Counter Intelligence Corps History and Mission in World War II

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Counter Intelligence Corps History and Mission in World War II 1/ U.S. AR MY MILITARY Hl!3TORYtl$jTlWTE WCS CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5008 CIC Wwk!OUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS I’ HISTORY AND MISSION IN. WORLD WAR II COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS SCHOOL FORT HOLABIRD BALTIMORE 19, MARYLAND . Special Text BISTGRYAND NISSION \ - IFJ woB[D WARII - - - CIC School Counter Intelligence Corps Center LlU, a‘.* ,’ ARMY WAR COLLEGE - ~Ai%WyE BARFiAdI@, PA, THE CORPSOF INTELLIGENCEPOLICE - CHAPTER1. FROM1917 TO WORLDWAR II Paragraph Page- Purpose and Scope. 1 The Corps of Intelligence Police . 2 : - CHAPTER2. ORGANIZATIONFOR WAR The Corps of Intelligence Police is Geared for Action ....... 5 The Counter Intelligence Corps .............................. 5 Personnel Procurement ....................................... 5 The Problem of Rank......................................... 6 1; CBAPIER3. TBE COUNl’ERITVI’ELLIGENCE CORPS IN THE ZONEOF TIE INTERIOR, 1941-1943 The Military Intelligence Division . ..*.......... 7 13 - PARTTWO _I OPERATIONSOF TIE COWTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS IN THE PRINCIPAL TBEATERS CHAPTER4. OPERATIONSIN NORTHAFRICA The klission . ..*.........................................* 8 The Landing . ..*...........****............. 9 Organization for Operation with Combat Troops . 10 Operations in Liberated Areas . Liaison with United States Intelligence Organizations....... Liaison with Allied Intelligence Organizations.............. 13 Lessons Learned Through Experience . ..*...... 14 Counterintelligence During the Tactical Planning Phases..... 15 Counterintelligence During Mounting Phase of Tactical Operations . Conclusions . CBAPIER5. OPERATIONSM SICILY Pre-Invasion Program. ..*................................ 21 - Staging Area Preparations and Duties . ..a............ Operation with Combat Troops . ..*........................... 20 i: Operation in the Static Situation . ..*........ 23 -- Occupational Phase Begins . ...* 24 I - - Paragraph We Captured Documents.......................................... 23 25 Lessons Learned Through Field Experience .................... 24 26 _~ CHAPTER6. OPERATIONSIN ITALY Pre-Invasion Planning ....................................... 25 28 Counter Intelligence Corps During the Invasion .............. 26 28 - From the Volturno River to Rome.......... ..? ................ 27 29 Administrative Procedures During the Italian Campaign....... 28 31 From Rome to the Arno River ................................. 29 32 - The German Espionage Roblem ................................ 30 The Final Breakthrough ...................................... 31 ii Lessons Learned on the Basis of Field Fhqerience ............ 32 34 - CBAPTER7. OPERATICNSIN THE IJNYlED KlNGDOM Organization ................................................ 33 36 .- Liaison with British Intelligence ........................... 34 36 .CHAPTER8. OPERATIm IN FRANCEAND TIE LWLANDS - Pre-Invasion Planning ....................................... 35 38 Operations with Combat Troops ............................... 36 39 - Operations in Normandy...................................... 37 41 Operations in Northeastern France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland .................................................. 38 42 Operations in Southern France ............................... 39 44 - CHAPTER9. OPERATIONSIN GERMANY Operations During the Advance............................... 40 46 Operations in the Static Situation .......................... 47 Conclusions ................................................. 2 48 CHAPTER10. OPERATIONSIN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN AREAS North Atlantic Operations ................................... 