Defence policy of the Russian Federation Russia’s emergence as a sovereign state in 1991 led to claimed independence in 2008, Russia refused to recognise turmoil within and the disintegration of Soviet military struc- it, fearing that this case could become a precedent for all tures. Due to mass reduction of personnel, army organisation separatist-tending territories. fell into disarray, the industrial process was disrupted for lack The next escalation of tensions occurred in 2004 with of raw materials or components formerly supplied by other NATO expansion towards south-east Europe. As early as republics and regions, while logistic routes became unviable. 2000, in the previous Military Doctrine, NATO enlargement The political and economic crisis of the transitional period be- was assessed as representing a serious threat to Russia’s tween 1992 and 1999 and the disastrous war in Chechnya security. The question of NATO membership for Ukraine and brought about a far-reaching crisis in the armed forces and Georgia constitutes a red line for Russia. Having very lit- the military-industrial complex. It was not until the end of the tle influence on the current Ukrainian and Georgian political 1990s that the situation began to stabilise. During the decade establishment, Russia opts for harsh arguments when dis- of 1999-2009 the industrial and technological sectors under- cussing their potential membership in NATO: State officials went a large-scale restructuring process which was clearly claim that Ukrainian and Georgian aspirations to join NATO necessary for restoring Russia’s defence capability. could be a perfect justification for the secession of Crimea from Ukraine and the permanent separation from Georgia of THE RELATIONS WITH NATO the breakaway autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South In the latest Military Doctrine of 2010, NATO’s current pol- Ossetia. icy is characterised as a potential danger to Russia’s secu- On the operational level, however, Russian officials do rec- rity: “The intention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ognise the importance of military cooperation with NATO. to use its power-based potential for performing global func- Russia and NATO have established a working relationship in tions without due respect for international law, its intention the area of theatre missile defence, this being based on ex- to bring the military infrastructure of NATO member-states changes of information and joint exercises. Despite evident to the borders of Russia, including the enlargement of the opposition to NATO enlargement, at the Bucharest summit bloc” represent a danger (though not a threat which, in the of 2008, Putin accepted that should NATO be consistent in Doctrine’s terminology, is far more crucial than danger) to its intention to develop an in-depth strategic partnership with national security. Russia, the latter would eventually cease to react so nega- Russia’s current conflict with NATO originates from the tively to Alliance activity in neighbouring countries. Agree- time of the fall of the Berlin wall. In opposing NATO territo- ments were also achieved to ensure access to Afghanistan rial expansion, Russia refers to the alleged promise given to across Russian airspace and territory for the deployment of Mikhail Gorbachev by NATO officials not to expand into the the forces and equipment of the International Security As- territories which are crucial for the country’s security. In sistance Force (ISAF). Another positive factor is Medvedev’s return, Russia pledged to remove its troops from Eastern initiative of common Euro-Atlantic security to be based, in his Europe and the Baltic states. Russia honoured its obliga- judgment, on a trilateral US-EU-Russia partnership. tions, but the NATO countries failed to keep their word. Nev- By the end of 2009 positive trends in NATO-Russia rela- ertheless, in 1997 Russia and NATO signed the Founding tions began to emerge. The NATO Secretary General, An- Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between ders Fogh Rasmussen, declared that NATO gives priority to NATO and the Russian Federation. This agreement estab- restoration of close partnership with Russia. In his speech lished the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as a in the Carnegie Center in Brussels in September 2009, Ras- forum for political dialogue and cooperation. In 1999, when mussen stated it is necessary to work out a project of a NATO started its military operation in Kosovo, sidelining Rus- common NATO-USA-Russia missile defence system; stated sia from decisions concerning Yugoslavia, relations between that Georgia and Ukraine do not meet criteria of the alliance Russia and NATO entered into a period of deep crisis and membership; declared that NATO is willing to cooperate with mutual distrust. NATO’s decision on bombing Belgrade was Russia on the exploration of the Arctic; pledged to consider perceived as a potential threat to Russia’s territorial integ- Russia’s interests in the alliance’s security policy; and said he rity as it is not difficult to draw parallels between Kosovo would take into consideration Medvedev’s proposal on new secession and the situation in Chechnya. After Kosovo pro- European security architecture (NATO—Russia…, 2009). 