September 2019 September

The Magazine of the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps - Italy

EAGLE TOUR 19

Special

Edition #WEARENATO / 1 NATO Rapid Deployable Corps - Italy Ubique Celere

CONTENTS BATTLEFIELD TOUR/STAFF RIDE DIDACTIC VALUE: THE IMPORTANCE AND ROLE OF MILITARY HISTORY, BATTLEFIELD TOURS AND STAFF RIDES FOR MULTINATIONAL HEADQUARTERS IN THE 21ST CENTURY. /NRDCItaly Maj. Gen. (retd.) Scollo, Italian Army

THE GOTHIC LINE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND @NRDCITA 1 Col. Cacciagrano, Italian Army JOINT FIRE PLAN NRDC ITA 2Col. Smith, British Army CONDUCT AN ARMORED ATTACK AGAINST A DEFENSIVE LINE NRDC-Italy 3Col. Cacciagrano, Italian Army MOUNTAIN WARFARE, TERRAIN EXPLOITATION AND LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS 4Ltc. Sotlar, Slovenian Army, Ltc. Baessato, Italian Army Everywhere Rapidly is the authorized of- and Maj. Hoxhaj, Albanian Navy cial publication of the NATO Rapid De- ployable Corps, Italy. All editorial content EXPLOITATION OF SUCCESS AND RESERVE COMMITMENT of the Everywhere Rapidly is approved Maj. Snitko-Dottarelli, Lituanian Army by the NRDC-ITA Commander, at “ Ugo 5 Mara” barracks, via per Busto Arsizio, 20 - AIR AND NAVAL SUPPORT 21058 Solbiate Olona , Varese, Italy. TO OPERATIONS 6Col. Andreozzi, Italian Air Force Everywhere Rapidly is published by the Public Affairs Of ce. Contents of the and Commander Marzollo Italian Navy Everywhere Rapidly are not necessarily the of cial views of, or endorsed by the HOW TO INTEGRATE COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS North Atlantic Treaty Organization and IN DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENTS IN ORDER the Nations thereby represented. All 7 TO MAINTAIN TEMPO intellectual property rights, including Col. Cacciagrano, Italian Army copyright in the content displayed on the everywhere rapidly, belong to their INVOLVEMENT OF A NEUTRAL COUNTRY IN THE WAR respective owners. All material and in- formation, including comments, are go- Col. Greggersen, German Army, Col. Zouggari French Army and verned by the doctrine of fair use. The 8Col. Bauska, Latvian Army Publication and the content may only be used for lawful purposes. For this purpo- COMPARE THE CONDUCT OF THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, se alone one may print out, reproduce, or FOCUSED ON THE ARMY CORPS, WITH THE MULTI CORPS LCC photocopy as needed. The editor reserves 9Maj. Rodà, Italian Army the right to edit all submissions for style, brevity and clarity. ASSESS IF THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK OF THE OPERATIONS DEEP, CLOSE AND REAR IS APPLICABLE TO THE WWII EVENTS Printed by: Gra ca Olona 10IN THE GOTHIC LINE AND COMPARE THOSE EVENTS WWII WITH THE CURRENT DOCTRINE Col. Dario and the Sta of Friuli Division, Italian Army

MILITARY HISTORY STUDY AND THE ART OF COMMAND

2 / #WEARENATO War is a complex endeavor composed of many variables including terrain, the composition and organization of forces, human aspects, and chance. The interdependency and dyna- mics among these variables leads to a certain degree of entropy that, under the umbrella of the principles of the art of war, the intellectual abilities and knowledge of commanders (at all levels) seek to clarify in order to understand the battle. The absence of major state con icts over the past 70 years and recent experiences in asymmetric con icts, have heavily contributed to a shift in interest and training of staff away from the basic principles of large scale con icts in a near-peer confrontation scenario.

Even with the recent increase in the frequency of hybrid con icts, the re-alignment of staff’s mindset toward high intensity warghting is a valuable exercise for military leaders. The accurate and in-depth study of Military History remains useful to prepare both those in positions of authority and their supporting staff. To that end, staff rides and battleeld tours are natural and effective tools to illustrate the theoretical concepts learned by studying pre- vious con icts, experiences and lessons learned.

Detailed preparatory studies, accurate maps, review of the impacts of the terrain, a critical approach and an open mindset are essential to facilitate quality staff rides/battleeld tours. Through highlighting the ‘so what’ from events of past con icts, they enhance the knowled- ge of staff which can be effectively applied to the real-world planning and execution of the Corps’ operations.

NRDC-ITA, in its efforts to re-align to the Corps role, is proactively evolving its structure, procedures and training to enable it to operate in any contemporary environment. In this context, the senior staff of NRDC-ITA conducted a week-long Battleeld Tour, from 31 Mar- ch to 7 April 2019, focusing on the operations related to the breakthrough of the Gothic Line during the summer of 1944. The aim of this event was to increase the knowledge and the decision making skills for the senior ofcer attendees by exploring a multi-Corps high

intensity con ict. FOREWORD

This special edition of the ER magazine will illustrate the procedures used by NRDC-ITA to conduct staff rides/battleeld tours and share the lessons drawn from the study of a mul- ti-Corps campaign, based on the Allies’ breakthrough of the Gothic Line in World War II.

#WEARENATO / 3 BATTLEFIELD TOUR/STAFF RIDE DIDACTIC VALUE: THE IMPORTANCE AND ROLE OF MILITARY HISTORY, BATTLEFIELD TOURS AND STAFF RIDES FOR MULTINA- TIONAL HEADQUARTERS IN THE 21ST CENTURY.

Maj. Gen. (retd.) Scollo, Italian Army

It is well known to all ocers of NATO armies that training of the ocer cadre is one of the most demanding issues that trainers have to face. It is not only training but, more appropriately, education of minds and personalities. Military leaders must be trained to analyse complex issues and situations in which the level of uncertainty is normally high, grasp quickly the core aspects of the situations and take sound and swift decisions to seize and maintain the initiative. It is universally recognized that the study of military history, campaigns and battles are an invaluable part of an ocer’s education.

The study, however, should not be limited to re- than the norm. Attendees may express some con- searching only the accuracy of the position of units siderations about the military operation which is on the terrain, as this actually has little value. “Those being studied but no formal follow on activity is who believe that exactness is really important nev- expected. er have known war or must have forgotten it. For the issue of any operation of war is decided not The Staff Ride is something more professional and by what the situation actually is, but what the rival consists of a preliminary study of a selected mili- commanders think it is”1. Moreover, the study has to tary campaign, an extensive visit to the actual asso- be conducted to draw useful contemporary lessons ciated sites, and an opportunity to integrate the rel- and to develop officers’ ability to solve problems evant lessons from each. This is achieved through independently. To that aim three types of differ- an in-depth analysis of selected training objectives ent exercises have been developed: the Battlefield for each day in order to draw lessons applicable to Tour, the Staff Ride and the Tactical Exercise With- modern warfare. It is normally divided into prelim- out Troops (TEWT) (supported by maps). Though inary study, field study and follow-on integration in these terms are quite often interchanged, they have an after action review. different functions and describe a different type of exercise. TEWT is a further development of the Staff Ride which can be played both at operational and tacti- A Battlefield Tour is generally concerned at looking cal levels. In this activity, the historical events of the at past operations for general interest: systematic past are in the background while the terrain is the preparation for this activity is more the exception main training tool. A detailed study of the terrain 1 See B.H. Liddell Hart “ Sherman, Soldier, Realist, American” Da Capo Press, 1994 p. xiv.

4 / #WEARENATO is a preliminary step to conduct a MAPEX (map A key point of the diagram is that the Staff Ride exercise) with a fictitious scenario in which appears to be the best possible compromise that attendees should employ contemporary opera- matches the knowledge of military history with tional art, tactics, techniques and procedures to the study and application of current NATO doc- play an operation that may recall in broad terms trine to military operations. a campaign of the past. Apart from the terrain study and the preliminary recce, a TEWT can be Preparation of a Staff Ride requires an early played also on maps, even in garrison. conceptual engagement across the HQ: firstly it must be focused on the appropriate training The level of involvement of the Training Audi- phase of the HQ, secondly the historical period ence in the three activities is depicted in Dia- has to be carefully selected in order to consider gram 1 below. a battle in which all HQ Divisions and Branches may be conveniently trained2, then it has to be focused on certain fields of interest (e.g. Joint Diagram 1 Fires, Engineers, Air Operations and so forth), and lastly it has to take into account the need to involve relevant specialists of the HQ in the de- cision making process related to specific issues (LEGAD, POLAD, STRATCOM, Provost Marshal, just to name a few). Finally, a list of training ob- jectives and related discussion themes has to be drafted, to be matched with the main events of the campaign or the battle under consideration. In the Table below, we can see how different training events may match (generic) training ob- jectives.

TRAINING EVENT TRAINING OBJECTIVE Battlefield Tour Staff Ride TEWT To demonstrate the principles of war and the links between strategy, operational art Less likely Very likely Likely and tactics. To study command, leadership, morale Yes Yes Less Likely and cohesion. To expose the reality of war and its Yes Yes Less Likely human dimension (losses, destructions). To examine the dynamics of battle in terms of space and time , taking into Yes Yes Yes account weather, terrain and climate. To study the conduct of complex From Likely operations (Joint, Combined), taking into Likely To Yes account the implications of multinational (IAW the battle Yes (IAW the battle environment, and different military selected) selected) backgrounds. To promote in the Training Audience pro- fessional interest in military history and to Yes Yes Less likely provide the conceptual tools for self-study of a military campaign. To provide a number of case studies to understand Joint operations, combined Yes Yes Likely arms tactics, information operations, Joint Fires, logistics, etc. To understand the impact of technology, training and doctrine on military Less Likely Very Likely Yes operations. To improve military skills including Less Likely Yes Yes decision making at senior level. INTRODUCTION

2 To train a Multinational Joint HQ or a Corps level HQ, only campaigns/battles fought in the last century may be taken into consideration. Though it may be interesting from the purely historical standpoint, XIX century wars unfortunately do not have the required level of complexity to conveniently train commanders and staff.

