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To the Ombrone-Orcia Valley
CHAPTER IV ............... To the Ombrone-Orcia Valley r\.T noon on n June Fifth Army pursued the Germans northwestward with two fresh command groups directing operations. IV Corps was on the left and the FEC on the right after completion of their relief of VI Corps and II Corps respectively. Comparatively fresh troops were available for the continuance of the chase, especially in the French zone where the two FEC divisions initially committed, the 1st Motor ized Division and the 3d Algerian Infantry Division, had been out of heavy com bat nearly two weeks. Only one American division, the 36th, was in action on the IV Corps side. It had been following behind the swift advance of Combat Command A of the 1st Armored Division north of Rome. Although its men had been con stantly on the move since passing Rome, it had not been engaged in any extensive righting, its action behind the armor having been confined largely to mopping up operations. The 361st Regimental Combat Team was attached, giving the 36th Di vision four regimental combat teams. The 34th Division was resting in the vicinity of Tarquinia, where it had moved from Civitavecchia to make way for supply depots being set up near the port. The 1st Armored Division was rehabilitating near Bracciano, and the other two French divisions, the 26. Moroccan Infantry Division and the 4th Mountain Division, were in FEC reserve. The 85th and 88th Divisions were en route to rest areas south and west of Rome. Other American and British divisions around Rome were in the process of leaving Fifth Army. -
Third Division World War II Vol One.Pdf
THIRD INFANTRY DIVISION THE VICTORY PATH THROUGH FRANCE AND GERMANY VOLUME ONE 'IVG. WILLIAM MOHR THE VICTORY PATH THROUGH FRANCE AND GERMANY THIRD INFANTRY DIVISION - WORLD WAR II VOLUME ONE A PICTORIAL ACCOUNT BY G. WILLIAM MOHR ABOUT THE COVER There is nothing in front of the Infantry in battle except the enemy. The Infantry leads the way to attack and bears the brunt of the enemy's attack. The primary purpose of the Infan try is to close with the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting. On the side of a house, tommy gunners of this Infantry patrol, 1st Special Service Froce Patrol, one of the many patrols that made possible the present offensive in Italy by feeling out the enemy and discovering his defensive strength, fire from the window of an adjoining building to blast Nazis out. The scene is 400 yards from the enemy lines in the Anzio area, Italy. Fifth Army, 14 April, 1944. The 3rd Infantry Division suffered 27,450 casualties and 4,922 were killed in action. 2 - Yellow Beach, Southern France, August, 1944 3 - Marseilles, France, August, 1944 4 - Montelimar, France, August, 1944 5 - Cavailair, France, August, 1944 6 - Avignon, France, August, 1944 7 - Lacroix, France, August, 1944 8 - Brignolles, France, August, 1944 9 -Aix-En-Provence, France, August, 1944 12 - St. Loup, France, August, 1944 13 - La Coucounde, France, August, 1944 14 - Les Loges Neut, France, August, 1944 15 - Besancon, France, September, 1944 18 - Loue River, Ornans, France, September, 1944 19 - Avonne, France, Septem&er, 1944 20 - Lons Le Sounier, France, September, 1944 21 - Les Belles-Baroques, France, September, 1944 22 - St. -
US Fifth Army History
FIFTH ARMY HISTORY 5 JUNE - 15 AUGUST 1944^ FIFTH ARMY HISTORY **.***•* **• ••*..•• PART VI "Pursuit to the ^rno ************* CONFIDENTIAL t , v-.. hi Lieutenant General MARK W. CLARK . commanding CONTENTS. page CHAPTER I. CROSSING THE TIBER RIVE R ......... i A. Rome Falls to Fifth Army i B. Terrain from Rome to the Arno Ri\ er . 3 C. The Enemy Situation 6 CHAPTER II. THE PURSUIT IS ORGANIZED 9 A. Allied Strategy in Italy 9 B. Fifth Army Orders 10 C. Regrouping of Fifth Army Units 12 D. Characteristics of the Pursuit Action 14 1. Tactics of the Army 14 2. The Italian Partisans .... .. 16 CHAPTER III. SECURING THE FIRST OBJECTIVES 19 A. VI Corps Begins the Pursuit, 5-11 June 20 1. Progress along the Coast 21 2. Battles on the Inland Route 22 3. Relief of VI Corps 24 B. II Corps North of Rome, 5-10 June 25 1. The 85th Division Advances 26 2. Action of the 88th Division 28 CHAPTER IV. TO THE OMBRONE - ORCIA VALLEY .... 31 A. IV Corps on the Left, 11-20 June 32 1. Action to the Ombrone River 33 2. Clearing the Grosseto Area 36 3. Right Flank Task Force 38 B. The FEC Drive, 10-20 June 4 1 1. Advance to Highway 74 4 2 2. Gains on the Left .. 43 3. Action on the Right / • • 45 C. The Capture of Elba • • • • 4^ VII page CHAPTER V. THE ADVANCE 70 HIGHWAY 68 49 A. IV Corps along the Coast, 21 June-2 July 51 1. Last Action of the 36th Division _^_ 5 1 2. -
The London Gazette of TUESDAY, 6Th JUNE, 1950
