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Linea Gotica Linea Gotica Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera Linea Gotica Parte della campagna d'Italia della seconda guerra mondiale La Linea Gotica nell'agosto 1944. In blu le manovre alleate Data 25 agosto 1944 - 21 aprile 1945 Luogo Appennino tosco-emiliano e riviera adriatica tra Fano e Rimini Esito Sfondamento Alleato della linea e successivo collasso delle forze tedesche in Italia Schieramenti Regno Unito Germania • Canada Repubblica Sociale • Nuova Italiana Zelanda • Sudafrica • India britannica Stati Uniti d'America Francia libera Polonia Regno d'Italia Brasile Grecia Comandanti Comandanti delle armate Comandanti gruppo in Italia - 15° Army armate C[3][2] Group:[1][2] Albert Kesselring Harold Alexander Heinrich von fino nov. '44 poi Vietinghoff Mark Clark Comandanti della 10ª Comandanti dell'8ª armata: armata: Heinrich von Oliver Leese fino Vietinghoff sett. '44 poi Joachim Lemelsen[4] Richard McCreery Traugott Herr Comandanti della 5ª Comandanti della 14ª armata: armata: Mark Clark fino nov. Joachim Lemelsen '44 poi Fridolin von Senger Lucian K. Truscott und Etterlin Heinz Ziegler Traugott Herr Kurt von Tippelskirch Joachim Lemelsen Comandanti dell'Armata Liguria: Rodolfo Graziani Effettivi 8ª armata britannica 10ª armata tedesca 5ª armata statunitense 14ª armata tedesca Armata Liguria Perdite tra 26 agosto e il 7 tra 26 agosto e il 7 ottobre: ottobre: 30.000 uomini di cui 42.000 uomini (stima oltre 4.500 canadesi del generale (stima del generale Alexander) Alexander) circa 60.000 civili italiani La Linea Gotica (in tedesco Gotenstellung, in inglese Gothic Line) fu la linea difensiva istituita dal feldmaresciallo tedesco Albert Kesselring nel 1944 nel tentativo di rallentare l'avanzata dell'esercito alleato comandato dal generale Harold Alexander verso il nord Italia. La linea difensiva si estendeva dalla provincia di Apuania (le attuali Massa e Carrara), fino alla costa adriatica di Pesaro, seguendo un fronte di oltre 300 chilometri sui rilievi delle Alpi Apuane proseguendo verso est lungo le colline della Garfagnana, sui monti dell'Appennino modenese, l'Appennino bolognese, l'alta valle dell'Arno, quella del Tevere e l'Appennino forlivese, su cui si distinse il corpo dei volontari polacchi. I tedeschi battezzarono inizialmente questa linea con il nome di "Linea Gotica". Per volere dello stesso Adolf Hitler, che temeva le ripercussioni propagandistiche se il nemico avesse sfondato una linea dal nome così altisonante, si decise poi di ribattezzarla "Linea Verde" ("Grüne Linie"), anche se nella storia, e soprattutto in Italia, questa linea difensiva continuò ad esser conosciuta con il nome di "Gotica". Il feldmaresciallo Kesselring intendeva così proseguire la sua tattica della "ritirata combattuta" già attuata dai tedeschi fin dai primi sbarchi alleati in Sicilia, per infliggere al nemico il maggior numero di perdite, in modo tale da rallentare e addirittura fermare l'avanzata angloamericana verso nord, difendendo la Pianura Padana e quindi l'accesso all'Europa settentrionale, attraverso il Brennero, e l'accesso all'Europa centrale attraverso Trieste. Sfruttando il terreno montuoso, Kesselring poté concentrare le sue truppe sulle direttrici e sui pochi valichi appenninici che le colonne alleate avrebbero potuto percorrere, impedendo per molti mesi all'esercito angloamericano composto dall'8ª armata inglese e dalla 5ª armata americana di avanzare in modo significativo verso l'Emilia-Romagna. La Linea Gotica cedette nel settembre 1944 sul settore adriatico nel corso della operazione Olive mentre resistette nella parte centrale, cedendo solo il 21 aprile 1945 a seguito dell'offensiva di primavera Alleata. Infliggendo agli attaccanti gravi perdite e permettendo all'esercito tedesco di resistere fino al decisivo sfondamento delle fortificazioni pochi giorni prima della resa incondizionata delle truppe tedesche in Italia, la Linea Gotica trasformò paradossalmente l'ultimo fronte italiano di una guerra ormai perduta in una "vittoria difensiva" tedesca Premesse Fin dai primissimi giorni successivi lo sbarco alleato in Sicilia, i tedeschi avevano pianificato la realizzazione della Linea Gotica, i cui lavori concreti iniziarono nel 1944, prima dello sfondamento alleato della Linea Gustav[8], con l'approntamento nelle immediate vicinanze di Massa e Carrara di un complesso sistema di difese fisse, costituite da campi minati, reticolati, fossati anticarro, trincee, ricoveri e bunker, soprattutto sulle montagne appena sopra Massa, come monte Folgorito, monte Altissimo e in tutte le Alpi Apuane, in modo tale da controllare i passaggi verso nord attraverso la riviera di levante e la valle del Serchio. Per ottimizzare le limitate risorse che già condizionavano la capacità offensiva della Wehrmacht, furono sfruttati