A War of Reputation and Pride
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Linea Gotica
Linea Gotica Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera Linea Gotica Parte della campagna d'Italia della seconda guerra mondiale La Linea Gotica nell'agosto 1944. In blu le manovre alleate Data 25 agosto 1944 - 21 aprile 1945 Luogo Appennino tosco-emiliano e riviera adriatica tra Fano e Rimini Esito Sfondamento Alleato della linea e successivo collasso delle forze tedesche in Italia Schieramenti Regno Unito Germania • Canada Repubblica Sociale • Nuova Italiana Zelanda • Sudafrica • India britannica Stati Uniti d'America Francia libera Polonia Regno d'Italia Brasile Grecia Comandanti Comandanti delle armate Comandanti gruppo in Italia - 15° Army armate C[3][2] Group:[1][2] Albert Kesselring Harold Alexander Heinrich von fino nov. '44 poi Vietinghoff Mark Clark Comandanti della 10ª Comandanti dell'8ª armata: armata: Heinrich von Oliver Leese fino Vietinghoff sett. '44 poi Joachim Lemelsen[4] Richard McCreery Traugott Herr Comandanti della 5ª Comandanti della 14ª armata: armata: Mark Clark fino nov. Joachim Lemelsen '44 poi Fridolin von Senger Lucian K. Truscott und Etterlin Heinz Ziegler Traugott Herr Kurt von Tippelskirch Joachim Lemelsen Comandanti dell'Armata Liguria: Rodolfo Graziani Effettivi 8ª armata britannica 10ª armata tedesca 5ª armata statunitense 14ª armata tedesca Armata Liguria Perdite tra 26 agosto e il 7 tra 26 agosto e il 7 ottobre: ottobre: 30.000 uomini di cui 42.000 uomini (stima oltre 4.500 canadesi del generale (stima del generale Alexander) Alexander) circa 60.000 civili italiani La Linea Gotica (in tedesco Gotenstellung, in inglese Gothic Line) fu la linea difensiva istituita dal feldmaresciallo tedesco Albert Kesselring nel 1944 nel tentativo di rallentare l'avanzata dell'esercito alleato comandato dal generale Harold Alexander verso il nord Italia. -
Military Tribunal, Indictments
MILITARY TRIBUNALS Case No. 12 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -against- WILHELM' VON LEEB, HUGO SPERRLE, GEORG KARL FRIEDRICH-WILHELM VON KUECHLER, JOHANNES BLASKOWITZ, HERMANN HOTH, HANS REINHARDT. HANS VON SALMUTH, KARL HOL LIDT, .OTTO SCHNmWIND,. KARL VON ROQUES, HERMANN REINECKE., WALTERWARLIMONT, OTTO WOEHLER;. and RUDOLF LEHMANN. Defendants OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (US) NORNBERG 1947 • PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c6a171/ TABLE OF CONTENTS - Page INTRODUCTORY 1 COUNT ONE-CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 6 A Austria 'and Czechoslovakia 7 B. Poland, France and The United Kingdom 9 C. Denmark and Norway 10 D. Belgium, The Netherland.; and Luxembourg 11 E. Yugoslavia and Greece 14 F. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 17 G. The United states of America 20 . , COUNT TWO-WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: CRIMES AGAINST ENEMY BELLIGERENTS AND PRISONERS OF WAR 21 A: The "Commissar" Order , 22 B. The "Commando" Order . 23 C, Prohibited Labor of Prisoners of Wal 24 D. Murder and III Treatment of Prisoners of War 25 . COUNT THREE-WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: CRIMES AGAINST CIVILIANS 27 A Deportation and Enslavement of Civilians . 29 B. Plunder of Public and Private Property, Wanton Destruc tion, and Devastation not Justified by Military Necessity. 31 C. Murder, III Treatment and Persecution 'of Civilian Popu- lations . 32 COUNT FOUR-COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY 39 APPENDIX A-STATEMENT OF MILITARY POSITIONS HELD BY THE DEFENDANTS AND CO-PARTICIPANTS 40 2 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c6a171/ INDICTMENT -
Erich Von Manstein and the War of Annihilation
