littoral during hostilities, but that the latest innovations or proven weapons should be implemented to bypass anti-access weapons and influence maneuverability in the littoral.

An example of this are discussions revolving around the U.S. Navy’s ability to conduct mine warfare in the littoral.

Apart from amphibious operations and naval aviation, mines played a prominent role during most of Keyes’ career. It was in 1915 at the Dardanelles where Keyes witnessed the power mines had in denying a powerful fleet access through the littoral.

Although mines were disdained by the Royal Navy before the war, Keyes was able to implement them with success in the Dover Strait in 1918. As discussed in chapter one, his minefield was not the only means of denying the Germans access through the Dover

Strait; other methods were a denser patrol on the surface and bombing raids against naval bases. Yet, Keyes did a better job maintaining and intensifying the minefield compared to his predecessor, Admiral Bacon. In late-1917, when inspecting Bacon’s minefield, Keyes

310 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: Scapa Flow to the Dover Strait, 143. 134 was shocked to discover that mines regularly drifted away concluding that his minefield was “ineffective”.311

Besides a strengthened minefield, Keyes also implemented the latest devises within the Dover Strait. Examples include magnetic and acoustic mines which, although

Keyes admits needed fine-tuning, he regards as yielding “great possibilities”.312 It should be noted that not all of his suggestion were practical; for example, he thought massive towers could be placed along the Dover Strait to enhance its defense. Regardless, Keyes realized the need to protect Allied traffic both within the Channel and beyond by preventing the Germans from moving through Dover. Keyes argued as such on December

23, 1917 explaining that if the Dover Patrol was neglected, “the enemy will leave Dover

Straits in peace and the brunt will be borne, as it has been borne, by our commerce and not by Dover.”313

Keyes was also familiar with minesweeping operations within the littoral. He was first introduced to such operations during the First World War in the Dardanelles when the British realized they needed a minesweeping force that was not composed of trawlers manned by civilians. It was Keyes’ task to organize a new force which included naval ratings and destroyers fitted with minesweeping equipment. Although his reorganized force was never used, his appreciation for minesweepers never faded. One such example

311 Roger Keyes “Memorandum by Keyes, 23 December 1917,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part IV, 437. 312 Roger Keyes “Report of the Barrage Committee, 21 December 1917,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1979), Part IV, Pg. 434. 313 “Memorandum by Keyes, 23 December 1917,” Keyes Papers I, 438. 135 is Exercise MU from the Interwar Years where minesweepers were an integral part in simulating how the British fleet would transit the Strait of Malacca under fire.314

What is significant about Keyes and his experience with mines in the littoral is that our idea of mine warfare in similar environments has not changed; if anything it has become more relevant. As Vego explains, “Most narrow seas are highly favorable areas for both offensive and defensive mine warfare.”315 Specifically, Vego argues that by using mines in coastal areas the purpose is, “To make operational deployment of enemy fleet striking forces difficult or to destroy enemy surface ships and submarines on their movement routes and in operating areas.”316 Although anti-ship missiles are undoubtedly deadly, naval mines continue to be destructive weapons. As Hughes points out, since the end of the Second World War fourteen out of eighteen attacks on U.S. Navy warships was by naval mines.317 Additionally, Hughes also highlights the importance of minesweeping operations such as those during the Gulf Wars which were vital in keeping the Persian Gulf open.318 With such considerations, there have been discussions calling for the U.S. Navy to enhance its mine warfare capabilities in the littoral.

One of those insisting for such a decision is Commander Christopher Nelson who in an article in Proceedings, “Win with the Second Best Weapon”, points out that mines were an important factor in forcing Japan to surrender in 1945. Upon analyzing the

314 Roger Keyes, “Memorandum by Keyes on Exercise “MU”, 15 December 1925,” in The Keyes Papers: Volume II, 1919-1938, ed. Paul G. Halpern (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), Part II, 154. 315 Vego, Naval Strategy in Narrow Seas, 25. 316 Ibid, 167. 317 Hughes and Girrier, Fleet Tactics Third Edition, 161. 318 Ibid, 146. 136 impact and opportunities of using mines in the littoral, Nelson explains that, “Maritime traffic in inland waters has increased in volume; sweeping mines from these waters during a conflict will be complicated. Properly placed mines in inland chokepoints will create serious obstructions.”319 Nelson concludes that the U.S. Navy should not only increase the means to deploy mines, which range from warships to aircraft, but also recommends increasing the Navy’s arsenal of mines. “A diverse mine inventory that covers deep-to-shallow water—and one that balances quality and quantity—will complicate any adversary’s countermine capability.”320

Captain Edmund B. Hernandez makes a similar argument stressing that mine warfare should figure prominently in U.S. Navy operations. In a statement similar to ones made by Vego, Hughes, and also mirroring Keyes’ experience, Hernandez explains, “The ability to offensively deploy sea mines significantly restricts an adversary’s ability to achieve military objectives by denying them freedom of movement.”321 The ideal places for mines to be deployed, Captain Hernandez explains, is in “chokepoints and the littoral” by such means as submarines and surface ships.322 Hernandez also argues that the U.S.

Navy should increase its minesweeping capabilities, particularly by implementing UUVs.

By equipping destroyers, amphibious ships, and littoral combat ships with minesweeping

319 Commander Christopher Nelson, “Win with the Second Best Weapon,” Proceedings 144, no. 11 (November 2018), accessed January 17, 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-11/win-second-best-weapon. 320 Ibid. 321 Captain Edmund B. Hernandez, “Now Hear This: The Navy Must Prioritize Mine Warfare,” Proceedings 144, no. 11 (November 2018), accessed January 17, 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-11/now-hear-navy-must-priotitize- mine-warfare. 322 Ibid. 137

UUVs, he predicts that the Navy will be able to act promptly whenever mined waters are encountered.323

Another technology that Keyes was heavily associated with that has since become prevalent today is aircraft; in this case naval aircraft. Throughout the First World War

Keyes was familiar with the impact naval aircraft had on operations within the littoral.

