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Miszelle Eine Authentische Halder-Ansprache?

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Miszelle Eine Authentische Halder-Ansprache? Miszelle Klaus Mayer Eine authentische Halder-Ansprache? Textkritische Anmerkungen zu einem Dokumentenfund im früheren Moskauer Sonderarchiv Im November 1938, vier Wochen nach seiner Verabschiedung als Chef des Gene- ralstabs des Heeres (GenStdH), verfaßte Generaloberst z.V. Ludwig Beck eine »grundsätzliche Betrachtung« über das Thema »Deutschland in einem kommen- den Krieg«1, deren Fazit lautete: »Ein Krieg, den Deutschland beginnt, wird sofort weitere Staaten als den an- gegriffenen auf den Plan rufen. Bei einem Krieg gegen eine Weltkoalition wird Deutschland unterliegen und dieser schließlich auf Gnade und Ungnade aus- geliefert sein2.« Zu der militär- und zeitgeschichtlich wichtigen Frage, wie nach Becks Abgang sein Nachfolger (ab 1. September 1938), General Franz Halder, das Problem eines »kom- menden Krieges« ansah, wurde in jüngster Zeit von Christian Hartmann, wissen- schaftlicher Mitarbeiter des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ) München, und Sergej Slutsch, wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Moskauer Institut für Slawistik und Bal- kanistik der Akademie der Wissenschaften Rußlands, in den »Vierteljahrsheften für Zeitgeschichte« ein bisher unbekanntes Halder-Dokument publiziert3, das nach Auffassung des deutsch-russischen Editorenteams in »gewisser Weise« sogar mit Hitlers geheimen Ansprachen (5. November 1937, 23. Mai und 22. August 1939) vergleichbar sei4. Der Moskauer »Zufallsfund«5, ein undatierter acht Seiten langer, mit Maschi- ne geschriebener Text ohne Verfasserangabe, deponiert im Fond 1525 des ehe- maligen sowjetischen »Sonderarchivs« in Moskau6, dem heutigen Zentrum zur Aufbewahrung historisch-dokumentarischer Sammlungen (CChlDK)7, enthält die wörtliche Mitschrift eines Vortrages, den Halder, so die Datierung von Hartmann und Slutsch8, in der zweiten Aprilhälfte 1939, nach dem 13. April, vor Generalen 1 Zum Text seiner Denkschrift siehe Ludwig Beck, Studien. Hrsg. und eingel. von Hans Spei- del, Stuttgart 1955, S. 51-64. 2 Ebd., S. 63. 3 Christian Hartmann und Sergej Slutsch, Franz Halder und die Kriegsvorbereitungen im Frühjahr 1939. Eine Ansprache des Generalstabschefs des Heeres, in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 45 (1997), S. 467-^95. 4 Vgl. ebd., S. 469. 5 Vgl. ebd., S. 468. 6 Zum Moskauer »Sonderarchiv« siehe Götz Aly und Susanne Heim, Das Zentrale Staats- archiv in Moskau (»Sonderarchiv«). Rekonstruktion und Bestandsverzeichnis verschol- len geglaubten Schriftguts aus der NS-Zeit, Düsseldorf 1992. 7 Zum CChlDK vgl. Gerhard Jagschitz und Stefan Karner, »Beuteakten aus Österreich«. Der Österreichbestand im russischen »Sonderarchiv« Moskau, Graz, Wien 1996 (= Veröf- fentlichungen des Ludwig Boltzmann-Instituts für Kriegsfolgen-Forschung, Bd 2), S. XL-XLVII. 8 Vgl. Hartmann/Slutsch, Franz Halder (wie Anm. 3), S. 469 f. Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 58 (1999), S. 471-527 © Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Potsdam 472 MGM 58 (1999) Klaus Mayer und Generalstabsoffizieren über das Thema »Der kommende Krieg« gehalten ha- be. Nach dieser Mitschrift soll Halder seinen Zuhörern erklärt haben, »daß Polen in der kürzestmöglichen Zeit vollkommen erledigt werden muß«9. Es müsse in der Vernichtung des polnischen Gegners ein »Rekord an Schnelligkeit« aufgestellt wer- den. In »spätestens drei Wochen«, »möglichst schon in 14 Tagen«, müsse der »schlag- artige Uberfall auf Polen« zu Ende sein10. Bei einem Eingreifen von Frankreich und England in den Konflikt seien »schwerste Luftraids« vorgesehen, »um durch Ver- nichtung von Paris und auch Londons die Moral des Gegners zu treffen«11. Wie der Vortragstext ausweist, scheute Haider offenbar weder den militärischen Konflikt mit den Westmächten noch mit der Sowjetunion. Nach der Beendigung des Polen-Feldzuges werde es, so Halders Botschaft, »von den Russen abhängen, ob die Ostfront zum europäischen Schicksal wird oder nicht. In jedem Fall wird darin eine siegreiche Armee, erfüllt mit dem Geist gewonnener Riesenschlachten, bereitstehen, um entweder dem Bolschewismus entgegenzutreten oder [...] nach dem Westen geworfen zu werden, um dort die Entscheidung rasch, aber gründlich zu erringen12.« Mit dem brisanten Inhalt des Moskauer CChlDK-Dokuments wird posthum der Nachkriegsautor Halder als Zeitzeuge gründlich diskreditiert, da der einstige, von Hitler am 24. September 1942 in die »Führerreserve« entlassene Generalstabschef des Heeres in seiner literarischen Abrechnung mit dem »Feldherrn Hitler« aus dem Jahre 1949 die Verantwortung für den militärischen Angriff auf Polen einzig dem politischen Führer anlastete: »Die Entwicklung der polnischen Krisis im Jahre 1939 zeigt, [...] wie der Politi- ker Hitler die Krise schafft und schürt, um zu der Gewaltlösung zu kommen, die ihm offenbar, trotz aller Warnungen von militärischer Seite, von Anfang an vorgeschwebt hat. Die ihm immer wieder vor Augen gestellten Grenzen der militärischen Leistungsfähigkeit überschreitet er mit der Versicherung, es nicht zum Zweifrontenkrieg kommen zu lassen >wie die unfähigen Menschen des Jahres 1914<13.« »Ich veranlaßte«, so schilderte ein Jahr später Halder sein Antikriegsengagement im Gespräch mit Peter Bor, »den Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres und den Staatssekretär des Auswärtigen Amtes, Hitler eindringlich zu warnen, und zwar stets mit dem Tenor, ein deutsch-polnischer Konflikt würde unweigerlich England und Frankreich auf die Seite Polens bringen und damit für Deutschland die Lage des Zweifron- tenkrieges schaffen. Ein gesellschaftliches Zusammentreffen mit dem engli- schen Botschafter gab mir dann Gelegenheit, ihn zu bitten, England möge sei- ne Entschlossenheit, Polen beizustehen, Deutschland gegenüber so eindeutig aussprechen, daß auch Hitler davon überzeugt werde. Sir Nevile Henderson versprach seine Unterstützung. Das Ergebnis war ein Brief Chamberlains an Hitler, der freilich auf diesen keine Wirkung hatte14.« 9 Vgl. ebd., S. 483. 10 Vgl. ebd., S. 492 und 495. 11 Vgl. ebd., S. 489 f. 12 Vgl. ebd., S. 495. " Franz Halder, Hitler als Feldherr, München 1949, S. 26. 14 Vgl. Peter Bor, Gespräche mit Haider, Wiesbaden 1950, S. 127 f. Eine authentische Halder-Ansprache? 