233 THE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED able to NATO as a partner in security projects. Yet differenc- STATES es in approach to energy security and to conflict resolution Defence cooperation between the United States and Rus- in Georgia and Moldova hampered further development of sia lies in the sphere of nuclear arms limitation and reduc- EU-Russia relations throughout the last decade. Occasionally tion. One of the most important treaties in this area is SORT joint military exercises of Russian, French, British, German (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty) signed in 2002, and American troops take place and some EU countries buy while in 2006, the Russian Federation and the United States Russian equipment. launched a Global Initiative to Combat Acts of Nuclear Ter- The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) was rorism. The number of states participating in the Initiative signed in Paris in 1990 and supplemented in 1992 within had reached 75 in 2009. With regard to global ballistic the framework of the OSCE. These documents set ceilings on missile defence, the United States and Russia hold regular the equipment and armed forces the signatory states might negotiations seeking a compromise position. have and deploy on their territory. They include measures to Nonetheless, the United States has been quite dissatisfied enhance mutual trust and exchange of information as well with the fact that Russia has developed a complex network as provisions for inspections. In 1999, the CFE Treaty was of partnerships and relations of cooperation with countries complemented with an “Agreement on Adaptation” (includ- interested in having access to Russian military equipment. ing the so-called Istanbul Commitments) which reflected This network includes some states that are denied such such changes as the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and Russian Federation, Country Profile Country Russian Federation, cooperation by the United States and Europe (for example, the increased number of NATO members. However, the new Iran, Syria and Venezuela) which, in the opinion of the United treaty was ratified only by Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Ka- States, does not contribute to global and regional security. zakhstan. Other parties refused to ratify it until Russia com- More serious points of discord arose in 2006 when the plied with the terms of the Istanbul Commitments concerning United States began bilateral negotiations with Poland and the the withdrawal of Russia’s remaining armed forces and mili- Czech Republic on deploying elements of the American global tary equipment from the territories of Georgia and Moldova. missile defence system on the territories of these countries. Russia insisted that these issues should not block ratification Russian officials claimed that this defence system would be of the CFE Treaty but gradually pledged to withdraw all its useless in case of missile attack by Iran and that, in fact, the military bases from both countries. In 2007, the situation true intention of the United States is deterrence of Russia and changed drastically. The United States announced its plans interference in its sphere of interests. In an attempt to pre- to install elements of the American global missile defence vent these deployments and prove their inconsistency, Russia system in Poland and the Czech Republic. In addition, NATO suggested several initiatives as possible alternatives to the US started speaking of the prospect of enlargement by giving missile defence system. These included providing the United membership to Georgia and Ukraine. Having considered that States with access to data on Iranian missile developments these actions jeopardised the security of Russia, President from the Russian-leased Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan, Putin issued a decree bringing into effect a moratorium on use of an almost-constructed radar installation in the southern Russian compliance with the CFE Treaty. However, Russia part of Russia, involving other European governments in anti- continues to propose reopening negotiations on this Treaty. missile defence construction through creating new European As the Deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Ivanov, put it during security architecture, and establishing joint warning data cen- Munich Security Conference of 2009, “…The long-lasting re- tres in Moscow and Brussels. When these initiatives failed luctance of NATO to bring the 1990 Treaty on Conventional to receive a positive response from the Bush administration, Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in line with the new realities Russia announced its intention to deploy intermediate-range and expansion of the Alliance - despite certain countries’ se- and tactical nuclear weapons along the borders with Ukraine, curity interests, has forced Russia to suspend the Treaty. At Belarus or in Kaliningrad. Russian officials also started rais- the same time, Russia has proposed a distinct programme ing the question of renewing the strategic weapons arsenal.