Defence policy of the Russian Federation

Russia’s emergence as a sovereign state in 1991 led to claimed independence in 2008, Russia refused to recognise turmoil within and the disintegration of Soviet military struc- it, fearing that this case could become a precedent for all tures. Due to mass reduction of personnel, army organisation separatist-tending territories. fell into disarray, the industrial process was disrupted for lack The next escalation of tensions occurred in 2004 with of raw materials or components formerly supplied by other NATO expansion towards south-east Europe. As early as republics and regions, while logistic routes became unviable. 2000, in the previous Military Doctrine, NATO enlargement The political and economic crisis of the transitional period be- was assessed as representing a serious threat to Russia’s tween 1992 and 1999 and the disastrous war in Chechnya security. The question of NATO membership for Ukraine and brought about a far-reaching crisis in the armed forces and Georgia constitutes a red line for Russia. Having very lit- the military-industrial complex. It was not until the end of the tle influence on the current Ukrainian and Georgian political 1990s that the situation began to stabilise. During the decade establishment, Russia opts for harsh arguments when dis- of 1999-2009 the industrial and technological sectors under- cussing their potential membership in NATO: State officials went a large-scale restructuring process which was clearly claim that Ukrainian and Georgian aspirations to join NATO necessary for restoring Russia’s defence capability. could be a perfect justification for the secession of Crimea from Ukraine and the permanent separation from Georgia of THE RELATIONS WITH NATO the breakaway autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South In the latest Military Doctrine of 2010, NATO’s current pol- Ossetia. icy is characterised as a potential danger to Russia’s secu- On the operational level, however, Russian officials do rec- rity: “The intention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ognise the importance of military cooperation with NATO. to use its power-based potential for performing global func- Russia and NATO have established a working relationship in tions without due respect for international law, its intention the area of theatre missile defence, this being based on ex- to bring the military infrastructure of NATO member-states changes of information and joint exercises. Despite evident to the borders of Russia, including the enlargement of the opposition to NATO enlargement, at the Bucharest summit bloc” represent a danger (though not a threat which, in the of 2008, Putin accepted that should NATO be consistent in Doctrine’s terminology, is far more crucial than danger) to its intention to develop an in-depth strategic partnership with national security. Russia, the latter would eventually cease to react so nega- Russia’s current conflict with NATO originates from the tively to Alliance activity in neighbouring countries. Agree- time of the fall of the Berlin wall. In opposing NATO territo- ments were also achieved to ensure access to Afghanistan rial expansion, Russia refers to the alleged promise given to across Russian airspace and territory for the deployment of Mikhail Gorbachev by NATO officials not to expand into the the forces and equipment of the International Security As- territories which are crucial for the country’s security. In sistance Force (ISAF). Another positive factor is Medvedev’s return, Russia pledged to remove its troops from Eastern initiative of common Euro-Atlantic security to be based, in his Europe and the Baltic states. Russia honoured its obliga- judgment, on a trilateral US-EU-Russia partnership. tions, but the NATO countries failed to keep their word. Nev- By the end of 2009 positive trends in NATO-Russia rela- ertheless, in 1997 Russia and NATO signed the Founding tions began to emerge. The NATO Secretary General, An- Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between ders Fogh Rasmussen, declared that NATO gives priority to NATO and the Russian Federation. This agreement estab- restoration of close partnership with Russia. In his speech lished the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as a in the Carnegie Center in Brussels in September 2009, Ras- forum for political dialogue and cooperation. In 1999, when mussen stated it is necessary to work out a project of a NATO started its military operation in Kosovo, sidelining Rus- common NATO-USA-Russia missile defence system; stated sia from decisions concerning Yugoslavia, relations between that Georgia and Ukraine do not meet criteria of the alliance Russia and NATO entered into a period of deep crisis and membership; declared that NATO is willing to cooperate with mutual distrust. NATO’s decision on bombing Belgrade was Russia on the exploration of the Arctic; pledged to consider perceived as a potential threat to Russia’s territorial integ- Russia’s interests in the alliance’s security policy; and said he rity as it is not difficult to draw parallels between Kosovo would take into consideration Medvedev’s proposal on new secession and the situation in Chechnya. After Kosovo pro- European security architecture (NATO—Russia…, 2009). 