One of his earliest experiences was the raid on the zeppelin sheds at Cuxhaven by Royal

Navy seaplanes. Keyes also recognized the value naval aircraft had in supporting operations on land during the Dardanelles Campaign. His appreciation of the impact aircraft had on targets along a hostile coastline was made clear when, in support of

Operation Z.O., Keyes ordered naval aircraft to bomb Ostend and Zeebrugge.324

Undoubtedly, during the First World War Keyes would have seen that naval aircraft had the ability to bypass anti-access weapons, like coastal artillery and mines, and could strike at land and sea-based targets along the littoral.

From his experience in the First World War, Keyes became an advocate for naval aviation, appreciating its ability to conduct a variety of missions. His recognition of the importance of naval aviation was made clear when, as C-in-C of the Mediterranean Fleet in the mid-1920s, wrote of the importance naval aircraft were to modern fleet operations.325 His understanding of naval aviation within the littoral is prevalent when examining his war plans against Turkey during the Mosul Crises. For example, he specifies that air control was required for the fleet when it passed through the

323 Ibid. 324 “Plan for Operation Z.O., 25 February 1918,” Keyes Papers I, 472. 325 “Keyes to Secretary of the Admiralty, 16 November 1925,” Keyes Papers II, 144. 138

Dardanelles.326 Other than protecting the fleet, Keyes arranged for naval aircraft to be launched from the littoral to bomb targets within Turkey’s interior.327

Keyes’ appreciation and understanding of air power continued into the Second

World War. As early as 1940, he called for an amphibious operation to seize airfields around Trondheim arguing they were the key to controlling Norway. He made a similar argument for Operation Workshop, the seizure of Pantelleria, explaining it would have given the British air superiority over the Central Mediterranean. Had this been done, he claimed, Britain’s sea lanes between Gibraltar and Suez would have been protected. In all, during the era of the world wars, Keyes was aware of the impact naval aircraft would have on operations, especially those within the littoral. He recognized that naval aircraft were important in supporting amphibious operations, such as those in the Dardanelles or off the coast of Belgium. Keyes also understood that air superiority over coastlines and narrows was vital in protecting maritime routes or the movement of naval units. Through

Keyes it can be seen that aircraft are decisive in littoral operation from an early period.

From these operations naval aircraft demonstrated the ability to conduct a wide range of missions: recon, anti-ship, anti-ground attack, and air support. They also showed that they could bypass a portion of anti-access weapons, such as anti-ship/anti-ground weapons, and engage targets on land and at sea.

Since the end of the Second World War the U.S. Navy has used the littoral to project power inland through the usage of carrier-based aircraft. Examples include the

326 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Admiralty, 29 December 1925,” in The Mediterranean Fleet, 1919-1929, ed. Paul Halpern (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), Part IV, 472. 327 Ibid. 139

Korean and Vietnam Wars’ during the Cold War, and the Yugoslavian Wars of the

1990s. Among the more prominent displays of U.S. naval air power was during the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan where, other than U.S. Air Force bombers, the U.S. Navy conducted the majority of aerial operations.328 More recently, in late-2018, F-35Bs from the Essex conducted their first air strike in support of ground forces in Afghanistan. All of these cases demonstrate the power naval aircraft have when operating from the littoral; something Keyes was no doubt familiar with. Yet, these cases differ from Keyes’ experience in that many were conducted when the littoral was already secure. The challenge for policy makers is how to use naval air power over contested littoral zones.

One of the challenges within contested littoral zones is protecting amphibious ships and landing craft from anti-ship missiles and aircraft. To combat these, some have proposed that aircraft be attached to amphibious units as a flexible means to engage enemy units in and along the littoral. In recent Proceedings article, titled “Upgun ARG –

MEU Training for the Fight at Sea”, Commander Bob Jones speculates that, with operational planning focusing on China and Russia, MEUs (Marine Expeditionary Units) and ARGs (Amphibious Groups) need to be strengthened to sustain operations in contested regions. Citing projected difficulties, Commander Jones explains that,

“defending an ARG is even more challenging; and it will be nearly impossible in a contested environment without properly harnessing capabilities resident in the MEU.”329

With the introduction of the latest fighters, like F-35Bs, Commander Jones explains,

328 Black, Combined Operations, 202. 329 Commander Bob Jones, “Upgun ARG - MEU Training For the Fight at Sea,” Proceedings 144, no. 12 (December 2018), accessed February 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-12/upgun-arg-meu-training-fight-sea. 140 amphibious units will be given more flexibility in conducting operations in contested zones. For example, the F-35B, unlike the AV-8 Harrier, can a conduct a range of missions for the fleet, including air superiority missions. He also states that aerial wings from amphibious units would be flexible enough to coordinate with carrier aircraft to conduct a greater range of “high-end fights”.330

Retired U.S. Navy Rear-Admiral Terry McKnight also believes that equipping amphibious units with F-35Bs will increase their striking power. As he explains in the

Proceedings article, “Expeditionary Forces are America’s Military Crown Jewel”, amphibious units are the “major power in littoral operations” because of their ability to conduct an assortment of missions.331 In the past, however, these units needed the protection of cruisers and destroyers because of their vulnerability to different threats.

Today, he explains, this may no longer be the case because F-35Bs based from amphibious units can heighten their striking power. As he explains further, when F-35Bs from these units are linked with the Aegis defense system the effect will be that, “all future amphibious forces will have “fifth generation” offensive and defensive capabilities to operate in any contested battlespace.”332 By combining these systems, he concludes, amphibs can use their flexibility to support a greater range of operations against land and sea-based threats.

330 Ibid. 331 Rear Admiral Terry McKnight, “Expeditionary Forces Are America’s Military Crown Jewel,” Proceedings 145, no. 1 (January 2019), January 23, 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/expeditionary-forces-are-americas-military- crown-jewel. 332 Ibid. 141

Providing amphibious units with F-35Bs, as Commander Jones and Rear-Admiral

McKnight suggests, is arguably a good policy based on the range of operations that can be conducted in the littoral. By giving enhancing amphibious units with capable air wings they will not only be able to defend surrounding waters but can conduct a variety of missions within the operating zone; from air-defense to supporting amphibious landings.

