Most Underrated General of World War II: Alexander Patch by Keith E
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Ubject S Section ACADEMIC DEPARTMENT the INFANTRY
). General .:>ubject s Se ction ACADEMIC DEPARTMENT THE INFANTRY SCHOOL Fort Henning, ueorg i a ·ADVANCED ll\IFA.NTRY GFFICERS COURSE 1 947 - 194 8 / uPERATIONS OF THE 2 ~D BATTALION , 3241H HJFAI~RY R GntJiNT (44TH DIVISI ON) IN THE BATTLE OF BUCHEN BUSCH \iOODS , 15-17 J:EBRUARY 1945 (RHINELAND CAMPAIGN ) (Personal Experi en ce of a Batt ali on Execut ive vfficer) '.IY'pe of op eration described: BATTALIO~ IN LJ1~ITED OBJECTIVE TTACK Maj or J oseph m. Fles ch , lnfant~ff lillV ANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS CLASS NO I \ TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Index .•.....••....•.••..•..•..••••••...•.••...••...••...• .-. • . • . 1 Bibliography .................................................... 2 Introduction .................................................... 3 General 0ituation ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 4 Pl anning for the Attack ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 7 The Battalion ~lan of Attack. •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 11 'Ihe At t ack • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 13 The Counterattacks . • . • . • • . • . • . • • • . • • . • • • 16 An~sis and ~rit icism •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 19 Lessons Learned ................................................. 21 Map I - Seventh Army Frent 31 uecember 1944 Map II - G-2, Seventh Ar my , Estimate of the Enemy Situation map III - X:V Cor s ~lan of Attack Map I\T - Terrain Map Buchen Busch Woods Area Map V - Boundary vhanges 44th vivision, 13-15 February 1945 Map VI - 2nd battalion, 324th .Lnfantr y , Plan of Attack Map VII - Enemy t;ounterattack 17 l''ebruary 1945 - 1- BIBLIOGRAPHY A-1 The Seventh United St ates Army Report of 0 erations, Volume li (TIS Library) A-2 Combat History 324th Infantry Regiment, (TIS Library) A-3 Letter, dated 11 .~. •ebruary 1945, ::;ubject: Tentative Plan of Attack, to C. G. 44th Infant~r Division, signed K. s. Anderson, colonel Infantry. (Personal possession) A-4 Field Order Number 12, 44th lnfantry Division, dated 12 February 1945. -
To the Ombrone-Orcia Valley
CHAPTER IV ............... To the Ombrone-Orcia Valley r\.T noon on n June Fifth Army pursued the Germans northwestward with two fresh command groups directing operations. IV Corps was on the left and the FEC on the right after completion of their relief of VI Corps and II Corps respectively. Comparatively fresh troops were available for the continuance of the chase, especially in the French zone where the two FEC divisions initially committed, the 1st Motor ized Division and the 3d Algerian Infantry Division, had been out of heavy com bat nearly two weeks. Only one American division, the 36th, was in action on the IV Corps side. It had been following behind the swift advance of Combat Command A of the 1st Armored Division north of Rome. Although its men had been con stantly on the move since passing Rome, it had not been engaged in any extensive righting, its action behind the armor having been confined largely to mopping up operations. The 361st Regimental Combat Team was attached, giving the 36th Di vision four regimental combat teams. The 34th Division was resting in the vicinity of Tarquinia, where it had moved from Civitavecchia to make way for supply depots being set up near the port. The 1st Armored Division was rehabilitating near Bracciano, and the other two French divisions, the 26. Moroccan Infantry Division and the 4th Mountain Division, were in FEC reserve. The 85th and 88th Divisions were en route to rest areas south and west of Rome. Other American and British divisions around Rome were in the process of leaving Fifth Army. -
Corsa Verso Le Alpi. Parte IX Cap V-3.Pdf
