Russia's Armed Forces on Modernisation Course. Progress

Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ments German Institute for International and Security Affairs m Co Russia’s Armed Forces on Modernisation Course WP S Progress and Perspectives of Military Reform Margarete Klein and Kristian Pester In 2008 Russia’s Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov launched a mammoth project of comprehensive military reforms, whose objectives his successor Sergei Shoigu has also upheld since his November 2012 appointment. Despite deficits in recruitment, equipment and funding, Moscow’s armed forces have already accomplished the organisational transition from mass mobilisation army to modern combat force. Although the reforms will not fundamentally change the balance of power with the United States, increased military muscle-flexing vis-à-vis Europe must be expected. Above all, however, the reforms expand Moscow’s ability to project power in the post-Soviet space and mili- tarily reinforce Putin’s efforts to tie that region more closely to Russia. In October 2008, immediately after the third, and with the arms industry, towards Russia-Georgia War exposed serious deficits which the reformers adopted a tougher in the Russian armed forces, Moscow ini- stance. Serdyukov’s dismissal on 6 Novem- tiated the most sweeping military reforms ber 2012 is therefore likely to have had for decades. The Russian leadership was deeper reasons than the officially cited seeking nothing less than massive mod- corruption investigations against Oboron- ernisation of an army that was still to a servis, a commercial enterprise under the large extent orientated on the concept of Defence Ministry. mass mobilisation. For conventional forces As his successor, Vladimir Putin ap- in particular this involves deep changes in pointed the former Minister for Emergency organisation and concept as well as weap- Situations and governor of the Moscow onry and personnel. region, Sergei Shoigu, a popular politician Until November 2012, Defence Minister and capable manager. Now that Shoigu has Anatoly Serdyukov and Chief of the General been in office for a little more than a year, Staff Nikolai Makarov vigorously imple- the question arises whether he has altered mented central elements of the reforms. the reform agenda and if so how. Where This caused conflicts, including with the can successes and failures be identified in officer corps, which was reduced by one the implementation of the original targets? Dr. Margarete Klein is a Senior Associate, Major GS Kristian Pester an Associate in SWP’s Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division SWP Comments 9 January 2014 1 And what are the repercussions of the mili- to be made, as central reforms ultimately tary reform project on Russia’s foreign and remained unfinished under Serdyukov. security policy? Structural Reorganisation of the A New Style of Leadership Armed Forces The first clearly visible sign of change is Organisational change is one of the areas the leadership style in the defence ministry. where most progress has been made. It Shoigu’s predecessor Serdyukov only partly seals the fate of the mass mobilisation army succeeded in communicating the goals and designed for large-scale war with NATO and necessity of the reforms internally, espe- lays the foundations for creating modern cially to critics in the ranks of the military armed forces that can be deployed rapidly leadership. In contrast to his predecessors, and flexibly in local and regional conflicts. whose professional experience was based To this end all the “skeleton units” were on a career in the armed forces or intelli- disbanded by December 2009. In the event gence services, Serdyukov was in the first of mobilisation they would have required place an economist. As the former head of up to a year to attain full strength and the Russian tax service he stood outside the materiel readiness. The overall size of the military leadership networks. While this army shrank nominally from 1.13 million allowed him to push through the radical to 1 million men, and the planned num- organisational transformation even against ber of reservists from about 20 million to their resistance, the loss of military con- just 700,000. The cumbersome divisions fidence in the ministerial leadership im- intended for fighting on a long front line paired the implementation of the reform were also disbanded by December 2009, project. replaced instead by smaller more rapidly Sergei Shoigu recognised the associated deployable brigades that are to be in “per- problems and has been working to repair manent readiness” even in peacetime, mean- the damaged relationship, also making ing fully staffed, trained and equipped. And symbolic gestures underlining his respect finally, the military command structure for military culture. For example, he wears has been thoroughly overhauled. While the the uniform of an army general, reversed Russian army was still following a twenti- the dissolution of historic regiments and eth-century operational concept in Georgia reinstated critics dismissed by Serdyukov. in 2008, with army and air force operating In contrast to Serdyukov, Shoigu cam- largely uncoordinatedly, enabling joint paigns energetically within the army for operations is now a key goal of the reform- support for the reforms. He also draws ers. To this end four strategic commands more heavily on military expertise in his were set up by late 2010 (West, East, South, decision-making, as evidenced by the grow- Centre). Each controls all units of all armed ing number deputy ministers from military services stationed in its area as well as backgrounds. He also removed the civilian the other armed organs (Interior Ministry, officials from the tax service that his pre- Emergency Situations Ministry, border decessor had appointed to top ministerial troops), with the exception of the strategic posts, who were extremely unpopular in missile forces. large parts of the officer corps. Important organisational foundations But the rapprochement with the military for the “new face” of the Russian armed leadership is a tightrope walk for Shoigu. forces had thus already been established It remains to be seen whether he can pre- under Serdyukov. Shoigu is building on serve the autonomy he will need to impose that and also setting new priorities in- decisions that contradict military opinion. cluding expanding special capabilities. In There is certainly no shortage of decisions March 2013 it was announced that Russia SWP Comments 9 January 2014 2 would set up a “Special Operations Com- formance. Most succeeded is attaining mand”, and according to media reports the combat readiness within no more than founding of a “Cyber Command” is also fourteen days, completing marches across imminent. sometimes strategic distances and there- The Special Operations Command serves after mastering branch-specific tasks. Just to intervene as rapidly as possible in local five years ago such challenges would have conflicts and countering terrorism, drug overstretched most units’ personnel and trafficking and insurgency. It is a reflection materiel. of concern about the unstable situation in Weaknesses were identified above all in the Northern Caucasus and fears that the individual training of soldiers. The Chief of ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan could the General Staff complained in April 2013 lead to negative spillover effects in the that many drivers could not control their neighbouring Central Asian countries. The vehicles properly and that officers were in- role of the Cyber Command is to conduct capable of operating the new command “information warfare” in virtual space. and control system. Increases in malfunc- Alongside real capability expansion, the tions and failures in the air and ground founding of these two commands also has forces were partly due to equipment defi- symbolic character, as it creates a kind of cits, he said, but above all to operator error. organisational parity with the United States and China. Recruitment Problems This points to a fundamental problem of Testing Operational Readiness the Russian armed forces. In order to mod- The new structures and deployment con- ernise comprehensively, increased profes- cepts are indispensable, but only the first sionalisation would be the logical conse- step on the road to a modernisation. In a quence, if not indeed a transition to a pro- second step they must be tested and prac- fessional army. Serdyukov adopted that tised. This was one focus of military argumentation and decreed a target of activities in 2013. recruiting 499,000 kontraktniki (enlisted In addition to the scheduled exercises of soldiers) by 2017. Shoigu is adhering to that the summer and winter training cycle, the goal, and facing similar challenges to his Defence Ministry concentrated in partic- predecessor: ular on a series of unscheduled operations. Firstly, a career as soldier is not very These included the largest manoeuvre of attractive. On the one hand, this has socio- the post-Soviet era, involving about 160,000 economic causes. Although pay was more soldiers in the Eastern Military District than doubled in January 2012, bonuses from 13 to 20 July 2013. and immaterial benefits were abolished in The spring exercises concentrated above return. On the other, the reforms appear all on highly mobile crisis response units not to have fundamentally improved the with highly developed capabilities for fight- morale of the armed forces. This is not only ing unconventional adversaries such as because of the dissolution and reorganisa- insurgents and terrorists. The

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