From Keyes we can understand that using naval aircraft in contested littoral zones has the potential be successful. Throughout the world war era Keyes was involved in a number of operations where air support aided operations in straits and coastlines. Examples include the Dover Strait where aircraft harassed the Germans by hindering movement and bombing naval facilities. Exercise N.A. of the Interwar Years also emphasized that aircraft be used to enhance amphibious operations on an enemy coastline. Therefore, from Keyes’ experience alone, the conclusion can be made that air superiority over a contested littoral is vital for operations to occur. From nearby ships they can deny the enemy safe movement as well as support friendly forces on land and at sea.

As a final note, Keyes was able to use these and other innovative weapons to successfully conduct offensive operations in littoral zones protected by anti-access weapons. One such example is his usage of submarines in the Heligoland Bight and

Baltic Sea in the first months of the First World War. Before the war, many in the Royal

Navy believed that sending a fleet off the German coast would be a hazardous undertaking due to the heavy presence of mines and submarines. Keyes, however, emphasized a policy of constructing ‘overseas’ submarines, aimed at conducting naval operation off the German coast. He recognized that submarines, unlike surface ships, 142 could impose a blockade by silently laying off Germany’s coast to engage unsuspecting ships. As he discusses in the first volume of his memoir, “submarines would be able to take the place of the inshore blockading squadron and the lookout frigate of old.”333 The success of this policy is noticeable in late-1914 when the German navy had virtually disappeared from the Heligoland Bight.

Aircraft can be seen as another way in which Keyes bypassed anti-access weapons in a contested littoral zone. For example, by 1918, the Germans had stationed a number of coastal guns off the Belgian coast to prevent Allied ships from operating along the coast. They were successful because the Allies refused to conduct landings and were unable to conduct sustained bombardments on German positions. Keyes found that aircraft could bypass these guns allowing him to bomb facilities off the Belgian coast.

The relevance of Keyes’ experience is that today we must also overcome similar weapons to fight in contested littoral zones. Current discussions range from implementing long- range missiles to using submarines as a way to engage enemy forces without risking the fleet.

The role of submarines largely remains the same since Keyes’ time, although many now possess the ability to launch cruise missiles. With this ability and other characteristics they continue to have an important role in littoral operations. As retired

Admiral, W. J. Holland Jr., states in his Proceedings article, “Submarines: Key to the

Offset Strategy”, war games have shown the advantage of “flooding the littoral” with

333 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 44. 143 submarines.334 The intention is to, “position submarines in the coastal and near-ocean areas of a potential enemy as a crisis builds and, should war break out, to quickly sink all opposing surface warships and submarines.”335 The type of submarine Admiral Holland prefers to accomplish these tasks are nuclear explaining that they have better endurance than other types. On inspection, his method of using submarines nearly correlates with how Keyes deployed his submarines in the littoral. As can be seen by Keyes’ experience,

British submarines off the Heligoland Bight were successful in engaging the German navy and driving them from protected waters.

From Keyes what we can learn is that the Navy possess weapons that can make it difficult for an opposing fleet to maneuver in the littoral. Today, much like in Keyes’ day, mines and submarines still have the capability to manipulate enemy naval movement by making the waters around straits or outside seaports hazardous. By doing this, the enemy will be focused on protecting their waters and would likely have less resources for extended offensive operations. Keyes’ experience also demonstrates that enemy anti- access weapons can be bypassed. Both in his time and in ours, aircraft have the means to strike at enemy forces beyond the range of many anti-access weapons. Missiles deployed from friendly warships, or from islands or shorelines, can deny the enemy the usage of their anti-access weapons. An older method, and one Keyes helped perfect, which is still of value in the littoral are amphibious operations. Although modern weapons make

334 Admiral W. J. Holland Jr., “Submarines: Key to the Offset Strategy,” Proceedings 141, no. 6 (June 2015), accessed February 12, 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-6/submarines-key-offset-strategy. 335 Ibid. 144 amphibious operations difficult to conduct on the same level as Normandy, they continue to be vital in seizing strategic locations or harassing enemy lines and facilities.

Outmaneuvering the Enemy: Amphibious Operations in the Littoral

Throughout Keyes career, amphibious operations were conducted in a variety of ways against many types of targets. Operations in the Dardanelles, both the 1915 campaign and the proposed war plans of 1925-26, centered on massed infantry landings to hold a large swath of strategic territory. At the other end of the spectrum, Operation

Z.O. and the commando raids of the Second World War aimed to destabilize the enemy along the shore, gather intel, or support large operations by securing pieces of territory long enough for support to arrive. Regardless of the size of the assaulting forces, these are all similar in that the goal was to use the littoral as a quick and easy means to secure regional or theater sized objectives.

When organizing massed amphibious assaults, Keyes was aware of the necessity for joint-operations. The best example was the Dardanelles Campaign in 1915 whereby

Keyes stressed the need to conduct simultaneous naval and ground operations. By doing so, he claimed, the Ottomans’ would have been stretched too thin to concentrate their forced against either the navy or army. Even up into the Second World War, Keyes envisioned on conducting joint amphibious operations to gain strategic territory. This is demonstrated by his proposed seizure of Trondheim airfields from the Germans by joint naval and ground forces. Doing so, he planned, would have given the British control over

Norway. 145

Raids, though conducted on a smaller scale, also had important strategic objectives in mind. Operation Z.O. was to neutralize an enemy base located near a vital choke point in Britain’s sea lanes. Operation Workshop, the proposed invasion of

Pantelleria, would also have secured Britain’s line of communication in the

Mediterranean by securing the Strait of Sicily. Aside from gaining strategic objectives,

Keyes’ raids had important secondary effects. Whether achieving their objectives or not, they were vital in boosting morale at moments when Britain was experiencing military setbacks. Lastly, the raids also potentially could lead to intelligence breakthroughs such as the capture of German ciphers during Operation Claymore.

