HISTORY Badge of the Royal Marines, from 1943 onwards, the official parent formation of the Commandos. LAC photo PA 213630 by Lt. Royal Commando training – scaling cliffs. STRENGTH BORN FROM WEAKNESS: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RAIDING CONCEPT AND THE BRITISH COMMANDOS by Colonel Bernd Horn Introduction This obscure drama passed into history without notice or fanfare. It was just another tragic act in a chaotic world. he waves crashed noisily onto the beach as the German However, it was the living embodiment of Winston T sentry pulled up his collar to ward off the chill that Churchill’s vision. “There comes from the sea,” he blew off the English Channel. He hunched his shoulders proclaimed in the dark early days of the war, “a hand of steel involuntarily inside his heavy wool greatcoat as he trudged that plucks the German sentries from their posts.”1 As along the beach on the way back to the patrol house. He dramatic and inspiring as the Prime Minister’s words were, suddenly stopped, his sixth sense warning him of danger, but they were not delivered from a position of strength. as he turned into the icy, cold wind he saw nothing, and heard Rather, they were born from weakness. only the relentless swells hammering the French coastline. He picked up his pace and began to think of the warmth he The speed and violence of the German invasion of would soon enjoy, when he realized, too late, that he was not Europe in the spring of 1940 caught the British and the alone. Before, he could turn or unsling his rifle, his head was French, still stuck in their Great War mentality, totally by violently jerked to one side as the cold steel of a fighting surprise. The military subjugation of western Europe took knife was thrust into his carotid artery. The body of the just 46 days, but it was decided in only ten. The last available lifeless sentry was gently lowered to the ground by a phantom-like figure. Suddenly, as if on cue, more figures emerged from the shadows, clutching sub-machine guns Bernd Horn, an infantry officer, is currently Director of the Canadian and demolitions. The commandos had arrived once more to Forces’ Leadership Institute at the Canadian Defence Academy visit death and destruction on Hitler’s occupied territories. in Kingston. Autumn 2005 ● Canadian Military Journal 59 LAC photo PA 113247 Commando training exercise with small craft. members of the British Expeditionary Forces in France Commons, on 4 June 1940: “We shall not be content with were evacuated from the beaches of Dunkirk on the night of a defensive war.’2 He was well aware that winning a war 2 June 1940. Significantly, the desperate withdrawal ultimately required offensive action. Moreover, only resulted in the loss of virtually all their heavy equipment, through offensive action could an army provide the needed weapons and transport. Britain now braced for what confidence and battle experience to its soldiers and leaders. appeared to be the inevitable conclusion to the German Furthermore, only offensive action could sustain public and master plan – the invasion of England. military morale. And finally, offensive action represented a shift in initiative. By striking at the enemy, an opponent In the Beginning is inherently forced to take defensive measures, and that generates a diversion of scarce resources. evoid of any major equipment or weapons, and D encumbered by a doctrine and warmaking methodology That afternoon, Churchill penned a note to his Chief of that was clearly defunct, England was on the precipice Staff of the War Cabinet Secretariat, General Hastings Ismay: of disaster. Simultaneously, it had to re-equip, rebuild “We are greatly concerned ...with the dangers of the German and retrain its armed forces – and this, in landing in England,” he wrote, “...why addition to preparing the island for its should it be thought impossible for us to defence. It appeared that Britain had no “The military do anything of the same kind to them?” other choice but to surrender the initiative, subjugation of He then added: “We should immediately dig in, and await the inescapable assault. set to work to organize self-contained, western Europe thoroughly equipped raiding units.”3 After But this was not to be. Despite took just 46 days, all, pondered Churchill, “how wonderful it the still-smouldering British equipment but it was decided would be if the Germans could be made to strewn upon the beaches of Dunkirk, wonder where they were going to be struck Churchill, Great Britain’s combative new in only ten.” next, instead of forcing us to try to wall prime minister, declared in the House of in the island and roof it over!”4 60 Canadian Military Journal ● Autumn 2005 Two days later, Churchill sent yet Dudley Clarke’s concept was coming another missive to Ismay: “Enterprises “Winston Churchill, to life. He could