473 Für die beiden Editoren des Moskauer CChlDK-Dokuments trägt dagegen das »Führungszentrum der deutschen Streitkräfte« eine »Mitverantwortung an der Entfesselung des Zweiten Weltkriegs«; sie sind sich völlig sicher, daß Halder »zu- mindest in den entscheidenden Monaten im Frühjahr und Sommer 1939 nichts an- deres war, ja nichts anderes sein wollte als ein Handlanger der Hitlerschen Kriegs- politik«15. Nun weist das Moskauer Haider-Dokument in seiner Authentizität al- lerdings einen kompromittierenden Makel auf. Von unbekannter Hand stammend, trägt das Dokument als Überschrift nämlich den Vermerk: »Auszug aus einem Vor- trag des Chefs des Generalstabs Halder, gehalten vor Generalen und General- stabsoffizieren im Rahmen eines Zyklus der Wehrmacht-Akademie«16. Zunächst muß man dazu anmerken, daß die Bezeichnung »Chef des General- stabs Halder« in der militärischen Nomenklatur gänzlich unkorrekt war, da es in der Wehrmacht gleich zwei amtierende Generalstabschefs gab: Neben Halder als Chef des Generalstabs des Heeres fungierte im Jahre 1939 Generalmajor Hans Je- schonnek als Chef des Generalstabs der Luftwaffe. Deshalb mußte die korrekte Be- zeichnung im Dokumenten ti tel lauten: Chef GenStdH GendArt Halder. Wesentlich gravierender für die Frage der Authentizität ist aber die Angabe des Vortragsortes in der Dokumentenüberschrift. Die Wehrmachtakademie, eine ab dem 15. Oktober 1935 bestehende Einrichtung zur Weiterbildung von höheren Ge- neralstabsoffizieren aller drei Wehrmachtteile, hatte im Frühjahr 1939 ihre Tore schon längst geschlossen. »In den Jahren 1935 und 1936 hat diese Wehrmacht-Aka- demie«, so Halders Nachkriégsauskunft, »je einen Jahreskurs abgehalten, kam dann aber doch, infolge des Widerstandes der drei Wehrmachtteile, zum Erlie- gen«17. Quellenmäßig belegt bzw. im Text vorhanden sind einige Vorträge, die von ver- schiedenen Generalstabsoffizieren aus den drei Wehrmachtteilen in den Jahren 1935/36 an der Wehrmachtakademie gehalten wurden18. Für das Jahr 1937 existiert ein Quellenhinweis zu einem Vortrag, den Graf v.d. Schulenburg, der deutsche Bot- schafter in Moskau, vor der Wehrmachtakademie hielt19. Vermutlich fand die Wehrmachtakademie deshalb ihr Ende, weil sie am 3. Ja- nuar 1938 unter dem Titel »Kriegführung« den Entwurf einer Vorschrift für den gemeinsamen Einsatz aller drei Wehrmachtteile unter einem Oberkommando in Umlauf brachte20. Der Teil II dieses Entwurfs behandelte die Befehlsverhältnisse ,s Hartmann /Slutsch, Franz Halder (wie Anm. 3), S. 472. 16 Vgl. ebd., S. 479. 17 Vgl. Bor, Gespräche (wie Anm. 14), S. 77. Zur Wehrmachtakademie siehe auch die Aus- kunft von Freiherr Geyr v. Schweppenburg, Erinnerungen eines Militärattaches. London 1933-1937, Stuttgart 1949, S. 62: »In der Zuteilung qualitativ hochwertiger Hörer wurde sie von der Armee lau und vom Luftministerium und Auswärtigen Amt praktisch über- haupt nicht unterstützt.« 18 Vgl. dazu die näheren Angaben mit Nachweis der Signatur des Bundesarchiv-Militär- archivs (BA-MA) bei Jehuda L. Wallach, Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht. Die Leh- ren von Clausewitz und Schlieffen und ihre Wirkungen in zwei Weltkriegen, München 1970 (= dtv 701 ), S. 320 f. und 429 f. 19 Vgl. die Erwähnung des Schulenburg-Vortrags im Brief des deutschen Militâr-Attachés in Moskau, Generalleutnant Köstring, vom 25.12.1937 an den Oberquartiermeister IV im GenStdH, Oberst i.G. v. Tippelskirch; abgedruckt in: General Ernst Köstring. Der mi- litärische Mittler zwischen
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