43 50 CHAPTER11. OPERATIONSIN THE CARIBBEANAREAS Background .................................................. 44 53 Operations in the Canal Zone................................ 45 53 Operations in the Department of the Antilles ................ 46 54 ~~- CBAPTER12. OPERATICNSIN THE SOUTHATLANTIC THEATER Organization and Activities . 47 56 - CBAPTER13. OPERATIONSM THE MIDDLEEAST 58 - . CHitions Existing in the Area . 48 -- Paragraph me Organization and Administration ............................. 58 ~- Activities in an Area of Multiple Jurisdictions ............. 58 Lessons Learned ............................................. 51 59 CBAPIER 14. OPERATIONSIN TBE CHINA-BBRMA-II‘0I.ATBEAl’ER Activities in India and Bum . ..*.................. 52 60 Activities in China . ..*..........*........ Southeast China Project . t: CHARER 15. OPERATIONSIN ALASKA - Introduction ................................................ 64 Organization ................................................ 64 - Operation and Investigative Procedure ....................... 57 64 CHAPTER16. OPERATI(lNSlN THE HAWAIIANl!XANBS - Introduction . 58 66 Organization .a............................................., 59 Counter Intelligence Corps Controls in Insular Areas.. 60 it- CHAPTER17. OPERATIONSIN THE SOUIHWEST PAC IFIC Early Organization . 69 -- Reorganization of the Counter Intelligence Corps . Counter Intelligence Corps in Combat in the Admiralty Islands63 E Counter Intelligence Corps in the New Guinea Operations..... 64 E .- Operations in the Solomon Islands . 65 Operations in New Hebrides . ..e. 66 74 Operations in the Fiji Islands . 74 -- Lessons Learned from These Island Activities .e.............. b”o’ 74 CHAPTER18. OPERATIONSIN THE PBlLIPPINE ISLANDS - Pre-Invasion Planning . ..e...c........................eo.... 69 77 The Landing Phase. ..o......e... 70 77 - Lessons Learned . ..e.....................*..............*... ; Operations in Luzon . ..*.......................... ;6’ The Entry into Manila . 73 81 The Final Phase. ..o.............................*. 74 81 - CHAPTER19. CONCLUSION Conclusion . ..~....................................... 75 82 - - Part One TBE COBPSOF IWIELLIGENCEPOLICE CHAPTER 1 FROM1917 to 1IoBlD WABII 1. PDEPCSEAND SCOPE. The material in this manual is designed to furnish information on the historical development of the Counter Intelli- gence Corps. It covers the period from 1917 to 1945, with special - emphasis on the war years. An attempt has been made, from the documents available, to describe the history and mission of the Counter Intelli- gence Corps in the various theaters of operations. - 2. Tf?E COB&%OF IMTEUIGEWCEPOLICE. During World War I the In- telligence Section, American Expeditionary Force, recoaaaendedand the War College Division sanctioned the establishment of the Corps of In- telligence Police. Authority for such action was contained in the provi- sions of Section II of an Act of Congress (approved 18 May 19171 giving the President the power to increase the Army to meet the national emer- - gency. This Corps of fifty men in the rank of sergeant of infantry was to report for counterespionage duty under the CommandingGeneral, Ameri- can Expeditionary Force. On 13 August 1917, the Corps of Intelligence - Police was officially established by War Department General Orders. a. A French-speaking officer with experience in police work was given the mission of recruiting the men. He traveled to New Orleans - and New York City where he advertised in the local newspapers for men who could speak French to do intelligence work in France. Ae accepted all candidates who could pass the Army physical examination and answer a - few simple questions in French. b. On 25 November 1917, the Corps of Intelligence Police, fifty strong, arrived in St. Nazaire, France. Some were sent to British Intelligence at L.e Havre for further training. The others were assigned to the rear area under the control