now establish his “picked must be prepared,” he wrote, “with bands of guerrilla fighters who would specially-trained troops of the hunter class himself an harry the long enemy coastline in order who can develop a reign of terror down accomplished to make him [Germans] dissipate his these coasts, first of all on the butcher superior resources.”12 In all, twelve adventurer, journalist HISTORY and bolt policy.” He then curtly directed: Commando units, consisting of 500 men, “...the Joint Chiefs of the Staff to propose and soldier, held a broken up into a headquarters and ten me measures for a vigorous, enterprising, heroic and romantic troops each, were proposed. Incredibly, and ceaseless offensive against the whole image of war.” Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke was also German-occupied coastline.”5 directed to mount a cross-Channel raid, “at the earliest possible moment.”13 Churchill’s ruminations and subsequent missive were passed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Fielding a Force General Sir John Dill. The CIGS wasted no time. He passed the problem to one of his general staff officers, Lieutenant- he next hurdle consisted of actually raising the force. Colonel Dudley W. Clarke, with direction to find means by T It was considered axiomatic from the beginning that no which the offensive spirit of the army could be fostered until existing units of the army could be made available for raiding it was in a position to resume the offensive. Clarke began operations, nor could any personnel be diverted from work immediately. Like Churchill, he realized that “even the unavoidable necessity of home defence. The corollary the lightest threats... must compel the Germans to turn in the condition was one of stringent economy. So acute was the midst of their feverish invasion preparations to organise shortage of equipment and weaponry that commandos were defence and divert troops to guard this enormous front line “armed, equipped, organised and administered for one task [Occupied Europe].”6 and one task only – tip-and-run raids of not more than 48 hours from bases in England against the Continent of To Clarke, the solution was simple – guerrilla Europe.”14 The problem was so severe that a commando operations. This, he believed, was the best model the British could adopt under the existing conditions. Therefore, he proposed that ‘commandos,’ the term taken directly from the Boer War experience, be established to, firstly, create a threat to divert German resources, and, secondly, to restore the offensive spirit to the British Army.7 Dill passed the idea to Churchill, who leapt on it immediately. After all, it appealed to his character. Winston Churchill, himself an accomplished adventurer, journalist and soldier, held a heroic and romantic image of war. Moreover, he maintained “an almost abstract attachment to the offensive.”8 He believed that audacity and willpower constituted the only sound approach to the conduct of war.9 He later penned a note to President Franklin D. Roosevelt that revealed his mindset: “[The] essence of defence,” he asserted, “is to attack the enemy upon us – leap at his throat and keep the grip until the life is out of him.”10 Dissent and Accord nd so it came to pass. Despite resistance from Amany senior military commanders, who felt that valuable resources were being frittered away for no valuable return at a time when the nation faced invasion, Churchill pressed on with his initiatives. In a remarkable display of military efficiency, by 8 June 1940 General Dill had received approval for the creation of the commandos, and that same afternoon, Section MO9 of the War Office was established. Four days later, Churchill appointed Lieutenant-General Sir Alan Bourne, the Adjutant-General of the Royal Marines as “Commander of Raiding Operations on Coasts in Enemy Occupation and Advisor to the Chiefs of Staff Photo by Bern Schwartz on Combined Operations.”11 Lord Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations from October 1941. Autumn 2005 ● Canadian Military Journal 61 LAC photo PA 141307 A group of commandos march past a collapsed Goatley boat upon returning from a raid on the French coast. unit drew its full complement of weapons, such as no training for the militia soldiers or leaders of the submachine guns, from a central pool, and then only when Independent Companies before they were deployed it was about to set out on a raid.15 to that beleaguered country. With respect to manpower, Clarke was somewhat more Nonetheless, the German advance in Norway was fortunate. The cadre of 1 and 2 Commandos were harvested extremely rapid, and the five Independent Companies that from the ten Independent Companies that had been raised actually made it to Norway in time were withdrawn by early earlier in the year to harass the advancing Germans in June.