233 234 CIDOB International Yearbook 2010 Russian Federation, Country Profile lyn is isl dfne ytm n oad n te Czech Republic. the and Poland in system defence missile its ploying de for plans its renounced officially administration Obama the set” relations between the two countries. In September 2009, Obama took office, the US of Department State offered to “re after soon Indeed, administration. incoming the with eration coop on counted and America in election presidential the of outcome the for waiting apparently was Russia deadlocked. were system defence missile the of issue the on Negotiations arsenal. weapons strategic the renewing of question the ing rais started also officials Russian Kaliningrad. in or Belarus Ukraine, with borders the along weapons nuclear tactical and intermediate-range deploy to intention its announced Russia administration, Bush the from response positive a receive to failed initiatives these When Brussels. and Moscow in tres cen data warning joint establishing and architecture, security European new creating through construction defence missile anti- in governments European other involving Russia, of part use of an almost-constructed radar installation in the southern Azerbaijan, in station radar Gabala Russian-leased the from developments missile Iranian on data to access with States United the providing included These system. defence missile suggested several initiatives as possible alternatives to the US inconsistency,their prove Russia and deployments these vent pre to attempt an In interests. of sphere its in interference true intention of the United States is deterrence of Russia and the fact, in that, and Iran by attack missile of case in useless wouldbe system defence this that claimed officials Russian countries. these of territories the on system defence missile global American the of elements deploying on Republic Czech United States began bilateral negotiations with Poland and the States, doesnotcontributetoglobalandregionalsecurity. Iran, Syria and Venezuela) which, in the opinion of the United such denied example, (for are Europe and States United that the by cooperation states some includes network This equipment. military Russian to access having in interested countries with cooperation of relations and partnerships of network complex a developed has Russia that fact the with negotiations seekingacompromiseposition. ballistic global regular hold to Russia and States United regard the defence, missile With 2009. in 75 reached had Initiative the in participating states of number The rorism. TerNuclear of Acts Combat to Initiative Global a launched 2002, States United the and in Federation Russian the in 2006, while signed Treaty) Reductions Offensive (Strategic tion. One of the most treaties important in this area is SORT reduc and limitation arms nuclear of sphere the in lies sia sphere of security, mostly because the EU is deemed prefer usa ek t etbih eain wt te U n the in EU the with relations establish to seeks Russia EUROPEAN THE UNION WITH RELATIONS THE the when 2006 in arose discord of points serious More Nonetheless, the United States has been quite dissatisfied Rus and States United the between cooperation Defence STATES UNITED THE WITH RELATIONS THE ------plied with the terms of the Istanbul Commitments concerning concerning Commitments Istanbul of the terms the with plied com Russia until it ratify to refused parties Other zakhstan. Ka and Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, by only ratified was treaty new However,the members. NATO of and number Union, increased the Soviet the of dissolution reflected the as which changes Commitments) such Istanbul so-called the ing (includ Adaptation” on “Agreement an with complemented was Treaty CFE the 1999, well In inspections. as for provisions as information of exchange and trust mutual enhance toterritory. measures their include on They deploy and have might states signatory the forces armed and equipment the within 1992 the in framework of the OSCE. These documents set supplemented ceilings on and 1990 in Paris in signed Russian equipment. buy countries EU some and place take troops American German and British, French, Russian, of exercises military joint EU-Russia relations throughout the last decade. Occasionally of development further hampered Moldova and Georgia in resolution conflict to and security energy to approach in es able to NATO in as security a projects. partner Yet differenc war broke out on 26 August 1999, soon after Vladimir Putin Chechen second The cities. Russian several in attacks rorist neighbouring Republic of Dagestan and launched massive ter out of Moscow’s control, as Chechen separatists invaded the again was Chechnya that clear become had it 1999, By las. guerril Chechen the against war devastating a led 1996 Russia and 1994 Between 1994. in secede to attempted Chechen separatists Union, formed an Soviet independence movement the and of collapse the After Empire. Russian of pared tocontinueandintensifythedialogue”. ventional armaments. Our proposal still applies. We are pre con over regime control European the of viability restore to programme distinct a proposed has Russia time, same the Treaty. At the suspend to Russia forced has interests, curity se countries’ certain realities despite - Alliance the of expansion and new the with line in (CFE) Europe in Forces Armed Conventional on Treaty 1990 the bring to NATO of luctance re long-lasting “…The 2009, of Conference Security Munich during it put Ivanov, Sergei Minister, Prime Deputy the As Treaty.this on negotiations reopening propose to continues Russia However, Treaty. CFE the with compliance Russian on moratorium a effect into bringing decree a issued Putin President Russia, of security the jeopardised actions these that giving considered Having by Ukraine. and Georgia to enlargement membership of prospect the of speaking started NATOaddition, In Republic. Czech the and Poland in system defence missile global American the of elements install to plans its announced States United The drastically. changed situation the 2007, In its countries. all both from withdraw bases to military pledged gradually but Treaty CFE the of ratification block not should issues these that insisted Russia Moldova.and Georgia of territories the from equipment tary mili and forces armed remaining Russia’s of withdrawal the h Tet o Cnetoa Fre i Erp (F) was (CFE) Europe in Forces Conventional on Treaty The The origins of Chechen separatism date back to the periodthe to back date separatism Chechen of origins The SEPARATISM CHECHEN OF PROBLEM THE ------was appointed Prime Minister of Russia. In February 2000, eration with Russia is quite important since it gives India a Russia recaptured the Chechen capital of Grozny, regaining military edge over Pakistan. control over