Oliver von Wrochem. Erich von Manstein: Vernichtungskrieg und Geschichtspolitik. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2006. 431 S. EUR 39.90, cloth, ISBN 978-3-506-72977-4. Reviewed by Jeff Rutherford Published on H-German (April, 2008) On May 7, 1953, the Swabian village of All‐ ers. The message was clear: Hitler's "most brilliant mendingen prepared for a festival. The mayor strategist" was ready to enter West German soci‐ had roused the village inhabitants early in the ety. morning, school was cancelled, the town was fes‐ In this timely, impressively researched study, tively decorated and, according to a member of Oliver von Wrochem describes this "idyllic the media who was present, nearly every child Heimat" occasion as "simultaneously a historical/ wore a bouquet of fowers. A brass band provided political signal and a memory/cultural event" (p. musical accompaniment. The few villagers initial‐ 260). Manstein's release symbolized the rehabili‐ ly unaware of the reason for the unusual events tation of the men who had served in Hitler's were quickly informed: Field Marshal Erich von Wehrmacht, though this rehabilitation was pri‐ Manstein, the most celebrated of Hitler's military marily due to the efforts of high-ranking officers commanders and most controversial of the post‐ to produce their own version of the war, a process war military internees, had been released from in which the former Field Marshal was intimately captivity and was coming to the village. When involved. Wrochem also details the complicity of Manstein addressed the crowd, he thanked them western governments, particularly the British, in for their support and exclaimed, "We no longer covering up the unsavory aspects of Nazi Ger‐ want to think about the difficulties of the past, but many's war against the Soviet Union to ensure only of the future" (p. -
1940 Commandés À Plusieurs Chantiers Navals Néerlandais, Seuls Quatre Exemplaires (T-61 À T-64) Doivent Être Poursuivis, Les Autres Seront Annulés
Appendice 1 Ordre de bataille de l’Armée Rouge sur le front au 1er juin 1943 (forces principales) (pour les deux Fronts Baltes – les indications pour les autres Fronts ne sont entièrement valables qu’à partir du 1er juillet) 1er Front de la Baltique (M.M. Popov) Du sud de Parnu (Estonie) au sud de Võru (Estonie). – 1ère Armée (A.V. Kourkine) – 4e Armée (N.I. Gusev) – 7e Armée (A.N. Krutikov) – 42e Armée (V.I. Morozov) – 12e Corps Blindé (V.V. Butkov) – 15e Corps Blindé (F.N. Rudkin) Aviation subordonnée : 13e Armée Aérienne (S.D. Rybalchenko) 2e Front de la Baltique (K.A. Meretskov) Du sud de Pskov (Russie) au nord de Vitebsk (Biélorussie). – 27e Armée (N.E. Berzarine) – 34e Armée (A.I. Lopatine) – 39e Armée (A.I. Zigin) – 55e Armée (V.P. Smiridov) – 13e Corps Blindé (B.S. Bakharov) – 14e Corps Blindé (I.F. Kirichenko) – 101e Brigade Blindée lourde Aviation subordonnée : 14e Armée Aérienne (I.P. Zhuravlev) 1er Front de Biélorussie (A.I. Eremenko) De Vitebsk (Biélorussie) à Orsha (Biélorussie) – 20e Armée (P.A. Kourouchkine) – 1ère Armée de la Garde (I.M. Chistiakov) – 3e Armée de la Garde (I.G. Zakharkine) – 63e Armée (V.I. Kuznetsov) – 18e Corps Blindé (A.S. Burdeiny) Aviation subordonnée : 2e Armée Aérienne (N.F. Naumenko) 2e Front de Biélorussie (I.S. Koniev) D’Orsha (Biélorussie) à Gomel (Biélorussie). – 2e Armée de la Garde (L.A. Govorov) – 29e Armée (I.M. Managrov) – 15e Armée (I.I. Fediouninski) – 54e Armée (S.V. Roginski) – 3e Armée de Choc (M.A. Purkayev) – 7e Corps Blindé (A.G. -
Howard Grier on When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army
David Glantz, Jonathan House. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. xiii + 414 pp. $29.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7006-0717-4. Reviewed by Howard D. Grier Published on H-German (April, 1996) David Glantz, America's foremost Soviet mili‐ grad in November 1942. Here the authors depict a tary historian, joins with Jonathan House, Asso‐ Red Army fghting two vicious foes -- the Nazi jug‐ ciate Professor of History at Gordon College in gernaut and Joseph Stalin himself. As German Georgia, to bring us an important and long-need‐ armies swept ever deeper into Soviet territory, ed study. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Stalin repeatedly refused to heed his military ad‐ Army Stopped Hitler demolishes several myths visers, usually with disastrous results. The third and clarifies dozens of unanswered questions. section deals with the turn of the tide from No‐ The book is divided into four sections. In the vember 1942 to December 1943. Glantz and House first part, the authors examine the Red Army from show how the Red Army effectively responded to 1918 to 1941, and set forth their thesis that the the Nazi threat as skilled commanders like Mar‐ Red Army did not achieve victory in the East sim‐ shal Georgi Zhukov, Marshal Aleksandr ply by copying German tactics. In fact, Blitzkrieg- Vasilevsky, and General Alexei Antonov planned style, mobile tactics had been devised and em‐ and executed effective offensive operations of ployed by Russian troops during the Russian Civil their own. Stalin began to show faith in his subor‐ War, decades prior to World War II. -
