The London School of Economies and Politicai Science The Enigma of German Operational Theory: The Evolution ofMilitary Thought in Germany, 1919-1938 Gil-li Vardi A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, December 2008 ii Déclaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD de gre e of the London School of Economies and Politicai Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author. I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. iii In loving memory of Omri Kidron, 1985-2008 IV Abstract From the end of the Second World War historians have sought to answer one of its most intriguing questions: to what - and to whom - did the Wehrmacht owe its shocking initial operational successes? What was the nature of Gemían strategie and operational perceptions, and were they new — or even, as some researchers have suggested, 'revolutionary'? Was Germán post-1918 military culture conducive to a thorough investigation of past mistakes, a re-evaluation of traditional notions, and the pursuit of new ideas? In reality the Reichswehr offícer corps jealously defended its inlierited conceptual boundaries, retreated ever-deeper into a one-dimensional self-perception and strategie outlook, and offered conceptually ossified solutions to the Republic's pressing security problems. Gemían officers, convinced that their doctrine and military world-view were flawless, never challenged the axioms and values that had brought army and nation to catastrophe in 1918: extreme warfare, culminating in the most destructive and eventually self-destructive actions; extremes of risk-taking; the endless pursuit of annihilational battles that dictated the réduction of strategy to meticulous operational and tactical planning; the trust in 'spiritual superiority' to overcome enemy advantages in material and manpower; ruthlessness; and an exaggerated drive for action at ali costs. Idiosyncratic operational planning that was at times completely detached from strategie reality completed the picture of a military organisation unable to renew itself. No comprehensive analysis has yet convincingly explained this astonishing continuity, or linked it to the allegedly innovative operational theory and doctrine that evolved in the second half of the 1930s. The concept of military and organisational culture can however provide the necessary theoretical foundations for understanding both that continuity and the doctrinal shape that it assumed in the imminence of the Second World War. It can explain - as this thesis demonstrates - the disastrous and seemingly inexplicable wrong-headedness of a group of otherwise highly intelligent men. IV Contents Acknowledgements vii Introduction: The nature and dynamics of German military culture 1 Chapter 1: German military culture: Founding fathers and paradigm 16 I. Clausewitz: The foundations 17 II. From Moltke to Schließen 27 1.Moltke 29 2. Schlieffen 35 3. New paradigm? Schlieffen as 'déviant1: Friction and command-and- 36 control 4. Old paradigm? Schlieffen as disciple: The fîngerprints of 45 Clausewitz and Moltke III. Beyond Schlieffen: Challenging annihilation? Erich von Falkenhayn 53 and the strategy of attrition 1. Contending schools? 54 2. Germany's Verdun concept: Attrition? 56 3. Endkampf 1918: radicalisation and heroic suicide 63 Conclusion 68 Chapter 2: The 1920s: The road most travelled 70 I. Wilhelm Groener 74 1. Groener the Soldier: 1919-1928 76 2. Groener the Minister: 1928-1932 92 II. Joachim von Stülpnagel 98 1. Acknowiedging the problem: Stiilpnagel the realist 101 2. The opponent within: self-delusion 103 3. Finding a solution: Stiilpnagel the radical 106 4. A revolutionary and radical approach? 111 5. Operational concepts: from attrition to annihilation 116 6. Operational concepts: a new 1Rezepfl 121 7. The thumb on the scales: Gemían Geist 124 8. Cooperation with the civilian authorities? 127 9. The irrelevance of international politics 134 10. 'Hold[ing] doggedly to the aim of annihilation' 139 vi III. Hans von Seeckt 143 1. Military world-view and operational vision: forgetting nothing 147 2. Modern warfare, modern armies, antique dogma 150 3. Civil-military relations: leaming nothing 158 Conclusion 169 Chapter 3: The enigma of the 1930s: Transforming German military 179 I. Technology and innovation: the clash of interprétations 182 1. Blitzbieg as RMA 182 2. 'Fascism': Cause orcontext? 185 3. A decisive British influence? 190 4. Evolutionary change witli culture as its mediator 194 II. From an imagined army to a real one: doctrinal changes? 