Chechnya. Federal forces put it under the strict In such countries as Kirghizstan and Uzbekistan, Russia security regime of a counterterrorist operation for the next has established a permanent military presence and achieved few years. In 2007, Putin appointed Ramzan Kadyrov as a certain level of influence and control over decision-making President of the Chechen Republic. Kadyrov was in fact given processes concerning security issues and the energy re- freedom in his choice of methods of stabilising the situation sources of these countries. in the region. Many analysts agree that Chechnya now enjoys quite a high level of autonomy, with Kadyrov remaining loyal THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES to Moscow. “The flip side is that Chechnya’s internal political As the main successor of the Soviet superpower, the Rus- issues are largely resolved without Russia and with minimal sian Federation inherited about 70% of the Union’s military adherence to federal laws” (Markedonov, 2009). might. The entire decade after the collapse of the Soviet In April 2009, President Medvedev called off the regime Union was characterised by processes of large-scale rede- of counterterrorist operation, which marked an end to the ployment of Russian armed forces and weaponry from post- strict security regime imposed in Chechnya. Some analysts Soviet republics and several Eastern European countries - warn that with this decision of the Kremlin local authorities former participants of the Warsaw Pact alliance. As early as led by Kadyrov are going to gain more control in the Repub- 1994, about 30 infantry, tank and airborne divisions, over lic. The National Antiterrorism Committee commented that 50 missile, artillery and anti-aircraft brigades, as well as over abolition of this regime would be a chance for Chechnya to 60 aviation regiments had returned to Russia. With over continue restoring and developing its economic and social 45,000 units of weaponry and almost four million tons of Defence policy the Russian Federation of infrastructure. strategic reserves also taken back to Russia, this was one of the largest redeployments in history.1 THE EASTERN DIMENSION OF RUSSIAN As the economic and political situation in the country took a DEFENCE POLICY turn for the worse, finance for the armed forces was signifi- In Asia, Russian defence policy is implemented within the cantly cut. Between the years of 1991 and 1997 the Russian framework of regional security alliances (the Collective Secu- defence budget shrank eightfold. The main manufacturers rity Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation of military equipment in the country were therefore obliged Organisation (SCO)), and in bilateral defence projects with to reorient their production to foreign countries, while the China, India, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russian military forces had significantly depleted their opera- Iran, and some other countries. tional potential by 2000. The members of CSTO and SCO organise joint military exer- After Vladimir Putin became President, he promised that the cises, while seeking to avoid presenting them as being aimed military share of the defence budget would increase to 3.5% against any third party. Again, these organisations facilitate of the country’s GDP. In 2008, the government announced cooperation among their members in border monitoring, the beginning of a new military reform, the main purposes of prevention of separatism and fighting against terrorism and which were reduction of the total number of troops to one organised crime. The Chief of Staff of the Russian Army, Yuri million servicemen, transition from the four-tiered structure Baluyevsky, stresses SCO neutrality: “We are not acting as (military district-army-division-regiment) to a three-tiered one a counterweight to anyone and believe that in today’s world (military district-operative command-brigade), and large-scale there is no place for military confrontation between coalitions renovation of military equipment. of states, or for military-political blocs. The SCO member The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Rus- states condemn any attempts to rely exclusively on military sian Federation is the President. The main administrative force in international relations” (Na voenno-politicheskih…, body, which supervises all the activities in the military sphere, 2007). is the Ministry of Defence. China is one of Russia’s biggest partners in terms of arms Contemporary Russian Armed Forces include three branches, and military equipment supply. Despite the fact that China’s these being Ground Forces, Navy and Air Force; three independ- defence budget is almost double that of Russia, the latter still ent branches of troops, which are Strategic Missile Troops, has the advantage in defence technologies and avoids trans- Military Space Troops and Airborne Troops; as well as Rear fer of technology to China. Russia is competing with China in Armed Forces, Railroad Troops, Chief Administration of Military the region for the gas and oil reserves of the Central-Asian Medical Service, military units and organisations, responsible countries, which have the option to export their energy re- for housing and procurement, and troops that do not belong to serves either to Russia (which re-exports them to Europe) any of the abovementioned branches of the Armed Forces. or to China. A branch of the Armed Forces is usually active in a par- India is also a major partner with which Russia has em- ticular environment (air, land, water) and has specific arma- barked on several defence programmes, including the Brah- ments. A branch of troops, unless it is independent, is a part Mos missile, the loan of a nuclear attack submarine “Admiral of a certain section of the Armed Forces, and operates with Gorshkov”, and a prospective programme for a so-called “fifth a specific kind of weaponry, has a specific structure and is generation” Stealth fighter plane. For India, defence- coop capable of performing certain functions.

