Matthias Strohn. The German Army and the Defence of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle 1918–1939. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 292 S. ISBN 978-0-521-19199-9.
Reviewed by Brendan Murphy
Published on H-Soz-u-Kult (November, 2013)
This book, a revised version of Matthias political isolation to cooperation in military mat‐ Strohn’s Oxford D.Phil dissertation is a reap‐ ters. These shifts were necessary decisions, as for praisal of German military thought between the ‘the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht in the early World Wars. Its primary subjects are political and stages of its existence, the core business was to military elites, their debates over the structure fnd out how the Fatherland could be defended and purpose of the Weimar military, the events against superior enemies’ (p. 3). that shaped or punctuated those debates, and the This shift from ofensive to defensive put the ofcial documents generated at the highest levels. Army’s structural subordination to the govern‐ All of the personalities, institutions and schools of ment into practice, and shocked its intellectual thought involved had to deal with a foundational culture into a keener appreciation of facts. To‐ truth: that any likely adversary could destroy ward this end, the author tracks a long and wind‐ their Army and occupy key regions of the country ing road toward the genesis of ‘Heeresdien‐ in short order, so the military’s tradition role was stvorschrfft 300. Truppenführung’, written by doomed to failure. Ludwig Beck and published in two parts in 1933 The author lays out two problems to be ad‐ and 1934, a document which is widely regarded to dressed. First, the academic overemphasis on be the single most important work of western mil‐ Blitzkrieg and its origins in the analysis of itary thought since the First World War. Its doctri‐ Weimar’s military thought and secondly, the mili‐ nal predecessor, ‘Führung und Gefecht der ver‐ tary’s status as a ‘state within the state’, when the bundenen Wafen’, or F.u.G. was published in two Army was clearly subordinate to the State. These parts in 1921 and 1923, largely neglected defen‐ problems are answered through an orthodox mili‐ sive fghting, especially the concept of delaying re‐ tary history of Weimar’s defensive military sistance. Delaying resistance was initially under‐ thought, with the 1923 Ruhr Crisis serving as the stood as morally corrosive and prohibitively risky, pivotal turn from ofensive to defensive, and from but by 1933 it was acknowledged as the best way H-Net Reviews for a weak but well trained army to preserve it‐ prospects. Two further investigations, codenamed self. This involved a balancing act between fght‐ ‘Sommerarbeit’ and ‘Winterarbeit’, determined ing and retreating, though whether the fnal goal that massive yet unrealistic Reichswehr expan‐ was to gain time or infict losses was unresolved. sion was necessary for reasonable prospects of In the end, ‘Truppenführung’ was grounded in an success. But a useful lesson was learned, partially analysis of what the military could and could not as a byproduct of von Stülpnagel’s call for univer‐ do, rather than the idealized qualities and poten‐ sal mobilization and irregular warfare on a grand tial of the individual German soldier. scale, and that was the necessity of support from Both a pressing doctrinal problem and roots civilian institutions and elites to augment the of a solution lay in recent German military histo‐ Army. ry. Both Clausewitz and Moltke the Elder had ar‐ Chapter 7 deals specifcally with the topic of gued that the defensive must contain ofensive el‐ increased civil-military cooperation and its over‐ ements as well. These teachings had been put into all utility in a military context, concluding that no practice with the First World War doctrine of amount of civil-military cooperation would have ‘Elastic Defence’, which utilized fxed strong improved the Weimar Republic’s military points and sudden counterattacks in concert. But prospects. These sentiments were confrmed by a the First World War had left Chef der 1927 policy discussion between Oberst Kurt von Heeresleitung (1920–1926) Hans von Seeckt with a Schleicher, Oberst Werner von Fritsch, Deputy low opinion of conscript soldiers derived from his Foreign Ministry State Secretary Gerhard Köpke war experience, concluding that they ultimately and Reichswehrminister Wilhelm Groener. The lacked technical skills and discipline. Thus, the Army ofcers’ contributions to policy were wel‐ British proposal that Germany maintain a long comed, but they were gently reminded that service, volunteer Army was already in line with Weimar security depended on the political goal of his thinking. This small, quick, elite force would ‘avoidance of armed confict at any cost’ (p. 182). be more psychologically robust and able to out‐ Still, the Reichswehr existed to defend the State, maneuvre ponderous conscript armies. Support‐ and though it was willing give up initiatives to ing this ‘Operationsheer’, or Operating Army was strengthen the border guards or raise Feldjäger a partially trained militia whose function was to for larger political ends, tactical and operational/ hold ground, so that the Operating Army re‐ strategic problems remained unanswered. The mained free to manoeuvre. means to do so did not exist in the F.u.G, so a new The centrality of the Ruhr Crisis was crucial manual was needed. to debates over fundamental doctrine. The result ‘Truppenführung’, analysed in depth in Chap‐ was to prove defnitively that Versailles had left ter 8, saw ofensive and defensive action as equal‐ the Weimar Republic with no viable military re‐ ly important and their successful combination course, but with a few useful conclusions. All con‐ was crucial at every level, from the tactical to the temporary theories were inefective, whether the strategic. Readers were told that ‘the conduct of Army took the form of Hans von Seeckt’s ‘Opera‐ war is art, a free creative activity based upon sci‐ tionsheer’, or Joachim von Stülpnagel’s ‘Volk‐ entifc principles’ (p. 190). In pursuit of these goals skrieg’, or People’s War model based on a Levée and unlike the F.u.G, junior ofcers were to be en masse supported by professional partisans, the told they were fghting a delaying engagement to Feldjäger. Investigations into a crash mobilization better coordinate their actions and focus the lati‐ with whatever arms were at hand to create a tude granted to them to carry out orders. ‘Notheer’, or Emergency Army, yielded similar
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The Nazi seizure of power demanded ofen‐ sive action, which the Army believed impossible until the planned completion of rearmament in the 1940s. However, Hitler had successfully merged the military with the political by creating the ofce of Führer. The Army, the author argues, had always believed that either a general with po‐ litical skill or a politician with military experience would be the best head of state, and believed its expertise was even more critical when pacifst or democratic governments sat in power. As it was described by Oberstleutnant Walter Warlimont, by assuming a place between the Führer and all other institutions, the Army traded political pow‐ er for status within the Nazi Party, so where in the past the Army had aided in the formulation of pol‐ icy, they became its executors instead. Matthias Strohn’s work is complex, detailed, and well situated. Moreover, the author deserves a great deal of credit for managing a huge cast of ofcers and politicians. However, there is a lack of explanation as to why ‘Truppenführung’ was adopted when it was, which runs against the grain of the Army’s post-Ruhr pragmatism.
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Citation: Brendan Murphy. Review of Strohn, Matthias. The German Army and the Defence of the Reich: Military Doctrine and the Conduct of the Defensive Battle 1918–1939. H-Soz-u-Kult, H-Net Reviews. November, 2013.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=40615
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