Russia's Armed Forces on Modernisation Course. Progress

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Co m ments

Russia’s Armed Forces on Modernisation Course WP S Progress and Perspectives of Military Reform Margarete Klein and Kristian Pester

In 2008 Russia’s Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov launched a mammoth project of comprehensive military reforms, whose objectives his successor Sergei Shoigu has also upheld since his November 2012 appointment. Despite deficits in recruitment, equipment and funding, Moscow’s armed forces have already accomplished the organisational transition from mass mobilisation army to modern combat force. Although the reforms will not fundamentally change the balance of power with the United States, increased military muscle-flexing vis-à-vis Europe must be expected. Above all, however, the reforms expand Moscow’s ability to project power in the post-Soviet space and mili- tarily reinforce Putin’s efforts to tie that region more closely to Russia.

In October 2008, immediately after the third, and with the arms industry, towards Russia-Georgia War exposed serious deficits which the reformers adopted a tougher in the Russian armed forces, Moscow ini- stance. Serdyukov’s dismissal on 6 Novem- tiated the most sweeping military reforms ber 2012 is therefore likely to have had for decades. The Russian leadership was deeper reasons than the officially cited seeking nothing less than massive mod- corruption investigations against Oboron- ernisation of an army that was still to a servis, a commercial enterprise under the large extent orientated on the concept of Defence Ministry. mass mobilisation. For conventional forces As his successor, Vladimir Putin ap- in particular this involves deep changes in pointed the former Minister for Emergency organisation and concept as well as weap- Situations and governor of the Moscow onry and personnel. region, Sergei Shoigu, a popular politician Until November 2012, Defence Minister and capable manager. Now that Shoigu has Anatoly Serdyukov and Chief of the General been in office for a little more than a year, Staff Nikolai Makarov vigorously imple- the question arises whether he has altered mented central elements of the reforms. the reform agenda and if so how. Where This caused conflicts, including with the can successes and failures be identified in officer corps, which was reduced by one the implementation of the original targets?

Dr. Margarete Klein is a Senior Associate, Major GS Kristian Pester an Associate in SWP’s Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division SWP Comments 9 January 2014

And what are the repercussions of the mili- to be made, as central reforms ultimately tary reform project on Russia’s foreign and remained unfinished under Serdyukov. security policy?

Structural Reorganisation of the A New Style of Leadership Armed Forces The first clearly visible sign of change is Organisational change is one of the areas the leadership style in the defence ministry. where most progress has been made. It Shoigu’s predecessor Serdyukov only partly seals the fate of the mass mobilisation army succeeded in communicating the goals and designed for large-scale war with NATO and necessity of the reforms internally, espe- lays the foundations for creating modern cially to critics in the ranks of the military armed forces that can be deployed rapidly leadership. In contrast to his predecessors, and flexibly in local and regional conflicts. whose professional experience was based To this end all the “skeleton units” were on a career in the armed forces or intelli- disbanded by December 2009. In the event gence services, Serdyukov was in the first of mobilisation they would have required place an economist. As the former head of up to a year to attain full strength and the Russian tax service he stood outside the materiel readiness. The overall size of the military leadership networks. While this army shrank nominally from 1.13 million allowed him to push through the radical to 1 million men, and the planned num- organisational transformation even against ber of reservists from about 20 million to their resistance, the loss of military con- just 700,000. The cumbersome divisions fidence in the ministerial leadership im- intended for fighting on a long front line paired the implementation of the reform were also disbanded by December 2009, project. replaced instead by smaller more rapidly Sergei Shoigu recognised the associated deployable brigades that are to be in “per- problems and has been working to repair manent readiness” even in peacetime, mean- the damaged relationship, also making ing fully staffed, trained and equipped. And symbolic gestures underlining his respect finally, the military command structure for military culture. For example, he wears has been thoroughly overhauled. While the the uniform of an army general, reversed Russian army was still following a twenti- the dissolution of historic regiments and eth-century operational concept in Georgia reinstated critics dismissed by Serdyukov. in 2008, with army and air force operating In contrast to Serdyukov, Shoigu cam- largely uncoordinatedly, enabling joint paigns energetically within the army for operations is now a key goal of the reform- support for the reforms. He also draws ers. To this end four strategic commands more heavily on military expertise in his were set up by late 2010 (West, East, South, decision-making, as evidenced by the grow- Centre). Each controls all units of all armed ing number deputy ministers from military services stationed in its area as well as backgrounds. He also removed the civilian the other armed organs (Interior Ministry, officials from the tax service that his pre- Emergency Situations Ministry, border decessor had appointed to top ministerial troops), with the exception of the strategic posts, who were extremely unpopular in missile forces. large parts of the officer corps. Important organisational foundations But the rapprochement with the military for the “new face” of the Russian armed leadership is a tightrope walk for Shoigu. forces had thus already been established It remains to be seen whether he can pre- under Serdyukov. Shoigu is building on serve the autonomy he will need to impose that and also setting new priorities in- decisions that contradict military opinion. cluding expanding special capabilities. In There is certainly no shortage of decisions March 2013 it was announced that Russia