235 236 CIDOB International Yearbook 2010 Russian Federation, Country Profile oc: vain bmadet gon atc, i defence air attack, ground (bombardment, aviation Force: forces andequipment. military of transportation and reconnaissance forces, naval and ground supporting operations, combat in participation functions chief include protection of Its state borders and 1992. territory from the in air, established was it Federation, Russian the of Force Air the As century. nineteenth the of 7,550 rocketswereactive. piecesand900artillery vehicles, towed artillery artillery self-propelled 3,500 vehicles, ing fight infantry armoured 6,000 carriers, personnel armoured 6,400 tanks, 6,500 only these of out Warfare, website the on information to According missiles. defence air 2,670 and rockets artillery 2,606 pieces, artillery towed 10,060 cles, vehi artillery self-propelled 4,705 vehicles, fighting infantry 15,000 armoured armoured personnelcarriers, 9,900 cles, vehi fighting armoured 25,975 tanks, 21,820 had Forces Ground Russian the 2008, in website, Security Global the on published data to According Forces. Armed Russian number the total for the of 36% about is which troops, 360,000 forcesinregionalwarfare. the mainmilitary are for used expanding which forces, reserve strategic third, wars; regional or in local units during the readiness of combat constant enlargement is which of purpose main the and bodies, units military reduced second, conflicts; local in attacks enemy repelling of capable are which readiness, combat constant in units military first, and bodies components: administrative three into divided are Forces Ground establishments, enterprisesandorganisations. military units, military individual districts, fortified as well as tric Caucasu (Moscow, districts military six includes Forces Ground the of structure The protection). rearguard andautomobile support, technical protection, biological and chemical radiation, engineering, warfare, radio-electronic air defence and also special corps (reconnaissance, signals, forces, rocket and artillery tanks, rifles, motorised troops: prised by various divisions belonging to different branches of forces enemy ifnecessary.and capturingenemyterritory defeating attacks, enemy repelling borders, main country’s the land forces that are responsible for the protecting the state are These reform. 2008 the of object prime the were Forces Ground the Forces, Armed (Soviet) or omns ih omn cnrs n t Petersburg, St in centres command with Commands four of consist will it which of result a as restructuring, of ess echelons. troopsandlogisticssupport cial support tion), anti-aircraft missile troops, radio-technical troops, spe fighter, reconnaissance, and transport combat avia support t rsn, h Rsin i Fre s negig proc a undergoing is Force Air Russian the present, At Air the of basis the constitute troops of branches Several The of history the Russian Air Force dates back to the end THE AIRFORCE The current personnel of the Ground Forces consist of about the parts, structural the all administration better For com is it Forces, Armed the of branch largest the As Russian the of branches the of one as 1946 in Established THE GROUNDFORCES t s), where nine armies and one army corps are located; are corps army one and armies nine where s), s , Volga-Ura l , Siberia n and Far Easter Far Leningra n Military Dis Military d , North North ------aggression andmonitoringforeignnavalactivities. enemyof repelling world’s and prevention as well as oceans, the of areas remote more the and zone economic exclusive the in waters, territorial its in monitoring countries other and of activities activities economic effective for necessary conditions the of maintenance borders, water state’s the of protection entails which domain, water the in security its maintaining and interests country’s the protecting for force Peter the Great in October 1696. Today it is the main military wasestimatedatbeingaround2,800. service personnel equalling183,000troops. regiments, with 37 the surface-to-air-missile total number of defence. In 2008, there were 71 aviation, 18 helicopter and aerospace of brigades 13 and airbases 33 It include also will defence. aerospace of command strategic a and mand ing a long-range aviation command, a transport aviation com includ these Rostov-na-Donu, and Khabarovsk Novosibirsk, troops, about30,000 ofthemcivilians. with fixedmissilecomplexesand fivewithmobileones. armed being them of four with 2016, by nine to cut be will number their 2008, in launched plan reform military the to According divisions. eleven of consisted armies these 2009, 33 and (Orenburg), Army 31 Vladimir), in headquarters (with Army Missile so- the called “nucleartriad”. in (ICBM) Missiles Ballistic Intercontinental based Russia possesses. This branch of troops is in charge of land- warheads 47% of for some all the nuclear accounting forces, nuclear strategic Russian the Toof basis the troops. are SMT the of day branch a into Forces Armed the of branch and eighteenconventionalattacksubmarines(SSKs). (SSNs) submarines attack nuclear fourteen (SSGNs), rines marines (SSBNs), five nuclear-powered cruise missile subma sub missile ballistic nine frigates, six cruisers, destroyers, fourteen five ships, war amphibious light sixteen carrier, aircraft one them among warships, 233 be to estimated is service active in vessels Today,of times. number Soviet the with comparison in especially significantly, shrank weaponry The overallmanpoweroftheNavyisabout142,000. Flotilla. Caspian the and Fleet Northern Russian the Pacific Fleet, the Fleet, Sea Black the Fleet, Baltic the flotilla: one of itsstructure. part a form also units rear-based and unconventional ships, infantry.defence coastal and Vessels,naval and aviation, val na forces, surface naval and submarine includes it troops, and general-purpose naval forces. Regarding the branches of The regular Russian Navy was originally established under under established originally was Navy Russian regular The THE NAVY operational in aircraft Force Air of number year,the This t rsn te M nme apoiaey 110,000 approximately number SMT the present At The SMT are comprised of three missile armies: 27 a being from transformed were SMT the 2001 March In STRATEGIC MISSILETROOPS(SMT) naval and vessels combat of number the 1990s the During and fleets four of comprised is Navy Russian the total, In The Navy is forces into two naval