Deutsche Generäle in Britischer Gefangenschaft 1942–1945. Eine
289 Von vielen deutschen Generälen des Zweiten Weltkriegs sind häufig nur die Laufbahndaten bekannt; Briefe und Tagebücher liegen nur wenige vor. Für die For schung sind sie oft genug nur eingeschränkt zugänglich. So fällt es nach wie vor schwer, zu beurteilen, wie die Generale selbst die militärischen und politischen Geschehnisse der Zeit zwischen 1939 und 1945 rezipiert haben und welche Folgerungen sie daraus zogen. Wichtige Aufschlüsse über ihre Kenntnisse von den nationalsozialistischen Massenmorden oder ihr Urteil über den deutschen Widerstand gegen Hitler bieten jedoch die Abhörprotokolle deutscher Stabsoffiziere in britischer Kriegsgefangen schaft. Sönke Neitzel Deutsche Generäle in britischer Gefangenschaft 1942-1945 Eine Auswahledition der Abhörprotokolle des Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre UK Die deutsche Generalität hat sich der öffentlichen Reflexion über ihre Rolle wäh rend des Zweiten Weltkrieges weitgehend verschlossen. Das Bild, das sie vor allem in ihren Memoiren von sich selbst zeichnete, läßt sich verkürzt auf die Formel bringen: Sie hat einen sauberen Krieg geführt, hatte von Kriegsverbrechen größe ren Ausmaßes keine oder kaum Kenntnis, und die militärische Niederlage war zu einem Gutteil den dilettantischen Eingriffen Hitlers als Obersten Befehlshaber in die Kriegführung zuzuschreiben. Es erübrigt sich näher darauf einzugehen, daß dieses Bild von der Geschichts wissenschaft längst gründlich widerlegt worden ist. Aber nach wie vor wissen wir wenig darüber, wie die Generäle die Zeit zwischen 1939 und 1945 rezipiert haben, welche Kenntnis sie von den militärischen und politischen Geschehnissen hatten, die über ihren engen Arbeitsbereich hinausgingen, und welche Schlußfolgerungen sie hieraus zogen. Zur Durchleuchtung dieses Komplexes ist vor allem der Rück griff auf persönliche Quellen wie Briefe und Tagebücher notwendig, die allerdings nur von einem kleinen Personenkreis vorliegen und zudem oft auch nur beschränkt zugänglich sind, da sie sich in Privatbesitz befinden1. -
Koch on Macksey, 'Guderian: Panzer General'
H-German Koch on Macksey, 'Guderian: Panzer General' Review published on Friday, August 1, 2003 Kenneth Macksey. Guderian: Panzer General. London: Greenhill Books/Lionel Leventhal, 2003. xii + 228 pp. $34.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-85367-538-6. Reviewed by James V. Koch (Old Dominion University) Published on H-German (August, 2003) If Germany had defeated the U.S.S.R. militarily in 1941-42, it is likely that the tightly knit Guderian clan would still today occupy the estate at Deipenhof in the Warthegau in West Prussia (now part of Poland) that was given to Generaloberst Heinz Guderian in October 1942 by Adolf Hitler. What should we make of this gift from the Fuehrer to Guderian, the acknowledged genius behind German armored forces in World War II? Was it simply one among many such secretive gifts that Hitler lavished upon the paladins and favorites of the Reich on the occasions of their anniversaries and birthdays, or when they recorded an especially notable achievement? (Guderian had been awarded the rare Oak Leaves to the Iron Cross in July 1941.) Alternatively, was it a subtle bribe to muffle an occasionally insubordinate general who, despite demonstrated affinity for National Socialism and Adolf Hitler, might have been viewed by Hitler as potentially disruptive and contentious? He was, after all, "always a rebel in his profession," according to Downing, and known for speaking his mind to nearly everyone, even to hisFuehrer .[1] Does the gift further suggest that Hitler regarded Guderian, who had been sacked for ordering a retreat south of Moscow contrary to theFuehrer's orders in December 1941, as, nonetheless, an ideological comrade? These are among the interpretative dilemmas Kenneth Macksey, veteran military historian, tackles in his revision of his original 1975 biography of Heinz Guderian. -
Soviet Union