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would set up a “Special Operations Com- formance. Most succeeded is attaining mand”, and according to media reports the combat readiness within no more than founding of a “Cyber Command” is also fourteen days, completing marches across imminent. sometimes strategic distances and there- The Special Operations Command serves after mastering branch-specific tasks. Just to intervene as rapidly as possible in local five years ago such challenges would have conflicts and countering terrorism, drug overstretched most units’ personnel and trafficking and insurgency. It is a reflection materiel. of concern about the unstable situation in Weaknesses were identified above all in the Northern Caucasus and fears that the individual training of soldiers. The Chief of ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan could the General Staff complained in April 2013 lead to negative spillover effects in the that many drivers could not control their neighbouring Central Asian countries. The vehicles properly and that officers were in- role of the Cyber Command is to conduct capable of operating the new command “information warfare” in virtual space. and control system. Increases in malfunc- Alongside real capability expansion, the tions and failures in the air and ground founding of these two commands also has forces were partly due to equipment defi- symbolic character, as it creates a kind of cits, he said, but above all to operator error. organisational parity with the United States and China. Recruitment Problems This points to a fundamental problem of Testing Operational Readiness the Russian armed forces. In order to mod- The new structures and deployment con- ernise comprehensively, increased profes- cepts are indispensable, but only the first sionalisation would be the logical conse- step on the road to a modernisation. In a quence, if not indeed a transition to a pro- second step they must be tested and prac- fessional army. Serdyukov adopted that tised. This was one focus of military argumentation and decreed a target of activities in 2013. recruiting 499,000 kontraktniki (enlisted In addition to the scheduled exercises of soldiers) by 2017. Shoigu is adhering to that the summer and winter training cycle, the goal, and facing similar challenges to his Defence Ministry concentrated in partic- predecessor: ular on a series of unscheduled operations. Firstly, a career as soldier is not very These included the largest manoeuvre of attractive. On the one hand, this has socio- the post-Soviet era, involving about 160,000 economic causes. Although pay was more soldiers in the Eastern Military District than doubled in January 2012, bonuses from 13 to 20 July 2013. and immaterial benefits were abolished in The spring exercises concentrated above return. On the other, the reforms appear all on highly mobile crisis response units not to have fundamentally improved the with highly developed capabilities for fight- morale of the armed forces. This is not only ing unconventional adversaries such as because of the dissolution and reorganisa- insurgents and terrorists. The summer and tion of units, but also incisive changes in autumn manoeuvres, on the other hand, leadership structure. The officer corps was followed conventional scenarios. This reduced by one third to 220,000 and the applies for example to the Zapad (West) 140,000 warrant officers (praporščiki/mič- series of exercises in September 2013, in mani) completely abolished. But there is a which about 12,000 Russian and 10,000 lack of adequate replacement in the shape Belarussian soldiers took part. of career NCOs. As a result the internal In almost all manoeuvres the partici- cohesion and discipline of units suffers: the pating forces demonstrated improved per- absolute number of crimes committed has