of General Headquarters or were merged with divisional intelligence sections. The Le Bavfe Detachment worked et copying British suspect lists and counterespionage suavaeries and be- gan indexing these lists, This training continued until a short while before the Armistice. - c. In January, 1918, the Corps opened its office in Paris and began work on its central card file, securing names from British, French, and American sources. At the end of the war this file contained some 50,000 names. d. The first. actual counterespionage work was done at’ St. Nazaire where enemy agents were reported to be active. Agents appre- hended by the Corps of Intelligence Police were imediately turned over to French authorities for disposition. Civilians were screened, travelers checked, and passports examined. In addition to work of a counter- espionage and security nature, the Corps of Intelligence Police also did investigative work for the Department of Criminal Investigation by con- ducting fraud and graft investigations. Members of the Corps of Intelli- gence Police were assigned to the American Peace Delegation in Paris. One detachment was assigned to guard President Wilson’s residence while he was in France. e. In January, 1918, authorization was granted to increase the Corps gradually to an eventual strength of 750 men. One year later, there were 405 agents on duty with the American Fzpeditionary Force. However, the allotted 750 vacancies were never filled because of the Armistice and demobilization of the Corps. f. Weanwhile, during the years 1917-1918, the work of the Corps of Intelligence Police in the continental United States was carried out under the Chief of the War College Division, General Staff. On 28 November 1917, the Corps was increased to 300 men, 250 of whom were to work within the United States. In Warch, 1918, with the abolition of the War College Division of the General Staff, the Corps of Intelligence Police was transferred to the control of the Wilitary Intelligence Branch of the Executive Division of the
Recommended publications
  • Emergy Evaluation of Water Management in the Florence Area
    EMERGY SYNTHESIS 5: Theory and Applications of the Emergy Methodology Proceedings from the Fifth Biennial Emergy Conference, Gainesville, Florida Edited by Mark T. Brown University of Florida Gainesville, Florida Managing Editor Sharlynn Sweeney University of Florida Gainesville, Florida Associate Editors Daniel E. Campbell US EPA Narragansett, Rhode Island Shu-Li Huang National Taipei University Taipei, Taiwan Enrique Ortega State University of Campinas Campinas, Brazil Torbjorn Rydberg Centre for Sustainable Agriculture Uppsala, Sweden David Tilley University of Maryland College Park, Maryland Sergio Ulgiati Parthenope University of Napoli Napoli, Italy December 2009 The Center for Environmental Policy Department of Environmental Engineering Sciences University of Florida Gainesville, FL ii 32 Emergy Evaluation of Water Management in the Florence Area Federico M. Pulselli, Riccardo M. Pulselli, Nicoletta Patrizi and Nadia Marchettini ABSTRACT The paper presents the results of a project on the Province of Florence (Italy), investigating the availability and use of water resources by emergy evaluation. The study is devoted to the analysis of the watershed of the Sieve River, tributary of River Arno that feeds Florence and its surroundings. Along the river an artificial basin has been created by means of the Bilancino dam to preserve water quantity and quality, and to protect the Florentine area from dangerous periodical inundations. Different specific emergies of water can be identified along the course of the river, especially before and after the Bilancino dam. The aqueduct system of the province of Florence is fed by several rivers and torrents. Here we consider Stura, Sieve and Arno rivers. It is fragmented and divided into many subsystems, slightly interacting with each other.
