Contemporary Judgment by American Historians

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Contemporary Judgment by American Historians is to av Photograph from coll•x:tion of Underwood & Underwood. Copyright, 1914. E CHOPE LAID IN RUIN5-This photograph is typical of the destruction left in the wake of the gigantic armies during the Great War. It was taken after the battle at Mons, Belgium (August 22-23-24, 1914). The war photographers entered just after the G<'rman troops left the city in devastation. Around this Old World cathedral raged a fierce artillery duel. (2) A CONTElVIPORARY RECORD OF EPOCH-1\-f.AKING EVENTS FROl\11 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, DIPL01\1ATIC CORRESPONDENCE, MILITARY ORDERS AND PHOTOGRAPHIC EXHIBITS EDITOR-IN-CHIEF FRANCIS TREVELYAN MILLER, LL.D., LITT. D. Editor-in-Chief of the Ten-volume" Ph! t! graphic History of the Civil War" Founder of The Journal of American History Editor of The Search-Light Library rI ADVISORY BOARD OF MILITARY AUTHORITIES Major-General A. W. Greely, U. S. A. Rear-Admiral Austin M. Knight. U. S. N. Major John Bigelow, U. S. A. Rear-Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, U. S. N. Captain A. L. Conger, U. S. A. Rear-Admiral Colby M. Chester, U. S. N. HISTORIC COLLECTION OF WAR PHOTOGRAPHS CONNECTICUT M:CMXIV STATE LIBRARY lhtNtlt~ork itibw AUG 28 1957 NEW YORK HARTFGRD P hotogro.phs and text copyright, 1914, by McBride, Keller & Company CONNECTICUT 13) Photograph from ool~ection of Bro"'-n Brothers. Copyright, 1914. MOBILIZATION OF THE Al:STRIAN ARMY-This photograph was taken immediately after the Austro-Hungarian Em pire declared war on Servia on July 28, 1914, It shows the aged Emperor Francis Joseph's troops being mobilized for the Great War. Of all the armies that fought in the tremendous conflict this was the most diversified-a polyglot of nationalities. (41 TROOPS MOVING ONTO THE BATTI,EGROUNDS-Fighting under the Austrian flag were Germans, Czechs, Magyars, Poles, Croats, Ruthenians, Slovem•s, Bohemtans and a score of races. The offi<•ial military language was German. Austria had three separate military est:l blishments: the Imperial Royal army. the "Laudivehr," and the Hungarian "llonved." 15) - Photograph from collection of Brown Brothers. €opyright, 1914:. TRAGIC CAUSE OF THE GREAT WAR-This photograph shows Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria (standing.) wilh . Emperor William of Germany seated on his horse. The assassination of the Archduke and his wife, - the Duahess of Hohenberg, on June 28, 1914, led directly to the war. (6) Historian's Foreword liE purpose of this work is to present in historical narrative and actual \var photographs the first authoritatiYe and comprehensive record of the epoch-making events enacted on the battlegrounds and in the world's capitals during the tragic days of the Great 'Var of the ~ations T -the greatest war in the history of Lhe world. It is in the nature, therefore, of a standard contemporary history of the times-social, political, and economic-as well as a repository for the permanent record of official docu­ ments, military movements, and diplomatic intercourse. This historical service has been performed by a board of historians and mili­ tary authorities, who have received the evidence from every source and have weighed it with judicial deliberation. It is absolutely neutral in its policy, in complete agreement with the position taken by the rnited States at the beginning of the conflict, and in full accordance with the proclamation of neutrality issued by President 'Yilson and herein given historical record. Each nation engaged in the conflict has been granted the opportunity to present its own case in these pages for the judgment of future generations. This work depends entirely upon ex-perts in interpreting the military campaig11s and the naval engagements from the official records, and is intended as an official source book to which the reader may turn for accurate information. It is the further purpose of this work to collect and to preserve for posterity the actual photographs taken during the war. These photographs are incontro­ vertible witnesses of the historical crises that they perpetuate. They are the sole survivors that will stand throughout the centuries as unimpeachable evidence of the epochal events that changed the destinies of nations. It is not within the province of this work to enter into the deductions and argu­ ments that will engage historians for many generations to come, but ·rather to collect the material upon which