#WEARENATO / 5 To gain the maximum results and benefits from the of command and leadership: mission command vs activity, and to avoid the Training Audience (or at detailed orders. Furthermore, it incorporates the in- least a portion of it) staying comfortably in a ‘re- teractions between regular armies and guerrilla and ceive only’ mode, each attending staff officer has to partisan formations, a feature increasingly important brief the audience on a specific topic to stimulate in 21st Century hybrid and asymmetric warfare. Oth- discussion. The desired conduct at each scheduled er battles such as Cassino, the Ardennes in 1940 or briefing point during the Ride could therefore be Operation MARKET GARDEN in the Netherlands, the following: may be considered for the future. The attendance of − brief terrain orientation conducted by a staff officers belonging to NRDC-ITA’s affiliated and sub- officer or by the historian; ordinated formations also added value to the exer- − a concise historical description of the events, cise, sharing professional views and increasing mu- linking them to the terrain, highlighting the tual confidence and understanding. conditions under which the battle was fought in the specific places, and the relevant deci- sions of the commanders during the fight. This Conclusion also is led by the historian; The Staff Ride is a well proven training method that − then a selected staff officer should focus the may enhance and harden staff officers’ professional Training Audience on a relevant discussion skills. Its main value, like any other military educa- theme that matches the historical event and tion event, lies in the clear and early definition of the terrain;discussion amongst the training au- training objectives, the selection of speakers (both dience with questions posed to the historian civilian and military), in the detailed reconnaissance or /and the staff officer, in order to seek clarifi- of historical places by planning and directing staff cations, consider options or comment on par- and, last but not least, by the professional and will- ticular issues; ing contribution of the training audience too. − lastly the senior officer can summarize the Beyond the benefit to each individual’s education, most relevant topics and conclusions. A the Staff Ride is crucial to prepare staff to operate in member of the directing staff should act as a a well prepared and effective HQ. In an HQ such as note-taker to get records of the discussion. NRDC-ITA, due to the multinationalism of the staff, NRDC ITA has developed a recurring cycle of staff the high tempo of activities and its many different rides focused mainly on 2nd World War battles and roles, the time allocated for the exercise would be campaigns. Great emphasis is placed on the joint optimized by performing ‘enhanced’ Staff Rides, and combined dimension choosing historical events with a solid historical background and follow-on that may challenge the training audience. Operations study to draw lessons for current operations. This in Crete in 1941 were chosen because “Operation would preserve the value of the event as an edu- Mercury” remains the only operation in history in cational applied study of military history and as a which a major strategic objective was assaulted and valuable individual experience, and make the best successfully secured by airborne troops. Operation possible use of the available resources. Husky, the invasion of Sicily in 1944, is an interesting example of joint multinational operations on both sides, and also the most complex amphibious assault About the Author: in the Mediterranean during the war. Operation Ol- Luigi P. SCOLLO Maj.Gen. (retd.) Italian Army ive and the battle of the Gothic Line in 1944, allows is the selected Academic for historic support for the study of mountain warfare, of different styles NRDC-ITA Battlefield Tour/Staff Rides.

British Churchill tank moves in a sandy terrain near Castel Borsetti – Gothic Line Eastern Sector

6 / #WEARENATO THE GOTHIC LINE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Col. Cacciagrano, Italian Army

This article provides the reader with the historical framework of the attack of the “Gothic Line” with particular focus on the strategic situation, planning, and opposing forces during the Italian campaign of the Second World War.

The biggest difference of opinion on military strategy between Britain and the U.S. came over the proposal to land a force in the south of France to join the forces in Normandy1 in drives into Germany. Churchill argued against it, maintaining that it would divert from Italy troops which could otherwise push north and east into the Balkans. Roosevelt insisted on the original plan, and landings were made. The weakened forces in Italy were stalled, and Russian armies swept into Eastern Europe (from “Life International”).

Most would agree that 1944 was the crucial year of of Western Europe, seemingly imminent by early WWII. For two years German Forces consistently 1944, the loss of portions of his eastern conquests withdrew under Allied military pressure from ter- evidently seemed less serious to Hitler. He contin- ritories they had recently conquered. In the face ued to insist on the primacy of the war in the West of the Reich’s imminent collapse, strategic differ- after the start of the Allied invasion of northern ences arose amongst Allied leaders that decisively France in June 1944, and while his armies made affected the course of post-war Europe. President strenuous efforts to contain the Allied bridgehead Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed that in Normandy for the next two months, Hitler ac- when Allies landed in Normandy the Italian front cepted the annihilation of the German Army Group would become secondary in priority to support Centre on the Eastern Front by the Soviet summer the main effort directed to the heart of Germany offensive, from June 1944, which quickly brought from France. However, Churchill never faltered in the Red Army, within a few weeks, to the Vistula his belief that the control of Mediterranean meant River and the borders of East Prussia. the control of Western World. He remained strong- ly committed to the idea that a decisive victory in There were two German military Commanders Italy would lead to influence and control of the Bal- with different views about the Italian Peninsula’s kans and Eastern Europe, balancing the presence defence in 1943 and 1944: Field Marshalls Al- of the Soviet Union. Conversely, Roosevelt and his brecht Kesselring and Erwin Rommel. Kesselring advisors did not share Churchill’s vision and con- wanted a defence of Italian territory that exploited firmed Italy as a secondary theatre by diverting ex- the geographical length of the country, commit- perienced troops to the French theatre. This “im- ting forces in the south. Given the Allied air and portant divergence”, as it was called by Churchill, land equipment superiority, Rommel argued for a materialised in the summer 1944 after the fall of withdrawal to the more defendable North, with a Rome, when the Americans stopped their pursuit shorter logistics chain and where the concentra- of the Germans to divert troops in France and, on tion of force could be exploited. Hitler’s distaste the other side, the British prepared their own forc- for trading ground for forces was more favourable es to strike the Axis defences along the Apennines to Kesselring’s strategy than Rommel’s controlled to follow Churchill’s strategic vision. withdrawal strategy.

Quite the opposite of the Allies’ vision of Italy as German Strategy from 1943 a secondary theatre, Hitler was convinced that the From late 1943, Adolf Hitler’s strategy was to defence of the Peninsula was a German priority strengthen the German forces in Western Europe to consolidate and re-assure internal public opin- at the expense of those on the Eastern Front. With ion of the army’s capabilities to defend the Moth- the benefit of hindsight Hitler’s strategy remains erland. The defence of the Axis Southern front inexplicable to most western historians. In view would be vital both for ensuring Italian industrial of the danger of a cross-channel Anglo-US invasion and agricultural support to the German war effort

#WEARENATO / 7 and also to keep Allied troops pinned down in a 1944 little of the Gothic Line existed, but the rapid long campaign on easily defendable terrain. collapse of the front south of Rome in late May and early June, as well as instructions from the high command, finally prompted Kesselring to refocus Axis Planning on the northern Apennines. In early summer anti- tank defenses on the more exposed sectors of the and Preparation projected line were strengthened with mine fields When developing the Gothic Line in the northern and the civilian population was evacuated from a Apennines, the Germans created a defensive zone “dead zone” 20 kilometers deep in front of what of considerable depth. The origins of the defenses would become the main line of resistance. Within actually preceded the Italian campaign. In August that zone all roads, bridges, and communications 1943, before the Allied landings in southern Italy, facilities were either to be destroyed or prepared Field Marshal Rommel, then Army Group B Com- for demolition.

Gebirgsjäger MG 42 position – Gothic Line Central Sector

mander in northern Italy, had begun reconnais- The two most vulnerable sectors of the Apennines sance for defensive positions in the northern Apen- defensive zone were in the central sector north of nines, whence the Germans might withdraw in the Florence, where the range is at its narrowest and event of an Allied invasion of Italy. Reconnaissance on the Eastern Sector south of Rimini, where the for the projected defensive zone continued during mountains descend into low foothills and to a nar- the remaining months of 1943, but actual work row coastal plain. In the central sector north of only began in the following spring under a paramil- Florence, Highway 65 linked that city with Bolo- itary German Construction agency, Organization gna, 80km away, across two passes: the Futa and Todt. The construction effort employed several the Radicosa. A good secondary road from Flor- thousand civilians, 15.000 Italians and 2.000 Slo- ence via Firenzuola to Imola, in the Po Valley 30km venians. From the vicinity of Massa on the Ligurian southeast of Bologna, crossed the mountains over coast about 64km northwest of Livorno, the Goth- the Giogo Pass. In the Eastern Sector, the coastal ic Line extended eastward along the ridge line of corridor offered a wider choice of passage to the the main Apennines chain to foothills north of Po Valley. Although Kesselring had long regarded the Foglia River. From there the line ran along the those two sectors as the most likely targets of an crest of one of the range’s many spurs to Pesaro on Allied offensive, construction on defensive works the Adriatic coast, some 60km northwest of Anco- in both sectors fell behind schedule until well into na. The line covered a total straight line distance of the summer of 1944. some 290km. When Kesselring became the Senior German Commander in Italy, he shifted focus from With time running out, Kesselring decided to rely the northern Apennines, in keeping with his plan, instead upon a combination of antitank emplace- to stand instead in the South. Until the spring of ments within the main line of resistance and a mo-