197 1. 1930: Yet another opérations manual 197 2. Technology and armaments 201 3. Civil and military leadership, statesman and Feldherr 202 4. Operational ends and means 204 5. Geist and Wille in a new key 206 III. The 'when and how' of the development of German armour doctrine 209 1. 1930-1933: Shaping armour doctrine 212 2. 1933-1934: Heersdienstsvorschrift 300: Truppenfiihrung 215 3. 1935-1938: From doctrine to operational concept. What should 225 armoured and mechanised divisions do, and how should they do it? 4. Force structure, composition, and build-up: the projection of future 230 operational requirements IV. Revolutionaries? German armour experts, enthusiasts, supporters - 236 and their 'rivais1 V. Disciples of the 'British school'? The German army and British 244 armoured warfare expérimentation Conclusion 254 Conclusion: Military culture: Necessity, contingency, and choice 257 Bibliography 265 vii Acknowledgements Acknowledgments are no doubt the most pleasant part of any thesis to write. First and foremost, I would like to thank my Supervisor, MacGregor Knox, for his invaluable guidance and enduring support, as well as his endless patience. Robert Boyce of the LSE Department of International His tory provided me with insightful comments and much appreciated assistance throughout my years as an LSE PhD candidate. Special thanks are also due to Hew Strachan from the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War for his most rewarding and thought-pro voking seminars and private conversations on military history. I am in debt to many friends and colleagues who were always there for advice, useful comments and encouragement: Louise Woodroofe, Garret Martin, Stephanie Hare, Jeff Byrne, Tanya Harmer, Alex Wieland, Isabelle Rohr, Sybille Scheipers and Alia Brahimi. Most of all I would like to thank my family, whose love, support and faith in me never waned: Ytzhak and Dina Vardi, Shai Vardi, Rony Vardi, Inbar Wolanski and Uria Gai. Special thanks to Shahar Gai for being so patient with my never-ending demands for his attention. I am also thankful to Zvi and Neora Goldberg, Ye'ela Goldberg, and mostly to Regina Goldberg, for never holding it against me that I took Amir so far away from home. I am grateful to my daughter, Aima, for joining us and for putting everything eise in perspective. But my greatest debt and greatest thanks are to my husband, Amir Goldberg. For making this possible, for making Aima possible, for the most wonderful life only you made possible. Kol ze bezkhuîkha ve bishvilkha. Introduction The nature and dynamics of German military culture Modem German military history is a self-contradictory story of a Janus-faced military organisation. From the beginning of the First World War to the end of the Second, it offers some of the most enticing examples both of tactical brilliance and operational success and of strategie foolishness and blind extremism. It is a story that has captured and still captures the interest of historians and military practitioners alike: a story of a military organisation with an undying faith in the operational principles and military tenets that had seemingly guided it to a pinnacle of achievement despite unprecedented objective hardships. That military organisation in its différent incarnations - Imperial German Army, Reichswehr, and Wehrmacht — supposedly overcame the most daunting obstacles and limitations in order to achieve some of the most breath-taking operational successes in history - and the most catastrophic final outeomes. German military history thus présents the most intriguing question of ail: how and why did the army fail twice to translate its noteworthy brilliance and many accomplishments into lasting strategie victories? That question could be - and for many historians has indeed been - a genuine mystery. But the mystery persists only if we accept the fundamental assumptions of the narrative that is usually presented: that the German war machine prevailed when it did thanks to brilliant theory and effective practice, and failed when it did because of externally imposed limitations and setbacks, most if not all of which derived from forces - politicai, ideological, or economic - outside the military domain. 2 This thesis suggests a novel explanation for the German army's success and failures. It examines not simply what German military thinkers and planners wrote, planned, and strove for, not merely their declared intentions, but also