    [Show full text]
  • Brigadier General James R. Camp
    U N I T E D S T A T E S A I R F O R C E BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES R. CAMP Brig. Gen. James R. Camp is the Assistant Adjutant General for Air, Ohio National Guard. He is responsible to the Ohio Adjutant General for directing Air National Guard operations and establishing policy to ensure mission readiness of more than 5,100 personnel assigned to four flying wings and six geographically separated support units. General Camp earned his commission in 1990 through the Academy of Military Science, McGhee Tyson Air National Guard Base, Tennessee. Following his commission, General Camp attended Undergraduate Pilot Training at Columbus Air Force Base, Mississippi. Prior to assuming the post of Assistant Adjutant General for Air, General Camp commanded the Ohio Air National Guard’s 179th Airlift Wing, Mansfield, Ohio. He has served in a number of operational and staff positions throughout his career to include the Ohio National Guard Director of Human Resources, 745th Special Operations Squadron (Provisional) Commander, and Coordinator and Tanker Control Duty Officer with the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center. General Camp is a command pilot with more than 4,000 hours of military flight time. Throughout his career, he has deployed in support of operations Deny Flight, Decisive Endeavor, Noble Eagle, Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Iraqi Freedom, and Enduring Freedom. EDUCATION 1989 Bachelor of Science, Policy and Management, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa. 2008 Air Command and Staff College, Correspondence 2012 Crew Resource Management Instructor Course, Memphis, Tenn. 2013 ANG Intermediate Development Course, NGB, Md. 2013 Air War College, Correspondence- Excellent Graduate 2013 Mobility Commander’s Tactics Course, St.
    [Show full text]
  • Documents from the Archive of Scuola Normale Superiore Presented By
    Exposition - documents from the archive of Scuola Normale Superiore Presented by: Alberto Lusiani - Physics researcher at SNS Maddalena Taglioli - Head archivist at SNS Chiara Visentin – SNS Student, Virtual Immersion in Science Scuola Normale Superiore of Pisa was formally founded in 1810, by a Napoleonic decree which dealt with “places of public instruction” in Tuscany, part of the French empire since 1807 and referred to as the departments of Arno, Ombrone and Mediterraneo in the terminology used in revolutionary France at that time. Scuola Normale was to be a subsidiary of École Normale Supérieure of Paris, granting 25 publicly funded places, for students in the humanities and sciences. Scuola Normale began operating in 1813 and only for one year, as in April 1814 Napoleon was forced to abdicate. “Normale” refers to the mission of the school, which was to train middle and high school teachers able to convey “norms” in a context where training teachers was connected to “forming” citizens loyal to the laws and the emperor. Scuola Normale and École Normale did not initially have the denomination “Superiore / Supérieure”. In France, after the institution of the “Écoles Normales primaries” in 1845, the School was denominated “École Normale Supérieure”. In 1846, the grand duke of Tuscany, Leopold III, established the “Scuola Normale Toscana”, also called the “ Scuola Normale of the Imperial Reign” - as it was then connected to the “Theoretical and Practical” Austro-Hungarian system – designed “to train teachers and masters for secondary schools”. After the Italian unifcation, the “Scuola Normale of the Kingdom of Italy” was formally established in 1862.
    [Show full text]
  • The Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in World War I: from Inception To
    THE PORTUGUESE EXPEDITIONARY CORPS IN WORLD WAR I: FROM INCEPTION TO COMBAT DESTRUCTION, 1914-1918 Jesse Pyles, B.A. Thesis Prepared for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS May 2012 APPROVED: Geoffrey Wawro, Major Professor Robert Citino, Committee Member Walter Roberts, Committee Member Richard McCaslin, Chair of the Department of History James D. Meernik, Acting Dean of the Toulouse Graduate School Pyles, Jesse, The Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in World War I: From Inception to Destruction, 1914-1918. Master of Arts (History), May 2012, 130 pp., references, 86. The Portuguese Expeditionary Force fought in the trenches of northern France from April 1917 to April 1918. On 9 April 1918 the sledgehammer blow of Operation Georgette fell upon the exhausted Portuguese troops. British accounts of the Portuguese Corps’ participation in combat on the Western Front are terse. Many are dismissive. In fact, Portuguese units experienced heavy combat and successfully held their ground against all attacks. Regarding Georgette, the standard British narrative holds that most of the Portuguese soldiers threw their weapons aside and ran. The account is incontrovertibly false. Most of the Portuguese combat troops held their ground against the German assault. This thesis details the history of the Portuguese Expeditionary Force. Copyright 2012 by Jesse Pyles ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The love of my life, my wife Izabella, encouraged me to pursue graduate education in history. This thesis would not have been possible without her support. Professor Geoffrey Wawro directed my thesis. He provided helpful feedback regarding content and structure. Professor Robert Citino offered equal measures of instruction and encouragement.