The methods and reasons why amphibious operations would occur in the littoral in current discussions parallel Keyes’ experience. As Vego emphasizes, the purpose of amphibious operations in the littoral are, “aimed at seizing of an enemy-controlled coast giving access to an operational objective inland, at speeding the advance of one’s own troops along the coast, or in some cases, helping to end the war itself.”336 Keyes held similar views which can clearly be seen in his war plans against Turkey in 1925-26. Here, ground forces were to seize the Dardanelles and islands in the Marmara to both ease the

Royal Navy’s access into the Marmara. Seizing these locations also had the objective of capturing vital territory to quickly force Turkey to terms with Britain.

Current discussions also focus on securing a vital choke points through amphibious operations; though in some cases it is to be done as a last resort. U.S. Navy

Commander Daniel Dolan in the Proceedings article, “Rethinking the Strait of Hormuz”,

336 Vego, Naval Strategy in Narrow Seas, 185. 146 believes that amphibious operation would be necessary to allow the Navy to enter the

Persian Gulf should Iran become hostile.337 This, he concludes, would be the final option because current weapons, like missiles and aircraft, have the ability to bypass Iranian anti-access weapons and pummel their navy in the Gulf. Another example, though one not intent on seizing enemy territory, also relies on amphibious forces to engage the enemy in the littoral. Lieutenant Joseph Hanacek states in the article, “Island Forts: Land

Forces have value in an Air-Sea Battle”, U.S. Marines could land along the first island chain to box in the Chinese navy.338 By using the swiftness of amphibious forces, mobile missile launchers could quickly be deployed onto these islands to prevent the Chinese navy from moving within their littoral.

Raids also continue to have an important place in modern littoral operations.

Raids continue to potentially offset the enemy by neutralizing facilities in narrow bodies of water or tying down opposing forces along a broad coastline.339 Although stating that they are not always decisiveness, Vego is explicit in that they can accomplish physiological objectives and improve morale. Hughes, meanwhile, emphasizes that an objective of amphibious operations is to land forces behind enemy lines to attack fortifications from the rear.340 In both cases, amphibious power in the littoral is to off-

337 Commander Daniel Dolan, “Rethinking the Strait of Hormuz,” Proceedings 138, no. 5 (May 2012), accessed February 12, 2019, https://www.usni.org/magaines/proceesings/2012-5/rethinking-strait-hormuz. 338 Lieutenant Joseph Hanacek, “Island Forts: Land Forces have Value in Air-Sea Battle,” Proceedings 145, no. 2 (February 2019), accessed February 8, 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019-2/island-forts-land-forces-have-value- air-sea-battle. 339 Vego, Naval Strategy in Narrow Seas, 193. 340 Hughes and Girrier, Fleet Tactics Third Edition, 29. 147 balance the enemy by striking at places where he is least expecting it. By doing so the enemy either has to protect more territory, as Vego states, or could be weakened, as

Hughes states.

In engaging potential enemies in the littoral, the usage of amphibious operations is prevalent in many works. Stubbs proposes that, should Russia attempt to seize the

Baltic States through “Gray” operations, special forces could be inserted via the navy as a suppressing measure.341 In a large-scale war against Russia, as Sam J. Tangredi states in

Anti-Access Warfare, that, although the maritime domain will not be prominent in landlocked operations, navies have an important role. Naval forces will enable the movement of power-projecting units into regions of conflict and sustain them from the sea.342 Lieutenant-Commander Laanemetes makes a similar point arguing that using the

Baltic as a highway is important during a conflict in Eastern Europe.343

Aerial wings attached to amphibious units, as discussed in the previous section, also have the ability to assist in amphibious operations. Fighters based off of these units could provide close air support in locations where there are no nearby airbases.

Additionally, the usage of navy helicopters could be used to insert Marine or ground forces behind enemy defenses along a beachhead. Among those pointing this out is

Lieutenant Daniel Stefanus. In the Proceedings article, “From Wells to Wings”, he argues that MEU-ARGs should rearrange their means of delivery on their aerial wings

341 Stubbs, U.S. Sea Power Role in Baltic. 342 Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 227. 343 Laanemetes, Solve the Baltic. 148 rather than landing craft.344 In analyzing the trend in naval operations in the littoral during the past two-decades, he concludes that it was the aviation section of amphibious units, not landing craft, that did the majority of operations. Although not arguing that pure amphibious landings are impossible, he does question the practicality of large-scale beach landings such as those during the Second World War. Instead he focuses on MEU-

ARGs being rearranged into TEGs (Tactical Expeditionary Groups) which incorporates destroyers or cruisers with a focus on aerial contingents such as UAVs, F-35Bs, and MV-

22s. This new arrangement will not only provide mobility and striking power, through the aerial contingent and surface units, but will continue to conduct raids or low-intense beach landings.345

Captain Daniel Phillips, of the U.S. Marines, while not calling on the rearrangement of MEUs, also insists that the main element of current amphibious operations are the aerial wings. Captain Phillips points out that, with adversaries either manufacturing or having the means to purchase anti-ship missiles, large-scale beach landing would be hazardous. He therefore points to helicopters as the means to launch an initial amphibious assault remarking, “Assault support helicopters organic to the MEU are the only platforms that can transit hundreds of miles over the ocean and around enemy threat rings.”346 Additionally, he states, “Organization shift to embrace more

344 Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Daniel Stefanus, “From Wells to Wings,” Proceedings 143, no. 12 (December 2017), accessed February 14, 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/wells-wings. 345 Ibid. 346 Captain Daniel Phillips, “Helicopters Best Enable Forced Entry From Sea,” Proceedings 144, no. 10 (October 2018), accessed January 23, 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-10/helicopters-best-enable-forced- entry-sea. 149 aircraft capable of moving a battalion landing team will allow a rapid buildup of combat power ashore, and a means to conduct a forced-entry operation.”347

The previous arguments are not made to downplay the role of amphibious operations, rather they are a discussion to adapt them to the needs of modern warfare.