nuclear divided main parts: rd Guard Missile Army (Omsk). In In (Omsk). Army Missile Guard st th Missile Guards ------In January 2010, the SMT had at their disposal 367 mis- By 2005 their personnel numbered about 35,000 troops, sile complexes of four different types, which were capable of having at their disposition about 1,038 airborne armoured carrying 1,248 nuclear warheads. They included 59 SS-18 combat vehicles, 894 armoured personnel carriers, 308 model missiles, 70 SS-19, 171 SS-25 and 67 SS-27. The gun mounts and other weaponry. operational phase of the first three types ends in the next 5-10 years, while SS-27 and newly developed SS-X-29 mis- MILITARY DOCTRINE siles are expected to become the basis of SMT weaponry by The New Military Doctrine was published in February 2010. the end of 2016, accounting for 80% of all the missiles. In this document one can clearly trace conventional “realpoli- tik” considerations in the balance of power between the United SPACE TROOPS States, NATO and Russia. Although the Doctrine is presented After the merger with the SMT in 1997, the Russian Space from a defensive viewpoint, it intrinsically implies that Russia Troops were re-established in 2001 as an independent will not agree to being sidelined from decision-making in those branch of troops. The Space Troops control Russia’s early- international problems that are related to its national interests. warning, missile defence system, space object tracking, and It asserts that Russia would not hesitate to take unilateral ac- military satellite launching and flight control assets.2 The tion, if this is required by its most vital national interests. main tasks of the Space Troops include informing the highest The Doctrine evaluates current and potential threats to military and political administration about a missile attack, national security. It mentions that military instruments are antimissile defence of Moscow; creation, development, main- now less significant than in the past, considering that, along tenance and control of the orbital group of space vehicles of with conventional threats such as separatism, regional and military, dual, socioeconomic and scientific application. international instability, there are also asymmetrical risks Defence policy the Russian Federation of Space Troops operate three cosmodromes (spaceports): such as extremism and terrorism, organised crime, drug Baikonur, Plesetsk and Svobodny. It also includes the Mili- and arms trafficking, mass migrations, resource depletion, tary Formation of Space Missile Defence System, the Main climate change, and so on. The central purpose of the Rus- Testing and Controlling Centre of Aerospace Vehicles, named sian armed forces according to the Doctrine is safeguarding after G. S. Titov, and other military training centres. territorial integrity and control of energy resources, which It also consists of three divisions, these being the 1st Divi- are two recurrent themes in official discourse on defence sion of Missile Attack Warning (with headquarters in Solnech- issues. The Doctrine also asserts the importance of civilian nogorsk), the 9th Division of Anti-missile Defence (Sofrino), control over defence structures. and the 45th Division of Outer Space Surveillance (Noginsk). About fourteen radar sites under their control are located REFORM OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY around the country and nearby countries such as Azerbaijan, Putin’s defence policy was based on the intention of re- Belarus, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. turning to the Russian Federation the status of world power. Today, Space Troops operate about 100 space vehicles, 40 In this aspiration Putin’s team was relying on fossil fuel re- of which are vehicles of defence application, 21 of dual ap- sources and modernisation of defence capabilities. The latter plication, and 39 of scientific and socioeconomic application. goal required large-scale, thoroughgoing restructuring and By 2009 the GLONASS system, which is considered to be reorganising of the armed forces. With this in mind, the Rus- the main rival navigation system to the American NAVSTAR sian government set about a long-term process of reform in GPS, had sixteen vehicles, and is expected to have nineteen the armed forces. in 2010. Putin gave strong political support to the military establish- ment, and during his presidency, the first attempts to start AIRBORNE TROOPS a structural reform of the Russian armed forces were made. The birth date of the Russian (Soviet) Airborne Troops is The decision to restructure the political and military defence considered to be 2 August 1930. However, it was only in structures was approved by the Duma in 2004. During his 1991 that it was established as an independent branch of tenure, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov worked on revamping troops. This is an elite mobile branch of troops responsible the operational command structures, which corresponded for conducting combat operations in rapid response to enemy to Putin’s own policy of building “vertical power” aiming at attacks, engaging the enemy in the air and with rearguard strengthening presidential control in the regions and increas- military activity. These troops often form part of peacekeep- ing the speed and accuracy of implementation of the Presi- ing forces as well. dent’s decisions in all executive bodies at both federal and Structurally, they consist of four divisions – 7th Guards Air regional levels. Ivanov’s reform established a chain of com- Assault Division (with headquarters in Novorossiysk), 76th mand with the president as the supreme commander of the Guards Air Assault Division (Pskov), 98th Guards Airborne armed forces; ensured that the government would have the Division (Ivanovo), 106th Guards Airborne Division (Tula) efficient and well-supplied army necessary to accomplish its – the 31st Guards Airborne Brigade (Ulyanovsk), the 38th missions; and shifted operational authority over the armed Signal Regiment, the 45th Detached Reconnaissance regi- forces to the Minister of Defence (a function that formerly ment (Kubinka), the Ryazan Institute of Airborne Troops, the belonged to the General Staff). Since 2004 the General Staff 242nd Training centre (Omsk), and a separate helicopter must implement decisions made by the Minister of Defence squadron. under the authority of the President).