    [Show full text]
  • The Bosnian Train and Equip Program: a Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power by Christopher J
    STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 15 The Bosnian Train and Equip Program: A Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power by Christopher J. Lamb, with Sarah Arkin and Sally Scudder Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified com- batant commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: President Bill Clinton addressing Croat-Muslim Federation Peace Agreement signing ceremony in the Old Executive Office Building, March 18, 1994 (William J. Clinton Presidential Library) The Bosnian Train and Equip Program The Bosnian Train and Equip Program: A Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power By Christopher J. Lamb with Sarah Arkin and Sally Scudder Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 15 Series Editor: Nicholas Rostow National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. March 2014 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction
    Title: Daring Missions of World War II Author: William B. Breuer ISBN: 0-471-40419-5 Introduction World war ii, the mightiest endeavor that history has known, was fought in many arenas other than by direct confrontation between opposing forces. One of the most significant of these extra dimensions was a secret war-within-a-war that raged behind enemy lines, a term that refers to actions taken a short dis- tance to the rear of an adversary’s battlefield positions or as far removed as a foe’s capital or major headquarters. Relentlessly, both sides sought to penetrate each other’s domain to dig out intelligence, plant rumors, gain a tactical advantage, spread propaganda, create confusion, or inflict mayhem. Many ingenious techniques were employed to infiltrate an antagonist’s territory, including a platoon of German troops dressed as women refugees and pushing baby carriages filled with weapons to spearhead the invasion of Belgium. Germans also wore Dutch uniforms to invade Holland. The Nazi attack against Poland was preceded by German soldiers dressed as civilians and by others wearing Polish uniforms. In North Africa, British sol- diers masqueraded as Germans to strike at enemy airfields, and both sides dressed as Arabs on occasion. One British officer in Italy disguised himself as an Italian colonel to get inside a major German headquarters and steal vital information. In the Pacific, an American sergeant of Japanese descent put on a Japan- ese officer’s uniform, sneaked behind opposing lines, and brought back thir- teen enemy soldiers who had obeyed his order to lay down their weapons.
    [Show full text]
  • Guides to German Records Microfilmed at Alexandria, Va
    GUIDES TO GERMAN RECORDS MICROFILMED AT ALEXANDRIA, VA. No. 32. Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police (Part I) The National Archives National Archives and Records Service General Services Administration Washington: 1961 This finding aid has been prepared by the National Archives as part of its program of facilitating the use of records in its custody. The microfilm described in this guide may be consulted at the National Archives, where it is identified as RG 242, Microfilm Publication T175. To order microfilm, write to the Publications Sales Branch (NEPS), National Archives and Records Service (GSA), Washington, DC 20408. Some of the papers reproduced on the microfilm referred to in this and other guides of the same series may have been of private origin. The fact of their seizure is not believed to divest their original owners of any literary property rights in them. Anyone, therefore, who publishes them in whole or in part without permission of their authors may be held liable for infringement of such literary property rights. Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 58-9982 AMERICA! HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE fOR THE STUDY OP WAR DOCUMENTS GUIDES TO GERMAN RECOBDS MICROFILMED AT ALEXAM)RIA, VA. No* 32» Records of the Reich Leader of the SS aad Chief of the German Police (HeiehsMhrer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei) 1) THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION (AHA) COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF WAE DOCUMENTS GUIDES TO GERMAN RECORDS MICROFILMED AT ALEXANDRIA, VA* This is part of a series of Guides prepared