8 / #WEARENATO bile reserve of self-propelled antitank guns, a tac- Eighth Armies, their strength concentrated on con- tic that had worked well in the Caesar Line south tiguous wings, to launch a joint offensive by four of Rome. Yet it had one serious shortcoming: army corps, controlling fourteen divisions, against vulnerability to Allied airpower. Since the Allies the Gothic Line’s, central sector north of Florence. dominated the skies, shifting antitank guns or any- The Armies were to attack simultaneously along thing else during daylight was always hazardous. parallel axes: the Eighth along the main routes be- Furthermore, about 150 FLAK 88-mm. guns would tween Florence and Bologna and the Fifth from ei- be needed and it was doubtful whether that many ther Lucca or Pistoia (preferably the latter) toward would be available in time. Modena, in the Po Valley 40km northwest of Bolo- gna. Beside the physical obstacle created by manmade barriers, German defensive plans were based upon Since Alexander doubted that Clark’s forces would the concept of ‘mobility’ of troops and the con- be strong enough to exploit much beyond Mode- trolled withdrawal of defensive positions. The na and since the Eighth Army was larger, the Al- forces were not sufficient to permanently man the lied commander gave General Leese’s Army the defensive line with a credible concentration and task of exploiting to the Po river. Yet as the pause this deficiency was resolved by ensuring the rapid along the Arno lengthened into weeks, Leese was movement and deployment of the units between convinced that the geographically vulnerable Adri- the Line’s strongpoints. Combining exploiting ter- atic flank and not the central sector north of Flor- rain features and the rapid concentration of forc- ence would be the most favourable point for the es where needed most, the Axis troops dramati- main attack against the Gothic Line. Kesselring cally enhanced the stopping power of the Gothic had reached a similar conclusion and had shifted Line. The use of reserve forces to counter-attack the center of gravity of his army group to a 40km and successive controlled withdrawal aimed to wide sector on the Tenth Army’s left flank. Gener- increase attrition in the most defendable areas, al Leese’s argument ran something like this: with whilst exploiting to the maximum the scarce re- the departure of the French Expeditionary Corps, sources available compared to the overrunning units of the Allied armies trained and experienced Allied forces. in mountain warfare were limited. An offensive concentrated not in the mountains, but against the Eastern flank of the Apennines chain, where Allied Planning the mountains give way to a low range of foothills overlooking a narrow coastal plain, would offer and Preparation terrain better suited to the Eighth Army’s mobile Even as Kesselring’s engineers rushed to finalize capabilities. There Leese could also better exploit their defensive works in the Apennines, British the advantage of his superior firepower in support Field Marshal Alexander made significant changes of a series of set-piece attacks against successive to his plan to break through the defences. positions in the low hills between the Metauro and Foglia Rivers. Furthermore, a breakthrough in Alexander had originally planned for the Fifth and that sector would carry Allied troops more quickly

US patrol moving to attack a defended position – Gothic Line Central Sector

New Zealand Tankers maintain their vehicle – Gothic Line Eastern Sector

#WEARENATO / 9 onto the plain north of the Apennines than from Wilson’s Joint Planning Staff, strongly influenced the central sector north of Florence; also, General by General Devers, was less than enthusiastic. The Leese believed, erroneously, that Kesselring ex- staff, for example, considered the naval and am- pected no major Allied effort in the east. An attack phibious operations planned against the enemy’s in the east would also reduce the forces needed for left flank too ambitious. flank protection as Clark’s Fifth Army represented sufficient protection for the left flank of the main Neither the structure of the coast in the Ravenna attack, and shifting eastward toward the coast area nor the resources available would permit sig- would enable General Leese to rely on the coast nificant operations along the coast. Only two gun- itself for right flank protection, plus a small fleet of boats with 6-inch guns could be made available destroyers and gunboats. The new plan called for to supplement a small destroyer force already in naval bombardment and small-scale amphibious as- the Adriatic. Nevertheless, since most operational saults against the enemy’s Adriatic flank. requirements, including air support, seemed well within the theatre’s capabilities, Wilson approved Although unstated at the time, the shift of the the plan in principle, and on 6 August Alexander main offensive would also harmonize more closely issued orders for preliminary operations designed with the strategic goals upheld in Allied councils to set the stage for the main offensive to be mount- by Prime Minister Churchill: a thrust from north- ed from the right flank instead of the center. Yet eastern Italy through Slovenia, toward which Tito right up to the eve of the offensive many doubts as and his Yugoslav partisan army were moving, and to the plan’s feasibility lingered on at Allied head- into the valley of the mid-Danube, the objective of quarters, especially among the American members the southern wing of the Red Army. Later in the of Wilson’s Joint Planning Staff. month, after the Russians overran Rumania, the military logic of Churchill’s arguments and Alexan- der’s eastward shift of the location of his main of- Preliminary Moves fensive would seem compelling in British eyes. To Alexander declared that the heavy dissipation of what degree, if any, Churchill’s views influenced or Allied strength over the preceding few months, es- indeed determined Alexander’s decision to change pecially the US Fifth Army’s loss of two corps and his original plans for the Gothic Line offensive can, several divisions during Operation ANVIL-DRA- at best, only be inferred. In any case, Leese’s argu- GOON, had greatly reduced the chances for suc- ment appealed to Alexander who readily accepted cess of a joint attack by both Armies against the it. Yet when he first submitted the new concept sector north of Florence. With the shift of the main to the theater commander for approval, General attack from the central to the eastern sector on the

10 / #WEARENATO US patrol approaching a farm on the Apennines – Gothic Line Central Sector Eighth Army’s right flank, the US Fifth Army, rath- observed as he had when planning the offensive er than attack as originally planned toward both south of Rome, “a one-two punch”. Pistoia and Lucca, was to move only against Pis- toia, for an attack against both objectives would General Clark readily agreed that the new concept, further dissipate Clark’s already greatly reduced especially on the matter of timing, was sound. He resources. Leese’s Eighth Army was to make the could easily hold his left flank with the few forces main Allied effort beginning on 25th August with available, even if the Pisano massif remained in en- a three-corps attack against the German left flank emy hands, and shift the rest to the central sector along the Adriatic, to be followed at a date to be for the attack. His only concern was his right flank, determined by Alexander, by the Fifth Army’s at- where the distance and possible lack of co-ordina- tack against the central sector of the Gothic Line. tion between an American attack toward Pistoia Clark’s attack would begin after Alexander had and that of the British 13th Corps on the Eighth determined Kesselring had weakened the central Army’s left flank constituted, in Clark’s opinion, sector by shifting forces to check Leese’s attack. a real hazard to the success of operations in the The operation was to be, the Allied Commander central sector.

#WEARENATO / 11 German PAK 40 ready to open fire along an approach route – Gothic Line Eastern Sector

In raising the objection, Clark shrewdly saw an op- General Graziani’s Italian Army with counter-guer- portunity to trade off a shift of the Allies’ main ef- rilla tasks in the rear area of the 14th Corps and the fort from the center to the British-controlled right 20th Luftwaffe Infantry Division as Army Reserve. for Anglo-American unity of command in the cen- The 10th Armee from Sieve River to the Adriatic ter. He appeared to be intent upon reconstruct- Sea was composed of the 51st Mountain Troops ing in his own sector the concept that Alexander Corps commanded by General Valentin Feuerstein had just abandoned for the army group. An effec- and the 76th Armoured along the coast, where ter- tive operation against the enemy’s center, even if rain was more suitable for tanks, commanded by secondary, would require both Clark’s Army and Traugott Herr. The 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, the British 13th Corps to be under the operation- deployed north of Rimini, was the Army Reserve al control of one commander and that their axes and some Italian units at Regiment level were sta- of attack be along the shortest distance across the tioned in the rear area to counter the partisans. mountains, that is, from Florence to Bologna. The strength of the Axis troops totaled 340,000 against 900,000 Allied. In terms of equipment the OPPOSING FORCES Germans were also outnumbered by the Allied troops, with ratios of 7: 1 for tanks and 5:1 for artil- Axis Forces lery. The Axis Air Force was also overwhelmed by In 1944 the German Divisional structure was re- its opponent and the Sea power was firmly in the duced from 3 to 2 Infantry Regiments for a total of Royal Navy’s hands. 6 Battalions of 250 men each. Additional available units included one recce Battalion, one Artillery Group, one Anti-Tank Battalion and one Engineer Allied Forces Battalion. In order to man the Gothic Line, Kessel- After the approval of Operation OLIVE, Allied dispo- ring deployed on the Adriatic side the 10th Armee sition changed to the new plan with the complete commanded by Heinrich von Vietinghoff-Scheel shift of the 8th Army on the eastern sector and, for and on the Tirrenian side Joachim Lemelsen’s 14th the 5th Army, replacement of the forces already de- Armee. In total, 18 divisions were available. parted for France for Operation DRAGOON - AN- VIL. The 14th Armee sector from the Tirrenan Sea to the Sieve River had 2 Corps: the 14th Armoured com- In the Western Sector, the new disposition had manded by General Fridolin Von Senger und Etter- the 5th Army (US) commanded by General Clark, lin and the experienced 1st Fallschirmjager Corps comprising (from west to east) the 4th (US) Corps of General Alfred Schlemm. In addition, there were commanded by General Crittenberger, the 2nd (US)

12 / #WEARENATO Corps commanded by General Keyes, (deployed on a narrow AOO along the Apennine passes of the FUTA and GIOGO), and in the area contiguous to the British Army sector, General Kirkman’s 13th (UK) Corps given to the 5th Army in order to ac- commodate Leese’s plan.

The 8th British Army commanded by General Leese had in the west the 10th (UK) Corps of General Mc Creery, with Indian troops. The powerful 5th Corps of General Keightley was deployed in the centre US infantry unit takes cover behind a river bank – of the British AOO and, at the relatively flat coastal Gothic Line Western Sector area there were the 1st Canadian Corps command- ed by General Burns and General Anders’ 2nd Pol- cost. Furthermore, different views about strategic ish Corps. objectives amongst the Allies, caused planning and execution difficulties. Nevertheless, the campaign established fundamental procedures, especially at Conclusion joint level, that are still relevant for our current Considering the contemporary geo-political en- doctrine, such as Mission Command planning and vironment, where a symmetric confrontation is execution, Air and Naval cooperation, joint fire, and possible, the study of the WWII Italian Campaign engineer support. offers important lessons to apply in conducting op- erations against a near-peer adversary in demand- ing terrain. Despite advances in technology, some About the Author principles and commanders’ decisions from oper- Col. Pier Francesco Cacciagrano currently work ations in 1944 still offer valid insight for our HQ as ACOS Engineer of NRDC-ITA. and staff.

The Allied assault of Axis positions in Italy was one of the most time and resource-consuming opera- tions of WWII. Due to the extremely difficult ter- rain and well-organized defences, the overwhelm- ing Allied Army Group was bogged down in a slow advance where every position was taken at high

The “Gothic Line” – Forces disposition

#WEARENATO / 13 JOINT FIRE PLAN

Col. Smith, British Army

The advance to the ‘Gothic Line’ (Operation OLIVE) was an oensive operation planned with overwhelming force ratio and strong fire support. The Allied operations oer an example of a Joint Fire Plan and its eects on the Campaign.