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not fallen since 2008 even as the size of the eral budget. However, the service varies army has fallen, while the dedovshchina sys- regionally and individual wishes cannot tem of bullying and violence against young always be satisfied. conscripts continues nearly unabated. Other measures to improve the accep- Secondly, the army competes with other tance of military service concentrate on armed organs for new personnel, further traditional instruments of ideological in- complicating the planned recruitment of fluence. The Soviet-era state-subsidised 499,000 kontraktniki. Apart from the Defence Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Ministry, the Interior Ministry and Emer- Army, Aviation, and Fleet (DOSAAF) is to gency Situations Ministry also maintain intensify its para-military training efforts. large armed formations whose recruitment Fostering patriotism remains a cornerstone. needs are not insignificant. In the Interior Ministry alone 170,000 military posts are to be professionalised by 2015. Ambitious Armaments Programme Against this background, thirdly, demo- Alongside organisational and personnel graphic developments weigh heavily. The changes, improving equipment and weap- number of male eighteen-year-olds is set to onry is another core element of the military fall from 1.1 million (2007) to a forecast reforms. In 2008 only 10 percent of weap- 630,000 by 2017, of whom on average only ons systems satisfied modern standards; two thirds will be fit to serve. Under these that share is to increase to 70 percent by circumstances it will be difficult to both fill 2020. As well as replacing outdated aircraft, the depleted ranks of the kontraktniki and vehicles and naval vessels, this means above recruit 220,000 conscripts annually. For all procuring precision weapons and auto- years already more than 20 percent of all mated command systems. Only then can military posts have remained unfilled. the qualitative leap to network-centric oper- The political leadership has limited short- ations be accomplished. term options for improving this critical Whether this succeeds will depend deci- situation. One of these would be to dras- sively on the innovation and production tically increase the number of conscripts. capacity of the Russian defence industry. Given that domestic political calculus Although it has been able to achieve indi- precludes their period of service being vidual modernisation successes, such as the extended beyond twelve months, the only Iskander short-range ballistic missile, the remaining option is to expand the recruit- Armata modular platform for armoured ment pool. Complementing Serdyukov’s vehicles and the SU-35 fighter, the defence approach of reducing the grounds for industry complex still suffers from a lack exemptions, Shoigu increased national of innovation. Its staff and production facil- conscription quotas at the beginning of ities are outdated, while central planning 2013, even for North Caucasian ethnic relicts and corrupt structures do the rest. groups that are regarded as a security risk. For these reasons the arms industry still In parallel the Defence Ministry is seeking often fails to meet the needs of the armed to improve public attitudes towards mili- forces and/or delivers late. For example, the tary service. Serdyukov had already im- long-planned introduction of an automated proved conditions for the conscripts, who command and control system (ESU TZ) has are now permitted to use mobile phones repeatedly been postponed, and the sorry in the barracks and leave at weekends. Serd- story of this prestige project is no isolated yukov’s successor introduced additional case. Only 15 to 20 percent of all procure- qualification opportunities. Under a legal ment projects planned for the first half of amendment, from January 2014 conscripts 2013 were completed on time. will be able to complete an additional voca- Former Defence Minister Serdyukov took tional qualification funded out of the fed- a hard line in negotiations with the defence

SWP Comments 9 January 2014

industry, criticising poor quality and high and exercises. But the biggest cost driver prices, insisting on strict cost controls is procurement. Because the nuclear forces and abandoning preferential treatment of continue to enjoy priority for political domestic producers. Foreign firms are now (security) and symbolic reasons, the means increasingly included in procurement ten- for the urgently needed modernisation of ders, leading for example to helicopters conventional forces are constrained. It is being purchased from France and wheeled estimated that about 40 percent of state vehicles from Italy. The resulting conflicts arms spending goes on nuclear capabilities. between Defence Ministry and defence Secondly, it must be assumed that a large industry likely contributed to Serdyukov’s proportion of the budget is embezzled. fall. According to the Russian military prose- His successor Shoigu softened the con- cutor 20 percent of the defence budget frontative stance towards the military- vanishes that way each year. Thirdly, there industrial complex. This partly reflects is a fundamental tension between social altered political circumstances, where the and military spending. Although major defence industry occupies a central role in investments are needed in health and edu- Putin’s ambitions for economic modernisa- cation, their share of GDP will probably fall tion as a potential motor for other sectors. from 4.0 to 2.2 percent and 5.1 to 3.9 per- Domestic producers are therefore again cent respectively between 2013 and 2016. given preference in tendering. Putin also On the other hand the defence budget’s reshuffled government responsibilities, share will increase in the same period from putting the military-industrial commission 3.2 to an estimated 3.8 percent of GDP. In headed by the nationalist populist Dmitry view of stagnating economic growth and a Rogozin in charge of procurement pricing one-sided orientation and dependency on rather than the Defence Ministry. This does fluctuating energy revenues, this conflict nothing, however, to rectify the arms indus- of goals is likely to sharpen in future. These try’s structural deficits such as poor inno- difficulties are so grave as to put a question vation and ageing staff. mark over whether the ambitious military reforms can be adequately funded in the long term. Questions over Funding The success of the reform project depends not only on overcoming technological and Foreign and Security Policy demographic problems. Adequate and sus- Implications of Military Reforms tainable funding is just as necessary. The Russia’s armed forces are still heading on military budget is indeed being signifi- a modernisation course. At the organisa- cantly increased. By 2016 the budget item tional and conceptual level the transition “national defence” is to increase by 60 per- to an effective modern combat army has cent from 2,098 billion rubels (€47 billion) already been successfully accomplished. to 3,377 billion rubels (€75 billion). At the Nonetheless, problems still remain in same time Russia plans to spend 23,000 bil- recruitment, equipment and funding, as lion rubels (€515 billion) on military equip- well as open questions for example on ment by 2020. Yet even if the figures appear the future of conscription. impressive, it remains unclear whether These impact to differing degrees on these investments will be adequate. Moscow’s capability to rebuff security Firstly, it must be remembered that threats and project power. Russia is hardly the reforms consist of many parts that are going to close the technology gap with the closely interlinked and must therefore be United States in the medium term. Its tackled in concert. These include recruit- ability to intervene at the global scale also ment and adequate pay as well as training remains limited, lacking as it does a deploy-