    [Show full text]
  • The Quandary of Allied Logistics from D-Day to the Rhine
    THE QUANDARY OF ALLIED LOGISTICS FROM D-DAY TO THE RHINE By Parker Andrew Roberson November, 2018 Director: Dr. Wade G. Dudley Program in American History, Department of History This thesis analyzes the Allied campaign in Europe from the D-Day landings to the crossing of the Rhine to argue that, had American and British forces given the port of Antwerp priority over Operation Market Garden, the war may have ended sooner. This study analyzes the logistical system and the strategic decisions of the Allied forces in order to explore the possibility of a shortened European campaign. Three overall ideas are covered: logistics and the broad-front strategy, the importance of ports to military campaigns, and the consequences of the decisions of the Allied commanders at Antwerp. The analysis of these points will enforce the theory that, had Antwerp been given priority, the war in Europe may have ended sooner. THE QUANDARY OF ALLIED LOGISTICS FROM D-DAY TO THE RHINE A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Department of History East Carolina University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in History By Parker Andrew Roberson November, 2018 © Parker Roberson, 2018 THE QUANDARY OF ALLIED LOGISTICS FROM D-DAY TO THE RHINE By Parker Andrew Roberson APPROVED BY: DIRECTOR OF THESIS: Dr. Wade G. Dudley, Ph.D. COMMITTEE MEMBER: Dr. Gerald J. Prokopowicz, Ph.D. COMMITTEE MEMBER: Dr. Michael T. Bennett, Ph.D. CHAIR OF THE DEP ARTMENT OF HISTORY: Dr. Christopher Oakley, Ph.D. DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL: Dr. Paul J.
    [Show full text]
  • Another History of Europe at War. Gendarmeries and Police Facing the First World War (1914-1918)
    Another history of Europe at war. Gendarmeries and police facing the First World War (1914-1918) International Conference organised at the EOGN in Melun on the 4th , 5th and 6th February 2016 by : Le Centre de recherche de l'École des officiers de la Gendarmerie nationale and Le musée de la Gendarmerie, in cooperation with : Université Paris-Sorbonne the Centre d'histoire du XIXe siècle Labex EHNE Université catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve Le Pôle d'attraction interuniversitaire « Justice et populations : l'expérience belge en perspective internationale ») Dr. Guillaume Payen Chef du pôle histoire et faits sociaux contemporains du CREOGN, chercheur associé au Centre Roland Mousnier, université Paris-Sorbonne Dr. Jonas Campion Chargé de recherches du FRS-FNRS, Centre d’histoire du droit et de la justice, université catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgique) Dr. Laurent López Chercheur associé au CESDIP (université de Versailles/Saint Quentin) et au Centre d'histoire du XIXe siècle (universités Panthéon-Sorbonne et Paris-Sorbonne) The history of Europe into the First World War is still to be written from the police's point of view, in spite of the frequent claim of "constraint"1 in the conflict's historiography. Classically marking the break between the 19th and the 20th centuries, the First World War is more than a separation between two periods. It is a deep historiographic void on both national and European scales. From a Europe-wide perspective, while the comparative approach carried out by Jonas Campion and confronting the cases of the Belgian, French and Dutch gendarmeries focuses on the end of the Second World War2, the book published under G.