The enemy now seeks to delay our advance while he reassembles his broken and scattered forces in the mountains to the north. You have him against the ropes, and it now only remains for you to keep up the pressure, the relentless pursuit and enveloping tactics to prevent his escape, and to write off as completely destroyed the German armies in Italy. Now is the time for speed. Let no obstacle hold you up, since hours lost now may prolong the war for months. The enemy must be completely destroyed here. Keep relentlessly and everlastingly after him. Cut every route of escape, and final and complete victory will be yours. i. Into the Mountains. (See Map No. j.) The drive the last 6 days as Fifth Army fanned out to finish off the enemy was designed to capture as many enemy as possible in the valley and forestall the formation of the Tyrolean army reportedly being organized in the mountains. The Adige River proved no serious obstacle to our forces, and neither did the nearly unmanned defense line beyond it. The very fact that our forces could practically at will roam across country 20 miles a day indi cates clearly enough the state of the enemy organization. Nonetheless, the Germans still tried to get as many troops as they could out of the valley to the comparative safety of the Alps, and single units often fought fiercely to cover their retreat. In no case, however, did those actions constitute a real threat to the advances of our columns. Not infrequently our rear columns found places reportedly taken and cleared by leading elements again in the hands of the enemy; the simple fact was that no front lines existed, and the countryside literally swarmed with Germans from a wide variety of units, many apathetically awaiting capture and others attempting to pass unobserved through our thin lines and into the mountains. -
Too Young to Be Old
Too Young to be Old To most of us, 33 doesn’t seem very old. But, when you’re surrounded by young men in their late teens and early 20s, your perspective might change a bit. Forrest Hugh Coleman, Jr. of Laurens found himself in just this situation when he was called to active duty in November 1942. Coleman enrolled in Clemson College in just as the Great Depression began to squeeze the momentum from the United States economy. A member of the Class of 1933, Coleman was selected as the Best Drilled Cadet during his sophomore year of 1930. Coleman was an electrical engineering major and served as vice president of the Laurens County Club, was a member of the Sabre Club and attended ROTC training at Fort McClellan, Alabama. Coleman married the former Caroline Burroughs of Augusta, Georgia. They were the parents of a daughter, Sue, and son, Forrest Hugh III. In October 1940, the United States implemented its first peace-time draft. Draftees were called to federal service for a twelve month term to undergo basic military training. Fearful of the international situation, President Roosevelt in the summer of 1941 asked Congress to extend the draftees’ tours of duty beyond twelve months. After the United States entered World War II, a new Selective Service Act made men between 18 and 45 eligible for military service and required all men between the ages of 18 and 65 to register. By April 1942, the Army was inducting young men at the rate of almost 150,000 a month. The supply of 1-A men, those deemed “available for military service,” from the 1940 registration was running out. -
Map Room Files of President Roosevelt, 1939–1945
A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of World War II Research Collections MAP ROOM FILES OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, 1939–1945 Map Room Ground Operations Files, 1941–1945 Project Coordinator Robert E. Lester Guide Compiled by Blair D. Hydrick A microfilm project of UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA An Imprint of CIS 4520 East-West Highway • Bethesda, MD 20814-3389 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Map room files of President Roosevelt, 1939–1945. Map room ground operations files, 1941–1945 [microform] / project coordinator, Robert E. Lester. microfilm reels ; 35 mm. — (World War II research collections) Reproduced from the presidential papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Accompanied by printed guide compiled by Blair D. Hydrick. ISBN 1-55655-513-X (microfilm) 1. World War, 1939–1945—Campaigns—Sources. 2. United States— Armed Forces—History—World War, 1939–1945. 