On 26th August 1944 the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill arrived in Montemaggiore to see the initial phase of the Operation”Olive”. He visited the Command Post of the II Polish Corps 2and together with Gen. Alexander and Gen. Leese went on the top of the hill to appreciate the battleground. On the day before massive artillery barrage was red against the German position, starting from 23.55. In this sector the Canadian Corps was employed. At 23.15 the 1st Canadian Bde (Brig. Calder), the 48th Regt. Highlanders of Canada, and the Royal Canadian Regt. crossed the Metauro and advanced to Lucrezia and Cartoceto villages. At 23.35, 2nd Canadian Bde (Brig. Gibson) started its advance with “Princess Patricia” and “Royal Edmonton” Regt. in direc- tion of Mt. Bartolo and Serraungarina. At this stage, there was little resistance from the German side. The intense artillery preparation re (1.500 guns- about 25.000 shells) did not hit the en- emy units that were withdrawing on the Foglia River. Both the Polish and the Canadian Corps were progressing slowly but steadily to Pesaro.

Attack to ‘Gothic Line’ – (15th Army Gropup Eastern Sector)

Scope their re will be directed and coordinated to A Fire Plan is a tactical plan for using the weap- meet the Commander’s intent. The Commander ons of a unit or formation (both those owned is responsible for all aspects of the tactical plan, OPCOM and those allocated by higher) so that including the re plan. The relevant Fires Com-

14 / #WEARENATO mander understands and interprets the Com- of representatives from G-2, Photo Interpre- mander’s requirements and integrates all allo- tation, G-3, Air Force and Artillery, met daily cated res systems into the re plan. For this and selected pro table targets for both artil- reason, mutual trust and con dence between lery harassing and air shoots. This was ‘Air- the Commander and his Fires Commander, at Land and Integration’ as we know now it; all levels, is absolutely critical. It is sometimes − (Positive) Precision Attack was available and referred to as a “sacred bond”. used regularly. We sometimes think ‘preci- Translating the Commander’s intent and plan- sion’ attack is a new thing manifested only ning outputs into a Fires Plan is a part art and by the arrival of GPS. However, 240mm guns part science. The science is the weaponeering played the very important role of destroying so as to ensure the most suitable munitions are pillboxes and strong points: with accurate red against suitable targets, the selection of survey, good meteorological data, accurate weapon system, area of target, weapon effects, target grid references they could do so quick- fuse settings, trajectory, and errors in probabili- ly and without ring hundreds of rounds; ty, for example, are all ‘known knowns’ and will − (Negative) Gun emplacement and movement be understood throughout the Joint Fires chain was not well synchronized with the manoeu- of command. The art, therefore, is a blend of ex- vre of infantry forces, especially in a rapid perience, knowledge, judgement and balance of moving situation. Artillery units should have risks both from the professional artillery of cer, moved with the infantry and into new po- but also in his understanding of the Command- sitions where close re support to the ma- er’s intent, plan and appetite for risk etc. noeuvre units could be provided from at The Fire Plan has to be articulated and trans- least 2/3 the maximum range; mitted throughout the formation. Every man in- − (Negative) Divisions’ re assets for direct sup- volved has to know their part in that plan. A port were not suf cient to provide enough comprehensive Fires Synch Matrix is construct- close re support to their manoeuvre units ed that will include details on the assets, the during offensive ops. The infantry still had a targets, the timings, the authorities, the rates of hard ght once close in with the enemy; re and the alternative options. The Fires Staff − (Positive) Impact of Fires on morale. For the at the highest HQ will write this plan, but then Axis it was low; constant harassment by res in its distribution and dissemination every level impacted on their day to day life and routine. must draw their own speci ed and implied tasks For the Allies it was a positive effect. The from it, locations of guns, times to be ready, sur- Air and Fire campaigns of Allies had a huge vivability moves, actions on attack, etc. etc.. impact over the Axis leadership and soldiers. To sum up, the overarching principle is that the Air superiority was gained and maintained Fire Plan and the assets involved are command- during all ops by Allies; provided enormous ed at the highest level, but then controlled at advantage over the adversary throughout Op the lowest. This has been the practice and the OLIVE. mantra of artillery of cers from the First World War onwards. It remains absolutely applicable to today’s battle eld. Modern Warfare − Strategic/Operational/Tactical targets should be multinational within the operational de- Historical Considerations sign; − (Positive) General support to the division - − Air superiority provides enormous advantage artillery groups were formed from 3 to 6 bat- over the adversary; talions with different types of cannons; for − Air support, Attack helicopters, Joint Fires example, II Corp had four Field Arty groups; support, use of precision ammo, use Info ops − (Positive) Long range harassment, destruc- all help to achieve tactical success; tion, interdiction and counterbattery res − Lines of communication disruption to the en- were the role of the Corps Artillery Group; emy, from ‘home base’ to forward lines dras- − (Positive) Extensive use was made of Air Ob- tically reduces war ghting capabilities. servation Posts (AOPs). There were two air- craft in each artillery battalion to facilitate this capability; Conclusion − (Positive) Cleared airspace - because of the A signi cant number of lessons can be drawn use of Variable Time (VT) fuses and the pres- from the 1944-45 period through to the contem- ence of the AOP aircraft, it was necessary to porary operating environment that must consid- clear the aircraft from the line of res; er the possibility of a near-peer confrontation − (Positive) Air-Artillery Committee – this was with war ghting procedures to apply. Especial- very similar to the Targeting Working Group ly, considering the Corps level, NRDC-ITA staff (TWG) that is a central part of the Corps Bat- might bear in mind the following considerations tle Rhythm. This Committee, which consisted in planning operations:

#WEARENATO / 15 Winston Churchill observing the attack to Gothic Line – Montemaggiore al Metauro

− Deep Ops and shaping operations (for deci- sidering it with our current capabilities would sive close) are a Corps HQ’s responsibility. be an extremely useful opportunity in allowing An accurate Fire Plan will enable the Corps the Corps’ staff to re-orient its mindset to the to meet the operational objectives; tactical level. − The assets to enable Deep Ops should be aligned to Corps level. Fires, ISTAR, Avia- tion might be controlled directly by Corps About the Author in order to maximize their effectiveness and Col. Richard SMITH currently is the ACOS Joint optimize their timely employment; Fire for NRDC-ITA and he is responsible for ad- − We must always think ‘Deep, Close & Rear’; vising about the Corps Fire Plan. ‘Shaping, Sustaining & Decisive’; and ‘time, space & resources’. Corps staff must always plan accordingly to the aforementioned inte- grated battle framework in order to effective- ly reach operational objectives and maximize the tactical operations; − We should never under-value the impact and effects of res over ground manoeuvre; in war ghting, repower is a key factor of suc- cess in shaping operations and maintaining re superiority often allows effective ma- noeuvre. In conclusion, given its complexity in terms of terrain and forces, using the Italian Campaign as a scenario for specialized training and con-

16 / #WEARENATO CONDUCT AN ARMORED ATTACK AGAINST A DEFENSIVE LINE

Col. Cacciagrano, Italian Army

Despite the unfavorable terrain, Allied forces eectively used Armoured troops against the Axis defensive positions. Detailed planning was a key factor of success for fully exploiting the advantages of Armoured units. 3 On 1st September 1944 the 8th British Army attacked the Gothic line with the 1st Canadian Corps towards Tavullia. The 5th Canadian Armoured Division fought the battle of Tavullia employing the Lord Strathcona’s Horse Royal Canadians, the Perth Regiment and the British Columbia Dra- goons. The 1st Canadian Infantry Div. (MG Hawkesworth), belonging to the 1st Canadian Corps, was launched on the direction from the River Foglia to Tavullia. On 30th August the 1st Canadian Corps launched an attack against the German position on the Foglia river held by the 4th Para Reg. and Kampfgruppe Schmal, catching the German defenders by surprise. The attack against Borgo S. Maria was blocked by German troops defending mine elds and an antitank ditch. On the eve- ning of 30th Aug. the Perth Regiment, 11th Canadian Infantry Bde became the rst unit to break the Gothic Line, when its D Coy captured Point 111 (Ca’ Caprotti) with a bayonet charge, followed by A Coy outanking and seizing point 147 (Ca’ Viterbo-Gnucci). The German defenders surren- dered to the attacker after a short ght. These initial gains were exploited on 31st August by units of the 2nd Canadian Div. (1st Infantry and 5th Armoured). Although intense re prevented the Perths from joining the British Columbia Dragoons (BCD) of the 5th Canadian Armoured Bde, the Tank regiment boldly advanced and seized Point 204, the Green Line lynch pin position in this sector. That evening the Perths and the Lord Strathcona’s Tanks relieved BCD and held point 204 against three determined counter attacks by 4th Para Regiment and tanks from 26th Panzer Regiment Tank.

Scope ing these as a speci c target when planning res. Contingency plans are made for the possibility of The attack of a forti ed position follows the ba- encountering previously undetected forti cations sic principles of tactical manoeuvre. However, along the route to the objective, and for neutraliz- greater emphasis is placed upon detailed plan- ing underground defences when encountered. ning, special training and rehearsals, increased re support and the use of special equipment. The degree of special preparation depends Historical Considerations upon the character and extent of the defences. − (Negative) Mostly frontal attack at high costs The deliberate nature of defences requires a de- in terms of resources; liberate approach for the attack. These types of − (Negative) Hasty at Bn level, deliberate at operations are time consuming and leaders must Div/Corps level; develop schemes of manoeuvre that systematically − (Positive) Balanced and synchronized Ops at reduce the area. Initially, these attacks should be Corps/Div. limited in scope, focusing on individual positions and intermediate terrain objectives. Leaders must establish clear bypass criteria and position destruc- Modern Warfare tion criteria as well as allocate forces to secure − Strategic/Operational/Tactical objectives should cleared enemy positions. Failure in this will likely be compatible; result in enemy reoccupying the positions, isolat- − Manoeuvre with Battle grouped tactical units ing lead elements and ambushing follow-on units. after IPB, mostly during the night time; During planning, the leader’s level of detail should − Air support, Attack helicopters, Joint Fires identify each aperture (opening or ring port) of support and use of precision ammo, use Info his assigned forti cation(s) and consider assign- Ops to achieve tactical success.