al massimo i vantaggi offerti dall'ambiente naturale. La linea difensiva fu infatti modellata seguendo la morfologia del territorio e quindi utilizzando le posizioni vantaggiose sui rilievi e gli ostacoli naturali come fiumi e terreni paludosi. La costruzione di questo sistema difensivo fu affidata all'Organizzazione Todt, che mobilitò circa 50.000 operai italiani e una brigata slovacca di 2.000 uomini sotto il coordinamento di circa 18.000 genieri tedeschi, che incentrarono le difese nei punti chiave della penisola. Nella zona costiera adriatica venne realizzata una linea continua di bunker, campi minati e ostacoli di ogni tipo per impedire l'avanzata delle colonne corazzate, mentre nella zona appenninica, soprattutto tra i passi della Futa e del Giogo venne realizzato un articolato sistema di bunker in cemento, con torrette d'artiglieria, capisaldi per mitragliatrici, reticolati, campi minati sui pendii delle montagne e punti d'osservazione per dirigere il tiro. Solo nel settore orientale della linea, nell'estate del 1944, erano presenti 3.604 trincee, 479 postazioni anticarro e di mortaio, 2.376 nidi di mitragliatrice, 16.000 postazioni per tiratori scelti, 9 chilometri di fossati anticarro oltre che 120 km di reticolati e 95.689 mine antiuomo e anticarro. Non venne trascurata l'organizzazione tattica della linea e fu applicato il metodo tedesco di "difesa in profondità" utilizzando un sistema di fasce fortificate in successione, profonde qualche chilometro, a seconda della conformazione del terreno. Questo sistema si rivelò molto utile a contenere gli attacchi alleati per molti mesi. Non a caso si parla infatti di Linea Gotica (Verde) I e II, proprio per distinguere la prima linea dalla seconda, posta mediamente circa una ventina di chilometri a nord della prima, ben organizzata e difesa nel settore adriatico e con un andamento vago nel settore appenninico dove verrà ricostruita di continuo dai tedeschi, sfruttando i lunghi tempi concessi dalla lenta avanzata alleata. Le forze in campo Gli alleati Lo sbarco alleato in Francia meridionale (operazione Dragoon) avvenuto il 15 agosto 1944, fece sì che alcuni reparti Alleati in Italia fossero spostati dal fronte per essere accorpati alle forze necessarie allo sbarco in Francia. L'intero French Expeditionary Corps composto da quattro divisioni coloniali addestrate alla guerra di montagna, e tre divisioni americane del 15° gruppo d'armate al comando del generale Harold Alexander vennero quindi allontanate dal fronte italiano. Prima dell'attacco alla Linea Gotica, le forze alleate erano quindi calcolabili in 19 divisioni di fanteria e 5 divisioni corazzate, più tre divisioni di rincalzo, ma il necessario ri-coordinamento delle forze alleate assegnò il XIII corpo britannico comandato dal generale Sidney Kirkman e composto dalla 6ª divisione corazzata, dalla dall'1ª divisione di fanteria indiana dall'8ª divisione indiana appoggiate da una brigata corazzata canadese e successivamente dalla 78ª Divisione inglese, alla 5ª armata del generale Mark Wayne Clark rimasta sguarnita. Della 5ª armata, rimasta pesantemente sguarnita, facevano parte anche il II e il IV corpo, comandati rispettivamente dai generali Geoffrey Keyes e Willis D. Crittenberger, ai quali vennero aggiunte a settembre la 6ª divisione corazzata sudafricana e il contingente brasiliano della Força Expedicionária Brasileira, ad ottobre la 92ª divisione di fanteria statunitense, ed a novembre la 10ª divisione da montagna sempre proveniente dagli Stati Uniti Mentre il settore occidentale dal mar Tirreno fino a Firenze era tenuto dalla 5ª armata statunitense, il settore orientale era invece sotto il controllo dell'8ª armata britannica al comando di sir Oliver Leese, che comprendeva il X corpo d'armata al comando del generale Richard McCreery, il V corpo al comando del tenente generale sir Charles Keightley che comprendeva ben 5 divisioni pronte ad avanzare verso Bologna e Ferrara, e che alle quali verrà successivamente aggiunta la 2ª divisione neozelandese e una brigata greca da montagna[14]. Infine vi erano il I corpo canadese e II corpo polacco, concentrati nell'area pianeggiante tra l'Appennino e il mar Adriatico, il primo al comando del tenente generale Eedson Burns e diretto verso le alture ad ovest di Pesaro e il secondo comandato dal generale polacco Władysław Anders con il compito di occupare il terreno sopraelevato a nord-ovest di Pesaro. Per quanto riguarda l'aviazione, per gli Alleati la completa supremazia aerea era assicurata dai circa 2.900 aerei in dotazione alle due armate alleate che attaccarono la Linea Gotica. I tedeschi Giovane carrista tedesco posizionato nella torretta mimetizzata di un Panzer V Panther Ausf.D. Serventi italo-tedeschi di una batteria antiaerea lungo la Linea Gotica. Durante l'estate del
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