3. Roosevelt, Franklin D. (Franklin Delano), 1882–1945—Archives. 4. Roosevelt, Franklin D. (Franklin Delano), 1882–1945—Military leadership—World War, 1939–1945. I. Lester, Robert. II. Hydrick, Blair. III. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. IV. University Publications of America (Firm). V. Series. [D743] 940.53’73—dc20 94-42746 CIP The documents reproduced in this publication are from the Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, National Archives and Records Administration. Former President Roosevelt donated his literary rights in these documents to the public. © Copyright 1994 by University Publications of America. All rights reserved. ISBN 1-55655-513-X. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ............................................................................................................................ vii Source and Editorial Note .................................................................................................... -
Third Division World War II Vol One.Pdf
THIRD INFANTRY DIVISION THE VICTORY PATH THROUGH FRANCE AND GERMANY VOLUME ONE 'IVG. WILLIAM MOHR THE VICTORY PATH THROUGH FRANCE AND GERMANY THIRD INFANTRY DIVISION - WORLD WAR II VOLUME ONE A PICTORIAL ACCOUNT BY G. WILLIAM MOHR ABOUT THE COVER There is nothing in front of the Infantry in battle except the enemy. The Infantry leads the way to attack and bears the brunt of the enemy's attack. The primary purpose of the Infan try is to close with the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting. On the side of a house, tommy gunners of this Infantry patrol, 1st Special Service Froce Patrol, one of the many patrols that made possible the present offensive in Italy by feeling out the enemy and discovering his defensive strength, fire from the window of an adjoining building to blast Nazis out. The scene is 400 yards from the enemy lines in the Anzio area, Italy. Fifth Army, 14 April, 1944. The 3rd Infantry Division suffered 27,450 casualties and 4,922 were killed in action. 2 - Yellow Beach, Southern France, August, 1944 3 - Marseilles, France, August, 1944 4 - Montelimar, France, August, 1944 5 - Cavailair, France, August, 1944 6 - Avignon, France, August, 1944 7 - Lacroix, France, August, 1944 8 - Brignolles, France, August, 1944 9 -Aix-En-Provence, France, August, 1944 12 - St. Loup, France, August, 1944 13 - La Coucounde, France, August, 1944 14 - Les Loges Neut, France, August, 1944 15 - Besancon, France, September, 1944 18 - Loue River, Ornans, France, September, 1944 19 - Avonne, France, Septem&er, 1944 20 - Lons Le Sounier, France, September, 1944 21 - Les Belles-Baroques, France, September, 1944 22 - St. -
O C Moving on the Left, Along Secondary Roads. Entrenched German Paratroopers of the S.Fallschlrmjaeger-Diuision, Which The
moving on the left, along secondary roads. Entrenched German paratroopers of the S.Fallschlrmjaeger-Diuision, which the 4th Armored Division had met previously in Brittany, checked CCA's advance at Mzuielange for the rest of the day. In Bastogne, General McAuliffe, commander of the surrounded American troops, rejected a German surrender demand with the famous comment, "Nuts!" The CCA columns spent most of the day waiting at Marlenge while engineers spanned the wide chasm of the Sure River with a ninety-foot Bailey bridge. To the west, CCB reached Bumon, only seven miles from Bastogne the first day, but the head of the column was stopped by anti• tank fire in nearby Chaumont after midnight. CCB decided to take no chances and waited for daylight. Saturday dawned clear and bright, enabling Allied aircraft to intervene in the fighting for the first time. Tankers and crewmen of the 704th watched hundreds of C47 transports rumble overhead, bound for Bastogne to paradrop supplies. Soon afterwards, P38s now relieved of their escort duties, swooped down to bomb and sh-affe. After soften• ing Chaumont with an artillery barrage and airstrikes, CCB launched an attack at 1330 hours. At first everything seemed to go fine as the armored infantry and the twenty-two remaining Shermans of the 8th Tank Battalion swept into the village while M18 Hellcats of the 704th laid down a base of fire. But, the clear weather had thawed the fields, and the soft ground bogged down the American tanks. Then, a counterattack from the high ground beyond, led by the 26.Volks- Grenadier-Division's 11 .Sturmgescheutz-Brlgade, blasted eleven of the Shermans and the enemy reentered the village. -
