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Mark W. Clark and the Italian Campaign in World War II Jon Mikolashek

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Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2007 Flawed, but Essential: Mark W. Clark and the Italian Campaign in World War II Jon Mikolashek Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES FLAWED, BUT ESSENTIAL: MARK W. CLARK AND THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN IN WORLD WAR II By JON MIKOLASHEK A Dissertation submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Degree Awarded: Summer Semester, 2007 The members of the Committee approve the dissertation of Jon Mikolashek defended on 29 March 2007. ______________________________ James P. Jones Professor Directing Dissertation ______________________________ Tony Stallins Outside Committee Member ______________________________ Max Paul Friedman Committee Member ______________________________ Robert Gellately Committee Member ______________________________ Michael Creswell Committee Member Approved: _____________________________________________ Neil Jumonville, Chair, Department of History _____________________________________________ Joseph Travis, Dean, College of Arts and Sciences The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation signifies an end and a beginning. While my career ends at Florida State, my life as a historian will begin. Over the years, I have received help from numerous people that have helped make my five years as a graduate student come to a speedy and productive end. My father, James Mikolashek, has supported me before and after the passing of my mother. I will never completely understand the ordeals he had to face on his own raising a son, while at the same time retiring from the Army and embarking on a new career. You were always there Pops, to not only force me to do my math homework, but to throw around the baseball and drive me to practice and other activities. Without your guidance, I would not be were I am today. Also, to my uncle, Paul T. Mikolashek, who has always been there for me and my academic career. Your corrections and comments not only improved this dissertation, but helped me become a better historian. I can never repay your help in going to Italy or your guidance throughout my life. My wife, Colleen, has proven to be a counter balance in my life, constantly steering me away from trouble and keeping me headed towards my goals. She is also my favorite editor, who always took time out of her busy life to read my papers and this dissertation. I never thought that when we met in 1999, that you would become the love of my life. How lucky I am to be surprised. James P. Jones is everything a major professor should be. Demanding, understanding and vastly experienced not only in life, but in the field of history. While I am just one of his numerous Ph.D. students, he was always there to discuss my ideas and push me in the right direction. From holding “publication meetings” to drinking a “few” beers, he has proven to be the best mentor I could ask for. The other members of my committee, Max Paul Friedman, Robert Gellately, Michael Creswell and Tony Stallins have always been willing to meet and have been attentive to the numerous forms and meetings required of completing a Ph.D. degree. Special thanks goes to Dr. Friedman and Dr. Gellately, who were particularly helpful and allowing me to take my comprehensive exams during the summer. Go Lloyd Clark! iii Special mention must go to Jane Yates at the Citadel, who helped me research and made thousands of pages of copies for me. Also, the late Martin Blumenson, who without his guidance I would never have gotten interested in this subject. Dr. Blumenson, I hope this study on Clark would meet your approval. Lastly, I would like to thank my friends, who have served as teammates, editors and critics. Special thanks go out to Fox, Fertick, Scott, Vinny and Weber. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures …………………………….……………………………………...……………..vi Abstract ........................................................................................................................vii INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................1 1. TWO MEN OF DESTINY: THE ARRIVAL OF THE AMERICAN GROUND FORCES IN ENGLAND …………………………………..................................................................10 2. ADVENTURE BELOW, POLITICS ABOVE: CLARK’S SECRET MISSION TO AFRICA AND THE DARLAN DEAL …………................................................................22 3. THE BIRTH OF THE FIGHTIN’ FIFTH: THE UNITED STATES FIFTH ARMY…………………………………………………..………………………..……………...54 4. DISASTER SAVED: THE BATTLE OF SALERNO ……..…..…………………………65 5. STUCK IN THE MOUNTAINS: THE FIRST WINTER ……….......……………………80 6. BLOODY RIVER: THE RAPIDO RIVER CROSSING AND THE PLANNING OF ANZIO ………………………………………………………….………..……...…………..….88 7. THE WILDCAT THAT BECAME A WHALE: ANZIO …………………………..….....110 8. ROME: THE PRIZE? ………………………………………………..…………..………135 9. THE STARVING TIME: THE FAILED ADVANCE FROM ROMEAND THE SECOND WINTER ……..…………….…………………………...…………………………………….161 10. VICTORY AT LAST ………………………………………………..……………..……173 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................183 APPENDIX A................................................................................................................189 APPENDIX B................................................................................................................200 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................210 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ..........................................................................................215 v LIST OF FIGURES 1. Allied invasion Plans……………………………………………………………………..189 2. The VI Corps perimeter after landing at Salerno………………………….…………..190 3. The Fifth Army at the Winter Line………………………………………………………191 4. The crossings of the Rapido and Garigliano Rivers………………..…………………192 5. The VI Corps perimeter at Anzio…………………………………………………..……193 6. Allied lines prior to the capture of Rome……………………………………………….194 7. The VI and II Corps reunite………………………………………………….…………..195 8. Clark shifts the attack towards Rome…………………………………………………..196 9. The assault on Rome…………………………………………………………………….197 10. The Allied lines during the Second Winter………………………………….………..197 11. The Allies break into the Po Valley……………………………………………………198 12. The final offensive……………………………………………………………………....199 13. Mark W. Clark…….……………………………………………………………………..200 14. John P. Lucas……………………………………………………………………………201 15. Troops returning from the Rapido River………………………………………………202 16. Aerial view of Anzio…………………………………………………………………..…203 17. Aerial view of Monte Cassino………………………………………………………….204 18. The bombing of the monastery………………………………………………………..205 19. Geoffrey Keyes (left) and Willis D. Crittenberger……………………………………205 20. Donald Brann and Clark………………………………………………………………..206 21. The abbey at the time of Allied capture………………………………………………207 22. Valmontone and Highway 6……………………………………………………………207 23. Clark and Alphonse Juin……………………………………………………………….208 24. Von Senger surrenders to Clark……………………………………………………….209 vi ABSTRACT The wartime career of General Mark W. Clark has never been critically analyzed. This study addresses that missing scholarship. This dissertation examines the wartime career of General Clark beginning with his arrival in England in 1942 to the end of the war in May 1945. Aside from Clark’s career and achievements, the study further examines the reasons the United States went to war in Italy and decided to stay. vii INTRODUCTION George S. Patton once remarked, “I think that if you treat a skunk nicely, he will not piss on you – as often.”1 The skunk was General Mark Wayne Clark. Often ignored and nearly always forgotten, Mark Clark was a member of what historian Martin Blumenson calls, “the essential quartet of American leaders who achieved victory in Europe.”2 Along with Dwight D. Eisenhower, George S. Patton, and Omar N. Bradley, Mark Clark was a key figure in World War Two and a hero to Americans, Italians and Brazilians. Clark commanded the Fifth United States Army, and later the 15th Army Group, on the Italian front. Originally intended to quickly capture Rome, the campaign against the “soft underbelly” of Axis power proved much more difficult than Allied planners anticipated and dragged on until 2 May, 1945. The campaign eventually became a sideshow for OVERLORD, and Allied success on D-Day and the breakout across France quickly made Italy the forgotten front. To most historians and the general public the war in Italy remains little known and is believed to be a sideshow that took too long. The main attraction of invading Italy for the Allies was that it would knock Italy out of the war, eliminate its fleet, and establish a base for a possible invasion of the Balkans and it would bring the Allied bombers closer to German factories and Romanian oilfields. Lastly, and most importantly, the Allied planners hoped that an invasion of Italy would pin down German divisions that might otherwise be used against the Soviets in the east or against the Western Allies after their landing in Normandy.3 Both Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt realized that the Western Allies needed to fight somewhere
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