Red Army Operations in Theory and Practice, 1936-1942
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University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2014-09-30 Ten Principles of Soviet Operational Art: Red Army Operations in Theory and Practice, 1936-1942 Brisson, Kevin Brisson, K. (2014). Ten Principles of Soviet Operational Art: Red Army Operations in Theory and Practice, 1936-1942 (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/27996 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/1872 master thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Ten Principles of Soviet Operational Art: Red Army Operations in Theory and Practice, 1936-1942 by Kevin M. Brisson A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTRE FOR MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES CALGARY, ALBERTA SEPTEMBER, 2014 ©Kevin M. Brisson 2014 2 Abstract Over the course of the Great Patriotic War, fought from 22 June, 1941 to 9 May, 1945, there was a dramatic transformation in the way the Red Army conducted battle. From an army on the cusp of annihilation to one that quickly recovered to vanquish the invading forces of Nazi Germany, this resurgence can be traced in part to its mastery of operational art. Moreover, the ever-increasing series of strategic victories which eventually led to Nazi Germany’s final defeat, beginning in late 1942, revealed the importance that offensive doctrine held for the Red Army leaders. The guiding principles which formed the basis of operational art were proscribed within many of the Red Army’s prewar and wartime theoretical writings, many of which coalesced unto the pages of several Red Army field manuals. However, for the purposes of this thesis, focus shall be assigned to the 1936 Provisional Field Regulations as the primary source for what the author shall later identify as the ten principles of Soviet operational art. The first chapter will be devoted to explaining how the author utilized various sources in the examination of this subject. In addition to English-language sources, Russian and German primary and secondary materials were extensively consulted. As part of this literature review, comments regarding both the value and shortcomings of these works will be made to show why they were used and to what degree they proved helpful. The second chapter will seek to discuss all ten principles of Soviet operational art. This will begin by identifying where in the manual these principles are located and how they were supposed to be applied in the context of tactical and operational offensives. This will be followed by a brief look at how each was conceptually developed. A broader understanding of the nature of these principles will require an examination of their respective roles in the planning and conduct of tactical deep battle and operations in depth. The third major section of this thesis will assess the importance of the aforementioned principles by examining their roles in two major operations. These are: (1) the Smolensk Counter Offensive Operation, 21 July to 7 August, 1941 and (2) Operation Uranus, 19-23 November, 1942. The Smolensk Counterstroke was chosen to demonstrate operational failure when most of the ten principles of operational art were absent. Conversely, Uranus will be to show success when all are present. Following this shall be the fourth chapter, which will offer a comparative discussion on the differences and similarities in German and Russian military doctrines as expressed by their respective field manuals, namely the 1933 Truppenführung and the 1936 Soviet Polevyye Ustav. Lastly, the fifth and final chapter will offer a summary conclusion that will address the question of why the German army failed to win the war, even when abiding by a military doctrine similar to that practiced by the Red Army. This will involve a comparative assessment of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin’s abilities as military leaders and their understanding of operational art. 3 Acknowledgments I would like to thank the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies for having made possible the continuation of my studies into the field of military history. Without the generous support of the Centre and the advice and assistance of its fellows and staff, this work could never have been achieved. My gratitude for the many efforts made by faculty and staff to accommodate my needs is one that cannot be fully expressed and for that, they will always have my deepest appreciation. I want to thank my thesis adviser, Dr. Alexander Hill, for his willingness to supervise my work. It is my hope that, with his help, I have produced what is a positive contribution to this field. 4 Dedication For Cheryl and Cali 5 Table of Contents Title Page………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………….…1 Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..2 Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………………………………….……………………..….….3 Dedication………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………4 Table of Contents……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………5 Glossary……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…7 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...9 Background………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….….9 Thesis Statement……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………….10 Thesis Framework Overview………………………………………………………………………………………………………….……..11 Chapter One: Literature Review……………………..………………………………………………….……………….………..……..13 Chapter Two: Ten Principles of Deep Operations…………….…………………………………………………….……….…...17 Simultaneity……………………………………………………………..…………………………………………………………………………..19 Combined arms…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…………….….23 Surprise………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..31 Tempo……………………………………………………………………………………………………….………………………………………….35 Mass………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………………………………………….41 Shock…………………………………………………………………………………………………….………………………………………………43 Command, Control and Intelligence ……………………………………………………………………………………………….…...47 Depth………………………………..………………………………………………………………………………………………………………....54 Mobility …………………………..……………….......................................................................................................59 Pursuit……………………..……………………………………………………..……………………………………………………………………63 Chapter Three: Operational Analysis…………………………………………………………..…………………………….…………68 6 Smolensk Counter Offensive Operation (21 July to 7 August, 1941)………………………………………....….……69 Disposition of Forces ………………………..………………………………………………………..…………………………………….…69 The Plan……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..………..70 Assessment……………….…………..……………………………..……………………………………………………………..……….….….73 Operation Uranus (19-23 November, 1942) ……………………………………….………………....………………….……....84 Disposition of Forces………………………………………..……………………………………………………………………………..…..84 The Plan……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….87 Assessment..………………………….…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….88 Chapter Four: A Comparison of German and Russian Military Doctrines……………………………..……………106 Chapter Five: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………129 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...….150 Appendix 1…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…....158 Appendix 2………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..……….160 Appendix 3…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..……...…….164 Appendix 4…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…….167 Appendix 5………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...169 Appendix 6………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...171 Appendix 7………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...173 Map 1………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….175 Map 2……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…176 7 Glossary of Russian Military Terms Gluboki Boi (Tactical Deep Battle) The use of lower-level formations to offensively engage the enemy within his tactical depth. Glubokiye Operatsii (Deep Operations) Theory of maneuver warfare popularized by Red Army theorists, Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Vladimir Triandafillov, Alexander Svechin, Alexander Yegerov, and others. It is generally understood as the accumulated sum of tactical victories secured in the varied depths of the enemy’s operational area, utilizing principles espoused by Red Army doctrine regarding offensive combat. Glubokiy Tyl (Deep Rear) That part of the territory of a state (or states) beyond the range of enemy operational and tactical means of attack. Maskirovka (Deception) A variety of active and passive measures designed to create a false disposition of friendly forces to the enemy. This included camouflage, diversion, disinformation, and false maneuvers. Maskirovka was employed to mislead the enemy to a commander’s intent, mission objectives, and combat strength. Nastuplenie (Offensive) The principal form of military or combat operation, employed to destroy the enemy and seize key areas, battle lines or installations. It involves using all available firepower to defeat enemy forces, decisive assaults, a high rate of advance into