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able carrier group and a global network privileged interests” to Russia through of military bases, and making only slow economic, political and military integra- progress on the development of long-range tion projects such as the Customs Union, conventional precision weapons. Moscow the Eurasian Union and the Collective will therefore continue to prioritise its Security Treaty Organisation. If Moscow strategic nuclear forces, which serve as a succeeds in positioning itself as the guar- symbol of parity with the United States antor of security in the post-Soviet space, and an instrument of deterrence not it could gain greater acceptance and legit- only against a nuclear first strike but also imacy for its regional hegemony projects. against large-scale conventional attack. And Russia’s growing military might could However, where the European NATO also indirectly restrict the scope of action states are concerned, the military reforms of NATO and European Union in the shared bring a slight growth in Russian power. neighbourhood. This is amplified by the persistent Euro- How should Germany and Europe re- pean trend of falling national defence spond to changes in the Russian armed spending and shrinking armed forces. In forces? First of all, there are important view of this, Russia might be tempted to aspects where it is still crucial simply to make greater use of its armed forces to obtain a better understanding of murky assert its interests and resort to demon- developments. Although the NATO-Russia strations of power, provocations and open Council has a working group where both threats. These include violations of Swedish sides regularly discuss individual issues and Finnish airspace, the announced sta- of military development, greater Russian tioning of Iskander short-range ballistic transparency is needed, especially on the missiles in Kaliningrad in the event of a “hard” aspects of the reform like arms mod- NATO missile defence complex being estab- ernisation and deployment of forces. But lished in Poland, or the Zapad exercise given Moscow’s tense relationship to NATO series that in 2009 simulated a nuclear and the European Union, including the strike on Poland and in 2013 concentrated crisis of conventional arms control, union repelling an attack by “Baltic terrorists”. lateral Russian concessions are unlikely Political considerations mean that the here. “strategic partner” China does not feature But because the Russian military reforms as a military threat in any official Russian are catching up many developments that document. Nonetheless it appears to be Western armies themselves completed in the becoming increasingly important for the past two decades, Moscow certainly does direction of military reforms, as indicated possess an interest in mutual exchange in by the fact that the Eastern Military District individual areas. This applies in the first has been equipped with enhanced modern place to “soft” issues such as training of weaponry and its capabilities for large-scale NCOs, establishing a military police or inter-state confrontation maintained. changes in the medical and supply systems. That said, the reformers are principally Germany and the European states should looking to the post-Soviet space. That is respond to this interest of the Russian where Moscow’s most critical security chal- military leadership in order in this way to lenges lie: ethnoterritorial and religious promote transparency and confidence- conflicts in the Caucasus (Karabakh, South building. Ossetia, Abkhazia) and Central Asia, as well Moreover, a Russia whose armed forces as Transnistria, and trans-national risks have been successfully modernised could such as drug smuggling and terrorism. It become an interesting cooperation part- is also in this region that the will to project ner for Western states. The stabilisation of power is strongest. In his third term Putin Afghanistan and its northern periphery strengthened efforts to tie the “zone of represents just one of the possible areas for

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initiating greater collaboration. Even if a peacemaking or peacekeeping operation involving both Russia and NATO is current- ly unthinkable, in the long run it makes sense to continue developing the conceptual and practical foundations for greater interoperability. This can build on shared KFOR experience in Kosovo and the ex- changes in the scope of the NATO-Russia Council. For NATO, however, expanding military cooperation is a tricky matter, especially where it could contribute to improving the capacities of the Russian armed forces.

Opinions concerning Moscow’s military © Stiftung Wissenschaft und reforms differ within NATO. Developments Politik, 2014 like increased Russian combat-readiness in All rights reserved connection with increased defence spend- These Comments reflect ing exacerbate traditional fears, especially solely the authors’ views. among new members, and cause demands SWP for a stronger NATO presence in these Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik regions to grow louder. The other alliance German Institute for members tend to feel less threatened. But International and Security Affairs Russia’s provocations and the enhanced capabilities of its armed forces are grounds Ludwigkirchplatz 34 enough to work more intensively in NATO 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 for a shared understanding of the conse- Fax +49 30 880 07-100 quences of its military reforms. www.swp-berlin.org [email protected]

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Translation by Meredith Dale

(English version of SWP-Aktuell 72/2013)

SWP Comments 9 January 2014