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FIFTH ARMY HISTORY ** * * * R B S T R 1C T E O Instructors Reading this Document (File No r^«fr^_ Date ZllkJ£ CLAS FIFTH ARMY HISTORY 16 AUGUST - 15 DECEMBER 1944 She Sothie CiasBifiration changed to MODIFIED HAN Authority P RESTRICTED r" r* (I Lieutenant General MARK W. CLARK * *• commanding CONTENTS* page CHAPTER I. THE ARNO LINE i A. Advance to the Arno . i B. Terrain Before Fifth Army 3 C. Enemy Defenses 7 D. Strength and Disposition of Enemy Forces 10 E. Disposition of Fifth Army Forces 13 F. The Eighth Army Front 15 CHAPTER II. PREPARING TO ATTACK 17 A. Preliminary Plans 18 B. Change in Allied Strategy ig C. Fifth Army Plan of Attack 21 D. Action in Late August, 22 1. Regrouping on the Left, 20-31 August 22 2. 13 Corps Crosses the Arno 23 E. Eighth Army Penetrates the Gothic Line, 18 August-6 September . 26 CHAPTER III. APPROACHING THE GOTHIC LINE 31 A. IVt Corps Crosses the Arno, 1-5 September 31. 1. Securing a Bridgehead 31 2. Consolidation 35 B. 13 Corps Expands its Bridgehead, 1-5 September 36 C. Development of the Fifth Army Plan of Attack 39 D. II Corps Prepares to Attack 41 E. Further Enemy Withdrawals, 6-9 September 43 F. II and 13 Corps Reach the Gothic Line, 10-12 September .... 44 1. Advance of II Corps 45 2. Advance of 13 Corps 47 G. IV Corps Enters the Mountains, 6-12 September 48 H. Summary of Action 52 IX page CHAPTER IV. BREACHING THE GOTHIC LINE 53 A. Disposition of Forces 53 B. The Assault on II Giogo Pass, 13-22 September 55 1. Terrain 56 2. First Attacks 56 3. Wearing Down the Enemy 60 4. The 85th Division Breaks Through 63 5. The 91st Division Takes Mount Monticelli 65 6. Exploiting the Break-through 66 C. The 362c! Infantry Captures Futa Pass, 13-22 September 68 D. The 34th Division Attacks on the Left, 13-22 September 71 E. 13 Corps Breaks Through, 13-22 September 73 1. The I Division on the Left 74 2. The Corps Right Flank 75 F. Advance of IV Corps, 13-22 September 77 1. The 6 South African Armoured Division on the Right ... 78 2. The 1st Armored Division in the Serchio Valley 79 3. The Corps Left Flank 80 4. Corps Artillery 82 5. Changes in Enemy Dispositions 82 G. Air Support, 1-22 September 83 H. The Balance Sheet of Victory 85 CHAPTER V. THE THRUST TOWARD IMOLA 89 A. The Drive Down the Santerno Valley, 21-30 September 90 1. Terrain of the Santerno Valley 90 2. Initial Successes 91 3. Seizing the Last Heights before Imola 93 4. The Defense of Mount Battaglia 94 B. The Attack on Radicosa Pass, 23-30 September 97 1. Condition of Enemy Forces 98 2. The 85th Division Captures Mount Canda 98 3. The 91st Division Captures Mount Oggioli 100 4. The 34th Division Attacks on the Left 101 C. 13 Corps Advances on the Right, 23-30 September 103 D. I V Corps Passes Through the Gothic Line, 23-30 September .... 105 E. Situation of Fifth Army, 30 September 108 X page CHAPTER VI. THE DRIVE TO THE NORTH in A. Plan of Attack m B. The First Attack, 1-4 October 114 1. The 91st Division Approaches Loiano 114 2. The 85th Division Spearheads the Attack 115 3. The 88th Division Turns North 118 4. The 34th Division Captures Mount Venere 119 5. The Ground Gained 122 C. The Second Phase, 5-9 October 123 1. Action of the 85th Division 123 2. The 91st Division Approaches the Livergnano Escarpment . 124 3. The 34th Division on the Left 127 4. The 88th Division on the Right 128 5. Situation of II Corps on 9 October 130 D. The Third Phase, 10-15 October 131 1. Capture of Mount delle Formiche 131 2. Battle for the Livergnano Escarpment 133 3. The 88th Division Brings up the Right Flank 136 4. Relief of the 34th Division 137 5. Conclusion of the Third Phase 139 E. Advance of the 6 South African Armoured Division, 1-15 October . 140 F. 13 Corps on the Right, 1-15 October 143 1. Assisting the 88th Division 143 2. Protecting the Army Right Flank 145 G. Air Support 147 CHAPTER VII. THE FINAL EFFORT 149 A. II Corps Plan of Attack 149 B. The Thrust in the Center, 16-19 October 150 1. Attack of the 34th Division 150 2. Action on the Flanks of the 34th Division 153 3. The 88th Division Approaches Mount Grande 155 C. Shift to the Right Flank, 20-26 October 157 1. New Orders 157 2. Assault on Mount Grande 158 3. Preparations to Renew the Attack 159 4. Expanding the Bulge 160 5. The Attack Bogs Down 162 XI page D. II Corps Reverts to the Defensive 165 E. The 6 South African Armoured Division Stabilizes the Left Flank, 16-31 October 166 F. 13 Corps Brings up the Right Flank, 16-31 October 167 G. Action on the IV Corps Front, 1-31 October 170 1. Shifts of Allied and Enemy Units 170 2. Renewal of the Advance 171 CHAPTER VIII. THE WINTER STALEMATE 175 A. Fifth Army Halts the Offensive • 175 B. Early Winter Activity 177 1. Changes in Troop Dispositions 177 2. Action During November and Early December 178 C. Action of Eighth Army, 7 September-15 December 179 D. Summary o f Fifth Army Activity, 16 August-15 December .... 