Although amphibious operations will be hazardous in the future, they are still instrumental for the United States to secure objectives in the littoral. The difference between Keyes’ time and the present is massed assaults, like those on Normandy or

Inchon, will be less likely in the future. What has not changed is that they will be conducted, albeit in a smaller form, in the littoral to protect vital points of transit. They will also be important to prevent the enemy from maneuvering their forces in the littoral to disrupt friendly naval activity. Even raids continue to be regarded as important due to their light footprint, high maneuverability, and ease in disrupting unsuspecting forces along the littoral. Not all amphibious operations call for insertion into hostile territory.

For example, it may be important to quickly land Marines or friendly soldiers on islands in the Western Pacific, or on Gotland in the Baltic, to contain the enemy. Coincidently, nearly a century ago, Keyes had similar ideas in wanting to use friendly islands in the

Mediterranean, such as Crete, to enhance Britain’s defense and harass enemy operations.

Much has changed since Keyes time. Military technology continues to evolve with more emphasis placed on unmanned vehicles, cyber networks, missiles, and sensors.

The composition of naval units, such as ARGs and MEUs, could change in the future depending on where or how hostilities erupt. What has not changed is the need to conduct

347 Ibid. 150 defensive or offensive operations in the littoral. This zone in the ocean continues to be important not only for commerce but for the movement of naval and ground forces. The technology has changed but the core ideas on littoral operations, from how Keyes would have understood them, has arguably not. Much like Keyes, we still use, or discuss on using, submarines and mines, not to mention the latest aircraft and missiles, in the littoral to deny it to the enemy or use it to move forces. Amphibious operations, though being reduced to a small scale, will still need to be conducted, either by air or sea, to protect territory, off-balance the enemy, or open the way for naval movements. Regarding all of these methods and ideas, Keyes was arguably among the first in understanding how modern naval operations are conducted in the littoral.

151

CONCLUSION

It cannot be understated that throughout the second decade of the twenty-first century clashes in the littoral have increased. In 2016 American sailors were captured by

Iran claiming they had ventured into Iranian territory near Farsi Island. The final months of 2018 saw Russia capture three Ukrainian patrol boats that attempted to sail through the

Kerch Strait in the Black Sea. Almost monthly the U.S. Navy conducts FONOPs

(Freedom of Navigation Operation) in waters claimed by China. Of course these trends may be temporary. Diplomacy and regime changes may reduce tension in the littoral around Europe and Asia. Until this happens, the United States and its allies must weigh its options on how to deal with aggressive regimes in the littoral.

One of the options suggested has been for the United States to refrain from acting in hostile littoral zones. Among those making this case is Graham Allison who, in

Destined for War, believes that war between the United States and China is likely given recent clashes between the two in the Western Pacific. Allison particularly questions how

Chinese claims on the South China Sea is a threat to United States national security concluding that America should refrain from taking an interest in the region.348 On the opposite side of the divide is Thomas Modly, Under Secretary of the Navy, who, in

February 2019, declared that, due to Chinese and Russian military buildup, the U.S. Navy had to respond to growing threats.349

348 Allison Graham, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston – New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), 235. 349 Gidget Fuentes, “Modly: Navy Needs to ‘Radically Change’ How it Operates in New Era of Great Power Competition,” United States Naval Institute News (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press), February 14, 2019. https://news.usni.org/2019/02/modley-navy-needs- radically-change-operates-new-era-great-power-competition. 152

As of now the United States has chosen not to retrench and decided that aggression, especially in contested littoral zones, would not be tolerated. Diplomatically the United States has voiced outrage over violent actions in littoral zones worldwide. An example is in 2017 when Rex Tillerson, then Secretary of the State, demanded that China cease land reclamation and expansion in the South China Sea.350 From a military standpoint, the U.S. Navy, as exemplified by Thomas Modly’s speech, is preparing its forces for the littoral. This has led to policies and discussion on how the U.S. Navy will fight in contested littoral zones protected by anti-access weapons. Solutions vary on using the latest weapons and technologies (F-35Bs, UUVs, and smart mines) to restructuring amphibious units. Confidence with these measures is high, but with a lack of experience in naval engagements within the littoral, their full effect is unknown.

From a historical standpoint, the issues the U.S. Navy faces in contested littoral zones is not altogether new. In particular, the Royal Navy in the period of the world wars faced similar problems as the United States does today. The Royal Navy, like the U.S.

Navy, was not only stretched to the limit by the Interwar Period, but was also facing a financial crunch much like the U.S. Navy is today. For both the littoral was and is a contested zone and continues to be heavily defended by opposing forces. The littoral then and now continues to be essential for national and international commerce.

There were forward thinkers in the Royal Navy at this time who were undeterred by the challenges realizing the importance of the littoral in naval operations. Arguably, at

350 Michael Forsythe, “Rex Tillerson’s South China Sea Remarks Foreshadow Possible Foreign Policy Crisis,” New York Times (New York: New York), Jan. 12, 2017. http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/world/asia/rex-tillerson-south-china-sea-us.html. 153 the forefront was Roger Keyes who best personifies how challenges in contest littoral zones can be overcome. At a time of nonstop technological changes Keyes was among select officers in the Royal Navy who championed the implementation of the latest weapons and devices in what we identify as the littoral. Through a lifetime of experience,

Keyes was aware of the challenges in the littoral yet realized that these could be overcome with ingenuity and innovation.

At a time when aircraft and submarines were new to naval warfare, Keyes saw that these could give the Royal Navy an advantage in constrained waters. Take the

Heligoland Bight and the Baltic during the First World Was as an example. From 1910 to

1914, with many senior Royal Navy officials abandoning all hope of blockading the enemy coast, Keyes recognized that submarines could easily fulfill this mission. As a result, in the years leading up to the First World War he implemented a policy to build submarines that had the endurance to operate for extended periods off the enemy’s coast; in this case Germany’s. The material effect was the sinking of a few warships, but the end result was the German fleet being detained in port for fear of being sunk by British submarines.