#WEARENATO / 17 Battle of Tavullia (30 August to 01 September 1944)

sition in terms of combined re and obstacles. Conclusion Due to its complexity, deliberate attacks must be Considering its complexity and intrinsic risks, a carried out by combined units with signi cant direct attack on a forti ed position protected by re and engineer support. The rst being nec- active and passive obstacles, should always be essary to weaken the objective during the ap- avoided. If a direct attack is necessary, this oper- proach and then to isolate the enemy position. ation must be accurately planned in all phases. The latter being important to ensure mobility by Troops must be adequately prepared to opti- breaching the obstacles placed in defence. mize and coordinate their employment with re In sum, the deliberate attack on a forti ed posi- and combat support assets. Training must pro- tion is a complex action that should be avoided vide realistic, detailed procedures in terms of due to its intrinsic high loss ratio. If the attack is coordination and objectives, down to the lowest required, it should be accurately prepared with level of command. detailed planning, intelligence and pre-attack The deliberate attack on a forti ed position must training. be planned and supported by an accurate intel- ligence preparation to harmonize the task orga- nization involving combat and combat support About the Author units, and to de ne all the possible aspects re- Col. Pier Francesco CACCIAGRANO currently lated to the stopping power of the forti ed po- works as ACOS Engineer in NRDC-ITA.

Hit Churchill tank near Gothic Line – Eastern Sector

18 / #WEARENATO MOUNTAIN WARFARE, TERRAIN EXPLOITATION AND LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS

Ltc. Sotlar, Slovenian Army, Ltc. Baessato, Italian Army and Maj. Hoxhaj, Albanian Navy

Along the Apennines mountains, the terrain played a fundamental role in enhancing the capabilities of the defenders, almost zeroing the overwhelming force ratio of the attacking forces. A detailed study of the terrain can reduce losses, improve resource eectiveness and ensure responsive logistics 4support.

Passo del Giogo Battle: German defences on Monte Altuzzo were the forward edge of the defen- sive line on the Giogo pass. The German lines consisted of eld forti cations and bunkers made of timber logs. The 2nd Corps Commander, Gen. Keyes ordered the 12th Div. to attack along the Giogo Pass against Mt. Altuzzo and Mt. Monticelli. The 383rd Inf. Regt started the initial attack on 12th Sept. by night. The 338th Regt. advanced along the route from L’Omo Morto to the Giogo Pass (Highway 6524,) but after 1200 m they were halted by artillery, mortar and small arms re. The 363rd Regt. attacked Monticelli, but the troops were pinned down by artillery and mortar re and on the eastern ank, 339th Inf. Regt failed to take Mt Verruca. On the night of 12th Sept. an addi- tional German platoon was sent to reinforce the defence of the Giogo Pass. On 14th Sept Company B /338th Regt. was sent to take Mt. Altuzzo, but in the end it was only able to seize the Western Peak (Peabody Peak). Germans launched 3 counter-attacks, which were repelled by the US, but a fourth German counterattack was successful in driving back the attackers. On 15th Sept. the rst Knob was quickly taken by the 338th Regt. units and the advance to the second Knob went on, but in the end an order to withdraw to one of the rear platoons was misinterpreted and the US troops left Knob 1 to come back to their initial positions. The 338th Inf. Regt. was sent to secure Mon- ticelli, Giogo Pass and Mt. Altuzzo and on 16th Sept. a new attack started: Knob 1 was reached without heavy casualties and by 03.00 Knob 2 was captured after a short ght; shortly after they were able to reach the top of Mt. Altuzzo. In the morning of 17th Sept. Germans launched other 2 counter-attacks to Mt. Altuzzo, allowing the remaining German troops to withdraw. The US troops counter-attacked the German position. It became untenable for German troops that in the end withdrew. After the 338th Inf. Regt. reached Giogo pass, the US troops secured also Monticelli and Mt. Verruca. Monte Battaglia Battle: the 350th US infantry Regt. (88th US infantry Div.), on the 26th Septem- ber, occupied Monte Battaglia establishing a defensive position but they didn’t exploited the new gap in the German defences. On 27th Sept. US positions were attacked by German troops. In the following days the 350th US Inf. Regt. faced other ve days hard battle until the 4th October when the Blue Devils were relieved by the British 1st Guards Bde, which took-over their positions. The initially successful attack was able to break the enemy lines, but it became useless without effec- tive exploitation.

Approach; Cover and Concealment; Obstacles; Scope and Key Terrain (OACOK). The mounted terrain Terrain Analysis is the second step of the Intelli- in Monticelli and Monte Altuzzo (Passo del Gio- gence Preparation of Operational Environment go – Apennines) favoured the German defen- (IPOE) process, called Describe the Area of Op- sive forces and provided few Mobility Corridors erations (AO). From a military prospective we for Allied attacking forces. This kind of terrain do not describe the terrain features, but its as- restricted the movement to only dismounted pects that effect military operations for friendly troops, whilst armoured vehicles were not used. and enemy forces. The military aspects include: In most cases the mobility corridors allowed Observations and Fields of Fires; Avenues of only the passage of a Coy size unit and in some

#WEARENATO / 19 II US Corps Attack (15th Army Group Central Sector)

cases only a platoon. This disrupted Allied forc- since WWI are formidable bulwarks. Artillery es, and despite having a two Divisions frontline, re, as demonstrated during both WWI and the they were able to conduct operations with only Italian Campaign battles of Montecassino and two battalions. Given the dif cult topography, Passo del Giogo, is never decisive by itself. Of mountain terrain is more suited to defenders, al- note, the use of camouage and masking with lowing forti ed positions to become force mul- the surrounding environment to make the forti- tipliers. cation not only a resistant objective but above all dif cult to identify. In German defensive Field forti cations were extensively used by the procedures during WWII, engineer assets and Germans during the Italian campaign, as they engineer expertise were always planned and made it possible to considerably increase the al- detached to the lowest level, to allow the max- ready signi cant natural obstacles typical of the imum adherence to manoeuvre and enhancing Apennine terrain. Field forti cations, especially the eld forti cation delay or blocking power.

Passo del Giogo Attack (10 to 18 September 1944)

20 / #WEARENATO Passo del Giogo Attack (10 to 18 September 1944)

Logistic support in dif cult terrain, like the ty and towards the ‘proper personal care of re- mountains, requires the highest planning and duced but higher quality equipment available’. execution consideration for Commanders to Greater dimensions of the support could be maintain operational tempo. In the Italian Cam- available only in favour of the follow on forces paign the mountainous terrain restricted mobil- where the opportunity to consolidate mobility ity, required special equipment, and increased and force protection is assured. resource consumption. The proper support for front line units could be obtained only by using small units, often throughout direct engagement Historical Considerations of the same units. So, a small size (but at same − (Negative) Poor employment of Mountain time dynamic) 1st line is required. Consequent- troops (Mountain troops used in at terrain ly, for the forces employed on mountain terrain, or urbanized areas – Greek mountain Div em- the training has to be focused on survivabili- ployed in Rimini);

Fallschirmjäger in an observation post along the Apennine Mountains

#WEARENATO / 21 − (Positive) Defenders fully applied the mis- operate at a smaller scale. Small unit tactics sion command procedures; and leadership will also play a crucial role. − (Positive) Mountain terrain suitable for defend- Units will require more autonomy and plans ers and enhancement of forti cation value. to allow for decentralized execution (low level C2 initiative). Communications must also be maintained constantly with higher Modern Warfare command but especially with anking units − Adapted training and equipment for moun- and often low technology solutions will be tain troops; useful. Fire planning and execution will be − Preparatory study of the terrain. especially challenging; − Supply and special equipment. Quality rath- er than quantity is the golden rule. The need Conclusion for a light and dynamic approach to com- − Understanding mountainous terrain. While bat the enemy in unfavourable terrain places conducting the Intelligence Preparation of stress on the ow of supplies, with a pre- Battle eld, staff should carefully analyze the dominance of 1° line support (self-sustained) military aspects of the mountainous terrain and the requirement of proper, dedicated considering the opportunities for cover and «case by case» equipment; concealment, and setting appropriate key − Training. Physical tness is the cornerstone terrain. Since the frontline in the mountain of the mountain warfare. But also units will terrain is smaller and the troops are orga- require training to operate in small units, the nized in small formations, the staff should usage of mountain terrain, operating in ex- consider mobility corridors at the appropri- treme weather, marksmanship and commu- ate levels despite the doctrinal reference as nicating; two levels down; − Field forti cation training. Every soldier − Proper employment of troops (INF vs MTN). must be trained in preparing eld forti - It is important to use proper troops. As moun- cations, since strong forti ed positions in tain troops are most suitable, their availability mountain terrain are a force multiplier. Engi- is usually limited and infantry units are often neers might be used extensively in preparing used in this role. In this case it is important strong defensive positions. to provide the maximum possible training to these units both in soldier mountain skills as well as in leadership tasks; About the Authors: − Operations. It is important to note that oper- Ltc. Vojko SOTLAR is Deputy ACOS Operations, ations in mountains require adjusting plan- Ltc. Alberto BAESSATO is Logistic Planner in ning assumptions. Terrain will restrict opera- NRDC-ITA G4 and Maj. Edion HOXHAJ is Staff tions and reduce the frontage, so units must Of cer in the NRDC-ITA G2.

1945 Italian auxliary troops bringing supplies to Pietra Colora - Ghotic Line Central Sector

22 / #WEARENATO EXPLOITATION OF SUCCESS AND RESERVE COMMITMENT

Maj. Snitko-Dottarelli, Lituanian Army

Commanders at all levels must plan and conduct operations to exploit local success and eectively employ all available resources.