237 238 CIDOB International Yearbook 2010 Russian Federation, Country Profile the Defence Ministry. As many analysts agree, Putin count Putin agree, analysts many Ministry.As Defence the of Head appointed was Serdyukov Anatoly when 2007 ary equipment procurementprogrammes. defence of cost the auditing and monitoring for introducing system and a complex, military-industrial restructuring Russian the the of supervising projects, research defence of management functions and operational main strategy the Its defining 2006. are in (MIC) Commission Industrial riain f qimn, euig h am i quantitative in army the reducing equipment, of ernisation mod includes 2008-2009 during conducted he that forces armed the of reform The Army. Russian the as structure inertia-tending and vast a such of reform the implement to ed upon Serdyukov’s managerial skills, which would allow him Country www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=766827 www.rian.ru/spravka/20100215/209344182.html Sources:RIANovostiInformationAgency;‘Kommersant–Vlast’magazine 3 2 1 ** Civil * South Osetia Abkhazia basestobebuiltonthebasisofsignedagreements Military Ukraine Tajikistan Syria Moldavia Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan Belarus Armenia Azerbaijan It has no official status as a military base. Ithasnoofficialstatusasamilitary Estimateddata. Mostcontractsareautomaticallyextendedfor5/10yearsunlessanobjectionarises. The most significant step in the reform was made in Febru Military- the - unit defence new a established also Putin Military Baikonur Gulshad Vileika Gantsevichi Erevan, Erebuni,Gyumri Gabala Djava, Tshinval Gudaut, Ochamchir Crimea Nurek Base, Dushanbe,Kulyab,Kurgan-Tyube Tartus Transdniestria Karakol Kara-Balta Kant Kostanai Oblasts Atyrauskaya andZapadno-Kazakhstanskaya Oblasts ya, Zapadno-KazakhstanskayaandZhambylskaya Aktyubinskaya, Karagandinskaya,Kzyl-Ordinska Karaganda Location - - - - Air Forces airport Transport air force base at Kostanai Flight testcenters Multipurpose firingranges Aviation commandcenter Cosmodrome Radar station Communications center Radar station andairbase Military Radar station Military base Military and navalbase Military Naval base Ground-based space-monitoringcomplex base Military for navy Material and technical support station base Military Test BaseforAnti-SubmarineWeapons Communications center Type Facility ofMilitary operational inefficiency in Georgia in 2008. By demonstrat By 2008. in Georgia in inefficiency operational its proved had Army Russian the that after statement a 2008, made he in team Serdyukov’s by demolished easily was argument latter The 2009). (Zygar’, security of national tions founda the damages reform the undertaken that saying Serdyukov, strategy by general the with disagree officers ing officers to 150,000 (Gol’tz, 2010). Second, many high-rank 355,000 from 2/3, about of reduction the for estimate an gives Makarov, Nikolai Staff, General of Head The officers. of number the in cutback large-scale swift, the of because all of first opposition, concealed though strong meeting is reform The discipline). military and conditions, social and sanitary their (accommodation, soldiers, conditions living of and training preparation, employment of terms the recruitment, of improving and system contract the of extension terms, 3 RUSSIAN MILITARY FACILITIES ABROAD FACILITIESMILITARY RUSSIAN 13,000* y16,000** Number ofTroops 3,000 2,000 4,000 1,700 1,700 7,000 1,000 500 400 350 900 50 50 ------2 Produced by:CIDOB Contract valid till 2058 2058 2042 2043 2014 2013 2013 2067 2016 2016 2016 2016 2050 2016 2020 2020 2020 2012 1 - - - - - ing poor coordination and the undesirable results of Russia’s At the Munich Security Conference 2009, the Deputy actions in Georgia, Serdyukov overcame resistance to the Prime Minister, Sergey Ivanov, urged universalisation of the reform. In order to proceed with its implementation, Ser- basic international agreements such as the Treaty on the dyukov had to carry out numerous personnel replacements. Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Com- He also admitted that corruption in Russian Army had taken prehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CNDN). He also spoke on intolerable dimensions and that fighting it is one of the of the necessity of working out a new treaty to substitute top priorities of the reform. Due to the opposition and to the START I Treaty which expired on 5 December, 2009. the scale of the planned changes, the reform has dragged During their July 2009 summit, the US President Barack out into an interminable process where intentions are often Obama and the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev issued a declared and not always implemented afterwards. joint statement outlining the basic content of a new strategic Modernisation of Russia’s armed forces heavily depends on arms reduction agreement. Since then, experts from both a military-industrial complex (MIC) which is still in the proc- sides have been working on the text of the agreement. The ess of recovery and restructuring. De facto, Russia is a major main stumbling block was legally-binding interdependence be- producer of defence equipment of all kinds and possesses criti- tween strategic nuclear reductions and missile defence. At cal defence technologies in the