jRtttnb, 38937 2879 SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette OF TUESDAY, 6th JUNE, 1950 Registered as a newspaper MONDAY, 12 JUNE, 1950 The War Office, June, 1950. THE ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY FROM SRD SEPTEMBER, 1943, TO DECEMBER; 1944. PREFACE BY THE WAR OFFICE. PART I. This Despatch was written by Field-Marshal PRELIMINARY PLANNING AND THE Lord Alexander in his capacity as former ASSAULT. Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in Italy. It therefore concentrates primarily upon Strategic Basis of the Campaign. the development of the land campaign and the The invasion of Italy followed closely in time conduct of the land battles. The wider aspects on the conquest of Sicily and may be therefore of the Italian Campaign are dealt with in treated, both historically and strategically, as reports by the Supreme Allied Commander a sequel to it; but when regarded from the (Field-Marshal Lord Wilson) which have point of view of the Grand Strategy of the already been published. It was during this- war there is a great cleavage between the two period that the very close integration of the operations. The conquest of Sicily marks the Naval, Military and Air Forces of the Allied closing stage of that period of strategy which Nations, which had been built up during the began with the invasion of North Africa in North African Campaigns, was firmly con- November, 1942, or which might, on a longer solidated, so that the Italian Campaign was view, be considered as beginning when the first British armoured cars crossed the frontier wire essentially a combined operation. -
The Brazilian Participation in World War II
The Brazilian Participation in World War II A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Military History by Carlos José Asumpção Penteado, LtCol, Cav, Brazilian Army Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2006 ABSTRACT This thesis examines how Brazil participated in World War II shoulder to shoulder with the Allies and what this participation brought to the country. During the 1930s, when the relationship between Brazil and Germany was improving yearly, and when it was supposed Brazil would support Germany in case of war, Brazilian leaders could drive the country to support the Allies cause, mainly the United States of America, allowing this country to set aerial bases in Brazilian North East region, in order to facilitate a connection with North of Africa. Moreover, the option in sending a Brazilian Expeditionary Force (BEF) to fight for the Allied in Italy was one of the most important decisions in Brazilian history. It was the first time that Brazil would take part in a war away from South America. The BEF did its best to well represent Brazil, overcoming several difficulties since its preparation and eventually, showing the Brazilian soldiers could fight as equal as the best soldiers in that war. Brazilian participation is almost unknown by countries away from South America, even here in United States; however, this participation was responsible for several transformations in Brazilian's nation powers. After the war, Brazil became the most powerful and wealthy country in South America. -
Plans for the Offensive
CHAPTER II.. * • * * • • * * * • * * * • Plans for the Offensive IVXONTHS of planning by all echelons of command in Italy were climaxed by the final spring offensive directives issued in March and April. To break the formi dable array of defenses which the winter lull had given the Germans an opportunity to build, another carefully planned, coordinated effort would be required by the Allied armies, the activities of which had become more closely correlated as the lines were pushed northward up the Italian peninsula and into the Gothic Line. The ultimate mission remained the same as it had been throughout the entire campaign, the complete destruction of the enemy forces in Italy. The immediate mission was threefold, holding the present positions in the event of an enemy offensive, contain ing the maximum number of enemy divisions in the country, and finally bringing the enemy to battle in order to destroy him. It was estimated that by the first of February the Germans had completed preparations for a withdrawal from the line of the Apennines to the line of the Adige River if necessary, but no factual evidence had been received that this plan would be put into effect at any given time. It was expected, therefore, that the enemy would make such a withdrawal only if forced to do so by Allied pressure, or if or dered to transfer such a large number of troops out of Italy for service in other the aters that he could no longer hold the present 130-mile front. A shortening of his commitment to a line running from the western edge of Lake Comacchio south to Mount Grande would allow three or possibly four divisions to be released from the Eighth Army front; removal of more than that number of units would force him to pull back at least to the line of the Ticino and Po rivers, or possibly as far as the Adige line. -
Ofbattle Italian