The VIII British Army broke through the Axis lines along the Adriatic coast with the Canadian Corps as spearhead. Along the VIII Army central sector, where the terrain was more favour- able for defenders, the 1st Armoured Division was pinned down by stubborn resistance.5 General LEESE’s directed the Canadian Corps to stop and defend, and reinforced the Central Sector, miss- ing the opportunity to exploit the success and crash the last Axis line. On 19th September 1944 General Leese’s plan was to employ the 1st Armored Div, led by MG Hull, to exploit a breach in the German lines. The Division had to cross the Ausa River and proceed on hilly terrain, to seize Hill 153, the village of S. Ermete, the Marecchia River and then turn right, IOT entrap the German Paratroopers in Rimini. The attack was to be led by the 2nd Dragoon Guards ‘The Queen’s Bays’, an armored Bn supported by the 9th Lancers and the King’s Royal Ries Corps (KRRC) as the Div. Recce Bn. The Queen’s Bays moved to the Ausa river. The weather was rainy and the country roads were clogged by mud. One of the 3 Coys of the Bn was short of ammo and fuel and Lt Col Asquith, the Bn CO decided to stop, resupply and postpone the attack to the day after. At dawn, Kampfgruppe Stollbock counterattacked and seized Ca’ Cima and Ca’ Cantoni. There was a violent ght between the Germans and the KRRC. Lt Col Asquith judged the situation critical and asked to BG Goodboy to delay the attack, but Gen. Kreightley, the Corps Commander, instead, con rmed the order. The terrain was an open slope with German foxholes manned by the 9th Coy / 361st Inf., the Pz Jager Bn and tanks on the left ank. At 11.50 of 20th Sept. the charge was launched and the Shermans of the Queen’s Bays appeared from the ridges and moved to hill 153. They were accompanied by the KRRC as supporting infantry. As soon as they moved, the KRRC were pinned down by the German MGs, while the tanks continued to ad- vance. When they were at about 100 meters from the German trenches, the Shermans got a volley of Panzerfausts and small arms re. In a few minutes, out of 27 Shermans only 3 managed to withdraw safely to the line of departure. All the others were destroyed or heavily damaged.

capabilities to make permanent what would be Scope only a temporary tactical effect if an exploita- In the framework of mission command and the tion were not conducted. Exploitation may be manouvrist approach, exploitation is the prima- decisive in ensuring the decisive effect to the ry means of translating tactical success into op- attacking force. Conduct of a major exploitation erational advantage. It reinforces enemy force is a speci c contingency mission assigned to a disorganization and confusion in the enemy’s large unit in anticipation of offensive success by command and control (C2) system caused by another unit of equivalent size. Divisions and tactical defeat. It is an integral part of the con- brigades are the echelons that conduct a ma- cept of offense. The heavy losses of the Queen’s jor exploitation although a corps can conduct a Bays in Montecieco are proof of the failure to major exploitation as part of a multi-corps op- aggressively exploit success at every turn, giv- eration. ing the enemy time to reconstitute an effective defence by shifting his forces or by regaining In exploitation it is critical for offensive activity the initiative through a counterattack. The com- to: mander designs his exploitation to maintain − Maintain the high tempo of attack and the pressure on the enemy, compound and take ad- initiative; vantage of his disorganization, shatter his will to − Have a strong and complete force with a resist, and seize decisive or key terrain. Exploita- suf cient Combat Power; tion takes advantage of this reduction in enemy − Apply decentralized execution to sub-units;

#WEARENATO / 23 Attack to Marecchia Line (15th Army Group Eastern Sector)

− Make a clear intent of the objectives; will need to be updated as the battle progresses − Have exibility; and the enemy’s intentions become more ap- − Maintain situational awareness in order to parent. When it is committed, the reserve ac- keep contact. tion may well become the formation main effort. Reserves are required to meet the unexpected. The success of the reserve action depends on its They may be committed to inuence the bat- timely commitment, mass, surprise, speed and tle, to exploit success or to respond to coun- boldness. termoves. Reserves provide a commander with exibility and balance. Once reserves are com- mitted, the commander must reconstitute it as Historical Considerations soon as possible, even if this means a change − (Negative) 8th UK Army failure to exploit the in task organization. Operations that lack a breakthrough on the Adriatic side shifting detailed intelligence picture or that may meet the effort to the center; unanticipated situations should hold signi cant − (Positive) Germans carried out effective de- forces in reserve if possible. lay operations withdrawing on successive Many campaigns and operations will present well planned and prepared forti ed posi- signi cant geographic challenges. Many AOOs tions at high cost for attackers; and enemy situations will not allow for a lin- − (Negative) Missed use of 8th UK Army re- ear and/or contiguous deployment. Co-ordina- serve in exploiting the success. tion, cooperation and mutual support between elements will be more dif cult. Mission com- mand philosophy (see AJP-3.2) and the use of Modern Warfare well-practiced reserves at all levels become in- − Improved situational awareness allows com- creasingly important under such circumstances. manders to promptly adapt their manoeuvre Commitment of the Reserve. The decision on to current conditions and exploit success how and when a reserve is to be committed is without delay; one of the most important a commander must − Modern communication systems allow com- make. Reserves should be located where they manders to promptly coordinate subordi- are best able to react when they are required. nate units efforts, adapting the manoeuvre Routes may need to be planned and prepared to to changing conditions; cover likely deployment options. The command- − Troops mobility remains a key-factor in er will designate his decision criteria to assure shifting the effort where needed. Airborne the timely commitment of his reserves. These troops and/or armoured troops can support

24 / #WEARENATO British Sherman tanks ready to move - Gothic Line Eastern Sector

the exploitation of success, reinforcing the the main effort of the action to allow the timely effort where it is necessary. Engineers might exploitation of success and provide the proper be in support of manoeuvre units. allocation and synchronization of resources. Be- sides the planning, in the execution phase the exploitation of success is pursued by enabling Conclusion the mission command concept, understanding In the contemporary operational environment, the commander’s intent and maintaining situa- with multiple actors and uid situations, com- tion awareness in order to timely dedicate forc- manders at all levels are challenged in maintain- es where and when needed. ing an updated situational awareness. Having a clear vision of the battle eld is essential to properly balance forces and to maintain tem- About the Author po in the pursuit the mission objectives. Com- Maj. Irina SNITKO-DOTTARELLI currently works manders and their staff must accurately plan as a planner in the NRDC-ITA G5.

British column moving along flooded roads - Gothic Line Eastern Sector

#WEARENATO / 25 AIR AND NAVAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

Col. Andreozzi, Italian Air Force and Commander Marzollo Italian Navy

Many of the assumptions used in planning modern joint and combined military operations have their foundation in the Italian campaign of World War II, especially the roles and contribution of airpower to joint warfighting.

Scope Operations (CAS and AI). The Italian Campaign 6 illustrated the requirement for armies to have Airpower played four main roles in the Allied Air Superiority to conduct successful offensive Mediterranean strategy, as described by Air ground operations, yet also showed that Air Vice Marshal J.H.D’Albiac, the Deputy Com- Superiority does not guarantee success on the mander of the Tactical Forces in Italy in 1945. ground. The Air Superiority battle started well They were: Air Superiority, Air Interdiction (AI), before the events on the Gothic Line, with Op- Close Air Support (CAS) and Strategic bombing. eration HUSKY and the invasion of Sicily. After The close relationship between the Italian Cam- gaining Air Superiority, the Allies were able to paign’s Airpower strategy and the current strat- dedicate a signi cant portion of the Air assets egy, is illustrated by the similarity in the doctri- to interdicting German lines of communication. nal description of the roles. In the current AJP Air Interdiction is de ned as air operations con- 3.3, the roles of Airpower are Counter Air, which ducted to divert, disrupt, delay, degrade or de- contributes to the achievement of Air Superiori- stroy an adversary’s military potential before it ty, and Attack, which can be further subdivided can be brought to bear effectively and at such into Strategic Attack and Counter Surface Air distance that detailed integration of each air

RAF North American B25 Mitchell bomber in action – North Italy

26 / #WEARENATO mission, with the re and manoeuvre of friend- Naval Fire Support (NFS) is one of the main ac- ly forces, is normally not required. When the tivities performed by a Naval Task Force in sup- Allies observed the resilience of the Axis forc- port of Land Operations together with Naval Air es and their ability to overcome the problems Strike support and Amphibious Operations. In caused by the interdiction of the Po river, they mid-August 1944, two of the 12 river gunboats switched to communication lines concentrating Insect Class, HMS Aphis and HMS Scarab, re- on trains, railways, marshalling areas and even sumed duty with the Mediterranean Fleet and in transformer stations (to force the Axis to use September they were deployed to the Adriatic steam powered trains). Sea in support of Army operations, based at An- cona. They returned to Malta in January 1945. Like many airpower roles, CAS also came of age in the Italian campaign. Several aspects NFS reached its zenith during the WWII, when of CAS taken for granted in modern air forces the availability of man-portable radio systems were developed in the mud and skies of Italy. and sophisticated relay networks allowed for- The Allies experienced problems in air-ground ward observers to transmit targeting information coordination, communications and identi ca- and provide almost instant accuracy reports, tion of friendlies, but also implemented sever- once troops had landed. Battleships, cruisers al solutions that survive in today’s battlespace. and destroyers would attack shore installations, One solution was a daily meeting between Army sometimes for days, in the hope of reducing for- and Air Force staffs to review the day’s activi- ti cations and the strength of defending forces. ties and the Army representatives would nomi- Noting, that naval guns generally have a rather nate the targets they wanted attacked the next at trajectory and even at long ranges the shells day. This meeting was the forerunner of today’s don’t fall at a particularly steep angle. Battle Rhythm events such as daily synchroni- Moving to current operations, NFS is one of zation meetings and the Joint Targeting Board, the capabilities which constitutes the power at which similar issues are still discussed. An- projection activity of Naval Forces. Technology other solution was ‘prearranged CAS’ sorties, has changed the way NFS is performed; WWII missions over the next 24 hours initiated at di- warships were equipped with many guns, while vision level. These requests made their way to modern ones employ different weapon systems. a Joint Army-Air Force Group that created an Guns are normally tted from small corvette air programme (now called the Air Tasking Or- to big battleships: guns are cheaper, have high der or ATO). In addition, some ghter-bomber rates of re and longer endurance, but the low squadrons were reserved for ‘on-call missions’ range exposes the ring platform to counter at- which took into account changes in the battle tack from shore re. Alternatively, missiles are situation that favoured attacks against targets of expensive and available only for the most mod- opportunity. ern Naval Forces. Their range, sometimes over

HMS Scarab – Adriatic Sea

#WEARENATO / 27 600 nautical miles, does not expose the plat- − New technologies. form to the counter re threat: they are used when accuracy and low collateral damage are required. Conclusion When NFS is employed in support of land oper- Current doctrine for joint operations and for Air ations, the NFS Operations Centre is established and Naval support has its foundations in the onboard a ship to process NFS requests for sup- WWII experience. Given the complexity of the port and control the execution of NFS plans. It is battle eld, Land Commanders must think of the an agency of the Naval Force Commander, and battlespace in all three dimensions and, more- it normally includes a representative of the sup- over, try to also exploit the exibility and force ported Land Forces. multiplier that naval support can offer. Coordina- tion among services is a responsibility at all lev- els of command and its interaction is a key factor Historical Considerations: of success; all commanders must exploit this po- − (Positive) New Air and Maritime Tactics tential and put in place all the necessary training Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) and co- for applying these cooperation procedures effec- ordination; tively. As shown during the Italian Campaign, the − (Negative) Limited employment of Naval re evolution of inter-services cooperation brought support; the Allies strategic advantage over the Axis by − (Negative) Non amphibious ops conducted; applying new procedures based upon enduring − (Negative) AI targeting. lesson learned directly in the eld.