aviation, submarine, nuclear, the negotiations, the Russian delegation has insisted that the space and shipbuilding sectors, but its MIC is still suffering decisions on deploying offensive and defence weapons should from the Soviet legacy of human failings and structural prob- be interrelated. Russia also took a stand on the prohibition of lems. In spite of mass exportation of military land equipment, strategic nuclear deployments outside of national territories. the equipment available within Russia is not replaced at the The Americans did not want to include any binding state- same rate, and modernisation of existing supplies is progress- ments on missile defence systems. Other issues that split Defence policy the Russian Federation of ing slowly. The MIC is facing great financial, technical and hu- the parties were sharing missile data known as telemetry, man limitations as well as lack of qualified personnel. These methods of arms reduction and the verification regime. By problems have a negative impact on external cooperation in the the beginning of 2010, the terms of the new treaty were sphere of the arms trade, as illustrated by incidents with India still subject to negotiations between the United States and over the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier and with Algeria Russia. The parties were planning to finish the work and sign over MiG-29 aircraft, when Russia was not able to meet the START II before the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, demands of its customers due to a lack of qualified staff and D.C. in April 2010. outdated machinery and technological procedures. As for the issue of the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, Russia’s position on non-proliferation is declaredly NUCLEAR WEAPONS tough, but much more moderate than, for example, that of Despite numerous self-imposed restrictions and cutbacks the United States. Russia calls for settlement on the nuclear within the framework of different treaties on nuclear weap- issue of North Korea by means of political and diplomatic meth- ons control between the Soviet Union / Russia and the Unit- ods, stressing the role of the Six-party talks with Pyongyang. ed States, Russia still has an impressive nuclear arsenal. Al- Influence exerted on Iran should be also exclusively peaceful though the nuclear arms complex always has been of higher by nature, in Russia’s view. Russia (together with China) has priority than conventional forces, a great part of it is still in kept blocking UN resolutions imposing sanctions on Teheran in need of modernisation. the UN Security Council. According to Russia’s official position, In 2008, with the growing tensions between Russia, on “sanctions should not be regarded as a cure-all. Resort to this the one hand, and the United States and its European allies, instrument has to be carefully weighed and be proportional to on the other, some Russian military officials started placing the level of Iran‘s cooperation. If sanctions are to be used at all, greater emphasis on the importance of nuclear weapons. they have to be aimed exclusively at resolving non-proliferation Despite some harsh statements made by a number of gener- matters” (Ivanov, 2010). Nevertheless, during his speech at als (Demonstratsiya reshimosti…, 2008), the new Military the 64th UN General Assembly in September 2009, President Doctrine does not include provisions for a preventive or pre- Medvedev pledged that Russia would join UN sanctions against emptive nuclear strike. Use of nuclear weapons would only Iran if Teheran failed to prove the peaceful nature of its nuclear be permissible in a counter-strike against a nuclear attack on programme. As for the North Korean nuclear programme, on Russia. Russia also reserves the right to use nuclear weap- 30 March, 2010 Russia made the decision to join UN sanc- ons to counter-strike in an attack using conventional means tions against this country. of destruction (in large-scale war, regional war) but only if the existence of the state is jeopardised. Along with this Doctrine RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY the Russian President signed a document on nuclear deter- UNTIL 2020 rence policy until 2020, which is not available to the public. The National Security Strategy until 2020 is a document ar- Current reforms in the Russian Army demonstrate that the ticulating Russia’s strategic priorities in defence policy in the Russian government considers that it is not sufficient to rely medium-term prospect. It was issued by the Security Council on nuclear deterrence alone, and that it views nuclear weap- on May, 12, 2009. ons as coming under the heading of “non-use” except in the The definition of security given in the Strategy is rather extreme case of last resort. broad, which is obvious from the titles of chapters: “National