Keyes also recognized the value of amphibious operations in the littoral which he modernized to meet evolving threats. It was from the Boxer Rebellion where he first learned the impact amphibious operations had on the movement of forces along the coast.

Yet, it was in the Dardanelles where he learned that entrenched enemies could disrupt amphibious landings, especially ones poorly coordinated and planned. The lessons Keyes took away was that innovations like aircraft and specialized landing craft could be used to 154 overcome enemy defenses along beachheads. Keyes also modernized raids which, through assault landing craft and specially trained soldiers, were used at Zeebrugge and later the Second World War. These raids were important because they aided larger objectives by disrupting enemy activity or movement near beachheads or narrows. What makes Keyes unique regarding amphibious operations was not only his experience, but that he had a trait for reorganizing units in almost no time.

This is not, however, to argue that Keyes was the sole driver of such changes.

Keyes was one of many who advocated new weapons and pushed for amphibious operations during the period of the world wars. What does make Keyes standout from his peers is that he had his hands in a variety of projects and operations that eventually had an effect on littoral operations. Keyes was not the first officer in the Royal Navy to push for submarines or aircraft, but he was among the first to operationally use them in the littoral. Keyes was also not the first to use raids or conduct large-scale landings on islands or beachheads; operations like these are as old as the Royal Navy itself. Yet, what Keyes did was implement new weapons and tactics that allowed raids or large-scale landings to overcome modern defenses in the littoral.

Keyes uniqueness centers on the time he served combined with the ideas he had.

Keyes’ naval career spans from the Victorian period to the dawn of the atomic age. In that time the way naval operations were conducted drastically changed; from coal-fired battleships to carrier-based bombers. During this period, and especially after the First

World War, Keyes advocated change, for weapons and methods that would allow the

Royal Navy to stay one step ahead of the enemy. The weapons Keyes pushed for, naval 155 aircraft and submarines, would become vital by the Second World War. Lastly, Keyes recognized the importance of operations in what is now labeled littoral environments. He understood that islands, coastlines, or straits along lines of communication needed to be protected for friendly forces and denied to the enemy.

While Keyes does not have a direct connection in contemporary discussions, he does have an indirect influence as many of his ideas have resonance in present debates.

For example, regarding amphibious operations, Milan Vego, in Naval Combat and

Narrow Seas, explained, “Today, the main prerequisite for the success of an amphibious landing in a typical narrow sea is local command of the sea and in the air.”351 Nearly fifty years earlier Keyes made a similar point arguing, “To launch and maintain an amphibious operation, it is necessary to possess Sea supremacy in the theater of the enterprise, and with the advent of Air Power can only be obtained by a Navy possessing the means to fight.”352 Keyes also highlighted the advantage sea power gave armies in maneuvering large forces along the coastline. Discussing the advantages of the Dardanelles over the

Western Front he argued, “Where in France, or anywhere else for that matter, could a position have been reinforced with 25,000 men without the enemy having any suspicion of it.”353 Compare this to a statement made by Hughes who explained the advantages of naval maneuverability in the littoral, “A fleet is not worthy of the name unless it can

351 Vego, Naval Strategy in Narrow Seas, 186. 352 Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, 7. 353 Keyes, Naval Memoirs: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 478. 156 move troops and trade through coastal waters in safety and keep the enemy out of his own waters.”354

From today’s perspective, it can be argued that the way Keyes conducted naval operations in the littoral continues to have relevance. Using technology to offset enemy anti-access weapons was nothing new to Keyes. While discussions of the present question how submarines and naval aircraft are to be used in the littoral, Keyes successfully used them to harass opposing naval units near their bases. Regarding the need for joint-operations, Tangredi argued that navies are a prerequisite, not an add-on, in conducting successful operations.355 This is something Keyes understood well as demonstrated by his planned naval operations for the Dardanelles in 1915 and 1925-26.

In both Keyes planned on the navy being the deciding factor in forcing the Turkish to terms by deploying the fleet near their cities and lines of communication. Although the

Dardanelles Campaign in 1915 was a failure, and his planned raids as DCO were rejected, this was far from Keyes’ fault. In these circumstances, failure or rejection was due to decisions made by officials senior to Keyes. Nonetheless, if conflict does erupt in the littoral the operations conducted would look similar to the ones Keyes conducted nearly century ago. The differences would be the weapons are more technology advance and the means to collect, analyze, and distribute information is far more efficient than at any point in Keyes’ career.

354 Captain Wayne P. Hughes Jr., Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, Second Edition. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 250. 355 Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare, 243 157

With Keyes’ foresight and relevance on modern naval operations explained one final question remains. If Keyes was such an innovator and if his ideas are still prevalent, if in an indirect way, then why is he not a well-known figure? The answer centers on both

Keyes’ personality and the time and place he was pushing his ideas. Regarding the former, Keyes was strong minded and can best be described as hard headed. He valued his ideas, believing them to be correct, and chafed at others going against him. An example of this is his response to a letter written to him in 1911 by Captain Sydney Hall;

Keyes’ predecessor as Inspecting Captain of Submarines. Captain Hall questioned Keyes’ policies on submarines arguing they would slow the service and embarrass the navy.

Keyes’ response began with, “You have given me your opinion pretty freely…Now I’ll give you mine on your criticism! I think it is narrow minded and rottenly unfair…”356

Keyes ends the letter stating, “It is because I feel that we owe so much to you that I am at such pains to explain my motives. If you still condemn, I shall be sorry, but shall still think I am right.”357 Keyes has also been seen as a man of action and not an intellectual.

Even his most ardent supports prop up this image as exemplified by Halpern who states,

“Keyes, whatever his sterling qualities of leadership, had never been considered an intellectual, and his actual academic record in the past was mediocre.”358

Second, the height of Roger Keyes career was not the height of the Royal Navy.