Armies of the Soviet Union WrittenWrit by: Andy Chambers EditedEdited by:by: RickRick PriestleyPriestle and Alessio Cavatore CCoverove artwork: Peter Dennis InteriorInterio Artwork: Peter Dennis and Ron Volstad PPhotography:hotography: WWarwickarwick KinraKinrade,de, MMarka Owen, Rick Priestley and Paul Sawyer ArArtefacts:tefacts: JJohn Stallard Collection. MMiniaturesiniatures ppaintedainted bby:y: SSimoni Bargery, Neil Burt, AAndrésndrés AAmiánmián Fernández,Fernández, SStephanteph Huber, Alan Mander Sample file and Gary Martin. ThTThanksanksk tto:o: SSimonimon Bargery,Bargery, AnAndrewdrew Chesney, Wojtek Flis, PPaulaul HHicks,icks, DDavidaviid HHolmes,olmes, DDaveave LLawrence,aw Bernard Lewis, PPaulaul SSawyera and John Stallard OSPREYSPREY PUBLISHINGPUBLIS H ING ospreypublishing.com warlordgames.com Contents What Is This Book? 5 Ampulomet ‘Molotov Launcher’ Anti-Tank Team 34 ‘Tank Hunters’ Anti-Tank Team 34 The Red Army Of World War II 7 Dog Mines Anti-Tank Team 35 Sniper Team 36 The October Revolution and the Civil War 8 Flamethrower Team 36 The Red Army 8 Light Mortar Team 36 The Purges 9 Medium Mortar Team 37 The Russo–Finnish War 11 Heavy Mortar Team 37 The Great Patriotic War 12 1941 – Moscow 12 ARTILLERY 38 1942 – Stalingrad 14 FIELD ARTILLERY 38 1943 – Kursk 15 Light Howitzer 38 1944–45 – Berlin 16 Medium Howitzer 38 Heavy Howitzer 39 Army List 17 ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS 39 REINFORCED PLATOON 19 37mm 61-K Model 1939 39 ARMY SPECIAL RULES 21 25mm 72-K Model 1940 39 The Great Patriotic War 21 ANTI-TANK GUNS 39 Quantity has a quality -
Conclusionconclusion 389 Conclusion
ConclusionConclusion 389 Conclusion The combat/military effectiveness of an army can be described as the capabil- ity of that institution to sustain itself in the battlefield against hostile forces and to inflict casualties on the opponent by adapting to changing conditions and adopting certain techniques. Combat effectiveness depends on several factors, like recruitment, the combat motivation/loyalty mechanism (an amal- gam of morale and discipline), tactical procedures, the training system, the hardware at the disposal of the military machine, the logistical infrastructure, etc. Let us evaluate these elements in the Indian Army, especially for the period between 1941 and 1945. First, let us analyze the combat contribution of the Indian Army. Winston Churchill and Orde Wingate both had a very low opinion of the Indian Army.1 How far their assessments hold water needs to be evaluated. British India cov- ered 1,630,000 square miles. As a point of comparison, the European part of the USSR extended over 2,110,000 square miles with another 6,460,000 square miles in Asia. In September 1939, Germany had a population of 80 million, the USSR 171 million, Italy 43 million2 and Japan 100 million.3 The Indian Army was not only the largest volunteer force but also the biggest colonial force. But its size pales in comparison with the armies raised by the first class powers during World War II. Malnourishment in the rural sector, political demands (the British could not dare to impose conscription in India for fear of adverse politi- cal repercussions) and imperial prejudice (the Martial Race theory) prevented massive expansion of the Indian Army. -
Kiev 1941: Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East
Kiev 1941 In just four weeks in the summer of 1941 the German Wehrmacht wrought unprecedented destruction on four Soviet armies, conquering central Ukraine and killing or capturing three-quarters of a million men. This was the battle of Kiev – one of the largest and most decisive battles of World War II and, for Hitler and Stalin, a battle of crucial importance. For the first time, David Stahel charts the battle’s dramatic course and after- math, uncovering the irreplaceable losses suffered by Germany’s ‘panzer groups’ despite their battlefield gains, and the implications of these losses for the German war effort. He illuminates the inner workings of the German army as well as the experiences of ordinary soldiers, showing that with the Russian winter looming and Soviet resistance still unbroken, victory came at huge cost and confirmed the turning point in Germany’s war in the east. David Stahel is an independent researcher based in Berlin. His previous publications include Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East (Cambridge, 2009). Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 210.212.129.125 on Sat Dec 22 18:00:30 WET 2012. http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9781139034449 Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 Kiev 1941 Hitler’s Battle for Supremacy in the East David Stahel Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 210.212.129.125 on Sat Dec 22 18:00:30 WET 2012. http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9781139034449 Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 cambridge university press Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao˜ Paulo, Delhi, Tokyo, Mexico City Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 8ru,UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107014596 c David Stahel 2012 This publication is in copyright. -
The Third Winter
GAME SPECIFIC RULES The Third Winter ©2021 Multi-Man Publishing, LLC. All Rights Reserved. Updated 12 August 2021 late September 1943. By the campaign’s converted to Soviet gauge (ignore units Game Design: Antony Birkett end in late April 1944, four Axis armies being supplied by a Kessel HQ.) Development: Chip Saltsman will have faced four Soviet fronts in a titanic struggle. Several scenarios Design Note: By this point in the Series Design: Dean Essig supplement the main campaign, as the war, the Soviets had immense logistical Research Help: Stéphane Acquaviva, German army fights its “Third Winter” in activities that are not represented by units. Carl Fung, Hans Kishel, Roland LeBlanc Russia. 1.2a Off-Map Rail. Either player can use Mapping Research & Playtest their Rail Capacity to rail cargo off and Graphics: Hans Kishel back on any of their map-edges (as long as Graphics: Curtis Baer, Dean Essig the cargo does not cross the Black Sea). 1.0 General Special The only hexes that can be used for this Playtesting Honcho: Marcus Randall Rules purpose are those capable of normal rail Playtesting and Proofreading: Perry movement for that player. No ground unit Andrus, Stéphane Acquaviva, Curtis Baer, can ever end its movement off map. Daniel Broh-Kahn, Dave Barsness, Allen 1.1 Map & Terrain 1.2b Extra Detrainable Hexes. Point of Beach, John Bowen, Art Brochet, Eric Interest hexes on the map are detrainable. Brosius, Thomas Buettner, Malcolm There are four maps labeled A through D. Cameron, Stephen Campbell, Jeff Coyle, Hexes are identified by a map letter and Houndog Cross, Paolo De Francesco, number, e.g., hex B60.10 is a Kharkov city 1.3 Rumania Air Box Myk Deans, Mark Fazakarley, Mark hex. -
Playground of Violence: Mennonites and Makhnovites in the Time of War and Revolution
International Relations and Diplomacy, July 2015, Vol. 3, No. 7, 439-447 D doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2015.07.001 DAVID PUBLISHING Playground of Violence: Mennonites and Makhnovites in the Time of War and Revolution Mikhail Akulov The Kazakh-British Technical University, Almaty, Kazakhstan Focusing on the relationship between the German Mennonite colonists and the self-professed followers of Nestor Makhno, this paper attempts to present a view of the Revolution in which participants are seen primarily through the framework of competition, rather than through binary narrative structures of victims vs. perpetrators, bourgeoisie vs. proletariat, revolutionaries vs. counterrevolutionaries, etc.. Always with an eye at a real or an imagined opponent, the Mennonites and the avowed adherents of the fabled bat’ko ended up profoundly influencing one another, conditioning one’s moves and limiting one’s latitude as does the omnipresent other vis-a-vis the unfolding self. In that light, violence, which both sides had on their record, functioned to cement such ongoing dialects, carrying the protagonists of these turbulent times well beyond their original intentions. Keywords: Russian Civil War, violence, Makhno, Mennonites, revolution Introduction The Russian Revolution, a subject relegated from the top priorities of the scholarly scrutiny in the late 1990s and early 2000s, is now making a comeback. The multiple jubilees are certainly working in its favor. Thus, pouncing upon the opportunity proffered last year by the centennial anniversary of the Great