\r Ql \ ORDER OFBATTLE OF. THE ITALIAN ARMY JULY 1943 This document must not fall into enemy hands MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WASHINGTON Di. C. fl '1, I~ Tj H> FOREWORD Order of Battle intelligence consists of carefully sifted and evalu- ated information received from a great variety of sources on the organization, strength, and disposition of enemy forces. This information, if complete and accurate, not only facilitates the planning of military operations but enables commanders in the field to judge the enemy's local capabilities and to make their decisions accordingly. The purpose of this text is to furnish intelligence officers with a detailed picture of the basic composition and disposition of the Italian Army. The first part, comprising sections I to IV, is for general orientation on the structure of the Army and its high command, the types of units and their organization, and the other Italian militarized and auxiliary formations. The second part, consisting of sections V to VII, is the Order of Battle proper, giving specific data on the names, numbers, composition, location, and commanders of all identified units of the Italian Army. This latter type of information is of course constantly changing, and it is therefore intended to issue sectional or complete revisions of the book at suitable intervals. More details on the basic organization of units, means of identi- fication, symbols, and abbreviations will be found in the forth- coming Technical Manual on the Italian Armed Forces and the MIS Special Series publication. on Italian military abbreviations, signs, and symbols. All intelligence personnel concerned with the Italian Army should become thoroughly familiar with the contents and arrange- ment of this book so that they can perform their duties more intlligently and can use the great mass of factual data given here as quickly and efficiently as possible. -
The Advance to Highway 68
LiiAr ILK V ******«»»,,«*,,,* The Advance to Highway 68 W N 21 June the front line of Fifth Army stretched from a point about eight miles north of Grosseto near the west coast eastward to the Eighth Army boundary in the vicinity of Sarteano. The troops were entering the Tuscan hill country with the valleys of the Ombrone and Tiber Rivers now behind them. On the right the French were up against the Orcia River; all along the line the most difficult coun try yet encountered north of Rome lay just ahead, and evidences of the stiffening German defense were slowly accumulating. On the extreme left, where troops of the 36th Division were pressing into the hills bordering the north and northwest side of the Ombrone Valley, the coastline swings sharply northwest, thus increasing the frontage of the IV Corps zone and necessitating the use of another division. The plan of IV Corps was to continue the 36th Division along the coastline, following the general axis of Highway 1, while the 1st Armored Division advanced abreast on the right flank, through rugged mountains and over a multitude*of small roads and trails. The 36th Division received a zone about 12 miles wide; the 1st Armored Division front covered a slightly wider area, at places reaching a width of nearly 20 miles. The French front, now divided between the 3d Algerian In fantry Division on the left and the 2d Moroccan Infantry Division on the right, fol lowing relief of the 1st Motorized Division, was approximately 25 miles wide, split nearly evenly between the two divisions. -
Counter Intelligence Corps History and Mission in World War II
1/ U.S. AR MY MILITARY Hl!3TORYtl$jTlWTE WCS CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5008 CIC Wwk!OUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS I’ HISTORY AND MISSION IN. WORLD WAR II COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS SCHOOL FORT HOLABIRD BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND . Special Text BISTGRYAND NISSION \ - IFJ woB[D WARII - - - CIC School Counter Intelligence Corps Center LlU, a‘.* ,’ ARMY WAR COLLEGE - ~Ai%WyE BARFiAdI@, PA, THE CORPSOF INTELLIGENCEPOLICE - CHAPTER1. FROM1917 TO WORLDWAR II Paragraph Page- Purpose and Scope. 1 The Corps of Intelligence Police . 2 : - CHAPTER2. ORGANIZATIONFOR WAR The Corps of Intelligence Police is Geared for Action ....... 5 The Counter Intelligence Corps .............................. 5 Personnel Procurement ....................................... 5 The Problem of Rank......................................... 6 1; CBAPIER3. TBE COUNl’ERITVI’ELLIGENCE CORPS IN THE ZONEOF TIE INTERIOR, 1941-1943 The Military Intelligence Division . ..*.......... 7 13 - PARTTWO _I OPERATIONSOF TIE COWTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS IN THE PRINCIPAL TBEATERS CHAPTER4. OPERATIONSIN NORTHAFRICA The klission . ..*.........................................* 8 The Landing . ..*...........****............. 9 Organization for Operation with Combat Troops . 10 Operations in Liberated Areas . Liaison with United States Intelligence Organizations....... Liaison with Allied Intelligence Organizations.............. 13 Lessons Learned Through Experience . ..*...... 14 Counterintelligence During the Tactical Planning Phases..... 15 Counterintelligence During Mounting Phase of Tactical Operations -
Most Underrated General of World War II: Alexander Patch by Keith E