Although Keyes pressed for naval aircraft and amphibious landings, the Royal Navy from

356 Roger Keyes, “Keyes to Hall, 19 October 1911,” in The Submarine Service, 1900- 1918, ed. Nicholas Lambert (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2001), Part IV, 173 357 Ibid, 178. 358 Halpern, Introduction Keyes Papers I, XX. 158 before the First World War to the beginning of the Second was in a difficult state. It was more or less preoccupied with balancing the budget than implementing the latest weapons. Financial difficulties aside, the Royal Navy during Keyes’ time was not a radical force and, despite the work of a few visionaries, did not jump at innovations, especially by the post-1918 years. Battleships were the vital component of the Royal

Navy during Keyes’ service because they could protect or deny trade, its key to victory.

Therefore, Keyes was pushing for innovative weapons to a navy whose senior command believed changes were only supplementary, not necessary for winning a war. As a result, when Keyes was voicing calls to implement the latest weapons, they were lost in the white noise of budget cuts and the need to maintain a battle fleet.

Even though Keyes is not as admired as Admiral Fisher or Churchill, he was, nonetheless, a man who was ahead of his time in modernizing naval operations. Not only did he recognize the value of technology or refining old methods, but he also believed that the lessons of war should not be forgotten. Regarding modern naval operations in the littoral, both history in general, and Keyes in particular, can serve as a guide in how they can be conducted and how success can be achieved. In discussing amphibious operations

Keyes stresses that history was important in understanding the future, arguing, “The lessons of history are invaluable…in which to gain inspiration and guidance.”359 In an era of political and military tension in the littoral it is best to remember that contemporary problems are not new. Keyes also had to contend with problems similar to ones in the

359 Keyes, Amphibious Warfare, 7. 159 present. From him we can be guided and inspired to make decisions in this time of uncertainty.

160

REFERENCES

Primary Sources: Memoirs Keyes, Roger. The Naval Memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes: The Narrow Seas to the Dardanelles, 1910-1915. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co, 1934.

Keyes, Roger. The Naval Memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Roger Keyes: Scapa Flow to the Dover Straits, 1916-1918. New York: E. P. Dutton & CO., INC., 1935.

Slessor, John. The Central Blue: The Autobiography of Sir John Slessor, Marshal of the RAF. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957.

Wester-Wemyss, Rosslyn. The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1927.

Collected Documents The Keyes Papers: Volume I, 1914-1918, Edited by Paul G. Halpern. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972.

The Keyes Papers: Volume II, 1919-1938, Edited by Paul G. Halpern. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980.

The Keyes Papers: Volume III, 1939-1945, Edited by Paul G. Halpern. London: Navy Records Society, 1981.

The Mediterranean Fleet, 1919-1929, Edited by Paul Halpern. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2011.

The Submarine Service, 1900-1918, Edited by Nicholas Lambert. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2001.

Books Keyes, Roger. Amphibious Warfare and Combined Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943.

Secondary Sources Books Allison, Graham. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Boston – New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017.

Aspinall-Oglander, Cecil. Roger Keyes: Being the Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Keyes of Zeebrugge and Dover. London: The Hogarth Press, 1951. 161

Bell, Christopher M. Churchill and the Dardanelles. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Bell, Christopher M. Churchill and Sea Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Bell, Christopher M. The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.

Black, Jeremy. Combined Operations: A Global History of Amphibious and Airborne Warfare. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2018.

Black, Jeremy. Naval Warfare: A Global History since 1860. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017.

Bull, Stephen. Commando Tactics: The Second World War. Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2010.

Cole, Bernard D. “More Red than Expert: Chinese Sea Power during the Cold War.” In China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective, edited by Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, 320-340. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009.

Crawley, Rhys. Climax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014.

Cumming, Anthony J. The Battle for Britain: Interservice Rivalry Between the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, 1909-40. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015.

Dunn, Steven R. Securing the Narrow Sea: The Dover Patrol, 1914-1918. Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2017.

Edwards, Kenneth. We Dive at Dawn: Britain’s Submarine’s in World War I. Chicago: The Reilly & Lee Co., 1941.

Fergusson, Bernard. The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961.

Goldrick, James. Before Jutland: The Naval War in Northern European Waters, August 1914 – February 1915. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015.

Halpern, Paul. A Naval History of World War I. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

162

Hargreaves, Andrew L. Special Operations in World War II: British and American Irregular Warfare. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013.

Hezlet, Arthur. Aircraft and Sea Power. New York: Stein and Day, 1970.

Hezlet, Arthur. The Submarine and Sea Power. New York: Stein and Day, 1967.

Hughes Jr., Captain Wayne P. Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, Second Edition. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000.

Hughes Jr., Captain Wayne P., and Girrier, Robert P. Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, Third Edition. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2018.

Lambert, Nicholas A. Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999.

Layman, R. D. Naval Aviation in the First World War: Its Impact and Influence. London: Chatham Publishing, 1996.

Lipscomb, F. W. The British Submarine. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1954.

Macksey, Kenneth. Commando: Hit-and-Run Combat in World War II. Chelsea: Scarborough House, 1990.

Mandeles, Mark D. Military Transformation Past and Present: Historic Lessons for the 21st Century. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007.

Marder, Arthur J. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: Volume I The Road to War, 1904-1914. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.

McVadon, Eric A. “China’s Navy Today: Looking toward Blue Water.” In China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective, edited by Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, 374-400. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009.

Messenger, Charles. The Commandos, 1940-1946. London: William Kimber & Co. Limited, 1985.

Millett, Allan R. “Assault from the Sea: The development of amphibious warfare between the wars. The American, British, and Japanese Experiences.” In Military Innovation in the Interwar Period edited by William Murray and Allan R. Millett, 50-95. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

163

Mohan, C. Raja. Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012.