Operation Overlord James Clinton Emmert Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College
Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Master's Theses Graduate School 2002 Operation overlord James Clinton Emmert Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons Recommended Citation Emmert, James Clinton, "Operation overlord" (2002). LSU Master's Theses. 619. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/619 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. OPERATION OVERLORD A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Liberal Arts in The Interdepartmental Program in Liberal Arts by James Clinton Emmert B.A., Louisiana State University, 1996 May 2002 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis could not have been completed without the support of numerous persons. First, I would never have been able to finish if I had not had the help and support of my wife, Esther, who not only encouraged me and proofed my work, but also took care of our newborn twins alone while I wrote. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Stanley Hilton, who spent time helping me refine my thoughts about the invasion and whose editing skills helped give life to this paper. Finally, I would like to thank the faculty of Louisiana State University for their guidance and the knowledge that they shared with me. -
BATTLE-SCARRED and DIRTY: US ARMY TACTICAL LEADERSHIP in the MEDITERRANEAN THEATER, 1942-1943 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial
BATTLE-SCARRED AND DIRTY: US ARMY TACTICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER, 1942-1943 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Steven Thomas Barry Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2011 Dissertation Committee: Dr. Allan R. Millett, Adviser Dr. John F. Guilmartin Dr. John L. Brooke Copyright by Steven T. Barry 2011 Abstract Throughout the North African and Sicilian campaigns of World War II, the battalion leadership exercised by United States regular army officers provided the essential component that contributed to battlefield success and combat effectiveness despite deficiencies in equipment, organization, mobilization, and inadequate operational leadership. Essentially, without the regular army battalion leaders, US units could not have functioned tactically early in the war. For both Operations TORCH and HUSKY, the US Army did not possess the leadership or staffs at the corps level to consistently coordinate combined arms maneuver with air and sea power. The battalion leadership brought discipline, maturity, experience, and the ability to translate common operational guidance into tactical reality. Many US officers shared the same ―Old Army‖ skill sets in their early career. Across the Army in the 1930s, these officers developed familiarity with the systems and doctrine that would prove crucial in the combined arms operations of the Second World War. The battalion tactical leadership overcame lackluster operational and strategic guidance and other significant handicaps to execute the first Mediterranean Theater of Operations campaigns. Three sets of factors shaped this pivotal group of men. First, all of these officers were shaped by pre-war experiences. -
Aggressor Order of Battle
.il* VJ DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL AGGRESSOR ORDER OF BATTLE i or*' DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ■ JUNE 1955 < FOREWORD The country, peoples, forces, or individuals described herein are fictitious. Any resemblance to existing countries, forces, or indi-., viduals is inadvertent and coincidental. *FM 30-103 FIELD MANUAL DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY No. 30-103 WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 23 June 1955 AGGRESSOR ORDER OF BATTLE Paragraphs Page PART ONE. INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1,2 3 2. GENERAL — 3-6 5 PART