239 240 CIDOB International Yearbook 2010 Russian Federation, Country Profile striving to secure exclusive control over the Arctic’s natural natural Arctic’s the over control exclusive secure to striving is Russia Strategy. Security National 2009 May its in several times mentioned is which region, Arctic the in policy and especially vulnerabletothiskindofthreat. consideredis Russia resources, natural vast possessing try Arctic, in the Caspian Basin and in Central Asia”. As a coun East, on the shelf of the Barents Sea of and theother parts on controlling the sources of energy resources in the concentratedMiddle be will long-term the of in attention politics international “The threats: these of one be to considered are energy over conflicts Future decades. next in arise to the region. in arising threats with dealing for instrument main the be to considered is Organisation Treaty Security Collective the region, CIS the in policy Russia’s for As security. collective decisionswhichdisregardinternationallaw.trary any expansion of NATO to the Russian borders or NATO’s arbi tolerate not will Russia that states Strategy the Furthermore, Europe. in system defence anti-missile its of elements cating lo of intention States’ United the by undermined are stability regional and global maintaining of possibilities the that claims terrorist strategies and regional conflicts. At the same time, it disarmament and arms control, nuclear non-proliferation, anti the proliferationofweaponsmassdestruction. systems are likely to lead to a new cycle of the arms race and defence of missile global of militarisation installation unilateral the and the space that states Strategy the proliferation, arms of issue the on Expanding in weapons’. nuclear especially strategic superiority achieving at aims which states ing national security. to threats major Russian being as between acknowledged also are imbalances regions economic materials and raw upon exportation, dependence heavy situation, graphic demo problematic the gap, income growing a rate, ment unemploy high a as factors Such radicalism. religious and extremism, xenophobia, separatism, nationalism, including national security are deemed to be of domestic origin, these out “cooperationwiththeinstitutionsofcivilsociety”. ment states that building national security is impossible with ecology.technology,and docu of education The healthcare, spheres the cover policy security national of goals Strategic Measures”. Informational and Regulatory “Organisational, gy”, “Strategic Stability and Partnership on Equal Terms” and “Ecolo “Culture”, “Healthcare”, Education”, and Technology “Research, Growth”, “Economic Standards”, Living “Improve of ment Protection”, Civil and Security “State Defence”, the geopoliticalcompetition overnaturalresources. in instrument ultimate the as force military on reliance cow’s Mos reflects This Arctic. the in activity aviation strategic and Fleet Northern its intensifying region, the military in presence its increasing is global Russia a resources”. of for terms in “struggle future the see to tending resources, Accordingly, Russia continues to give priority to its interests likely are that threats predict to attempts Strategy The binding of system new a build to seeks Russia Europe, In The Strategy envisions cooperation with the United States in As for external threats, first of all is ‘the policy of some lead to threats most that document the from apparent is It ------zlev.ru/45_63.ht 20-8-2004. Lion], Lev[Golden Zolotoy form]. re the after Forces Armed Russian the of strength merical реформирования после сил вооруженных nisprofs/russia/govt/ministry.ht russian_army-0 english.pravda.ru/russia/history/07-05-2007/91060- http:// 07.05.2007 Pravda. ever”, redeployment military http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=54897 21-2-2005. Vlast, Kommersant Army]. Russian Whole [The 21-5-2007. aspx?DocsID=76682 Kommersant Abroad]. Bases Military Vlast, Russian the [All ” sant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=85613 25-2-2008 Vlast Kommersant Navy]. http://www.voltairenet.org/article163919.htm February,6 VoltaireInternational, Conference”, Network rity tail/15958 New 22 Times, February. red.htm 2008. uary ria/376281.htm 2009, April 16 themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/kadyrovs-new-ichke Times, Moscow The ria”, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=101459 [The Whole Russian Aviation]. Kommersant Vlast, 25-8-2008. AAI A “ A. BABAKIN Bibliographical references Initiative Threat Nuclear The 2. biggest with started Forces Armed Russian of “History 1. Notes LUKIN, Mikhail; SAVVIN, Vladimir.SAVVIN,“ Mikhail; LUKIN, LUKIN, Mikhail; STUKALIN, Alexandr. “ “ Mikhail. LUKIN, “ Mikhail. LUKIN, Secu Munich 46th IVANOV,the at “Speech 2010, Sergei, The srazheniye”, “General’skoye Alexander,GOL’TZ,2010, Global Security “Demonstratsiya reshimosti”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 Jan Ministry ofDefense oftheRussianFederation Ministry Ichke New “Kadyrov’s 2009, Sergei, MARKEDONOV, l / http://www.ng.ru/editorial/2008-01-21/2_ http://www.globalsecurity.org m l рмры сса и тутр Российских структура и состав примерный Весь РоссийскийВесь флот с Рсиси вене аы зарубежом базы военные Российские Все 7 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc. http://newtimes.ru/articles/de m 2 http://www.nti.org/db/ Вся Российская авиация Российская Вся http://www.kommer ” [The Whole Russian Russian Whole [The ” Вся Вся Российская армия [prxmt nu [Approximate ” www.mil.ru http://www. http://www. / l 8 / 2 ” ” ------

“Na voenno-politicheskih konsultatsiyah v gorode Urumchi”, The Russian Federation Ministry of Defence website, 9 Au- gust 2007. http://www.mil.ru/info/1069/details/index. shtml?id=28193

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