Preston, Diana. The Boxer Rebellion: The Dramatic Story of China’s War on Foreigners that Shook up the World in the Summer of 1900. New York: Walker & Company, 2000.

Roberts, John. “Great Britain: The Royal Navy.” In To Crown the Waves: The Great Navies of the First World War, edited by Vincent P. O’Hara, W. David Dickson, and Richard Worth, 129-177. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013.

Roskill, Stephen. Naval Policy Between the Wars Vol I: Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919-1929. London: Collins, 1968.

Silbey, David J. The Boxer Rebellion and the Great Game in China. New York: Hill and Wang, 2012.

Tangredi, Sam J. Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013

Wilson, Michael. Baltic Assignment: British Submarines in Russia 1914-1919. London: Leo Cooper, 1985.

Vego, Milan N. Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas. London: Frank Cass, 1999.

Online News Articles Forsythe, Michael. “Rex Tillerson’s South China Sea Remarks Foreshadow Possible Foreign Policy Crises.” New York Times (New York: New York), Jan. 12, 2017. http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/world/asia/rex-tillerson-south-china-sea us.html.

Fuentes, Gidget. “Modly: Navy Needs to ‘Radically Change’ How it Operations in New Era of Great Power Competition.” United States Naval Institute News (February 14, 2019). https://news.usni.org/2019/02/14/modly-navy-needs-radically-change-operates new-era-great-power-competition.

Online Articles Barclay, Glen St. J. “‘Butcher and Bolt’: Admiral Roger Keyes and British Combined Operations, 1940-1941.” Naval War College Review 35, no. 2 (March-April 1982). Accessed January 19, 2019. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol35/iss2/4.

164

Black, Stephen. “The Black Sea and Beyond.” Proceedings 141, no. 10 (October 2015). Accessed February 6, 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-10/black-sea-and-beyond.

Delanoe, Igor. “Russia’s Navy in the Pacific: A Forgotten Fleet?” Proceedings 144, no. 7 (July 2018). Accessed February 2, 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-07/russia’s-navy-pacific forgotten-fleet.

Dolan, Commander Daniel. “Rethinking the Strait of Hormuz.” Proceedings 138, no. 5 (May 2012). Accessed February 12, 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-05/rethinking-strait-hormuz.

Fagal, Andrew J. B. “Terror Weapons in the Naval War of 1812.” New York History 94, no. 3-4 (Summer/Fall 2013): 221-240. Accessed October 31, 2018. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/newyorkhist.94.3-4.221.

Frost, Commander H. H. “The Attack on Zeebrugge.” Proceedings 55, no. 3 (March 1929). Accessed January 1, 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1929-03/attack-zeebrugge.

Gillmore, Commander T. J. “Iran Owns the Gray Zone.” Proceedings 144, no. 3 (March 2018). Accessed February 6, 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-03/iran-owns-gray-zone.

Hanacek, Lieutenant Joseph. “Island Forts: Land Forces have value in an Air-Sea Battle.” Proceedings 145, no. 2 (February 2019). Accessed February 8, 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019-02/island-forts-land-forces have-value-air-sea-battle.

Hernandez, Captain Edmund B. “Now Hear This: The Navy Must Prioritize Mine Warfare.” Proceedings 144, no. 11 (November 2018). Accessed January 17, 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-11/now-hear-navy-must prioritize-mine-warfare.

Holland Jr., Admiral W. J. “Submarines: Key to the Offset Strategy.” Proceedings 141, no. 6 (June 2015). Accessed February 12, 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-06/submarines-key-offset strategy.

Jessop, Captain E. P. “Failure at Gallipoli.” Proceedings 61, no. 2 (February 2013). Accessed January 1, 2019. https://www.usni.org/document/jessop-earl-1935-61-2 384/magazine_article=41728. 165

Jones, Commander Bob. “Upgun ARG – MEU Training for the Fight at Sea.” Proceedings 144, no. 12 (December 2018). Accessed February 11, 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-12/upgun-arg–meu-training fight-sea.

Laanemetes, Lieutenant-Commander Ott. “Solve the Baltic’s Geography Problem.” Proceedings 144, no. 3 (March 2018). Accessed February 7, 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-03/solve-baltics-geography problem.

Macke, Admiral Richard. “Deal with China From a Position of Strength.” Proceedings 144, no. 6 (June 2018). Accessed February 7, 2017. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-06/deal-china-position strength.

McKnight, Rear Admiral Terry. “Expeditionary Forces are America’s Military Crown Jewel.” Proceedings 145, no. 1 (January 2019). Accessed January 23, 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019-01/expeditionary-forces-are americas-military-crown-jewel.

Nelson, Commander Christopher. “Win with the Second Best Weapon.” Proceedings 144, no. 11 (November 2018). Accessed January 17, 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-11/win-second-best-weapon.

Phillips, Captain Daniel. “Helicopters Best Enable Forced Entry From the Sea.” Proceedings 144, no. 10 (October 2018). Accessed January 23, 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-10/helicopters-best-enable forced-entry-sea.

Ross, Robert S. “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response.” International Security 34, no. 2 (Fall, 2009): 46-81. Accessed March 26, 2018. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40389213.

Schultz, Captain Karl. “The British Assault on the German Bases Ostend and Zeebrugge.” Proceedings 55, no. 7 (July 1929). Accessed January 1, 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1929-07/british-assault-german bases-ostend-and-zeebrugge.

Scott, David. “Conflict Irresolution in the South China Sea.” Asian Survey 52, no. 6 (November/December, 2012): 1019-1042. Accessed March 26, 2018. http://www.jstor.org/stable/as.2012.52.6.1019.

166

Stubbs, Bruce B. “U.S. Sea Power has a Role in the Baltic.” Proceedings 143, no. 9 (September 2017). Accessed January 22, 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-09/us-sea-power-has-role baltic.

Stefanus, Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Daniel. “From Wells to Wings.” Proceedings 143, no. 12 (December 2017). Accessed February 14, 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/wells-wings. ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

Thesis and Dissertation Services ! !