the future historian may work. Its duty is to perpetuate the photographic evidence, digest the official records, reduce the state­ ments to their proper proportion, and place the facts before the reader in their correct perspective. It includes also for purposes of record a symposium of the viewpoints of contemporary historians. The editors take this opportunity to extend their appreciation of the advice and courtesies extended by the Ambassadors of the various governments; the officials in the vVar Department and in the Navy Department, at \Vashington; the Presidents of the American universities who contributed to the symposium of contemporary judgments, and to the various officials in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg (Petrograd), also in Berlin and Vienna, who placed material at their disposal. They further extend their thanks to Admiral George Dewey, President of the General Board of the United States Navy; .l\Iajor-General Leon­ ani 'Yood, Chief of Staff of the United States Army; and the various other mili­ tary and naval authorities who extended advice and counsel. It is hoped that this contemporary history, which is dedicated to American neutrality, may be made to occupy a very serviceable position in the records of civilization. 17) Photograph from CoJJe~Jon of Paul Thompson. Copyright, 1914. GREAT HRITAIK'S CALL TO ARMS-Photograph taken in the historic Guildhall, London, on Septemb<'r 4, 1914. when Great Britain's Prime Minister, -Ron. Henry Herbert Asquith, delivered the patriotic sp<'<'<'h !hat uroused England to war. 1t marked the beginning of a national campaign for recruits lo !he Br·itish Ar·my. (81 Wqt Amrriruu Jrnplr aub tqt ~rrat War ~P fellow countrpmen : j' ~uppo~e tl)at rberp tf}ougl)tful man tu ~mcrira f)a~ .2ll[l n~ltrl:l {Jim~clf l:luring tl)e la~t troubleb wrdt,ll wl)nt inffurncc tf)e ~uropean war map ertrt upon tf)e ·unitel:l ~tate~, anl:l "] tafu tl)e Iibcrtp of abbre~~rng a few \tJorl:l~ to pou in orber to point out tf)at it i~ rntirdp \tJitl}in our own d)oice lul}at it~ effect upon u~ \tJiU be null to urge berp earne~tfp upon pou tlJr ~ort of ~peecl) anb conl:luct tul}icl) will be~t ~afeguarb tf)e nation again~t bi~tre~~ nub bi~n~tcr. -Qtl}e effect of tf)e war upon tf)e irtniteb ~tate~ tutU brpenl:l upon \tJf)at :ll.mericmt dti;rn~ ~ap null bo. ~http man \tJfJo reaUp lohe~ ~merim will act anl:l ~peak in t(Je true ~pirit of ncuttalitp, \tJf)icf)· ~ t{Je ~pirit of impnrtiahtp anb fairne~~ anb frienbhnc~~ to all concernel:J. qrf)e ~pirit of tf)e nation in tf)i~ critical matter will be bcttrmincl:J largdp bp \tJf)at inllibilmal~ nub ~ocietp null tf)o~e gatf)creb in public meeting~ bo anb !;lap, upon tu{Jat nelu~papcr~ anb maga:;ittcl;l contaitt, upon wf)at our mini~terl;l utter in tf)eir pulpit~ anl:l mm proclaim a~ tf)cir opinionl;l on tf)e l;ltrertl;l. ~be people of t{Je irtnitel:J ~tatel;l are brawn from mtlnp nationl;l, anb chtrflp from t(Je nation~ now at tuar. Jt i~ natural null ittehitable tf)at tl)rre l;lf)oulb be tl}e utmol;lt barietp of l;lpmpatl)p aull bel;lire among tf)em luit(J regarl:J to tl)e il;ll;luel;l anb circum~tanre~ of tl)e cottffict. ~ome will tui~b one nation, otl)cr~ anot{Jer, to ~ucceeb itt tf)e momentoul;l l;ltruggle. 'jt tutU be rn~p to etcite pal;l~ion anl:l lltfficult to allap it. ~l)ope re~pon~iblr for netting it tum a~~ume a l)eabp re~pon~ibilitp - re$ponl;libthtp for no lel;l~ a tl)iug tl)an tl)at tl)e people of tl)c Uniteb ~tutcl;l, tul)ol;le lobe of t{Jeir countrp anl:J whol;le lOAJaltp to it~ gobernment Pf)oull:J unite tl)em n~ 'ltlmericanl;l aU, bouull in l)onor anb affection to tl)inft fir~t of f)er anl:J l)er interegt~, map be bihil:lel:J in ramp~ of l)o~tile opinion~. bot again~t eacb otl)rr, inholheb in tl)e \Uar it~df in impul~e anb opinion, if not in action . .!'ncb bihcr~ionl;l among u~ luoulb be futal to our peace of minl:l anb mtgbt ~crioul;llp ~t&mb in tbe wap of proper performance of our l:Jutp a~ tl)r one great nation at peace, tl)c one people l)olbing it~df reabp to plap a part of impartial mcbintion anb l;lpealt tl)e coun ::: . gel~ of peace anb accommobation, not tUt a parti~nn but a~ a fricnb. ~ r bcnture, tl)erefore, mp fdlotu countrpmm, to gpcalt a ~olrmn tuorb of warning to pou again.st tl)at beepe~t, mo~t ~ubtle, mo~t el;ll;lrntial breacl) of ttcutralitp tul)idJ map ~pring out of pa~anl;ll)ip, out of pa.S~ionattlp taltittg ~ibe~. ~be Uttittb ~tatel;l mul;lt · be ntutral, in fact al;lludl a~ in name b.uring tl)el;le l:Jap~ tl)at are to ttp men · ~ ~oull;l.
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