Modern Warfare: About the Authors − Air Space Management and Battle Space Col. Enrico ANDREOZZI is the NRDC-ITA Air Ad- Management; visor for the NRDC-ITA COM. − Synch targeting process; Commander Mauro MARZOLLO is the Navy Ad- − New domains; visor for the NRDC-ITA COM.

RAF B 25 Mitchell Bomber over Padana plains

28 / #WEARENATO HOW TO INTEGRATE COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS IN DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENTS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN TEMPO Col. Cacciagrano, Italian Army 7 Terrain dictates operations. Combat support units are a force enabler and force multiplier when operating in dicult terrain noting that employing these forces requires detailed planning and coordinated execution.

The Argenta Gap battle was the last important engagement of Allied Forces during WW2 on the Italian Front. In winter 1945 the Senio River became the frontline between the advancing 8th British Army and the Axis Troops still defending the Po plain. On 11th April 1945 in the northern part of the 8th Army Front, the British 56th Inf. Div. launched the Operation “Impact Plain”: the amphibious operation on the southern west sector of the Comacchio Lagoon. While the 40th Royal Marine Commando was attacking on the right ank north of Menate, the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Queen’s Regiment of the 169th Bde set off in their Fantails from Idrovora Umana at 08.45 and crossed the ooded area. During the day they established a bridgehead fro m Menate to Longas- trino and the following night the Royal Fusiliers and the London Scottish Regiment forces linked up with incoming elements of the 167th Bde. Then, on 13th April, the Operation “Impact Royal” started; the small village of Fiorana was a tactical objective due to its bridges on the Fossa Ma- rina canal. The attacking force left the Umana Pumping Station at 05.15 of 13th April. During their course to the Bando Canal, north of Fiorana, they were spotted by a coy level German unit deployed in Fiorana. The defenders also laid mine elds along the north bank of the Pioppa Ca- nal. When the leading elements got stuck in the mud and were unable to reach the Bando canal, the follow-on British units made a sharp turn to the South to reach the Pioppa canal and dry land. After other attacks on 14th and 15th April other tactical objectives were secured. On 17th April the third attempt to cross the Fossa Marina canal was successful and at 16.00 a Bailey bridge was completed, replacing an existing damaged road bridge. The Coldstream Guards then moved on from La Fiorana to Il Bando, which was reached on 18th April 1945.

ing water crossings, in cooperation with a Scope TF, in a Close Combat environment; Terrain signi cantly impacts military operations. − Clearing Operations: to detect and eliminate For example, large areas of ooded countryside obstacles, not in a Close Combat environ- can limit movements, swampy areas can retard ment (i.e. Route Clearance in the Rear Area); and restrict mobility, could reduce the effect of − Road Maintenance: including bridging res- indirect artillery re, and make communications toration or research for a bypass. and supply dif cult. At the tactical level mo- bility is supported by Combat Engineers with Considering most obstacles are observed by the other speci c tasks performed by Corps Level enemy and protected by re, before approach- Engineers: Combat Engineers are trained and ing the obstacle area Combat Engineers are fo- equipped to support a TF. Main tasks regarding cused on Reconnaissance, including obstacle mobility are: intelligence and developing appropriate TTPs to − Combined Arms Breaching operations: to clear/overcome the obstacle. In these situations overcome mined areas or obstacles includ- Combat Engineers may require augmentation

#WEARENATO / 29 Operation Impact Plain, Comacchio Valley (10-12 April 1945)

from Corps Level Engineers to accomplish the To plan and conduct these kinds of operations mission. properly, the following aspects must be taken in Considering the case of ooded areas, it may consideration: also be necessary to consider the handling of − Centralized command and control, IOT have civilian displaced persons or refugees to avoid clear coordination of all units, engineers and any negative impact on a military operation. re support;

US vehicles stuck in a river – Gothic Line Central Sector

30 / #WEARENATO British Engineers setup a Bailey Bridge – Gothic line Eastern Sector

− Clear de nition of commander’s intent de- high operational tempo; ning, in particular, objectives at the lowest − Communication assets are essential to allow level, to better assess the trend of the battle; the effective coordination in a joint and com- − Availability of special equipment; bined environment. − Engineer augmentation. Conclusion Historical Considerations This historical case study represents an iconic − (Negative) Use of new equipment without example of how terrain drives operations. Riv- training hampered the effectiveness of new ers, marshes, swampy areas, and other restrictive technologies in the battle; terrain still impact military operations. During − (Negative) Terrain dictates manoeuvre - poor the planning phase, it is essential to identify consideration of the terrain’s features dra- how terrain impacts your operational area to matically reduced the favourable force ratio both improve friendly opportunities and reduce of Allied forces; enemy opportunities. Friendly forces must ac- − (Positive) Integration of Combat Engineers curately plan to use specialized assets that are with manoeuvre units in breaching obstacles normally allocated to Corps level or higher ech- was an effective measure in maintaining the elons. Additionally, the inherent complexity of operational tempo in dif cult terrain. deliberate wet gap crossing operations is de- tailed in a dedicated STANAG that details C2, force organization, crossing site organization, Modern Warfare crossing timings and re support. Both plan- − Enhanced ISTAR assets will help to have ning and execution phase of deliberate crossing complete and clear situational awareness of dif cult terrain must be detailed in order to and terrain knowledge; allow a successful execution. − Shared procedures for obstacle breaching and river crossing operations facilitates the coordination in such operations (STANAG About the Author 2085); Col. Pier Francesco CACCIAGRANO currently − Task organized units allow maintenance of a works as ACOS Engineer in NRDC-ITA.

#WEARENATO / 31 INVOLVEMENT OF A NEUTRAL COUNTRY IN THE WAR

Col. Greggersen, German Army, Col. Zouggari French Army and Col. Bauska, Latvian Army

Considering the Political and Legal implications in dealing with a neutral Country is paramount for planning military operations.

San Marino is the only surviving medieval microstate in the Italian peninsula and is one of the most ancient republics in the world. San Marino declared its neutrality during the rst and the 8second world wars and was a safe haven for more the 100.000 refugees during summer in 1944 due to the ghting along the Gothic Line. The number of refugees supported by San Marino was impressive since the population during the war was approximately 15.000. Despite their declared neutrality, on 26th June 1944, San Marino was bombed by the British Royal Air Force, resulting in 63 civilian casualties. The bombing was ordered as San Marino was believed to have been overrun by German Forces and was being used to store ammunitions and observation post. In September 1944 the Germans and Allies clashed within San Marino territory during the battle of Monte Pulito and then, for three months, San Marino was invaded by the Allies on 20th Septem- ber 1944 to chase the eeing Germans northwards.

fered during WWII, with only 8 of the original Scope 20 neutral states remaining when the War ended. According to the HAGUE CONVENTION 1907 The new post-war concept of collective security the following articles might have been consid- resulted in many neutral countries joining new ered for violation of San Marino’s neutrality: economic and security alliances such as NATO − ARTICLE 1: the territory of neutral authority and the EU, based on the idea that integration is inviolable, conict parties are not allowed and collective security would better solve their to enter in the area; security concerns. Ultimately, this campaign and − ARTICLE 5, 10: a neutral State must defend the broader international conict illustrated that its neutrality. Then if a neutral State rejects the concept of neutrality was incompatible with violations of its neutrality, even by force, it new threats including terrorism, mass migration cannot be regarded as an act of hostility; or nationalism. − ARTICLE 12, 13: the neutral Authority shall supply refugees and prisoners of war with food, clothing and accommodation, assign Modern Warfare them a place of residence; − International Organizations are involved at − ARTICLE 20: the provision of this agreement the earliest step of military operations; shall apply only between contracting author- − Public opinion support is an objective for ities and only if all of the belligerents are commanders; parties of the convention. − Refugee management is coordinated with main actors in a given operational theatre Historical Considerations (IOs, NGOs, HN). The principle of neutrality was undoubtedly at a cross-roads due to the Second World War, with Conclusion some arguing that the War led to obsolescence From the San Marino case study, it is possible to of the principle of neutrality. After the war, in- draw the following lessons: ternational critics of the neutrals accused them − Know your adversary: a sound Comprehen- of economically bene ting from the war. Exam- sive Preparation of the Operational Environ- ples include the Swiss gold and Sweden trading ment (CPOE) performed by the Allies would iron with Germany. Neutral countries also suf- have given hints about German consider-

32 / #WEARENATO British Officer in an observation post near San Marino – Gothic line Eastern Sector

ations regarding the principle of neutrality. tral countries by the adversary in our poten- It leads us to address this phase of the core tial area of operations; planning process with a sound analysis to − Respect of neutrality: articles + Geneva Con- better frame our potential adversary’s capa- vention + culture + environment and the im- bilities and strategy; portant roles of LEGAD, POLAD (planning − Learn from the past: this episode of San Ma- and execution phase); rino reminds us that the implementation and − Clear direction and guidance, accompanied the proper use of the lessons learned process by delegation of authority to lower HQs (di- is useful to avoid being surprised by our visons/brigades); adversary. It reduces the uncertainty and of- − CIMIC as part of both planning and execu- fers opportunities in terms of planning and tion phases of operations. execution of operations; − Use existing laws: NATO countries are bound by laws, but articles of existing organizations About the Authors or conventions can also be exploited to over- Col. Thomas GREGGERSEN is deputy DCOS In- come the principle of neutrality (possibility uence in NRDC-ITA; to rely on the support of neutral countries Col. Daniel ZOUGGARI is the Strategic Commu- based on EU Art 42.7 or the Geneva Conven- nication Advisor to NRDC-ITA COM; tion); Col. Vilis BAUSKA is ACOS G9 in NRDC-ITA. − Plan for the worst case scenario: our poten- tial adversary might not be legally or moral- ly bound. Therefore, we should always plan (contingently) for possible violation of neu-

San Marino bombings September 1944

#WEARENATO / 33 COMPARE THE CONDUCT OF THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FOCUSED ON THE ARMY CORPS, WITH THE MULTI CORPS LCC

Maj. Rodà, Italian Army

During the Italian Campaign, the Allied C2 organization was adapted to be 9eective in planning and executing the operational objectives. The integration of specialized and joint assets allowed eective use of available resources and power to pursue the mission objectives.