TWO. IDENTIFIED GROUND ORGANIZATIONS CHAPTER 3. MAJOR GROUND UNITS Section I. Army Groups - 7-11 12 II. Armies 12-28 14 III. Corps 29-69 20 IV. Rifle Divisions 70-129 35 V. Mountain Divisions 130-134 69 VI. Airborne Divisions 135-141 72 VII. Mechanized Divisions 142-163 78 VIII. Tank Divisions 164-171 90 IX. Cavalry Divisions 172-176 95 X. Artillery Divisions 177-192 98 XI. Antiaircraft Divisions 193-206 108 CHAPTER 4. GROUND UNITS, DIVISIONAL Section I. Rifle Units 207-214 114 II. Airborne Units 215-230 117 III. Armored and Cavalry Units 231-240 120 IV. Field Artillery Units 241-257 123 V. Antiaircraft and Antitank Units 258-269 126 VI. Mortar and Rocket Units 270-281 129 VII. Engineer Units 282-287 131 VIII. Signal Units 288-292 133 IX. Service Units 293-804 134 CHAPTER 5. GROUND UNITS, NONDIVISIONAL (GHQ) Section I. Rifle Units 305-312 136 II. Armored and Cavalry Units 313-317 187 III. Field Artillery Units 318-330 138 IV. Antiaircraft and Antitank Units 331-337 141 V. -
The Rhine River Crossings by Barry W
The Rhine River Crossings by Barry W. Fowle Each of the Allied army groups had made plans for the Rhine crossings. The emphasis of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) planning was in the north where the Canadians and British of Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery's 21st Army Group were to be the first across, followed by the Ninth United States Army, also under Montgomery. Once Montgomery crossed, the rest of the American armies to the south, 12th Army Group under General Omar N. Bradley and 6th Army Group under General Jacob L. Devers, would cross. On 7 March 1945, all that Slegburg changed. The 27th Armored Infantry Battalion, Combat Beuel Command B, 9th Armored Division, discovered that the Ludendorff bridge at 9th NFANR " Lannesdorf I0IV R Remagen in the First Army " Mehlem Rheinbach area was still standing and Oberbachem = : kum h RM Gelsd srn passed the word back to the q 0o~O kiVl 78th e\eaeo Combat Command B com- INP L)IV Derna Ahweile Llnz mander, Brigadier General SInzig e Neuenahi Helmershelm William M. Hoge, a former G1 Advance to the Rhine engineer officer. General 5 10 Mile Brohl Hoge ordered the immediate capture of the bridge, and Advance to the Rhine soldiers of the 27th became the first invaders since the Napoleonic era to set foot on German soil east of the Rhine. Crossings in other army areas followed before the month was. over leading to the rapid defeat of Hitler's armies in a few short weeks. The first engineers across the Ludendorff bridge were from Company B, 9th Armored Engineer Battalion (AEB). -
[email protected] 44 Panzer-Armeeoberkommando 2
Panzer-Armeeoberkommando 2 (Second Panzer Army) 43 The predecessor of the Second Panzer Army, the XIX Motorized Corps (XIX. Armeekorps /mot./), was formed in May 1939, and took part as such in the Polish campaign. It fought in the West as Panzer Group Guderian (Panzergruppe Guderian), and in early May 1941, it was de- signated Panzer Group 2 (Panzergruppe 2). It fought as Panzer Group 2 in the early stages of the campaign on the eastern front. From July 28 to August 3, 194-1, it was known as Army Group Guderian (Armeegruppe Guderian), On October 5, 1941, it became the Second Panzer Army (Panzer-AOK 2). It continued to operate on the central sector of the eastern front until the middle of August 1943, when it was transferred to the Balkans for anti- guerilla operations. It was engaged in the Brod area in eastern Croatia in December 1944, and subsequently against the Soviets in southern Hungary. Commanders of the Army from May 1941 until its disbandment in May 1945 were Generals Heinz Guderian, Rudolf Schmidt, Walter Model, Lothar Rendulic, Franz Bbhme, and Maximilian de Angelis. Organization Index Abteilungen Dates Item I'o. Abteilung la Zustandsberichte Oct 24, 1939 - May 1, 1941 75118/8 T&tigkeitsbericht Jun 25 - Dec 24, 1940 10001/1 Anlagen zum T&tigkeitsbericht Jun 25 - Dec 17, 1940 10001/2-8 Meldungen Jul 12, 1940 - Jun 7, 1941 85424/5 Anlagen z. Tatigkeitsbericht* Dec 27, 1940 - Feb 27, 1941 10001/9-10 Anlage z. Tatigkeitsbericht Mar 1-28, 1941 10001/15 Anlagen z. Tfctigkeitsbericht Mar 25 - Jun 3, 1941 10001/19-21 Anlage z.