183 E. Change in Command of Fifth Army 187 Annexes * • * * * * * Number One. Operations Instructions 189 A. Operations Instruction No. 31, 7 August 1944 191 B. Allied Armies in Italy Operation Order No. 3, 16 August 1944 . 193 C. Operations Instruction No. 32, 17 August 1944 196 D. Operations Instruction No. 33, 24 August 1944 200 E. Operations Instruction No. 34, 4 September 1944 201 F. Operations Instruction No. 35, 5 October 1944 205 G. Current Operations, 370.2-Y, 2 November 1944 208 Number Two. Statistics 213 A. Casualties, U.S. Forces, 16 August-15 December 1944 .... 215 B. Total Casualties and Strength 219 C. Prisoners of War 220 D. Major Ordnance Losses, 20 August-26 November 1944 .... 224 E. Quartermaster Supply, September-November 1944 228 F. Almanac, 1 September-31 October 1944 230 Number Three. Fifth Army Staff . 233 Number Four. Troop List of Fifth Army, 16 October 1944 237 XII lVLCI>J/o ************************ opposite page 1. The Arno Line, 15 August 1944 16 2. Fifth Army Regroups for the Attack, 16-31 August 1944 22 3. Eighth Army Breaches the Gothic Line, 24 August-6 September 1944 . 30 4. Approaching the Gothic Line, 1-12 September 1944 52 5. The Assault on II Giogo Pass, 13-18 September 1944 63 6. Fifth Army Breaches the Gothic Line, 13-22 September 1944 .. 87 7. Attack of the 88th Division Down the Santerno Valley, 21-30 Sep­ tember 1944 g6 8. Advance of Fifth Army, 23-30 September 1944 109 9. The Drive Toward Bologna, 1—15 October 1944 147 10. The Final Effort, 16-31 October 1944 170 11. Action on the IV Corps Front, 1-31 October 1944 173 12. Advance of Fifth and Eighth Armies, 15 August-16 December 1944 . 188 Illustrations * ******************* American soldier inspects German pillbox knocked out dur­ ing the Gothic Line fighting Frontispiece Mile after mile of rugged mountains lay between the Arno and Po Valleys opposite page 6 Few roads cross the Northern Apennines, and these could be easily blocked opposite page 6 Antitank ditch constructed by the Todt Organization to pro­ tect Futa Pass opposite page 7 German machine-gun position in the II Giogo Pass sector of the Gothic Line opposite page 7 Italian partisans share in the welcome of British troops enter­ ing Florence opposite page 24 Our troops seized Florence, but the enemy still held the hills to the north opposite page 24 Sapper of the 8 Indian Division searches for mines near a dead Italian opposite page 25 British engineers clear the way for a Bailey bridge across the Arno River opposite page 25 Briefing Italian civilians who are to be evacuated from near the Arno . opposite page 34 XIII Shallow fords, like this one at Cascina, aided our troops in crossing opposite page 34 Antiaircraft-infantry troops of Task Force 45 cross on a de­ molished bridge opposite page 35 North of Lucca the mountains rise abruptly from the fertile Arno Plain opposite page 35 A 240-mm howitzer crosses a road fill while moving up near Vaglia opposite page 46 Armored cars of the British 1 Division follow a narrow moun­ tain road opposite page 46 Traffic waits while the engineers work to save this bridge near Pontedera opposite page 47 Troops of the 92d Division in action along a canal north of Lucca opposite page 47 Looking across II Giogo Pass toward Peabody Peak and Mount Altuzzo opposite page 56 Artillery fire destroyed these pine trees on the heights near II Giogo Pass opposite page 56 German positions were designed to take full advantage of the rugged terrain opposite page 57 Troops of the 338th Infantry climbing a narrow trail up Mount Verruca opposite page 57 This Italian farmhouse became a casualty collecting point on Mount Altuzzo opposite page 66 Convoy moving up over Highway 6524 after the capture of II Giogo Pass opposite page 66 Jeeps wait for a bulldozer operator to complete a bypass near Firenzuola opposite page 67 Smoke screen over Firenzuola viewed from an abandoned enemy gun position opposite page 67 German tank turret emplaced to command Highway 65 south of Santa Lucia opposite page 72 Troops of the 91st Division pack supplies over slopes near Futa Pass opposite page 72 Italian soldiers lead mules over muddy trails in the 13 Corps zone opposite pagt 73 Artillery firing a concentration in support of the 13 Corps at­ tack opposite page 73 Air view of the Santerno Valley from the vicinity of Firenzuola .
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