Most Underrated General of World War II: Alexander Patch by Keith E. Bonn This article is excerpted from an upcoming book, Extreme War, by Terrence Poulos, due to be published by the Military Book Club. The article, written by Keith E. Bonn, draws not only from primary source documents, and also secondary source works such as The Story of the Century and Sandy Patch: A Biography of Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, by William K. Wyant. Used with permission from the author. He was the first American commander to drive the Japanese off a major island; commanded soldiers from North America, Africa, and Europe in a stunningly successful invasion of the European mainland; led the first Allied units to successfully establish themselves along the Rhine; and defeated the last German offensive in the west. Other than Lucian Truscott, he was the American to command a division, corps, and field army in combat. He was the only American general to command large forces in three distinct theaters, namely, a division and corps in the Pacific Theater; an army in the Mediterranean Theater during the invasion of southern France; and an army in the European Theater. The field army he commanded fought over the most diverse and difficult terrain in all of western Europe, yet he never lost a major unit, and accomplished every mission assigned. Eisenhower rated him as “more valuable” than several of his much more well- known peers; Barry Goldwater said that he would have given his “right arm” to have served under him. He was deeply admired by his men, and lost his only son, an infantry captain serving under his command in combat. -
American Signal Intelligence in Northwest Africa and Western Europe
United States Cryptologic History American Signal Intelligence in Northwest Africa Series IV World War II Volume 1 American Signal Intelligence in Northwest Africa and Western Europe i46074 This publication is a product of the National Security Agency history program. It presents a historical perspective for informational and educational purposes, is the result of independent research, and does not necessarily reflect a position of NSA/CSS or any other U.S. government entity. UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY Sources in Cryptologic History Series IV Volume 1 American Signal Intelligence in Northwest Africa and Western Europe George F. Howe National Security Agency 2010 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Table of Contents Page Foreword . ix Author’s Note . x Introduction . .1 PART ONE: THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA Chapter 1: Situation Report . .7 Early Conditions . 7 Early British Experiences with Field SIGINT . 10 German Army and Air Force SIGINT Organizations . 11 U.S. Preparations for SIGINT Service in the West . 13 The Call of the Mediterranean . .16 Chapter 2: Beginnings in Northwest Africa . 19 Planning SIGINT Service in Operation TORCH . 19 Operation TORCH . 23 Tunisia: Organization for the Second Phase . 28 Action during January 1943 . 30 Chapter 3: Axis Initiative in February 1943 . 35 Axis Plans — Allied Expectations . 35 Allied Reversals, 14-17 February 1943 . 36 Through Kasserine Pass . 38 Recapitulation . 39 Two Opposing Army Groups . 40 Chapter 4: The March Offensives . 45 Expectations . 45 II Corps Attacks: Gafsa, Maknassy, and El Guettar . 46 The Enemy Retreat to the Bridgehead . 48 Chapter 5: The Final Phase of Tunisia . .51 Summary . .51 The Attack Begins . 51 The End in Tunisia . -
R-491702 Mudo MOUPYTAINS Ai'm ARMOR
R-491702 MUDo MOUPYTAINS Ai'M ARMOR (THE 1st ARMAORED DIVISION FIFOA ROME TO THE ALPS) A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED All BY COMMITTEE 17, OFFICERS ADVAi~TC3D CQUTRSE THE ARMOR3D SCHOOL 1948 - 1949 MAJOR CUr.,,RY N. VAUGi{AZ MAJOR ROBMET E. iIMiJR, MAJOR VASCO J. ?Eiif~hILi I'llAJOR MMi C. REAG.OR MAJOR JOIN Mv. MULLN CAPTAIN (iORDOIT, Z. McqUAIlT CAk'PTAIN MELVINT H. JM.TSMET 4 FORT Ki-TOX, Kzj\T1JCKY JUNE 1949 I PRFC The purpose of this study .isto present a reasonably detailed account of the employment of the lst Armored Division as an integral part of the tank - infantry - artillery - eng- ineer team which drove strong, deter'mined German forces from ROME to the ALPS during the Italian Campaign .of W'orld W'ar II. The narrative covers the period 3 June 1944 to 2 May 1945, describing (1) the exploitation following the breakout from the AN~ZIO BEACHHE-AD; (2) the pursuit beyond ROIE; (3) the drive through hastily prepared enemy mountain positions south of the ARNO LIVER line; (4) the push from the ARIlO thirough the formidabiF mountain defenses of the GOTHIC LIINE (5) the stalemated winter warfare in the high 1ORTUIN APPE1_4NIVESS. and (6) the rapid breakout into the P0 VALLEY, drawing the campaign to a -glorious conclusion. The scope of this study is limited, since it is based on unit after action reports and histories; a limited number of statpments and writings of campaign participants, observers and historians; and the semi-annual reports of tho Chief of Staff U. S.