    [Show full text]
  • PDF File, 139.89 KB
    Armed Forces Equivalent Ranks Order Men Women Royal New Zealand New Zealand Army Royal New Zealand New Zealand Naval New Zealand Royal New Zealand Navy: Women’s Air Force: Forces Army Air Force Royal New Zealand New Zealand Royal Women’s Auxilliary Naval Service Women’s Royal New Zealand Air Force Army Corps Nursing Corps Officers Officers Officers Officers Officers Officers Officers Vice-Admiral Lieutenant-General Air Marshal No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent Rear-Admiral Major-General Air Vice-Marshal No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent Commodore, 1st and Brigadier Air Commodore No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent 2nd Class Captain Colonel Group Captain Superintendent Colonel Matron-in-Chief Group Officer Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Wing Commander Chief Officer Lieutenant-Colonel Principal Matron Wing Officer Lieutentant- Major Squadron Leader First Officer Major Matron Squadron Officer Commander Lieutenant Captain Flight Lieutenant Second Officer Captain Charge Sister Flight Officer Sub-Lieutenant Lieutenant Flying Officer Third Officer Lieutenant Sister Section Officer Senior Commis- sioned Officer Lieutenant Flying Officer Third Officer Lieutenant Sister Section Officer (Branch List) { { Pilot Officer Acting Pilot Officer Probationary Assistant Section Acting Sub-Lieuten- 2nd Lieutenant but junior to Third Officer 2nd Lieutenant No equivalent Officer ant Navy and Army { ranks) Commissioned Officer No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent No
    [Show full text]
  • The German Military and Hitler
    RESOURCES ON THE GERMAN MILITARY AND THE HOLOCAUST The German Military and Hitler Adolf Hitler addresses a rally of the Nazi paramilitary formation, the SA (Sturmabteilung), in 1933. By 1934, the SA had grown to nearly four million members, significantly outnumbering the 100,000 man professional army. US Holocaust Memorial Museum, courtesy of William O. McWorkman The military played an important role in Germany. It was closely identified with the essence of the nation and operated largely independent of civilian control or politics. With the 1919 Treaty of Versailles after World War I, the victorious powers attempted to undercut the basis for German militarism by imposing restrictions on the German armed forces, including limiting the army to 100,000 men, curtailing the navy, eliminating the air force, and abolishing the military training academies and the General Staff (the elite German military planning institution). On February 3, 1933, four days after being appointed chancellor, Adolf Hitler met with top military leaders to talk candidly about his plans to establish a dictatorship, rebuild the military, reclaim lost territories, and wage war. Although they shared many policy goals (including the cancellation of the Treaty of Versailles, the continued >> RESOURCES ON THE GERMAN MILITARY AND THE HOLOCAUST German Military Leadership and Hitler (continued) expansion of the German armed forces, and the destruction of the perceived communist threat both at home and abroad), many among the military leadership did not fully trust Hitler because of his radicalism and populism. In the following years, however, Hitler gradually established full authority over the military. For example, the 1934 purge of the Nazi Party paramilitary formation, the SA (Sturmabteilung), helped solidify the military’s position in the Third Reich and win the support of its leaders.
    [Show full text]
  • The Central Reserve Police Force Rules/Regulations/Scheme,1955
    1 MINISTRY OF : HOME AFFAIRS (Department of : CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE FORCE) The Central Reserve Police Force Rules/Regulations/Scheme,1955. 1* S.R.O. 499 dated 24th February, 1955:- In exercise of the powers conferred by section 18 of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949,(66 of 1949), the Central Government hereby makes the following rules, namely:- 1. Title: These Rules may be called the Central Reserve Police Force Rules. 1955. 2. Definitions: In these Rules, unless the context otherwise requires: (a)"The Act" means the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 (Act No. 66 of 1949); (b)"Commandant" means the Commandant appointed to the Force; (c)"Deputy Inspector General of Police" means an officer who has been notified by the Central Government as Deputy Inspector General of Police for the Force: (d)"Detachment" includes any part of the Force required or ordered to proceed on duty away from headquarters, (dd)"Director General" means the Director General of the Force appointed by the Central Government through whom the superintendence of, and control over, the Force of the Central Government shall be exercised and who shall, subject to any instructions that the Central Government may give, administer the Force in accordance with the provisions of the Act and of these or other rules; (Inserted vide GSR-3117 dated 15.7.71) (e)"The Force" means the Central Reserve Police Force; (ee)"Additional Director General" means an officer who has be appointed by the Central Government as Additional Director General of Police for the Force and who shall subject to supervision and control and directions of the Director General perform such functions and exercise such financial and other powers as may be authorised by the Director General by general or special order and exercise such financial powers as may be delegated to him by the Central Government.
    [Show full text]