As preamble for a fair comparison between the ti ed targets beyond the Corps’ capabilities Italian Campaign WWII and a current NATO war- (see the air campaign prior to Operation ghting scenario (MJO+), given the multination- OLIVE or the photo interpretation both for alism, modern technologies and re power, we intelligence and BDA); must consider that the WWII Armies (5th US and − Close: Allocated and apportioned joint and 8th UK) as a modern Corps and the relative Corps Operations Areas - wide land assets to sup- as the modern Divisions. The WWII 15th Army port Corps’ operations (see movement of Group is to be considered as a modern LCC. Corps between Armies in order to support the ME XIII from 8th Army to 5th Army), syn- chronized the tactical objectives in order to Scope support operational effects; The WWII Army Group had all the character- − Rear: Coordinated Intra-Operational area istics and relative tasks that the current NATO sustainment, integrated follow-on land forc- doctrine allocates to an LCC, in particular using es into operational area (i.e. the creation of the modern battlespace framework: pipelines and the management of the rear − Deep: Developed the collection plan and in- MSRs in order to maintain the continuous tegrated joint and land assets to strike iden- ow of supply to Corps).

34 / #WEARENATO During the Italian campaign, the management operations. of war ghting units and their synchronization − HQs’ organization: Armies and Army Group to meet the strategic and operational objectives integrated joint and combined assets chang- were played by the Land Component HQ (15th ing their internal organization to keep the de- Army Group). cision making process more coherent with the operational objectives. Joint and combined staffs were organized in 4 different ways in Historical Considerations: order to deal with planning and execution: − (Negative) Allied forces had more interop- o Integrated Staff (for units well integrated erability problems than Axis forces which in procedures and supply); were more uniform; o Incremented Staff (for units that often − (Positive) Corps had full complement of change or assigned in limited time); Combat Support and Combat Service Sup- o Mission tailored staffs (for large units port units; with small national attachments); − (Positive) Specialized Combat Support, o Liaison (for units with little interoperabil- Heavy Artillery and Intelligence Units were ity or minimal presence). retained at Army level; − Operational level objectives might match − (Positive) Army Group HQ (both sides) di- strategic objectives for an effective campaign rected the operational campaign; and tactical conduct. Divergent strategic ob- − (Positive) Mission Command (auftragtaktik) jectives within the force contributors might concept was developed and fully applied by hamper the campaign conduct in pursuing Axis. operational and tactical objectives. The unity of effort is ensured by a unique command vision and procedure. A clear mission ob- Modern Warfare: jective, at all levels, must be shared at the − Joint and Combined HQ within NATO forces; very beginning of the campaign in order to − Corps has a complete set of specialized as- ensure that all resources and actions are fo- sets in order to carry out the full spectrum cused on its accomplishment; of missions; − The Mission Command concept must be − LCC focusses on the following roles: developed and implemented at all levels of o Synchronize Land activities with the HN command to maintain tactical manoeuvre ad- and Higher HQs; herent to operational objectives (i.e. success o Frame the Land operations in accordance exploitation) and ensure the proper degree with operational/strategic objectives; of exibility in changing operational envi- o Shift priorities, modify execution; ronment. During the studied campaign, the o Ensure access to Joint enablers. defenders were able to optimize and maxi- mize the scarce resources, applying mission command to the lowest level of command. Conclusion Consequently they were an extremely ex- Due to its inherent characteristics, complex ter- ible and adaptable organization able to re- rain, high tempo, force composition, resources spond promptly. and the divergent strategic vision, the WWII Italian Campaign was complex both in planning Bearing in mind the previously mentioned con- and execution. From an organizational point of siderations identi ed in this WWII event study, view, studying the Italian Campaign offers les- a multi-corps HQ may have clear mission objec- sons in organizing and conducting multi-Corps tives that would ensure the adherence between the strategic/operational objectives and the tac- tical conduct of the operations. Moreover, the HQ should have a exible organization in order to quickly adapt to a changing uid situation and to exploit to the maximum extent the avail- able resources. Flexibility will ensure the rapid prioritization and shifting of resources and as- sets when and where needed and, furthermore, is a key factor in employing effectively the joint enablers.

About the Author Maj Mario RODA’ currently works as staff of cer in the NRDC-ITA Engineer branch. General Mark W. CLARK – Gothic Line Central Sector

#WEARENATO / 35 ASSESS IF THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK OF THE OPERATIONS DEEP, CLOSE AND REAR IS APPLICABLE TO THE WWII EVENTS IN THE 10GOTHIC LINE AND COMPARE THOSE EVENTS WWII WITH THE CURRENT DOCTRINE

Col. Dario and the Sta of Friuli Division, Italian Army

The Italian Campaign oered examples of how to manage the Battlespace. Having a clear understanding of the area of operations allows commanders to better prioritize eorts.

Historical Considerations, applicability of deep close rear framework to the ‘Gothic Line’ battle area (contiguous area).

36 / #WEARENATO vide the force with time and manoeuvre space Modern Warfare within which to react to the enemy, protect the − Areas of operation help commanders quick- force from surprise, and develop the situation ly prioritize and focus resources and efforts. so the commander can effectively use the force. Commanders organize their battle eld with control measures to assign responsibilities, to coordinate res and manoeuvre, and to Conclusion control other activities; Framing the battlespace will allow command- − Battles and engagements are at times linear ers to effectively allocate and leverage available with deep, close, and rear components. Al- resources and forces. As observed in the Italian though these components may be noncon- Campaign, for the Allied and Axis forces, the tiguous, they are not separate and distinct key factor of effective corps operations and bat- activities. They are synchronized efforts tlespace management was updated situational throughout the entire depth of the battle eld. awareness and an effective use of forces and res. The deep-close-rear framework has historically The following aspects might be considered in ap- been associated with terrain, orientation but can plying the battlespace framework to corps level: be applied to temporal and organizational ori- − Modern CIS capabilities improve C2 and entations as well. ensure the adherence of manoeuvre to the commander’s intent; − Then and now, the use of ISTAR/recce as- Deep Ops sets enables the deep operations; Deep operations involve efforts to disrupt un- − Use of guided weapons improve strike pre- committed enemy forces. The purpose of deep cision on small size targets reducing collat- operations frequently ties to other events distant eral effect; in time and space. − Air and Army Aviation employment (CAS/ transport/recce) provide 3rd dimension sup- Close Ops port. Close operations involve efforts to have imme- In conclusion, framing the battlespace will ease diate effects with committed friendly forces-po- the control of tactical forces and allow the prop- tentially in direct contact with enemy forces-to er degree of exibility and speed in adapting include enemy reserves available for immediate the operations to current conditions. commitment. About the Author Rear Ops Col. Giovanni DARIO currently works as DCOS Rear operations involve efforts to provide early OPS of the Friuli Division. and accurate warning of enemy operations, pro-

#WEARENATO / 37 38 /#WEARENATO CONCLUSION AND THE ART OFCOMMAND MILITARY HISTORY STUDY reached the appropriate level of granularity months oftheItalianCampaignduring WWII, The NRDC-ITA staff, in studyingthe nal dictable, adaptive andresilientadversaries. weremanders andstaff challengedby unpre- tions in which Army, Corpsand Division com- staffs,- especiallywhenhighlightingopera leadersandtheir essential topreparemilitary cordingly, is history theanalysisofmilitary and professional skills ofitspersonnel. Ac- developmultiple toolstofurther thepersonal NRDC-ITA organization thatuses isalearning a capable, preparedandeffective staff. within our Joint, multinational team represent authorities that are represented and military it may becalledto ght. However, theNations will notknow where, whenandagainstwhom metric, allfromdifferent sources. NRDC-ITA to different threats, bothsymmetricandasym- capable peeradversaries, promptlyrespond forces.itary Unitsmustbepreparedtoface requires ahighdegreeofadaptationfor mil- environment operational The contemporary British Sherman crossesBritish Sherman theruinsofImprunetanear Florence future complex operational commitment. future complex operational understand how tosucceedwhenfacingany and well-trained ofNRDC-ITA staff tobetter case studies allow the ready, multinational history. fromhistorical The lessonslearned tooltostudyandunderstandmilitary erful RidesandBattle eld Staff Tours areapow- events.adversary andotherexternal ofthe in ordertocountertheunpredictability and timely manner mand in the most ef cient battle eld wherethey canexercise theircom- manders mustremain close enoughtothe Command Post, atthe Tactical level com- NRDC-ITA’s developing conceptofForward tive decisionmaking; secondly, inlinewith (mission command), always promptineffec - to have leadersthatareguidedby initiative fered lessonstoapply: several important rst, andtheassociatedleaders of- history military commanders involved inthatevent. Studying namics relatedtothe ‘human factors’ ofthe phases ofthelandmanoeuvreanddy- by focusing ontheCorpslevel, examining all nrdcita . Milannrdcita . . Milan .

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